ML081290517

Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone and Nancy Burton Reply to Responses of NRC Staff and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. to Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing

ML081290517
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/22/2008
From:	Burton N Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
08-862-01-OLA-BD01, 50-423-OLA, RAS P-14
Download: ML081290517 (106)

Text

DOCKETED USNRC April 23, 2008 (8:00am) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Before the Atomic Safety andLicensing Board In the Matter of Docket No. 50-423 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

(Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3) April 22, 2008 CONNECTICUT COALITION AGAINST MILLSTONE AND NANCY BURTON REPLY TO RESPONSES OF NRC STAFF AND DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

TO PETITION TO INTERVENE AND REQUEST FOR HEARING Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §2.309(h)(2), the Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone

("CCAM") and Nancy Burton ("Ms. Burton")(collectively, "CCAM") hereby reply to the responses by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") Staff ("NRC Staff Answer to Request to Intervene and for Hearing of the Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone and Nancy Burton")("NRC Staff Answer") and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.'s ("Dominion") Response to Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone and Nancy Burton's Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing")(Dominion Response"), both dated April 11, 2008, to CCAM's Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing.

Selection of Hearing Procedures CCAM requests that Subpart G hearing procedures be followed in these proceedings, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §2.310. Resolution of CCAM's contentions necessitates resolution of issues of material fact including material facts relating to the occurrence of past activities - such as issues related to Dominion's historical practice of exceeding power limits as set forth in Contention 3; the structural integrity of the Millstone Unit 3 containment as set forth in Contention 4; Dominion's failure to detect the evolution of "tin whiskers" in its circuit boards (which are being modified to achieve

the proposed power uprate) which led to an unplanned shutdown in April 2005 with unusual releases of radiation to the environment;' and historical failures of Dominion and its predecessor, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, related to recurring valve and other equipment malfunctions and engineering failure and leading to inter alia damage to the Millstone Unit 3 safety systems in March 1998.2 In each of these matters, the credibility of an eyewitness may reasonably be expected to be at issue and/or issues of motive or intent of the party or eyewitness material to the resolution of the contested matters.3 Standing The NRC Staff does not object to CCAM's assertion of standing to obtain a hearing.4 The NRC Staff does not object to Ms. Burton's assertion of individual standing with certain qualifiers.5 Dominion does not object to CCAM's standing to seek to obtain a See Exhibit A, Photograph of Millstone Unit 3 on April 17, 2005 as it continuously vented steam for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in a Class II Emergency.

2 See Exhibit B, "Damage to Millstone 3 Safety System Raises More Questions" (New London Day, April 3, 1998).

3 Dominion's application is noteworthy for its complete failure to acknowledge historical issues involving recurring pump, valve and other significant mechanical failures and engineering errors; nor does the application provide information from which it may be reasonably concluded that such recurring problems will not recur when Millstone Unit 3 is operating under heightened stresses at a 7+% power uprate.

' NRC Staff Answer at 8.

5 The NRC Staff does not oppose Ms. Burton's individual standing "assuming Ms. Burton's seasonal residence at Mystic, Connecticut is valid and her presence there is frequent." NRC Staff Answer at 9.

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hearing nor does it object to Ms. Burton acting as CCAM's representative. Dominion does object to Ms. Burton's assertion of individual standing.7 Dominion's Response asserts that Ms. Burton's declaration that she is a "seasonal resident" of Mystic, Connecticut, a locality ten miles downwind from Millstone, is "too vague to demonstrate standing. Where a petitioner claims standing based on visits to the vicinity of a plant, the petitioner must provide sufficient information on their length and nature to establish a bond between the petitioner and the facility's vicinity and 'the likelihood of an ongoing connection and presence,"' citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI 98-13, 48 N.R.C. 26, 32 & n.3 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI 99-10, 49 N.R.C. 318, 324 (1999).)

Ms. Burton maintains that her assertion of "seasonal residency" in Mystic, Connecticut suffices to confer individual standing, as Mystic, Connecticut is indisputably located within approximately ten miles of Millstone. More particularly, Ms. Burton shares frequent spring, summer and fall occupancy of a summer cottage in Mystic with her husband, owner of the cottage, as she has done on a regular basis since 1970 and as she expects to continue to do into the future. Should the ASLB Panel wish further details with regard to Ms. Burton's occupancy of her husband's Mystic cottage, Ms.

Burton will be happy to accommodate the Panel's further inquiry.

6 Dominion Response at 4.

7 Dominion Response at 4-5.

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Contentions Both the NRC Staff and Dominion object to the admissibility of all of CCAM's contentions.

As discussed below, their arguments opposing admission of the contentions are without merit. CCAM's contentions satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R. §2.309(f) because they provide a specific statement of the issues of law and/or fact to be controverted, identifying the particular aspects of the power uprate application with which CCAM has a dispute. The contentions also show the issues raised by the contentions are material to the NRC's decision on the power uprate application and within the scope of this proceeding. Finally, the contentions are supported by documentation and/or expert opinion sufficient to show that a "genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact." 10 C.F.R. §2.309(f)(1)(vi). Where the NRC Staff and/or Dominion in their responses take issue with factual assertions of CCAM and CCAM's experts, CCAM respectfully represents that CCAM and CCAM's experts stand on their factual assertions; factual disputes are to be resolved by the fact-finder, here, the ASLB Panel, during the hearing proceedings.

Statement of Standards for Admissibility of Contentions To be admissible, a contention need be supported by "a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions which support the requestor's petitioner's position." 64 NRC at 186, citing 10 C.F.R. §2.309(f)(v). Further, at the contention-filing stage, the petitioner "must make a minimal showing that material facts are in dispute, thereby 4

demonstrating that an 'inquiry in depth' is appropriate. Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings - Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed.

Reg. at 33,171 (August 11, 1989), (emphasis added) citing Connecticut Bankers Association v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 245, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

"To trigger a full adjudicatory hearing, petitioners must be able to 'proffer at least some minimal factual and legal foundation in support of their contentions.'"ln the Matter of Florida Light & Power Company (Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant), 54 NRC 3, (2001), citing Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Stations, Units 1, 2 and 3), 49 NRC 328, 334 (1999). "Hearings should serve the purpose for which they are intended: 'to adjudicate genuine, substantive safety and environmental issues placed in contention by qualified intervenors.' ld.-(Citing H.R. Rep. No.97-177, at 151 (1981). "While intervenors need not be technical experts, they must knowledgeably provide some threshold-level factual basis for their contention."

CCAM's Contentions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 satisfy the above standards. The NRC Staff and Dominion differ with CCAM as to material facts in dispute. It is for the administrative law board to decide the factual issues through a full administrative hearing under Subpart G procedures.

Contention 1:

The proposed power level for which Dominion has applied to uprate Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 exceeds the NRC's SPU regulatory "criteria." The SPU application fails to satisfy the first NRC "criterion" 8 that the NRC has set the power limit for SPUs at ".... up to 7%..." (Emphasis added.)

8 Id.

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It is notable that as a result of CCAM's Petition to Intervene, both the NRC Staff and Dominion now agree with CCAM that the proposed Millstone Unit 3 power uprate exceeds 7 per cent.

In mathematics, the concepts of "greater than" and less than" are called "inequalities." These concepts are taught in the eighth grade. According to "Introduction to Mathematics" (Turner and Prouse, 1972, published by Scott, Foresman & Company, page 93):

An inequality is a statement that two expressions are not equal.

Hence, mathematically speaking, the governing law which states that Stretch Power Uprates are less than 7 per cent must be taken on face value; since Millstone Unit 3's proposed uprate exceeds 7 per cent, it cannot be classified as a Stretch Power Uprate and must be re-examined under the more rigorous reviews of the "Extended Power Uprate."

CCAM's Contention 1 is not an "attack" on NRC regulations as suggested by the NRC Staff. Rather, CCAM is pointing out to the NRC that Dominion is in violation of the NRC regulations in, the method by which it has filed its application. Moreover, CCAM notes that in response, Dominion has attempted to change the regulation by noting that the NRC's webpage states that stretch power uprates are ... typically less than seven per cent." CCAM respectfully submits that this is an issue for the ASLB Panel to hear, as it presents an issue for the "trier of fact." CCAM agrees with the regulation as stated:

that Criterion 1 establishes that an SPU uprate application is appropriate for a proposed increase in the nuclear reactor power that is "up to 7 per cent."

CCAM also believes that NRC Staff has erred in its response by attempting to change 6

the focus of the regulation from the rigorous mathematical definition accurately promulgated by NRC in an ostensibly exacting regulatory environment to the use of the single non-mathematical word "typical."

The Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines "typically" as an adverb meaning "showing all the characteristics that you would expect from the stated person, thing or group." Dictionary.com defines "typically" as meaning "of the nature of or serving as a type or representative specimen, conforming to a particular type."

By either of these definitions, CCAM has proven in its Petition to Intervene and through the Declaration of its nuclear safety engineer expert, Arnold Gundersen, through rigorous mathematical analysis that the Millstone 3 power uprate application is anything but "typical" of Stretch Power Uprates. Indeed of all the Westinghouse four-loop plants constructed, CCAM has demonstrated that:

1. Millstone Unit 3 is the only nuclear power station ever built with sub-atmospheric containment.

2. The free volume of Millstone Unit 3 containment is the smallest one in any comparable group by a wide margin.

3. The ratio of its free volume to its initially licensed reactor power is the smallest by a wide margin.

4. The ratio of its free volume to its uprated reactor power is also the smallest in the nation by a wide margin.

5. In addition, finally and most critically, that the containment was already "stretched" in 1990.

Clearly, an outlier cannot be regarded as typical: such usage of language create an 7

oxymoron. That Millstone Unit 3's containment design makes it an atypical outlier compared with all the other nuclear reactors in the nation is important to all of CCAM's contentions.

The following NRC statement supports CCAM's "outlier" argument:

Since many of the available stretch power uprates have already been approved by the NRC, and since only a limited number of stretch power uprate applications are expected in the future, there is no specific guidance for stretch power uprates. The NRC, therefore, uses previously approved stretch power uprates, along with RS-001, for guidance.

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates.html.

In performing its stretch power reviews, it is apparent that the NRC relies upon other "previously approved" "typical" reactors that have come before Millstone Unit 3 in the licensing process. Since there is no nuclear power reactor containment in the entire nation like the Millstone Unit 3 containment as discussed above, the NRC's stretch power review cannot be applied according to the NRC's own promulgated regulations. The present application is unprecedented as an SPU application.

Finally, CCAM will address the issue raised in Dominion's Response with regard to the question of mathematical rounding. Dominion's Response asserts in pertinent part:

At the outset, it should be noted that the proposed power increase is a 7.0%

increase to the nearest megawatt (i.e., 1.07 x 3411 Mwt=3649.77 Mwt [fn. 14],

which has been rounded to 3650 Mwt). Taking the rounding into consideration, the percentage increase is 7.0067% [fn.5]. Specifying the power level to the nearest megawatt is consistent with the method used to specify thermal power in MPS3's "Technical Specifications." [fn. 16] Petitioners and their declarant, Mr.

Arnold Gundersen, assert that "mathematical methodology demands that the calculation be rounded down" but provide absolutely no basis for this claim. [fn.

17] Neither the Petitioners nor Mr. Gundersen identify any rule, standard or guidance that "demands" that the calculation be rounded down. In fact, the statement on the NRC website which Petitioners identify [fn. 18] as establishing the 7 per cent criterion does not even make 7 percent a precise limit for an SPU.

The full quote, which Petitioners have truncated, states: "Stretch power uprates 8

are typically up to 7 per cent and ware within the design capacity of the plant."

[fn. 19]

In its Response, Dominion has stated that CCAM's contention lacked mathematical rigor relating to "rounding off" the megawatt capacity of the plant. This is incorrect. The CCAM report clearly discussed the fact that since "less than seven per cent" used two significant figures, it was inappropriate for Dominion to round down its power level request. The concept of significant figures is taught in eleventh-grade high school physics and need not be elaborated on in detail in this reply unless the ASLB Panel should specifically request such a detailed response. Furthermore, since the eighth-grade concept of mathematical inequality clearly states "less than," it is also mathematically unacceptable for Dominion to round the answer up to "greater than" when conventional mathematics requires just the opposite application for conformance.

CCAM takes this opportunity to refer to two specific notations by Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.'s Response. Both applicable footnotes are on Page 14 of Dominion's Response.

First, Dominion alleges that CCAM's Petition does not meet statutory requirements by suggesting "that the NRC's review will be adversely affected by the classification of the uprate, their contention would still be inadmissible.., the sole focus of the hearing is on whether the application satisfies NRC regulatory requirements, rather than the adequacy of the NRC Staff performance." (see quoted section below)

"23 If Petitioners intended to suggest that the NRC's review will be adversely affected by the classification of the uprate, their contention would still be inadmissible. It is well established that the manner in which the NRC Staff performs its review is not an appropriate issue in this proceeding or gives rise to an admissible contention. "With the 9

exception of NEPA issues, the sole focus of the hearing is on whether the application satisfies NRC regulatory requirements, rather than the adequacy of the NRC Staff performance." Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. at 33,171 (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 N.R.C. 777, 807, review declined, CLI-83-32, 18 N.R.C. 1309 (1983). An Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has no jurisdiction to review the NRC Staff's review process.

Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-5, 37 N.R.C. 168, 170 (1993); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Montagne Nuclear Power Station), LBP-75-19, 1 N.R.C.

436, 437 (1975)."

CCAM lauds Dominion for bringing this issue forward, and agree with Dominion's assessment that the application to increase power at Millstone Unit 3 is wrongly classified as a Stretch Power Uprate and does not satisfy NRC regulatory requirement.

(Note inserted above, Footnote 23 from page 14 Dominion's Response). Moreover, CCAM continues to contend that Dominion's application should therefore be considered as an EPU application and believes that Dominion's citations also support this contention.

Second, Dominion also contends that CCAM's expert, Arnold Gundersen, allegedly did not accurately account for the 8 percent uprate granted at Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2. Once again, CCAM commends Dominion for alerting NRC staff and the public to its agreement with CCAM's Contention regarding the fact that Dominion's application does not meet NRC regulatory standard for an SPU, and instead should have been classified as an EPU. See quote below:

"24 Petitioners also state that no Westinghouse reactor has been granted an SPU in excess of 7 percent. Since 7 percent is the approximate level used to define an SPU, this statement is meaningless and certainly does not establish any particular deficiency in the application. Moreover, Table 1 in the Petition and Gundersen Declaration purporting to list "Westinghouse Uprates in 10

Ascending Order" is misleading, because it omits the 8 percent uprate granted to Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2. See http ://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operatinc/licensing/power-uprates/approved-applications.html."

By following Dominion's link to the NRC website:

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates/approved-applications.html, one is ultimately taken to NRC documents which once again support CCAM's Contention that Dominion's application does not meet NRC regulatory standard for an SPU, and instead should have been classified as an EPU. According to the NRC document: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 And 2 (Bvps-1 And 2) -

Issuance Of Amendment Regarding The 8-Percent Extended Power Uprate (Tac Nos.

Mc4645 And Mc4646) and other substantiating documents filed regarding Beaver Valley, the Beaver Valley units, which received an 8-percent power increase, were indeed classified as an Extended Power Uprate.

While Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 are indeed three-loop Westinghouse sub-atmospheric containments and Millstone Point Unit 3 is four-loop Westinghouse sub-atmospheric containment, CCAM's' Expert Arnold Gundersen, did not compare Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 in his Table9 precisely because the increased power level at Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 met the NRC regulatory criteria for an EXTENDED POWER UPRATE, not a Stretch Power Uprate. CCAM once again contends that Dominion's application does not meet NRC requirements for an SPU, and lauds Dominion for acknowledging the discrepancy in its application to the NRC.

Furthermore, CCAM requests that Dominion's application for a power uprate at 9 Gundersen Declaration, Table 1, Page 9.

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Millstone Unit 3 be appropriately reclassified as an EPU application like Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2, as Dominion has so appropriately acknowledged in its Response.

Moreover, the chart on the NRC website shows that the highest SPU previously approved by the NRC was a 6% SPU for Kewaunee on February 27, 2004. Moreover, the chart shows that Monticello's 6.3% uprate - although clearly less than 7 per cent -

was approved as an Extended Power Uprate in 1998. Of the 62 SPUs granted as identified on the chart, the average percentage increase was 4.28 per cent. Thus, Dominion's application for Millstone Unit 3 power uprate of 7+ per cent is 163 per cent higher than the "typical" SPU granted by the NRC and 117 per cent higher than the next-highest SPU ever granted by the NRC over the course of the past 31 years. These facts - asserted on the NRC's own website - lend clear support to CCAM's contention that the Millstone Unit 3 power uprate application must be reviewed by the NRC under the more exacting standards of an Extended Power Uprate.

