ML043640167

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Changes to the Emergency Response Plan and Implementing Procedures
ML043640167
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/16/2004
From: Roach E
Constellation Energy Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML043640167 (24)
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Text

.. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Constellation Generation Group, LLC Lusby, Maryland 20657 Constellation Energy Group December 16, 2004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Docket No. 72-8 Changes to the Emergency Response Plan and Implementing Procedures As required by 10 CFR Part 50.54(q), 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, V, "Implementing Procedures,"

10 CFR 72.44(f), and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(5), changes to the Emergency Response Plan and Implementing Procedures are enclosed.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact me at 410-495-4974.

Very truly yours, E. H. Roach Director - Emergency Preparedness EHR/CAN/bjd Enclosure(s): ERPIP-601, Revision 2, Change I cc: S. J. Collins, NRC (two copies)

Resident Inspector, NRC (one copy)

(Without Enclosure)

J. Petro, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. V. Guzman, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR ale5

I CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TECHNICAL PROCEDURE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS REVISION 2 Safety-Related X Non-Safety-Related CONTINUOUS USE Read each step before performing action Effective Date: Aug. 23, 2002 Kevin J. Nietmann Approved:

Plant General Manager Date

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 C_ _ _ Page 2 of 23 RECORD OF REVISIONS AND CHANGES Rev. Chg. Summary of Revision and Changes 2 0 Procedure upgraded to meet the format and content requirements of the Technical Procedures Writer's Manual.

Added information and procedure flow diagram steps in response to Interim Compensatory Measure requirement B.5.b. This is basis captured as [B-1].

2 04-180 Editorial corrections:

  • Changed references from Emergency Planning to Emergency Preparedness throughout procedure (result of TQPC). Change bars have not been used to identify these changes.
  • Appendix B, Picoammeter Set-Up; itshould read: Appendix B, Picoammeter (Reactimeter) Set-Up.
  • Appendix B: corrected coax cables to coax cable S.
  • Appendix B, page 2: the 7th bullet states following:

Connecting, at the Reactimeter,

1. Cable 1PTPU (2PTPU) to Ion Chamber Input NI-X-L
2. Cable IPTPV (2PTPV) to Ion Chamber Input NI-X-U This has now been changed to:

Connecting, at the Reactimeter,

1. Cable 1PTPW (2PTPW) to Ion Chamber Input NI-Y-L.
2. Cable 1PTPX (2PTPX) to Ion Chamber Input NI-Y-U.
a. ENSURE the picoammeter output (picoammeter logarithmic output) is connected to reactimeter analog input (Al-1).
3. Updated reference to PSTP-23, Physics Test Equipment Hookup.

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ........................... 5 2.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE ......................... 5 2.1 Responsibilities .......................... 5

3.0 REFERENCES

AND DEFINITIONS .......................... 5 3.1 Developmental References ........................... 5 3.2 Performance References .......................... 5 3.3 Definitions ....................... 6 6:

4.0 PREREQUISITES ....................... 6 4.1 Training and Qualification ........................ 6 5.0 PRECAUTIONS ...................... 6 6.0 PERFORMANCE ....................... 6 6.1 Activation ........................ 6 6.2 Process ....................... 6 6.3 Deactivation........................ 6 7.0 POST PERFORMANCE ACTIVITIES ........................... 6 8.0 BASES ........................... 7 9.0 RECORDS ........................... 7 ATTACHMENT 1, INSTRUCTIONAL FLOWCHART . . . 8 ATTACHMENT 2, DATA TABLE . . .10 ATTACHMENT 3, RCS FLOWCHART . . .11.

ATTACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT FLOWCHART . . . 13 ATTACHMENT 5, SFP FLOWCHART . . .16 ATTACHMENT 6, PLANT DAMAGE CONDITION MATRIX LOCATOR ... 17 APPENDIX A, IPE/IPEEE INSIGHTS . . . 18 APPENDIX B, PICOAMMETER SET-UP . . .22

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 4 of 23

,tRI~P 9F" . . rt,<.>X:=* 'v W,1 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Cumulative changes to this revision I (including EC's)

~PageNo

-1 - Change No2.Nll

,t
<-Page No' Caeg6No!~-Il g~age i P- g N6'-,<lCangeN33,

'-,!ChneN 1 21 2 04-180 22 04-180 3 23 04-180 4 04-180 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2

- .Page 5 of 23 1ERPIPm 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides emergency response instructions to Reactor Engineer, Technical Support Center Analyst, and Operations Analyst during the following events:

  • Site Emergency
  • General Emergency 2.0 :APPLICABILITY/SCOPE This procedure applies to the conduct of the Reactor Engineer, Technical Support Center Analyst, and the Operations Analyst.

Performance of this procedure is in the order of Activation (Section 6.1), Process (Section 6.2),

and Deactivation (Section 6.3).

2.1 Responsibilities A. The Reactor Engineer, Technical SupportCenter Analyst, and the Operations Analyst shall:

1. Perform severe accident management initial diagnosis according to this procedure.

3.0 REFERENCES

AND DEFINITIONS 3.1 Developmental References A. NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B. 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans C. 10 CFR 50 Appendix E to Part 50, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities D. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan E. PR-1-101, Preparation and Control of Calvert Cliffs Technical Procedures F. PR--1I 03, Use of Procedures G. Technical Procedures Writer's Manuial 3.2 Performance References A. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan B. PR-3-100, Records Management C. ERPIP-600, Severe Accident Management

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2' CS Page 6 of 23 3.3 Definitions Refer to ERPIP-600 for definitions applicable to this procedure.

4.0 PREREQUISITES 4.1 Training and Qualification A. Personnel performing this procedure shall be qualified on the tasks or activities contained in this procedure.

5.0 PRECAUTIONS A. Declared pregnant women and minors are not authorized to perform emergency functions.

6.0 PERFORMANCE 6.1 Activation A. A site emergency or general emergency has been declared.

6.2 Process A. IDENTIFY appropriate event from listing below, THEN GO TO the indicated attachment/appendix for instructions.

Attachment 1, Instructional Flowchart Attachment 2, Data Table Attachment 3, RCS Flowchart Attachment 4, Containment Flowchart Attachment 5, SFP Flowchart [B-1]

Attachment 6, Plant Damage Condition Matrix Locator Appendix A, IPEJIPEEE Insights Appendix B, Picoammeter Set-up 6.3 Deactivation A. Upon event termination, forward completed records to the Technical Support Center Director.

7.0 POST PERFORMANCE ACTIVITIES None

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Cur ".Z- s-sV>S, 8.0 BASES

[B-1] NRC Letter, Samuel J. Collins to Charles Cruse, Issuance of Orders for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plants Unit 1 and 2, February 25, 2002 (ICM order B.5.b) 9.0 RECORDS Records generated by this procedure may be permanent, non-permanent, or lifetime radiological records depending on the circumstances under which they are generated. Records shall be captured and controlled as follows:

A. During an actual event as described in the purpose statement of this procedure, records shall be considered permanent records and submitted to the Emergency Preparedness Unit for final disposition according to PR-3-1 00.

Attachment 2, Data Table B. During an actual event as described in the purpose statement of this procedure, dosimetry records, that is, any dose-related record including access history records, are considered radiological lifetime records and are to be handled and maintained according to standard practices and unit procedures.

C. During a drill or exercise, records generated shall be considered non-permanent records and submitted to the Emergency Preparedness Unit for evaluation.

  • Attachment 2, Data Table

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 8 of 23 ATTACHMENT 1, INSTRUCTIONAL FLOWCHART [B-1]

Page 1 of 2 n .g Begin ERPIP-601 /

Initial Diagnosis Yes=

Complete the First Enter "Not in a (Next) Column in Severe Accident" in No ERPIP-601, Att. 2, ERPIP-601, Aft. 2; v Data Table. Repeat Data Table for SFP approximately every l Enter SFP Diagnosis in 15 minutes. ERPIP-601, Aft. 2and Att. 6 Complete ERPIP-601, Aft. 3, RCS 1 4, Flowchartand Att. 5, SFP usingtheFlowchart ERPIPGo to ERPIP-612, using the ERPIP-2Da , SAM Candidate High AT. 2, Data Level Actions as Complete ERPIP 601, SevereAc tint No - Flowchart using the A Seer AccERPIP-601, Att.2, Date Table.

