ML061450546

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Revised Augmented Inspection Team Charter
ML061450546
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/25/2006
From: Travers W
Region 2 Administrator
To: Moorman J
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB
References
Download: ML061450546 (4)


Text

May 25, 2006 MEMORANDUM TO: James H. Moorman, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety FROM: William D. Travers, Regional Administrator /RA/

SUBJECT:

REVISED AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM CHARTER An Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was established on May 23, 2006, for Catawba Nuclear Station to inspect and assess the facts surrounding a loss of offsite power (LOSP) and subsequent dual unit reactor trip at Catawba on or around May 20, 2006.

The team composition and the objectives of the inspection are unchanged. However, the enclosed charter has been revised to clarify and expand on the actions to be accomplished by Item e to assess the implications of a common cause failure of the emergency diesel generators due to external flooding.

For the period during which you are leading this inspection and documenting the results, you will report directly to me. The guidance in Inspection Procedure 93800, Augmented Inspection Team, and Management Directive 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Program, applies to your inspection.

If you have any questions regarding the objectives of the enclosed revised charter, contact Charles A. Casto at (404) 562-4500.

Enclosure:

AIT Charter Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 CONTACT: D. Charles Payne, RPB1/DRP 404-562-4540

___ML061450546 OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:ORA SIGNATURE DCP CAC1 LRP NAME CPayne CCasto LPlisco DATE 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 6/ /2006 6/ /2006 6/ /2006 6/ /2006 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Memo to James H. Moorman from William D. Travers dated May 25, 2006.

SUBJECT:

REVISED AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM CHARTER Distribution:

cc: W. Kane, OEDO S. Lee, OEDO J. Dyer, NRR C. Haney, NRR R. Martin, NRR R. Zimmerman, NSIR L. Plisco, RII C. Casto, RII V. McCree, RII

REVISED AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) CHARTER CATAWBA LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND DUAL UNIT REACTOR TRIP Basis for the Formation of the AIT - On May 20, 2006, an electrical fault occurred apparently causing several power circuit breakers (PCB) to open in the Catawba switchyard. This fault apparently caused several other PCBs to open resulting in a loss of offsite power (LOSP) and trip of both Catawba reactors. In accordance with Management Directive 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Program, deterministic and conditional risk criteria were used to evaluate the level of NRC response for this operational event. The review concluded that the circumstances of the event met the MD 8.3 deterministic criteria due to an apparent single electrical failure causing a loss of offsite power to both operating units and reactor trips. The risk review indicated the CCDP for the event met the criterion for an Augmented Inspection. Subsequently, Region II determined that the appropriate level of NRC response was the conduct of an Augmented Inspection.

This Augmented Inspection is chartered to identify the circumstances surrounding this event and review the licensees actions following discovery of the conditions.

Objectives of the AIT - The objectives of the inspection are to: (1) review the facts surrounding the LOSP on May 20, 2006, and related plant complications; (2) assess the licensees response and investigation of the event; (3) identify any generic issues associated with the event; and (4) conduct an independent extent of condition review.

To accomplish these objectives, the following will be performed:

a. Develop a complete sequence of events, including applicable management decision points, from the time the LOSP occurred until both units were stabilized.
b. Identify and evaluate the effectiveness of the immediate actions taken by the licensee in response to this event including the accuracy and timeliness of the licensees classification of the event.
c. Identify additional actions planned by the licensee in response to this event, including the time line for their completion of the investigation and follow-on analysis.
d. Assess the circumstances surrounding the multiple lifting and reseat of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 primary power operated relief valves.
e. Determine if there are any generic issues related to this event which warrant an additional NRC response. As part of this review, assess the implications of a common cause failure of the emergency diesel generators due to external flooding. Promptly communicate any potential generic issues to regional management.
f. Document the inspection findings and conclusions in an inspection report within 30 days of the inspection.

Revised: 5/25/06 Enclosure