ML073110381

Progress Energy Florida, Inc. Proposed Florida Nuclear Site Transmission Planning Study, Final Report, Attachments Dand F Included

ML073110381
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	05/21/2007
From:	Fougere K, Januzik L, Schneider A TRC Solutions
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3F1107-04, LAR-296, Rev 1
Download: ML073110381 (75)

Text

PROGRESS ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST #296, REVISION 1 MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY RECAPTURE PROGRESS ENERGY FLORIDA, INC., PROPOSED FLORIDA NUCLEAR SITE TRANSMISSION PLANNING STUDY ATTACHMENT D

Power Systems Division Power Delivery - Consulting Progress Energy Florida, Inc.

Proposed Florida Nuclear Site Transmission Planning Study FINAL REPORT MAY 21, 2007 Prepared by Len Januzik Alex Schneider Kevin Fougere TRC Solutions Power Systems Division Power Delivery Services

C TRO Executive Summary Progress Energy Florida, Inc. (PEF) has requested TRC to perform a comprehensive transmission planning study to determine the feasibility of constructing a 1125 MW nuclear generation facility in Levy County northeast of the existing Crystal River complex and 8 miles directly north of PEF's Crystal River East Substation. The first unit is expected to be placed in service by June, 2017, with a potential second 1125 MW unit to be in service by June 2018. The study is intended to determine the required transmission upgrades to interconnect the plant(s) to the PEF transmission system and deliver the full output of the plant(s) to PEF, and thus will require a thorough study consisting of load flow analysis, stability analysis and short circuit analysis.

Power Flow Analysis -

Power flow analysis was conducted to determine the impact of hypothetical transmission expansion options, in support of the additional capacity expected to be installed at the Levy county site. The analysis for each scenario centered on equipment loading and bus voltages within the study area under normal (pre-contingency) and design criteria contingency conditions. The analysis was first done without the unit additions and then with the project installed under various support alternatives to identify the incremental impact of the project and incremental support requirements.

Options reviewed in this analysis include various expansions and/or rebuilding of the PEF transmission system using 500kV, 765 kV, and High Voltage. DC voltage levels.

Upon the reduction of scenarios based on power flow results and facility cost estimates, additional work was done to determine breaker duty at stations and substations along with analysis to verify system stability with the new facilities.

The conclusions from steady state thermal and voltage review are as follows:

1) The double circuit 500kV or single circuit 765kV options with retention of underlying 230kV system perform well although the 500kV option still requires 500/230kV transformer upgrades or additions.

2) The Rating on existing equipment, especially transformers, becomes an issue in all options available.

3) There are two areas of chronic lower voltage - specifically the area along the 230kV line from Suwanee to Pinegrove and in the Avalon-Windemere area.

While these areas do not fall to dangerously low levels for any scenarios examined, their regular depression indicated they are the likely areas where collapse may occur if larger scale outages were to happen and therefore care must be exercised in that regard.

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4) Conversion of 230kV to 500kV puts additional strain on facilities in the Crystal River-CREast-Brookridge areas and creates an outlet problem for CR generation on the 230kV bus.

5) Overall Voltage levels are improved in the 765kV option when compared to other options examined as well as forward looking expansion options.

6) There are some strong disincentives for 765kV including the need to completely rebuild several substations, the need for spares not readily available among neighboring systems and the issues created by introducing a different voltage level than currently exists within the state or among neighboring systems.

7) The disadvantages of HVDC appear to strongly outweigh its advantages even if costs are favorable. This appears to be.a square peg - round hole situation.

8) The FL-GA interface capability is maintained under all of the options reviewed.

9) In virtually all cases it appears that a single circuit at a voltage level less than 500kV from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen will suffice.

Stability Analysis -

The dynamic stability of a proposed plant consisting. of two 1125 MW nuclear units at a site in Levy County, Florida has been investigated. Only a proposed 500 kV transmission alternative has been investigated to date; consideration of a 345 kV transmission alternative isongoing. Critical clearing times for close in three-phase faults on the 500kV lines from the plant are 5.5 cycles on the Brookridge line and 6.0 cycles on the Central Florida line. These values can be achieved by standard protection schemes. Cases simulating backup clearing of a fault followed by a stuck circuit breaker pole are also stable. However the dynamic response following successful or delayed clearing is highly oscillatory, which is unsatisfactory, although optimizing stabilizer settings offers some prospect for relief.

Short Circuit Analysis -

Breakers associated with buses that were 100% or above their breaker duty were identified for a more detailed analysis. Detailed breaker configuration drawings for the over-dutied breakers were provided by Progress Energy and were used to ascertain more detailed breaker fault duty results. In addition, Progress Energy provided TRC detailed simulation results for some of the more complex substation configurations.

The Levy generation contributed an additional 1,102 Amps for a three-phase fault and 4,524 Amps for a single-phase fault on the Brookbridge 500kV bus. Total project contributions for the same faults were 3,578 Amps for a three phase fault and 4,695 Amps for a single-phase fault.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 3 Nuclear Site Planning Study

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As shown in Table 2-2 (in the results section), Occidental #1 breakers N-360, N-361, and N-363 along with the Windermere 1570 breaker exceeded their fault duty limitations in a pre-Project system configuration. Progress Energy is aware of these breaker deficiencies and will be scheduling them for upgrades in the near future.

In conclusion, this short-circuit study demonstrates that the Project has no significant adverse impact on the short-circuit duty within the Progress Energy transmission system and that no system upgrades are necessitated due to the Project.

Facilities and Costs -

The results of preliminary facilities costs show that the HVDC option is more expensive than any other option by a factor of at least two to three times.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 4 Nuclear Site Planning Study

C TRC Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 5

1.1 DESCRIPTION

OF PROJECT ............................................... 5 2 STUDY ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................... 7 2 .1 S tud y A re a ...................................................................

3 LOAD FLOW A NA LY S ES ................................................................................................ 11 3.1 2012 Summer Crystal River Upgrade ......................................... 11 3.1.1 Thermal Analysis ................................................................. 11 3.1.2 Voltage Analysis ................................................................. 16 3.2 2017 Summer Base case .................................................................. 17 3.2.1 Thermal Analysis ................................................................ 17 3.2.2 Voltage Analysis .................................................................. 22 3.3 2017 Summer Expansion Cases - Double Circuit 500kV - F1 ......... 23 3.3.1 VOLTAGE Analysis ............................................................... 24 3.3.2 Voltage Analysis ................................................................. 27 3.4 2017 Summer Expansion Cases - Double Circuit 500kV - F2 ......... 28 3.4.1 VOLTAGE Analysis ...................... ................................. 28 3.4.2 Voltage Analysis ..................... .................. 31 3.5 2017 Summer Expansion Cases - 765kV Loop Alternative- F3 ........ 31 3.5.1 VOLTAGE Analysis ............................................................... 32 3.5.2 Voltage Analysis ................................................................. 35 3.6 2017 Summer Expansion Cases - HVDC Alternative- F4 ............... 36 3.6.1 VOLTAGE Analysis ............................................................... 38 3.6.2 Voltage Analysis ................................................................. 42 4 FRCC-SERC Interface Impact ............................................................ 43 5 Faciltiy Requirements and Costs ............................................. 49 6 FAULT ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 50 7 STABILITY ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 63 8 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ....................................................... 67 Dr,-r . .IrrI L-JrCA IIn-I.Il 5 r qifa Plnnninn q i !

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1. Introduction Progress Energy Florida (PEF) has requested a transmission expansion study to support the addition of two 1125 MW class nuclear units to its system in the vicinity of Crystal River East substation in Levy County. The study is intended to determine the required transmission upgrades to interconnect the plant to the PEF transmission system and deliver the full output of the plant to PEF. Due the size of the facility and the potential impact of the facility on the existing bulk power network the study will need to be thorough and will consist of load flow, stability and short circuit analyses.

1.1 Description of the Project Progress Energy Florida, Inc. (PEF) has requested TRC to perform a comprehensive transmission planning study to determine the feasibility of constructing a nuclear generation facility in Levy County northeast of the existing Crystal River complex and eight miles directly north of PEF's Crystal River East Substation. This location is identified in Figure 1-1. The first 1125 MW unit is expected to be placed in-service by June 2017, with a potential second 1125 MW unit to be placed in-service by June, 2018.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 6 Nuclear Site Planning Study

The project consists primarily of:

1) The development of appropriate power-flow, short-circuit and dynamics models for the time period(s) indicated.

2) The analysis of viable transmission expansion plans with those models utilizing existing facilities to the maximum extent possible.

3) The review of the Florida - Georgia interface capability as impacted by the addition of the new nuclear facility.

4) The identification of new transmission and substation facilities along with their associated costs.

This report documents the results of the Levy Nuclear Plant review which was conducted in accordance with the applicable national and regional electric power system guidelines, procedures and practices.

2. Study Assumptions There are a number of assumptions that have been made to facilitate this study and they are itemized within the applicable sections of this report, however, there are certain key assumptions that should be brought to the readers' attention.

The following key assumptions were used in performing this study:

2.1 Study Period Two study periods were identified for the purpose Of this analysis. Those periods are:

1) The summer of 2012 which reflects a 180 MW upgrade to the Crystal River #3 generator. PEF has requested that TRC review facility limits based on this upgrade.

2) The period from 2017 to 2018 which is the time span during which the addition of two 1125 MW nuclear units is proposed.

2.2 Study Area The study was focused primarily on the Crystal River - Crystal River East area and those 500kV/230kV transmission facilities that occupy the Rights-of-Way from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen via Brookridge, Crystal River East, Crystal River, Holder and Central Florida as shown in Figure 2-1.

However, due to the potential impact of the proposed addition, facilities well north and south of the primary area of interest were also monitored and outaged.

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CTRC 2.3 Base Case Conditions PEF Staff provided the following base cases for use in this study.

y06_16srl-1.sav y06_16wrl-1.sav y06_12srl-1.sav y06_12wrl-1.sav The following dispatch files were also provided:

ED2012S.ecd ED2012W.ecd ED2016S.ecd ED2016W.ecd All cases required significant changes as directed by PEF to achieve useable cases for the time periods in question.

Fig.2 Lake Tarpon to Kathleen Transmission Corridor Progress Energy Florida, Inc 8 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC The changes made to these cases are summarized as follows:

Cases y06_12srl-l.sav & yO6_12wrl-1.sav

1) Removal of Hines CT #7 from case and from dispatch file.

2) Adjust capability of Taylor Energy Center (TEC) up to 800MW in case and ECDI file.

3) Adjust capability of Crystal River #3 up to 992 MW (+180MW) in case and in ECDI file. Allocate additional capability per PEF instructions.

4) Re-dispatch of PEF generation using ECDI files provided.

Cases y06_16srl-1.sav & yO616wrl-1.sav

1) Scale load by 3% per year from 2016 to 2017 and to 2018.

2) Apply Florida Central Coordinated Study (FCCS) Solutions for the Orlando Utilities Commission (OUC).

3) Apply Florida Central Coordinated Study (FCCS) Solutions for.PEF.

4) Turn off Levy units 1 and 2 in each case, and remove from each ECDI file.

Restore transmission system associated with these units back to their original state - as currently exists today.

5) Remove Hines CT #7 from cases and from dispatch file.

6) Adjust capability of Taylor Energy Center (TEC) up to 800MW in cases and ECDI file. Allocate increased capability per PEF instructions.

7) Increase output of Crystal River unit 3 and modify output in ECDI.

8) Turn on full output of Vandolah Power Station and dispatch output to PEF.

Modify PEF interchange and apply ECDI.

9) Apply unit up-rates at Crystal River (other than CR #3), Anclote and Hines generating stations as specified and re-dispatch.

Detailed operations associated with the above identified changes are found in the appendix.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 9 Nuclear Site Planning Study

STRC 2.4 Modeling Issues The primary modeling issue that was encountered during the above process was a shortage of generating capability as the load in Florida was grown from 2016 to 2018 by 3% per year. This shortage is illustrated by the load and capacity table of Figure 2-2 which shows the surplus or shortage by area for the year 2018.

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'is taeneration surpius tsnortagej The significant shortfall for FPL in this year is partially due to additional schedules created in 2017 from FPL to several other entities within the state to balance out their shortages in that year. Since compensating for this shortage by added schedules from SOCO would impact the FL-GA interface allocation adversely, it was decided to use only the 2017 model for modeling the addition of both nuclear units.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 10 Nuclear Site Planning Study

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3. Load Flow Analysis Power flow analysis was conducted to determine the impact of hypothetical transmission expansion options in support of the additional capacity expected to be installed at the Levy county site. The analysis for each scenario centered on equipment loading and bus voltages within the study area under normal (pre-contingency) and design criteria contingency conditions. The analysis was first done without the unit additions and then with the project installed under various support alternatives to identify the incremental impact of the project and incremental support requirements. TRC used both the Siemens-PTI PSS/E power flow program and the Powerworld Simulator to conduct the thermal and voltage analyses. Detailed results of the analysis are provided in Appendix II.

