Text

Initial Exam 2011-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML112650108
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	09/21/2011
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
References
	Download: ML112650108 (145)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev_O4tlli)

Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

I Op Test No.:

Nil-I Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 75% power (MDL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

lB KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1NIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last

hour, however, level has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2

SMOO1D C-RD SG 1D PORV leak C(TS)-SRO 3

NCOO3D C-BOP PORV Leakage C(TS)-SRO 4

EP0O3C C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO IREOO9 C-BOP C-SRO 5

ISEOO1C M-RO Inadvertent SI Actuation M-BOP M-SRO 6

IPEOO1AIB NA Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i Draft (Rev_0441 11)

McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1 B KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1NIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last

hour, however, level has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/i/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate

Dilute, of OP/1/A161 50/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/i /A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

During the power increase, the I D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE.

Next, a B Train PORV (1NC-32B) will fail slightly open.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/1 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1 i, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB ii and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate.

The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually. The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-i.1, Safety Injection Termination.

Upon entry into EP/1/A15000/ES-i.1, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps.

The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft(Rev-_041141)

Critical Tasks:

E-OA Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear GenerationlATWS.

Safety Significance:

Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist.

This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

SS (4600!1131E13.6)

Terminate SI by closing Nl-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.

Safety Significance:

An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves.

PTIOIAI4600II 13, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation).

The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains >

500°F.

If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 DFaft(Rev_041441)

Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

Nil-I Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1 KFP-51 30, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Event Maif.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

LOA C-RO High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower CFOO7 C-SRO 2

ENBO13C C-BOP Power Range Failure C(TS)-SRO 3

KCO1OD C-BOP 1B2 KC Pump trip C(TS)-SRO 4

NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5

IREOO3A C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6

IPEOO1AIB M-RO Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve on I B fails Open IPEOO2AIB M-BOP DEHOO1 M SRO SMOO4B 7

CAOO5 NA TD CA Overspeed Trip 8

CAOO4AJB NA lA/i B MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft(Rev_O4H11)

McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (AE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (ICF-75) will inadvertently open. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high.

The operator will enter AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Next, the 1 B2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

Subsequently, the lB DG will be declared inoperable.

The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.

Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the 1 B Steam Generator will lift and fail Open.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EP/1/A15000/FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

During the performance of FR-Si, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor.

On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the lA/lB MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically.

The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps.

After completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/i/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. After the lB Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/i/A15000/ES-i.1, SI Termination.

The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-li.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev_041111-)

Critical Tasks:

FR-S.1 C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken.

Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits.

A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

E-0 F Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1, unless the transition is made to EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators.

Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft(Rev 041111)

V Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

Nil-I Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

Unit I

is at 1x10 8 amps in accordance with OPI1IA/61001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift.

The CF&E Surnp level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A KR Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1CAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator IAD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA N-BOP Pump CF&E Sump N-SRO 2

NA R-RO Raise power to 2-3%

N-SRO 3

ENBOO7A C-RO Intermediate Range Channel failure C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 4

KCOO5A C-BOP KC System leak C(TS)-SRO 5

IREOO6H8 C-RO Sequentially Dropped Control Rods IREOO6D4 C-SRO 6

ANN M-RO Seismic Event/Steam Line Break AD1 3E07 SMOO8A M-SRO 7

EPOO1 NA Loss of Offsite Power (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Rev04It11)

McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #3 Unit 1 is at lx10 amps in accordance with 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift. The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: IA KR Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1CAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1,

failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Upon shift turnover, before the operator initiates the power increase, the operator will pump the Containment Floor and Equipment (CF&E) Sump in accordance with Section 3.3 of Enclosure 4.2, Containment Floor and Equipment Sump and Incore Instrument Room Sump Operation, of OP/1/A/6500/001, Liquid Waste System.

Following this, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail. The operator will enter APII/A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.

Subsequently, a leak will develop in the KC System.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.

Next, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. 30 seconds later a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor.

The crew will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The operator will transition to EP/1 /A/5000/ES-0. 1, Reactor Trip Response.

Shortly after entry into EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, the O.B.E. Exceeded annunciator will alarm, indicating that an earthquake has occurred. Within seconds a large Steam Rupture will occur outside Containment on the A Steam Generator. The operator will actuate Safety Injection, and return to EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur.

Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and load onto the Emergency Busses, and all SI loads will sequence on as designed.

Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition to either EP/1/A15000/E-1,

Response

to Loss of Primary or Secondary

Coolant, or EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, SI Termination.

The scenario will terminate this transition is made.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Draft (Re41111)

Critical Tasks:

ss Trip the reactor within 30 seconds of the second dropped rod (460011131E13.19)

Safety Significance:

Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant from challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry.

PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.

E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur.

Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

NOTE:

This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitor/control Steam Generator level, Steam Dumps, Tavg, Tcold and the operating CF Pump during this scenario.

This is based on Step 3t2 of Enclosure 4.8 of OPIIIAI6IOO/003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup.

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I-I

REFERENCES:

I.

0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 168) 2.

0P111A161501009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 110) 3.

0P111A163001001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 9) 4.

APIIIAI5500IO1, Steam Leak. (Rev 17) 5.

Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs).

6.

API1IAI5500I11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. (Rev 11) 7.

Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV5).

8.

Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

9.

AP111A15500103, Load Rejection. (Rev 25)

10. AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14)

11. EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31)

12. EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (Rev 23)

Author:

David Lazarony, W stern Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. 041111 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

I Op Test No.:

Nil-I Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days. The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

lB KG Pump is 005 for motor replacement. INIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour,

however, level has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Event Maif.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2

SMOO1D C-RO SG 1D PORV leak C(TS)-SRO 3

NCOO3D C-BOP PORV Leakage C(TS)-SRO 4

EPOO3C C-RO Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO IREOO9 C-BOP C-SRO 5

ISEOO1C M-RO Inadvertent SI Actuation M-BOP M-SRO 6

IPEOO1AJB NA Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenar[o I McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days.

The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: lB KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement. 1NIP-5070, ACCUM TK lB PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator lAD 2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, level has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

During the power increase, the I D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat.

The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A15500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE.

Next, a B Train PORV (1NC-32B) will fail slightly open. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV5), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A15500/03, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in auto, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate.

The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually.

The operator will enter EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EP/1 /ASOOO/ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.

Upon entry into EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps.

The scenario will terminate in EP/l/A15000/ES-1.1 at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.

Scenario Event Description NRC SóénriO 1 Critical Tasks:

E-OA Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear GenerationlATWS.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist.

This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

SS (46001113113.6)

Terminate SI by closing Nl-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.

Safety Significance:

An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase.

Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves.

PTIOIAI4600I1 13, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500°F.

If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Sceriari 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On Q

Reset to Temp I/C T

0 Malfunctions:

158.

LOA KGOO6, KG Pump lB CS = Remote Value (IC-37, adjusted LD to 75 (PTL) gpm, added 60 of dilution XMT-CLA-Oll = o water.)

IPEO0IA, Failure of Auto Rx Trip Train A IPEO0I B, Failure of Auto Rx Trip Train B Q

RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:

I NIP-5070 (0-stick)

Reset all SLIMs MCB Annunciator IAD-9, E-2 (0-stick)

MCB Annunciator IAD-2, D-5 (0-stick)

Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Setup OAC Freeze.

Q Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NEOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description NRC SchfiO I Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing 1.

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements 2.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3.

Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/l/A/6100/003, marked up as follows:

Step 2.3 Initialed.

Step 3.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.2 Initialed.

Step 3.3 Initialed.

Step 3.3.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.3.2 Checkbox Checked. Entry Step: 3.32 Step 3.3.3 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.3.4 Initialed.

Step 3.32.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.2 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.3 Initialed. Person Notified: Monty Champion!

Step 3.32.5 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.6.1 Initialed. Person Notified: Ben Smith?

Step 3.32.6.2 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.32.6.3 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.32.7 Initialed.

Step 3.32.7.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.7.2 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.7.3 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.7.4 Initialed.

Step 3.32.8 Initialed.

Step 3.32.8.1 Checkbox Checked.

Step 3.32.8.2 Initialed.

Step 3.32.10 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.32.11 NA/Initialed.

4.

Handout a copy of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 110), Enclosure 4.4; and OP?1/A16300/001A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 9) 5.

Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Event I Power Increase examiner At direction of Event 2 SG 1 D PORV Controller Failure examiner (MALF) SMOOID = 100 Ramp 10 seconds Trigger #1 Scenario Event Description RC Scenario ¶ ACTIVITY Event 3 (MALF) NCOO3D =5%

No Ramp Trigger #3 Event 4 (MALF) EPOO3C (MALF) IREOO9 = 0 (Fail in Auto ONLY)

No Ramp Trigger #7 Event 5 (MALE) ISEOOIC Trigger #9 Event 6 (MALE) IPEOOIA (T=O)

(MALE) IPEOOIB (T=0)

Bench Mark L:J At direction of examiner DESCRIPTION PORV Leakage At direction of examiner Trigger #5 (LOA-NC33 (Racked OutI300 seconds delayed).

Zone 1 B Lockout causing Runback/Rods Fail to move in AUTO

i At direction of examiner J

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Inadvertent SI Actuation D

At direction of examiner Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available NOTE: This malfunction must be removed prior to the operator reset of SI.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1, Power

Increase, of 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate

Dilute, of 0P111A16150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/11A16300/00l A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA 0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE ROI (Step 3.32.9) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, BOP OTDT DCS alarming as follows:

On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU.

Select TVAG, DELTA T INPUTS &

ALARM CHECKING graphic.

Select ON for the following:

NCAA 5422 NCAA 5462 NCAA55O2 Time Pos.

CRS RO Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3.32) Increase power to 95% RTP.

(Step 3.32.4) IF AT ANY TIME Power Mismatch% (Excore/Thermal Power Mismatch) indicates greater than 4% during power increase, perform the following:

Stop power increase.

Have IAE calibrate each Power Ranage NI Channel to +/-1% Power Mismatch (NIs vs BETP).

WHEN calibration complete, continue power increase.

Comments Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

1 Page 8

of 40 Event

Description:

Power Increase

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

1 Page 9

of 40 Event

Description:

Power Increase NCAA 5542 OTDELTAT-FAIL Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3.32.12) Continue power increase to NOTE: The power increase 95% RTP.

wifl be at 2 MWe/minute.

OPIIIA/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.).

BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero:

(R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1 NV-i 75A (BA Blender to VCT Outlet), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A(BA Blender to VCT Inlet).

Total Reactor Makeup Water:

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

1 Page 10 of 40 Event

Description:

Power Increase BOP (Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.

(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control).

(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on I NV-i 37A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control).

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.

desired flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT required to lower VCT level, perform the following:

lower VCT level.

BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 11 of 40 Event

Description:

Power Increase Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

(Step 3.17) Check 1 NV-i 75A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) open.

(Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water To Blender control) open or throttled as required.

(Step 3.19) IF 1 NV-i 71A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet) in AUTO (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

(Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter.

Comments NOTE: 1NV-i7iA is NOT in AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows:

(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump lB Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:

BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:

Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

1 Page 12 of 40 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior 1 NV-i 75A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) 1 NV-252A (RX M/U Water To Blender Control) 1NV-171A(BA Blender To VCT Inlet)

(Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A(BA Blender to VCT Inlet) in AUTO.

(Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)

(Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control adjusted per Step 3.11 (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (NC Filters OtIt 3-Way Control) in AUTO.

Comments NOTE: The Rx M.U Water Flow Control was NOT adjusted.

BOP (Step 3.32) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

BOP BOP BOP BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender....

(Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.

(Step 3.30) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter (Step 3.31) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 13 of 40 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos.

BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

Comments OPII 1A163001001 A, TU RBIN E-GENERATOR STARTU PISH UTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE 0P111A161001003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4A, POWER INCREASE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following:

(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.

(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

(Step 3.5.1.3) Depress LOAD RATE.

(Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load rate in VARIABLE DISPLAY.

(Step 3.5.1.5) Depress ENTER.

(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress REFERENCE.

(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.

(Step 3.5.1.8) Depress ENTER.

(Step 3.5.1.9) Depress GO (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

NOTE: the RO will select 2 MWe/Min loading rate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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1 Event#

1 Page 14 of 40 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO!

(Step 3.32.13) At greater than 85% steam BOP flow from each SIG, ensure the following valves in auto and open:

1CF1O4AB (IA SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass) 1CFIO5AB (lB SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass) 1CF1O6AB (10 SIG CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass) 1CF1O7AB (1D S/G CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass)

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

2 Page 15 of 40 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak During the power increase, the I D Steam Generator PORV will develop a leak through the seat.

The operator will respond in accordance with API1IAJ5500IO1, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #1 (SMOOID (100)

Indications Available:

1CF-26AB Red status light LIT, Green status light OFF.