Dominion is attempting to have it both ways: it argues that it prepared its application in accordance with Extended Power Uprate standards. 10 (". . .[Review Standard for Extended Power Uprates] was in fact used in preparing the LAR."). However, this statement is belied by Dominion's actual application submission. Attachment 1 to the July 13, 2007 application contains the following acknowledgment at page 13:

While it is concluded that the proposed power level change is classified as a Stretch Power Uprate, the guidelines for an Extended Power Uprate have also been used in the LR with a small number of exceptions. [Emphasis added.]

10 See Dominion Response at 30.

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The "small number of exceptions" wherein the Millstone Unit 3 power uprate application does not conform to the NRC's guidelines for Extended Power Uprate are not identified; nor indeed are specific instances wherein the application assertedly conforms to the NRC's guidelines for Extended Power Uprate identified.

Given the already reduced safety margins,11 the problematical operational and managerial history of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station and Millstone Unit 3's unique containment, it is important for the ASLB Panel to understand exactly which NRC guidelines for Extended Power Uprate the application for license amendment does not conform to, as acknowledged by Dominion - and the reasons why. A full hearing pursuant to Subpart G procedures is necessary to. develop these critical facts fully.

Contention 2:

Dominion's application fails to meet the NRC's second "criterion" for a SPU application because Millstone Unit 3 already has had its design margins dramatically and substantially reduced.

CCAM contends that Millstone Unit 3 is not an appropriate candidate for an SPU uprate because it has already had its design margins dramatically and substantially reduced, as demonstrated by CCAM's nuclear safety engineer expert, Arnold Gundersen, in his Declaration. CCAM contends that the NRC does not contemplate SPU uprates for a nuclear power reactor such as Millstone Unit 3 given these limiting conditions.

Both Dominion and the NRC Staff disagree.

1 Refer to Declaration of Arnold Gundersen in support of CCAM's Petition to Intervene.

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Contention 2 presents a substantial factual dispute which can only be resolved through an adjudicatory hearing proceeding.

Contention 3:

When compared to all other Westinghouse Reactors, Millstone Unit 3 is an "outlier" or "anomaly." Dominion's proposed uprate is the largest per cent power uprate for a Westinghouse reactor, while Millstone Unit 3 also has the smallest containment for any Westinghouse reactor of roughly comparable output.

CCAM incorporates its comments with regard to Contentions 1, 2 and 4: Dominion's application for Millstone Unit 3 power uprate as an SPU is without precedent. Dominion is proposing the highest percentage power uprate ever proposed as a Stretch Power Uprate; the limiting features of its containment, its previous "stretch," history of operational deficiencies and incomplete application all dictate that the application be rejected. The NRC has never been presented with an SPU application with these limiting features.

Contention 4:

Construction problems due to the unique sub-atmospheric containment design, coupled with the impact upon the containment concrete by the operation of the containment building at very high temperature, very low pressure and very low specific humidity, place the calculations used to predict stress on that concrete containment in uncharted analytical areas.

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Dominion relies heavily in its opposition to admissibility of Contention 4 on the 12 conclusions reached by NRC Staff on the recent Millstone relicensing application.

However, Dominion neglects to mention the results of the NRC's Office of the Inspector General audit in September 2007 which found inter a/ia examples of NRC Staff comments mirroring statements, uncritically, presented by Dominion in its License Renewal Application.13 The OIG audit, which was far from a painstakingly thorough audit but rather a random-sample audit, cannot be disregarded as providing a basis Of support for CCAM's Contention 4.

CCAM notes significant error in the NRC Staff's Answer, page 15, as follows:

In Contention 4, the Petitioners have failed to provide an explanation of the basis for the contention by failing to give any explanation about how the stress on the concrete containment is in "uncharted analytical areas," thus the contention fails to meet 10 C.F.R.§ 2.309 (f)(1)(ii). The Petitioners make no effort to explain further its suggested analytical limits by, for instance, stating where the current limits end and the "uncharted" areas begin. Moreover, the Petitioners only speculate about historical construction-related issues, while admitting that the construction, apparently supervised by Petitioners' expert, was performed by trained personnel using qualified procedures. Petition at 25.

The discussion of a solution to a problem during construction simply provides no basis for contention with this uprate application. [Emphasis added.]

12 Dominion Response at 23.

13 The OIG report is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-gen/2007 (Click on OIG-07-A-1 5) 15

Moreover, the Petitioners only speculate about historical construction-related issues, while admitting that the construction, apparentlysupervised by Petitioners'expert, was performed by trained personnel using qualified procedures." As an "operating engineer" for Northeast Utilities during the construction phase of Millstone Unit 3, CCAM's Nuclear Safety Expert Witness Arnold Gundersen attested that he sat in on meetings during which the significant operating issues regarding Millstone Unit 3's sub-atmospheric Containment were discussed. At no time was construction "apparentlysupervised by Petitioners'expert' as NRC alleges.

Moreover, once again, NRC Staff misinterprets critical information brought forth by Expert Witness Gundersen. NRC's unwillingness to adequately review Mr.

Gundersen's Nuclear Safety Engineering Analysis and Assessment is a matter of record. Please note that in May 1993, Former NRC Commissioner and Chairman Ivan Selin publicly commended Mr. Gundersen to the U.S. Senate noting:

"It is true.. .everything Mr. Gundersen said was absolutely right; he performed quite a service."

These comments by former NRC Chairman Ivan Selin were made to the U.S.

Senate regarding the NRC staff cover-up of safety issues. Mr. Gundersen's allegations of a cozy relationship between the nuclear industry and its NRC regulators was clearly substantiated by NRC Inspector David Williams in 1993. Mr. Gundersen's technical resume has once again been attached herewith 14 in order to refresh NRC staff memory regarding Mr. Gundersen's credentials.

14 Mr.Gundersen's Curriculum Vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

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Finally, regarding Mr. Gundersen's testimony as an expert witness, Mr. Gundersen has a superlative record of uncovering flaws in uprate applications. For example, in Mr.

Gundersen's Expert Witness Engineering Analysis regarding a power uprate at Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY), Mr. Gundersen testified to Vermont Public Service Board regarding:

• Weaknesses he noted in ENVY's inspection program (Aging Management) were not addressed and thereby resulted in a transformer fire

• Weaknesses in the steam dryer, which were not addressed and resulted in steam dryer cracks following uprate, as Mr. Gundersen demonstrated would occur by his calculations.

• Weaknesses in the condenser resulted in tube failures, which Mr. Gundersen demonstrated in his analysis of ENVY's calculations.

• Weaknesses in the cooling towers resulted in a structural collapse, which was why Mr. Gundersen had requested a new seismic analysis. He maintained that the current Cooling Towers could not withstand the additional torque of the cooling tower fans associated with uprate.

• Finally, Mr. Gundersen identified problems with ENVY's Decommissioning Fund, and its significant under-funding has resulted in a special Vermont State Legislative Review in conjunction with the Vermont State Auditor.

Contention 5:

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The impact of flow-accelerated corrosion at Dominion's proposed higher power level for Millstone Unit 3 has not been adequately analyzed nor addressed.

CCAM contends that Dominion's application has not adequately addressed the increased corrosion which will be encountered at Millstone Unit 3. When power is increased, the flow of steam and water throughout the facility is increased. As a result of the additional flow, there will be a significant non-linear increase in corrosion within piping due to a higher velocity water or steam. The industry calls this recognized issue Flow Accelerated Corrosion, and the fact that it will be an issue after the proposed power increase is not in dispute among the parties.

Historical recurring failures of mechanical components such as pipes and valves at Millstone Unit 3 and poor engineering in the late 1990s are not addressed in Dominion's application. See Exhibits A and B as illustrations of emergency situations at Millstone Unit 3 created by mechanical failure and/or poor engineering involving water and steam movement.

Dominion has offered "Attachment A-iTi invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf' as an attachment to its April 11, 2008 Response. With the attached of the aforementioned Invoice, Dominion states that its application has adequately addressed this FAC contention acknowledging that the Invoice (Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf) from an inspection agency that conducted an inspection of Millstone Unit 3 in 2007 is 18

proof of its attention to the serious problem of Flow Accelerated Corrosion. In response, CCAM disagrees with Dominion's assertion.

Moreover, in juxtaposition, CCAM believes that "Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf" actually supports petitioner's position that Flow Accelerated Corrosion has not been adequately addressed in Dominion's license amendment application for a proposed power increase at Millstone Unit 3.

Likewise, in offering this Invoice: (Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf) as evidence against CCAM's Contention #5 regarding Flow Accelerated Corrosion, Dominion alleges that this invoice supports its claim that Flow Accelerated Corrosion will be adequately addressed by hiring outside contractors.

Rather, CCAM contends that Invoice: (Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf) actually suppports CCAM's Contention 5. While it is true that Flow Accelerated Corrosion inspections will be performed, the Invoice: (Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf) shows that such inspections will be performed on a "Fixed Price" basis.

Thus, Invoice: (Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf) clearly indicates that the number of inspections will not increase following Dominion's proposed power increase as Dominion claims. Instead, the petitioner finds it of utmost concern that rather than increased inspections under the condition of acceleratedflow, such inspections will be limited to the "Fixed Price" levels of the 2007 inspection.

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Furthermore, since the Invoice: (Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf) clearly indicates that all of Flow Accelerated Corrosion testing at Millstone Unit 3 is "Fixed Price," which means that the number of inspectors and inspections following the proposed power increase will be limited to the 2007 Fixed Price inspection level.

Therefore, CCAM reiterates Contention #5: The impact of flow-accelerated corrosion at Dominion's proposed higher power level for Millstone Unit 3 has not been adequately analyzed nor addressed.

In conclusion, CCAM also submits Invoice: (Attachment A- iTi Invoice for MPS3 FAC Inspection Services.pdf) as a support document for its claim.

Contention 6:

Dominion's application for a Millstone Unit 3 7+ per cent uprate cannot be and should not be analyzed as a SPU application insofar as the NRC has not adopted standards nor regulatory requirements for reviewing SPU applications.

Dominion's Response to Contention 615 asserts that the contention raises no genuine, material dispute with the application. Dominion further asserts:

Further, the absence of guidance specific to an SPU is irrelevant, because RS-001 ["Review Standard for Extended Power Uprates"] was in fact used Dominion Response at 30.

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in preparing the LAR. As the LAR states: . . ."[Dominion] developed this LAR utilizing the guidelines in NRC Review Standard, RS-001, "Review Standard for Extended Power Uprates." Accordingly, this contention raises no genuine, material dispute with the application.

However, in Attachment 1 to the application, Dominion is more candid. At page 13, Dominion states:

While it is concluded that the proposed power level change is classified as a Stretch Power Uprate, the guidelines for an Extended Power Uprate have also been used in the LR with a small number of exceptions.

[Emphasis added.]

The "small number of exceptions" wherein the Millstone Unit 3 power uprate application does not conform to the NRC's guidelines for Extended Power Uprate are not identified; nor indeed are specific instances wherein the application assertedly conforms to the NRC's guidelines for Extended Power Uprate identified.

Given the already reduced safety margins,16 the problematical operational and managerial history of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station and Millstone Unit 3's unique containment, it is important for the ASLB Panel to understand exactly which NRC guidelines for Extended Power Uprate the application for license amendment does not conform to, as acknowledged by Dominion - and the 16 Refer to Declaration of Arnold Gundersen in support of CCAM's Petition to Intervene.

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reasons why. A full hearing pursuant to Subpart G procedures is necessary to develop these material disputed critical facts fully.

Contention 7:

Dominion has neglected to provide all information to the NRC staff as it has requested and therefore its application for Millstone Unit 3 uprate should be considered to be incomplete and inadequate.

In Contention 7, CCAM gave examples of Dominion's acknowledgment to the NRC that its application is incomplete and necessary application materials were still being developed or further postponed well after the July 13, 2007 initial submission.

On March 28, 2008 - eleven days after CCAM filed its Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing - the NRC Staff notified Dominion of even more deficiencies in its application for Millstone Unit 3 power uprate.

The NRC's letter ("Potential Schedule Change for Proposed Stretch Power Uprate License Amendment Request")17 states in pertinent part as follows:

The NRC staff schedule, as provided in the acceptance review letter dated October 15, 2007, was predicated on the assumption that all information and analyses would be submitted by the end of January 2008.

The final Request for Additional Information (RAI) letter was sent to 17 The letter may be accessed in ADAMS ML080460620; a copy is attached as Exhibit D.

22

[Dominion] on December 20, 2007, and [Dominion] agreed to respond within 30 days. The following information and analyses were not received by January 31, 2008:

1. The updated control room fire analysis;

2. Summary of the final results of elastic-plastic analysis;

3. The evaluations of the continued acceptability of the environmental qualification equipment with increased accident temperature in the Main Steam Valve Building and the increased radiation total integrated dose in selected Engineered Safety Features and Auxiliary Building zones.

When your stretch power uprate application was received, the NRC staff scheduled its review activities. Implicit in this scheduling was an expectation that adequate time would be available to allow NRC staff to complete a thorough review of the application and any supplemental information requested by the NRC staff.

The NRC staff endeavors to complete power uprates in a timely manner to support NRC's goals of efficiency and reliability. Based on the above, the current schedule for the completion of the proposed stretch power uprate amendment may be in jeopardy.

On March 27, 2008 via teleconference, Mr. Bill Bartron of your staff stated that the summary of the final results of the elastic-plastic analysis would be sent to the NRC on April 7, 2008.

Please note that if you do not respond to the outstanding summary of the final results of the pastic-elastic analysis by April 7, 2008, we may be 24

required to revise the project schedule or reject your application for amendment under the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.108.

Apparently, there is a discrepancy between the NRC Staff's expectations regarding Dominion's submission of its "plastic-elastic analysis" results referred to above and Dominion's assertions in its Response18 that a summary of results to have been provided by February 28, 2008 was provided on February 25, 2008. See Exhibit C.

Dominion's failure to adhere to the expedited schedule it itself requested to enable it to implement the anticipated NRC approval of its Millstone Unit 3 power uprate application during the planned Fall 2008 refueling outage supports CCAM's Contention 7 and reinforces CCAM's request that the application be rejected.

Dominion's rush to gain approval - with certainty of the outcome, namely, NRC approval - has been a theme even before Dominion filed its application on July 13, 2007.

Indeed, as early as May 2, 2007- more than two months before Dominion submitted the Millstone Unit 3 power uprate application to the NRC - Thomas Farrell, President and Chief Executive Officer of Dominion Resources, Inc., the applicant's corporate parent, told investors during a "1 st quarter" teleconference call:

18 Dominion Response at 35.

25

Upgrades to our merchant plants are a low cost,19 high return expansion option. The plant upgrade [sic] at Millstone 3... will allow us to supply additional power in very attractive merchants markets.

Farrell's confidence in the outcome was expressed again in his "2d quarter" teleconference call with investors on August 1, 2007:

Following up on announcements during our last earnings call ... The Millstone Unit 3 upgrade [sic] will be 75 megawatts and is expected to be online by the end of 2008.

In the NRC's weekly information report for the week ending October 19, 2007,20 the NRC tacitly acknowledged it was acceding to Dominion's pressure to expedite review of the application stated as follows:

By application dated July 13, 2007, the licensee requested a 7% SPU for Millstone 3. By letter dated October 15, 2007, the NRC informed the licensee that the licensee provided the necessary information for the staff to begin a detailed technical review, ands that the application meets the criteria for an SPU.

The application requested NRC approval of the amendment by June 30, 2008. However, the NRC stated in its October 15, 2007 letter that the

'9 Farrell did not share with investors the true costs of the prospective Millstone Unit 3 uprate: significantly reduced safety margins and heightened risks to the public health and safety.

20 As of March 8, 2008, the cited notice appeared on the NRC's website at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2007/secy2007-0188/200...

26

application may require more review time due to the licensee's proposed revisions to the licensing basis for the alternative source term dose consequence analysis, and as a result, the licensee agreed to a new requested completion date of August 15, 2008.

The NRC Staff erroneously asserts that Contention 7 "is an attack on the NRC regulatory process."2 1 In fact, the contention is an affirmation of the NRC regulatory process which requires an applicant for a license amendment to file a complete application and fully respond timely to NRC Staff queries. Dominion's failure to file a complete application, inability to meet filing deadlines and failure to provide adequate responses to NRC Staff queries is itself conduct disrespectful of the NRC and its Staff.

