Similar Documents at Hatch |
---|
Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24009A1112024-01-0909 January 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch 1&2 LAR - Revise TS 3.7.1 & 3.7.2 to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times for RHRSW and Psw Systems (L-2023-LLA-0169) ML23354A2032023-12-18018 December 2023 Document Request for Hatch Nuclear Plant - Radiation Protection Inspection - Inspection Report 2024-01 ML23264A0142023-09-14014 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Draft Round-2 RAI - Hatch, Units 1 and 2, Revise TS 1.1-1 Modes LAR ML23249A2082023-09-0606 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Change in Estimated Review Schedule and Level of Effort for Hatch 'Revise TS Table 1.1-1 (Modes)' LAR (L-2022-LLA-0120) ML23223A0142023-08-10010 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - SNC Fleet Exemption to 10 CFR 73.2, Physical Barriers ML23198A1552023-07-17017 July 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - for Your Action - Request for Additional Information (RAI) - Hatch, Farley, and Vogtle, Units 1 and 2 Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) Submittal Dated June 15, 2023 ML23135A0922023-05-11011 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - SNC Fleet Request to Use Specific Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME BPV Code, Section XI (L-2023-LLR-0016) ML23073A0252023-03-13013 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Fyi - Closeout the Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Reviews for SNC Fleet ML23065A0922023-03-0505 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Revised Estimate Hours and Completion Date - Hatch RPV Head Closure Bolts LAR (L-2022-LLA-0120) ML23033A0952023-02-0202 February 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Re for Your Comments - State of Georgia - Hatch Units 1 and 2 - Relax Required Number of Fully Tensioned Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Closure Studs ML23033A0282023-01-30030 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Revised Estimates for Hatch RPV Studs LAR ML23026A0132023-01-19019 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Revised Estimates for Hatch RPV Studs LAR ML23018A1872023-01-17017 January 2023 2023 HNP CGD Inspection Information Request ML23006A0662023-01-0505 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) for Your Comments - State of Georgia - Hatch Units 1 and 2 - Revise NFPA-805 License Amendment Request ML22355A2082022-12-21021 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - Hatch, Units 1 and 2, Reactor Pressure Vessel 'Rpv Head Studs' LAR ML23006A0252022-12-13013 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) for Your Comments - State of Georgia - Hatch Units 1 and 2 - TSTF-208 License Amendment Request ML22341A1212022-12-0606 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Recap of Takeaways from Hatch Audit on Dec 1, 2022 ML23026A2372022-11-16016 November 2022 2023001 Hatch RP RFI Final ML22305A7032022-11-0101 November 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Potential Audit for Hatch'S 'Rpv Head Studs' LAR ML22258A1532022-09-15015 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch Closure Studs in TS Table 1.1-1 Modes LAR (L-2022-LLA-0120) ML22251A1322022-09-0808 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Fyi - Hatch TSTF-505 LAR ML22208A1332022-07-26026 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - Hatch, Units 1 and 2, TSTF-208 LAR ML22207B8532022-07-25025 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - RCI - Hatch, Units 1 and 2, Revision to NFPA-805 LAR ML22157A3552022-06-0606 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Revised Estimates - Hatch TSTF-505 LAR ML22157A3542022-06-0606 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - Hatch, Units 1 and 2, TSTF-505 LAR ML22140A1192022-05-20020 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - RAIs - Hatch, Units 1 and 2, TSTF-505 LAR ML22138A4122022-05-18018 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch TSTF-208 LAR (L-2022-LLA-0045) ML22140A1182022-05-13013 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - for Your Action: Hatch TSTF-505 - Follow Up from Audit Question 12 ML22116A1492022-04-26026 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch Revise NFPA 805 LAR (L-2022-LLF-0000) ML22055A6652022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch TSTF-580 LAR (L-2022-LLA-0022) ML22018A0272022-01-18018 January 2022 2022 All RFI Responses - Exercise and Program Inspections - Revl ML21357A0912021-12-23023 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch TSTF-207-A LAR (L-2021-LLA-0219) ML21354A5942021-12-20020 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch TSTF-227 and TSTF-297 LAR (L-2021-LLA-0227) ML21347A8532021-12-13013 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Required: Hatch TSTF-505 LAR - Audit Plan - Additional Documents to Be Uploaded to the Portal ML21347A9002021-12-13013 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Updated Request: Additional Request for SNC to Place Document on the Portal ML21363A0872021-12-0606 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Question - Hatch - Eliminate Automatic Main Steam Line Isolation on High Turbine Building Area Temperature (L-2021-LLA-0188) ML21321A3812021-11-16016 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch TSTF-505 LAR (L-2021-LLA-0199) ML21306A3272021-11-0202 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Hatch Eliminate Ms Line Isolation on High Turbine Building Area Temperature LAR (L-2021-LLA-0188) ML21292A1562021-10-19019 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - SNC Operating Fleet TSTF-554 LAR ML21265A3402021-09-22022 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Hatch, Unit 1, Emergency TS 3.7.2 LAR ML21253A1992021-09-10010 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Clarification Call Summary - Hatch Pre-Submittal Meeting TSTF-505 LAR ML21174A1182021-06-23023 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - SNC Fleet - Remove Table of Contents LAR (L-2021-LLA-0115) ML21132A0132021-05-11011 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - SNC Fleet QATR Reduction in Commitment Licensing Action - L-2021-LLQ-0002 ML21111A3032021-04-21021 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - Hatch Unit 2 - One-Time Emergency RHR LAR (L-2020-LRO-0068) ML21110A6842021-04-20020 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - Hatch Unit 2 - One-Time Emergency RHR LAR (L-2020-LRO-0068) ML21105A0132021-04-14014 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - SNC Fleet LAR to Change TS 5.7, High Radiation Area (L-2021-LLA-0052) ML20338A3472020-12-0202 December 2020 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML20318A0212020-11-12012 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Fyi - Acceptance Review - SNC Fleet TSTF-541 LAR (L-2020-LLA-0232) ML20293A0752020-10-14014 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - RAIs for SNC Fleet EP LAR (L-2020-LLA-0150 and L-2020-LLA-0151) ML20258A0272020-09-11011 September 2020 Acceptance Review - Hatch TSTF-582 LAR (EPID L-2020-LLA-0194) (e-mail) 2024-01-09
[Table view] |
See also: IR 05000366/2003006
Text
Charles H. gle - MOw: ht-i: ri-amnfl r-ri -umi :u-,ooiu31-uo-u0 , II
From: Caswell Smith
To: Charles Ogle; Charlie Payne; Kathleen O'Donohue' 2Z
Date: 12/11/03 7:21AM
Subject: Fwd: RE: Hatch TFPI "URI 50-366103-06-060
More info from Ken per my request.