. Yes '

Enter "NSA" into the ERPIP-601, Aft. 2, Data Table for Plant Damage Condition Code.

f d review If desired, review If desired, .ni ERPP 11 ERPIP-601, Appendix ERPacIh-61asI,

-AA,, A.-f insgt in for insights in Attachments, Alternate Water for-rducing reuiglikelihood ofAlentWar Sources and Power

'core damage. Supplies

ERPIP-601

( SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 9 of 23 ATTACHMENT 1, INSTRUCTIONAL FLOWCHART [B-1]

Page 2 of 2

/

diagns l Go to ERPIP-602, reached for both No 0 Verification of ontainment an Diagnosis.

Yes Enter the RCS and Containment diagnoses into the ERPIP-601, Att. 2, Data Table s' Identify plant damage Verification of condition matrix Diagnoses No- location, ERPIP-601, esired? Att. 6.

Go to ERPIP-603-610, SAM Candidate High Level Actions

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2

< J Page 10 of 23 ATTACHMENT 2, DATA TABLE [B-1]

1. COLLECT data approximately every 15 minutes. Data can be obtained from the Plant Parameters Status board and/or the Plant Computer terminal in the Technical Support Center.
2. IF data is NOT available/NOT applicable, OR NOT reliable, THEN ENTER NA or NR."
3. ENSURE ALL cells in a column are completed.

DATE TIME Pressure (psig)

Temperature (OF)

Sump Level (in)

Hydrogen% (Dry) _

Pressure H2 is Combustible (CA-7)

Pressure (psia) = - = =___=

CET ( 0F) _ _ _ _ _ _

PORV Discharge (Tailpipe) Temp (°F)

RCS Subcooling (OF)

RCS Level above top of core? (YI/N)

(RVLMS 10" light off)

SG Level (in)

CST Level (ft) .

RWT Level (fl)

PZR Level (in) . =______

Excore Pico-Ammeter (hook-up per Appendix B of ERPIP-601)

Coolant F1ow' -'4 .r' >+ ~t @ >s F' .

  • $, s , T Si .,t <s AFW (gpm)

Safety Injection (gpm)

Charging (gpm)

Radiation:Levels - l^-"-'

-s,

'^A-jei N4;,J 4'tbi t+i; ,1v.... s1~;-~¢'j 'i Inside Containment (R/hr) _ _

Outside Containment (R/hr)

(Contact RAD for the 0.7 mile plume EDE)

SFP Water Level (fl)

  • Diagnosed Accidents;.Y' . t-:' W ...--

SG Tube Rupture? / Isolated?

Inter System LOCA? Isolated? .

RCS Damage Code Containment Damage Code SFP Damage Code

  • Notify te POM once a severe accident isdiagnosed; pri plant damage condition/applicable ERPIP.
  • Ensure this information is provided to the Control Room.

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 11 of 23 ATTACHMENT 3, RCS FLOWCHART Page 1 of 2 Evaluation of RCS If a question cannot be answered with a Condition "Yes" or "No" then the flowchart is complete and has provided "No Diagnosis."MWhen the flowchart is complete, return to the ERPIP 601, Att.

  • 1, Instruction flowchart.

p ~No I

/vsel wter lvel\

abov the topo Yes Consider that the RCS is Not in a Severe lo Accident (NSA)

No condition.

Consider that the RC'sA I is Not in a Severe Accident (NSA) condition.

