ML062190311
| ML062190311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/2005 |
| From: | Bauder D Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ERPIP-611, Rev 2, Change 1 | |
| Download: ML062190311 (125) | |
Text
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TECHNICAL PROCEDURE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES ERPIP-611 SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT RESTORATIVE ACTIONS REVISION 2 Safety Related 4/ Non-Safety Related REFERRAL USE Periodically refer to procedure during use.
APPROVAL AUTHORITY D. Bauder 9/14/2005 EFFECTIVE DATE
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 Severe Accident Management Restorative Actions RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL: Reactor Engineer TSC Analyst Ops Analyst CONDITION: Severe Accident ]
2
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 Instructions Note: If the Plant Condition changes to a reliable matrix SAM diagnosis, GO TO the appropriate ERPIP 603-610.
3
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 K>
CHLAs AND ADDITIONAL OVERVIEW FOR RCS CONDITION: UNKNOWN RCS Condition Unknown CHLA Implementation and Assessment Tracking Table TIME PRI CHLA Inject into the RCS Spray into CNTMT Inject into the S/Gs Depressurize the S/Gs Operate CACs Depressurize the RCS Vent the RCS Operate H 2 Recombiners Restart the RCPs Flood the Reactor Cavity Vent CNTMT U Spray the Outside of the CNTMT Spray the Aux Building Flood the Aux Building NOTE: The CHLAs are listed in recommended order of implementation. However, the TSC may re-prioritize them depending on plant conditions.
I = In Use to Full Capacity T = In Use but Throttled N = Not In Use N/E = Not Yet Evaluated A = Available Immediately P = Available Pending Alternate Power Source or Equipment Lineup X = Not Available 4
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 1. CHLA 1: Inject into the RCS A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Sudden restoration of flow through the cold leg injection path could cause hot gases in the core to travel to the S/G tubes, possibly causing creep failure.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- HPSI Pump(s)
" LPSI Pump(s)
" Charging Pump(s)
- Source of water:
- 1. RWT
- 2. Containment Sump
- 3. BASTs
- 4. Plant Fire System D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room perform one or more of the following:
- 5. Provide makeup to the SI/CVCS system from alternate water sources (Refer to Attachment 1 of ERPIP 611).
5
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 2. CHLA 2: Spray into the Containment K-.
A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Spraying into the Containment can facilitate flooding the Reactor Cavity and prevent or delay vessel melt-through.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
Spraying into the containment will scrub fission products from the atmosphere and reduce containment pressure. Use of containment spray should be coordinated with knowledge of the non-condensible gas volume in the containment to avoid undesired deinerting and potential hydrogen detonations.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Containment Spray Pump(s) 0 Source of water:
- 1. RWT
- 2. Containment Sump D. Recommended Actions:
G RECOMMEND the Control Room initiate containment spray.
6
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 3. CHLA 3: Feed the Steam Generators A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
" Water injection into the S/Gs will increase heat transfer from the primary side, resulting in RCS depressurization.
- Keeping the secondary side water level above the top of the U-tubes (-59") will provide over-temperature protection for the U-tubes and help preserve RCS integrity.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
The additional water may be released to the containment as steam through any RCS openings and increase the containment pressure challenge.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- One of the following sets of equipment:
- 1. Auxiliary Feedwater System
- At least one AFW Pump
- Source of makeup water
- 2. Appropriate system lineup. Main Feedwater System (unavailable if SIAS, SGIS or CSAS actuated unless bypassed, blocked or overridden):
" At least one SGFP (except for Condensate Booster Pump Injection)
- At least two Condensate Pumps (only one required for Condensate Booster Pump Injection)
- At least one Condensate Booster Pump
- Source of makeup water
- Appropriate system lineup D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the one or more of the following:
- 1. Verify CST availability and establish feed flow using Auxiliary Feedwater.
- 2. Verify CST availability and establish feed flow using the other Unit's electric-driven AFW pump. (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
- 4. Establish feed flow using Condensate Booster Pump Injection (Steam Generator pressure must be less than 500 psia for this method to be effective). (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
7
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 4. CHLA 4: Depressurize the S/Gs A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Depressurizing the S/Gs will increase heat transfer from the RCS and reduce primary pressure. This increases the potential for water injection from ESF systems to the RCS.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
0 None C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
-NOTE -
Use of TBVs is preferable to minimize potential offsite radiological doses.
" Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs)
- 1. Electrical power (except for local operation)
- 2. Instrument Air System pressure at least 40 psig (except for local operation)
- 3. Condenser vacuum at least 22.5 inches Hg. (Unit-i) or 20 inches Hg. (Unit-
- 2) (except for local operation)
- 4. Associated system alignment
- Atmospheric Dump Valves
- 5. Electrical power (except for local operation)
- 6. Instrument Air System or SaltwaterAir Compressors (except for local operation)
- 7. Associated system alignment 8
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 4.D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform one or more of the following:
- 2. Cooldown the RCS using manual operation of the TBVs (Refer to the Alternate Actions of EOP-8, HR series).
- a. IF a SGTR exists, THEN notify the Chemistry Director to determine if ERPIP 810, Main Steam System Radioactivity Release Rate Estimate, needs to be performed.
- 4. Cooldown the RCS by aligning the steam drains to the condenser (Refer to the Alternate Actions of EOP-8, HR series).
- 5. Cooldown the RCS by draining via S/G Blowdown to the Miscellaneous Waste System (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
9
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 5. CHLA 5: Operate Containment Air Coolers (CACs)
A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
0 None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- CACs promote mixing of non-condensible gases, thus reducing local high concentration pockets inside containment that could easily detonate.
- CACs will facilitate reduction of containment pressure.
- CACs could provide an ignition source during operation.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE-.
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Containment Air Cooler(s)
" Service Water D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room start all available Containment Air Coolers in slow speed witlt maximum Service Water Flow using OI-5A as guidance. The provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-5A cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
10
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 6. CHLA 6: Depressurize the RCS A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
" Depressurization of the RCS can lead to increased injection to the system which can mitigate hot gas natural circulation through the hot legs and surge line and potentially prevent creep failure.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Depressurizing the RCS will mitigate a Direct Containment Heating Event upon vessel failure that could challenge containment integrity.
- Depressurizing the RCS reduces S/G tube stress which will mitigate a potential containment boundary failure path.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves
- Pressurizer Vent Valves 11
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 6.D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND one or more of the following actions to the Control Room:
- 1. Depressurize the RCS using PORVs per guidance provided by OI-1G REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 2. Depressurize the RCS using Reactor Head Vent Valves per guidance provided by 01-1G, REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 3. Depressurize the RCS using Pressurizer Vent Valves per guidance provided by 01-1G, REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 5. Cooldown the RCS using manual operation of the TBVs. (Refer to the Alternate Actions of EOP-8, HR series).
- a. IF a SGTR exists, THEN notify the Chemistry Director to determine if ERPIP 810, Main Steam System Radioactivity Release Rate Estimate, needs to be performed.
12
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 7. CHLA 7: Vent the RCS A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
Venting the RCS concurrent with operation of the RCPs can sweep out non-condensible gases trapped in the S/G U-tubes. This will help enable natural or forced circulation of primary coolant and subsequent RCS heat removal.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves
" Pressurizer Vent Valves D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND one or more of the following actions to the Control Room:
- 1. Depressurize the RCS using PORVs per guidance provided by OI-1G REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 2. Depressurize the RCS using Reactor Head Vent Valves per guidance provided by 0-1-G, REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 3. Depressurize the RCS using Pressurizer Vent Valves per guidance provided by 01-1G, REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
13
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 8. CHLA 8: Operate Hvdro2en Recombiners K>
A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Hydrogen Recombiners should not be operated in H2 environments exceeding 4% by volume, as their potential as an ignition source increases and they can be damaged by the exothermic reaction.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Hydrogen Recombiner(s)
D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room start all available Hydrogen Recombiners using 01-4 IA for guidance. The provisions of IOCFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-41A cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
14
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 9. CHLA 9: Restart Reactor Coolant Pumps A. Special Considerations When Proticting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Jogging RCPs can help sweep trapped non-condensible gases from the S/G U-tubes.
This will help restore core and RCS heat removal via natural circulation.
" If water exists in the loop seals of the cold legs or at the bottom of the reactor vessel, then restarting RCPs may help to deliver a large amount of water to the core for a short period of time. However, the resulting primary system pressurization may also be sufficient to challenge reactor vessel integrity. (Refer to ERPIP 611, Attachment 5 CA-3a.)
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
" If water is available in the S/Gs after the vessel fails, then the RCPs may provide circulation of hot gases (from remaining core materials) to the secondary side. This transfer of energy load away from the containment may extend containment overpressure lifetime.
- If RCPs are jogged, then the trapped hydrogen gas can be swept into containment (via a RCS break or a PORV), possibly resulting in a hydrogen bum in containment.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Electrical power to RCPs and auxiliaries.
- RCP auxiliaries.
