ML072841019

Issuance of License Amendments 202 and 149 Regarding Minor Changes and Corrections to the Technical Specifications

ML072841019
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/22/2007
From:	Mozafari B NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLII-2
To:	Stall J Florida Power & Light Co
Mozafari B, NRR/ADRO/DORL, 415-2020
Shared Package
ML072850821	List: ML072841019 ML072980860
References
TAC MD3497, TAC MD3498
Download: ML072841019 (21)

Text

October 22, 2007 Mr. J. A. Stall Senior Vice President, Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer Florida Power and Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

SUBJECT:

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING MINOR CHANGES AND CORRECTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TAC NOS. MD3497 AND MD3498)

Dear Mr. Stall:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 202 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-67, and Amendment No. 149 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively.

These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated October 19, 2006.

The amendments revise various TSs to address requirements that should have been changed as part of amendments previously approved by the NRC, as well as to correct some typographical errors.

A copy of the NRC staffs Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brenda L. Mozafari, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 202 to DPR-67

2. Amendment No. 149 to NPF-16

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/enclosures: See next page

Florida Power and Light Company ST. LUCIE PLANT cc:

Mr. William E. Webster Mr. Christopher R. Costanzo Vice President, Nuclear Operations, Plant General Manager South Region St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Florida Power & Light Company 6351 South Ocean Drive P.O. Box 14000 Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Mr. Terry Patterson Senior Resident Inspector Licensing Manager St. Lucie Plant St. Lucie Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6351 South Ocean Drive P.O. Box 6090 Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Don E. Grissette Craig Fugate, Director Vice President, Nuclear Training Division of Emergency Preparedness and Performance Improvement Department of Community Affairs Florida Power & Light Company 2740 Centerview Drive P.O. Box 14000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 M. S. Ross, Managing Attorney Mr. Rajiv S. Kundalkar Florida Power & Light Company Vice President - Nuclear Technical Services P.O. Box 14000 Florida Power & Light Company Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Marjan Mashhadi, Senior Attorney Florida Power & Light Company Mr. J. Kammel 801 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Radiological Emergency Suite 220 Planning Administrator Washington, DC 20004 Department of Public Safety 6000 Southeast Tower Drive Mr. Douglas Anderson Stuart, Florida 34997 County Administrator St. Lucie County Mr. Bill Parks 2300 Virginia Avenue Operations Manager Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Mr. William A. Passetti, Chief Jensen Beach, Florida 34957-2000 Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control Mr. Seth B. Duston 2020 Capital Circle, SE, Bin #C21 Training Manager Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1741 St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Mr. Gordon L. Johnston Jensen Beach, Florida 34957-2000 Site Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957-2000

ML072841019 Pkg: ML072850821 TS: ML072980860 NRR-058 OFFICE LPL2-2 LPL2-2/LA LPL2-2/PM AADB/BC SCVB/BC EICB/BC OGC LPL2-2/BC NAME MVaaler BClayton MVaaler for MKotzalas* RDennig* WKemper* NLO subject TBoyce BMozafari to comment MBaty DATE 10/15/07 10/16/07 10/15/07 3/13/2007 8/8/2007 8/30/2007 10/22/07 10/22/07

• By Memo Dated FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-335 ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.202 Renewed License No. DPR-67

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company (the licensee), dated October 19, 2006, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 3.B to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 202, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Thomas H. Boyce, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Operating License and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 22, 2007

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 202 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 DOCKET NO. 50-335 Replace pages 3 and 4 of Renewed Operating License DPR-67 with the attached pages 3 and 4.

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13a 3/4 3-13a 3/4 3-24 3/4 3-24 3/4 7-31 3/4 7-31 3/4 9-9 3/4 9-9 6-12 6-12 6-14 6-14 6-23 6-23

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA AND FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY DOCKET NO. 50-389 ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 149 Renewed License No. NPF-16

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Florida Power & Light Company, et al (the licensee), dated October 19, 2006, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 3.B to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 149, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Thomas H. Boyce, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Operating License and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 22, 2007

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 149 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16 DOCKET NO. 50-389 Replace page 3a of Renewed Operating License NPF-16 with the attached page 3a.

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-15 3/4 3-15 3/4 3-16b 3/4 3-16b 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-28 3/4 7-24 3/4 7-24 3/4 9-10 3/4 9-10 5-5 5-5 6-13 6-13 6-14a 6-14a 6-23 6-23

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 202 AND 149 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-67 AND NPF-16 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, ET AL.

ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 19, 2006 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML063040607), Florida Power and Light Company, et al. (FPL, the licensee), requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TSs) associated with Renewed Facility Operating Licenses DPR-67 and NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. This amendment request was noticed in the Federal Register on January 3, 2007 (72 FR 00153). The amendments would revise various TSs to address requirements that should have been changed as part of amendments previously approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as well as to correct some typographical errors.

The amendments proposed by FPL encompass four areas of the TSs as follows:

1. The proposed changes would revise TS Section 6.0, Administrative Controls, to relocate certain TS provisions to licensee controlled documents such as the FPL Topical Quality Assurance Report (TQAR) and the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR). These corrections are associated with a proposal submitted to the NRC by FPL on November 21, 2003, and the respective staff safety evaluation (SE), dated March 11, 2004, associated with this previous TS amendment (Nos. 189 and 133). The proposed changes in the submittal dated October 19, 2006, were subsequently identified by FPL as items that should have been included within the scope of the previous submittal and the NRC SE.

2. The proposed changes would revise certain TS action statements and applicable modes in TS 3.9.9 and Table 4.3-3 for both units to correct various discrepancies within the existing TSs. These corrections are associated with two different proposals submitted to the NRC by FPL on May 23, 2002, and September 18, 2003, and the relevant staff SEs, dated August 30, 2002, and September 27, 2005, respectively, associated with these previous TS amendments (Nos. 184 and 127, and 197 and 139, respectively). The proposed changes in the submittal dated October 19, 2006, were subsequently identified by FPL as items that should have been included within the scope of the previous submittals and the NRC SEs.

3. The proposed changes would revise certain TS action statements and applicable modes in tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-3 for both units to correct various minor errors and discrepancies, including some editorial changes. These corrections are associated with a proposal submitted to the NRC by FPL on October 18, 2001, as superseded by letter dated July 18, 2002, and the relevant staff SE, dated September 30, 2003, associated with this previous TS amendment (Nos. 188 and 132). The proposed changes in the submittal dated October 19, 2006, were subsequently identified by FPL as items that create internal inconsistencies and that should have been included within the scope of the previous submittals and the NRC SE.

4. The proposed changes would also make other miscellaneous typographical corrections.

The proposed revisions relate to an incorrect date for a listed NRC letter, deletion of TS references, and discrepancies between TS Table 5.7-1 and UFSAR Table 3.9-2.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The regulatory requirements for items that must be included in the TSs are contained within Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 36, Technical Specifications. Specifically, the TSs include items in the following five categories: safety limits and limiting safety systems settings and control settings, limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, design features, and administrative controls.

Four criteria provided in 10 CFR 50.36(d)(2)(ii) are used to determine if an item should be included within the TSs. Items satisfying any of the four criteria must be retained in the TSs; however, items not meeting any of the four criteria may be relocated from the TSs to a licensee-controlled document. The four criteria for determining the items required for inclusion in the TSs are listed below:

Criterion 1: Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Criterion 2: A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Criterion 3: A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or present a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Criterion 4: A structure, system or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

The first and fourth set of changes proposed by FPL fall under 10 CFR 50.36(d)(5),

Administrative Controls, which requires that TSs include ... provisions relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, review and audit, and reporting necessary to

assure operation of the facility in a safe manner. The NRC staff considered the regulatory requirements contained in this section of 10 CFR 50.36 to establish that the proposed changes are administrative in nature and are meant to achieve consistency in statements and requirements, as well as meant to remove discrepancies and errors currently existing due to not previously incorporating the NRC staff approved changes in all applicable sections of the TSs.

The regulatory guidance that the staff considered in its review of the second and third set of changes proposed by FPL included:

1. NUREG-1432, Standard Technical Specifications Combustion Engineering Plants, Revision 3, which contains model standard technical specifications (STSs) that provide guidance for plant specific TS improvements. Use of this document was considered an improvement over NUREG-1432, Revision 2, which was used as a guidance document in the approved Amendment Nos. 184 and 127, dated August 30, 2002, to the TSs for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.

2. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) TS Task Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF-51, Revise Containment Requirements During Handling Irradiated Fuel and Core Alterations, Revision 2, which removed the TS applicability regarding operability of certain systems (containment penetrations, spent fuel pool and shield building ventilation, and containment isolation) when handling fuel that has decayed for a sufficient period of time such that dose consequences for the postulated fuel-handling accident (FHA) remain below the limits of limits of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 6.4, when these systems are not available.

As this safety evaluation addresses the impact of the proposed changes on previously analyzed design basis accident radiological consequences, the regulatory requirements on which the staff based its acceptance of the second and third set of changes proposed by FPL are the accident dose guidelines in 10 CFR 100.11, as supplemented by accident-specific criteria in Section 15 of the SRP, and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19 (GDC-19), Control Room, as supplemented by Section 6.4 of the SRP.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Changes Associated With the Relocation of TS Administrative Requirements to Licensee Controlled Programs 3.1.1 Basis and Background for Proposed Changes On November 21, 2003, the licensee proposed a change to the St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 TSs to relocate certain provisions of TS Section 6.0, Administrative Controls, to licensee controlled documents such as the TQAR and the UFSAR. The submittal justified relocating the administrative TS controls for the Facility Review Group (FRG), the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB), and record retention requirements to the TQAR. The NRC approved these changes in an SE dated March 11, 2004, for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 (TS Amendment Nos. 189 and 133).

FPL has subsequently identified several TS changes that should have been implemented within the scope of the original submittal and NRC SE. These specific changes are:

1. Both units have TS requirements associated with FRG responsibilities. The FRG and its responsibilities have been relocated to the TQAR. Therefore, FPL proposes to revise the following TSs to delete references to the FRG and FRG responsibilities that now reside in the FPL TQAR:

a. Unit 2 TS Table 3.3-1 ACTION 2a will be revised to delete the requirement to review the desirability of maintaining inoperable reactor protection system (RPS) channels in the bypass condition in accordance with TS 6.5.1.6m. TS 6.5.1.6m was a review function of the FRG that was relocated to the TQAR.

b. TS Table 3.3-3 ACTION 14a (Unit 1), ACTION 13 (Unit 2), and ACTION 20a (Unit 2) will be revised to delete the requirement to review the desirability of maintaining inoperable engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) channels in the bypass condition in accordance with TS 6.5.1.6m. TS 6.5.1.6m was a review function of the FRG that was relocated to the TQAR.

c. TS 6.13.2 for both units will be revised to delete the relocated FRG review and acceptance functions associated with changes to the Process Control Program.

d. TS 6.14.2 for both units will be revised to delete the relocated FRG review and acceptance functions associated with changes to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

2. Both units have requirements associated with CNRB audit functions for the programs listed in TS 6.8.4. TS 6.8.4 for both units will be revised to delete the reference to program audit requirements by the CNRB.

3. Both units have FRG, CNRB, and corporate officer review functions for REPORTABLE EVENTS that have been relocated to the TQAR. TS 6.6.1.b for both units will be revised to delete these relocated review functions.

4. Both units have requirements associated with TS record retention. TS record retention requirements were relocated to the TQAR. Therefore, FPL proposes to revise the TSs listed below to delete the record retention requirements:

a. Unit 1 TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.10.g will be revised to delete the requirement for record retention associated with Snubber Service Life Monitoring.

b. Unit 2 TS SR 4.7.9.h will be revised to delete the requirement for record retention associated with the Snubber Seal Replacement Program.

c. TS 6.13.1 for both units will be revised to delete the requirements for record retention associated with the Process Control Program.

d. TS 6.14.1 for both units will be revised to delete the requirements for record retention associated with the ODCM.

The licensee stated that these changes are justified by the original November 21, 2003, submittal and the March 11, 2004, NRC SE for the relocation of TS administrative requirements

to licensee controlled documents. FPL further stated that these changes are within the scope of NRC guidance on the relocation of TS provisions that are not specifically required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5), and not otherwise necessary in the TSs for the safe operation of the plant, from the plant license to licensee controlled documents.

This NRC position was provided in amendments to 10 CFR 50.36, Final Rule, Technical Specifications, 60 FR 36593 (July 19, 1995), NUREG-1432, dated April 1995, and Administrative Letter (AL) 95-06, Relocation of Technical Specification Administrative Controls Related to Quality Assurance, issued on December 12, 1995. AL 95-06 provides specific guidance for relocating TS provisions of reviews and audits, procedure review processes, and records and records retention to the Quality Assurance (QA) Plan.