Various OAC alarms (3 associated with open PORV)

NCS Tavg is lowering.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the 1 D SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

APIIIAI5500IOI, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS.

NOT in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

Excore Nis LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

NC Loop D/Ts LESS THAN 60°F D/T T-Avg AT T-REF.

NOTE: The CRS will likely direct the RO to take the Turbine to HOLD.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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1 Event#

2 Page 16 of 40 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Pos.

BOP BOP BOP CRS CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event GREATER THAN P-li (1955 PSIG).

(Step 6) Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.

(Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.

(Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

(Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging system.

Comments NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RD to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RD (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves CLOSED.

RD RD (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

(Step 13a) Check SM PORVs

CLOSED.

(Step 13a RNO) IF SIG pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close affected SIG SM PDRV manual loader.

IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform the following:

Close SM PORV isolation valve.

I IF SM PORV isolation valve still open NOTE: The 1D SG PORV is Open.

NOTE: Closing the Manual Loader will have no effect.

NOTE: The 1D SG PORV Isolation Valve will need to be closed.

NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve is closed.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

I Event#

2 Page 17 of 40 CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria:

the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

If needed, as Station management direct that the startup be continued.

Size of leak Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Time Pos.

BOP RO!

BOP CRS BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 1 3.c) Check containment conditions NORMAL:

Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

(Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump OFF.

(Step 13.e) Check valves on STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1MC-9)

CLOSED.

(Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2)

STEAM HEADER PRESSURE

GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

(Step 1 3.g) Dispatch operator to check for leaks.

(Step 14) Check UST level STABLE OR GOING UP.

Comments NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO for AS Header pressure.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 AS header pressure is> 200 psig.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch NEOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

2 Page 18 of 40 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve...

IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak...

Check unit shutdown or load reduction

REQUIRED.

Comments NOTE: Shutdown/Load Reduction will no longer be required CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.7, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.4.7 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: After evaluation, the ACTION TIME CRS will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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1 Event#

2 Page 19 of 40 Event

Description:

SG ID PORV leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 34.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

3 Page 20 of 40 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Next, a B Train PORV (1NC-32B) will fail slightly open.

The operator will enter APIIIAI5500II 1, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs), and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #3 (NCOO3D (5%))

Indications Available:

1NC-32B Red and Green Status lights LIT.

Pzr Relief Line FLOW RED Status light LIT.

MCB Annunciator IAD-6, F5, 1 NC 1,2 or 3 FLO Detected.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, A9, PZR SAFETY DISCHARGE HI TEMP.

Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure HAS GONE DOWN.

(Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

CLOSE PORVs.

Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the Pzr PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

AP/1115011, PRESSURIZER PRESSU RE ANOMALI ES BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP BOP IF PORV will not close, THEN CLOSE PORV isolation valve.

(Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

(Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: 1 NC-32B will display dual indication, even after closing the PORV.

Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 BOP CRS (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

(Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

3 Page 21 of 40 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage lime Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CLOSE associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, THEN CLOSE 1NC-271 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1NC-32B).

IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed...

IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed...

CRS IF Pzr PORV isolation valve is closed for failed Pzr PORV, THEN GO TO Step 5.

(Step 9 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired NOTE:

By this time, NC pressure...

System pressure should be recovering.

BOP BOP BOP (Step 7) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol)

CLOSED.

(Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters

ON:

1A lB 1D (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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3 Page 22 of 40 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER

IN AUTO.

(Step 11) Check INC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

(Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

Comments CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.411, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2 AND 3.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 23 of 40 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage CONDITION B. One or two PORVs inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled.

B. 1 AND B.2 REQUIRED ACTION Close associated block valves.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments COMPLETION Booth Instructor:

TIME After 5 minutes, as NEO 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months report that the breaker for the Block Valve has been Racked Out.

Remove power from associated block valves.

AND B.3 Restore one PORVto OPERABLE status if two PORV5 are inoperable.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

entered and exited during the transient.

Operate Trigger #5 (LOA NC33 (Racked Out/5 minutes delayed).

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Ni 1-i Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 24 of 40 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Subsequently, a Zone lB Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the lB Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%.

The operator will implement AP111A15500103, Load Rejection.

During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #7 (EPOO3, IREOO9)

Indications Available:

MOB Annunciator lAD-I, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms.

MOB Annunciator lAD-I, F9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNOT, alarms.

Turbine Generator MWe lowering.

Tavg-Tref deviation with no Auto Rod motion.

MOB Annunciator lAD-Il, K3, UNIT 1 LOCKOUT, alarms.

MCB Annunciator lAD-il, L3, GEN BKR A OR B FAULT TRIP, alarms.

1 of 2 Main Generator Breakers is OPEN.

POB-Il and 12 OPEN.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto.

Immediate Action NOTE: While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RO will inform the CRS of the situation, and the CRS will direct that the RO control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.

RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

RO Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 25 of 40 Event

Description:

Zone I B Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

Check control banks MOVING IN AS NOTE: The Control Rods will REQUIRED.

NOT be moving in as required.

RO (Step 3 RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

Place Control Rods in manual.

Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref.

If no rods will move, THEN NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

CRS /

(Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

RO BOP RO CRS RO (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps RUNNING.

1CM-420 (Unit I Generator Load Rejection Bypass control)

OPEN.

(Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 PSIG.

(Step 6) Announce:

UNIT 1 LOAD REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG.

(Step 7) Check P/R meters LESS THAN 20%.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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1 Event#

4 Page 26 of 40 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO RO (Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1 PB cooling as follows:

IF MAIN GENERATOR less than NOTE: The Main Generator is 10,000 amps...

NOT < 10,000 amps.

CRS Dispatch operator to check the following NOTE: The CRS will dispatch areas for signs of fire and notify Control an NEO.

Room of results within 5 minutes:

1A Main Step Up Transformer lB Main Step Up Transformer Unit 1 IPB Fan Enclosure area.

CRS Record approximate time lockout occurred.

CRS Do not continue until operator has been Booth Instructor:

given sufficient time (approximately 5 Within 3 minutes, as NEO minutes) to complete fire inspection, report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.

CRS IF operator confirms a fire has occurred...

Time Pos.

CRS RO BOP Expected ActionslBehavior Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.

GO TO Step 9.

(Step 9) Check condenser dump valves

MODULATING OPEN.

(Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (lAD-i 1, J-5)

DARK.

Comments NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will designate the RO to observe this action.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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4 Page 27 of 40 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos.

CRS Expected ActionslBehavior IF operator confirms no fire has occurred, THEN dispatch operator to perform the following at the Unit 1 IPB ALARM PANEL:

Depress LOCKOUT OVERRIDE on the fan in MAN.

IF IPB fan in MAN cannot be started, THEN depress LOCKOUT OVERRIDE on the fan in AUTO.

Comments NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an NEO.

Booth Instructor:

CRS IF neither IPB fan can be started, THEN GO TO Enclosure 1 (Load Reduction Following Loss of IPB Cooling).

Within 3 minutes, as NEO report that the Lockout Overide has been pressed, and NEITHER IPB Fan is running.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 1.

AP111A15500103, LOAD REJECTION ENCLOSURE 1, LOAD REDUCTION FOLLOWING LOSS OF IPB COOLING BOP (Step 1) Reduce Generator output less than NOTE: The BOP will need to 10,000 amps within 15 minutes of lockout as take this action since the RO follows:

will need to operate the Control Rods in MANUAL..

BOP (Step la RNO) Depress MW IN/OUT pushbutton.

Determine load reduction rate based NOTE: The load reduction rate on time since lockout occurred PER will be 70MWe/minute.

the following table:

Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.

Initiate turbine load reduction to approximately 350 MW.

Maintain power factor 0.9 to 1.0 lagging during load reduction.

WHEN Generator output amps are less than 10,000 amps, THEN stop load reduction.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

4 Page 28 of 40 Event

Description:

Zone lB Lockout causing RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS (Step 2) GO TO Step 1 1 in body of this procedure.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #5-6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event#

5 & 6 Page 29 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available Following this, Train A Safety Injection will spuriously actuate.

The Reactor will fail to trip automatically and the operator will need to trip the Reactor manually. The operator will enter EPI1IAI5000!E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to step 10 of EPI1IAI5000IES-l.1, Safety Injection Termination.

Upon entry into EPI1IAI5000IES-1.1, the operator will stop NI and ND pumps.

The scenario will terminate in EPI1IAI5000/ES-1.1 at Step 12 when the operator determines that Safety Injection is NOT required.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (ISEOOIC)

Indications Available:

Train A Safety Injection actuates.

Reactor does not trip.

Time Pos.

Expected Actions!Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE:

Mark Time of Train A SI Actuation (To the Minute):

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

NOTE: Reactor does not trip on SI Actuation as required, and will need to manually tripped.

All rod bottom lights LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers

NOTE: The Reactor will trip OPEN manually.

hR amps GOING DOWN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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1 Event#

5&6 Page 30 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation/ Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior RD (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip the reactor.

IF reactor will not trip...

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-OA)

Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear GenerationlATWS.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and I ETB

ENERGIZED.

RD I (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

BOP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14)

LIT.

BOP (Step 5 RNO) Initiate S/I.

NOTE: Train B of SI must be manually initiated.

CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RD to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RD.

Time Comments

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Booth Operator Instructions: Remove Malfunction ISEOOIC at Step 6 of E-O RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4)

- LIT BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1,2,5 DARK.

Group 3 LIT.

OACIN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.

CRS GO TO Step 10.

Booth Operator: As IAE, Call Control Room and report that the Train A SI Actuation was caused inadvertently during maintenance.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Start 2A RN pump.

RO!

BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps ON.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.

Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

5 & 6 Page 31 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails!manual available

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

5&6 Page 32 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuationl Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available Time Pos.

RO BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

(Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

GREATER THAN 775 psig.

(Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

(Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressures LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

(Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1 ND-67B (1 B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

Comments Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is 0.15 psig.

NOTE: NV Flow is 320 gpm.

NOTE: NC System pressure is 2250 psig.

RO /

(Step 18) Check CA flow:

BOP Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

5 & 6 Page 33 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available Time Pos.

RO BOP Expected ActionslBehavior Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN each SIG N/R level is greater than 1 1% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that Sf0 N/R level between 1 1% (32% ACC) and 50%.

(Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

OR IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F IF all NC pumps off, THEN...

(Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Comments NOTE: All NC Pumps will be ON.

NOTE: 1NC-32B has previously failed OPEN.

BOP (Step 20a RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE Pzr PORV(s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE its isolation valve.

CLOSE the following_valve(s):

IF 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, NOTE: 1NC-271 has been THEN CLOSE 1NC-271 (OZR previously CLOSED.

OIRV Drn Isol For 1 NC-32B).

IF 1NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed...

IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed...

IF PORV isolation valve cannot be NOTE: 1NC-31B has been closed..,

previously CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 BOP BOP BOP (Step 20b RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE spray valve(s).

IF spray valve(s) cannot be closed...

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be 80-90°F.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed NOTE:

1 NC-32B has been or isolated....

previously CLOSED.

BOP Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

NOTE: depending on NC System pressure the Spray Valve may be OPEN.

BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal.

The following secondary EMF5

NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1 EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1 EMF-24 (S/G_A) 1EMF-25(S/GB) 1EMF-26(S/GC) 1EMF-27(S/GD)

RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressure STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.

NOTE: All SG Pressures are 1 1 Oopsig.

Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

5&6 Page of 40 Inadvertent SI Actuationl Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

5 & 6 Page 35 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuationl Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available Expected ActionslBehavior SIG levels STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

(Step 24) Check if NC System intact:

Check containment EMFs NORMAL:

1EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR))

1 EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range))

1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine)

Check containment pressure LESS THAN 1 PSIG Check containment sump level

NORMAL.

IF offsite power available, THEN check ICE COND LOWER INLET DOORS OPEN alarm (1AD-9, A-5)

DARK.

Check all Unit 1 6900V buses

ENERGIZED..

(Step 25) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least one S/G

GREATER THAN 11%

OR Total feed flow to S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

NC PRESSURE stable or going up.

PzrlevelGREATERTHAN 11%.

Time Pos.

BOP Comments NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is 0.20 psig.

BOP (Step 26) Reset the following:

RO/

BOP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

5&6 Page 36 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip fails/manual available Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments S/I Sequencers.

BOP (Step 27) Stop all but one NV pump.

BOP (Step 28) Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 29) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check NV pumps miniflow valves

OPEN:

1 NV-i 508 (NV Pumps Recirculation) 1NV-i5iA (NV Pumps Recirculation).

Close the following valves:

1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV) 1NI-iOB (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

Examiner NOTE:

Mark Time of 1 NI-gA/i OB Closure (To the Minute):

CRITICAL TASK:

(SS-460011 I 31E1 3.6)

Terminate SI by closing NI-9110 within 15 minutes of SI actuation.

Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/A14600/1 13, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains>

500°F.

If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

1 Event#

5&6 Page 37 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuationl Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 30) Establish charging as follows:

BOP Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

BOP THROTTLE 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) to maintain 6-10 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

BOP Close 1NV-241 (Ui Seal Water lnj Flow Control).

BOP Check one of the following valves

OPEN:

1NV-13B (NV Supply to A NC Loop NOTE: 1NV-13B is OPEN.

Isol).

OR 1 NV-i 6A (NV Supply to D NC Loop lsol).

BOP Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray to PZR Isol)

CLOSED.

BOP Open the following valves:

1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) 1NV-245B (Charging Line cont Outside Isol).

CRS WHEN controlling NV flow in subsequent NOTE: This is a Continuous steps, THEN maintain flow within the Action. The CRS will make following limits while THROTTLING both board operators aware.

charging and seal injection control valves:

Charging flow LESS THAN 200 GPM.

Seal injection flow to each NC pump 6-10 GPM/

BOP (Step 31) Control charging flow as follows:

Control charging flow as required to maintain Pzr level stable.

Check Pzr level STABLE OR GOING UP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event#

5 & 6 Page 38 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available Time Pos.

BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 32) Reset the following:

Phase A Isolation Phase B Isolation.

(Step 33) Establish VI to containment as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

lVl-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol) 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol) 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

Comments BOP (Step 10) Check if NI pumps should be Examiner NOTE: After stopped:

transition to ES-li, terminate Exam at Lead Examiner discretion.

Check NC pressure CRS CRS CRS (Step 34) Implement EP/1/A15000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

(Step 35) WHEN EP!1/A15000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination) is implemented in next step, THEN monitor its Foldout page.

(Step 35) GO TO Step 10 of EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.1 Step 10.

ES-I.1, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

1 Event #

5 & 6 Page 39 of 40 Event

Description:

Inadvertent SI Actuation! Auto Reactor Trip failslmanual available Time Pos.

BOP CRS BOP Expected ActionslBehavior STABLE OR GOING UP GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG.

Stop NI pumps.

GOTOStepli.

(Step 11) Check if ND pumps should be stopped:

Check any ND pump ON.

Check running ND pumps suction

ALIGNED TO FWST.

Check both NS pumps OFF.

Stop ND pumps.

Comments RO BOP (Step 12) Check S/I flow not required:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29%

ACC).

NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be 65-85°F.

NOTE: Pzr Level will be 60-90%

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT I STATUS:

Power Level:

75%

NCS [B]

1136 ppm Pzr [B]:

1139 ppm Xe:

2369.56 pcm Power History:

The Plant 75% power (MOL), for Core Burnup:

250 EFPDs four days.

CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

0P111A16100103 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The plant is at 75% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 4 days.

The crew is expected to raise power to 100% on this shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

I B KG Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

I NIP-5070, ACCUM TK 1 B PRESS, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-5, LOSS OF SUBCOOLING, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, however, level has indicated normal (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Raise power to 100% starting at Step 3.32 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A16100/03, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, has been approved.

The Reactor Group has recommended that a Dilution of 200 gallons be made during initial power increase.

Perform the load increase at 2 MWe/Minute.

Work Control SROIOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg.

John Aux Bldg.

Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5

th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I -2

REFERENCES:

1.

OAC Alarm Response Procedure Ml L291 7, UI WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS.

2.

Control Room Crew Expectations Manual.

3.

AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. (Rev 12) 4.

Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

5.

AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. (Rev 9) 6.

Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

7.

AP111A15500104, Rapid Downpower. (Rev 21) 8.

AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14) 9.

EPIIIAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31)

10. EPI1IAI5000IFR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. (Rev 12)

11. EPI1IAI5000IE-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Rev 9)

12. EPI1IAI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination. (Rev 23)

Author:

David Lazany, Wern Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. 041111 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scnrio 2 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Event MaIf.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

LOA C-RO High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower CFOO7 C-SRO 2

ENBO13C C-BOP Power Range Failure C(TS)-SRO 3

KCOIOD C-BOP 1B2 KC Pump trip C(TS)-SRO 4

NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5

IREOO3A C-RO Continuous inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6

PEOO1AIB M-RO Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve on 1 B fails Open PEOO2AJB M-BOP DEHOO1 M-SRO SMOO4B 7

CAOO5 NA TD CA Overspeed Trip 8

CAOO4AIB NA 1AJ1B MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Serario 2 McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 250 days.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (1CF-75) will inadvertently open.

The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high. The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) instrumentation.

Next, the 1B2 KC Pump will trip.

The operator will enter AP/1/A15500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

Subsequently, the I B DG will be declared inoperable. The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with API1/A15500104, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert.

The operator will enter AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.

Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the 1 B Steam Generator will lift and fail Open.

The operator will enter EP/1IAI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EPI1IAI5000IFR-S.1,

Response

to Nuclear Power Generation/ATVVS.

During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor.

On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the IA/I B MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps.

After completion of FR-Si, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EPI1IA/50001E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. After the I B Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EPI1IAI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination.

The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-i.1.

Scenario Event Description fs1RCSeriO2 Critical Tasks:

FR-S.1 C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken.

Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits.

A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

E-0 F Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1, unless the transition is made to EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions.

Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators.

Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenano 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION J

Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp I/C T = 0 Malfunctions:

159.

ANN-ADO9-D04 = I (OFF)

MALF-CAOO4A = 0 (Fail in AUTO)

(IC-39, Adjust LD to 75 MALF-CAOO4B 0 (Fail in AUTO) gpm, SD Bank B Group 2 MALF-CA005 made to be 226)

MALF-EPQOOIA MALF IPEOOIA MALF IPEOOIB MALF IPEOO2A MALF IPEOO2B LOA-DGOII = Racked Out IND-KFOO2 = 0 RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:

IA DG Breaker (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs IA DG Control Power (Tagout)

IND-KFO2 (0-Stick)

MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-6 (0-stick)

MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-4 (0-stick)

Q Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Setup OAC Q

Freeze.

Q Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Q Fill out the NEOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Q Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description NRCSehariO 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing 1.

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements 2.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3.

TSail Sheets for IA DG.

4.

Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-O Begin Familiarization Period Q

At direction of Event I High Pressure Heaters Bypass/Overpower examiner (LOA) CFOO7 =

(OPEN)

Ramp = 50 seconds Trigger #1 At direction of Event 2 Power Range Failure examiner (MALF) ENB0I3C = 200 (High)

Ramp = 20 Seconds Trigger #3 Q

At direction of Event 3 1 B2 KC Pump trip examiner (MALF) KCOIOD Delay = 10 seconds Trigger #5 At direction of Event 4 Rapid Downpower examiner NOTE: Trigger #7 (EPQOOI B) will be operated at start of event.

NOTE: Floor instructor will need to provide the BOP with a copy of 0P111A161501009,.7, during this event.

At direction of Event 5 Continuous inward Rod Motion examiner (MALE) IREOO3A = 0 (IN)

Trigger #9 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 6 Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG Safety Valve examiner on 1 B fails Open (MALE) DEHOOI No Delay (MALF) SMOO4B = 100 NOTE: LOA-SAOO3 0 TD CA Turbine isolation during event.

Trigger #11 Trigger #13 At direction of Event 7 TD CA Overspeed Trip examiner Continued Event 8 lA/i B MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO from Event 7 Q

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 8

of 53 Event

Description:

High Pressure Heaters Bypass! Overpower Shortly after taking the watch, the High Pressure Heater Bypass Valve (1CF-75) will inadvertently open. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm Response Procedure M1L2917, Ui WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS, and the Control Room Expectation Manual, and immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #1 (LOA CFOO7 (1))

Indications Available:

OAC Alarm M1L2917 (Ui Water Bypassing A&B Heaters).

TPBE will update over 100%.

Excore Nis will read in excess of 100%.

Main Generator MW output will increase.

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an NEC.

If so, FloorlBooth instructor acknowledge as NEC.

Wait 3 minutes of time, and report that 1CF-75 is CPEN.

NOTE: The RC will drop load on the Turbine 3O-6OMWe with the Turbine in MANUAL.

Time Pos.

CRS CRS RC Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 1) Dispatch operator to check position of 1CF-75 (HP HTRS Bypass Vlv).

(Step 2) Investigate for leakage through 1CF-75 (HP HTRS Bypass VIv).

Immediately reduce 2OMWe and then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition.

Comments M1L2917, UI WATER BYPASSING A&B HEATERS CRS (Step 3) Notify System Engineering.

CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 9

of 53 Event

Description:

High Pressure Heaters Bypass! Overpower Time Pos.

Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

If the CRS directs that the valve be closed, Booth Instructor, as the WCC Supervisor, inform CRS that IAE will investigate prior to operating valve.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 10 of 53 Event

Description:

Power Range Failure After this, Power Range Instrument N42 will drift high.

The operator will enter API1/A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #3 (ENBOI 3C(200))

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2 B3, P/R CHANNEL DEVIATION MCB Annunciator 1AD-2 C8, P/R OVERPOWER ROD STOP MCB Annunciator 1AD-2 A8, OTDT RUNBACK/ROD STOP ALERT MCB Annunciator 1AD-2 E8, DCS TROUBLE MCB PR N42 indicates HIGHER than other Power Range channels OAC Alarm, Ui Quad 3 AFD Deviation PR N42 Drawer indicates HIGHER than other Power Range drawers PR N42 Drawer Upper Detector indicates HIGH.

Time APIIIAI5500II 6, MALFUNCTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CASE III, POWER RANGE MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) Place control rods in manual.

RO (Step 2) Check S/G levels AT PROGRAMMED LEVEL.

CRS (Step 3) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system.

RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 4) Check P/R channels ONLY ONE NOTE: A channel Check will CHANNEL FAILED.

reveal that only the Upper Detector on N42 has failed.

CRS (Step 5) Secure any power increase in progress.

Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 11 of 53 Event

Description:

Power Range Failure Time Pos.

RO BOP BOP Expected ActionsIBehavior (Step 6) Check the following interlocks IN REQUIRED STATE FOR EXISTING PLANT CONDITONS:

P-7 Lo Power Rx Trips Blocked P-8 Hi Pwr Lo FIo Rx Trip Blocked P-1O Nuclear at Power.

(Step 7) Perform the following actions at the MISCELLANIOUS CONTROL AND INDICATION PANEL drawer:

Place the appropriate ROD STOP BYPASS switch to the failed channel position.

Place the POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to the failed channel position.

(Step 8) Perform the following actions at the DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer:

Place the UPPER SECTION switch to the failed channel position.

Comments NOTE: The BOP will operate the switch for N42.

NOTE: The BOP will place the switch in the N42 position.

BOP (Step 9) Perform the following action at the COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer:

Place the COMPARATOR CHANNEL NOTE: The BOP will place DEFEAT switch to the failed channel the switch in the N42 position.

position.

Check the COMPARATOR DEFEAT light LIT.

Check the CHANNEL DEFEAT light for the upper section LIT.

Place the LOWER SECTION switch to the failed channel position.

Check the CHANNEL DEFEAT light for the lower section LIT.

NOTE: The BOP will place the switch in the N42 position.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

2 Page 12 of 53 Event

Description:

Power Range Failure BOP (Step 10) Trip bistables of failed channel as follows:

NUC OVERPOWER ROD STOP CH 1(11, Ill, IV) BYP (1S119)

PIR HI FLUX LO STPT (1SI-2)

PIR HI FLUX HI STPT (1SI-2)

PIR HI FLUX RATE (1SI-3)

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Remove Control Power fuses from NOTE: This action will cause POWER RANGE A drawer for failed Annunciators to alarm on MCB channel.

Panel 1AD-2.

BOP IF Power Range Cabinet shows evidence NOTE: There is no such of damage evidence displayed.

BOP/

(Step 1 1) Check the following status lights for RO the failed channel LIT:

BOP!

(Step 12) Check the following annunciator RO lights LIT:

BOP!

(Step 13) Check the following status lights on RO 1 SI-i 8 LIT:

RO (Step 14) Check all CF control valves IN AUTO.

P/R HI VOLTAGE FAILURE (1AD-2, F-3)

PIR HI FLUX HI STPT ALERT (1AD-2.

A-3)

PIR HI FLUX RATE ALERT (1AD-2, A 1)

PIR LO SETPOINT TRAIN A TRIP BLOCKED PIR LO SETPOINT TRAIN B TRIP BLOCKED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

2 Page 13 of 53 Event

Description:

Power Range Failure Time P05.

RO RO RO CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 15) Ensure operable P/R channel selected to record on NIS Recorder.

(Step 16) Adjust control rods to maintain T Avg at T-Ref.

(Step 17) WHEN T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref AND auto rod control desired, THEN return control rods to auto.