Thermal limits were assessed using normal ratings (RATE A) for pre-contingency conditions and applicable long-term emergency ratings (RATE B) for post-contingency conditions.

Voltages were assessed pre- and post-contingency using the following criteria for the bulk power system. Voltages outside the range of 0.95 pu to 1.05 pu in base case conditions are flagged as voltage violations. Voltages outside the range of 0.90 pu to 1.05 pu are flagged as voltage violations for post-contingency conditions.

3.1i 2012 Summer Crystal River Unit #3 Upgrade Revised 2012 base cases were developed from the 2012 cases that were supplied that.;

.include the changes as outlined in section-2.3. A change case was then developed from-.

.-the: base case which includes the Crystal River #3 upgrade of 180MW. Normal and contingency overloads were identified in both cases for comparison to determine incremental loading issues resulting from the upgrade. The results of this review are summarized in the following paragraphs and graphics.

3.1.1 Thermal Analysis - 2012 Summer Crystal River Unit #3 Upgrade Figure 3-1 shows the N-0 loading violations for the 2012 Summer base case. The violations fall into two distinct groupings: 1) they are small facilities at lower voltages that can be ignored for the purpose of this study or, 2) they are significant facilities but well removed from the study area and not likely responsive to changes made in the area of interest.

Figure 3-2 shows the base case flows in the primary area of interest.

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("TRCO Progress Energy Florida, Inc 12 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CT,RC In addition to the above, some facilities were noted to be approaching their normal ratings under N-0 conditions. Specifically, the Camp Lake 230/115kV Transformer was noted to be loaded to 80% of its normal rating and the Perry to Suwanee 230kV line was noted to be loaded to 91% of its normal rating.

Contingency analysis was then run on the base case system to establish a baseline for judging the incremental impact of new facilities. The process for contingency analysis was similar to that which is used for a feasibility study with outages taken in the vicinity of the study focus (in this case, Crystal River). These outages were limited to bulk power facilities at voltages of 230kV or above. All facilities at 69kV and above were monitored for impact.

The results for this contingency review are shown in Figure 3-3 below. Post contingency emergency loadings are shown along with their pre-contingency normal loadings.

Central Florida 500/230kV Tr.

• 3521 " 3552/53.(750/750) Z Newberry 230-69kV Tr 3165 -3050 (100/112).

Rice' Putnam 230kV 1..'

"462-468 (588/588). *56 11H ,

Perry. - Suwanee 230 kV 1 3167 - 3169 (454/542) *9 1 %N; Camp Lake 230 - 115 kVTr 2163-2109 <80%N Perry 230-69kV Tr - E 3167-3057 ... 1% N Fig. 3 Contingency Results for 2012 Summer Base case The Crystal River #3 upgrade was then introduced into the base case with the unit capability going from 812MW net to 992 MW net. The areas were re-dispatched to account for the additional generation in PEF and to account for the change in losses.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 13 Nuclear Site Planning Study

OTRC Normal overloads for this upgrade case are shown in Figure 3-4.

These results are very similar to the base case results and do not show significant impact due to the upgrade. The Camp Lake transformer and Perry to Suwanee 230kV line remain loaded as they were in the base case but are impacted incrementally by the upgrade every so slightly..

Figure 3-5r shows the -u'pgrade case flows in the primary area of interest and Figure 3-6 shows only the differences in flows between the upgrade case and the base case.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 14 Nuclear Site Planning Study

STRC Fig. 3 2012 Summer Upgrade Case Flows Fig. 3 Summer 2012 Difference Flows Progress Energy Florida, Inc 15 Nuclear Site Planning Study

Contingency results for the upgrade case are shown in Figure 3-7 along with the results from the base case contingency review shown earlier. Again, both the Emergency loading (N-1) and the Normal loading (N-0) are shown.

Fig. 3 Contingency Results for 2012 Summer Base Case and Upgrade Case Figure 3-7 indicates that the upgrade has a significant impact on the contingency loading of the Central Florida 500/230 kV transformers, however, it should be noted that these transformers do exhibit a significant overload condition in the base case as well.

3.1.2 Voltage Analysis - 2012 Summer Crystal River Unit #3 Upgrade For the voltage evaluation, the same base cases and contingencies used in Section 3.1 were used. The voltage was considered in violation of the criteria if voltages deviate from the normal (1.0) by more than 8%. However, voltage contours for all the bulk power buses in the areas of interest were developed to identify those areas prone to collapse.

No voltage violations were observed under base case or change case conditions.

Figure 3-8 shows the voltage contour for the area of interest with the Crystal River #3 upgrade implemented. Voltages throughout the area of interest hold steady under normal and contingency conditions.

Progress Energy Florid.a, Inc 16 Nuclear Site Planning Study

TRO Fig: 3 Voltage contour for Primary Area of Interest with CR#3 Upgrade It should be noted that while not related to the upgrade, an area of somewhat depressed voltages exists in the Camp Lake - Avalon - Windermere areas. This is a general trend that exists throughout all the cases.

Additional plots and contours relating to the Crystal River #3 upgrade can be found in the appendix.

3.2 2017 Summer Base case A 2017 base case was developed from the 2016 case that was supplied that includes the changes as outlined in section 2.3. Normal and contingency overloads were identified in the base case for the purpose of establishing baseline conditions. The results of this review are summarized below.

3.2.1 Thermal Analysis - 2017 Summer Base case Figure 3-9 shows the base case normal (N-0) overloads that were found in the area of interest.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 17 Nuclear Site Planning Study

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___ _ YS -. Default 201.2 200.0 ,. 100.6 MVA 30 2109 CAMP LK 2163 CAMP LK 1 !YES  ! Default 168.9 168.0 0 100.6 MVA I0"3f 1147916TIGRCRKI 10293 lWASHCO1 1 - 'YES Default 200.7 200.0 1.00.3 MVA 132. 3007 ALACH TP 6666 ALACHUA S Default 32.0 32.0 ' , 000.. MVA

.233 35tCUTLER  ; 11 CU.6 1 ]YES JDefault "" 080.0 150.0j " OQ000MVA f.34 12029~4SEMERE j13156 4SCOTT2 Ii :Default 130.0 130.0 1 0*0.nMVA Figure.3-9 -2017 Summer Base-Case Overloads (N-0)

Of most significance to the area of interest are theý loadings on the Polk Plant to Pebbledale 230kV line, the Brooksville West 230/115 kV transformer and the Camp Lake 230/69kV transformer all of which are overloaded in the normal (N-0) condition.

Also of interest (not shown in the listing above) are the Sheldon and Meadow Woods 230/69kV transformers whose loadings are near their respective normal ratings.

The Polk Plant to Pebbledale 230kV overload is an outlet issue that arises when the Polk Plant output exceeds the most limiting line's rating divided by its PTDF. In this case, the most limiting facility is the Polk Plant to Pebbledale 230kV circuit #2 whose rating is 737MVA and whose PTDF is 42.15%. This yields an output limit on the Polk Plant of about 1749 MVA. Since the PTDF will change somewhat depending on the dispatch of the entire system, the output limit will vary accordingly.

Figure 3-10 shows the topology around the Polk Plant as well as the base case loading values.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 18 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC TIOWS Bulk power system loadings for the 2017 summer base case area of interest are shown in Figure 3-11.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 19 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC I. 91 II As in the 2012 summer scenario, contingency analysis was then run on the base case system to establish a baseline for judging the incremental impact of new facilities. The results for this contingency review are shown in Figure 15 below. Post contingency emergency loadings are again shown along with their pre-contingency normal loadings.

From the contingency overloads identified in Figure 3-12, there are several facilities listed that are well removed from the area of interest and are overloaded for other reasons such as load growth and/or dispatch. These facilities are:

- Rice to Putnam 230kV

- Lee to Corbett 138kV

- BRNT STR to West CC 138kV

- West Jacksonville 230/69kV Tr.

- Hudson to Seminole 230kV

- Normandy to Firestone 230kV While the Newberry Transformer is not overloaded under contingency conditions in the base case it is shown here for future comparison in cases where it does overload.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 20 Nuclear Site Planning Study

TIRC Central Florida 500/230kV Tr.

3521 - .3552/53 (750/750) 4.-

Newberry 230-69kV Tr 4--

3165 - 3050 (100/112)

Rice - Putnam 230kV 4.-

462 - 468 (588/588) 4.-

Perry - Suwanee 230 kV 3167 - 3169 (454/542) 4.-

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2163-2109 4.-

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8000 - 8002/8006 4.-

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5005-5000 HudsonFL- Seminole 230kV 398-7119 F-Normandy - Firestone 230kV 4865 -4700 Y--

Fig. 3 Contingency Results for 2017 Summer Base Case Progress Energy Florida, Inc 21 Nuclear Site Planning Study

STRC 3.2.2 Voltage Analysis- 2017 Summer Base case Figure 3-13 shows the voltage profile in the area of interest for the 2017 Summer Base case under (N-0) conditions.

Fig. 3 2017 Summer Base Case Voltage Contour This wider area view clearly shows that most areas of the PEF system displayed hold adequate voltages of 1.0p.u. or greater with the exception of the Lake Camp - Avalon area which is again slightly depressed. There are no bulk power system voltage violations under (N-1) contingency conditions.

The complete listing of contingency results including voltage excursions is included in the appendix.

.22 Progress Energy Florida, Inc Nuclear Site Planning:Study

CTRC 3.3 2017 Summer Expansion Cases - Double Circuit 500kV - F1 Case F1 consists of construction of a second 500kV line from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen via Crystal River with a revised connection scheme at Crystal River and Levy resulting in two 500kV lines and two 230kV lines between the two substations. Build one east-west 500kV or 230kV circuit from Kathleen to Lake Tarpon. Add additional substation equipment such as 500/230kV transformers.

To accommodate two 1125 MW net nuclear units connected to the 500kV system an appropriate outlet configuration had to be established to accommodate 2250MW from Levy and the combined output of the Crystal River units #3 and #5 (- 1727 MW) such that a single contingency cannot isolate too much capacity on a single line. Figure 3-14 shows the location of the Levy plant relative to existing circuits.

Fig. 3 Location of Proposed Levy Nuclear Station It was decided that a reasonable connection for the units was to loop the new 500 kV line from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen via Brookridge and Central Florida through Levy but not to loop in the existing 500 kV line which already loops through Crystal River. This is shown In Figure 3-15 that follows where the solid line represents existing facilities and dashed lines represent new facilities.

This general approach for creating a double circuit 500kV loop was used for this case (Fl) and the following alternative - (F2).

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 23 Nuclear Site Planning Study

~TRC

"-z ILEVYNuc 500kV 3501

£.ystlR_500kV 3555 Oiolig 500kV 3550

--T-Centi-FL 501kV 3551 I

Kathl-en500kV 2913 LakeTaipon 500kV 2288 I TPJ 0 211r *.4~.;.~ 1 cnniw I Wnfiguration

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3.,-13.1 Thermal Analysis - Double Circuit 500kV- F1 The implementation of this connection scheme is shown in Figure 3-16 with bulk power flows shown for the primary area of interest. To accommodate the additional generation that was placed on the 500kV system, additional 500/230kV transformers were placed at both Lake Tarpon and at Central Florida.

It is apparent from this diagram that there are normal loading problems at both the Camp Lake and the Sheldon transformers which will only be exacerbated. The table in Figure 3-17 shows a complete list of normal overloads associated with this expansion option.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 24 Nuclear Site Planning Study

TRC Fig. 3 2017 Summer Expansion case - Two Nukes added with Double Circuit. 500kV Loop 3 1

-rom rNumbeFr.: To NumrberToNr~~circuit Ftrou M1W From Nl~ar Fro-, MVA'~ L-mMV fýM V LS'l~e o Nam~ I ,, Xr~r4I5Proit '~"Ma" '

' .... 3i T P 30591PERRYNTP"1. 'cos d - .. . -53.2 15.7. 53., 32. !1613* *.9 0.941 1.47.