According to FPL, the deletion of the TS required FRG review functions associated with extended bypass conditions and changes to the Process Control Program and ODCM is further justified by the NRC approved TSTF-76, Remove References to the Onsite Review Function, Revision 1. TSTF-76 states that the STSs have no requirements for onsite review of bypassed protective channels and changes to the ODCM, and that the onsite review committee review and audit functions may be relocated to licensee controlled documents.

The onsite review function for changes to the Process Control Program is not specifically mentioned in TSTF-76, but elimination of the TS review function meets the intent of reviews relocated to and governed by licensee controlled documents. As stated earlier, St. Lucie's onsite review functions were previously relocated to the TQAR, and these changes should have been within the scope of the original FPL submittal on administrative TS changes.

In addition, the licensee stated that the audit requirements for the programs listed in TS 6.8.4 have been relocated to licensee controlled documents such as the TQAR and/or other QA procedures. Consistent with the STSs, the audit requirement for TS required programs can be removed from the TSs. These changes should have been within the scope of the original FPL submittal on administrative TS changes.

3.1.2 Staff Evaluation The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees regulatory and technical analyses in support of the changes outlined above and agrees with FPL that the proposed TS revisions are solely administrative in nature.

As previously approved in the NRC SE dated March 11, 2004, the TS sections to be relocated do not satisfy the 10 CFR 50.36(d)(2)(ii) criteria and may be relocated to other licensee controlled documents, specifically the FPL TQAR for the St. Lucie Plant. These changes are, therefore, justified by the original submittal and the staff SE for the relocation of TS administrative requirements to a licensee controlled document.

In addition, the proposed changes to delete any reference to the FRG, CNRB, and the record retention requirements do not affect the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(d)(5) and are solely administrative in nature. On the basis of the above regulatory and technical evaluations, as well as the licensees justification for the TS changes, the NRC staff concludes that the licensees proposed TS changes are administrative or editorial in nature, to remove inconsistencies and errors, and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.2 Changes Associated With TS Revisions Concerning Recently Irradiated Fuel 3.2.1 Changes to the Limiting Condition for Operation for the Containment Isolation System FPL proposed a revision to TS 3.9.9, Containment Isolation System (CIS), for both units such that the action associated with the containment isolation system being inoperable will allow either the immediate suspension of all operations involving movement of recently irradiated fuel in the containment, or closure of each of the containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere.

For both units, the CIS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.9 will read:

3.9.9 The containment isolation system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

ACTION:

With the containment isolation system inoperable, either suspend all operations involving movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment or close each of the penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere.

(Note that the underlined portion of the ACTION denotes the words added that constitute the change to the LCO) 3.2.1.1 Background On May 23, 2002, the licensee submitted a license amendment request for a proposed change to the St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 TS 3.9.9 to incorporate line item improvements associated with the handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in accordance with NUREG-1432, Revision 2, and TSTF-51, Revision 2. The NRC staff approved the TS changes for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 as TS Amendment Nos. 184 and 127, dated August 30, 2002. The licensee has since identified TS changes that should have been included within the scope of the original submittal for both units. The proposed changes would correct this inadvertent omission.

3.2.2.2 Technical and Regulatory Evaluation TSTF-51, Revision 2, includes an ACTION associated with the refueling containment penetration TSs to immediately suspend all operations involving movement of recently irradiated fuel in the containment or isolate the affected penetration flow paths. As the licensee stated in its October 19, 2006, submittal, there is no counterpart TS contained in NUREG-1432 that parallels with the St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 TS 3.9.9, Containment Isolation System.

The previously approved St. Lucie TS Amendment Nos. 184 and 127 to the LCO for TS 3.9.9s applicability met the intent of TSTF-51. However, the action to immediately suspend all operations involving movement of recently irradiated fuel in the containment was not included as

part of these amendments. Amending TS 3.9.9 for both units as the licensee proposes aligns the TS with the Conditions and Required Actions of TS 3.3.6.1 contained in TSTF-51.

Succinctly, the licensees application adds the proposed action of either suspend all operations involving movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment or to TS 3.9.9. The licensees request to change TS 3.9.9 is justified because the proposed revision is consistent with the actions proposed for inoperable containment penetrations during refueling operations in TSTF-51 and, therefore, meets the intent of TSTF-51, Revision 2, which has been approved by the NRC staff. Based on these considerations, the NRC staff finds the proposed changes to TS 3.9.9 for both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 acceptable.