(Step 18) Instruct IAE to trip the following bistables associated with failed PIR channel within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of failure PER IP/1/A13090/014 (Tripping Inoperable Protection Channels):

OPDT OTDT Comments NOTE: The RO will ensure that N42 is NOT selected to be recorded.

NOTE: The RO may place the Control Rods back in AUTO.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS CRS CRS (Step 19) IF AT ANY TIME failed P/R channel is repaired prior to IAE tripping bistables (Step 20) IF AT ANY TIME IAE completes Step 18....

(Step 21) WHEN malfunctioning P/R channel repaired, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The Power Range Channel will NOT be repaired.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE (Functions 2a, 2b, 3, 6, 7, 16b, 16c, and 16d).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

2 Page 14 of 53 Event

Description:

Power Range Failure S.l Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.

OR S.2 Be in MODE 3 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s).

inoperable.

D. One channel D.i.i inoperable AND D.i.2 Place channel in trip.

OR D.2 Be in MODE 3 E. One channel E.1 Place channel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable, in trip.

OR 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months E.2 Be in MODE 3 T. One or more T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channel(s) interlock is in inoperable, required state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE 2 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months S. One or more channel(s) inoperable.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

3 Page 15 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos.

Expected Actions!Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an NEC to check out the 1B2 KC Pump.

If so, Booth Instructor, wait 3 minutes, and then report that the 1B2 KC Pump Breaker shows a 51150 Relay has operated, and the pump is NOT running.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-21.

AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump ON.

NOTE: The 1B1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.

ROI (Step 2) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress.

BOP (Step 4) Check ND IN RHR MODE.

NOTE: ND is NOT in the RHR Mode.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Next, the 1B2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage.

The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

Indications Available:

Operate Trigger #5 (KCOI OD)

MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, Bi through B4, A (B, C, and D) NC PUMP UPPER MTR BRG LO KC FLO, alarms.

1B2 KC Pump Green Status light LIT.

lB2KCPumpampsgotoO.

MCB Annunciator 1 RAD1 1 EMF 46A, LOSS OF TRN A KC SAMPLE FLO.

MCB Annunciator 1 RAD1 1 EMF 46B, LOSS OF TRN B KC SAMPLE FLO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

3 Page 16 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos.

CRS CRS BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7.

(Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging system.

(Step 8) Check both trains KC Surge Tank level

- STABLE OR GOING UP.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 9) Start standby KC train as follows:

Check standby KC train AVAILABLE TO START.

Check standby KC Surge Tank Level

GREATER THAN 2 FT.

Start standby KC train PER one of the following:

To start A Train, GO TO Enclosure 4 (Startup of 1A KC Train).

AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 4, STARTUP OF IA KC TRAIN CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP BOP BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC-56A (KC To A ND HX)

CLOSED.

(Step 2) Check 1KC-81B (KC To B ND HX)

CLOSED.

(Step 3) Check 1 B Train KC pumps OFF.

NOTE: The 1 Bi KC Pump is ON, and running properly.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

3 Page 17 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Check 1A Train KC pumps OFF.

BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1A train KC is NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected....

suspected.

BOP (Step 7) Close the following:

1 KC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

I KC-1A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

BOP (Step 8) Start 1A RN pump.

BOP (Step 9) Ensure I RN-86A (A KC Hx Inlet Isol) opens.

BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for IKC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the AUTO.

BOP (Step 11) Ensure 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc sd) opens.

BOP (Step 12) Start 1A1 KC pump.

BOP (Step 13) Check IKC-6 (IAI KC Pump NOTE: 1KC-12 was NOT Discharge)

LOCALLY THROTTLED IN locally throttled in Step 6.

STEP 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

3 Page 18 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip Pos.

BOP CRS BOP CRS BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following:

Start 1A2 KC pump.

GOTOStepl7.

(Step 17) Check ND pumps ANY ON PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

(Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

(Step 20) Check KC leak HAS OCCURRED.

Comments NOTE: The CRSIBOP may dispatch an NEO to check out the A Train KC Pumps.

If so, Booth Instructor, as NEO report that both pumps are operating normally.

NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are and have been OFF.

NOTE: A KC System Leak has NOT occurred.

BOP (Step 20 RNO) Perform the following:

Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.

Open the following valves:

1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).

Close the following valves:

1KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).

1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

Open the following valves:

1 KC-1A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

3 Page 19 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS GO TO Step 25.

BOP (Step 25) Check 1 B ND pump OFF.

BOP (Step 26) Check 1KC-81B (KC To B ND HX)

CLOSED.

BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the CLOSE position.

BOP (Step 28) Ensure I KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) closes.

BOP (Step 29) Stop 1 B1 and 1 B2 pumps.

NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1B1 KC Pump.

BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.

BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumps ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOP TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

and have been OFF.

CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED.

NOT occurred.

CRS (Step 37 RNO) GO TO Step 41 in body of this procedure.

AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 41) Check any letdown path IN NOTE: Normal Letdown is in SERVICE.

service.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

3 Page 20 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 42) Check NC pump thermal barrier valves OPEN:

BOP (Step 43) Check KC to Aux Bldg Non essential header ESTABLISHED.

BOP (Step 44) Check NM valves (on 1 MC-8)

NOTE: NM Valves have NOT PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BY THIS been previously Closed by this PROCEDURE.

procedure.

CRS (Step 44 RNO) GO TO Step 46.

CRS (Step 46) Evaluate KC chemistry requirements as follows:

Notify Primary Chemistry of KC NOTE: KC System makeup makeup that has occurred or is in has NOT occurred.

progress.

Evaluate recirculating the KC Surge NOTE: There is NO NEED for Tank volume and feed and bleed of KC System Feed and Bleed.

KC System PER OP/i /A/6400/005 (Component_Cooling Water System).

BOP (Step 47) Check both trains RN suction

ALIGN ED TO LLI.

CRS (Step 48) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

1 KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1 KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt) 1 KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otit) 1KC-4i3B(D NC Pump Therm Bar OtIt).

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

3 Page 21 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip Time Pos.

CRS CRS CRS Expected ActionslBehavior LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shaH be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION Comments A. One CCW train inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Restore CCW train to OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES

- OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System; and Two diesel generators (DG5) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems; AND The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.

COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

3 Page 22 of 53 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump trip CONDITION

b. One DG inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION B.2 Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS wiN declare the A KC Train inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of the B KC Train.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

4 Page 23 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Subsequently, the 1 B DG will be declared inoperable.

The crew will be directed to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP111A15500104, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions:

As WCC Supervisor call Control Room and report that there is a major leak of Lube Oil in the lB DG Room.

2 minutes later Operate Trigger #7 EPQOOI B.

As WCC Supervisor call Control Room and report that Station Management has directed that the plant be placed in Mode 3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator lAD-li, D8, DIG B 125 VDC CONTROL POWER TROUBLE, alarms.

(2 minutes delayed)

Time AP111A15500104, RAPID DOWNPOWER ROl (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control IN AUTO.

NOTE: Auto turbine control is available.

RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton.

Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

4 Page 24 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Down power Time Pos.

CRS CRS RO CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3

DESIRED.

(Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate:

Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15%

Power DESIRED.

At least two CA pumps OPERABLE.

(Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:

IF Mode 3 is time critical AND the reactor will be shutdown by manually inserting control rods Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.

Comments NOTE: With Both EDGs OOS neither MD CA Pump is OPERABLE.

NOTE: The shutdown will not be performed using manual rod control.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

Check unit to be shutdown VIA REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.

Calculate total power change (%):

NOTE: The CRS will determine the total power change to be 85%.

CRS RO BOP RO (Step 8) Determine the required power reduction rate (MW/mm).

(Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO.

(Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red dispatcher phone).

(Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

NOTE: The CRS will reduce load at 1 0-23 MWe/minute.

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 25 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/mm)

Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

Total Power change (%).

Comments RO BOP Record calculated boration amount:

Check auto or manual rod control

AVAILABLE.

Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OPI1IAI61 50/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1 NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #9 when I NV-265B is OPEN (IREOO3A (0))

Examiner NOTE: When RO alerts crew to the fact that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, Move to event 5.

RO (Step 13) Check control rods MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.

RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL.

RO (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits):

NOTE: The BOP will determine to inject 680-1 020 gallons of Boric Acid.

Floor Instructor: When BOP attempts to obtain copy of procedure from NDL, provide copy.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

4 Page 26 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Pos.

RO CRS CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during this procedure C-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.

(Step 17) REFER TO the following:

RP/01A157001000 (Classification of Emergency)

RPIOIAI5700IO1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

(Step 18) Notify Reactor Group Duty Engineer of load reduction.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.

CRS (Step 21) Dispatch operator to ensure the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch following valves are OPEN:

an NEO.

Booth Instructor:

Within 5 minutes, as NEO report that Valves are OPEN.

1AS-74 (Unit 1 & Unit 2 Aux Steam Hdr Cross-Tie Isol) (service bldg, 739+12, room 202, R-27, over B RL Pump)

RO RO (Step 19) Check target load LESS THAN 1000 MW.

(Step 20) Check Unit 2 AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AUX STEAM (AS) HEADER.

NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 RO to report AS Header pressure.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report that U2 is available.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenano#

2 Event#

4 Page 27 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Time Pos.

RO RO Expected ActionslBehavior Unit 2 valve 2AS-74 (Unit 1 & Unit 2 Aux Steam Hdr Cross-Tie 1501) (service bldg, 739+14, room 202, S-27, above RL strainer) 1AS-253 (Unit 1 Aux Steam Hdr lsol)

(service bldg, 739+15, P-28, above overhead door to Unit 1 turbine bldg).

(Step 22) Check SM flow on all SIGs

GREATER THAN 25%.

(Step 23) WHEN all SM flows are less than 75%, THEN ensure that following valves ramp CLOSED:

1CF-1O4AB (1AS/G CF Control Bypass) 1CF-1O5AB (lB SIG CF Control Bypass) iCE-i O6AB (1C SIG CF Control Bypass) iCE-i O7AB (ID SIG CF Control Bypass)

Comments Examiner NOTE: When RO alerts crew to the fact that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, Move to event 5.

CRS (Step 25 RNO) Perform the following:

IF target load is less than 40%, THEN perform the following:

Do not continue with this procedure until:

RO RO (Step 24) WHEN PIR instruments indicate less than 48%, THEN check P-8 HI PWR LO FLO RX TRIP BLOCKED status light (151-i 8)

LIT.

(Step 25) PIR meters indicate reactor power LESS THAN 40%.

NOTE: It is NOT expected that the crew will be less than 40%

at this time.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 28 of 53 Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments P/R instruments indicate reactor power is less than 40%.

All CF flows are less than 40%.

Impulse pressure is less than 260 PSI G.

WHEN all parameters above are met, THEN GO TO Step 26.

Examiner NOTE: When RO alerts crew to the fact that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, Move to event 5.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

5 Page 29 of 53 Event

Description:

Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The CRS could go one of two ways at this point. The operator may back-up to Step 9 of AP4 and drive rods inward in MANUAL, or proceed to AP14. BOTH are scripted here.

AP111A1550014, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Upon recognition that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, the RD may take the Control Rods to MANUAL If NOT, move forward to Page 29.

CRS (Step 9) Check control rods IN AUTO RD (step 9 RND) Perform the following:

IF auto control available....

IF manual control available, THEN move rods as required to maintain T-Avg at T Ref.

IF rods cannot be moved in auto or manual...

NOTE: AUTO rod control is NOT available.

NOTE: MANUAL rod control is available.

APII 1A15500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION During the downpower, the Control Rods will continuously insert. The operator will enter API1IAI5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and take manual control of the rods.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (IREOO3A (0))

(Previously operated during Event #4 when I NV 265B was opened)

Indications Available:

Control Rods are moving inward in AUTO without a proper signal.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

5 Page 30 of 53 Event

Description:

Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos.

RD RD RD Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, THEN perform the following:

(Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

(Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED.

Comments NOTE: Upon recognition that the Control Rods are moving uncontrollably, the CRS may enter AP14.

Immediate Action NOTE: No Rods have dropped in this event.

Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will place the rods in MANUAL.

Immediate Action NOTE: When the RD places the Rods to MANUAL, continual inward Rod Motion will stop.

CRS (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to NOTE: The CRS will transition unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, to Enclosure 3 of AP-14.

THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response To Continuous Rod Movement).

ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 3 RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT RD RD RO (Step 4) Check all rods ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

(Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (IAD-2, A-iD)

DARK.

(Step 6) Check T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP alarm (1AD-2, B-7)

DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

5 Page 31 of 53 Event

Description:

Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos.

CRS CRS CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging system.

(Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem.

(Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:

Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.

Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactors response.

Comments NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: This is a Continuous while in this procedure, THEN observe the Action. The CRS will make following guidance:

both board operators aware.