- 1. Component Cooling Water
- 2. RCP Controlled Bleed-Off
- 3. RCP oil supply/coolers 15
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 9.D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the following:
- 2. If the RCP restart criteria cannot be met and RCP restart is deemed essential, then consider the provisions of IOCFR50.54(x) and (y). If RCP auxiliaries are not available, removing the CLOSE fuses at the RCP breaker will disable all interlocks and allow the RCP breaker to be closed locally if the Control Room handswitch is not in Pull-to-Lock.
CLOSE FUSES RCP BREAKER (typical) 16
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 10. CHLA 10: Flood the Reactor Cavity A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
Flooding the Reactor Cavity may provide external vessel cooling that may prevent vessel melt-through if sufficient water is injected.
With one RWT injected, the bottom five to six feet of the vessel will be under water.
Before vessel melt-through, the debris in the vessel will build up to about the same level. Although the bottom of the vessel is cooled, the region at and above the top of the debris is not cooled and will heat up by radiation from the debris to the vessel side wall. This may lead to a delayed vessel failure for high RCS pressure conditions.
If the water level in containment can be raised by injecting twice the RWT volume then the debris may be contained in the vessel if the RCS has been depressurized.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
Flooding the Reactor Cavity will facilitate pool scrubbing of fission products as well as the partial cessation of cavity concrete ablation. However, adding water to the cavity will increase containment steam concentration and result in large increases in containment pressure.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Containment Spray Pump(s)
- Charging Pump(s)
" Source of water:
- 1. R'WT(s)
- 2. BAST(s)
- 3. Plant Fire System D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room perform one or more of the following:
- 1. Initiate containment spray per the appropriate CHLA.
- 2. Inject into the RCS per the appropriate CHLA.
- 3. Depressurize the RCS (to facilitate RCS injection and prevent high pressure melt-through) per the appropriate CHLA.
- 4. Provide additional sources of water to raise level in containment to approximately 10 feet (Refer to Attachment 1 of ERPIP 611).
17
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 11. CHLA 11: Vent Containment A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Venting containment after severe core damage has occurred will lead to radionuclide release.
- Venting containment will likely lower the containment pressure, thus reducing the stress on the containment structure.
- Venting containment may actually increase the probability of a hydrogen burn in containment under certain circumstances (refer to Containment Challenged Calculational Aid ERPIP 611, Attachment 5 CA-7).
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Hydrogen Purge System D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the following:
- 1. Operate the Hydrogen Purge System using OI-41B as guidance. The provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-41B cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
- a. IF the CNMNT is to be vented, THEN inform the Chemistry Director so release monitoring and dose assessment can be performed per the appropriate ERPIP 800 series procedure.
18
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 12. CHLA 12: Spray the Outside of the Containment A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Spraying the outside of the containment can provide an alternate means for removing heat from the containment, thus reducing pressure (and stress) on the containment structure.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Fire Suppression System
" Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the following action to the Control Room:
- 1. Commence spray-down of outside of containment using the Fire Suppression System and any other means available. The objective is to apply as much water to the outside of the containment as possible.
19
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 13. CHLA 13: Spray the Auxiliary Buildine A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
0 None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Spraying the Aux. Bldg. can potentially jeopardize the operation of equipment needed for containment isolation and cooling.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
& Fire Suppression System
- Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the following actions to the Control Room:
- 1. Use fire hoses with spray nozzles to spray down selected areas of the Aux. Bldg.
- 2. Closely monitor MWRT level and pump to RCWPS as necessary to prevent overflowing floor drains.
20
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 14. CHLA 14: Flood the Auxiliary Buildine A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Flooding the Aux Bldg. can compromise the performance of equipment necessary for adequate core cooling.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Flooding the Aux Bldg. can potentially jeopardize the operation of equipment needed for containment isolation and cooling.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Fire Suppression System
" Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room use the fire system or hoses and nozzles as necessary to flood desired areas of the Aux. Bldg.
21
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 CHLAs AND ADDITIONAL OVERVIEW FOR RCS CONDITION: BD RCS Condition BD CHLA Implementation and Assessment Tracking Table TIME PRI CHLA
- 1. INJECT into the RCS
- 2. DEPRESSURIZE the RCS
- 3. INJECT into the S/Gs
- 4. DEPRESSURIZE the S/Gs
- 5. SPRAY into CNTMT
- 6. VENT the RCS
- 7. OPERATE CACs U
- 8. RESTART the RCPs
- 9. FLOOD the Reactor Cavity
- 10. OPERATE H 2 Recombiners
- 11. VENT CNTMT
- 12. SPRAY the Outside of the CNTMT
- 13. SPRAY the Aux Building
- 14. FLOOD the Aux Building NOTE: The CHLAs are listed in recommended order of implementation. However, the TSC may re-prioritize them depending on plant conditions.