3.2.2 Changes to the Surveillance Requirements of Table 4.3-3 FPL proposed a revision to TS Table 4.3-3, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, for both units to change the modes in which the surveillance is applicable from Mode 6 to During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. This change is consistent with the current TS requirement for CIS operability.

For both units, line item 1.b in Table 4.3-3 will be changed as follows: the 6 in the MODES IN (FOR) WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED column will be replaced with ***. The following footnote will be added at the bottom of the table on page 3/4 3-24 for Unit 1 and on page 3/4 3-28 for Unit 2: *** During movement of recently irradiated fuel within containment.

3.2.2.1 Background On September 18, 2003, the licensee submitted a license amendment request for a proposed change to the St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 TSs. This proposed change was submitted to resolve inconsistencies in the radiation monitoring TSs related to the previously approved TS Amendment Nos. 184 and 127, dated August 30, 2002. The proposed TS amendments of September 18, 2003, changed the LCO applicability for the CIS radiation monitors from Mode 6 to During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment in TS Table 3.3-6 for both units. The NRC approved the change in the LCO applicability for the CIS radiation monitors in an SE for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 dated September 27, 2005 (TS Amendment Nos. 197 and 139). However, the modes for the CIS radiation monitor surveillance applicability were not changed in TS Table 4.3-3 as part of these TS amendments. The proposed changes would correct this inadvertent omission.

3.2.2.2 Technical and Regulatory Evaluation As a result of TS LCO changes associated with St. Lucie Unit 1 TS Amendment Nos. 184 and 197, the LCO applicability associated with the CIS radiation monitors has been revised in TS Table 3.3-6. Similarly, as a result of TS LCO changes associated with St. Lucie Unit 2 TS Amendment Nos. 127 and 139, the LCO applicability associated with the CIS radiation monitors has been revised in TS Table 3.3-6. The radiation monitors from both units send signals to the CIS to ensure that the containment isolation valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the respective containment.

The applicability for both units is currently identified as *** During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment in Table 3.3-6. However, the MODES IN (FOR)

WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED currently reads 6 in Table 4.3-3, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, for both units. Thus, the LCO requirements and the surveillance requirements for the same radiation monitoring instrumentation are inconsistent between these two TS tables.

Based on the guidance contained in SR 3.0.1 of NUREG-1432, the staff agrees with the licensee that the mode of applicability for the SRs of line item 1.b in Table 4.3-3 should match the mode of applicability for the LCO of line item 1.b in Table 3.3-6 for both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds the proposed changes to the surveillance requirements for the containment radiation area monitors contained in Table 4.3-3 to be acceptable for both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.

3.2.3 Potential Radiological Impacts of the Proposed Changes As described above, the NRC staff reviewed the assumptions and justification used by FPL to assess the radiological impacts of administrative changes to TS 3.9.9, Containment Isolation Systems and TS Table 4.3-3, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements. The staff finds that FPL used methods consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidance identified in Section 2.0 above. The staff finds, with reasonable assurance, that the licensees estimates of the exclusion area boundary, low-population zone, and control room doses will continue to comply with all regulatory criteria. Therefore, the proposed changes to TS 3.3.9 and TS Table 4.3-3 are acceptable with regard to the radiological consequences of postulated design basis accidents.

The postulated FHA is the only design basis accident potentially impacted by the proposed changes to TS requirements associated with the handling of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

The staff has determined that the FHA radiological consequence analysis that was approved in St. Lucie TS Amendment Nos. 184 and 127 is not affected by the proposed TS changes.

Therefore, the radiological consequence analyses for the postulated FHA previously performed by the licensee for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 remain bounding for the proposed TS changes in this license amendment request. The staff has reasonable assurance that the radiological consequences of the postulated FHA would be well within the dose guideline values specified in 10 CFR Part 100 for offsite doses and within the dose acceptance criteria specified in SRP Section 6.4, and GDC-19 for the control room.