I/\
arles . Oe RE: Hatch TFPI 'URI 50-366/03-06-06' raye I
.. . .
From: "Sullivan, Kenneth <ks~bnl.gov>
To: "'Caswell Smith'" <CFS1 @nrc.gov>
Date: 12/9103 4:14PM
Subject: RE: Hatch TFPI "URI 50-366/03-06-06"
Caswell
IN GENERAL: IF the postulated circuit failure would have a direct impact on
the operation of the credited SSD system the circuits are considered
REQUIRED CIRCUITS and must be provided with protection per III.G.2.
For a fire in FA 2104 (East Cableway) the Hatch SSAR credits the use of SSD
Path 1. Path 1 utilizes RCIC and S/RVs to provide eactor protection via
depressurization, inventory makeup, and decay heat removal. One S/RV should
be opened to begin depressurization before the reactor water level reaches
level 8 (approximately 2 1/2 hours). RCIC should be operated to aintain RPV
inventory between RPV water level 3 and 8 until the RCS is within the LPCI
operability pressure range of pproximately 135 psig (approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
into the event), at which time an additional S/RV will be opened to initiate
the alternate shutdown cooling mode of operation (ASDC).
As stated in Table 3.1-2 - The required Safe Shutdown Mode for the SRVs is
CLOSED Except for SRVs B21 -F01 3G and B21 -F01 3H which are required to be
operable in order to manually depressurize the RPV. Two S/RVs are required
to remain manually operable. - If all SRVs open then this criterion is
obvioulsy not met.
In addition, motive power for the RCIC pump Is provided by the RCIC turbine
which is driven by steam from the reactor. Therefore, In addition to other
concerns, the spurious opening of all SRVs (due to fire damage to circuits
ABE019CO8 and ABE019CO9) would impact the credited SSD (Path 1) by causing a
loss of motive steam to RCIC.
If RCIC was the only makeup system credited in the SSAR the SRV circuits
shoudl be considered as REQUIRED CIRCUITS and protected per III.G.2.
However, the SSAR does recognize the potential for this event (spurious
opening of all SRVs) and describes methods to prevent occurrence (open
liinks) or mitigate its impact on the SSD capability (use of Core Spray Loop
A). IF: the opening of links was shown to be an effective method of
preventing occurrence and/or CS Loop A was demonstrated (by documented
analysis) to be available and capable of mitigating this event I would not
have any concerns. However, I am not sure that this Is the case. At the
time of the inspection we questioned both the licensing basis and technical
adequacy/feasibility of manual actions to prevent this occurrence and we
were not provided with any objective evidence which demonstrated that CS was
capable of mitigating this event.
hope this helps -
Ken
Original Message-----
From: Caswell Smith [mailto:CFS1 @nrc.govJ
Sent: Thursday, December 04, 2003 7:58 AM
To: Sullivan, Kenneth
Subject: Hatch TFPI "URI 50-366/03-06-06"
l
harles R. Oale - RE: HatchTFPI 'GRI 50-366/03-06-06
Hi, Ken I am working on the licensee's response to our Inspection findings
and I have a question. The licensee claims that the 4-20 milli-amp
instrument circuits are not required for the SRVs to perform their design
function and are therefore associated circuits.
The logic developed by these circuits, however, are used in the 125 VDC
Class I E control circuit of of the SRVs which are required post-fire safe
shutdown equipment.
The licensee claims that this circuit is made up of two parts, one part is
the required circuit which implements the required Appendix R manual opertor
action . The other part is not rquired for Appendix R functions, and
implements the backup over-pressure protection for the nuclear boiler.
I totally disagree with this definition of an electrical circuit which is
not consistent with the definition given in IEEE 100-1977, IEEE Standard
Dictionary of Electrical and Electronic Terms.
Based on your vast experience of Appendix R regulations, can the circuit of
a required post fire safe shutdown equipment used for establishing hot
shutdown conditions be classified this way?
Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2, requires that the circuits of required post
fire safe shutdown equipment be protected from fire damage. Are the
instrument circuits required circuits and should they have been protected in
accordance with this regulatory requirement?
I would appreciate your comments, Thanks
I would appreciate your interpretation of this