I = In Use to Full Capacity T = In Use but Throttled N = Not In Use N/E = Not Yet Evaluated A = Available Immediately P = Available Pending Alternate Power Source or Equipment Lineup X = Not Available 22
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 1. CHLA 1: Iniect into the RCS A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Sudden restoration of flow through the cold leg injection path could cause hot gases in the core to travel to the S/G tubes, possibly causing creep failure.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
& HPSI Pump(s)
- LPSI Pump(s) 9 Charging Pump(s)
- Source of water:
- 3. BASTs
- 4. Plant Fire System D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room perform one or more of the following:
- 5. Provide makeup to the SI/CVCS system from alternate water sources (Refer to Attachment 1 of ERPIP 611).
23
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 2. CHLA 2: Depressurize the RCS A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
" Increases opportunity for injecting water into the RCS from HPSI, LPSI and SITs.
" Depressurization of the RCS can lead to increased injection to the system which can mitigate hot gas natural circulation through the hot legs and surge line and potentially prevent creep failure.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
" Depressurizing the RCS will mitigate a Direct Containment Heating Event upon vessel failure that could challenge containment integrity.
- Depressurizing the RCS reduces S/G tube stress which will mitigate a potential containment boundary failure path.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves
- Pressurizer Vent Valves 24
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 2.D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND one or more of the following actions to the Control Room:
- 1. Depressurize the RCS using PORVs per guidance provided by OI-1GQ REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 2. Depressurize the RCS using Reactor Head Vent Valves per guidance provided by OI-IQ REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 3. Depressurize the RCS using Pressurizer Vent Valves per guidance provided by O1-1 G REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 5. Cooldown the RCS using manual operation of the TBVs. (Refer to the Alternate Actions of EOP-8, HR series).
- a. IF a SGTR exists, THEN notify the Chemistry Director to determine if ERPIP 810, Main Steam System Radioactivity Release Rate Estimate, needs to be performed.
25
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 3. CHLA 3: Feed the Steam Generators A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
" Water injection into the S/Gs will increase heat transfer from the primary side, resulting in RCS depressurization.
" Keeping the secondary side water level above the top of the U-tubes (-59") will provide over-temperature protection for the U-tubes and help preserve RCS integrity.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- If a SGTR exists, this CHLA will provide inventory for backflow to the RCS. The additional water may be released to the containment as steam through any RCS openings and increase the containment pressure challenge.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- One of the following sets of equipment:
- 1. Auxiliary Feedwater System
- At least one AFW Pump
- Source of makeup water
- 2. Appropriate system lineup. Main Feedwater System (unavailable if SIAS, SGIS or CSAS actuated unless bypassed, blocked or overridden):
- At least one SGFP (except for Condensate Booster Pump Injection)
" At least two Condensate Pumps (only one required for Condensate Booster Pump Injection)
" At least one Condensate Booster Pump
- Source of makeup water
- Appropriate system lineup D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the one or more of the following:
- 1. Verify CST availability and establish feed flow using Auxiliary Feedwater. (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
- 2. Verify CST availability and establish feed flow using the other Unit's electric-driven AFW pump. (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
- 4. Establish feed flow using Condensate Booster Pump Injection (Steam Generator pressure must be less than 500 psia for this method to be effective). (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
26
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 4. CHLA 4: Depressurize the S/Gs A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Depressurizing the S/Gs will increase heat transfer from the RCS and reduce primary pressure. This increases the potential for water injection from ESF systems to the RCS.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- None C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
-NOTE -
Use of TBVs is pjreferable to minimize potential offsite radiological doses.
- 1. Electrical power (except for local operation)
- 2. Instrument Air System pressure at least 40 psig (except for local operation)
- 3. Condenser vacuum at least 22.5 inches Hg. (Unit-I) or 20 inches Hg. (Unit-2)
(except for local operation)
- 4. Associated system alignment
" Atmospheric Dump Valves
- 5. Electrical power (except for local operation)
- 6. Instrument Air System or Saltwater Air Compressors (except for local operation)
- 7. Associated system alignment 27
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 4.D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform one or more of the following:
- 2. Cooldown the RCS using manual operation of the TBVs (Refer to the Alternate Actions of EOP-8, HR series).
- a. IF a SGTR exists, THEN notify the Chemistry Director to determine if ERPIP 810, Main Steam System Radioactivity Release Rate Estimate, needs to be performed.