3.3 Changes Associated With the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) Trip/Bypass Requirements 3.3.1 Basis and Background for Proposed Changes In a submittal dated October 18, 2001, as superseded by a submittal dated July 18, 2002, FPL proposed a change to the St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 TSs to limit the period of time that an inoperable AFAS input channel could be in the bypass and/or tripped condition. As discussed in the submittal, placing an AFAS channel in indefinite trip is not appropriate because an additional single failure would result in the feeding of a faulted steam generator. The TS change involved placing a limit on the amount of time an AFAS channel could be in trip, at which time the

affected channel would be placed in bypass. The NRC approved these changes in an SE dated September 30, 2003, for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 (TS Amendment Nos. 188 and 132).

FPL has subsequently identified several TS changes that remove internal inconsistencies that should have been implemented within the scope of the original submittal and NRC SE. These specific changes are:

1. Action Statement 2 of St. Lucie Unit 1 TS Table 3.3-1 for RPS requires that an inoperable steam generator (SG) level channel, and all related functional units, be placed in the tripped condition after 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. However, Action Statement 14 of Table 3.3-3 for AFAS would require that an inoperable SG level channel, and all related functional units, be placed in the bypassed condition after 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

FPL proposes to resolve this discrepancy by modifying Action Statement 2.b to simply state: Within one hour, all functional units receiving an input from the inoperable channel are also bypassed or tripped. The portion of the Action Statement concerning placed in the same condition ... as that required by a. above for the inoperable channel would be deleted.

2. Action Statements 9.b & 14.b for St. Lucie Unit 1 TS Table 3.3-3 for ESFAS have the identical wording of RPS Action Statement 2.b. The same condition requirement contained in the existing action statement wording creates the same discrepancy for inoperable SG level and pressure channels as that described above.

FPL proposes to resolve this discrepancy by modifying Action Statements 9.b and 14.b to simply state: Within one hour, all functional units receiving an input from the inoperable channel are also bypassed or tripped. The portion of the action statement concerning placed in the same condition ... as that required by a. above for the inoperable channel would be deleted.

3. Action Statement 10.b for St. Lucie Unit 1 TS Table 3.3-3 for ESFAS has the identical wording of RPS Action Statement 2.b. Action Statement 10.b is only applicable to an inoperable containment pressure channel. Although containment pressure is used in multiple functional units, the same condition requirement contained in the existing action statement wording does not create any discrepancy between equally applicable action statements. However, this action statement would be revised to be consistent with Action Statements 2.b (RPS), 9.b (ESFAS) and 14.b (ESFAS).

4. Action Statement 14.a (Unit 1) and 20.a (Unit 2) to TS Table 3.3-3 for ESFAS is applicable to the following auxiliary feedwater (FW) instrument channels:

a. SG level channels used for AFAS actuation

b. SG differential pressure (DP) channels used for AFAS isolation

c. FW header DP channels used for AFAS isolation As currently written, these action statements require that If the inoperable channel can not be restored to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, then both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition. This requirement is appropriate for the DP measurement channels used for AFAS isolation. However, the

requirement to bypass both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 for an inoperable SG level channel is not appropriate, and is also not consistent with existing definitions of which functional units are associated with which process measurement channels.

FPL proposes to resolve this discrepancy by adding an additional sentence to these action statements to differentiate between the functional unit bypass requirements for inoperable SG level and DP channels. The new sentence specifically added for SG level will read as follows: If an inoperable SG Level channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, then AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 as applicable in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition. The existing sentence will be annotated with a measurement channel applicability qualifier as follows: If an inoperable SG DP or FW Header DP channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, then both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition.

The licensee stated that the changes outlined above are justified by the following:

1. Certain measurement channel parameters are utilized by multiple protection system functions. The purpose of the action statement is limited to providing redundant assurance that required mitigating actions are implemented for all affected protection system functions in the event of a measurement channel failure. In the event of a measurement channel failure, each RPS and ESFAS action statement applicable to that parameter will be independently entered into and complied with.

2. It is inappropriate for the action statement to dictate the required condition (bypassed or tripped) of other affected functional unit(s) since the required condition is controlled by the action statements applicable for affected functional unit(s).

3. It is contradictory that the same condition be mandated for all applicable functional units. This same condition requirement implies that the safe condition for all functional units associated with a given measurement parameter is the tripped condition (which was correct prior to TS Amendment Nos. 188 and 132). However, the July 18, 2002, submittal demonstrated that bypass, rather than trip, is the most conservative condition for AFAS functional units in the event of an inoperable channel.