Contention 7 presents an issue material to the application because the application proposes to reduce already razor-thin margins of safety within a containment which was already "stretched" in 1990. For example, Attachment 1 of the application states at Page 18:

MPS3 has safety-grade pressure-operated relief valves and piping that supports [sic] water relief from the PORVs during an event. The current analysis for an inadvertent ECCS actuation at power documented in FSAR Sectiotgn 15.1.1 shows that operator action within ten minutes is required to assure at least one PORV is available to prevent water relief from the pressurizer safety valves for which they are not qualified. This 21 NRC Staff Answer at 20.

27

operator action time frame will be reduced at the SPU conditions.

[Emphasis added.]

CCAM seeks in its Petition to Intervene to persuade the NRC to reject Dominion's SPU application for Millstone Unit 3's proposed 7+ per cent power uprate without prejudice to submission of a complete application for Extended Power Uprate.

The NRC docketed an obviously incomplete SPU application. Dominion has repeatedly failed to provide information timely to the NRC pertinent to the significant safety issues raised by the application. Similarly, CCAM, as a petitioning party, has been deprived of the opportunity to review a complete application; NRC Staff and CCAM review is occurring "piece-meal," an approached decidedly out of favor with the NRC.

In a recent matter involving South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co.

(South Texas Project Units 3 and 4), the NRC on February 13, 2008 issued a notice withdrawing its hearing notice - having the effect of postponing indefinitely the deadline within which petitions to intervene must be filed - because of the NRC's belated recognition, after docketing, of the application's incompleteness.

Pursuant to the NRC's order in South Texas, as well as pursuant to its authority under the provisions of 10 C.F.R. § 2.108, the ASLB Panel should reject Dominion's application as incomplete, thereby allowing Dominion to submit a complete application for Extended Power Uprate.

28

Contention 8:

The uprate will result in heightened releases of radionuclides and consequent exposures to plant workers and to the public estimated by Dominion to be 9 per cent but likely in excess of 9 per cent above current levels and such increases will result in corresponding 9 per cent (or more) increases of the risk of harmful health effects. Dominion's application for Millstone 3 uprate makes no provision for new shielding or other techniques to mitigate increased radionuclide release levels. Since Millstone first went online in 1970, cancer incidences in the communities surrounding Millstone have become the highest in'the state for many types of cancer; the Millstone host communities suffer high incidences of fetal distress, stillbirth, premature birth, genetic defects and childhood cancer. Cancer is widespread among current and former Millstone workers. Under these circumstances, Dominion's application is entirely inadequate to assure that the uprate will not endanger plant workers or the public to an unsafe and unacceptable degree. Dominion's application must be rejected.

Neither the NRC Staff nor Dominion disputes that, if Millstone Unit 3 achieves the requested 7+ per cent power uprate, there will be consequential increases in releases of radioactive emissions to the air at least 9 per cent higher than current 29

levels; indeed, this fact is set out unabashedly and with clarity in the application 22 The unquestioned dispute is whether and to what extent the additional radiation releases are "significant"; hence, Contention 8 presents a classic contention which requires resolution at an adjudicatory hearing before a trier of fact, the ASLB Panel.

Dominion's Attachment 1 states as follows in pertinent part at Page 52:

7.0 Environmental Evaluation

...The proposed license amendment request does not involve a significant adverse change in the types or amount of any effluent that may be released offsite nor does it involve a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. [Emphasis added.]

Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.) defines "significant" as "deserving to be considered; important."

The antonym of "significant" is "insignificant," defined by Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.) as "empty, meaningless."

Given Dominion's projections of estimates of increases in radiological effluent releases to the air, it is clear that the application proposes a significant new threat to human health, both among the public living and working offsite as well as to plant workers themselves.

22 Refer to Dominion application at Attachment 2 ("Supplemental Environmental Report" at Section 8.0 ("Radiological Environmental Impacts").

30

As eminent Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass opined in his Declaration supporting CCAM's Petition to Intervene:

8. If Millstone Unit 3 nuclear reactor is permitted to release radionuclides to the environment at levels 9 per cent greater than current levels, it is likely that.there will be a closely corresponding increase in adverse effects on human health.

Such a heightened risk to be assumed by the Millstone Nuclear Power Station host community is indeed "deserving to be considered" and "important"; hence, it is significant.

To accept Dominion's argument that the increases in radiological emissions to the air is "insignificant," i.e., "meaningless" or "empty," is to disregard the conclusion of the 2005 National Academy of Sciences report, "Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation" (BEIR VII - Phase 2) in which it is stated that there is no safe level or threshold of ionizing radiation exposure and that the smallest dose of low-level ionizing radiation has the potential to cause an 23 increase in health risks to humans.

Moreover, Dominion dismisses the facts asserted in the Declaration of Cynthia M. Besade as "anecdotal accounts ... [with] no probative value and

[which] are flatly contradicted by studies, such as that conducted by the National Cancer Institute in 1991, which have found that there is no general increased risk 23 Sternglass Declaration, ¶7.

31

of death from cancer for people living in 107 counties containing or closely adjacent to 62 nuclear facilities."24 Whether Ms. Besade's statements on personal knowledge of high cancer incidences in the Millstone vicinity - most disturbingly, among children - lack or possess probative value is within the exclusive realm of the fact-finder: the ASLB Panel. Dominion's protestations simply demonstrate that these very material facts are indeed in contention.

With regard to the 1991 National Cancer Institute study, it is out of date. In the intervening seventeen (17) years, there has been no epidemiological study of cancer incidences in the Millstone community which has not found markedly heightened incidences.25 In remarking that a "similar" contention was rejected by an ASLB Panel in the Millstone relicensing proceedings, 26 Dominion fails to note that NRC's peculiar requirements in relicensing of nuclear power plants deems the health effects of human exposure to plant releases of radiation to be a "generic issue" which may not be considered on a site-specific basis, in accordance with the Generic 24 Dominion Response at 42.

25 See, e.g., Comments of Michael Steinberg regarding Connecticut Tumor Registry Statistics, presented to the NRC on May 28, 2008. ADAMS ML041770179.

26 Dominion Response at 42.

32

Environmental Impact Statement ("GELS") for relicensing of nuclear power plants.27 No such prohibition applies to these proceedings.

Dominion's irrational aversion to consideration of the health effects of its poisoning of the community through Millstone's routine releases of radiological poisons to the air leads it to make extreme and unsupported statements, such as that

[T]he unsupported allegations in Ms: Besade's declaration[s] all pertain to past operations, not to the effects of the uprate. Consequently, these allegations are beyond the scope of the proceeding. 8 In fact, Ms. Besade objects to the Millstone Unit 3 uprate proposal precisely because it will, if granted, result in an estimated 9 per cent increase in Millstone Unit 3's radioactive effluent releases to the air she breathes, in addition to subjecting her to unacceptably heightened risks of accident and accident consequences.

Finally, Dominion notes that the NRC disagreed with the evidence presented by Ms. Besade and others during the Millstone relicensing proceedings on the health effects of public and worker exposure to Millstone's ionizing radiation.29 In 27 Dominion ascribes to the GElS a finding that was never made: that health effects on the community due to exposure to Millstone's radioactive effluents were "small." Dominion Response -at 43. The GElS was promulgated in 1986, the year Millstone Unit 3 first went online, and hence is itself an out-of-date and archaic, if not meaningless, standard.

28 Dominion Response at 43.

29 Dominion Response at 43.

33

fact, the NRC disallowed a hearing on the health contention; the decision was not appealed to the courts.

In the intervening time, the National Academy of Sciences has released its BEIR VII report and cancer incidences, early childhood mortality and other adverse consequences which may be statistically and medically linked to exposure to Millstone radiological effluents have escalated. 30 It is therefore necessary for the ASLB Panel to convene a hearing on Contention 8 to determine the facts which are in dispute.

Contention 9:

Dominion's application for a 7+ per cent power generation uprate at Millstone Unit 3 will result in significant new releases of radioactive material to the environment and it will result in discharges of significant volumes of water to the Long Island Sound at heightened temperatures, both of which consequences are inadequately addressed in the application.

It is undisputed that if Millstone Unit 3 achieves the requested 7+ per cent power uprate, there will be consequential increases in releases of radioactive emissions to the air at least 9 per cent higher than current levels; indeed, this fact is set out unabashedly and with clarity in the application.

As argued in Contention 8, such increased releases are "significant."

30 Recent tragedies have included numerous cases of infant deaths in families living within two to five miles of Millstone, including a seven-month old child who died of advanced liver disease within the past year.

34

Similarly, it is undisputed that if Millstone Unit 3 achieves the requested 7+

per cent power generation uprate, cooling water from the plant will enter the Long Island Sound at measurably higher temperatures.

In Contention 9, it is argued that both environmental effects will be "significant," that is, "deserving to be considered" and "important."

Dominion asserts that such effects lack significance. Whether such environmental effects are of significance or are not of significance is a material issue which is in dispute and can only be resolved through an adjudicatory hearing.

Dominion's Response contains statements which are incorrect or simply dubious.

For example, Dominion asserts that the hotter thermal plume discharged from Millstone Unit 3 resulting from implementation of the SPU "will still be within the limits allowed by the plant's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 31 (NPDES) permit."'

Dominion has no factual basis to make such an assertion which, even if true, in no way discounts the actual deleterious environmental effect to the marine fisheries and their habitat.

Millstone's NPDES permit was last issued in 1992 for a maximum five-year term under the Clean Water Act; the permit expired in 1997, eleven (11) years ago. There is no valid permit in effect presently; moreover, the Connecticut 31 Dominion Response at 45.

35

Department of Environmental Protection has repeatedly violated the Clean Water Act by granting "emergency authorizations" of infinite duration in the absence of notice to the public and an opportunity for hearing. These emergency authorizations have been issued at the request of Dominion and its predecessor owner to allow it to increase levels of water usage and releases of toxic chemicals to the Long Island Sound.32 Because Dominion lacks a valid NPDES permit, Dominion is incorrect to assert that CCAM does "not dispute that the temperature of the releases from the plant will be within allowable limits of the NPDES permit.",33 To the contrary, CCAM's position is that the temperature of the releases will exceed allowable limits of a valid NPDES permit.

Dominion devotes discussion to the matter of the Connecticut DEP vis-a-vis the expired NPDES permit.3 4 Suffice it to say that insofar as proceedings on the expired permit are ongoing before DEP and therefore Dominion's comments are inoperative; the issues have yet to be determined with finality.

32 Dominion's predecessor, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, pleaded guilty in 1997 in the U.S. District Court fo rthe District of Connecticut to committing environmental felonies at Millstone in violation of the 1992 NPDES permit.

3 Indeed, CCAM, an intervening party to Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection proceedings on the NPDES permit "renewal," has raised the issue in such proceedings that the DEP need consider the environmental effects of Millstone's release of a hotter thermal plume attributable to a Millstone Unit 3 power uprate. Thus, the issue is far from decided.

14 Dominion Response at 46.

36

With regard to environmental effects of increased radiological releases attributable to a Millstone Unit 3 power uprate, Dominion feigns ignorance as to how Millstone's increased radioactive releases to the air will "contaminat[e] fruits and vegetables raised locally for human consumption."35 Dominion's feint is belied by its annual filings with the NRC of its environmental monitoring program, which includes sampling and reporting on its sampling of locally grown vegetation for evidence of radioactive contamination.

With regard to high levels of strontium-90 found in goat milk samples in 2001 within five miles of Millstone - as reported by Dominion to the NRC and the Connecticut DEP - Dominion is incorrect in its statement that the high strontium-90 levels have been determined not to be related to Millstone releases.3" CCAM submits a copy of a critique of the Connecticut DEP "Reassessment" report, referenced in Dominion's Response, which was undertaken by nuclear safety engineer and former Northeast Utilities employee at Millstone Paul N.

Blanch.37 The Blanch critique is a scathing indictment of the "DEP Reassessment."38 For example, Blanch's critique asserts in Item 6 at page 9:

3 Dominion Response at 47.

316Dominion Response at 48.

17 The Blanch critique-is attached as Exhibit E.

38 CCAM and others have queried whether the DEP "Reassessment" was actually ghost-written by Dominion or its agents; although the report bears the asserted authorship of Edward C. Wilds of the DEP, Wilds has refused to meet with Blanch or CCAM to discuss the report or the Blanch critique and he has declined to provide a written response to the Blanch critique.

37

"This type of bogus data questions the validity and accuracy of the data in the report."

It is clear that CCAM and Dominion are engaged in a dispute over material facts regarding Contention 9, which dispute can only be resolved through a formal adjudicatory hearing process.

Conclusion CCAM has submitted nine admissible contentions. Each should be the subject of a Subpart G adjudicatory hearing Respectfully Submitted, CONNECTICUT COALITION AGAINST MILLSTONE NANCY BURTON N'ancy Burton) 147 CrossfHighway Redding Ridge CT 06876 Tel. 203-938-3952 38

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of  : Docket No. 50-423 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 (License Amendment Request Stretch Power Uprate)  : April 22, 2008 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that copies of the "CONNECTICUT COALITION AGAINST MILLSTONE AND NANCY BURTON REPLY TO RESPONSES OF NRC STAFF AND DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC. TO PETITION TO INTERVENE AND REQUEST FOR HEARING" with Exhibits A, B. C. D and E were transmitted on April 22, 2008 by email and by U.S. Mail, First Class, postage pre-paid to the individuals and offices as indicated below:

Office of the Secretary Office of Commission Appellate Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Adjudication U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: O-16G4 Mail Stop: O-16G4 Washington DC 20555-0001 Washington DC 20555-0001 HearingDocket@nrc.gov OCAAMAIL@nrc.gov Secy@nrc.gov (Original + 2 copies)

Administrative Judge William J. Froelich, Chair Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555-0001 wjfl @nrc.gov Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Dr. Paul B. Abramson Dr. Michael F. Kennedy Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop - T-3 F23 Panel 39

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T-3 F23 Washington DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission pba@nrc.gov Washington DC 20555-0001 mfk2@nrc.gov Lillian Cuoco, Esq.

Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Lloyd Subin, Esq. 120 Tredegar Street, RS-2 David Roth, Esq. Richmond VA 23219 Office of the General Counsel Lillian.Cuoco@dom.com U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov lbs@nrc.gov david.roth@nrc.gov David Lewis, Esq.

Stefanie Nelson, Esq.

Matias Travieso-Diaz, Esq.

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP Maria Webb, Paralegal 2300 N Street NW Washington DC 20037-1122 david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com stefanie.nelson@pillsburylaw.com matias.travieso-diaz@pillsburylaw.com maria.webb@pillsburylaw.com

[Signed in Origin Nancy Burton 147 Cross Highway Redding Ridge CT 06876 NancyBurtonCT@aol.com 40

"Millsteam" Millstone Unit 3 - Class II Emergency April 17, 2005 This event involving "unusual" releases of radiation to the atmosphere, was later attributed to a previously undetected microscopic " tin whisker" in a Millstone Unit 3 circuit board.

%ýi lie way RRIDAY, APRIL 3, 1998, NEW LONDON SERVING EASTERN CONNECTICUT SINCE 1881 VOL. 117, No. 276 74 PAGES 50 CENTS W-AdF Damage to Millstone 3 safety system raises more questions Engineering review as pipes began to vibrate. Later, when the system was dismantled, are needed to cool the reactor dur-ing a nuclear accident.

work. They were wrong.

Millstone critics point to the inci-sole job is to point out potential problems. When they raise a flag he said.

