ML13163A329

from Bhalchandra Vaidya to Samson Lee: G20120172

ML13163A329
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	06/08/2012
From:	Bhalchandra Vaidya Plant Licensing Branch 1
To:	Brice Bickett, Doerflein L, Samson Lee NRC/NRR/DRA, NRC Region 1, NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
References
2.206, FOIA/PA-2013-0010, G20120172, TAC ME8189
Download: ML13163A329 (14)

Text

Doerflein, Lawrence From: Vaidya, Bhalchandra Sent: Friday, June 08, 2012 8:46 AM To: Lee, Samson; Bickett, Brice; Doerflein, Lawrence: Jennerich. Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Ulses, Anthony; MorganButler, Kimyata; Fretz, Robert;1 (b)(7)(C) IEul, Ryan; Safford, Carrie; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, Timdhy;5 coTT, aTTlnerJe; Albert, Michelle; Cook, Cc: William; McCarver, Sammy; Russell, Andrea Banic, Merrilee; Wilson, George

Subject:

G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): Final PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendations after 2nd meeting (TAC ME8189)

Attachments: ME8189 (G20120172) PRB Notes (2nd Mtg) 5 31 12-for PRB Comments.docx Good Morning Folks, Attached for your comments/concurrence, is the file that shows the Final PRB Internal Meeting Notes on initial Recommendation after our PRB Meeting on May 29, 2012. The text in PURPLE shows, changes from the May 29, 2012, meeting.

After resolution of your comments and concurrence on this document, you will receive for your comments and concurrence, a draft e-mail on initial recommendations.

After resolving your comments and concurrence on the draft e-mail on initial recommendations, the final version of the e-mail will go to Sam Lee, PRB Chairman, to forward it to Bruce Boger, NRR.

After Bruce's approval, I will send the PRB's initial Recommendations, via the e-mail, to the Petitioners' POC.

Next after that: I expect that, just as with regards to PRB's Decision of Immediate Action, the Petitioners would request the details about the PRB Meeting discussions regarding the initial recommendation. Therefore, I will also, prepare and send a draft e-mail with the summary of PRB Meeting discussions regarding the initial recommendations to PRB for its comments/concurrence.

Please provide your comments and concurrence on the attached document by COB Friday, June 15, 2012.

Bhalchandra K. Vaidya Licensing Project Manager NRC/NRRIDORL/LPL1-1 (301)-415-3308 (0) bhalchandra.vaidya(,nrc.,qov 1

e-,l -31

10 CFR 2.206 PRB Closed Meeting Notes - 05129/12

SUBJECT:

GUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)

PETITIONER: Paul Gunter, et al DATE: March 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17o, 2012.

PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS Samson Lee (PRB Chair - Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)

Bhalchandra Vaidya (Petition Manager - NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)

Anthony Ulses (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)

Robert Dennig (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)

Robert Fretz (Senior Project Manager - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)

John Monninger (Associate Director - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)

Andrea Russell (Agency 2.206 Coordinator - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)

Kim MorganButler (Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)

Brice Bickett (Senior Project Manager - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

Mathew Jennerich (Project Engineer - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

Lawrence Doerflein (Branch Chief - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)

Carrie Safford (Deputy Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)

Ryan Eul (Enforcement Specialist - Office of Enforcement)

Catherine Scott (Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement -

Office of General Counsel)

Mauri Lemoncelli (Senior Attorney - Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)

SUMMARY

OF REQUEST:

On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al.,

submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations, Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).

The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.

The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to

mitigate the severe nuclear acciaents ai I-UKusnima uaiicni.

The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:

1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.

In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparentbeyond design and licensing basis vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.

To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:

" The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety." The Order further states, "While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents."

" The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary 2

containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."

• The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatrick.

" FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program." Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional identified "vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.

BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:

As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:

" The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.

" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.

• The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.

• The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.

• The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.

" The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.

" The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.

IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)

NO.

In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:

1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima 3

Daiichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities; and,

2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:

Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark II containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.