2 3016iBOYD TP I- 3-681SCANLNTP 1 Closed !No 46.8 -1661 49.6 32.0 *!155.2! 1.91- 2.96 3TP 47SMITH Tns . -305 PERRYLTP IL Closed - -37. 23..1 44.6, 32.0 111.,. 0.57L6 5.441 4 3025iERIDU TP 30681SCANLNTPIi Closed 1No -34.4 22.0! 40.81 32.0' 1279 0.861 1.301 IA -_3046LURAWVLE 3047lsMrTH TP 11 Closed ýNo 1 -3!-.6 26..26......0 40.9 32.0 27.7 0.911 1.361 0 3023!DRfPTON 3025i1ERIDU TP I Closed No -29.8 25.9! 9. 32.9 5'¶'4 3 2.03 3.02 234 0.76i 1.1 300)7Atl CH TP - 30341H10H SF03 Closed N1 ------- -. 31 3S.71- 32.0--

'2940 I-ORSECRK 11 Closed INI5. 0.06i 0 23HORSCKTP -.-123 1 1. I 59. 50.1 121 0.04 9905 LEE 1i ..Clo[sed *No  !, -186.2 -.74.5! 200.61 1821.

9 680.9,BRNWTSTR

...

31......

.....

.... B 1.52 ......0.71

... *- ..

6635 6 WEST CC It Closed No 788 .....................

9 79.61 ..........

• M . ......

195.0" .....-*

192.0-Cls'ed q 11 27381DAVENPRT 2l2~~NDVRT -7! 253.8 50.L 11 -- 3555CRYST RV 33011CR RVG3 11 Closed JYes -989.1 -69.01 991.5 950.0 107 .2 2.95 162.20, 4 'to 50.-* RKSVL W 351*PFRKSVL W 11 Closed Yes '731. -161.51 251.7 250.10, 1060 0.45 -__ 19.631 t4 11 9000 P01VP!NT 9050, PFRF9 2 rld iNe 774 7 67.6i 77'.7V 737.C -10, 7.01 67.65i 8100t3AXSN230 -. *,9021)AX- 2yB Closed 215.1 99.2.

o 233.31 224J. d1', 504:.1 0.60 23.86i 4 .. ...-I ...

..... .............

• . !Yes 1...

k~ . ..

.... ...... . 5... 7

."10 940HVB SUGI 942 VI G4 1._ Closed k2s -5. -26.86 61.81 93.L 7'~1O.0~ ------------

0.34 7.23!

513 210- CAMP LK 2163 CAMPLK 1 Closed 'Yes I -179.9

~19 ...................

...*

3,313? B,ý--L ..... ..... 3362 CNTRHCTP 1 Clse"T No 1051.6 1.7i 51.6! 50.o 102.6 . .. .21. .3 3.

4 , tO 2341F4COCK 6894 PEACOCK i Closed No j 46,4 . . q**Al...

? 000 001, 2C 12.E034L4NCROWL 13157 4SC0 T I iClosed 'NO 2.29. 58.6 2 222.- 216.0 15n30.981 4.45!1 _ 20.9 21l ..

i 50001WESTM 21 Coe Yes 1 195.1 59.6A! 2013.7 200.0 ' 11.9 0.68! 21.72:

... . ... W.. ES

..

I__21 8000 SHELD 800I2SHELD-NW I Closed Yes 221.1 54.5! 227.7 . 224.0 101 7 _- 058- 25.854 9404 VB SUBI

.......... * .. 9411 ~VB C3 363.4CAPECAN211 13 Closed C

Yes 1'Yes 1 -32.8 4239

-16.41 36.7l 38.0 ""5015 0.19 ~ 3.62:.

461 CAPE K -134.6i 444.61 460.9 101.4 1.58i 57.27; 23 _.5538! TNAST 11 5000WEST 3 Cosed Clsd j- -- es Yes -253,0 192.5 16.7! 253.54 253.0 ~33io6 -- .0.769-- 37.82i 195 0.671 21.43' 50.05WESTJ.A-..X._ *::..,.*,* .... . ....... ....

.. ....

.... .. ..... ..

11479 6TIGRCRKý 10293 IWASHCO1 I1 Closed !Yes '199.1 i"78 i Iio.b Ti,_ - '" '3*-10 3 - 09.96 33.90 3007.ALA.CH T ... . ..................

O6666ALACHUA I..11lCl.6

..... C*.. ...

_....... 'I ............ Close

• ..*_..._..... 'Iil~

....

.... 3. 10... 32.09 32.0 "-'A4"10 1' .031 0.05' Ye- 7 -119.n -Ini*1) 17?.4 A.-0 1 1' 00 i (110.41 12.05.

20524UTLER

'311 12029 4SEMERE 1315614SCOTT2 .i Closed No L -125.91 19.61 127.41 130.0W. 100: 3.811 10.78 Fig. 3 2017 Summer Normal Overloads (N-0) for Double Circuit 500kV Loop Option Progress Energy Florida, Inc 25 Nuclear Site Planning Study

OTRC Those overloaded facilities of most interest from this list are the Brooksville West 230/115 kVTransformer, the Polk Plant to Pebbledale 230kV line, the Camp Lake Transformer and the Sheldon 230/69kV Transformer.

As in the previous scenarios, (N-i) contingency analysis was run on this case to test the system for security. The results for this contingency review are shown in Figure 3-18 below. Post contingency emergency loadings are again shown along with their pre-contingency normal loadings and results from the 2017 base case and the 2012 reviews are also shown for comparison.

Central Florida 500/230kV Tr. R o i 18 % 103% 1?I5, ,E Brookrddge-BrooksvilleW 115kV 3521 - 3552/53 (750/750) %N ), ,61%N

• 75%N4 ý68%N.

3450 - 3451 65%N ° 66%N .76%

Newberry 230-69kV Tr R I1*!%0%E/ m%10,El 93%E @ NA Clermont E 230/69kV Tr.

3165-3050 (100/112) 49% 48% 49%., 49%N. 2164-2113 83%N 83%N 88%

Rice - Putnam 230kV R .07,4 F Brooksville W 230-115 kV Tr :i/NA NA<," *)N 462- 468 (588/588) <56%N; 69,N* , 70,N% 3519-3451 356°/q. *@91%N ' 82%N ,98%

Perry - Suwanee 230 kV N 1/%E 108%E Fi!10iE 3167-3169 (454/542) 91%N 92%N 82%N - 84%N Camp Lake 230-115kV Tr R ,05@ EI 2163-2109 - 0%N/ 80%N !0t1, 10?,N.

Perry 230-69kV Tr N 104/B t054E 02 -

3167-3057 5 66% 4 68%NJ 67,7/"

Polk - Pebbledale 230kV NA 107 S 107%E 7Nij 9000-9050 51a"'" 51%N x *1O,.N t05%N Sheldon 230/69 kV Tr. - .* 115%E 1 8E%

8000 - 8002/8006 88%N 89%N 99%N 102%N Lee - Corbett 138kV @!1-1 , 11,E 6815-6809 BRNT STR - West CC 138kV ,8%E 108%E 6803-6835 90%N 90%N 108N 108.N Meadow Woods 230/69kV Tr.

• 106%E" j" 05%

2583-2523 86%N 85%N 98%N 96%N West Jax 230/69 kV Tr. 03/

0 7 5005-5000 89%N 89%N 1 0 %,

HudsonFL - Seminole 230kV 05I E 398-7119 81%N 81oN ! 67,I>I 98%N Normandy - Firestone 230kV 1-1%, 6101 %,E 4865-4700 ,,60%N 59%N 69%N 1168.N-Fig. 3-18 -2017 Summer Expansion with Double Circuit 500kV Loop Contingency Violations Progress Energy Florida, Inc 26 Nuclear Site Planning Study

0ýTRC Contingency analysis identified three bulk power (N-i) overloads which are directly related to the expansion scenario. These overloads occurred on the:

1) Brookridge to Brooksville 115kV line,

2) the Clermont E. 230/69 kV transformer and the

/ 3) Brooksville W. 230/115 kV transformer.

Numerous other overloads were identified, as shown in the table, which are common to one or more of the previous reviewed scenarios.

3.3.2 Voltage Analysis - Double Circuit 500kV - F1 Figure 3-19 shows the voltage profile in the area of interest for the 2017 Summer 500kV expansion case F1 under (N-0) conditions.

41 1

Fig. 3 Voltage Analysis - Double Circuit 500kV case F1 This wider area view again clearly shows that most areas of the PEF system displayed hold adequate voltages of 1.0p.u. or greater with the exception of the Lake Camp -

Avalon area which is again slightly depressed. There are no bulk power system voltage violations under (N-i) contingency conditions and voltages under this scenario are equal to or slightly better than the base case under (N-O) conditions.

The complete listing of contingency results including voltage excursions is included in the appendix.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 27 Nuclear Site Planning Study

-TRC 3.4 2017 Summer Expansion Cases - Double Circuit 500kV - F2 This is the same topology as case F1 except the assumption is that PEF will rebuild/replace one 230kV circuit from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen via Crystal River with one 500kV line.

There is some concern about the ability to put two 500kV circuits and two 230kV circuits on the ROW from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen through Brookridge, Crystal River and Central Florida. An alternate scenario is then to sacrifice one 230kV circuit in order to build the second 500 kV circuit.

3.4.1 Thermal Analysis - Double Circuit 500kV - F2 Topology and flows for this scenario are shown in Figure 3-20.

i-ig. s-zu - zu1 ( bummer witn two NUKes aaaea ana Double circuit 500kV loop with one 230kV Circuit retained.

It should be noted that -a single circuit line is used in this scenario to connect Lake Tarpon to Kathleen across the bottom of the loop. A review of the loading on this segment of transmission indicates that there are no normal or emergency scenarios under which this line becomes heavily loaded, hence the need for only one line.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 28 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC The sacrifice of one 230kV circuit throughout the existing path from Lake Tarpon to Central Florida results in outlet problems for the Crystal River capacity that is connected to the 230kV bus and it obviously also places more stress on the remaining 230kV transmission and the existing 500/230kV transformers. To compensate for this, several system changes were made to the model in conjunction with the addition of the two nuclear units and the second 500kV line. These changes are:

Add three 500/230kV transformers

>Two at Central Florida

> One at Lake Tarpon

- Moving Crystal River #1 from the 230kV bus to the 500kV bus to relieve the 230kV outlet loading. (could possibly be one of the other two units instead -

subject to check)

- Close the 230kV tie between the two 230kV buses at Lake Tarpon (will need to verify fault duty on breakers)

These changes are not intended to be prescriptive in nature but rather a reasonability check as to whether operation in this fashion is possible. The normal (N-0) overloads for this scenario are shown in Figure 3-21.

1 From Nui~erom Name To Number iToame`n trncuil Fo WFomMaý~om, 1 l LuQSr BýOYDTP

. ......., = 9..'1 .6 4 . ...... . . . ............... ...

..... ................

30591IPERRYNTP 1 Closed. No -51.31 157i 53.6 320 'i 1 .9 1.48

-3016BOYD TP, 3068I5CANLNTF I ,-. Closed No " 1 32.0 15 1. 2.97 3047 35 I Co N0 -37RR rSMITH '5.39 3451 BRKS W j 35191~SV BVVL W I.Closed Yes 4 1B 311.6 250.0132B 31 32

-248.1: 07 3025.....T.....................30.2 A C- I N -34.5 22.049 320 12 0.87 .1.30

/1=35

• 3046 LURAVILE- 3O47ISMITH- T I Clsd No 311.5904 A 3

............

.......................

...............

3007,ALACH TP..............

..........-

...... .... ..... ....

....

................................................

.....

30.341H11HSFG1 Closed- [No.0.38S

"....... 32.0 1 4 1

... 0. . . ."......

........

0.77 2839 HORSCKTP 2840 HORSECRK .. Clsed. N - _ _89. ........................

.... 127 ............. 0 11 2 0

.6809

..

..... . .o..8.......6-ose 2 7 200.& 1020 1076 1.15

..........................................

.W-* 782 . C T - , ........ ... 2

..... NP

• 1.0 53.3 -7.6iR 5 . .....

...............

.8 50..... ..........

.........

1 -.. 5

.. -"0.71.

__J_- 6815 LEE d--- No, .......--- - -. 5 2738 DAVENPRT I 2829 W OVNPRT I JClosed !No 53.3 7.6: 53.8 5. 7b 11 1.47 6803 BRNT STR 6B35 WEST CC 1 Closed No 178 8 79 8 195.8 182.0 107.61 1.09 5.28 3555 CRYST RV 33011CR RV 3 I 'Closed Yes -989.11 -22.8' 989.3 950.0 '1062 2.94 161.51 9000 POLKFLNT 90501FEB 2 !Closed No i 774.11 88.2ý 779. 1 737.0 105*7 7.00 67.55 9404 VB SURI I!I tir41 11 cirý,- 7~ -79PA: A i 63ný 10 0 03~4 ZI091CAMPZK 8100 IAXSN230 .

4 21631CAMP LK 8102 ]AX-E I Closed y

iYes 213.61

-7.1~ed 90.7 171.81 232.11 168 224 _ 0.04

_~9 21.33 0.59 23.58

.... .. .. .......D G , 3451 BRKSVLW

.4

....