The incident, Lochbaum said.

process taken to task engineers discovered that a stain-less steel liner inside the pipe had The incident provided dramatic evidence that the engineering re-dent as evidence that Millstone 3 is not ready to restart. They say they and it's ignored, something's wrong."

raises doubts whether one of the most serious and longstanding By PAUL CHOINIERE been ripped away view process had failed. On Dec. 23, fear that corners are being cut in Michael Brothers, vice president problems at Millstone 3 has been Day Sial" Writcr The sleeve was found to be badly a report from the Nuclear Over- the rush to get the plant back on of nuclear operations, said the solved: the inability of manage damaged, large chunks broken sight Department had warned that line. warning was not ignored. He ad- ment to take effective corrective ac-from it like bites from an apple. the planned modifications could "This is engineering 10l stuff," mitted that in retrospect engineer- tion when a problem surfaces. Fail-Waterford - In eari March, en-Three other pump systems - cause serious problems. As a result said David Lochbaum. a nuclear en- ing should have (lone a better job ing to correct documented prob-gineers testing a newly modified which had already passed vibration of the warning, plant engineers re- gineer with the Union of Con- reviewing the modification. The re- lems was at the core of the Mill-safety system at the Millstone 3 nu- tests - were taken apart and found peatedly analyzed the proposed cerned Scientists. "Most discon- view was too narrow in scope and clear power plant watched in alarm to have similar damage. The pumps changes and concluded they would certing is nuclear oversight. Their as a result a problem was missed, ,cc MORE ipa-c A2

More questions raised after Mlflstone 3 incident

~5 '--

rron AlI be unable to fulfill its function of cir- ing rule of thumb that you do not open up the system and discovered stone plants' decline. It is a major culating a spray of cooling water place flow restrictors at locations the damage.

reason they have been kept out of op- over the reactor following a break in where the increased flow velocity Had the vibrations been less in-eration by the Nuclear Regulatory the primary cooling system. could causepr'obleirs, such as near tense, the system may have been ap-Commission for more -than two The decision was made to place an elbow or expansion joint. proved without anyone realizing it years.- flow restrictors in the 10-inch diame- "I can'timnaginA6 any worse place had been severely damaged, Del Core

'Brothers said it is wrong to allege ter pipe, eliminating the potential for for these thihgs," he said. said.

the system failed. While manage- 'flashing. These restrictors work like Brothers said he was aware of the "You have to question whether the mient would have preferred the prob- the.nozzle at the end of the hose, fun- potential problems, but was satisfied testing was adequate if, on three of lem had been found earlier, it was, in neling the water into a smaller open- the modification would work. four pumps tested, it did not pick up the end, detected and corrected. ing, thus increasing the velocity of I When the testing was performed, on a condition that was breaking the

• As engineers, we like to be per- the flow. The orifices used to restrict the outcome that nuclear oversight equipment," Lochbaum said.

feet, but no one's perfect. That is why the flow were placed just down- had warned about is exactly what Brothers said he, too, was troubled the system as a whole has to be stream of expansion joints, metal ac- happened. The metal liners in the ex- that the first three pumps tested strong," he said. "Ultimately, the cordion-like devices that have bel- pansion joints were torn away by the were approved. He said engineers are process did work." lows that allow the pipes to expand increased Velocity Made of stainless reviewing the incident with the in-

.The engineering mistake hap- and contract in response to dramatic steel and as thick as a compact disc, tent of improving testing. There are pened during the final stages of the changes in temperature and pres- they were ripped and shredded. no similar tests scheduled at the Millstone 3 recovery effort. North- sure. Brothers was awakened in the plant, he said.

east Utilities is racing to get the nu- The Dec. 23 Adverse Condition Re- middle of the night when the testing About a dozen slivers torn from clear plant back in service, but can- port, issued by nuclear oversight, proved the change had failed. the damaged liners, some an inch not do so until it wins NRC approval. had warned that the modifications "I remember coming in at 1 a.m. to long, are still' in the system, but Engineers are working 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> or likely would cause problems. look at the expansion joint. It created Brothers said an analysis deter-more a week to complete the recov- "The orifice location will result in an awful feeling in my stomach," mined they will not pose a problem.

ery Brothers estimated the problems significantly higher velocities at the said Brothers. "But you know, you The system has undergone further with the safety system have caused a expansion joints, which could cause get over it. We've been shut down for modifications. The expansion joints two-week delay fatigue failure in the bellows and/or almost two years, so a day or a week have been replaced with new piping

'The company is under severe fi- the liners," the report said. is not that important." and pipe hangers have been added to nancial pressure to get Unit 3 in ser- Nuclear oversight had reviewed Donald Del Core Sr, a former Mill- handle the anticipated vibration.

vice. The restart of Millstone 2 is the safety evaluation that had been stone employee who left the company The system is now considered ready still months away and Millstone 1 done on the proposed modification 'in 1991 after facing harassment from to operate, Brothers said.

may never return to operation. and found it lacking. management because-of the safety Bruce D. Kenyon, president and

.Modifications to the Recirculation "The safety evaluation ... does not issues he raised, questions how close chief executive officer for nuclear Spray System were undertaken after discuss the effects of higher veloci- engineers came to missing the prob- operations, called the incident a tem-a review showed that water flowing ties, vibration and initial operation lem. He said it was only during the porary setback and said Millstone 3 through the pipes could potentially ... on the expansion joint from the evaluation of the fourth and last is on schedule to gain Nuclear Regu-flash to steam during an emergency new orifice," the report said. pump that engineers detected vibra- latory Commission approval in May If' that happened, the system would Lochbaum said it is an engineer- tions so severe that they decided to to restart.

C.

CURRICULUM VITAE Arnold Gundersen March 2008 Education And Training ME NE Masters of Engineering Nuclear Engineering Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1972 U.S.-Atomic Energy Commission Fellowship Thesis: Cooling Tower Plume Rise BS NE Bachelor of Science Nuclear Engineering Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1971 Cum Laude, 3.74 out of 4.0 James J. Kerrigan Scholar RO Licensed Reactor Operator, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission License # OP-3014 Special Qualifications- including and not limited to.:

Nuclear Safety Expert Witness; 37-years of nuclear industry experience and oversight; former nuclear industry Senior Vice President; nuclear engineering management and nuclear engineering management assessment; prudency assessment; nuclear power plant licensing, licensing and permitting assessment, and review; nuclear safety assessments, public communications, contract administration, assessment and review; former Licensed Reactor Operator; systems engineering, structural engineering assessments, cooling tower operation, cooling tower plumes, nuclear fuel rack design and manufacturing, nuclear equipment design and manufacturing, in-service inspection, criticality analysis, thermohydraulics, radioactive waste processes and storage issue assessment, decommissioning, waste disposal, source term reconstructions, thermal discharge assessment, reliability engineering and aging plant management assessments, archival storage and document control technical patents, federal and congressional hearing testimony, and employee awareness programs.

Special Remediation Expertise Director of Engineering, Vice President of Site Engineering, and the Senior Vice President of Engineering at Nuclear Energy Services (NES).

0 Department of Energy chose NES to write DOE DecommissioningHandbook because NES hadda diLiiqie breadth and depth of nuclear engineers and nuclear physicists on staff.

• Personally wrote the "Small Bore Piping" chapter of the DOE's first edition Decommissioning Handbook, personnel on my staff authored other sections, and I reviewed the entire Decommissioning Handbook.

0 Served on the Connecticut Low Level Radioactive Waste Advisory Committee for 10 years from its inception Page 1 of8

• Managed groups performing analyses on dozens of dismantlement sites in order to thoroughly remove radioactive material from nuclear plants and their surrounding environs.

Managed groups assisting in decommissioning the Shippingport nuclear power reactor. Shippingport was the first large nuclear power plant ever decommissioned. The decommissioning of Shippingport included remediation of the site after decommissioning.

Managed groups conducting site characterizations (preliminary radiation surveys prior to commencement of removal of radiation). at the radioactively contaminated West Valley site in upstate New York.

Personnel reporting to me assessed dismantlement of the Princeton Avenue Plutonium Lab in New Brunswick, NJ. The lab's dismantlement assessment was stopped when we uncovered extremely toxic and carcinogenic underground radioactive contamination.

Personnel reporting to me worked on decontaminating radioactive thorium at the Cleveland Avenue nuclear licensee in Ohio. The thorium had been used as an alloy in turbine blades. During that project, previously undetected extremely toxic and carcinogenic radioactive contamination was discovered below ground after an aboveground gamma survey had purported that no residual radiation remained on site.

Publications Co-author - DOE DecommissioningHandbook, FirstEdition, 1981-1982, Authorship solicited by DOE Co-author - Decommissioning the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant: An Analysis of Vermont Yankee's DecommissioningFund andIts ProjectedDecommissioning Costs, November 2007, Presented to Vermont State Senator Ginny Lyons and Vermont State Auditor Tom Salmon Co-author - Decommissioning Vermont Yankee -Stage 2 Analysis of the Vermont Yankee DecommissioningFund- The Decommissioning Fund Gap, December 2007, Presented to Vermont State Senators and Legislators Co-author - Vermont Yankee Comprehensive Vertical Audit - VYCVA - Recommended Methodology to Thoroughly Assess Reliabilityand Safety Issues at Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, January 30, 2008 to Testimony to Vermont State Senate Finance Committee Patents Energy Absorbing Turbine Missile Shield -U.S. Patent #4,397,608 - 8/9/1983 Committee Memberships ANSI N-198, Solid Radioactive Waste Processing Systems Three Rivers Community College Nuclear Academic Advisory Board Founding Member of Connecticut Low Level Radioactive Waste Advisory Committee (Member for 10 years)

Founding Member National Nuclear Safety Network Page 2 of 8

Honors James J. Kerrigan Scholar 1967-1971 Tau Beta Pi (Engineering Honor Society), RPI, 1969 (1 of 5 in Sophomore class of 700)

B.S. Degree, Cum Laude, RPI (3.74 GPA) 1971 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Fellowship, 1972 Publicly commended to U.S. Senate by NRC Chairman, Ivan Selin, in May 1993 "It is true.. .everything Mr. Gundersen said was absolutely right; he performed. quite a service."

Teacher of the Year - 2000, Marvelwood School Nuclear Consulting and Expert Witness Testimony Peach Bottom Reactor Litigation Evaluated extended 28-month outage caused by management breakdown and deteriorating condition of plant.

Commonwealth Edison In depth review and analysis for Commonwealth Edison to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of all Commonwealth Edison engineering organizations, which support the operation of all of its nuclear power plants.

Western Atlas Litigation Evaluated neutron exposure to employees and license violations at this nuclear materials licensee.

Three Mile Island Litigation Evaluated unmonitored releases to the environment after accident, including containment breach, letdown system and blowout. Proved releases were 15 times higher than government estimate and subsequent government report.

PennCentral Litigation Evaluated license violations and material false statements by management at this nuclear engineering and materials licensee.

Federal Congressional Testimony Publicly recognized by NRC Chairman, Ivan Selin, in May 1993 in his comments to U.S. Senate, "It is true...everything Mr. Gundersen said was absolutely right; he performed quite a service."

State of Connecticut Assisted the State of Connecticut in drafting Whistleblower Protection legal statutes, the strongest in the United States.

Page 3 of 8

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Assisted the NRC Inspector General in investigating illegal gratuities paid, to NRC Officials by Nuclear Energy Services (NES) Corporate Officers. In a second investigation, assisted the Inspector General in showing that material false statements (lies) by NES corporate president caused the NRC to overlook important license violations.

International Nuclear Safety Testimony Worked for ten days with the President of the Czech Republic (Vaclav Havel) and the Czech Parliament on their energy policy for the 21 st century. Continue to work with Czech Friends of the Earth on Czech Energy and Environmental Issues State of Vermont Public Service Board Expert witness retained by New England Coalition to testify to the Public Service Board on the reliability, safety, technical, and financial ramifications of a proposed increase in power (called an uprate) to 120% at Entergy's 31-year-old Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. April 2003 to present U.S. Senators Jeffords and Leahy (2003 to 2005)

'Provided the Senators and their staff with periodic overview regarding technical, reliability, compliance, and safety issues at Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY).

10CFR 2.206 filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Filed 10CFR 2.206 petition with NRC requesting confirmation of Vermont Yankee's compliance with all General Design Criteria.

State of Vermont Legislative Testimony to Senate Finance Committee Testimony to the Senate Finance Committee, 2006 regarding Vermont Yankee decommissioning costs, reliability issues, design life of the plant, and emergency planning issues.

Finestone v FPL Plaintiffs' Expert Witness for Federal Court Case with Attorney Nancy LaVista, from the firm Lytal, Reiter, Fountain; Clark, Williams, West Palm Beach, FL.

This case involved twenty-six families in a cancer cluster alleging illegal radiation releases from nearby nuclear power plant caused children's cancers.

Production request, discovery review, preparation of deposition questions and attendance at Defendant's experts for deposition, preparation of expert witness testimony, preparation for Daubert Hearings, ongoing technical overgight, source term reconstruction.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (NRC-ASLB) Expert witness retained by New England Coalition to provide Atomic Safety and Licensing Board with an independent analysis of the integrity of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant condenser. (2006)

Page 4 of 8

U.S. Senators Bernie Sanders and Congressman Peter Welch (2007)

Briefed Senator Sanders, Congressman Welch and their staff members regarding technical and engineering issues, reliability and aging management concerns, regulatory compliance, waste storage, and nuclear power reactor safety issues

.confronting the U.S. nuclear energy industry.

State of Vermont Environmental Court Expert witness retained by New England Coalition to review Entergy and Vermont Yankee's analysis of alternative methods to reduce the heat discharged by Vermont Yankee into the Connecticut River. Provided Vermont's Environmental Court with analysis of alternative methods systematically. applied throughout the nuclear. industry to reduce the heat discharged by nuclear power plants into nearby bodies of water.

This report included the review of condenser and cooling tower modifications.

(Docket 89-4-06-vtec 2007)

Appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court Expert Witness Testimony in support of New England Coalition's Appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court Concerning: Degraded Reliability at Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee as a Result of the Power Uprate. New England Coalition represented by Attorney Ron Shems of Burlington, VT (March 2006 to 2007)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (NRC-ASLB) MOX Limited Appearance Statement to Judges Michael C. Farrar (Chairman), Lawrence G. McDade, and Nicholas G. Trikouros for the he "Petitioners": Nuclear Watch South, the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League,

• andNuclear Information & Resource Service have filed Contention 2: Accidental Release of Radionuclides, requesting a hearing concerning faulty accident consequence assessments made for the MOX plutonium .fuel factory proposed for the Savannah River Site. (September 14, 2007)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (NRC-ASLB) Expert Witness Supporting Pilgrim Watch's Petition For Contention 1:

specific to issues regarding the integrity of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station's underground pipes and the ability of Pilgrim's Aging Management Program to determine their integrity. (January 26, 2008)

Vermont State Senate - 2008 Legislative Session

• Senate Finance - testimony regarding Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee Decommissioning Fund

• Senate Finance - testimony on the necessity for a Comprehensive Vertical Audit (CVA) of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee

• Natural Resources Committee - testimony regarding the placement of high-level nuclear fuel on the banks' of the Connecticut River in Vernon, VT Page 5 of 8

Experience Teaching and Academic Administration Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - Advanced Nuclear Reactor Physics Lab Community College of Vermont - Mathematics Professor - 2007 to present Burlington High School Mathematics Teacher - 2001 to present Physics Teacher - 2004 to 2006 The Marvelwood School- 1996-2000 Chairman: Physics and Math Department.

Taught both physics and mathematics.

Director of Summer School and Director of Residential Life Awarded Teacher of the Year - June 2000 The Forman School & St. Margaret's School - Mathematics Nuclear Engineering 1970 to 1990 Nuclear Energy Services, Division of PCC (Fortune 500 company) 1979 to 1990 Corporate Officer and Senior Vice President - Technical Services Responsible for overall performance of the company's Inservice Inspection (ASME XI), Quality Assurance (SNTC 1A), and Staff Augmentation Business Units.

Senior Vice President of Engineering Responsible for the overall performance of the company's Site Engineering, Boston Design Engineering and Engineered Products Business Units. Integrated the Danbury based, Boston based and site engineering functions to provide products such as fuel racks, nozzle dams, and transfer mechanisms and services such as materials management and procedure development.

Vice President of Engineering Services Responsible for the overall performance of the company's field engineering, operations engineering, and engineered products services. Integrated the Danbury based and field based engineering functions to provide numerous product and services required by nuclear utilities.

General Manager of Field Engineering Managed and directed NES' multi-disciplined field engineering staff on location at various nuclear plant sites. Site activities included structural analysis, procedure development, technical specifications and training. Have personally applied for and received one patent.

Director of General Engineering Managed and directed the Danbury based engineering staff. Staff disciplines included structural, nuclear, mechanical and systems engineering. Responsible for assignment of personnel as well as scheduling, cost performance, and technical assessment by staff on assigned projects. This staff provided major engineering support to the company's nuclear waste management, spent fuel storage racks, and engineering consulting programs.

Page 6 of 8

New York State Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSE&G) - 1976 to 1979 Supervisor, Reliability Engineering Organized and supervised reliability engineers to upgrade performance levels on seven operating coal units and one that was under construction. Applied analytical techniques and good engineering judgments to improve capacity factors by reducing mean time to repair and by increasing mean time between failures.