Consequently, inclusion of the words same condition create a conflict between the requirements of AFAS functional unit end states (i.e., bypass) and the requirements of RPS functional unit end states (i.e., tripped) for an inoperable SG level or pressure channel.

4. Equivalent St. Lucie Unit 2 action statements do not include this same condition requirement. In addition, the proposed wording of the revised action statements closely resembles the existing wording of equivalent St. Lucie Unit 2 action statements.

5. The action statements applicable to inoperable AFAS measurement channels were extensively revised in response to two separate postulated failure scenarios that could compromise the AFAS rupture detection/isolation logic. The first scenario was identified as the indefinite trip scenario, and the remedy imposed by TS Amendment Nos. 188 and 132 was to limit the amount of time that an AFAS channel could remain in the tripped condition. There is no residual discrepancy associated with this portion of the TSs.

The second scenario was identified as the indefinite bypass scenario, where in response to a DP measurement channel failure only one of the two AFAS functional units (i.e.,

either AFAS-1 or AFAS-2) was bypassed. This precondition, in conjunction with a single failure of a second DP channel and a FW header rupture event, could result in feeding a ruptured SG. The remedy imposed by TS amendments 188/132 was to specify that both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 must be bypassed in the inoperable channel.

Review of these scenarios, and the related justification for TS Amendment Nos. 188 and 132, show that the rationale for ensuring that both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 are bypassed is limited to failures involving the SG or FW DP channels, and not SG level channels.

3.3.2 Staff Evaluation The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees regulatory and technical analyses in support of the changes outlined above and agrees with FPL that the proposed TS revisions are solely administrative in nature in that they remove inconsistencies and errors within the TSs without compromising any assurance that the facility is being operated in a safe manner.

As the technical basis for these changes was previously approved in the NRC SE dated September 30, 2003, the proposed changes fall under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5) and may be treated as solely administrative in nature. On the basis of the above regulatory and technical evaluations, as well as the licensees justification for the TS changes, the NRC staff concludes that the licensees proposed TS changes are administrative or editorial in nature, to remove inconsistencies and errors, and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.4 Miscellaneous Typographical Corrections 3.4.1 Basis and Background for Proposed Changes FPL has proposed several revisions to correct miscellaneous typographical errors within the St. Lucie TSs. These specific changes are:

1. The St. Lucie Unit 1 License Condition 3.E for Fire Protection reflects an incorrect date for a listed NRC letter. The date in the current TS is listed as July 17, 1984, and should be changed to July 11, 1984. This change would be solely administrative.

2. The St. Lucie Unit 2 TS Table 5.7-1 incorrectly sets the upper bound for reactor coolant system (RCS) heatup and cooldown transients at 545° F. The St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR Table 3.9-2, Transients Used in Design and Fatigue Analysis, states that the upper bound for the 500 heatup and cooldown cycles during the design life of the plant is 532° F. The existing lifetime design heatup and cooldown count is not affected by this TS inaccuracy because plant procedures use the UFSAR designated upper bound for the design count. FPL proposes to correct TS Table 5.7-1 as an administrative change.

Additionally, the table has several other typographical errors that are being corrected as administrative changes, including:

a. The table uses the word heat instead of heatup in the design 500 pressurizer heatup and cooldown cycles discussion.

b. The table uses the word critically instead of criticality in the design 200 leak testing cycles discussion.

c. There is an extraneous period in the design 40 turbine trip cycles discussion.

3.4.2 Staff Evaluation The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees proposed changes as outlined above, and agrees with FPL that the proposed TS revisions are solely administrative in nature. The staff finds that the licensee has adequately addressed the need to revise the TSs to correct the NRC letter date, adjust the upper bound for RCS heatup and cooldown transients, and make typographical revisions to TS Table 5.7-1. The proposed changes do not affect the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5), and do not affect the ability of the facility to operate in a safe manner.

Accordingly, the staff finds that the proposed TSs changes are solely administrative in nature and finds the changes acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon a letter dated May 2, 2003, from Michael N. Stephens of the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, to Brenda L. Mozafari, Senior Project Manager, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the State of Florida does not desire notification of issuance of license amendments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments relate to changes in record keeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (72 FR 00153, dated January 3, 2007). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: Iqbal Ahmed DyLanne Duvigneaud David Nold Jason Paige Date: October 22, 2007