RO CRS/

RO RO (Step 4) Check T-Ref indication

- NORMAL (Step 5) Do not move rods until IAE determines rod motion in permissible.

(Step 6) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of programmed T-Ref as follows:

Adjust Turbine load OR Borate/dilute NC System.

Booth Instructor: after 2 minutes, as IAE, report that MANUAL rod control only is permissible.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

5 Page 32 of 53 Event

Description:

Continuous inward Rod Motion Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments IF IAE has determined that it is permissible to move rods, THEN respond to the runback PER API1IAI5500/03 (Load_Rejection).

For all other circumstances, assume rod control is not available and respond to the runback as follows:

Trip Reactor GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection).

RO/

(Step 8) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP procedure a unit shutdown is required AND Action. The CRS will make rods cannot be moved, THEN perform the both board operators aware.

following:

Borate as required during shutdown to maintain T-Avg at T-Ref.

Monitor AFD during load reduction.

IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech Spec limit AND reactor power is greater than 50%, THEN perform the following:

Trip Reactor GO TO EP/1/A15000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety_Injection).

IF entry into Mode 3 is desired...

CRS (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN perform the following:

Ensure T-Avg atT-Ref+/- 1°F.

IF auto rod control desired, THEN place rods in auto.

CRS (Step 10) Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 33 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Following this, the Turbine will inadvertently trip, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, one Safety Valve on the lB Steam Generator will lift and fail Open.

The operator will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to EPI1IAI5000JFR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor.

On the Reactor trip, the TD CA will trip on overspeed, and the lA/lB MD CA Pump will fail to start automatically.

The operator will be expected to manually start the MD CA Pumps. After completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition back to E-O, and then to EP/1IAI5000IE-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

After the lB Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EPIIIA/5000IES-1.1, SI Termination. The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-1.1 Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (DEHOOI, SNIOO4D(1 00))

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1 EQ-i F5, TURB TRIP CAUSES RX TRIP MWe drops immediately to 0 Both Main Generator Breaker GREEN Status lights are LIT.

Reactor Trip breakers RED Status lights are LIT.

DRPI indicates that Control Rods have NOT tripped.

Pzr Pressure rises All three Pzr PORVs indicate OPEN.

EPIIIAI5000IE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/

(Step i) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip:

Immediate Action Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior All rod bottom lights LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN hR amps - GOING DOWN.

Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event#

6, 7 & 8 Page 34 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Trip!ATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Trip reactor.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action RO IF reactor will not trip, THEN perform the NOTE: The CRS may dispatch following:

an NEC to locally trip the reactor.

If so, Booth Instructor After 30 seconds delete MALF IPEOO2AIB, and report that the Reactor Trip Breakers have been opened.

CRS GO TO EPI1IA/5000IFR-S.1 NOTE: The CRS will transition (Response To Nuclear Power to FR-S. 1.

Generation/ATWS).

Implement EP/1IAI5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

EPII!AI5000IFR-S.I, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONIATWS RO (Step 1) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights

- LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN hR amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Trip the reactor IF reactor will not trip, THEN manually NOTE: The RO will manually insert rods.

drive Rods inward.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS/SG lB Safety Valve fails Open Op Test No.:

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:

FR-S.l C Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.l (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

BOP (Step 2) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves CLOSED.

RO!

(Step 3) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps ON.

NOTE: The lA/i B CA Pumps have failed to AUTO start, and the TD CA Pump has tripped on overspeed.

BOP (Step 4.a RNO) Start pumps.

NOTE: The BOP will start both MD CA Pumps.

BOP Check N/R Level in at least 3 S/Gs

GREATER THAN 17%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:

(E-0 F) Establish 450 gpm of CA Flow to the Steam Generators before transition out of FR-S.1, unless the transition is made to EPIIIAI5000IFR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

BOP (Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System as follows:

Ensure one NV pump

- ON Align boration flowpath as follows:

Open 1 NV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps).

Start both boric acid transfer pumps.

Check emergency boration flow

GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

(Step 5b.3 RNO) IF NV pump suction is NOTE: The NV Pump suction aligned to VCT...

is NOT aligned to the VCT.

BOP Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System:

1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside sd)

OPEN.

1NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol)

OPEN.

(Step 5c RNO) Perform the following:

IF NV pump suction is aligned to NOTE: The NV Pump suction VCT...

is NOT aligned to the VCT.

Open the following valves:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

6,7 & 8 Page 36 of 53 Inadvertent Turbine TrIpIATWS/SG lB Safety Valve fails Open

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event#

6, 7 & 8 Page 37 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open 1 NI-9A (NC Cold Leg lnj From NV) 1NI-1OB (NC Cold Leg In]

From NV).

1VQ-1A (Ui Cont Air Release Inside Isol) 1VQ-6A(U1 ContAirAddition Inside Isol) 1VQ-2B (Ui Cont Air Release Outside Isol) 1VQ-5B (Ui Cont Air Addition Outside Isol)

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS GO TO Step 5e.

BOP Check Pzr pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

BOP (Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/I signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:

Have another Licensed Operator check Examiner NOTE: SI may or S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3 may NOT have occurred at (Subsequent S/I Actions).

this point.

If it has, or when it does, the CRS will hand Enclosure 3 off to the BOP.

Examiner following the BOP, continue with the Enclosure 3 scripted steps below.

Examiners following the CRSIRO proceed to FR-S.I Steps on Page 39.

CRS Continue with this procedure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments EPIIIAI5000/FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS ENCLOSURE 3, SUBSEQUENT SIl ACTIONS BOP (Step 1) Check 1ETA and 1ETB ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 2) Check both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (ISI-14)

LIT.

BOP (Step 3) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groupsl,2,5DARK.

Group3LIT.

OACIN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.

GO TO Step 4.

BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps

- ON NOTE: Both MD CA Pumps should be RUNNING.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 5) Check all KC pumps ON.

BOP (Step 5.a RNO) Start pumps.

NOTE: The 1 B2 KC Pump has previously failed.

BOP (Step 6) Check both RN pumps ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 39 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP EPIIIAI5000IFR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATIONIATWS Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIRO continue HERE.

Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 7) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.

Comments NOTE: The BOP will direct the U2 BOP to start the 2A RN Pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RD report 2A RN Pump is running.

(Step 8) Check all S/C pressures

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

NOTE: The BOP will determine that the 1 B SC is depressu rizing.

(Step 8a RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following valves closed:

AIIMSIVs All MSIV bypass valves AIISMPORVs.

IFvalvesopen...

BOP (Step 11) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The BOP may ask perform EPI1IA/50001G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I).

acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: The BOP will report that Enclosure 3 has been completed to the CRS.

Closed.

NOTE: All 1 B SG Valves are (Step 9) Check Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

(Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure containment pressure goes above 3 PSIG, THEN perform Step 9).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-I Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS/SG I B Safety Valve fails Open Pos.

RD CRS RD Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical:

PIR channels LESS THAN 5%

W/R Neutron Flux LESS THAN 5%

hR SUR NEGATIVE.

(Step 10 ) GO TO Step 17.

(Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin as follows:

Obtain current NC boron concentration from Primary Chemistry.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an NED.

NOTE: The CRS/RO may call Chemistry.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

NOTE: The CRS may ask the U2 RD to perform this action.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 18) REFER TO RP/0/N5700/000 NOTE: The CRS may ask (Classification of Emergency).

OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

CRS (Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step NOTE: The CRS will transition in effect.

back to E-0.

WHEN current NC boron concentration is obtained, THEN perform shutdown margin calculation PER OP/0/A61 00/006 (Reactivity Balance Calculation).

WHEN following conditions satisfied, THEN NC System boration may be stopped:

Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.

Uncontrolled cooldown has been stopped.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event#

6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWS/SG lB Safety Valve fails Open Pos.

RO!

BOP RO RO BOP Expected Actions!Behavior Comments EPII!A15000!E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION BOP (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (lSl-4)

LIT.

ROI BOP CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

(Step 2) Check Reactor trip:

All rod bottom lights LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN hR amps GOING DOWN.

(Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves CLOSED.

(Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

ENERGIZED.

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-I 8)

LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (ISI-14)

LIT.

(Step 6) Announce Unit I Safety Injection.

Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action NOTE: It is expected that SI will either be actuated already, or REQUIRED by this time.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Ni 1-1 Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TrIpIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Groupsl,2,5DARK.

Group3LIT.

OAC-INSERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

CRS GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MDCApumps-ON NOTE: Both MDCAPumps should be RUNNING.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumpsON.

NOTE: The 1B2 KC Pump has previously failed.

(Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:

NOTE: The BOP will NOT attempt to start the I B2 KC Pump.

IF all KC pumps running...

NOTE: The 1B2 KC Pump is NOT running.

IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator NOTE: No KC System flow lit on 1AD-6, annunciators are LIT.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.

N/R level is at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.

Start pumps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

CRS RO RO Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

(Step 14) Check all SIG pressures

GREATER THAN 775 PS 1G.

(Step 14 RNO) Perform the following:

Check the following closed:

All MSIVs All MSIV bypass valves AIISMPORVs.

Comments NOTE: The CRS will direct the U2 BOP to start the 2A RN Pump.

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report 2A RN Pump is running.

NOTE: The lB SG is depressurizing.

BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running_pump(s) OPEN:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)

RO!

BOP BOP IFanyvalveopen, (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

(Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

NOTE: All 1 B SG Valves are Closed.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is normal.

NOTE: NC Pressure is >1600 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Pos.

CRS CRS ROI BOP BOP RO CRS (Step 17 RNO) Perform the following based NOTE: The CRS may assign on plant conditions:

the RO to perform this action.

If so, RO(BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Examiners following the CRSIBOP(RO) should move ahead to Page 45 to continue in E-0.

IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System_Cooldown).

RO Expected ActionslBehavior 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow lsol).

IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

(Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

(Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN N/R level in any S/G greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

(Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg-STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

NOTE: All NC Pumps will be ON Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Trip!ATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (BOP)

RO (BOP)

(Step 1) Check steam dump valves

CLOSED.

(Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED.

(Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT.

(Step 4) Check any NC pump ON.

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.

RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN.

NOTE: All MSIVs are Closed.

(BOP)

RO (BOP)

(Step 5) Check NC T-Avg GOING DOWN.

(Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

IF S/G N/R level is less than 1 1% (32%

ACC) in all S/Gs...

WHEN N/R level is greater than 11%

(32% ACC) in at least one S/G, THEN throttle feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one S/G N/R level greater than 11% (32% ACC).

NOTE: NR levels are> 11%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 46 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

BOP (RO)

Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Close MSIV bypass valves.

Exit this enclosure.

Comments CRS (Step 22 RNO) IF any S/G is faulted, THEN perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN start one train of VX PER Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start):

Containment pressure is between 1 PSIG and 3 PSIG.

Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG.

BOP (RO)

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

(Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs PRESSURIZED.

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP(RO) continue HERE.

NOTE: One 1 B SG Safety Valve is stuck OPEN.

Aooendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 7

of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

CRS Expected ActionslBehavior Implement EP/1IAJ5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

Comments NOTE: Since N42 has previously failed high, an invalid Red Path will exist on Subcriticality.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-2.

CRS GO TO EP/1/AJ5000JE-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation),

EPII IAI5000IE-2, FAU LTED STEAM GEN ERATOR ISOLATION ROl (Step 5) Identify faulted SIG(s):

NOTE: The 1 B SG is Faulted.

BOP Any S/G pressure GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Any S/G DEPRESSURIZED.

RO!

BOP CRS RO!

BOP RO!

BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

(Step 2) Maintain any faulted S/G or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.

(Step 3) Check the following valves

CLOSED:

AIIMSIVs All MSIV bypass valves.

(Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure

STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: Although all SG pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG).

Otherwise a transition to ECA 2.1 will be made.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 48 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Trip/ATWSISG 1 B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

RO!

BOP ROI BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 6) Maintain at least on SIG available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps.

(Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV

CLOSED.

Comments BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.

RO/

(Step 9) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:

BOP RO!

For1BS/G:

BOP Check SIC B FDW ISOLATED status light (1SI-4)

LIT.

Close 1CA-54A (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To 1BS/G Isol).

Close 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To lB S/G Isol).

RO!

Check at least on MD CA pump

BOP RUNNING.

Dispatch operator to unlock and CLOSE the following valves:

ISA-2 (lB S/G SM Supply to Booth Instructor:

Unit I TD CA Pump Turb Maint Operate Trigger #13 (LOA Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, SAoo3.

767+12, FF-53)

After 3 minutes, as NEO report that the ISA-2 and ISA-78 are CLOSED.

1SA-78 (lB SIG SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Loop Seal Isol) (Unit I interior doghouse,_767+10,_FF-53).

Check BB valves CLOSED:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWS/SG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 1BB-23 (lB SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1BB-6A (lB SIG BB Cont Inside Isol).