Lead Power Systems Engineer Supervised the preparation of proposals, bid evaluation, negotiation and administration of contracts for two 1300 MW NSSS Units including nuclear fuel, and solid-state control rooms. Represented corporation at numerous public forums including TV and radio on sensitive utility issues. Responsible for all nuclear and BOP portions of a PSAR, Environmental Report, and Early Site Review.

Northeast Utilities Service Corporation (NU) - 1972 to 1976 Engineer Nuclear Engineer assigned to Millstone Unit 2 during start-up phase. Lead the high velocity flush and chemical cleaning of condensate and feedwater systems and obtained discharge permit for chemicals. Developed Quality Assurance Category .1 Material, Equipment and Parts List. Modified fuel pool cooling system at Connecticut Yankee, steam generator blowdown system and diesel generator lube oil system for Millstone. Evaluated Technical Specification Change Requests.

Associate Engineer Nuclear Engineer assigned to Montague Units 1 & 2. Interface Engineer with NSSS vendor, performed containment leak rate analysis, assisted in preparation of PSAR and performed radiological health analysis of.plant. Performed environmental radiation survey of Connecticut Yankee. Performed chloride intrusion transient analysis for Millstone Unit 1 feedwater system. Prepared Millstone Unit I off-gas modification licensing document and Environmental Report Amendments 1 & 2.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) - 1971 to 1972 Critical Facility Reactor Operator, Instructor Licensed AEC Reactor Operator instructing students and utility reactor operator trainees in start-up through full power operation of a reactor.

Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) - 1970 Assistant Engineer Performed shielding' design of radwaste and auxiliary buildings for Newbold Island Units 1 & 2, including development of computer codes.

Vetted as expert witness in nuclear litigations, federal, international, and state hearings including but not limited to: Three Mile Island, US Federal Court, US NRC ASLB, Vermont State Public Service Board, Czech Senate, Connecticut State Page 7 of 8

Legislature, Western Atlas Nuclear Litigation, U.S. Senate Nuclear Safety Hearings, Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Plant Litigation, and OIG NRC.

Public Service Nuclear and Ener2y Issues Guest Lecturer on Nuclear Safety Issues UVM, Burlington College, Johnson State College, Community Environmental Events, High Schools Featured Nuclear Safety Expert for Television, Newspaper and Radio, including but not limited to CNN (Earth Matters), The Crusaders, WPTZ VT, WZBG CT, Front Page, Mark Johnson Show, WKVT, WDEV, Seven Days Founding Board Member NNSN - National Nuclear Safety Network Ongoing Public Testimony to Committees of the Vermont State Legislature Working with Burlington Electric Department (BED) on solar modifications to Burlington High School (BHS)

Television Show with Former NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford, aired March 2008, regarding lack of enforcement of NRC regulations Page 8 of 8

Cý UNITED STATES J NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 28, 2008 A'ig ~6O~'K9~Av Mr. David A. Christian /

President and Chief Nuclear Officer /

Virginia Electric and Power Company U Innsbrook Technical Center -J

,2' 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3 - POTENTIAL SCHEDULE CHANGE FOR PROPOSED STRETCH POWER UPRATE LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (TAC NO. MD6070)

Dear Mr. Christian:

By letter dated July 13, 2007,' as supplemented by additional letters,2 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (ONC), licensee of the Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3), submitted the application, "Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Millstone Power Station Unit 3, License Amendment Request, Stretch Power Uprate," to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The proposed license amendment would allow an increase in the maximum authorized power level from 3,411 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 3,650 MWt, and make Changes to the technical specifications, as necessary, to support operation at the stretch power level.

The NRC staff schedule, as provided in the acceptance review letter dated October 15, 2007,3 was predicated on the assumption that all information and analyses would be submitted by the end of January 2008. The final Request for Additional Information (RAI) letter was sent to DNC on. December 20, 2007, and DNC agreed to respond within 30 days. The following information and analyses were not received by January 31, 2008:

1. The updated control room fire analysis;

2. Summary of the final results of elastic-plastic analysis; and

3. The evaluations for the continued acceptability of the environmental qualification equipment with increased accident temperature in the Main Steam Valve Building and the increased radiation total integrated dose in selected Engineered Safety Features and Auxiliary Building zones.

' DNC Letter (07-450) to the NRC, "Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Millstone Power Station Unit 3 License Amendment Request, Stretch Power Uprate," dated July 13, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML072000386).

2 Supplemental Letters dated: July 13, 2007 (ML072000281); September 12, 2007 (ML072570061); November 19, 2007 (ML073230976); December 13, 2007 (ML073480240); December 17, 2007 (ML073520051); January 10, 2008 (ML080100600, ML080100604, ML080100606, ML080100611); January 11,2008 (ML080110695, ML080140077, ML080170495, ML080580476);

January 14, 2008 (ML080140570); January 18, 2008 (ML080220506, ML080220527, ML080220530. ML080220541, ML080280375); January 31, 2008 (ML080320308); February 25, 2008 (ML080560392, ML080560615); March 5, 2008 (ML080660108); March 10, 2008 (ML080710377, ML080710391); and March 25, 2008 (ML080850894).

3 ADAMS Accession No. ML072670216

D. Christian The enclosure to this letter presents a detailed discussion of the information and analyses not received by January 31, 2008, along with the current status of the NRC staff review in each respective area.

VV I ieri your strtc power Ipat C-UVVlitc ItJ dPJI.LUo iL I- VV C0I  ; I V ,U LI I Z, 1 N ,SLC1Ia

-~4I. I I UuI UVU I toI VI Vlv activities. Implicit in this scheduling was an expectation that adequate time would be available to allow NRC staff to complete a thorough review of the application and any supplemental information requested by the NRC staff.

The NRC staff endeavors to complete power uprates in a timely manner to support the NRC's goals of efficiency and reliability. Based on the above, the current schedule for the completion

• of the proposed stretch power uprate amendment may be in jeopardy.

On March 27, 2008 via teleconference, Mr. Bill Bartron of your staff stated that the summary of the final results of the elastic-plastic analysis would be sent to the NRC on April 7, 2008.

Please note that if you do not respond to the outstanding summary of thefinal results of the elastic-plastic analysis by April 7, 2008, we may be required to revise the project schedule or reject your application for amendment under the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.108.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Lamb at (301) 415-3100.

Sincerely,

/H/arold Chernoff, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 1-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation'

Enclosure:

As stated Docket No. 50-423 cc:, See next page

Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 3 cc:

11A;I-IU Lilli UU C U, W. %-.1C ,4 U Iu Senior Counsel Mr. Joseph Roy, Dominion Resources Services, Inc. Director of Operations Building 475, 5th Floor Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Rope Ferry Road Electric Company Waterford, CT 06385 Moody Street P.O. Box 426 Edward L. Wilds, Jr., Ph.D. Ludlow, MA 01056 Director, Division of Radiation Department of Environmental Protection Mr. J. Alan Price 79 Elm Street Site Vice President Hartford, CT 06106-5127 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Building 475, 5 th Floor Regional Administrator, Region I Rope Ferry Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Waterford, CT 06385 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. Chris Funderburk Director, Nuclear Licensing and First Selectmen Operations Support Town of Waterford Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

15 Rope Ferry Road 5000 Dominion Boulevard Waterford, CT 06385 Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 K

Mr. J. W. "Bill" Sheehan Mr. William D. Bartron Co-Chair NEAC Licensing Supervisor 19 Laurel Crest Drive Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Waterford, CT 06385 Building 475, 5 th Floor Rope Ferry Road Mr. Evan W. Woollacott Waterford, CT 06385 Co-Chair Nuclear Energy Advisory Council Mr. David A. Sommers 128 Terry's Plain Road Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Simsbury, CT 06070 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0. Box 513 Niantic, CT 06357 Ms. Nancy Burton 147 Cross Highway Redding Ridge, CT 00870

REQUESTED INFORMATION AND ANALYSES Updated Control Room Fire Analysis In a letter dated November 26, 2007,1 the NRC staff asked the following in a Request for M-NUUI.IUI fal IIUl III IdLII II k-vF*i) UnIUr*l *', rFB-U. -UJUV U.

LAR [License Amendment Request] Attachment 5, Section 2.5.1.4.2.3.7, "Operator Actions Required Following a Fire" states that"... [an] analysis was performed to determine the steam generator dryout time at the support stretch power uprate (SPU) power level; the results showed a dryout time of approximately 37 minutes. Therefore, there continues to be adequate time for the operator to manually initiate auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators

• (SGs) at SPU conditions..."

Discuss the, response time, including any assumptions that may have been made in determining that the operator manual actions can confidently be accomplished before SG dryout.

In a letter dated December 17, 2007,2 DNC provided the following response to AFPB 0008:

... Even with a decrease in steam generator dry-out time and an increase in the AFW flow initiation time, based on the availability of the large capacity turbine driven AFW pump, preliminary analysis has shown that the margin between 27 minutes and 34.67 minutes is still sufficient to assure that all BTP 9.5-1 criteria will be met. In order to provide a better estimate of the steam generator dry-out time as well as provide more complete documentation that all BTP 9.5-1 criteria can be met, an update to the control room fire analysis is in progress. Results of the updated control room fire analysis will be provided to you by February 29, 2008.

DNC supplied the updated control room fire analysis in a DNC supplemental letter (07-799A), dated February 25, 2008.3 The NRC staff is reviewing this updated control room fire analysis.

1ADAMS Accession No. ML073170665 2ADAMS Accession No. ML073520051 3 ADAMS Accession No. ML080560615 Enclosure

f

2. Summary of the Final Results of the Elastic-Plastic Analysis In a letter dated December 14, 2007,4 the NRC staff asked the following in an RAI under rE M CB -U-U If7 In addition to Table 2.2.3-3, various components listed in Tables 2.2.2.3-1.2.2.2.5.2.2-i and 2.2.2.7.2-2 of LAR Attachment 5, which contain stress summaries, have failed to meet the NB-3222.2 primary plus secondary stress intensity requirement of 3Sm. Attachment 5 states that these components have been qualified by passing the simplified elastic-plastic analysis of NB 3228.5.

a) Provide a summary of the evaluations which shows that the special rules for exceeding 3Srm as provided by (a) through (f) of subparagraph 3228.5 have been met.

b) Tables 2.2.2.5.2.2-1 and 2.2.2.7.2-2 also provide acceptability of components, that failed to meet the 3Sm allowable, through NB-3228.3. Discuss the basis and show that you meet the requirements for using the NB-3228.3 criteria.

Also provide a summary of the analysis results which shows that the requirements of NB-3228.3 have been met.

In a letter (07-0834D) dated January 14, 2008,t DNC provided the following response to EMCB-07-0072:

Several steam generator and pressurizer locations have maximum stress ranges that exceed the 3Sm limit in NB-3222.2. Most of these sections meet the simplified elastic-plastic analysis criteria in NB-3228.3 of the ASME B&PV Code

[American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code],

Section 11, 1971 Edition through the summer 1973 Addendum (equivalent to NB-3228.5 in latter Code Editions). In NB-3228.3 there are six requirements, (a) through (f), which are satisfied. A summary showing that each of these requirements have been satisfied will be provided. In addition, those sections that exceed 3Sm and that were qualified by full elastic-plastic analysis will also be summarized in the response showing details of the plasticity analysis.

Documentation of the final results of the elastic-plastic analysis is under

-development. A summary of the results will be provided by February 28, 2008.

DNC supplied the response to EMCB-07-0072 in a DNC supplemental letter (07-834J),

dated February 25, 2008.6 The NRC staff reviewed this response and determined that the DNC supplemental letter (07-834J) did not fully answer EMCB-07-0072, as DNC did with EMCB-07-0071. The NRC staff held a conference call with your staff on February 27, 2008, discussing the DNC supplemental letter (07-834J). Your staff stated that they would provide the 4 ADAMS Accession No. ML073370384 ADAMS Accession No. ML080140570 6 ADAMS Accession No. ML080560392

summary of the final results of the elastic-plastic analysis like it was performed for the response to EMCB-07-0071. The staff encourages DNC to complete the summary of the final results of the elastic-plastic analysis as soon as possible so the NRC staff can I~.AI IJI~~

LII J ý _ILy L.. VU I .. 4C LII..I I \k..IL./ II J

3. Environmental Qualification. Evaluations In a letter dated December 14, 2007,7 the NRC staff asked the following in an RAI. under EEEB-07-0052:

For the Main Steam Valve Building, Engineered Safety Features Building, and Auxiliary Building, the license amendment request, in Section 2.3.1, indicates that SPU conditions may affect the EQ of electrical equipment. Provide the complete evaluations of the affected equipment, including an in-depth discussion of the assumptions and methodology.

By DNC supplemental letter (07-0834C), dated January 10, 2008,8 DNC stated the following:

The evaluations for the continued acceptability of the EQ equipment with increased accident temperature in the Main Steam Valve Building (MSVB) and the increased radiation TID [total integrated dose] in selected Engineered Safety Features and Auxiliary Building zones are ongoing. The results will be available by March 31, 2008.

On March 25, 2008,9 DNC sent a supplemental response to RAI EEEB-07-0052. The NRC staff The NRC staff is reviewing this letter and the staff may have further RAI or clarifying questions.

• ADAMS Accession No. ML073370384 8 ADAMS Accession No. ML080100600 9ADAMS Accession No. ML080850894

LREVIEWED By Paul Blanch at 4:47 pm, 4 /3 /06 Reassessment of Millstone Power Station's Environmental Monitoring Data Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Division of Radiation March 2006

Summary of Comments on Reassessment of MP Env data 2006 final _rev_.doc Page: 1 Number: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Reviewed Date: 4/3/2006 4:47:38 PM Number: 2 Author: Paul

Subject:

Note Date: 5/2/2006 1:55:38 PM While I may or may not agree with the outcome I find the study not to be scientifically supportable. The study needs to be reviewed by an independent organization other than the NRC. My report on high levels of contamination in Florida have been totally ignored by the NRC and is still being looked at by the NRC's Inspector General's Office.

There are many errors and shortcomings in the study. It appears the DEP relied solely on the fact that there was no Sr-89 present to discount the possibility of the Millstone origin. There are many possibilities that this could have originated from Millstone and not have any Sr-89 present.

Further, the study fails to explain the high readings of Sr-90 in 2002 and 2003 compared to other readings in the State but makes the unsupported assertion that it could not have originated from Millstone. There is no discussion whatsoever of the sample used to determine the absence of Sr-89. If the sample was analyzed recently one would not expect any Sr-89 as it would have decayed within one year even if it did originate from Millstone.

Further the conclusion was supported by only one of possibly many plume models that show the SR-90 would not have deposited at these concentrations.

If the increase in Sr-90 levels was due to fallout I would also expect to see some increase in Cs-137 levels yet I don't see any data on the Cesium.

Also, fallout is not localized and one would expect similar increases in Sr-90 levels throughout the State of Connecticut.

The report seems narrowly focused to eliminate the possibility of this contamination originating from Millstone.

One other indication of the quality of the report is that the figure on page 8 contains no meaningful units of Sr-90 concentration and shows a negative concentration of Sr-89 which is a physical impossibility.

Reassessment of Millstone Power Station's Environmental Monitoring Data Executive Summary p In November of 2005, the Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone (CCAM) made claims that goat milk samples taken in the vicinity of the Millstone Power Station showed evidence that "routine operations of Millstone are in violation of federal health standards and are illegal."

CCAM based its assessment on the levels of the radionuclides Strontium-90 and Cesium-137 that were detected in milk samples from a goat farm located at 120 Dayton Road in Waterford, 5.2 miles NNE of the Millstone Power Station. These samples were a small subset of thousands of samples taken and analyzed over the past three decades as part of the approved Millstone Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP). CCAM believed that the levels detected in these few samples were twice as high as the levels found during weapons testing in 1963.

The Division of Radiation at the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) independently monitors and, through routine split sampling, verifies the data collected in the REMP. In response to the claims of CCAM, DEP conducted a thorough assessment of all the data collected in the vicinity of the Millstone Power Station prior to and during its operation. In addition, DEP collected and analyzed confirmatory samples, conducted computer modeling, and reviewed past inspection reports and technical documents prepared by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) related to Millstone Power Station. As a result of this comprehensive investigation, DEP has concluded that the collective sampling in and around the Millstone Power Station show expected levels of residual radioactive fallout from weapons testing and the Chernobyl event and are unrelated to the operation of the Millstone Power Station.