..... I Closed ;No - 33800 251.3 - -I----------- 254.21 246 E

3 3362 [iI Closed 2No 1d 51.6 133 1.88 10.54 0.34 0.45 2844 PCOCK I 6894 PEACOCK .I - Closed N... - 22.7- 51.6 50 -103.2 0.00 0.01 12034*4NCROWL-- 13157 4SCOTT I Closed No 2208 23.6 222.0 216 102.8 4.45 30.95 461!CAPE K I 363 CAPECAN2 1 Closed -429.1 34 460 I[

102.5 1.61 58.52 3522..R..ANT 1 3300 CR RV G12 I Closed Yes 540.0 181.7 569.7- 570 1 4 0.95 37.56 505 1WEST lAX 1 5000 WEST lAX 12 dosed....... ....-Ys

...............

..... 151

.......................

... ........

1.1111 58 ......

. - 111 1.................. - 203.7

...... -..- - .1- . . 200 ....1 ,-01-.9, 0.68 217

. 4.

8000°I-JELDi ST _ - ----

.......... ...........

-3..B.

.........

_ 113_G.

8002..............

SHE;l-NW .o...w

...... .......

1. ..... Closed -6

• ............ Closed Yes (Yes 1 219 -32..

71 16.41

-1.-

s555 36.7 226.6- 238 7 ....... . ...... 01L~ 0.19 ~ 3.62

.......

. ... . .. .... ......... . . . .. ____

.. ...

___ .. ___ .. .. . . ....... .. ,* _: [)I'll 0.58.l 25.56 s715 1 STNCCA . 553S1TN*sT .Yes 1 Csed 253 0 .. 2 253.5 253 5005W T

..... 5000 WEST JAX 1------ Closed Yes 192.5 581 201.1 200 *1400.0 0..605 0.367 21.43 11479L6T1GRCRK 30P_i- 10 931IWASHCO1 1 Closed Zlosed Yes -199.1, .. ..' .....17.8i 199.9F 200 !10~331 0.86 33.99 307 ACT66 ALACHUA 1 Closed No 30.4 10.0 32.0 32 100.11 0.03 0.05 351CUTLER 11 1CU.6 1 ! Closed Yes 1390 101 91 172.41 180 -100.0 0.34 12.05 1202914SEMER5 1315614SCOT-2 11 !Closed No i -125.9 19.65 127.41 130.0 -. 100.0 3.81 10.78 Fig. 3 2017 Summer Expansion with One 230kV Circuit Rebuilt to 500kV (N-0) Violations The pre-contingency outages shown in this table are very similar to the ones determined for the case with both 230kV lines- retained. The most notable change in loading level occurred at the Brooksville West 230/115 kV transformer whose loading increased to 133% of normal. This appears to be a result of the loss of 230kV feed to Hudson substation as a result of the assumed conversion of this line to 500kV.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 29 Nuclear Site Planning Study

cýTRC The impact-of the 230kV line conversion is more apparent in the contingency analysis review of this case which is shown in Figure 3-22 that follows.

Central Florida 500/230kV Tr. R akddg e-BrooksvilleW 115kV 3521 - 3552153 (750/750) 0)-3451 Newberry 230-69kV Tr R mont E 230/69kV Tr.

3165 - 3050 (100/112)

Rice - Putnam 230kV T )kvi W20-15 kV Tr 462 - 468 (588/588)

-345-1 Perry - Suwanee 230 kV ktalRiver - CR East 230kV 3167- 3169 (454/542) )-35230 Camp Lake 230 - 115 kV Tr stalRiver - Holder 230kV 2163-2109  ?-.3527 ,

Perry 230-69kV Tr N s 115/69kV Tr.

3167-3057 9-3385 Polk - Pebbledale 230kV o~kridge 230/115 kV Tr.m 9000-9050 S-3450 Sheldon 230/69 kV Tr. East 230/115 kV Tr.

8000 - 800218006 3-3456 Lee - Corbett 138kV East - CR N Tap 115 kV 6815-6809 6-3455 BRNT STR -.West CC 138kV 6803-6835 er - Bev Hills 115 kV 5-3449 nJ Meadow Woods 230/69kV Tr.

2583, 2523, ;tone 230/69 kVTr. 8

)-4690 Wesn Jax 230/69 kV Tr.

5005 -5000 HudsonFL - Seminole 230kV 398 m 7119 Normandy - Firestone 2301kV

+.

4865 -4700 Fig. 3 2017 Summer Contingency Results for Double Circuit 500kV Expansion with Conversion of One 230kV line.

Several additional contingency based overloads appear for this case, some of which are quite severe. Specifically, violations at the following facilities will need to be reviewed and corrected:

- Crystal River to Crystal River East 230kV line -Crystal River to Holder 230 kV line

- Inglis 115/69 kV Transformer -Brookridge 230/115 kV Transformer

- Crystal River East 230/115 kV Transformer

- Crystal River East to Crystal River North 115kV Tap

- Holder to Beverly Hills 115kV line Progress Energy Florida, Inc 30 Nuclear Site Planning Study

,TRO 3.4.2 Voltage Analysis - Double Circuit 500kV - F2 Figure 3-23 shows the voltage profile in the area of interest for the 2017 Summer 500kV expansion case F2 under (N-0) conditions.

4iUQ~ El 5

5""

5" '~, 5' Fig. 3 Voltage Analysis - Double Circuit 500kV case F2 This view clearly shows that most areas of the PEF system displayed hold adequate voltages of 1.0p.u. or greater with the exception of the Lake Camp - Avalon area which is again slightly depressed. Voltages under this scenario are equal to or slightly better than the base case and case F1 under (N-0) conditions.

The complete listing of contingency results including voltage excursions is included in the appendix.

3.5 765 kV Loop Alternative Since significant portions of the existing 500kV circuits from Lake Tarpon to Central Florida are built for 765kV operation, a viable option to review would appear to be the conversion of the 500kV line to 765kV. With a single 765kV loop operating at a substantially higher capacity than the existing 500kV circuit, the combined output of the Levy units and the Crystal River units could be accommodated.

This scenario involves the rebuild/replacement of the 500kV from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen via Crystal River with single circuit 765kV line. It calls for the construction of a new 765kV line from Lake Tarpon east to Kathleen and the rebuilding of applicable substations to accommodate 765kV in place of 500kV.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 31 Nuclear Site Planning Study

TRC 3.5.1 Thermal Analysis - Single Circuit 765kV Expansion - F3 Figure 3-24 shows the configuration and the resultant base flows for this case.

Fig. 3 2017 Summer 765kV Expansion Option This option would require a significant substation investment to convert from 500kV to 765kV. The scenario shown in Figure 24 includes:

- A new substation at Holder with two 765/230kV Transformers

- Two 765/230kV Transformers at Central Florida with assoc. facilities

- Two 765/230kV Transformers at Lake Tarpon with assoc. facilities

- A 765/230kV Transformer at Kathleen with assoc. facilities

- Two 765/230kV Transformers at Brookridge with assoc. facilities Of course, we must remember that in any of these cases, but especially the ones that involve substantial replacement of existing facilities, new facilities must be built while service is maintained.

Figure 3-25 shows the system normal violations (N-0) for the 765kV expansion option.

Normal overloads for this scenario are minimal on an incremental basis and compare very favorably with the results for the first case with two 500kV circuits and two 230kV circuits.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 32 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTR-C From NuelFo n To Number To Name Circuit Status r rX rom MVA LmMVAJ %of-MVA MWloss Mvar4Loss7

, ;, I: .***,**  ::  ::  :::- " ' * * ***, * * * !*2 , , ' >L,* m t  ::* ,:  ::M  : , ,

• ___________DT 3059 PERRYNTP I :Closed 14o -I. b 19b5. Q~

0.952 1 1.48

3016 BOYDTP 3068 SCANLNTP 1 46.9 166 4 QCosed 0o --. 320 ,"'1551 1.92; 2.98 3047 _SMIr1HTPý 30157,PERRY 1 !Closed ýNo I -37.6 444 30~1' 4 3.53, 5.3T 5 4 30275ERIDLITP 30461LURAVILE 3068 SCANLNTP 3047 SMITH TP !I1 closed Closed No No I -34.51

-31.4 22.01 258 40.(

40.61 2 L 32.0 21 1 128 1268 0.871 0.90! .0 134 6 3007 ALACHTP 3034 HIGHSPG 1 Closed No 1 -39.3i 39.3 320 112544 I

8 7

.... .. *-.[AE__RSCT 3023 DRIPTON HO 1...

_ 3025 ERIDUTP 28401 .HVRPR.KT_..

11

.... .losedL_.E

[Closed C.......

No

._

-29.9 57..7...

__s3.

59 27 203*.

591 32 500*I__1 17

_ 0.04l 2.041 o6300__-862 3.031 006 9_ 9.O. RBE1T . 6U8912VB1.EE j1 PClosed No -1862 76 182.0,7 111 1.521 0.71 10 2738i*F0VEc 282 P RCjI :Closed No 53.31 7..6 53.8. 50.0..107 .... . 5.. 1.47.

SRNo Closed -3.R. . .1 ..... .... 1823 107 OTC 1.09.. 5.2

... 3555 . .WYST RV 3301 CR RVG13 1 Closed Yes -991 .3 989.6 9500.01 H10 -6 l,713 .......... 9000 POLKPLNT. 9050 P68 . f12 Closed No 77. 51 795 3008 06 6.981 67.42