Close 1SM-89 (lB SM Line Drain Isol).

RO (Step 10) Close 1AS-12 Ui SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).

BOP (Step 11) Check if S/G tubes intact as follows:

Check the following EM Fs NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-24(S/GA) 1EMF-25(S/GB) 1EMF-26(SIGC) 1EMF-27(S/GD).

IF any SIG has previously been identified NOTE: There is no previously as ruptured...

known SGTL.

CRS Notify RP to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to request Radiation Surveys.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

If SIG(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation.

Frisk allUnit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly_higher for any SIG.

Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions.

WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate SIG activity.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

6,7 & 8 Page 50 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine TripIATWSISG I B Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

RO?

BOP CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

OR N!R level in at least on intact S/G

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC)

Total feed flow to intact S/Gs

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level GREATER THAN 11% (29%

ACC).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination).

Comments NOTE: Since N42 has previously failed high, an invalid Red Path will exist on Subcriticality.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-il.

BOP (Step 2) Reset the following:

S/I Sequencers Phase A Isolation.

Phase B Isolation.

IF AT ANY TIME a BIO signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on.

both board operators aware.

RO!

BOP EPIIIAI5000IES-I.1 SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 51 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Tr1pIATWSISG lB Safety Valve fails Open Time Pos.

BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3) Establish VI to containment as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol) 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol) 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

(Step 4) Check is NS pumps should be stopped:

AnyNSpumpON.

Comments BOP (Step 7) Isolate NV SIl flowpath as follows:

Check the following valves OPEN:

1NV-221A (NV Pumps Suct From FWST) 1NV-222B (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).

BOP CRS BOP RO/

BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an NS pump starts, THEN perform Step 4.

GOTOStep5.

(Step 5) Stop all but one NV pump.

(Step 6) Check NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Nil-i Scenario#

2 Event#

6, 7&8 Page 52 of 53 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Turbine Tr1pIATWS!SG I B Safety Valve fails Open Op Test No.:

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Check the following valves

- OPEN:

1NV-150B (NV_Pumps_Recirculation) 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).

CLOSE the following valves:

1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg_nj From NV) 1NI-1OB (NC Cold Leg_lnj_From_NV).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT I STATUS:

Power Level:

100%

NCS [B]

1035 ppm Pzr [B]:

1036 ppm Xe:

Per OAC Power History:

The Plant is at 100% power (MOL),

Core Burnup:

250 EFPDs for 250 days.

CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/i /A/61 00/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

None The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A DG is OOS for corrective maintenance.

1 KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LEVEL, has failed to off (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Maintain present plant power level.

Work Control SROlOffsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Unit I Unit 2 Aux Bldg.

John Aux Bldg.

Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5

th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

PROGRAM:

McGuire Operations Training MODULE:

Initial License Operator Training Class 27 TOPIC:

NRC Simulator Exam Scenario Nil-I -3

REFERENCES:

1.

0P111A165001001, Liquid Waste System. (Rev 76) 2.

0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 168) 3.

AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. (Rev 12) 4.

Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.

5.

API1IAI5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. (Rev 9) 6.

Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.

7.

AP111A15500114, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14) 8.

EPIIIAI5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 31) 9.

EP/1 /AI5000IES-O. 1, Reactor Trip Response. (Rev 31)

10. EPI1IAI5000IE-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Rev 9)

11. EPIIIAI5000IE-1

, Response to Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant. (Rev 13)

12. EPI1IAI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination. (Rev 23)

Author:

David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review:

Rev. 041111 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility:

McGuire Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

Nil-I Examiners:

Operators:

(SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions:

Unit 1

is at 1x10 8

amps in accordance with OPI1/A/61001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift.

The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.

Turnover:

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A KR Pump is DOS for motor replacement.

1CAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator IAD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Maif.

Event Type*

Event No.

No.

Description 1

NA N-BOP Pump CF&E Sump N-SRO 2

NA R-RO Raise power to 2-3%

N-SRO 3

ENBOO7A C-RO Intermediate Range Channel failure C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 4

KCOO5A C-BOP KC System leak C(TS)-SRO 5

IREOO6H8 C-RD Sequentially Dropped Control Rods IREOO6D4 C-S RD 6

ANN M-RO Seismic Event/Steam Line Break AD13EO7 M-BOP SMOO8A M-SRD 7

EPOO1 NA Loss of Offsite Power (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (J)nstrument, (C)om ponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenarfo 3 McGuire 2011 NRC Scenario #3 Unit 1 is at 1x10 8 amps in accordance with 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase. It is intended to raise power on this shift.

The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A KR Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1CAP-5610, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is invesligating).

MCB Annunciator lAD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Upon shift turnover, before the operator initiates the power increase, the operator will pump the Containment Floor and Equipment (CF&E) Sump in accordance with Section 3.3 of Enclosure 4.2, Containment Floor and Equipment Sump and Incore Instrument Room Sump Operation, of OP/1/A/6500/001, Liquid Waste System.

Following this, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail.

The operator will enter AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.

Subsequently, a leak will develop in the KC System.

The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.

Next, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core.

The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. 30 seconds later a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. The crew will enter EPI1IAI5000IE-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

Shortly after entry into EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, the O.B.E. Exceeded annunciator will alarm, indicating that an earthquake has occurred. Within seconds a large Steam Rupture will occur outside Containment on the A Steam Generator. The operator will actuate Safety Injection, and return to EP/1/A15000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur.

Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and load onto the Emergency Busses, and all SI loads will sequence on as designed.

Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A15000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition to either EP/1/A15000/E-1, Response to Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant, or EP/1/A15000/ES-1.1, SI Termination.

The scenario will terminate this transition is made.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Tasks:

ss Trip the reactor within 30 seconds of the second dropped rod (4600111 3IE1 3.19)

Safety Significance:

Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant from challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PTIO/A/4600/l 13, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.

E-2A Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of E-2.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that would not otherwise occur.

Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

NOTE:

This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitorlcontrol Steam Generator level, Steam Dumps, Tavg, Tcold and the operating CF Pump during this scenario. This is based on Step 3.1.2 of Enclosure 4.8 of OPIIIAI6IOO!003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

Sim. Setup Rod Step On Reset to Temp I/C T = 0 Malfunctions:

160.

LOA-KROO4 = Racked Out XMT-CAO5I =32 (lc-9, Close 1WL-65B, ANN-ADO4-A05 = 0 (ON) entered MALF-PLP025= 30 gpm and raise Sump 1A to 1 3, When there, inset a value of 0.0 to MALF PLP025. When the sump has stopped filling, delete MALF-PLPO26.)

RUN Place TagoutlO-Stick on:

IA KR Pump (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs ICAP-56I0 (0-Stick)

MCB Annunciator IAD-9, D-6 (0-stick)

Update Status Board, NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Setup OAC Q

Freeze.

Q Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Q Fill out the NEOs Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew RUN Briefing Scenario Event Description NRCScenario3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing 1.

Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements 2.

Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3.

Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OPI1IAJ6100/003, marked up as follows:

Step 2.1 Initialed.

Step 3.1 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.2 Initialed.

Step 3.3 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.4 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.5 Initialed.

Step 3.6 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.7 Initialed.

Step 3.8 Initialed. (Four Sub-Bullets)

Step 3.9.1 Initialed.

Step 3.9.2 Initialed.

Step 3.9.3 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.9.4 Initialed.

Step 3.9.5 Initialed.

Step 3.10.1 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.10.2 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.10.3 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.11 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.12 Initialed. (Management Designee: John Williams, Evolution Coordinator: Pam Smith)

Step 3.13.1 Initialed twice.

Step 3.13.2 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.3 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.4.1 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.4.2 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.4.3 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.4.4 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.5 Initialed twice.

Step 3.13.6 2

nd Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.7 Initialed.

Step 3.13.8 Initialed.

Scenario Event Description NRCScenario3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing (Contd)

Step 3.13.9 2 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.10 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.13.11 Initialed.

Step 3.13.12 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.13 Initialed.

Step 3.13.13.1 Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.13.2 Initialed.

Step 3.13.13.3 Both Checkboxes checked.

Step 3.13.13.4 Initialed.

Step 3.13.13.14Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13,15 Checkbox checked.

. Rod Position Bank: D Steps: 123

. Tavg: 557.5

. Boron Concentration: 1847

. Time: 0600

. Xenon Worth: 0

. Samarium Difference from equilibrium: -98.95 Step 3.13.16

- Checkbox checked.

Step 3.13.17

- Initialed.

Step 3.13.18 NA/Initialed.

Step 3.13.19

- Initialed.

Step 3.14 Initialed.

4. Provide Enclosure 4.8 of OP/1/A16100/003, marked up as follows:

. Step 3.1 Initialed.

. Step 3.1.1 Initialed. Reactor Operator: Enter Candidates Name on Exam Day

. Step 3.1.2 Initialed. Reactor Operator: Enter Candidates Name on Exam Day

. Step 3.1.3 Initialed. Reactor Operator: Enter Candidates Name on Exam Day

. Step 3.1.4 Initialed.

Step 3.2.1 Checkbox checked.

. Maneuvering Fuel Limit: No rate restriction 0-50%

. Control Rod Withdrawal Limits: None

. Step 3.2.2 Initialed, Person Notified: John Doe/

. Step 3.2.3 Initialed.

Step 3.2.4 NA/Initialed.

. Step 3.2.5 Checkbox checked.

5. Provide a copy of Enclosure 4.14 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg), Table 4.14-1 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg) of OP/1JA/6100/003, (Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation).

6. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

Q T-0 Begin Familiarization Period Scenario Event Description NRC SenariO 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q

At direction of Event I Pump CF&E Sump examiner D

At direction of Event 2 Raise power to 2-3%

examiner At direction of Event 3 Intermediate Range Channel failure examiner (MALF) ENBOO7A = 0 No Ramp/Delay Trigger #1 At direction of Event 4 KC System leak examiner (MALF) KCOO5A = 4 No Ramp/Delay LOA-KCOII = I (OPEN) (120 second Delay)

Trigger #3 LOA-KCOI2 = I (OPEN) (120 second Delay)

Trigger #5 LOA-KC023 =.5 (OPEN) (120 second Delay)

Trigger #7 LOA-KC024 =.5 (OPEN) (120 second Delay)

Trigger #9 Q

At direction of Event 5 Sequentially Dropped Control Rods examiner (MALE) IREOO6H8 =

No Delay (MALE) IREOO6D4 = I Delay = 30 seconds Trigger #11 Scenario Event Description NRC scenarIo Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 6 Seismic Event/Steam Line Break examiner ANN-ADI3-E7 = ON Trigger #13 (MALF) SMOO8A =

4.125 E+6 Ramp = 20 Seconds Delay = 5 Seconds Trigger #13 Q

At direction of Event 7 Loss of Offsite Power examiner (MALF) EPOOI Delay = 5 Seconds Trigger #13 Q

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

1 Page 10 of 43 Event

Description:

Pump CF&E Sump Upon shift turnover, before the operator initiates the power increase, the operator will pump the Containment Floor and Equipment (CF&E) Sump in accordance with Section 3.3 of Enclosure 4.2, Containment Floor and Equipment Sump and Incore Instrument Room Sump Operation, of OPI1/A16500/OO1, Liquid Waste System.

Booth Operator Instructions:

NA Indications Available:

NA Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A165001001, LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.2, CONTAINMENT FLOOR AND EQUIPMENT SUMP AND INCORE INSTRUMENT ROOM SUMP OPERATION BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

Section 3.3, Pumping Containment Floor and Equipment_Sump(s)

BOP (Step 3.3) Pumping Containment Floor and Equipment Sump(s)

IF time allows...

IF in Modes 1, 2, 3, or4, perform the following:

Declare Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Level Monitoring System_inoperable.

OR Ensure Containment Floor and Equipment Sump pump-out duration is less than 30 minutes.

Check CFAE Sump(s) to be pumped greater than 8 inches.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 11 of 43 Event

Description:

Pump CF&E Sump Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP Record Containment Floor and Equipment_Sump_level(s) to be pumped.

A CFAE Level 7 inches =

NOTE: The operator will inches to be pumped record 13 inches.

Estimate and record gallons to be NOTE: The operator will pumped (total inches to be pumped x 36 record 216 gallons.

gallons per inch):

gallons Notify Radwaste Chemistry of estimated gallons of water to be pumped form Floor and Equipment_Sump(s).

Ensure the following open:

1WL-65B (RB Sump Pumps Disch NOTE: The BOP will open this Cont Outside Isol) valve.

1WL-64A (Unit 1 Rx Bldg Sump Pumps Disch Cont Inside Isol)

Start desired CFAE pump(s):

NOTE: The operator will start both pumps.