Background:

Radioactivity is measured in millirems, extremely tinyamounts of energy that are absorbed by tissues in the body. The environment is naturally radioactive and man is constantly exposed to natural background radiation emitted from the earth (terrestrial), air, and water, as well as cosmic radiation from outer space. In addition to this natural background radiation, manmade products and activities also contribute to the average radiation dose of approximately 360 millirems per year for persons residing in the United States. Of the 360 millirems, 200 are from radon, 28 from cosmic rays, 28 from terrestrial, 39 from radioactive material naturally occurring in our body, 39 from medical x-rays, 14 from nuclear medicine, 10 from consumer products and 2 from other sources. Internal sources of radiation include the consumption of food that contains natural amounts of radioactive materials. Radioactivity found in consumer products comes from sources such as tobacco products, domestic water supplies, building materials, combustible fossil fuels such as coal and natural. gas, and airport inspections systems. The amount of public radiation from nuclear power stations is so low that it is generally included in the "other sources."

Millstone Power Station is a three-unit station. Unit One began operation in 1970 and was permanently shut down in 1998. Unit Two became operational in 1975 and Unit Three went I

Page: 2

. Number: 1 Author: Paul

Subject:

Note Date: 4Q12/2006 9:34:35 AM I believe a clear objective should be stated in the forward or abstract section of the report.

Something along the line of:

The purpose of this study is to determine the source of elevated Strontium levels detected in goat's milk at a farm located about 5 miles from the Millstone site. This report will examine all potential source of Sr-90 in the environment including those from Millstone, potential fallout from nuclear weapons testing, possible fallout from the Chernobyl accident and from medical sources.

operational in 1986. Three years before that start up of the Millstone Power Station and continuing today, an extensive environmental monitoring program has been in place. Samples gathered and analyzed include gamma radiation levels, air particulates, air radioiodine, bottom sediments, broad leaf vegetation, fruits, vegetables, aquatic flora, soil, fish, mussels, oysters, clams, lobsters, sea water, well water, hay, pasture-grass and milk. Due to the current lack of dairy (cows) farms in the vicinity of Millstone, goats have been used for milk sampling. During this time, DEP has reviewed the results of Millstone's sampling data and analysis. In addition, DEP has periodically conducted split sampling to ensure data accuracy. Split sampling requires that the station and DEP divide the sample in half, and send one half to Millstone's lab and the other to the Department of Public Health's radiochemistry lab for comparison.

The REMP, like other monitoring programs to detect radioactivity from nuclear power stations, is designed to detect the specific types and quantities of radioactive materials or radionuclides that are generated by each specific unit, as well as the ratios of the radionuclides, and each radionuclides' half-life. L~ased on years of nuclear reactor operation and research captured in technical documents published by Millstone and the NRC, it is understood that only specific types, quantities and ratios of radionuclides would be found in the environment in the event of a release from Millstone.

In addition, we know that many different factors can affect the level of radioactivity in goat milk.

These factors include temperature, Wason, size of the animal, abundance of grass for feed, and farming practices. For example: asqemperatures increase the amount of radioactive material present in milk increases; when pastur. grass is less abundant and the goats must graze in wider areas, concentrations are hig)er; soils -hat have not been tilled have higher amounts of radioactivity on the surface; -bils that have not been fertilized have less vegetation resulting in greater concentration of radioactivity in the vegetation; and lastly, the smaller the animal the higher the concentration of radioactive materials in their milk.

Results:

The goat farm at 120 Dayton Road in Waterford was neither tilled nor fertilized. Even sso, the amount of radioactive materials in the pat milk samples taken from 120 Dayton Road in Waterford hig ighted by CCAM was ico uries. This concentration represents 1.2% ofCthe .S. Food and Drug Administration's recommended limit on the concentration permitted in human food distributed in commerce and 2% of the International Atomic Energy Agency's maximum acceptable level. In short, the sampling results of concern to CCAM show levels of radioactivity that is significantly below established health and safety limits.

The ratios and quantities of radioactive materials found in these goat milk samples did not fall within the known values generated from a nuclear reactor. The ratio of Strontium-89 to Strontium-90 and the ratio ofesium-13-4to Cesii 137E1o not match to the proper ratios generated by Millstone Power Station. Mlillstont not the source of the radionuclides detected in these samples.

• Analytical results of add*12nal surface soil samples taken by DEP at 120 Dayton Road in December 2005 showed r-pical levels of radioactive fallout from above ground weapons 2

Page: 3 2

• Number: 1 Author: Paul

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:20:14 PM Not necessarily true. The ratios depend on the type, source and age of the release. As in Florida, if the release was from decayed liquid radioactive waste, there would be no Sr-89. A previous release from the steam generators may have also occurred which was not monitored for many years of Millstone operation.

YNumber: 2 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight. Date: 4/11/2006 4:14:18 PM It is not clear to the average reader as to why this would be true. Reference should be provided, 1-7Number: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Rectangle Date: 4/11/2006 4:15:10 PM All of these statements need supporting references.

Number: 4 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 4:37:40 PM The reason for this is not obvious. Strontium would tend to migrate into the soil such that it is possible that surface concentrations would be less than surface concentrations.

2Number: 5 Author: Paul

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:28:37 PM This is not intuitive. Reference needs to be provided.

2Number: 6 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:29:23 PM Per gram or per liter or per acre?

2Number: 7 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 4:41:27 PM Need clear reference. Is this strictly for Sr-90?

.Number: 8 Author: Paul

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:31:24 PM Where are the data for Cesium?

The ENTIRE report is based upon the fact that no Sr-89 was detected. The absence of Sr-89 has many possible explanations and still originate from a nuclear plant.

= Number: 9 Author: Paul

Subject:

Text Box Date: 4/11/2006 9:18:30 AM Number: 10 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 4:48:13 PM While this may or may not be true, coming to the conclusion that the Sr-90 did not originate from a nuclear plant is not supported.

There are annual effluent release reports from nuclear plants that report Sr-90 levels in excess of Sr-89. This may also be true of the Cs-134/137 ratios.

There are also other possible explanations such as the time from production to the time of release may have allowed the short lived isotopes to decay due to holdup or possible release from spent fuel or decay tanks.

2Number: 11 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 4:41:33 PM

.2l]Number: 12 What are these Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:37:43 PM typical levels and where is the supporting documentation?

The levels are not consistent with other sampling areas.

testing. [i* addition, data collected as part of the REMP shows lower concentrations of radionuclides in milk samples taken from locations located closer to Millstone than 120 Dayton Road in the same downwind vector. These data further support the conclusion that Millstone is not the source of radionuclides in these samples.

[Pwo different computer model runs conducted by DEP to determine how much radiation would need to have been released by Millstone Power Station to match the quantities of radioactive material found in the samples identified by CCAM, indicate that a catastrophic ev *t would have had to occur at Millstone for it to be the source of these radionuclides. L4-ny such an event would distribute other types of radioactive materials in addition to those found in the samples at 120 Dayton Road, materials that were not detected in any of the thousands of environmental samples taken as part of the REMP.

Simply put, no such catastrophic event has occurred at Millstone Power Station. In fact, DEP's review of the two NRC inspections conducted last year verifies that no issues of non-compliance or violations were identified.

3

Page: 4 Number: 2 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 9:28:05 AM Again, one would need to see all possible plume data. One other possible consideration is the possibility, of a liquid release similar to the releases from St. Lucie from 1976-1982. One would not expect Sr-89 after years of decay. This fails to explain why the levels are higher at Dayton Rd.

SNumber: 2 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:39:51 PM One would need to review the assumptions used in these computer models.

Major contamination occurred in Florida from a nuclear plant yet no catastrophic event ever occurred.

DNumber: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 5:09:34 PM Has Millstone and/or the DEP verified the presence or absence of other isotopes in the soils or in the vegetation?

Reassessment of Millstone Power Station's Environmental Monitoring Data Summary The Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone (CCAM) has made claims that goat milk samples taken in the vicinity of the Millstone nuclear power station show evidence that "routine cerations of Millstone are in violation of federal health standards and are illegal."[CC05]

CAM also claims that the activity in the goat milk samples in question confirm levels of radiation twice as high as those taken during the nuclear weapons testing in 1963 [CC05]. These claims are based upon the levels of the radionuclides Sr-90 and Cs-137 found in goat milk samples from a goat farm located 5.2 miles NNE from Millstone at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford in the year 2001. The samples identified by CCAM were taken as part of the normal Millstone Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP). CCAM based its claim upon one data point out of thousands of data points provided to them by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), in a Freedom of Information Act Request. After review of the available data, the Division of Radiation has concluded that Millstone Power Station was not the source of Sr-90 in the milk sample identified by CCAM. The factors that lead to the conclusion there is no scientific basis to link Millstone Power Station to elevated levels of Sr-90 and Cs-I137 are:

, *he ratio of Sr-89 to Sr-90 that would be present if the material was from a nuclear power station such as Millstone was not present in any of the rgvironmental samples.

" [he ratio of Cs-134 to Cs-137 that would be present if the material was from a nuclear power station such as Millstone was not present in any of the samples.

• The lower radionuclide concentrations in other milk samples including other sample locations located closer to Millstone in the same downwrd vector.

" The absence or lack of detection of other radionuclides in other 'ample media.

" [Recent sampling by DEP shows no activity except for expected levels of residual fallout from weapons testing and the Chomobyl event in soil from 120 Dayton Road and Connecticut's pooled milk.

This document reviews the claims made by the CCAM, and outlines the DEP's, Division of Radiation (DOR) reassessment of environmental data.

Introduction Starting in April of 1967, [EP61a] three years prior to the start up of Millstone Power Station's Unit One, Northeast Utilities as the original operators of the station began an environmental monitoring program. This comprehensive program continues today and includes the sampling of: ambient gamma radiation levels, air particulate, air radioiodine,, bottom sediments, broad leaf vegetation, fruits, vegetables, aquatic flora, soil, fish, mussels, oysters, clams, lobsters, sea water, 4

Page: 5 JjNumber: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:40:55 PM Where is the supporting documentation fore this claim?

! Number: 2 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:40:47 PM These ratios will change significantly with time. After about one year Sr-89 would not be measurable. What is the transit time from postulated release, to absorption in the vegetation, ingestion and into the goat milk?

Number: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:40:58 PM Where are the results for the measurements for Cs-137 and Cs-134?

Number: 4 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:40:50 PM What is the "sample media"? Was the soil, vegetation, and milk tested for these isotopes?

Number: 5 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:40:53 PM One would need to see these data.

well water, hay, pasture grass and milk. Dairy (cow) milk has and will be used when available.

Caprine (goat) milk is used when dairy milk is not available. During the past several years of testing, goat milk has been used in sampling due to the absence of dairy farms in a ten-mile radius around Millstone.

The State of Connecticut has been involved in the environmental sample analysis since the beginning of the program. Over the past thirty years DEP has reviewed the environmental data collected. DEP has also collected its own samples and engaged in a program of split sampling with an independent sample analysis.the past twenty years. In the split sampling program, Millstone Power Station collects the samples and provides DEP with a portion of the sample (split sampling) for independent laboratory analysis as a quality control on laboratory analysis.

The samples split with the DEP are analyzed at the Connecticut Department of Public Health Radiochemistry Laboratory. The results are then transmitted to DEP for review.

[4he DEP reviewed data from both its environmental monitoring program and Millstone's environmental monitoring program as part of this data assessment. The da.ta reassessment focused on airborne releases since transport by water is minimal due to a lowver possible concentrations of radionuclides in water due to dilution from Long Island Sound and a general limited mobility of radionuclides through soil because of natural filtration. Over thirty years of data and thousands of sample analysis from the various sampling media of the environmental monitoring program were reviewed.

Half-Life and Environmental Analysis of Milk in Connecticut When considering effluents from a nuclear power station such as Millstone, it is important to consider the different radionuclides rleased, the half-lives of those radionuclides, and the ratios that the radionuclides are released. 1 he following table lists the half-lives of radionuclides measured in milk. They range from as long as 1,277 million years to as short as eight days. The frequency of sampling for the REMP specifically enables the detection of the short lived radionuclides. Samples taken shortly after a release of radioactivity would show the short-lived radionuclides, such as 1-131, Cs- 134, and Sr-89. None of the milk or other environmental samples analyzed has shown any evidence of these short-lived radio nuclides in statistically significant quantities. Only the longer lived radionuclides that linger in the environment for many years such as Cs-137, Sr-90, and the natural radionuclide K-40 are seen in Millstone's environmental samples, including the goat milk samples in question. This includes samples of pasture grass from the field of the goat farm in question at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford, that were taken in some cases only days after goat milk samples were taken. If a release from

[yillstone were ongoing, Cs-137, Cs-134, Sr-90 Sr-89 and other radionuclides would have been posited on the grass and would have been detected in environmental samples [MC96]. This was not the case.

5

Page: 6 SNumber: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 5:29:02 PM Has the DEP considered the possibility of unmonitored releases such as those from the SG reliefs, AFW turbine etc.?

jNumber: 2 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 5:31:46 PM This statement infers that all of these isotopes are measured in milk. Is this accurate?

£Number: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 5:35:00 PM Is deposition on the grass the only pathway to the milk? Can the grass absorb Sr from the soil?

Is it true that crops around Chernobyl are still not fit for human consumption?

Radionuclide Half-Life Iodine 129 (1-129) 15 rnillion years Iodine 131 (1-131) 8 days Cesium 134 (Cs- 134) 2 years Cesium 137(Cs-137) 30 years Strontium 89 (Sr-89) 50 days Strontium 90 (Sr-90) 28 years Potassium 40 (K-40)* 1277 million years

• Potassium 40 (K-40) is a naturally occurring radionuclide Milk is one of the most sensitive indicators of fission products in the environment. This is due to the fact that grasses and vegetation make excellent traps for fallout. Grasses and vegetation are consumed by grazing animals, which in some cases produce milk. Grazing requires large areas of pastureland that re-concentrates the radioactivity in milk, making it a sensitive indicator.

Sampling of milk for radiological analysis in Connecticut dates back to 1961 [EP61a]. This sampling was initiated as part of the US Public Health Service's monitoring of weapons fallout in the United States. DEP began its current review of environmental data at this point.

Environmental levels of Sr-90 and Cs- 137 in milk are variable with fallout distribution, and different farming patterns [NC76]. Evidence of Sr-90 and Cs-137 has been detected in Connecticut's milk since 1961. Fallout from above ground nuclear weapons tests is responsible for the presence of these radionuclides in Connecticut's milk. With the introduction of the limited test ban treaty in 1963 between the United States and the Soviet Union, levels of Sr-90 and Cs- 137 in the global environment began to decrease.

Other notable events have occurred-that deposited additional measurable amounts of Cs and Sr in the environment. IA the late 1970's, the Chinese conducted a series of above ground weapons tests as well as the wrench in the early 1980's. It is estimated that approximately 16.8 million curies of Sr-90 was distributed in the environment due to above ground weapons testing [UNOI].

In 1986 the accident at Chornobyl released an additional 216,000 curies of Sr-90 into the global environment [UN01]. Both events, Chinese weapons testing and the accident at Chomobyl were detected in Connecticut's milk samples taken in 1976 and 1986 respectively [EP61 a].

Measurable levels of Cs-137 and Sr-90 in Connecticut peaked in 1963 with 143 Pico curies of Cs-137 and23 Pico curies of Sr-90 in dairy milk. These levels were found in the pooled Connecticut diary milk sample. The pooled Connecticut saaples consist of consolidating dairy milk from area farms, including the region near Millstone. Lqhis monitoring continues today.

The Environmental Protection Agency's National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL) in Montgomery, Alabama analyze these samples. Recently the DEP requested that NAREL reanalyze Connecticut's milk samples from the years 2003-2005. In addition to the standard gamma analysis, the DEP requested NAREL analyze these samples for Sr-90.

Measurements of Cs-137 have been non-detectable in Connecticut's pooled milk for over the past decade in NAREL's standard analysis. Levels of Sr-90 have been so low in the pooled milk sample that this analysis is no longer routinely performed.

6

Page: 7 Number: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/12/2006 9:36:29 AM The last atmospheric nuclear test was conducted on October 16, 1980 by China. 200KT to 1 MT.

One more indicator of the lack of review of the report.

iNumber: 2 . Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/12/2006 9:43:58 AM What are the units? PCi/gm or PCi/I?

How do these compare with. today's measurements?

If the peak Sr-90 levels in 1963 were 23 PCi/liter from fallout, then the 55 PCi needs to be explained.