Anti-core Melt Safety Functions:

- Reactivity Control

- RCS Pressure and Inventory Control

- Core and RCS Heat Removal

-'L ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 I) Page 12 of 23 ERPI.~~~V

=, S i .F7m @ ; VT.w ATTACHMENT 3, RCS FLOWCHART Page 2 of 2 If a qestion cannot be answered with a "Yes" or "No" then the flowchart is complete and provided "No Diagnosis." When complete, return to the ERPIP 601, Aft. 1, Instruction flowchart.

IHas there been a' recent, large rise in ex-core NI current?

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT-MANAGEMENT.INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2-Page 13 of 23

  • ATTACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT FLOWCHART I Pagel of 3

. .If a question cannot be answered with a "Yes" or "No" then the flowchart is complete and has provided "No

- ,Diagnosis." When the flowchart is

- complete, return to the ERPIP 601, Att. 1, Instructional flowchart.

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 14 of 23 ATTACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT FLOWCHART Page 2 of 3 If a question cannot be answered with a "Yes" or "No" then the flowchart is complete and provided "No Diagnosis."

When complete, return to the ERPIP 601, Att. 1, Instructional flowchart.

The Containment is Impaired (I).

.I

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 4, CONTAINMENT FLOWCHART Page 3 of 3 B C) If a question cannot be answered with a "Yes" or "No" then the flowchart is complete and has provided "No Diagnosis." When the flowchart is complete, return to the ERPIP 601, Aft. 1, Instructional flowchart.

r a s te07m Consider that the controlled No plume EDE less No Containmentis nti  ? Impaired (I).

Yesq Consider that the Containment is Closed and Cooled (CC).

Yes Consider that the Containment is Challenged (CH).

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 16 of 23 ATTACHMENT 5, SFP FLOWCHART [B-1]

Consider that the SFP is "Not in Severe Accident".

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 17 of 23 ATTACHMENT 6 ,PLANT DAMAGE CONDITION MATRIX LOCATOR [B-1]

1. IDENTIFY the plant damage condition in the following matrix using the RCS and Containment flowchart diagnosis.
2. INFORM the Technical Support Center-Director of the Plant Damage Condition.
a. If the core may go ex-vessel, hook-up the picoammeter according to Appendix B, Picoammeter Set-up.
3. IF the CNMNT is impaired or bypassed, THEN INFORM the Chemistry Director for assessment purposes.
4. RECORD RCS and Containment damage codes on Attachment 2, Data Table.

Containment Conditions Closed and Challenged Impaired Bypassed Cooled (CH) (I) (B)

Badly Damaged BD/CC BDICH BD/I BD/B RCS (BD) (ERPIP-603) (ERPIP-604) (ERPIP-605) (ERPIP-606)

Conditions Core debris Ex-vessel EX/CC EXICH EXII EXIB (EX) (ERPIP-607) (ERPIP-608) (ERPIP-609) (ERPIP-610)

SFP Fuel Condition Uncovered (ERPIP-612)

ERPIP-601

  • SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 18 of 23 WAP -IP'f 'T9; APPENDIX A, IPEIIPEEE INSIGHTS Page 1 of 4

SUMMARY

OF CCNPP LEVEL I RESULTS The CCPRA was examined to identify procedural improvements which would reduce the likelihood of core damage. These procedural improvements focus on preventative measures that provide a benefit in long term accident prevention. Recoveries and preventive measures which would be required in the short term (e.g. less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) would not be as effective in the SAMGs. Although short-term recoveries are not as effective in the SAMGs a few of the more risk significant preventive measures are identified. Of the long-term recovery related issues, the items listed below represent most of the risk for both internal and external events.