~14 _8100 JACS.N230. 8102 3AX.-6.Y.s

~~~~~~~~~

-~~~~~~ *s ~~~~~~ 6:*

.Closed CRW Yes. 21.2 1

_

22,T-2.-V 92.0 233A1.

2.0 2~4A0'>8104`-

260 ,"---1

.

-23

--

0.591 2;.5 .7.

,1, MB S4V8-UB1 9412 VB 3 Closed Yes -55.7t -26.8 61.8 630 0*i --- ---..-Z 010.-coe

.5

---

3.57.42 16 2109 CAMPLK 2163 CAMPLK 1 Closed Yes -171.01 -1 4171.1 10 '01005,

[08S 21.041 17 2844 PCOCK 6894 PEACOCK 11 Closed No 46.41 56.1 22.7 5 500 *,,10103 0.0 00 I 18 333 BUSHNLE 3362 CNTRHffTP I3 Closed No 51.6, 177 51.645 50.0[~132 .4 4 19 12034 4NCROWL 13157 4SCOTT 1i Coe No 220.8 23.61 222.0 216.01' 102.1 4.45! 39 I20 5005 WEST.laX 5000ETlX1 Closed Yes 151 5&88 203.8 200.01 10 QY 0.681 21.73 2 9 404 VB SUBI 9411 V380G3 !Il Closed Yes -28 14 38.7 38.089 'ý1_3 0.19, 3.62.

122 46ITCAPE K 363CAPECAN2 11 Closed Yes -423.8: 134.5 444.6 460.0! 1 101.4j 1.581 57.27 29 8000SEL 8002 1161-NW U ;Closed Yes 219.3i 56.1 226.4 224.0 ,ý 101 11 0.571 25.28; 24 57151STNCCA 5538 STNAST 1I Closed Yes -253.01 17.3 253.5 253.0 .', 1,006 0.76 37.831 2! 5D00WEST 0 IAX 5000fWEST JAX 1 Closed Yes 192.5 58.1 201.1 200.01 10W.cT - 0.6 -71 21.44 11479, ý ,T1RCK 10293-*WASHCO* 1- Cl*osd YesIj -199.1i 17.8 199.9 2000. *f70'3 . .... 339'A S3007LACHTP f lsd No.

[66A~HA 30.41 10,0 32.6 32.0 '1' 19' . OOL 0.05 1202914SEMERE 13156,4SCOTT2 I1 Closed No - - -125.91 19.6, 127.4 130.(~ 0,~06., 3.811 10.78!

25 3SJCUTLEI 1 I~I loed Yes 191 -09 174 1800 . 10001 03(L 10

.................................. .......... ..... .................... ...........................

..... . ............... .... .... ..... ...... E..............

x ..

..

.. ai............

. -........................... ( ) . ..

Fig. 3-25 -2017 Summer 765kV Single Circuit Loop Expansion (N-0) Violations Contingency analysis. results for this scenario are shown in Figure 3-26 that follows. -

These results compare veryl favorably with the first case with only two relatively minor facilities shbliing up on.-an iincremental basis compared to the first case. These two '

'falcil'ities' a~re:a theHu'dson to Hudson 115kV line

" theýHiggins 230/115 kV Transformer Progress Energy Florida, Inc 33 Nuclear Site Planning Study

STRC

,j, ~ 0) = 0 I fl S o 1 S 0

~

S.

. . . . . . . . . .: . . . . . .

Fig.3 765 kV Single Loop Contingency Results Progress Energy Florida, Inc 34 Nuclear Site Planning Study

~TRiC.

While the 765kV option seems quite viable from a technical standpoint, there are a few significant issues that need consideration.

First, installing 765kV introduces another bulk power voltage level in the state and brings up the issue of planning further expansion. How does this fit into the longer range development process?

Second, this option would require a major substation rebuilding effort. Is there enough space for the expansion and any temporary facilities that would be required to maintain service throughout the construction effort?

Third, PEF would be introducing major equipment, e.g.765/23OkV transformers and 765kV breakers, for which spares must be made available. This would truly be a "horse of a different color" in the state of Florida.

Fourth, you may still have to re-conductor and/or re-insulate the existing lines that are built at 765kV specifications and you will have to re-build at least a portion of the existing 500kV line at 765kV.

3.5.2 Voltage Analysis - Single Circuit 765kV Loop Expansion - F3 SFig'ure 3-27 shows the voltage profile in the area of interest for the 2017 Summer& 76.kV expansion case F3 under (N-0) conditions. * " * .* . , { ;}{

. .  : -. -.

:, :

S. .> >

I Ul ~

Fig. 3 Single Circuit 765kV Loop Expansion Flows This view shows that voltages in the area of interest have improved slightly when Progress Energy Florida, Inc 35 Nuclear Site Planning Study

compare to all other cases. However, voltages in the Lake Camp - Avalon area still remain slightly depressed.

The complete listing of contingency results including voltage excursions is included in the appendix.

3.6 HVDC Alternative PEF has requested that HVDC options be investigated in this review as well. This option would consist of replacing the 500kV AC lines with DC transmission and converter stations or a hybrid installation of DC and AC facilities.

It should be noted at the very beginning that HVDC applications on the interconnected systems have been generally limited to the transfer of power over a long distance from a source to a sink. In short, DC applications are almost exclusively two terminal scenarios. HVDC would have to demonstrate some significant technical advantages over the other alternatives to warrant consideration in this case given that its cost will most certainly be significantly higher.

The typical uses for HVDC implementation are as follows:

-. Long distance power transmission (which make it economical)

Connection of Asynchronous systems

- Reduction in fault current

. Where long cablesare required'.

.. To by-pass network con'gestion

-. Firewall function - isolation: . " -

Control of flow ROW space issues Where environmental concerns exist Consideration for HVDC was given to several scenarios on an idealistic basis. Those scenarios include an HVDC loop, HVDC radials with multiple stations, and an AC/DC hybrid consisting of AC transmission with AC-DC-AC converters to control flow.

Pictorially, these options are shown in Figures 3-27, 3-28 and 3-29 respectively.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 36 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC Fig. 3-27 ý- HVDC Loop Concept Fig.3 HVDC Multi-tap Concept Progress Energy Florida, Inc 37 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC

-Fig'.3.29 AC/DC Hybrid .with Individual Converters forFlow. Control These hypothetical proposals must be viewed in light of the following technical issues that exist with HVDC installations:

1) HVDC is almost exclusively used in Point-to-Point applications.

2) Multiple terminals on a line are possible but technically very challenging.

3) Network Considerations (such as a loop) are not feasible at this time.

4) Depending on the design, high VAR compensation may be required.

5) Protection and Control functions are more complicated.

6) Dynamic modeling more difficult.

7) Harmonics are likely and must be filtered adequately.

3.6.1 Thermal Analysis - HVDC Alternative - F4 The only scenario proposed that seems feasible based on the above issues, as well as through proven installations, is the Hybrid scenario of Figure 3-29. The system was modeled and solved based on the installation of:

2 - 2000 MVA Converter Station (500kV to DC to 230kV) at Lake Tarpon and at Central Florida.

1 - 1000 MVA Converter Station at Brookridge.

1 - 1000 MVAR SVC at Central Florida.

1 - 500 MVAR SVC at Lake Tarpon.

2 - 500kV/230kV transformers at Crystal River East (can be moved from L.T. or C.F.)

1 - 500kV/23OkV transformer at Crystal River Progress Energy Florida, Inc 38 Nuclear Site Planning Study

tTRC The flows for this system are shown in Figure 3-30.

1-g. J-JU -A;/Uk;,I Hybrid witn ,Ihree uonverter btations - I-lows The system normal overloads are displayed in Figure 3-31 that follows:

The overloads shown are consistent with what was seen in previous scenarios. The facilities within the area of interest in this listing are:

- Brooksville West 230/115 kV Transformer

- Polk Plant to Pebbledale 230kV line

- Jackson Rd. 230/69kV Transformer

- Camp Lake 230/69kV Transformer

- Sheldon 230/69kV Transformer One a contingency basis (N-i) the situation does become substantially more critical as many more contingency overloads appear. This is shown in Figure 3-32. The more prominent facilities that now appear incrementally include:

- The Kathleen 500/230kV Transformer

- The Kathleen to Zephyr N. 230kV Line

- The Holder to Ross Prairie 230kV Line Progress Energy Florida, Inc 39 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC Fig.3 AC/DC Hybrid - System Normal (N-0) Overloads I-n addition,ý several 115kV lines showup as contiingehny,: overloads which terids to .

illustrate an' underlying problem With the b(DC conceP-t as it is employed. There is a-mismatch between the size of the "converter station the 230kV outlets and the sub-transmission facilities that forces first contingency overloads to appear.

In short, this application does not seem to match the inherent characteristics of the concept.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 40 Nuclear Site Planning Study

cTRC Fig. 3 Contingency Overloads (N-I) for AC/DC Hybrid Scenario Progress Energy Florida, Inc 41 Nuclear Site Planning Study

cOTRC 3.6.2 Voltage Analysis - HVDC Alternative - F4 Figure 3-33 shows the voltage profile in the area of interest for the 2017 Summer HVDC expansion case F4 under (N-0) conditions.

This view shows that even with a total of 1500 MVAR of Static VAR Compensation, a substantial portion of the area of interest is VAR deficient. Voltages at Camp Lake and Clermont are at .95 p.u. with a large number of other bulk power buses in the .97p.u.

range. Clearly, additional compensation would be required to make this scenario manageable under contingency conditions.

The complete listing of contingency results including voltage excursions is included in the appendix.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 42 Nuclear Site Planning Study

cTRC

4. FRCC - SERC Interface Impact The Florida interface with Georgia is currently limited to a steady state import capability of 3600 MW which is contractually allocated within the state. With significant changes in capacity and/or topology, the interface must be tested to assure that the contractual transfer capability can be maintained. PEF has provided a list of contingencies to test the system with which is included in the appendix and to which the Levy units must be added as they now become the largest individual generation resources within the state.

To conduct the test, the interface was brought up to 3600 MW first. In the base cases developed for this study, the interface is carrying about 2425 MW. Therefore an additional 1175 MW was scheduled into the state to load the interface appropriately. To accomplish this within the capabilities of the model, it was decided to back-down load

,levels in SOCO by 1175 MW, schedule that equivalent amount of power into Florida to the four large Florida companies on a prorated basis,- Florida Power and Light (FPL),

Progress Energy Florida (PEF), Tampa Electric Company (TECO) and Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA). Then re-dispatch the Florida companies to balance load and capacity. The above approach was tested on several of the 2017 Summer expansion scenarios and all of them responded similarly.

The results of this review indicate that the interface is not impacted by any scenario analyzed and that the 3600 MW interface capability is therefore maintained. Two of the more significant outages are shown below for comparison using the765, kVS.ingle circuit

..expansion scenario as the base case.

All other conting~ency resultsi for the interface review'are .contained in the ,appendix.l.

Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the interface loading and Voltage contour respectively for the case with 3600 MW scheduled across the interface. The loadings and voltages are relatively normal with the areas along the 500kV corridor showing the highest loadings and voltage levels and those lower voltage facilities more distant from major generation sources and each other showing a somewhat lower loading and voltage levels.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 43 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC Fig. 4 Interface flow s and loading'contour for 3600 MW]Import Case j* j7

---

Fig. 4 Interface Voltage Contour with 3600 MW Import Progress Energy Florida, Inc 44 Nuclear Site Planning Study

Figures 4-3 and 4-4 show the same two images for the case where one of the Levy 1125MW class units is lost.

Fig.4 Interface flows and loading contour for 3600 MW Import Case and 'loss" Soift 1125MW Nuclear Unit For this case, the loading on the 500kV lines increase substantially as the two 500kV lines combined have a PTDF for SERC to FRCC transfers of approximately 76% with the Duval to Applinger line picking up about 40% of the transfer and the Duval to Thalman about 36%.

The voltage contour shows an area of voltage depression just north of the state border in the area of Sterling to Pinegrove. Figure 4-5 shows the voltage contour from a higher altitude and clearly shows the depressed area.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 45 Nuclear Site Planning Study

• :TRO ..

Fin4 4 I,-lnterface Voltage Contour for 3600 MW Import Case loss 1125M NucleIr'Unit rl

...... . 1 ... .. - '

Fig. 4 High Altitude Voltage Contour for 3600MW Import Case and loss of 1125MW Nuclear Unit Progress Energy Florida, Inc 46 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC Figures 4-6 and 4-7 respectively show the interface loading and the voltage contour for the case where the you loose the Duval to Thalman 500KV.

Fig. 4 Interface flows and loading contour for 3600 MW Import Case and Loss of Duval to Thalman 500 kV line.

These results are consistent with results seen before in prior studies.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 47 Nuclear Site Planning Study

C TRC Fig. 4 Voltage Contour for 3600 MW Import and Loss of Duval to Thalman 500kV Line.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 48 Nuclear Site Planning Study

TRC 5 - Facility Requirements and Costs Figure 6-1 shows a rough estimate of direct costs in today's dollars (millions) associated with the various expansion alternatives. This table will need further expansion and refinement but serves to provide a ballpark comparison between scenarios. It does not intend to represent the complete costs for each option.