1A1 CFAE Pump 1A2CFAEPump HOLD until desired to secure pumping CFAE, THEN perform the following:

Ensure off:

1B1 CFAE Pump 1B2CFAEPump Perform one of the following:

IF power available to 1WL-65B NOTE: The BOP will close this (Rx Bldg Sump Pumps Disch valve.

Cont Outside Isol), close 1WL-65B.

Evaluate Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Level Monitoring System_operability.

Record final Containment Floor and Equipment_Sump_level(s):

A CFAE Level NOTE: The BOP will record 7 inches.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 12 of 43 Event

Description:

Pump CF&E Sump Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Multiply total level decrease (inches) by 36 (gallons per inch) and record gallons discharged in Autolog.

IF total gallons pumped is different from estimated gallons provided to Radwaste Chemistry in Step 3.3.6, notify Radwaste Chemistry of actual amount pumped.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Comments

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

2 Page 13 of 43 Event

Description:

Raise power to 2-3%

Following this, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of 0P111A161001003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 0P111A161001003, CONTROLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE RO (Step 3.15) Perform the following to control NC System temperature until Turbine Generator is paralleled to the grid:

Maintain the following by adjusting setpoint on STM PRESS CONTROLLER:

Tcold 557-559°F SM Pressure 1060-1110 psig RO Refer to Enclosure 4.14 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg), Table 4.14-1 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg) for expected Tavg for a given Reactor Power level.

CRS (Step 3.16) IF feedwater flow is aligned to NOTE: CF flow is NOT aligned CA nozzles, perform the following:

to CA Nozzles.

Ensure Reactor Power will remain less than 20% RTP.

Evaluate swapping to CF nozzles per OP/1/A/62501001 (Condensate and Feedwater System)

BOP (Step 3.17) Ensure in service CF Pump NOTE: 1A CF Pump is aligned Turbine LP GOV CNTRL and HP GOV as needed.

CNTRL in auto.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 14 of 43 Event

Description:

Raise power to 2-3%

Time Pos.

ROl BOP RO Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3.18) IF AT ANY TIME SIG N/R Level decreases to 28% OR exceeds 52%, perform the following Comments NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

(Step 3.19) Increase Reactor Power to 2%

RTP (2.0-2.5%).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 15 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Range Channel failure After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail. The operator will enter AP111A15500116, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #1 (ENBOO7A(O))

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, C-2, hR COMPENSATING VOLT FAILURE COMP VOLT status liqht on Nl-35 Drawer is LIT Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS BOP (Step 3) Place failed or channel LEVEL TRIP switch on hR Drawer to BYPASS.

BOP (Step 4) Check the following LIT:

LEVEL TRIP BYPASS indicating light on failed hR drawer.

SIR OR hR TRIP BYPASS alarm (lAD-2, E-2).

The failed channels status light on 1SI-19:

1IN-35A hR CHANNEL I TRIP BYPASS OR AP111A15500116, MALFUNCTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CASE II, INTERMEDIATE RANGE MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) Check one IIR channel

OPERABLE.

(Step 2) Announce occurrence on paging system.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event#

3 Page 16 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Range Channel failure Time Pos.

RD CRS/

ROl BOP RO RD Expected ActionslBehavior i/N-36A hR CHANNEL II TRIP BYPASS.

(Step 5) Place operable hR channel to record on NIS Recorder (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME hR fuses are pulled above P-iO, THEN they should be inserted prior to lowering power below P-i 0 (to prevent a reactor trip).

(Step 7) Check hR channel FAILED LOW.

(Step 7 RNO) WHEN reactor less than P-6 during any subsequent shutdown (with failed IR channel), THEN place SOURCE RANGE SELECT switches to RESET to energize S/R detectors.

Comments NOTE: The RD will need to take this action later in the scenario.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

Booth Operator Instructions:

WHEN the CRS checks the Technical Specifications, Operate Trigger #3 (KCOO5A (4))

(NOTE: This action is needed to set up for Event 4, and the Malfunction will require 5 minutes before observable effects are seen)

CRS (Step 8) WHEN malfunctioning fR channel repaired, THEN....

NOTE: The channel will remain 005.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the malfunction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

3 Page 17 of 43 Intermediate Range Channel failure Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION CRS CRS CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable.

IMMEDIATELY A. 1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 forthe channel(s).

F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to

<P-6.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months F. THERMAL POWER

>P-6 and

<P-1O, one Intermediat e Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable NOTE: The CRS will determine that power must be raised or lowered within 24 OR F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to

>P-1o.

hours.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

4 Page 18 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Subsequently, a

leak will develop in the KC System.

The operator will enter AP111A15500121, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water System.

Booth Operator Instructions:

Operate Trigger #3 (KCOO5A (4))

(NOTE:_Operated as part of Event 3)

Indications Available:

(NOTE: This Malfunction will require 5 minutes before observable effects are seen)

MOB Annunciator 1AD13, C-i, ND & NS ROOM SUMP HI-HI LEVEL, alarms.

OAC Alarm Ui KC Surge Tank Compartment A Level.

KC Surge Tank Level 1A is lowering.

Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KO pump ON.

RO!

(Step 2) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress.

CRS (Step 4) Check ND IN RHR MODE.

CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7.

CRS (Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system.

to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 8) Check both trains KC Surge Tank level STABLE OR GOING UP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

4 Page 19 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 8 RNO) IF Surge Tank level trend NOTE:

1A KC Surge Tank indicates a KC System leak, THEN GO TO level is lowering.

Step 11.

CRS!

(Step 11) Initiate YM makeup to KC Surge BOP Tank as follows:

Immediately dispatch operator to open NOTE: The CRS/BO P will the following valves as required to dispatch an NEC.

maintain KC Surge Tank level:

Booth Instructor:

Operate Trigger #5 (LOA KC011112 (Open).

Within 2 minutes, as NEO report that YM is being added to the KC Surge Tank.

(NOTE: This may need to be closed later)

To makeup to 1A KC Surge Tank, unlock and open 1KC-107 (1A KC Surge Tank Compartment YM Supply Isol) (aux bldg, 767+2, JJ-57, under grating, between KC surge tanks)

To makeup to 18 KC Surge tank, NOTE: The 1 B KC Surge unlock and open 1 KC-1 1 1 (1 B KC Tank level may be lowering by Surge Tank Compartment YM this time.

Supply Isol) (aux bldg, 767+2, JJ-58, under grating, between KC surge tanks).

Adjust makeup rate as required to prevent overflow of KC Surge Tank (approximately 8.5 ft.).

CRS!

(Step 12) Dispatch operators to locate leak.

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP an NEC, or NEOs.

Booth Instructor:

Within 3 minutes, as NEO, report that piping downstream of 1A1 KC Pump has a leak.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Ni 1-1 Scenario #

3 Event #

4 Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Pos.

BOP CRSI BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 13) Check KC drain tank pump OFF.

(Step 14) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that YM makeup is inadequate to restore or stabilize KC surge tank level, THEN immediately align RN Makeup to KC PER (Aligning RN Makeup to KC Surge Tank) as required.

(Step 15) Check both trains KC surge tank level GREATER THAN 3 FT.

Comments NOTE: The CRS will take this action later.

When this is done:

Booth Instructor:

Operate Trigger #7 (LOA KC023 (Open).

Operate Trigger #9 (LOA KC024 (Open).

Within 2 minutes, as NEO report that RN is being added to the KC Surge Tank.

(NOTE: This may need to be closed later)

Examiner NOTE: Level may be greater or less than 3 feet.

Either way, the CRS will ultimately arrive at Step 20.

If needed. Move forward to Step 20 below.

BOP (Step 20) Isolate 1A KC Train from lB KC Examiner NOTE: The crew Train as follows:

may implement Enclosure 2 at any time based on Foldout Page Criteria.

If so, move forward to actions on Page 20.

Check any 1A KC Train pump

RUNNING.

BOP CRS (Step 16) Check sum of both trains KC surge tank level drops LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 0.10 FT/MIN.

(Step 16 RNO) IF level is dropping faster than 0.10 ftfmin, THEN GO TO Step 20.

NOTE: The level is lowering at.3 ft/minute.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

4 Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Check the following valves OPEN:

1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) 1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

Close the following valves:

1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

WHEN valves in Step 20c are closed, THEN check 1A KC Surge Tank level

GOING DOWN.

GOTOStep21.

CRS BOP (Step 21) Check Unit 2 KC Surge Tank level

- STABLE.

AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 2, ISOLATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL HEADERS BOP (Step 2) Ensure 1NV-121 (ND Letdown Control) is closed.

BOP (Step 1) Ensure normal letdown is isolated.

Comments Examiner NOTE: it is assumed that the crew will have been directed to implement Enclosure 2 by this point.

If NOT, the crew will continue in AP21, and implement this Enclosure shortly.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

4 Page 22 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Time Pos BOP BOP BOP CRS BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 3) Ensure recirc valve(s) on operating KC pumps in AUTO.

Comments IKC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) 1 KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol).

(Step 4) Isolate Aux Bldg Non-essential header from affected train:

IF 1A KC Surge Tank is less than 2 ft, OR 1A KC pumps tripped due to low surge tank level, THEN close:

1 KC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) 1KC-1A (Tm AAux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

IF 1 B KC Surge Tank is less than 2 ft, OR 1A KC pumps tripped due to low surge tank level CRSI (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP NOTE: The 1 B Surge Tank level is 2.25 feet.

(Step 5) Ensure all NM valves located on 1 MC-8 (vertical board)

CLOSED.

(Step 6) Check ND letdown ISOLATED PRIOR TO EVENT.

level:

(Step 7) Check both trains of KC surge tank Level STABLE OR GOING UP Level ON SCALE NOTE: The level will be lowering in 1A Surge Tank, and rising in the 1 B Surge tank.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

4 Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments IF surge tank level is less than 1 ft, OR NOTE: This condition will KC pumps were tripped due to low surge most likely be met.

tank level, THEN GO TO Step 9.

BOP (Step 9) Isolate Reactor Bldg Non-essential header from affected train as follows:

IF 1A KC Surge Tank is less than 1 ft, OR 1A KC pumps were tripped due to low surge tank level, THEN close:

1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).

1 KC-3A (Tm A Rs Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

IF 1 B KC Surge Tank is less than 1 ft...

NOTE:

It is likely that the 1 B KC Surge Tank level is> 1 foot.

Ensure NC pump trip criteria on Foldout page is monitored.

CRS (Step 11) Swap KC to train with surge tank level greater than 2 ft as follows:

To start 1A Train, GO TO Enclosure 4 (Startup of 1A KC Train)

OR To start 1 B Train, GO TO Enclosure 5 (Startup of 1 B KC Train).

NOTE: The CRS will go to.

AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 5, STARTUP OF lB KC TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check IKC-81B (KC to B ND HX)

CLOSED.

BOP (Step 10) Check either KC train surge tank level GREATER THAN 2 FT.

NOTE: The crew may stop makeup to the Surge Tank at this point.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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3 Event#

4 Page 24 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 2) Check 1KC-56A (KC To A ND HX)

CLOSED.

(Step 3) Check 1A Train KC pumps OFF.

(Step 4) Select CLOSED on 1 KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol).

(Step 5) Check 1 B Train KC pumps OFF.

(Step 6) IF voiding of 1 B train KC is suspected, Comments NOTE: The A Train KC Pumps may be running.

NOTE: The B Train KC Pumps are expected to be OFF.

If NOT, Move forward to Step 17 on Page 24.

NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected.

BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the AUTO position.

BOP BOP BOP (Step 7) Close the following:

1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup IsoI).

1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-228B (Tm B Rs Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret sd).

(Step 8) Start lB RN pump.

(Step 9) Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) opens.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenano #

3 Event #

4 Page 25 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Pos.

BOP BOP BOP BOP CRS CRS Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 11) Ensure 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) opens.

(Step 12) Start 1B1 KC pump.

(Step 13) Check 1KC-12 (1B1 KC Pump Discharge)

LOCALLY THROTTLED IN STEP 6.

(Step 13 RNO) Perform the following:

StartlB2KCpump.

GOTOStep17.

(Step 17) Check ND pumpsANY ON PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

Comments NOTE: 1KC-12 was NOT previously throttled.

NOTE: No ND Pumps were on prior to entering this procedure.

BOP (Step 24) Align KC as follows:

Monitor the following KC pump parameters while aligning KC in this step:

Pump flow and amps KC surge tank level.

CRS BOP BOP CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

(Step 20) Check KC leak HAS OCCURRED.

(Step 21) Check KC header with leak HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED.

(Step 22) GO TO Step 24.

NOTE: A KC leak has occurred.

NOTE: A KC leak has been identified downstream of KC Pump 1A1.

Time

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

4 Page 26 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Op Test No.:

BOP BOP BOP Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.

Check LEAK IDENTIFIED ON 1A KC TRAIN ESSENTIAL HEADER.