The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. In addition, the NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) following the events at Fukushima. The regional staff has communicated with NTTF regarding the Vent system configuration at FitzPatrick, including the differences from GL 89-16 recommendations (Larry Doerflein e-mail). The petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relating to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.

DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?

Criteria for Reviewing Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

1. The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an orderl modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.

YES.

2. The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.

YES.

3. There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.

4

YES.

Criteria for Rewectinq Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

1. The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns.

YES, in part.

2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.

YES, in part.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012.

The licensee's response to the Order will be publicly available. Subsequent NRC documentation regarding additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, would also be publicly available.

Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.

FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving its positions with regards to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system meets the design bases and the design intent. Further, the NTTF and The Commission Order have concluded that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public.

3. The request is to deny a license application or amendment. NO.

4. The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules. NO.

5

IS THERE A NEED FOR OE. 01. OIG, or OGC INVOLVEMENT:

The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):

Accept in part (see Table for explanation).

The next steps would be to:

" Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.

" Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.

• Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.

6

Table MThis table summarizes each issue for the following crteria),

Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation meet criteria for review under2.206

,,. process? , . . . . *. ... .....- --'--- '-----

FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended The NTTF and JLD inthe Commission Order have as the result of the undue risk to the public health and concluded that there isno immediate safety concern to safety presented by the operator's reliance on non- FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public, and conservative and wrona assumptions that went into the therefore, the request for immediate action should be analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existinq rejected. The Petitioners have not provided adequate ductwork containment vent system. The risks and basis for the their argument regarding the operator's uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and reliance on non-conservative and wrono assumotions decisions, inregard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as reliance on non-conservative and wrona assumDtions that went into the analysis of the capability of associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear FitzPatrick's ore-existina ductwork containment vent power plant now constitute an undue rsk to public health and safety.

The petitioner's concerns regarding this issue do not require immediate shutdown of FitzPatrck based on the conclusions reached by NTTF and the Commission Order regarding Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark IBWRs.

U.S.plants have implemented "beyond-design-basis" requirements such as ATWS, SBO, combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment, mitigation of major fires or explosions, and extensive damage mitigation guidelines, thereby reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. Asequence of events like those occurdnq inthe Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur at US GE Mark IBWRs.

I The NRC NTTF report on July 12, 2011, based on review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, made a recommendation to the Commission to include a/

reliable hardened vent system.

I 1

Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation meet criteria for review under2.206 The suspension of the operating license be ineffect No. This ismerely a statement to support the petition in pending final resolution of a public challenge to the general. This isnot an enforcement related action and is adequacy of the pre-existing vent line inlight of the outside the scope of the 2.206 process and therefore, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. this request should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 1 for reiectinq apetition under 10 CFR 2,206.

The joint petitioners do not seek or request that No. This ismerely a statement to support the petition in FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent general. This isnot an enforcement related action and is System (DTVS) Recommended by GL89-16, as itis outside the scope of the 2.206 process and therefore, demonstiated to have experienced multiple failures to this request should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 1 mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

Daiichi.

FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full hearing No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the rights on the continued operation of the Mark IBWR and subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that the adequacy and capability of apre-existing containment facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for vent which isnot a fully hardened vent line as which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16, As such, been resolved, and the resolution isapplicable to the the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make facility inquestion, The SE dated September 28, 1992 containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested. by recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2for reiectinQ a GE Mark Iinthe US; petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

FitzPatrick shall publicly document for independent Yes. The licensee's response to the Order will be publicly review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability available. Subsequent NRC documentation regarding and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, would also be vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable publicly available.

deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which \

recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and System and as outlined inthe NRC Safety Evaluation Recommendation 6, Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability ].

8

Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?

and reliability of the preexisting containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding: FiPatrcs response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember 1992, a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify including the staff review of the licensee's processes and not installing a fully hardened vent system and; procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving its positions with regards to GL-b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed inthe FitzPatrick 89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system meets pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise the design bases and the design intent. Further, the present increased risks and consequences NTTF and The Commission Order have concluded that associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas there isno immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to generated during asevere accident. the health and safety of the public.

The Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the inspection results inthe "Follow-up to the Fukushima subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric basis, for petitioners draw attention to what isdescribed at page 8 which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have of the inspection report as an "apparentbeyond design been resolved, and the resolution isapplicable to the and licensingbasis vulnerability"involving the FitzPatricý facility inquestion, pending re-validation of the operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended conclusions of NTTF and the Commission Order. The by NRC inGeneric Letter 89-16. Order on hardened containment vents (EA-12-050) has a timeline of December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2for

____ reiecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

TkMP 1f 4 kI l U FM I 1H"4J* k Ull i ! UJ ,IUL r tUt- ,' lJ lW I UO J IU VI ILIII O I lUýb. IIU I MIU*lbU IUZJUV IV It.) U UIUI l Will UU pLuuIIy that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current, available. Subsequent NRC documentation regarding procedures do not address hydrogen considerations additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, would also be during primary containment venting" which isfurther publicly available.

identified as a"current licensinq basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and finding that FitzPatrick's "existinq plant capabilities" as I

• I I Recommendation 6, 9

Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?

assumed by the Order are infact negated by the finding - "

that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also the plant to have a primary containment torus air space reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember 1992, hardened vent system as part of their Mark Icontainmen including the staff review of the licensee's processes and.

improvement program." procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, that 89-16, approving its positions with regards to GL-whileFitzPatrick's containment vent system meets the design bases and the design intent. Further, the NTTF and The Commission Order have concluded that there isno immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public.

The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the 2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does not subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that address, ina timely way, the unique condition of the facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric basis, for FitzPatrick nuclear power plant. which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution isapplicable to the facility inquestion. The SE dated September 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2for reiecting a i

oetition under 10 CFR 2.206.

The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant uniquely does not The petitioner raises issues that have already been the have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that Mark Icontainment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric basis, for capability isidentified with 'abeyond design and licensing which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have bases vulnerability, inthat FitzPatrick's current licensing been resolved, and the resolution isapplicable to the basis did not require the plant to have a primary facility inquestion. The SE dated September 28,1992 containment torus air space hardened vent system as shows that FitzPatdck met the BWROG criteria part of their Mark Icontainment improvement program." recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2for reiectinQal i

petition under 10 CFR 2.206. - . J 10

Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendaton meet criteria for review under2.206 ...

Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install No. FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "li n reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember 199ý,

basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now including the staff review of the licensee's processes and uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pendin procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation" closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for is stated, while approving its positions with regards to OL-adequacy and capability inthe event of a severe 89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system meets:

accident, the design bases and the design intent. Temporary Instruction 2515/183, "beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability [for beyond design basis accidents]"

was not a consideration during GL 89-16 inspections. It isnot mandatory on the Licensees to implement the Generic Letters.

The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution isapplicable to the facility inquestion. The SE dated September 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2for reiecting a

_petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

The additional identified "vulnerability" and the relatively Yes. The licensee's response to the Order will be publicly remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public \ available, Subsequent NRC documentation regarding health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the \ additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, would also be continued day-to-day operations where "current publicly available.

procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and I nearly five (5)more years. Recommendation 6.

11 1'ýý

Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendaton meet crfteria for review under2206 process? _._ _

- FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also"0 reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember 1t92, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation';

stated, while approving its positions with regards to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system meets t the design bases and the design intent. Further, the NTTF and The Commission Order have concluded that there isno immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public.

./

12

11

SUMMARY

(1) The petition and the supplements do not include any new or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.

(2) FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation had stated while approving its positions with regards to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System meets the design intent, It is not mandatory on the Licensees to implement Generic Letters.

(3) After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any generic communications, based on the industry operating experience, or the plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the Containment Vent System. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena. Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.