Those cells highlighted in Green represent values that have a validated source whereas other values are best estimates based on experience.

Double Ckt 5(W _ Double Ckt .Ckt

.5..*** ...... .65kV

.... D C ost t stkV Equipment Requirements - 23OkV -S I t.. tCt.. N

,.Cot D H Costi Equipment Reqirement s No. I Cost Io Cost No. I los[t. Cost $No.*s Cst Tot. Cost No. Cost Iot.

Transformers 500/230kV 2 ITt000 20.00 3 7 10.00 30.00 0.00 0.00 Move CR unit from 230 to 500kV 0.00 1 20.00 20.00 0.00 1 0.00 Add 500kV Transmission 45 " 1.60 72.00 45 1.60 72.00 0.00 214 - 1.6 342.40 Conversion /Lines 230/500kV 169 2.50 422.50 169 2.00 338.00 X Transformers 765/230kV 0.00 0.00 9 15.00 135.00 0.00 Convert 500/765 kV Lines 0.00 0.00 125 0.24 30.00 0.00 Add 765kV Transmission 0.00 0.00 . 105 2.40 252.00 0.00 Convert 500kV Subs to 765kV 0.00 0.00 .4 . 25.00 100.00 .. 0.00 Build New:765kV:Substation .,0.00 0.00 . 1 5000 50.00: . . -. 0.00 zO0MVA'Converter Station .< 0.00 .0.00 . . . 0.00 ..... ', 2 .330 660.00 1000 MVA Converter Station 0.00 0.00 _ 0.00 1 _ 2_75

• 275.00 4.51450 46000 567.00 1277.40 Fig. 5 Facilities Requirement and Costs ($millions) in 2006 Dollars It should be noted that the DC option does not include the cost of Static .Var Compensation devices which are significant.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 49 Nuclear Site Planning Study

C.TRC 6- Fault Analysis Introduction The purpose of this study was to assess the Levy Nuclear Power Project (Project) impact on short-circuit fault levels and identify over-dutied breakers as a result of the Project.

The proposed project will be comprised of the following elements:

i. Addition of two 1,389 MVA generators.

ii. Addition of two 1,269 MVA, 24/500 kV Delta-Wye Generator Step-Up Transformers iii. Addition of two 500kV transmission lines o From the Project to Central Florida o From the Project to Lake Tarpon iv. Addition of a 230kV transmission Line from Lake Tarpon to Kathleen

v. Addition of two 500/230 kV autotransformers

!o AtLake Tarpon -

.:'67 At Central Florida, Short-Circuit Y.

Short Circuit Model Data A Progress Energy ASPEN circuit 2012 representation base case was used for the short circuit studies. An Aspen Oneliner Batch Short Circuit was used to perform three-phase and single-phase area faults.

The Aspen OneLiner base case was modified to reflect the proposed configuration of the project. The generator layout of the Project is shown in Figure 1 below with a combined 2,414MW of generation at the 26kV bus, the two 1269MVA GSUs were also combined and were modeled with 500kV lines going to Central Florida and Lake Tarpon:

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 50 Nuclear Site Planning Study

OTRN Levy Nulc G 26Wk Levy NuWt 500.k\/

Figure 6-1 Levy Nuclear Station in ASPEN The project elements data used for this Study was extracted from Attachment A of the interconnection request and from previously calculated models found in PSS/E. The tables below include the project short-circuit modeling data used in this Study.

Generator 1&2 Unsaturated Values

-Positive 0.0001 . 0.303

'Negative 0.0001.,.: 0.176 Syn*hronous (Xd)" 0.0001 0.303

,.Tran'sient (Xd') 0.0001 0.436

.,Subtransient (Xd") 0.0001 2.09 Table 6-1 ASPEN Levy Generator Model Data Transformers

______At_____

Name Rating Rated Voltage Ratio NLTC R X %Z H.S. Bus #

3551 Central Florida 100 MVA 500kV to 230kV +/-5% 0.0008 0.0171 1.71 2288 Lake Tarpon 750 MVA 500kV to 230kV +/-5% 0.0008 0.0168 1.68 0%, +2.5%, +5%, 008 0.16 16 3501 GSU 1269 MVA 24kV to 500kV +7.5%, +10%

0%

3/+2.ý5% , +5, -/ .8 .6 1 3501 GSU 1269 MVA 24kV to 500kV +7.5%, +10% 0.08 0.16 16 Base Tb100MVA Table 6-2 ASPEN Levy Project Transformer Model Data Transmission Line From To R X B Bus # Name Voltage Bus # Name Voltage 3501 Levy 500kV 355 Brookbridge 500kV 0.00043 0.00714 0.6358 355 Brookbridge 500kV 2288 Lake Tarpon 500kV 0.0004 0.0096 0.6276 3501 Levy 500kV 3551 Central Florida 500kV 0.00067 0.01113 0.9911 3551 Central Florida 500kV 2913 Kathleen 500kV 0.0003 0.00938 0.7674 2884 Kathleen 230kV 2272 Lake Tarpon 230kV 0.01104 0.06874 0.1247 Table 6-3 ASPEN Levy Project Line Impedance Model Data Progress Energy\ Ilrrirln I Inr 51 Mucler J I*I*B Sitre Planning Study VE*%

~TRCi Methodology Short-Circuit models were derived for the project elements (as shown in Table 6-1, Table 6-2, and Table 6-3) and inserted into the Progress Energy short circuit base case. Pre-and post- Project cases were simulated with three-phase and single phase bus faults.

The calculations for these faults used the following program options:

• Assumed 'Flat' Voltage at 1.0 pu

• Loads are ignored

• Ignore transmission line G+jB

• Ignore shunts with positive sequence impedance Breakers associated with buses that were 100% or above their breaker duty were identified for a more detailed evaluation. Detailed breaker configuration drawings for the over-dutied breakers were provided by Progress Energy and used to ascertain more detailed breaker fault duty results. In addition, Progress Energy provided TRC detailed simulation results for some of the more complex substation configurations that contained breakers that were previously identified as overdutied.

Results Levy Short CircuitResults The short-circuit models that were derived from the project. elements (as shown in Table 6-1, Table 6-2, and Table 6-3) were inserted into the Progress Energy shortcircuit base case. Three phase and single phase faults were simulated on the Levy 26kV generator bus (as shown in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3 below).

Levy NuikkG1 26Wk 0.0P180 Levy WIl 500.W 174.7P1 1 94300P1 07- '- 4904P-103 14758P-90 1950P77 -

2654P77 -

10851 5P-75 Levy Nki G2 26kV 9.5P-10 5751 P-74 '- 299P76 5751P-74 Figure 6-2 Three-Phase Fault on the Levy 26kV Generator I Bus Progress Energy Florida, Inc 52 Nuclear Site Planning Study

TRC Levy Nule G1 26kW 4.3@-171 Levy We 500W!

0.0@)

0.00(M 9.0c00 1151 620@.8 0.00@

000~J0.00@0 0-0@

Figure 6-3 Single-Phase Fault on the Levy 26kV Generator I Bus Three phase and single phase faults were then simulated on the Levy 500kV bus as can be seen in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 below.

LevyWr'e G1 26W!

8.1P-§66 Lv Q.PP90 13607P-58< >. 78P92

,13607P-58 0-4615P93 6281P93 Levy NkAe G2 26M/

8.1P-66 13607P-584i - 708P92 13607P-58f 0.x 1231 OP-87 Figure 6-4 Three-Phase Fault on the Levy 500kV Bus Progress Energy Florida, Inc 53 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC Levy rN4i G1 26A/

500.k\/

72.6@166 1537@35 2687@B9 Levy Njle G2 26A/

0.0@)

0.00M 1 6178@102 0@0-X 16474@)81 Figure 6-5 Single-Phase Fault on the Levy 500kV Bus rhese values were recorded and placed in Table 6-4 below.

Levy to Bus Busted Bus,....

Levy G1 I LevyyG2 Levy GSU Levy GSU 26kV Bus 26kV Bus j . #1 J #2 Levy to Cntl Fla 500kVjLine Brookbridge 500kV Line Total (Amps)

.___

_*__ _Three-Phase Short-Circuit Contributions (Amps)

_evyG1- 14,758 5,751 4,904 299 1,950 2,654 108,515

-evy 500kV 13,607 13,607 708 708, -4,615 6,281 12,310 3rookbridge 500kV 10,591 10,951' J 551 551 2,476 3,578 15,683

entral Florida 500kV. 9,040 . 9,040

• 470 470 3,477 2,537 14,752 Single-Phase Short-Circuit Contributions (Amps)

_evy G1 151,620 0 0 0 0 0 151,620

_evy 5OOkV 0 0 6,178 6,178 1,537 2,687 16,474 3rookbridge 500kV 0 0 2,162 2,162 401 4,695 16,080 Central Florida 500kV 0 0 1,215 1,215 2,681 288 14,383 This table does not denote short circuit flows Table 6-4 Levy Fault Local Area Fault Contributions ProgressEnergy TransmissionShort-CircuitResults The pre- and post- project short-circuit results were obtained through an iterative process. The first step was to identify potential breakers whose buses could produce fault levels above their fault duty. These 45 breakers were identified and recorded with their three-phase and single phase levels. A majority of these breakers (42 out of 45) were identified in the pre-project simulations as having existing problematic fault levels.

The 23kA fault duty breakers 1390 (of the Crossroads Substation) and 4492 (of the Gateway Substation) became over-dutied in the post-project simulations with fault current increases of no greater than 350 amps. This listing can be found at the end of this section.

The next step involved a more detailed analysis by examining bus configurations and contributive fault flows for the identified breakers. Where needed, the ASPEN model was altered to correspond with three-line substation drawings (provided by Progress Energy) and the bus faults were re-simulated and analyzed. Simulations for some of the more complex configurations such as the Hines Energy Complex were performed by Progress Energy Florida, Inc 54 Nuclear Site Planning Study

~T RC Progress, Energy who supplied those results back to TRC for analysis.

Progress Energy has communicated that all the 230kV breakers at Hines Energy Complex have been replaced with 63kA breakers. In addition, the Seven Springs 115kV bus tie breaker 2720 used to operate normally open. This operational configuration has now changed to normally closed, and as such the FCG bus number 1095 no longer applies.

The second step along with additional information from Progress Energy produced results that showed that every breaker which exceeded its post-project fault duty had an existing Pre-Project fault duty deficiency. Progress Energy is aware of these breaker deficiencies and a list of breakers whose fault levels have exceeded their fault duties are provided in Table 6-5.

Bus Name FCG Bus Switch Voltage Interrupting 3-PH 1-PH Pre 3-PH 1-PH Post Number Number Rating Pre Post WIND 1905 1570 69 28.4 17367 28690 17425 28773 OC1 B1 10309 N-360 25 20 20070 22640 20070 22640 OC1 131 10309 N-361 25 11.3 20070 22640 20070 22640 OC1 B1 10309 N-363 25 11 20070 22640 20070 22640 Table 6-5 Progress Energy Breakers with Exceeded Breaker Duties Conclusions This Study evaluated the Levy Nuclear4 Power Plant Project and its short-circuit impact on the Progress EnergI transmiSSiOn system.. Three-phase and single phase faults were placed on individual buses system wide within the ASPEN cases. The Levy 26kV and 500kV bus faults were examined and recorded.

Suspect breakers whose bus faults produced fault levels above fault duty levels were assessed in a more detail analysis.

The Levy generation contributed an additional 1,102 Amps for a three-phase fault and 4,524 Amps for a single-phase fault on the Brookbridge 500kV bus. Total project contributions for the same faults were 3,578 Amps for a three phase fault and 4,695 Amps for a single-phase fault.

As shown in Table 6-5 (in the results section), Occidental #1 breakers N-360, N-361, and N-363 along with the Windermere 1570 breaker exceeded their fault duty limitations in a pre-Project system configuration. Progress Energy is aware of these breaker deficiencies.

In conclusion, this short-circuit study demonstrates that the Project has no significant adverse impact on the short-circuit duty within the Progress Energy transmission system and that no system upgrades are necessitated due to the Project.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 55 Nuclear Site Planning Study

OTRO Progress Energy Florida, Inc 56 Nuclear Site Planning Study

STRC Final Overdutied Breaker Results BusName FCG Nme Bus Switch Nubr Sty Sranubrp,- - .... ý - ýVotg.1-PH

-,- Interrupting breaker k 3-PH Post SeilnmeNye Vlae Rating type factor Post ECLW 1038 39 237Y2428 690G3500 69 27.7 1 0 15380 14518 BART 1066 278 0139A5075205 FK-115-5000 .115 22.8 1 0 18796 14634 BART 1066 188 K6566146HN204 FK-439-115-5000-5 115 22.8 1 0 18796 14634 BYVW 1070 1127 4130051602 115KM5000-12B 115 23 1 10 13472 10074 BYVW 1070 1129 438Y1839 GM-6B 115 24 1 0- 15256 11151 BYVW 1070 1125 538Y1839 GM-6B 115 24 1 0 12823 1.787 XRDS 1074 1390 0139A5906201 FK-121-22000-2 115 23 1 10 16756 14132 DISS 1076 4 0139A5099201 FK-115-5000 115 22.8 1 0 19280 14159 DISS 1076 9 0139A5977201 FK-121-22000 2 115 23 1 10 18557 15574 DISS 1076 141 41301461011 115KM5000-12B 115 23 1 10 16940 15529 SEVS 1094 2720 0139A5959201 FK-121-22000-2 115 23 1 10 16882 14934 GATE 1106 4492 0139A5978201 FK-121-22000-2 115 23 1 10 15382 13524 CFLA 1210 1425 0139A4956202 FK-69-3500-7 69 27.7 1 0 22486 19294 ZPHL 1290 1398 K6566126ST201 FK-439-69-1000-5 69 8.4 1 0 6930 4254 APKN 1589 1941 K6566126SN201 FK-439-69-1000-5. 69 8.4 1 0 7403 5151 HINE 1735 5272 H242A2281201 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5273 H242A2281202 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5274 H242A2281203 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5282 H242A2281204 HVB242-40000 -230 63 0 0. 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5280 H242A2281205 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5278 H242A2281206 HVB242-40000, 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5283 H242A2281207 HVB242-40000. 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5285 H242A2281208 HVB242-40000' 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5287 H242A2281209 HVB242-40000. 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5275 H242A2281210 HVB242-40000 ... .. 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5276 H242A2281211 HVB242-40000"< 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 HINE 1735 5277 H242A2281212 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 54146.2 58199 RIOP 1885 990 0139A9211201 FKA-72.5727000-1 -69 28.4 1 10 16297 16306 WGN 1901 3040 K-6566182SD-201 FK-69-1500-2 69 12 1 0 7253 3721 WIND 1905 1570 4120091201 69KM3500-20. 69 28.4 1 21 17425 28773 WIND 1905 1571 4120091202 69KM3500-20 69 28.4 1 21 12637 4085 WPKE 1908 1517 4120091101 69KM3500M20, 69 28.4 1 21 15447 14670 WPKE 1908 2243 426731 SP-72.5-31.5 69 31.5. 0 0 1 14070 14140 CFLA T2B 8717 1912 H68152A2 15VHKR500 13 20 0 0 970 0 CFLA T2B 8717 1910 R91981AZ 15-GMI-500 13 20 0 0 970 0 LTPN T1B 8770 1343 222071A010794 15VHKR500 13 20 0 0 1510 0 LTPN T1B 8770 1344 222071B020794 15VHKR500 13 20 0 0 1510 0 VB25245KK555KB LTPN T2B 8772 4713 SOOH183VB NN0952 25 25 0 0 ___ 940 0 LTPN T2B 8772 4715 65228A0001 26GKD2025 13 20 0 0 940 0 OC1 B1 10309 N-360 0372A76480010 PVDB2 25.8-20-1 25 20 0 0 20070 22640 OC1 B1 10309 N-361 406301 SDO-23-500 25 11.3. 1 15 20070 22640 OC1 81 10309 N-363 41-10527-3011 23KS500-12D 25 11i 0 20070 22640 Progress Energy Florida, Inc 57 Nuclear Site Planning Study