Close the following valves:

1 KC-230A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).

BOP 1 KC-3A (Tm A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

Open the following valves:

1KC-18B (Tm B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-228B (Tm B Rx Bldg non Ess Sup_Isol).

Close the following valves:

1 KC-50A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).

1 KC-1A (Tm A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

Open the following valves:

1 KC-2B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1 KC-53B (Tm B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup_Isol).

BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1 KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) closes.

(Step 25) Check 1A ND pump OFF.

(Step 26) Check 1 KC-56A (KC To A ND HX)

CLOSED.

(Step 27) Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the CLOSE position.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

4 Page 27 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Time Pos.

BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 29) Stop 1A1 and 1A2 pumps.

(Step 30) Check KC flow LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.

(Step 31) Check ND pumpsANY ON PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

Comments NOTE:

It is likely that the A Train KC Pumps are OFF.

NOTE: No ND Pumps were on prior to entering this procedure.

CRS BOP CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37.

(Step 37) Check KC System leak HAS OCCURRED.

(Step 38) GO TO Step 39 in boy of this procedure.

NOTE: A KC leak has occurred.

AP111A15500121, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS (Step 39) Continue attempts to identify and isolate leak.

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may address Technical Specifications at this time.

If NOT, address this Technical Specification evaluation at the end of the scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

4 Page 28 of 43 Event

Description:

KC System leak Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One CCW A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months train CCWtrainto inoperable OPERABLE status.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenano#

3 Event#

5 Page 29 of 43 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Control Rods Next, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/11A15500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. 30 seconds later a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor.

The crew will enter EPI1IAI5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The operator will transition to EPI1IAI5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (IREOO6H8 (1), IREOO6D4 (1), 30 seconds delayed)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, A-b, ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE, alarms.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-9, RPI AT BOTTOM ROD DROP, alarms.

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-10, RPI URGENT FAILURE, alarms.

DRPI indication that Control Rod H8 is on the bottom.

30 seconds later:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, E-9, RPI AT BOTTOM >1 ROD DROPPED, alarms.

DRPI indication that Control Rod D4 is on the bottom.

APII 1A15500114, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION EPIIIAI5000IE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Time Pos.

RO RO RO Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, THEN perform the following:

Trip Reactor.

GO TO EP/1IA/50001E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

(Step 2) Place control rods in manual.

(Step 3) Check rod movement STOPPED.

Comments Immediate Action NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.

Immediate Action Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Ni i-i Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 30 of 43 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Control Rods SRO CRITICAL TASK:

(SS) Trip the reactor within 30 seconds of the second dropped rod (460011 131E13.19)

Safety Significance:

Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant from challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.

BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

Immediate Action All throttle valves CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

RO /

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

Immediate Action BOP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18)

LIT.

BOP (Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:

Immediate Action Check if S/I is required:

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

All rod bottom lights LIT Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN I/R amps GOING DOWN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event#

5 Page 31 of 43 Sequentially Dropped Control Rods BOP CRS Time Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Pzr pressure less than 1845 PSIG OR Containment pressure greater than I PSIG.

IF S/I is required, THEN initiate S/I.

If S/I is not required, THEN perform the following:

Implement EPI1/A/5000/F-D (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EP/l/A/5000/ES-O.l NOTE: The CRS will transition (Reactor Trip Response).

to ES-O.1.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

EPIIIAI5000IES-O.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE NOTE: The RO will need to manually re-energize the S/R Channels due to a previous malfunction.

RO!

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 4) REFER TO the following:

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

(Step 2) Check the following:

VI pressure GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

Any Unit 1 6900V bus ENERGIZED.

(Step 3) Announce: Unit 1 Reactor trip, non essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 turbine bldg.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event#

5 Page 32 of 43 Event

Description:

Sequentially Dropped Control Rods Pos.

RO!

BOP RO!

BOP Expected ActionslBehavior RPIOIAI5700I000 (Classification of Emergency)

RPIOIAI5700IO1O (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

(Step 5) Check NC temperatures:

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

(Step 6) Continue to monitor NC temperature as follows:

Check any NC pump ON.

IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure the following occurs, THEN perform Step 5.

OR NC T-Avg is less than 557°F and going down.

NC T-Avg is greater than 557°F and going up.

Time Comments NOTE: The RO/BOP recognizes the need for SI and manually actuate SI. The CRS will transition back to E-O.

When SI is actuated move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

6&7 Page 33 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Shortly after entry into EPIIIAI5000IES-O.1, the O.B.E. Exceeded annunciator will alarm, indicating that an earthquake has occurred. Within seconds a large Steam Rupture will occur outside Containment on the A Steam Generator. The operator will actuate Safety Injection, and return to EP/1IAJ5000IE-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur.

Both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and load onto the Emergency Busses, and all SI loads will sequence on as designed.

Upon completion of E-O, the operator will transition to EPI1IAI5000IE-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Upon completion of E-2, the operator will transition to either EPI1IAI5000IE-1, Response to Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant, or EPI1IAI5000IES-1.1, SI Termination.

The scenario will terminate this transition is made.

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #13 (ANN-AD13-E7 (ON),

SMOO8A(4.125 E+6) and EPOOI)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD13 E-7, OBE EXCEEDED, alarms.

Control Room lights dim.

A EDG starts and loads onto Bus 1 ETA.

B EDG starts and loads onto Bus 1 ETB.

DRPI Panels de-energize.

Control Room lights return to normal after ESF Busses re-energize.

1A SG pressure starts to lower.

RCS pressure starts to lower.

SI actuates.

Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The RD will need to manually re-energize the SIR Channels due to a previous malfunction.

EPIIIAI5000!E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION SRO (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

RD (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:

Immediate Action All rod bottom lights LIT NOTE: DRPI indication is no longer available.

Reactor trip and bypass breakers

OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

6 & 7 Page 34 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos.

BOP BOP RO I BOP Expected ActionslBehavior hR amps GOING DOWN.

(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip...

(Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:

All throttle valves CLOSED.

(Step 4) Check 1 ETA and 1 ETB

ENERGIZED.

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated:

SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (151-i 8) LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14)

LIT.

Comments Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1,2, 5DARK.

Group 3 LIT.

SRO BOP (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection.

(Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4)

- LIT (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights

DARK.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

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3 Event#

6&7 Page 35 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic Event/Steam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power OAC-IN SERVICE.

Group 4, Rows A through F LIT AS REQUIRED.

MD CA pumps ON.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs GREATER THAN 17%.

Pos.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments CRS GO TO Step 10.

RO /

(Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ON.

NOTE: The Train A KC Pumps will re-start upon actuation of SI.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps ON.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following:

report 2A RN Pump is running.

Start 2A RN pump.

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures

NOTE: The 1A SG is GREATER THAN 775 psig.

depressurizing.

RO (Step 14 RNO) Perform the following:

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

Check the following valves closed:

All MSIVs All MSIV bypass valves All SM PORVs.

IFanyvalveopen....

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event #

6 & 7 Page 36 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic Event/Steam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos.

BOP BOP BOP Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure

HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

(Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressures LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

Check NI pumps INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure LESS THAN 275 PSIG.

(Step 16d RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (lB ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is 0 psig.

NOTE: NV Flow is 320 gpm.

RO I (Step 18) Check CA flow:

BOP Total CA flow GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

Check VI header pressure GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN each SIG N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 1 1% (32% ACC) and 50%.

CRS CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

6&7 Page 37 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic Event/Steam Line Break/Loss of Offsite Power Pos.

RO Expected ActionslBehavior Comments (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

OR IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

NOTE: All NC Pumps will be ON.

(Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:

IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO to perform this action.

If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 37.

E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.

RO RO RO RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves

CLOSED.

(Step 2) Check all SM PORVs CLOSED.

(Step 3) Check MSR RESET light LIT.

(Step 4) Check any NC pump ON.

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

6&7 Page 38 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos.

RO RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

IF SIG N/R level is less than 11% (32%

ACC) in all SIGs...

WHEN NIR level is greater than 11%

(32% ACC) in at least one SIG, THEN throttle feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one SIG NIR level greater than 11% (32% ACC).

(Step 7) Check MSIVs ANY OPEN.

(Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Close MSIV bypass valves.

Exit this enclosure.

Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: All MSIVs are Closed.

BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 0°F.

BOP (Step 22) Check if main steam lines intact:

All S/G pressures STABLE OR GOING NOTE: The 1A SG is UP depressurizing.

BOP E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

All Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

Normal Pzr spray valves CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve

OPEN.

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRSIBOP continue HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-I Scenario#

3 Event#

6&7 Page 39 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos.

CRS Expected ActionslBehavior All SIGs PRESSURIZED.

(Step 22 RNO) IF any SIG is faulted, THEN perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN start one train of VX PER Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start):

Containment pressure is between 1 PSIG and 3 PSIG.

Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG.

Comments NOTE: The Containment pressure is < 1 psig.

CRS CRS Implement EPI1IAI5000IF-O (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EPI1IAI5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation),

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-2.

EPII IAI5000IE-2, FAULTED STEAM GEN ERATOR ISOLATION RO!

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted S/G or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.

RO (Step 3) Check the following valves

CLOSED:

AIIMSIVs All MSIV bypass valves.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

6&7 Page 40 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos.

RO ROI BOP Expected ActionslBehavior (Step 4) Check at least one SIG pressure

STABLE OR GOING UP.

(Step 5) Identify faulted SIG(s):

Any SIG pressure GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Any S/GDEPRESSURIZED.

(Step 6) Maintain at least one S/G available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps.

Comments NOTE: Although all SG pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG).

Otherwise a transition to ECA 2.1 will be made.

NOTE: The 1A SG is Faulted.

RO/

(Step 9) Isolate faulted S/C(s) as follows:

BOP RO!

For lAS/C:

BOP Check SIC A FDW ISOLATED status light (1SI-4)

LIT.

Close 1CA-66A (Ui TD CA Pump Disch To IA S/G Isol).

Close 1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/C Isol).

Check BB valves CLOSED:

RO BOP (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV CLOSED.

(Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

Nil-i Scenario #

3 Event#

6 & 7 Page 41 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic EventlSteam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power Pos.

RD Expected ActionslBehavior 1BB-1B (1A SIG Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1BB-5A (A SIG BB Cont Inside Isol).

Close 1SM-83 (A SM Line Drain Isol).

(Step 10) Close 1AS-12 (Ui SM To AS Hdr Control In let Isol).

(Step 10 RNO) IF 1AS-12 will not close, THEN perform the following:

IF controller for lAS-i 1 (Unit 1 Main Steam TO Aux Steam Hdr Control)

(Unit 1 turbine bldg, 739, on column 1 F-34) is accessible, THEN dispatch operator to CLOSE lAS-i 1 PER EP/1/A15000/G-1 (Generic Enclosure). Enclosure 4 (Closing lAS-i 1 Using Local Controller), Step 2.

IF controller for lAS-i 1 is not accessible....

Comments BOP (Step 11) Check if S/G tubes intact as follows:

Check the following EM Fs NORMAL:

1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-24(S/GA) 1EMF-25(S/GB) 1EMF-26(S/GC) 1EMF-27 (S/G_D).

IF any S/G has previously been identified NOTE: There is no previously as ruptured...

known SGTL.

NOTE: The controller for lAS 1 1 is accessible.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:

Nil-i Scenario#

3 Event#

6&7 Page 42 of 43 Event

Description:

Seismic Event/Steam Line BreaklLoss of Offsite Power P05.

Expected ActionslBehavior Notify RP to perform the following:

If SIG(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation.

Frisk all Unit 1 SIG cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions.

WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate S/G activity.

Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

ROl (Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria:

BOP NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least on intact S/G

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC)

OR Total feed flow to intact S/Gs

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure STABLE OR GOING UP.

PzrlevelGREATERTHAN 11% (29%

ACC).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection_Termination).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.1 if the SI termination criteria is met, or E-1 if it is NOT met.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNITISTATUS:

Power Level:

1x10 8

NCS [B]

1847 ppm Pzr [B]:

1856 ppm Xe:

Per OAC amps Power History:

The reactor has just been started up Core Burnup:

12 EFPDs three days after a trip from 100%

power.

CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:

OP/1/A16100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

Unit 1 is at 1x10 8 amps in accordance with OP/1/A16100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase.

It is intended to raise power on this shift.

The CF&E Sump level is high, and the crew will need to pump the contents of the sump to the Floor Drains Tank.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A KR Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

1 CAP-561 0, CAST LEVEL CH 1, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-4, A-5, BB BLOWOFF TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Pump the CF&E Sump using 0P111A16500/OO1

, Liquid Waste System.

Raise reactor power to 2-3% and Hold in accordance with Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A16100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLOs AVAILABLE Uniti Unit2 Aux Bldg.

John Aux Bldg.

Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5

th Rounds. Carol Extra(s)

Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

ML112650108

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