If the peak in 1963 was 23 PCi it is unlikely that a reading of 55 PCi measured 26 years from the last atmospheric nuclear test could have originated from fallout.

L-Number: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 6:53:45 PM Pooled?

[RAREL counted Connecticut's 2003-2005 samples for 3,000 minutes and detected only trace quantities of Cs- 137 (< 5 pCi/liter) and only one sample showed a positive statistical detection of Sr-90. Again, none of the shorter-lived radionuclides that would be present if a release from Millstone had occurred or was ongoing were detected. As a general rule, it takes approximately ten half lives for a radionuclide to decay to non-detectable levels. Cs-134 with it's two-year half-life (twenty years to decay to non-detectable) would still be present in all of the samples and Sr-89 with its fifty-day half-life (five hundred days to decay to non-detectable) would still be present in samples from 2004 and 2005. 4he amounts and ratios of radioactive material detected in the Connecticut dairy samples from 2003-2005 counted by NAREL are indicative of weapons fallout.

[leasurements of Sr and Cs have been typically higher in the vicinity of Millstone since 1961, nine years prior to the start-up of Unit One [EP61a]. This can be accounted for by higher rainfall amounts in this region [HU83]. Rainfall is the primary means of causing localized high concentrations of fallout.

Another variable in detection of fallout today is the factor of disturbed verses undisturbed soil.

Simply stated, if the soil has been turned over (disturbed), then the .original fallout that was deposited on the ground is no longer a factor in radiation dose contribution. The fallout deposited on top of the soil is now diluted and distributed in the soil. Conversely, undisturbed soil is soil that has not been turned over g tilled since fallout distribution (1945-1986). In undisturbed soil the distributed fallout isLgill on the surface and available to be ingested or easily taken up in plants. The field where the goats grazed at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford, was undisturbed soil. This has been verified through discussions between DEP and Mr. Moran, the former owner of the property and goat farm [MO06].

Ratios of Radionuclides As stated previously, when considering environmental samples taken to monitor effluents from the Millstone Power Station it is important to consider all possible radionuclides emitted, the half-lives of the radionuclides, and their relative ratios. The nuclear fission reaction in a power reactor requires specific relationships to exist between the hundreds of radionuclides produced And the actual release or theoretical release of at least thirty-four radionuclides from Millstone.

Por example, the ratio of Sr-89 to Sr-90 in the reactor core at Millstone ranges from a low often to one to a high of twenty-five to one depending on the~power history of the reactor core [NR94].

A similar relationship can be made with Cs-134 and Cs-137, with the Cs-134 to Cs-137 ratio in the reactor core being approximately two to one [NR94]. In contrast, ratios for the fission yields from atomic weapons are variable in fallout, makingit difficult to use this technique for determining the sopirce [GL77]. Therefore, when looking at levels of Sr or Cs in the environment, the htios for Sr and Cs are very important in determining if the source of the radioactive material is from a nuclear reactor. It should be.oted that the ratios for Sr and Cs as previously stated represent what is in the reactor core and ~e conservative values. The DEP took into consideration radioactive decay of fission products into the radionuclides of interest and the radioactive decay of the radionuclides of interest between sample collection dates to estimate potential Sr-89/Sr-90 and Cs-134/Cs-137 ratios in evaluating the data. The half-lives of 7

Page: 8 jNumber: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 6:57:09 PM A sample from more than 1.5 years would have no detectable Sr-89 with a half life of 50 days or 10 half lives. When were these samples counted?

jNumber: 2 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 6:59:19 PM This may be true but I am not convinced by the presentation of this data. It depends on the production date and the measurement date.

Number: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/3/2006 7:01:21 PM Where is data to support this conclusion and how much higher were the concentrations?

jNumber: 4 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 12:33:32 PM Not sure if this statement is scientifically supported. Testimony provided in Finestone vs. FPL contradicts this statement.

This assumption is vital to the conclusions reached in this study.

Number: 5 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 12:36:27 PM Not accurate. If the power history is such that the reactor has been shutdown for a long period, there will be no Sr-89.

jNumber: 6 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 12:56:08 PM Number: 7 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 1:01:26 PM Not conservative assumptions.

these radionuclides are =proximately: Sr-89.- fifty days, Sr 28 years, Cs-134 - 2 years, and Cs- 137 - 30 years.-or the material to have come from a nuclear reactor like Millstone, Sr-89 and Cs-134 must be present in the samples at levels greater than Sr-90 and Cs-137. The data shows that Sr-89 and Cs-134 are not present in the environmental samples at levels greater than Sr-90 and Cs- 137, supporting the conclusion that the source of the radioactive material is not from a power reactor.

The following graph depicts the Sr-89/Sr-90 and Cs-134/Cs-137 levels of goat milk taken from 120 Dayton Road, Waterford, during the period of July 1997 to May 2004 [EP61 a]. The results shown are from data taken from DEP split milk samples. The goat farm-at 120 Dayton Road in Waterford is the location that the milk sample was taken from that CCAM uses in its claim that Millstone Power Station is the source of the Sr-90. DEP's data is consistent with Millstone -

Power Stations data and does not support the hypothesis that a power reactor is the source of this radioactive material. Whe first graph illustrates that the levels of Sr-89 are much less than the levels of Sr-90. If the source of the activity seen in the milk samples were due to Millstone the Sr-89 levels would be gher than the Sr-90 levels (core ratios of 10 to 25 are greater than enviionmental ratios). 31he one Sr-89 spike that appears around 6/10/98 does not result in any Sr-90 dose greater than the natural variapon of background radiation [EP61 a]. It should be noted that all levels of activity are well within ýJood and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance intervention levels for Sr in milk and food products of 4,300 pCi/kg or liter. The second graph illustrates the Cs-134 and Cs-137 levels found in the milk samples. If the Cesium detected had been from Millstone the quantity of Cs- 134 detected would have been consistently greater than Cs- 137 detected.

Sr-89-90 at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford 50 40 30 -

20-- A r890

-20F

-30 '"

-,0-Note: The error bars were removed from this graph to make it easier to read. A graph that includes the statistical error is included at the end of this report. [EP61a]

8

Page: 9 Number: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 1:02:55 PM Not an accurate statement. The entire conclusion of this report is based upon this inaccurate statement.

JNumber: 2 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 1:05:24 PM True statement. Many of the Sr-89 level have negative concentrations of Sr-89. There are no meaningful units of measurement for the concentrations.

T-I*Number: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 1:09:50 PM A variation from -25 to +25 pico curies is more than a statistical variation.

WNumber: 4 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 1:11:49 PM I would like to see this guidance. If this plot has units of pico curies per gram then these limits are exceeded.

Number: 5 Author: Paul

Subject:

Note Date: 4/11/2006 4:52:33 PM Pico Curies per what unit?

Number: 6 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Note Date: 4/11/2006 4:50:10 PM What is meant by.a concentration of minus 30 Pico Curies????

This type of bogus data questions the validity and accuracy of the data in the report.

Cs-134 and Cs-137 at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford fou 50 40 30

-- '-- Cs-134 a.

Cs-1 37 20 10 5 0 - .~ .~ . .. .

-U' Y 10 - W W 1Y ý5 tlý' W W IV W ýO- 1\11, 115' Note: The error bars were removed from this graph to make it easier to read. Graphs that include error are included at the end of this report. [EP61a]

It is known from years of operation and experience what radionuclides would be released from a commercial nuclear reactor similar to'the pressure water reactors (PWR) in operation at Millstone Power Station. This has been verified by years of radiochemistry analysis at PWR's in operation through out the world, including the Millstone Power Station's reactors. It is a physical impossibility for only a single radionuclide to be released from a nuclear reactor'

[MC96]. lfr§r-90 and Cs-137 were released in quantities that could be detected in environmental samples, at %ast thirty-four other radionuclides would have been detected with them [MC96].

For Sr-90 to be released from Millstone to produce the levels observed a major fuel damage event would have to occur. This would require the release of other radionuclides at detectable levels that have not been observed.

The reason that at least thirty- four other radionuclides must be released can be understood through the basic design of a commercial power reactor in the United States. Reactor fuel for commercial nuclear power stations is slightly enriched uranium dioxide in the form of ceramic pellets with a high melting point (approximately 28000 Celsius or 5,072' Fahrenheit) and is designed to hold radionuclides produced in the fission process in the ceramic matrix of the fuel pellets. At temperatures below 1800'F, uranium dioxide retains essentially all the fission gas elements such as xenon and krypton. Above 1800'F the diffusion of gases from the ceramic pellets increase and at temperatures above 3250'F the ceramic fuel pellets begin to melt. At normal operating temperatures the pellets expand axially and fill the void spaces between pellets.

Sealed tubes around the ceramic pellets provide an additional barrier to the release of radionuclides. The fuel pellets are placed into sealed "fuel pins" constructed zircaloy tubes filled with pressurized inert gas approximately 12 feet long sealed with welded end caps. These fuel pins form the first barrier around the fuel pellets and is known as the cladding. The purpose of 9

Page: 10 Number: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Note Date: 4/11/2006 4:52:55 PM It is my understanding that there is no Cs-134 produced by nuclear weapons. Therefore, even the low concentrations of Cs-134 indicate the source to be a nuclear reactor.

Number: 2 Author: Paul

Subject:

Note Date: 4/11/2006 4:45:11 PM If the Sr-90 concentrations observed were from fallout then one would also expect a similar increase in Cs-137 levels.

-Number: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 4:55:29 PM What other isotopes are monitored in the milk, soil and grass? The chemical characteristics of the isotopes are considerable different such that Sr tens to concentrate in the milk.

the cladding is to contain the pellets and the highly radioactive fission products generated by the fission process. Therefore, the cladding makes up the first barrier to prevent the release of fission products such as Cs and Sr into the environment from the ceramic fuel pellets. The second barrier is the closed loop reactor-cooling system made up of the heavy steel of the reactor vessel (typically 9-12 inches thick) and high pressure piping system within the containment building. A third and final barrier for the release of radioactive material from the reactor is the containment building itself. This structure is designed to contain major liquid and gaseous releases from a reactor in the event of an accident. It is constructed of reinforce concrete between three to six feet thick, capable of withstanding a overpressure of approximately 40 lbs/in 2 . For a release significant enough to produce the level of Sr-90 found in the goat milk, a major event damaging the ceramic fuel pellets and defeating these three defense in depth barriers would have to occur. Since the fuel pellets and all these barriers are physical construction properties of a reactor design, other radionuclides produced in the fission process must also be released and found in other environmental sample media monitored for radiation in a major event. The following diagram illustrates the barriers just described.

Coontainment (3rd Fission Product Barrier)

Damage SemSteam Generator

/ Prsuie (,"Fission Product Barrier)

Fe- J  ! Reactor Coolant_/

Wate System r* *,*(2nd

• Fission ProductBarrier)

-- -Control i- Rods

~Fuel Pellets

• [Me031 10

This page contains no comments Plume ComDuter Modelina As stated previously, data reassessment focused on airborne releases since transport by water is minimal due to lower possible concentrations of radionuclides in water due to dilution from Long Island Sound and a general limited mobility of radionuclides through soil because of natural filtration. Additional information related to predicted deposition from air transport due to a plume from Millstone Power Station is available that indicates that Millstone is not.the source of Cs-137 and Sr-90 detected in the goat's milk. The farm that provided the sample of goat milk identified by CCAM, at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford, is located approximately five miles north/northeast from Millstone. Another goat farm providing milk samples is located only two miles from Millstone, alon, a relatively straight line from Millstone to the farm located at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford. 4he Cs-137 levels in milk sample analysis from this second farm closer to Millstone have been a factor of three lower than the farm at 120 Dayton Road.

Logically and as predicted by plume modeling, if there had been a release event from Millstone distributing a radioactive plume, there would be much higher levels of radioactivity in the samples only two miles from the plant compared to the samples five miles from the plant.

Plume modeling calculations were conducted by the Division of Radiation to estimate the source term necessary to produce the Sr-90 spike found in the milk sampled at the farm locationfive miles from Millstone Power Station. t44illstone would have to release greater than one curie of Sr-90 to produce the level observed in the milk sample. These calculations were made with two different dose assessment models: the Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS), and the National Atmospheric Release Assessment Center (NARAC). MIDAS is a commercial product developed by ABS Consulting Inc. to perform "puff' plume modeling for nuclear power plants using specific conditions at each facility that it models [AB99]. NARAC is a web based gaussian plume model developed by the National Atmospl}wric Release Assessment Center at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [TU04]. LA release of greater than one curie of Sr-90 from Millstone would have been a major event with large quantities of other radionuclides being released and detected in other environmental samples [MC96]. Lack of these other radionuclides in environmental samples is additional supportive information proving that Millstone is not the source of the Sr-90 or Cs-137 detected in the goat milk samples referred to in the CCAM accusation.

The following plume plots developed by the Division of Radiation's computer modeling illustrates this point.

11

Page: 12 WNumber: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 1:45:12 PM What about the Sr-90 levels?

INumber: 2 Author: Paul

Subject:

Highlight *Date: 4/11/2006 5:11:03 PM Where is the calculation and the assumptions supporting this statement?

LNumber: 3 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/4/2006 1:49:17 PM I agree.

MIDAS Plot

~

• ~ ' J +*ý n**- ý .Mair. d a" 'M.' +.' O.TT,+*,, M E

,12 I -"0 '

Si.: MiL"TDNE UNN:02 fi1e WROUN bOHTAIUNATION Pid12JOOHom.Ezpwm C~i~'4~LW~ *~D W ickaurn52$T0 DUTh-M153 Ltghd (.Lfi21 SACAG cr2

.5~ 7A[.Q u OEO4 II , .1OuE-u-. UtED 7,`- ZOE0E:E:D4.a

,  :'N*¸ */'*::* '*N * * * * *

• 12

Page: 13 Number: 1 Author: Paul Blanch

Subject:

Note Date: 4/11/2006 5:12:07 PM This model is for only one wind speed and direction. Even this model shows the lowest concentration nearest the plant. Other assumptions such

• as wind speed may expand this low concentration area.

Number: 2 Author: Paul

Subject:

Note Date: 4/12/2006 9:15:33 AM

,This corresponds to 2000 PCI/square meter. If a goat consumed one square meter of this soil I would expect very high concentrations of Sr-90 in the milk. I do not believe this support the statement that Millstone would have had to release more than one curie of Sr-90 for the milk concentrations.

NARAC Plot 305 Tele Atlas and/or LLNL Effects and Actions 1(uCi/m2)

Extent !Description Area

>0.01 I1.2km ,Possibly contaminated area. Use to confirm with monitoring surveys.

• 10.0010 rosil ...........

>14.4km Possibly contaminated area. Use to confirm with monitoring surveys.

• i19. 5k m 2 31 .2km 1Possibly contaminated area. Use to confirm with monitoring surveys. i

• [140km2" Note: Areas and counts in the table are cumulative.

13

This page contains no comments Other Factors Affecting Re-concentration of Radionuclides in Milk Vegetation density and seasonal variation also effect concentrations of radionuclides in milk,.

especially goat milk. Burman et al. [T183] noted, "that there is more uptake from open grazing than from than from green chop and more uptake from sparser pastures than from lush vegetation.. A possible explanation is the ingestion of the grass mat, which may be more highly contaminated (over the long term) than the upper portions of the vegetation. Another factor that contributes to higher intakes from sparse pastures is the greater area that must be covered by the animal to get the same intake."

As found by Bunch, "the season affects vegetation density, it, nutritional value, and the relative metabolic rate of the animal. The Controlled Environmentalt aijoiodine Tests (CERT) conducted in the 1960's found the following relationship for the t-tal -1 31 secretion into milk:"

[TI83]

Season [microCi-d/L] + [microCi/g(dry)]

Spring 64 Summer 620 Fall 580 Winter 18 Lentsh also noted: [lIemperature is an important component of these seasonal effects: the secretion of radioiodine into milk is 6.5 times higher at 330 C than at 5' C." [T183]

The metabolism and size of the animal can make a significant change in the quantity of radioactive material secreted in milk as well. lpntsh also states in his research "An extreme example of this is the relative concentration of-adioiodine in milk from cows and milk from Aoats having the same radioiodine intake. The percentage of daily intake per liter for the goat for 31 is 46.7%, and for the cow, it is only 0.42%. These values reflect the volume of milk produced: 7.5-14 kg/day for the cow and 1.2 kg/day for the goat." [T183]

Concentrations of radioactivity in goat milk are routinely higher when grass is less abundant and goats must eat from greater regions of their pasture. It is believed that this practice of large area grazing is a major contributor to greater concentrations of radioactivity in milk.