OTRO Final Overdutied Breaker Results Serial number typF- " Voltage Interrupting breaker k 3-PH 1-PH Bus Name FCG Bus Switch Number Number Rating type factor Post Post ECLW 1038 39 237Y2428 690G3500 69 27.7 1 0 55.52% 52.41%

BART 1066 278 0139A5075205 FK-115-5000 115 22.8 1 0 82.44% 64.18%

BART 1066 188 K6566146HN204 FK-439-115-5000-5 115 22.8 1 0 82.44% 64.18%

BYVW 1070 1127 4130051602 115KM5000-12B 115 23 1 10 58.57% 43.80%

BYVW 1070 1129 438Y1839 GM-6B 115 24 1 0 63.57% 46.46%

BYVW 1070 1125 538Y1839 GM-6B

• 115 24 1 0 53.43% 7.45%

XRDS 1074 1390 0139A5906201 FK-121-22000-2 115 23 1 10 72.85% 61.44%

DISS 10764 0139A5099201 FK-115-5000 115 22.8 1 0 84.56% 62.10%

DISS 1076 9 0139A5977201 FK-121-22000-2 115 23 1 10 80.68% 67.71%

DISS 1076 141 41301461011 115KM5000-12B 115 23 1 10 73.65% 67.52%

SEVS 1094 2720 0139A5959201 FK-121-22000-2 115 23 1 10 73.40% 64.93%

GATE 1106 4492 0139A5978201 FK-121-22000-2 115 23 1 10 66.88% 58.80%

CFLA 1210 1425 0139A4956202 FK-69-3500-7 69 27.7 1 0 81.18% 69.65%

ZPHL 1290 1398 K6566126ST201 FK-439-69-1000-5 69 8.4 1 0 82.50% 50.64%

APKN 1589 1941 K6566126SN201 FK-439-69-1000-5 69 8.4 1 0 88.13% 61.32%

HINE 1735 5272 H242A2281201 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5273 H242A2281202 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5274 H242A2281203 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5282 H242A2281204 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5280 H242A2281205 HV1242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5278 H242A2281206 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5283 H242A2281207 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5285 H242A2281208 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5287 H242A2281209 HVB242-40000 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5275 H242A2281210 HVB242-40000 230.......

230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5276 H242A2281211 HVB242-40000 " 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

HINE 1735 5277 H242A2281212 HVB242-40000 - 230 63 0 0 85.95% 92.38%

RIOP 1885 990 0139A9211201 FKA-72.5-2T000-1. 69 28.4 1 10 57.38% 57.42%

WGN 1901 3040 K-6566182SD-201 FK-69-1500-2 . . 69 12 1 0 60.44% 31.01%

WIND 1905 1570 4120091201 69KM3500-20. " 69 28.4 1 21 61.36% 101.31%

WIND 1905 1571 4120091202 69KM3500-20 . 69 28.4 1 21 44.50% 14.38%

WPKE 1908 1517 4120091101 69KM3500-20, ' 69 28.4 1 21 54.39% 51.65%

WPKE 1908 2243 426731 SP-72:5-31 :5 "-" 69 31.5 0 0 44.67% 44.89%

CFLA T2B 8717 1912 H68152A2 15VHKR500 13 20 0 0 4.85% 0.00%

CFLA T2B 8717 1910 R91981AZ 15-GMI-500 13 20 0 0 4.85% 0.00%

LTPN TIB 8770 1343 222071A010794 15VHKR500 13 20 0 0 7.55% 0.00%

LTPN TIB 8770 1344 222071B020794 15VHKR500 13 20 0 0 7.55% 0.00%

VB25245KK555KB LTPN T2B 8772 4713 SOOH183VB NN0952 25 25 0 0 3.76% 0.00%

LTPN T2B 8772 4715 65228A0001 26GKD2025 1 13 20 0 0 4.70% 0.00%

OC1 B1 10309 N-360 0372A76480010 PVDB2 25.8-20-1 25 20 0 0 100.35% 113.20%

OC1 B1 10309 N-361 406301 SDO-23-500 25 11.3 1 15 177.61% 200.35%

OC1 81 10309 N-363 41-10527-3011 23KS500-12D 25 11 0 0 182.45% 205.82%

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 58 Nuclear Site Planning Study

• a CTRC Final Overdutied Breaker Results FCG Bus Switch Interrupting breaker k 3-PH BusNumber Number Rating type factor Post 1-PH Post WIND 1905 1570 4120091201 69KM3500720 69 28.4 1 21 17425 28773 OC1 81 10309 N-360 0372A76480010 PVDB2 25.8-20-1 25 20 0 0 20070 22640 OC1 R1 10309 N-361 406301 SDO-23-500 25 11.3 1 15 20070 22640 OC1 B1 10309 N-363 41-10527-3011 23KS500-12D - 25 11 0 0 20070 22640 Progress Energy Florida, Inc 59 Nuclear Site Planning Study

CTRC LARGE GENERATING FACILITY DATA UNIT RATINGS kVA 1389000 95 OF Coolinq Water Voltage 26000 Power Factor 0.9 Speed (RPM) 1800 Connection (e.g. Wye) Wye Short Circuit Ratio More than 0.5 Frequency, Hertz 60 Stator Amperes at Rated kVA 30844 Field Volts Amps 650/6150 Max Turbine MW 1207MWe (VWO 1262MWe) (@Ave.2.7inHq COMBINED TURBINE-GENERATOR-EXCITER INERTIA DATA Inertia Constant, H = _ (4.26+ 0.93) kW sec/kVA 2

Moment-of-Inertia, WR 2 = (7.90+1.72) x 10e6 lb. ft.

(Note: The first':figure in the parenthesis is for turbine and the second one is for Generator.)

REACTANCE DATA (PER UNIT-RATED KVA).::,'

DIRECT AXIS QUADRATURE AXIS Synchronous B saturated XdV 1.900 Xqv 1.860 Synchronous B unsaturated Xdi 2.090 Xqi 2.050 Transient B saturated Xd'V 0.397 Xq'V 0.522 Transient B unsaturated Xd'l 0.436 Xq'I 0.606 Subtransient B saturated Xd"V 0.261 Xq"V 0.261 Subtransient B unsaturated Xd"l 0.303 Xq"l 0.303 Negative Sequence B saturated X2 V 0.261 Negative Sequence B unsaturated X 2i 0.303 Zero Sequence B saturated X0v 0.176 Zero Sequence B unsaturated X0i 0.176 Leakage Reactance Xlm 0.213 FIELD TIME CONSTANT DATA (SEC)

Open Circuit Td,' 11.0 Tqo' 2.3 Three-Phase Short Circuit Transient Td3' 2.3 Tq' 0.68 Line to Line Short Circuit Transient Td2' 3.4 Line to Neutral Short Circuit Transient Tdl' 3.9 Short Circuit Subtransient Td" 0.025 Tq" 0.025 Progress Energy Florida, Inc 60 Nuclear Site Planning Study

C-TRQ Open Circuit Subtransient Tdo" 0.036 Tqo" 0.05 ARMATURE TIME CONSTANT DATA (SEC)

Three Phase Short Circuit Ta 3 0.32 Line to Line Short Circuit Ta 2 0.37 Line to Neutral Short Circuit Tal 0.28 MW CAPABILITY AND PLANT CONFIGURATION LARGE GENERATING FACILITY DATA ARMATURE WINDING RESISTANCE DATA (PER UNIT)

Positive 0.0038 Negative 0.067 Zero 0.0078

.Rotor Short Time Thermal.Capacity 122 t = 6.32 Field Current at Rated kVA, Armature Voltage and PF = 5800 amps

,Field Current at Rated kVA and Armature Voltage,. 0 PF = NA amps Three Phase Armature Winding Capacitance = ý .56- microfarad Field Winding Resistance = 0.0776 ohms '20 '0 C Armature Winding Resistance (Per Phase) = 0.000887 ohms 20 'C

.CURVES Provide Saturation, Vee, Reactive Capability, Capacity Temperature Correction curves. Designate normal and emergency Hydrogen Pressure operating range for multiple curves.

(See attached file Characteristic Curve.tif)

Saturation Curves: ES-AP1000a-1 Vee Curves: ES-AP1000a-2 Reactive Capability Curve: ES-AP1000s-3 Capacity Temperature Correction Curve: n/a, only 75psig hydrogen pressure operational capability shown Progress Energy Florida, Inc 61 Nuclear Site Planning Study

a C,` TRC

.GENERATOR STEP-UP TRANSFORMER DATA RATINGS Capacity Self-cooled/

Maximum Nameplate 1269 / n/a MVA Voltage Ratio (Generator Side/System side/Tertiary) 24 / 500 / n/a kV Winding Connections (Low V/High V/Tertiary V (Delta or Wye))

Delta / Wye / n/a Fixed Taps Available 0%,i-2.5%, +5.0%, +7.5%, +10.0%

Present Tap Setting +5.0%

IMPEDANCE Positive.. Z (on 65°C ODAF) 16  % TBD X/R Zero Z0 (on 65°C ODAF) .16  % TBD X/R EXCITATION SYSTEM DATAk Identify appropriate IEEE model block diagram of excitation system and power system stabilizer (PSS) for computer representation in power system stability simulations and the corresponding excitation system and PSS constants for use in the model.

(See attached file AVRsettingrevl .tif)

AVR model: Type ST1A PSS model: Type PSS2A GOVERNOR SYSTEM DATA Identify appropriate IEEE model block diagram of governor system for computer representation in power system stability simulations and the corresponding governor system constants for use in the model.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 62 Nuclear Site Planning Study

C4

C "TRC

) ....! .:i. R " '

7 - Stability Analysis Study System This study was based on a power flow model of the planned generation and transmission system of Progress Energy and neighboring interconnected systems within FRCC, including planned system modifications through 2017. The neighboring SERC region was represented by a 2012 model abridged from the corresponding NERC dynamics-ready power flow case. Load was assumed to be at estimated peak load for that year. This model was modified to add two 1125 MW nuclear units at the Levy County site, connected to the Central Florida and Brookridge substation by new 500 kV lines. 500 kV is the only EHV voltage level currently in use in Florida or adjacent states.

Dynamic models of the study units and their ancillaries were provided by Progress Energy based on vendor proposals for similar units at another site. Models of units in the balance of the system were also provided; these correspond to the models in the NERC System Dynamics Data Base. Small or future units for which no dynamic model is available were netted against local load.

Software Version. 30.3 of the PSS/E TM software. package distributed by Siemens Power Technology International was used for power flow, simulation, and output plotting.

Simulation Cases Run The dynamic simulation portion of such- project'consists of two phases.

Determining the critical clearing time for three phase faults for each of the transmission lines at the sites under consideration. This is done by choosing an initial clearing time, simulating response, and determining whether the response is stable or unstable. If stable, a longer time is tried; if unstable, a shorter, until two times differing by 1/2 cycle (83 msec) are found, the shorter giving stable response and the longer, unstable. The shorter of these values is termed the critical clearing time. Using circuit breakers rated at two cycle interrupting time and allowing for relay time, communication channel time and margin, a minimum clearing time of approximately five cycles is required to give reasonable assurance that faults can be cleared if the protection system and circuit breaker operate as intended.

" Simulating the system response assuming circuit breaker failure to clear a fault in the normal time (3 cycles), followed by local breaker backup operation in 5 cycles to clear the adjacent bus and all facilities connected to it.

500 kV circuit breakers are of the air and SF6 types, either of which easily lend themselves to independent pole operation, and the probability of more than one pole failing is considered negligible. Thus after the primary clearing period the fault is converted from three-phase to phase-to-ground. A phase-to-ground fault does not reduce the generator terminal voltage as much and allows the affected unit(s) to deliver some power, so the unit(s) experience less acceleration during Progress Energy Florida, Inc 63 Nuclear Site Planning Study

TIRO the backup clearing period than would be the case if all three phases continued to be faulted.

At their current level of development most Progress Energy 500 kV substations employ a "ring bus" configuration, such that two circuit breakers operate at each terminal to clear the faulted 500 kV line. The 230 kV buses at major substation have a "breaker-and-a-half' configuration which also requires that two circuit breakers operate to clear a faulted line.

In general it would be necessary to simulate four possible breaker failure scenarios for each line fault. However it is reasonable to assume that the switchyard at the proposed plant will also have a ring bus configuration with transmission lines and generating units alternated around the ring. For any line fault followed by breaker failure at the near (study plant) end, one of the generating units at the study plant must be tripped to clear the fault, leaving the other unit connected to the system through the other line. Clearly this is a much less severe event than a fault which leaves two units on the same transmission line, and ifthe latter is stable there is little value in simulating the former.

It is assumed that the 500kV bus arrangements at Central Florida and Brookridge will continue the ring bus arrangement and that "supplying" lines from the proposed plant and Crystal River will alternate with "load" lines to the south (Kathleen or Lake Tarpon, respectively) and with 500/230 kV transformer positions. Thus a backup clearing case of one of the lines from the proposed plant can outage a load line or a transformer, but it:cannot outage a line from Crystal River.

Results Critical Clearing Times Critical clearing times for close in three-phase faults on the 500kV lines from the plant are 5.5 cycles on the Brookridge line and 6.0 cycles on the Central Florida line.

Plots of the following variables are attached for each of these cases: rotor angle (degrees), electrical power (MW), terminal voltage (PU on 26 kV base) and field voltage.

The plots for the critical clearing time and for one half cycle longer clearing time are shown. The simulations for the critical clearing time were each extended to ten seconds, while those for the unstable case were terminated after two seconds. This was judged to be adequate to demonstrate instability for the case cleared in longer than critical clearing time.

Even these critical clearing times do not give a very satisfactory dynamic response. The units' plotted responses continue to oscillate and shows little damping even out to 10 seconds from fault initiation. This may be amenable to compensation by optimizing stabilizer settings, which will necessarily require a near-final transmission plan and generator specifications.

An additional page contains a single plot of modal analysis of the power output of unit one at the study site during the last five seconds of the simulation. In addition to the simulated unit output power, curves trace the following groups of components as determined by modal analysis: component 1 (essentially the long term value to which Progress Energy Florida, Inc 64 Nuclear Site Planning Study