A. Short Term

1. Following the loss of 2-of-4 120 VAC vital buses on a single Unit, a spurious actuation of all the safety system will result. This includes AFAS, RPS, and ESFAS.' Some of the major consequences on this event are PORVs open, AFAS Block actuates, MFW is lost, and all major loads are shed. Consideration should be given to:
a. Opening'the AFW block valves
b. Overriding the PORVs closed (or using the block MOVs)
c. Tripping the SRW cooled DGs prior to a high temperature trip
d. Placing the SI pumps in pull-to-lock.
e. Starting SI pumps with a RAS present and a high primary system pressure could lead to the failure of all SI pumps
f. De-energizing the ESFAS cabinet and manually start necessary loads(IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.1b, pp 3.4.2-16 & 17)
2. If an operating turbine-driven AFW pump fails, the stand-by turbine driven AFW pump is available, no other secondary side heat removal is

'available; and the time to S/G'depletion' is relatively large, then consider the stand-by turbine driven pump'may be'suliject to the same failure

- mechanism as the operating turbine driven pump such as:

- a.' Air in the 12 CST feed line.

- b. Water slug in the steam admission lines.

c. Valve left in a bad position following AFW testing.

(IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.la, pp 3.4.2-14 & 15)

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 19 of 23 ERPIP' -.

APPENDIX A, IPEIIPEEE INSIGHTS Page 2 of 4

3. If a large fire exists on site, then consider placing the SWGR and CNTRL RM HVAC system in re-circulation.

(IPEEE, Section 4.6.7.1, pp 4-58 & 59)

B. Long Term

1. Following a small LOCA with a common cause failure of both Safety Injection recirculation headers (MOVs and check valves fail), prior to the RWT level reaching the RAS set point consider:
a. Providing additional inventory to the RWT
b. Consider reducing CS flow rates to extend RWT inventory
c. Discussing and/or staging the tools necessary to recover the failure of the re-circulation MOVs (IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.6, pp 3.4.2-27 & 28)
2. Following a LOCA where one or more ECCS Pump Room Coolers fail (e.g. due to the loss of the SW headers), consider running as few injection and spray related systems as possible to ensure the room heat load is reduced. Also ensure that the ECCS Pump Room ventilation fans are operating. For example, if both ECCS Coolers fail, but both HPSI pumps and CS pumps are available, then it may be prudent to only run a single HPSI pump in one room, and a single CSP in the opposite room.

(IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.5b, pp 3.4.2-25 & 26)

3. Following the loss of SRW head tank make-up (e.g. loss of off-site power), consider:
a. Isolating SRW to the turbine building
b. Pre-staging SRW make-up
c. Pre-staging SW to SRW make-up During high wind conditions, consider either pre-staging SRW make-up in the event a missile disables the SRW head tanks on the 69' elevation.

During a large turbine building fire, the pre-treated water storage tank may be depleted. This would eliminate a fresh water option (i.e. fire protection). During this circumstance, operations should consider how SRW make-up can be established given access to SRW pump rooms may be difficult or the staged equipment (for SW to SRW make-up) may be lost.

(CCPRA, Sequence Examination)

(IPEEE, Section 4.6.7.1, pp 4-58 & 59)

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENTINITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 20 of 23

[ERPIP ,-;4 IT ' g A-- T APPENDIX A, IPE/IPEEE INSIGHTS Page 3 of 4

4. Following a spurious safety system actuation where a locked in UV signal has caused the failure of all SRW cooled DGs, consider that power to the 125 VDC batteries will deplete without charging. Plan for an alternate means of charging if the charging can not be accomplished from an off-site power source.

(IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.1b, pp 3.4.2-16)

5. Following the loss of Main Feed Water, consider planning for a long term AFW water source prior to 12 CST reaching the 5' level by:
a. Beginning 12 CST re-fill.
b. Verifying operation of the valves used to supply long term AFW water
c. Staging alternate long term water options.

(CCPRA, Sequence Examination)

6. Following a loss of Main Feed Water with only the turbine driven pumps operational, consider these recoveries if the motor driven pump recovery is not eminent:
a. Condensate Low Pressure Feed Options
b. Once-Through-Core-Cooling Options
c. Alternate feed options using atypical systems such as fire protection Although low pressure feed and OTCC are already proceduralized, a late failure of the turbine driven pumps may cause addition options to present themselves. For example, later in the accident OTCC may be achieved with a single PORV verse the two normally required. Low pressure feed may be successful even if every step in the EOP is not accomplished.

(IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.1a, pp 3.4.2-14 & 15)

7. Following a SGTR, consider the likelihood of RWT depletion and provide an additional water supply to the RWT.

(CCPRA, Sequence Examination)

8. Following a loss of SWGR ventilation after a plant trip, consider shedding those loads not of high safety significance such as the motor generator sets. This may reduce the heat load sufficiently to prevent the failure of the SR 480 VAC Buses.

(IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.13a, pp 3.4.2-38)

R -

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 21 of 23 ERPI Pt .

APPENDIX A, IPE/IPEEE INSIGHTS Page 4 of 4

9. If CCW has been loss and the RCPs are still operating, consider tripping the RCPs.

(IPE, Section 3.4.2.3.3a, pp 3.4.2-19)

10. If secondary side cooling is lost, the PORVs are stuck open, and recovery of secondary side cooling does not seem likely, then consider not isolating the PORVs.

(IPE, Section 4.8.5, pp 4.8-12)

11. Following an ATWS with a high primary pressure spike, consider all primary injection ports may be failed closed due to extreme pressure causing the check valves to fail shut.

(IPE, Section 3.1.2.1.1, pp 3.1.2-4)

ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 22 of 23 APPENDIX B, PICOAMMETER (REACTIMETER) SET-UP l go 14 Page 1 of 2 To monitor the Ex-core NI current, a picoammeter must be hooked up to Reactor Regulating System (RRS) Channel X and Channel Y Linear Range Detectors. A suggested method for doing this, using the Reactimeter, is by:

NOTE The following is not a procedure but a suggested method. 'Always use approved procedures when performing plant operations.

  • Deenergizing the RRS(X) linear power channel drawer by turning the power switch to OFF
  • Disconnecting, from the rear of the drawer,
1. Coax cable R from the LOWER NI channel (J5)
2. Coax cable T from the UPPER NI channel (J4)
3. Coax cable S from the High Voltage power supply (J6) lo
  • Connecting cable IPTPU (2PTPU) to Coax cable R
  • Connecting cable 1PTPV (2PTPV) to Coax cable T
  • Connecting a temporary high voltage power supply to the Coax cable J6 and setting the power supply to 750 Volts (Power Designs Inc. Model AEC-315B or equivalent)
  • Energizing the temporary high voltage power supply
  • Reenergizing the RRS(X) linear power channel drawer by turning the power switch to ON
  • Connecting, at the Reactimeter,
1. Cable 1PTPU (2PTPU) to Ion Chamber Input NI-X-L
2. Cable 1PTPV (2PTPV) to Ion Chamber Input NI-X-U
  • Deenergizing the RRS(Y) linear power channel drawer by turning the power switch to OFF

inl ERPIP-601 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT INITIAL DIAGNOSIS Revision 2 Page 23 of 23 APPENDIX B, PICOAMMETER (REACTIMETER) SET-UP Page 2 of 2

  • Disconnecting, from the rear of the drawer,
1. Coax cable R from the LOWER NI channel (J5)
2. Coax cable T from the UPPER NI channel (J4)
3. Coax cable S from the High Voltage power supply (J6) 0t
  • Connecting cable 1PTPW (2PTPW) to Coax cable R
  • Connecting cable 1PTPX (2PTPX) to Coax cable T
  • Connecting a temporary high voltage power supply to the Coax cable J6 and setting the power supply to 750 Volts (Power Designs Inc. Model AEC-315B or equivalent)
  • Energizing the temporary high voltage power supply
  • Reenergizing the RRS(Y) linear power channel drawer by turning the power switch to ON
  • Connecting, at the Reactimeter,
1. Cable 1PTPW(2PTPW) to Ion Chamber Input NI-Y-L
2. Cable 1PTPX (2PTPX) to Ion Chamber Input NI-Y-U
a. ENSURE the picoammeter output (picoammeter logarithmic 4 output) is connected to reactimeter analog input (Al-1). 0
  • Energizing the Reactimeter (Ref.: PSTP-23, Physics Test Equipment Hookup, Rev. 5, Section 6.1)
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