It should be also noted that goat's milk is alkaline while dairy milk is acidic. Strontium is an alkaline earth, which may be an additional factor in goat milk concentrating Sr greater than cow milk. In addition, according to the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) animals such as goats lick the ground for nutritional needs [BA05]. Nutrimental needs of a lactating animal are greater than those of a non- lactating animal.

Farming practices, such as the use or lack of use of fertilizer can have a significant impact on the secretion of radionuclides into milk. One affect of fertilization is to increase the vegetation density. Straub and Fooks fertilized a pasture, doubling the grass yield that led to a 50%

reduction in the level of radioactive material in milk produced from cows feeding in that pasture

[TI83]. Underdahl notes: "Good farming practices such as fertilization can reduce the Sr-90 14

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:23:28 PM jNumber: 2 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:21:33 PM What does 1-131 have to do with Sr-89?

WNumber: 3 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:23:28 PM It is also true that the temperature in August is higher than that during January.

Iodine behaves differently than Strontium.

1Number: 4 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:23:40 PM jNumber: 5 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:23:47 PM

level in milk by as much as a factor of 5." [TI83] This is significant because the field the goats grazed in at 120 Dayton Road was unfertilized pasture.

1Jnderdahl also noted that stable elements in feeds and supplements tend to suppress radionuclide transfer into milk. He observed a threefold reduction in levels of Sr in milk produced by cows when their stable calcium intake was increased.

During this review the DEP interviewed Mr. Moran, the [Ormer owner and operator of the goat farm at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford. He stated in the interview that he had never tilled the soil where the goats were located or ever fertilized the area where the goats grazed. These two farming practices are important because they illustrate that:

" Phe soil was never tilled and therefore undisturbed with weapons fallout still on the surface.

• Straub, Fooks, and Underdahl's research shows that field fertilization can reduce the levels of radioactive material in milk from grazing animals.

Additional Environmental Data In December of 2005, the DEP took additional surface soil samples at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford. These samples were collected from two separate locations in the field where the goats grazed. The samples were sent to Eberline Laboratory Services in Oak Ridge, Tennessee for analysis. Analysis of the samples show classic undisturbed soil fallout levels of Cs- 137 of approximately one pCi/gm in soil in Connecticut [CY99]. There was no Sr-90 or Sr-89 detected in the soil samples.

As previously stated, operators of Millstone began environmental monitoring in 1967, three years prior to start-up of Unit One. The Connecticut DEP has monitored Millstone's environmental surveillance program since that time. For the past three decades thousands of samples from various media have been taken to monitor radioactive emissions from Millstone.

In addition to the other environmental sampling already mentioned, e DEP has fifteen passive thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) for radiation monitoring around Millstone. TLDs are used to detect direct gamma radiation and can be used to measure radiation exposure from deposited gamma ray emitting radioactive material distributed by an airborne release. None of these monitors has shown levels of radioactivity that would indicate a release from Millstone station or that would be harmful to the public health and safety or the environment.

The following graph illustrates this point. This graph illustrates ambient radiation monitoring performed with TLDs taken during the years 1999 to mid 2002. The horizontal region of the graph illustrates the year in quarters. Location #10 is 1.1 miles North North East, location #11 is 2.9 miles North East, location #16 is 0.6 miles East North East, and location #17 is 3.4 miles North of Millstone. The control location, #13, is 50 miles North North West from Millstone.

Data quality problems were identified with the 3 rd Quarter 2000 data when it was collected and 15

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:27:45 PM What does this have to do with Sr in goats milk?

ZNumber: 2 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:28:37 PM WHat is the significance of a "former owner?"

jNumber: 3 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:33:06 PM Where is the study that supports the fact that Strontium remains on the surface. I have seen indications that disturber soil will actually increase the surface radiation levels.

,flNum6er: 4 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:33:55 PM TLD's would not detect the presence of Sr-90 irrespective of the contamination levels.

therefore has not been presented here. All data are within the normal variation of natural background radiation.

TLD Data 60

---

#5 50 ---B-- # 6

1. 7

-x-- # 8 40

---

# 9 0 #10

---

#11

• - 30 14 - #13 E

-# 16 20 #17

1. 18

1. 19 10

- .2 .2 - - # 20

--*<-- # 21 0

1999 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd

[EP61 a]

Risk and Regulatory Guidance Levels In addition to the environmental monitoring program performed by the Connecticut DEP, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspects Millstone's environmental monitoring program and environmental effluent programs. This is done to ensure they are compliant With NRC and US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations (40 CFR 190.10). It also ensures that Millstone's plans, procedures, and operations are protective of the public health and safety, and environment. The NRC has stated in their regulations, 10 CFR 50.34a, that nuclear power stations shall " keep levels of radioactive material in effluents to unrestricted areas as low as reasonably achievable." The following are the maximum radiation dose limits for each reactor site:

0 The annual release of radioactive material above background gaseous effluents shall not result in an annual air dose in an unrestricted area in excess of 10 mrads for gamma rays and 20 mrads for beta exposure. Larger releases are permitted provided the annual dose does not exceed 5 mrems to the total body or 15 mrem to the skin.

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• The annual release of radioactive iodine and radioactNe material in particulate form shall not result in an annual dose or dose commitment to any organ in excess of 15 mrem.

The NRC recently conducted inspections pf Millstone's environmental monitoring programs to insure compliance with their regulations. 'One was an inspectin of the Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems [NR05].. Phe other was an inspection of the REMP [NR05]. No findings of significance were identified in either inspection. The NRC conclusions on these inspections were that Millstone's operations were in.compliance with federal regulations and plant operations were maintained in such a manner that the health and safety of the public and the environment are not at risk.

The CCAM has stated, "routine operations of Millstone are in violation of federal health standards and are illegal." Pastand current regulatory guidance levels show that this statement is false. During the era of fallout monitoring the U.S. Public Health Service in 1961 published standards in the Federal Radiation Council Report # 2 "Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection Standards." In this report three ranges of radioactive measurements were referenced. Range one levels of activity recommended adequate surveillance to provide reasonable confirmation of calculations. Range two recommended active surveillance and routine control. Range three recommendations were to evaluate consumption and provide appropriate positive control measures. The guidance for Sr-90 Were: Range One: 0-20 pCi/day, Range Two: 20 to 200 pCi/day and Range Three: 200 to 2,000 pCi/day [FR61].

These levels were developed for peacetime situations.

Interdiction levels for Sr-90 in the environment of 4,300 pCi/kg or liter have been established by the FDA [FD04]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses as a standard for infant milk of 2,700 pCi/liter as a generic action level. The highest level of Sr-90 found in goat milk from 120 Dayton Road in Waterford was 55 pCi/liter. Millstone analyzed the sample referenced by CCAM and is consistent with DEP's independent laboratoryg nalysis. A S'-90 concentration 55 pCi/liter is 1.2% of the FDA acceptable level and 2% of the -AEA standard.

The environment is naturally radioactive and man is constantly exposed to this natural background radiation. Natural background radiation comes from radioactive elements in the earth (terrestrial), air, and water, and cosmic radiation from outer space. In addition to natural background radiation, manmade items and normal activities also contribute to the average radiation dose in the United States. Combining these sources of radiation exposure results in an average radiation dose of approximately 360 mrem per year. This 360 mrem can be broken down in the following manner [NC87]!

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:37:39 PM Z'Number: 2 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:37:39 PM The NRC also inspected St. Lucie for more than six years during which the plant was releasing large quantities of radioactive material. The NRC saw no problems during this period.

jNumber: 3 Author: Paul

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.Highlight Date: 4/11/2006 5:41:36 PM Where is this reference?

I1

Source Percent Approximate Dose Natural Background 82%

Radon 55% 200 mrem Cosmic 8% 28 mrem Terrestrial 8% 28 mrem Internal 11% 39 mrem Manmade 18% _

Medical X-Ray 11% 39 mrem Nuclear Medicine 4% 14 mrem Consumer Products 3% 10 mrem Other <1% 2 mrem Total 360 mrem Internal sources of radiation dose comes from the consumption of food that contains natural amounts of radioactive material. Consumer product doses come from items such as tobacco products, domestic water supplies, building materials, combustible fuels such as coal and natural gas, and airport inspection systems to name a few [NC87]. An mrem is an extremely tiny amount of energy absorbed by tissues in the body.

As previously stated, radiation occurs naturally in the food we eat and drink. The amount of natural radioactive material in the goat milk sample from 120 Dayton Road was almost 2,000 pCi/liter of K-40 during the same period. This is almost 36 times greater than the 55 pCi/liter of Sr-90 questioned by CCAM. If an adult were to consume milk with 55 pCi/liter of Sr-90 at 2 liters per day over the course of the year the dose received would be less than 10 mrem. This consumption of the goat milk is practically impossible because the goats vere not milked throughout the year and the Sr-90 concentration did not remain steady at 55 pCi/liter. This annual dose of 10 mrem is a small portion of annual average radiation exposure. It is interesting to note that an annual average radiation increase of 10 mrem is less than the difference of increased annual radiation exposure of someone who moves to Denver from a sea level location.

The following graph illustrates the Sr-90 and Cs- 137 concentrations in relation to K-40 a radionuclide commonly found in nature. K-40 is another example of an exposure from natural background radiation and is naturally found in food products such as milk, bananas, broccoli, bread, beer, etc.

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This page contains no comments Sr-90, Cs-137, and K-40 In Milk Samples taken From 120 Dayton Road, Waterford 1500 '

i.=

• K-40 1000

.2o 0.

500

[E P61 a]

Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone's Scientific Methodology The National Academy of Science's (NAS) evaluation of the scientific methodology used by CCAM should also be mentioned. CCAM has based its claim on the selection of a single specific data point in thousands of data points. Others have used 'a similar methodology in the past. Professor Ernst Sternglass used this scientific methodology in the early 1970's. The NAS at that time reviewed Professor Stermglass' previous work on mortality and Sr-90. The NAS commented in its publication "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation" published in 1972 that: "The Evidence assembled by Sternglass has been critically reviewed by Lindop and Rotblat and by Tompkins and Brown. It is clear that the correlation's presented in support of the hypothesis depend on arbitrary selection of data supporting the hypothesis and the ignoring of those that do not." [NA72]

It appears that Professor Sternglass is again drawing conclusions using selected data, which support his. hypothesis,. and ignores data that does not..

Conclusions The evidence that the Cs-137 and Sr-90 detected in a milk sample at 120 Dayton Road, Waterford did not come from Millstone Power Station is conclusive. The following facts support this argument:

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[4he ratio of Sr-89 to Sr-90 that would be present if the material was from a nuclear power ation such as Millstone was not present in any of the samples.

e ratio of Cs-134 to Cs-137 that would be present if the material was from a nuclear power r*hation such as Millstone was not present in any of the samples.

• he lower radionuclide concentrations in other milk samples including other sample

& cations located closer to Millstone in the same downwind vector.

L he absence or lack of detection of other radionuclides in other sample media.

[lecent sampling by the DEP shows no activity except for expected levels of residual fallout R

from weapons testing and the Chornobyl event in soil from 120 Dayton Road and Connecticut's pooled milk.

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Highlight Date: 4/12/2006 8:57:30 AM The entire measurement of Sr-89 is in question indicated by numerous negative values for Sr-89. It is also very possible that the origin of the Sr-90 may be from Millstone without the presence of Sr-89.

jNumber: 2 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/12/2006 8:58:27 AM The report does not present any data on the measurement of Cs-134. We don't know if this was monitored.

Number: 3 Author: Paul

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/12/2006 9:00:55 AM It appears that the only comparison was with a location about 2 miles from Millstone. If the high readings were from fallout then one would expect similar concentrations at other sites including the site located 2 miles from Millstone.

jNumber: 4 Author: Paul

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Highlight Date: 4/12/2006 9:02:00 AM No data is provided in this report quantifying the presence or absence of other isotopes.

• Number: 5 Author: Paul

Subject:

Highlight Date: 4/12/2006 9:03:47 AM Not clear what is meant by "recent."

Be it fallout or emissions from Millstone it is possible that the activity migrated into the soil due to rainfall, etc.

Supplemental Graphs Sr-89 and Sr90 Farm # 22 Moran o

F = ýý,

1--)4-W- ýSf-90 3,E, Graph with error included. [EP61a]

Cs-i 34 and Cs-137 Farm #22 Moran 60 50" 40 s-14 30 I &--S17 0

Graph with error included. [EP6 Ia]

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- Number: 1 Author: Paul

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Note Date: 4/12/2006 9:07:00 AM This is one indication that the report was not reviewed by anyone other than the author. It is a physical impossibility that one would detect a minus 35 PicoCuries of Sr-89.

Data such as this questions the validity of the entire report.

Millstone Goat Sr-90 Data Farm # 24, 29 miles NNW, Farm # 22, 5.2 miles NNE Farm # 23 2 miles ENE, Farm # 21, 2 miles N 60 50 L

40 7J 30 #21 Sr-90 0.

is-- #22Sr-90 U) oCL

1. 24 Sr-90

~-vr :JLk 20 -X-- #23 Sr-90

.J¶ a I ý,ý

.9 0

10 ~

oT i,lrr'1" 0 X

'u sý 'tv "&0 6 'Sý -<\\

-7 'u N' ziý 0 I a It) '0

- - -e 'N ' .7

-In

[EP61 a]

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Note Date: 4/12/2006 9:09:17 AM If this increase in Sr-90 was due to fallout one would expect to find similar increases at other monitoring sites.

References

[AB99] ABS Consulting, Inc., Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System, Computer Software, 1999

[BA05] Baldwin, R., U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service -

Research Analyst Scientist, Telephone Conversation, December 2005

[CC05] Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone Press Release, November 2005

[CY99] Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station "Technical Support Document CY-HP-0025 Background Cesium Revision 2" February 1999

[EP61] Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Radiation Files: Radioactivity in Connecticut Milk, data files 1961-1978

[EP61 a] Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Radiation Files: Data files 1961-2005

[EP95] Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection: Annual Environmental Monitoring Data for Millstone Nuclear Power Station: 1995-2004

[FD04] U.S. Food and Drug Administration Guidance Document, Supporting Document for Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported Foods, January 2004

[FR61] Federal Radiation Council Report No. 2, Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection Standards, September 1961

[GL77] Glasstone, S., Dolan, P., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, US Government Printing Office, 1977

[HU83] Hunter, B.W., Meade, D.B., Precipitation in Connecticut 1951-1980, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Bulletin Number Six, 1983

[LA83] Lamarsh, Introduction to Nuclear Engineering, Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1983

[MC96] McKenna, T., Trefethen, J., Gant, K. (ORNL), Jolicoeur, J., Kuzo, G., Athey, G.;

US NRC NUREG/BR-0150 "Response Technical Manual 96" Vol. Rev four, 1996

[MO06] Moran, A., Former Property Owner and Goat Farmer, Telephone Interview, January 2006 23

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[MP03] Millstone Power Station, MP Unit 2 and Unit 3 EAL Reference Manual Rev. 1, 2003

[MP67] Millstone Power Station, Radiological Environmental Operating Report-. 1967-2004 (non- inclusive)

[NA72] The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, November 1972

[NC76] National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Report Number 50, Environmental Radiation Measurements, December 1976.

[NC87] National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Report Number 93, Ionizing Radiatin Exposure of the Population of the United States, September 1987.

[NR05] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Reports, 05000336/2005-004, 05000336/2005004008, 05000423

[NR771 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guidance Document 1.109-Calculation of Annual Doses to Man From Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix 1 Rev. 1, October 1977

[NR94] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 5247-Appendix C of RASCAL Version 2.1 Vol. 1 Rev. 2, December 1994

[ST63] Straub, Cooperative Field Studies on Environmental Factors Influencing 1-131 in Milk, Health Physics Journal,December 1963

[T183] Radiological Assessment - A Textbook on Environmental Dose Analysis, U.S.

Government Printing Office, ed. Tillman, J., Meyer, H.R. ,September 1983

[TU04] Tull, J.E., Foster, C.S., Gash, J.D. II, Eme, W.G., Carroll, L.A., Greenfield, J.L.,

Foster, K.T., Baskett, R.L., Nasstrom, J.S., NARAC Web Users Guide, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, March 2004

[UN01] UNSCEAR 2001 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation-2001 Report to the General Assemble, with Scientific Annex 24

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