A CTRC unit output will ultimately return), the sum of the first two components, the sum of the first three components, and the sum of all components.

In principle such plots should cover a time frame after a return to linear operation when all switching has been completed and internal exciter quantities are no longer up against limits. However it is apparent from the non-sinusoidal plots of exciter output voltage that this important auxiliary has not returned to operation within its limits, let alone entered a period where its response is damping back to a new equilibrium.

The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the modal analysis are also tabulated in Tables 7-2 and 7-3. The magnitude of the eigenvector can be interpreted as the magnitude of the component, while the real and imaginary parts of the eigenvalue can be manipulated to indicate the rate of decay and the frequency, respectively, of the exponentially decaying sine wave comprising that component. A positive damping ratio indicates that the component will die out with time, while a negative one in principle indicates that the component is growing. Because practical estimation of these requires least-square techniques applied to a limited sample of data points, small negative damping ratios associated with a fourth or fifth component whose magnitude is several orders of magnitude less than the first component are not of concern.

The predominant mode following the Brookridge fault has a resonant frequency of approximately 0.85 Hz. and a magnitude of 7.75 per unit or 775 MW. Oscillations of this magnitude are clearly unacceptable. For the Central Florida fault the resonant frequency is approximately0.87.Hz and 5.12 per'unitor 512 MW, also not acceptable.

COMP. EIGENVALUE EIGENVECTOR NO REAL' :IMAGINARYý MAGNITUDE ANGLE REMARKS..

1 -0.174056: . 12.183 -- TCNST: 5.745 SC.

2 -0.779985 5.34134 7.7506 138.2 FREQ.: 0.85 HZ.

3 -1.0531 11.0542 0.56611 93.1 FREQ.: 1.759 HZ.

4 -3.16029 23.5469 2.05E-02 138.7 FREQ.: 3.748 HZ.

5 -11.7506 40.5227 1.98E-03 26.05 FREQ.: 6.449 HZ.

6 -9.51239 83.8596 2.78E-04 -72.08 FREQ.: 13.347 HZ.

7 -7.91346 101.1 1.96E-04 -47.77 FREQ.: 16.091 HZ.

8 -11.5275 125.641 1.23E-04 -22.68 FREQ.: 19.996 HZ.

9 -6.24076 62.4579 7.85E-05 112.17 FREQ.: 9.94 HZ.

Table 7-1. Modal Components for Unit 1 Power Following Levy - Brookridge Three-phase Fault Cleared in 5.5 Cycles COMP. EIGENVALUE EIGENVECTOR NO REAL IMAGINARY MAGNITUDE ANGLE REMARKS 1 -9.97E-03 -- 11.117 -- TCNST: 100.334 SC.

2 -0.207129 5.4726 5.1233 -149.28 FREQ.: 0.871 HZ.

3 -1.03715 12.1779 0.45809 -135.89 FREQ.: 1.938 HZ.

4 -3.44764 22.8279 4.1OE-02 -150.14 FREQ.: 3.633 HZ.

5 -5.45056 45.2485 1.11E-02 -174.4 FREQ.: 7.202 HZ.

6 -7.5529 64.4742 6.55E-03 ' -163.6 FREQ.: 10.261 HZ.

7 -8.07371 82.9607 3.36E-03 -147.05 FREQ.: 13.204 HZ.

8 -6.31029 105.458 1.34E-03 -156.49 FREQ.: 16.784 HZ.

Table 7-2. Modal Components for Unit I Power Following Levy - Central Florida Three-phase Fault Cleared in 6 Cycles Progress Energy Florida, Inc 65 Nuclear Site Planning Study

a 7TRC System Response in the Event of Breaker Failure Line from Levy Line or Other Facility - Result to Outaged by Backup Clearing I Brookridge Lake Tarpon Line Oscillatory 500/230 kV Transformer Oscillatory Central Florida Kathleen Line Oscillatory 500 / 230 kV Transformer Oscillatory Table 7-3. Breaker Failure Cases Simulated Three phase faults followed by circuit breaker failure were simulated as shown in Table 7-3. In all cases the rotor angles and other important quantities showed very poor damping.

Two pages of plots are provided for each case. The first and second pages contain plots of the same quantities as in the critical clearing cases above. On the first page only the first two seconds of the simulation is plotted to enable the reader to see details of faster moving traces. On the second page the plots are extended to five seconds, more fully documenting the stable outcome.

Conclusions Two 500kV transmission, lines, one to Brookridge and one to Central Florida, are.

marginal from -the dynamic stability perspective for the proposed plant consisting of two, 1125 MW units. The dynamicresponse will be very poorly damped, whether clearing is successful or not.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 66 Nuclear Site Planning Study

A S~TRC 8 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS Three alternative transmission concepts (500kV, 765kV and Hybrid DC) to support the addition of two 1125 MW nuclear units in Levy County have been studied. We conclude that the 500kV expansion alternative appears to be the most efficient and effective transmission expansion choice. This alternative consists of two 500kV circuits from Lake Tarpon to Central Florida via Brookridge and Crystal River, one looping through Levy and one, already existing, through Crystal River, with .230kV underbuild. This conclusion is based on thermal and voltage reviews of the various transmission options considered.

The 500kV alternative was also reviewed from the standpoint of circuit breaker fault duties. This short-circuit study demonstrated that the Levy County plant has no significant adverse impact on the short-circuit duty within the Progress Energy transmission system and that no breaker upgrades are necessitated due to the Project.

The dynamic response of the 500kV alternative to fault conditions has been studied. As modeled, the system is marginally stable: although the machines do not lose synchronism following successful or backup clearing of a three phase fault, they exhibit significant undamped oscillations which are undesireable and potentially damaging. We therefore recommend additional review of the units' local connection choices for integration into the 500kV system. In particular, the addition of a new 500kV bus in the nearby area, such as Crystal River East, would permit the existing Crystal River and proposed Levy plants to share transmission capacity toward the Tampa and Orlando load centers. This would also facilitate connection of a third line into Levy if required for.

regulatory reasons.

Progress Energy Florida, Inc 67 Nuclear Site Planning Study

PROGRESS ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST #296, REVISION 1 MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY RECAPTURE CAMERON INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ATTACHMENT F

Measurement Systems Caldona Ultrasonics Technology Center 1000 McClaren Woods Drive Coraopolis, PA 15108 Tel 724-273-9300 ICAMERON Fax 724-273-9301 September 5, 2007 CAW 07-16 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Subject:

Caldon Ultrasonics Engineering Report: ER-608 Rev.2 "LEFM/ + Meter Factor Calculation and Accuracy Assessment for Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Power Station (Alden Reports NO. 2007-133/C1229)"

Gentlemen:

This application for withholding is submitted by Cameron International Corporation, a Delaware Corporation (herein called "Cameron") on behalf of its operating unit, Caldon Ultrasonics Technology Center, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations. It contains trade secrets and/or commercial information proprietary to Cameron and customarily held in confidence.

The proprietary information for which withholding is being requested is identified in the subject submittal. In conformance with 10CFR Section 2.390, Affidavit CAW 07-16 accompanies this application for withholding setting forth the basis on which the identified proprietary information may be withheld from public disclosure.

Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the subject information, which is proprietary to Cameron, be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations.

Correspondence with respect to this application for withholding or the accompanying affidavit should reference CAW 07-16 and should be addressed to the undersigned.

Very truly yours, Calvin R. Hastings General Manager Enclosures (Only upon separation of the enclosed confidential material should this letter and affidavit be released.)

September 5, 2007 CAW 07-16 AFFIDAVIT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:

ss COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY:

Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Calvin R. Hastings, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Cameron International Corporation, a Delaware Corporation (herein called "Cameron") on behalf of its operating unit, Caldon Ultrasonics Technology Center, and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief:

Calvin R. Hastings General Manager Sworn to and subscribed before me this ____day of

,,,,' , , ., 2007 NoI y Public

'OMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

1: Notarial seal 00 "MbeY I

Joa,nnB

-. Thomas, Notary Publc Conmissylan Expres July 28, 2011 i I

Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries

1. I am the General Manager of Caldon Ultrasonics Technology Center, and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public disclosure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing and rulemaking proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of Cameron.

2. I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations and in conjunction with the Cameron application for withholding accompanying this Affidavit.

3. I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Cameron in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information. The material and information provided herewith is so designated by Cameron, in accordance with those criteria and procedures, for the reasons set forth below.

4. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) (4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.

(i) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Cameron.

(ii) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Cameron and not customarily disclosed to the public. Cameron has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence. The application of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Cameron policy and provides the rational basis required. Furthermore, the information is submitted voluntarily and need not rely on the evaluation of any rational basis.

Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential advantage, as follows:

(a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of Cameron's competitors without license from Cameron constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies.

(b) It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.

(c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, and assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.

(d) It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Cameron, its customer or suppliers.

(e) It reveals aspects of past, present or future Cameron or customer funded development plans and programs of potential customer value to Cameron.

(f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.

There are sound policy reasons behind the Cameron system, which include the following:

(a) The use of such information by Cameron gives Cameron a competitive advantage over its competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Cameron competitive position.

(b) It is information that is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Cameron ability to sell products or services involving the use of the information.

(c) Use by our competitor would put Cameron at a competitive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.

(d) Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary information, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Cameron of a competitive advantage.

(e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Cameron in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.

(f) The Cameron capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.

(iii) The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence, and, under the provisions of 10CFR Section 2. 390, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.

(iv) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available information has not been previously employed in the same manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.

(v) The proprietary information sought to be withheld is the submittal titled Caldon Ultrasonics Engineering Report: ER-608 Rev. 2 "LEFM V + Meter Factor Calculation and Accuracy Assessment for Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear power Station (Alden Reports No. 2007-133/C1229)" and is designated therein in accordance with 10CFR §§ 2.390(b)(1)(i)(A,B), with the reason(s) for confidential treatment noted in the submittal and further described in this affidavit. This information is voluntarily submitted for use by the NRC Staff in their review of the accuracy assessment of the proposed methodology for LEFM CheckPlus Systems used by Crystal River Unit 3 for an MUR UPRATE.

Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Cameron because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar flow and temperature measurement systems and licensing defense services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without the right to use the information.

The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive Cameron effort and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.

In order for competitors of Cameron to duplicate this information, similar products would have to be developed, similar technical programs would have to be performed, and a significant manpower effort, having the requisite talent and experience, would have to be expended for developing analytical methods and receiving NRC approval for those methods.

Further the deponent sayeth not.