- 4. Cooldown the RCS by aligning the steam drains to the condenser (Refer to the Alternate Actions of EOP-8, HR series).
- 5. Cooldown the RCS by draining via S/G Blowdown to the Miscellaneous Waste System (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
28
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 5. CHLA 5: Spray into the Containment A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Spraying into containment can facilitate flooding the Reactor Cavity and prevent or delay vessel melt-through.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
Spraying into containment will scrub fission products from the atmosphere and reduce containment pressure. Use of containment spray should be coordinated with knowledge of the non-condensible gas volume in the containment to avoid undesired deinerting and potential hydrogen detonations.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Containment Spray Pump(s)
" Source of water:
- 1. RWT
- 2. Containment Sump D. Recommended Actions:
- 1. RECOMMEND the Control Room initiate containment spray.
29
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 6. CHLA 6: Vent the RCS A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
Venting the RCS concurrent with operation of the RCPs can sweep out non-condensible gases trapped in the S/G U-tubes. This will help enable natural or forced circulation of primary coolant and subsequent RCS heat removal.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
Hydrogen gas vented into the containment from the RCS can result in a H2 bum.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" PORVs
" Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves
" Pressurizer Vent Valves D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND one or more of the following actions to the Control Room:
- 1. Depressurize the RCS using PORVs per guidance provided by OI-1G, REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 2. Depressurize the RCS using Reactor Head Vent Valves per guidance provided by OI-IG, REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
- 3. Depressurize the RCS using Pressurizer Vent Valves per guidance provided by Ol-1G, REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND PRESSURIZER VENT SYSTEM.
30
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 7. CHLA 7: Operate Containment Air Coolers (CACs)
A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- CACs promote mixing of non-condensible gases, thus reducing local high concentration pockets inside containment that could easily detonate.
" CACs will facilitate reduction of containment pressure.
" CACs could provide an ignition source during operation.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Containment Air Cooler(s)
" Service Water D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room start all available Containment Air Coolers in slow speed with maximum Service Water Flow using OI-5A as guidance. The provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-5A cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
31
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 8. CHLA 8: Restart Reactor Coolant Pumps A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
0 Jogging RCPs can help sweep trapped non-condensible gases from the S/G U-tubes.
This will help restore core and RCS heat removal via natural circulation.
- If water exists in the loop seals of the cold legs or at the bottom of the reactor vessel, then restarting RCPs may help to deliver a large amount of water to the core for a short period of time. However, the resulting primary system pressurization may also be sufficient to challenge the reactor vessel integrity. (Refer to ERPIP 611, Attachment 5 CA-3a.)
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
" If water is available in the S/Gs after the vessel fails, then the RCPs may provide circulation of hot gases (from remaining core materials) to the secondary side. This transfer of energy load away from the containment may extend containment overpressure lifetime.
" If RCPs are jogged, then the trapped hydrogen gas can be swept into containment (via a RCS break or a PORV), possibly resulting in a hydrogen burn in containment.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Electrical power to RCPs and auxiliaries.
" RCP auxiliaries.
- 1. Component Cooling Water
- 2. RCP Controlled Bleed-Off
- 3. RCP oil supply/coolers 32
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 8.D. Recommended Actions:
0 RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the following:
I. If the RCP restart criteria can be met, restart RCP(s). (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
- 2. If the RCP restart criteria cannot be met and RCP restart is deemed essential, then consider the provisions of IOCFR50.54(x) and (y). If RCP auxiliaries are not available, removing the CLOSE fuses at the RCP breaker will disable all interlocks and allow the RCP breaker to be closed locally if the Control Room handswitch is not in Pull-to-Lock.
CLOSE FUSES RCP BREAKER (typical]
33
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 9. CHLA 9: Flood the Reactor Cavity A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
Flooding the Reactor Cavity may provide external vessel cooling that may prevent vessel melt-through if sufficient water is injected.
With one RWT injected, the bottom five to six feet of the vessel will be under water.
Before vessel melt-through, the debris in the vessel will build up to about the same level. Although the bottom of the vessel is cooled, the region at and above the top of the debris is not cooled and will heat up by radiation from the debris to the vessel side wall. This may lead to a delayed vessel failure for high RCS pressure conditions.
If the water level in the containment can be raised by injecting twice the RWT volume then the debris may be contained in the vessel if the RCS has been depressurized.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
Flooding the Reactor Cavity will facilitate pool scrubbing of fission products as well as the partial cessation of cavity concrete ablation. However, adding water to the cavity will increase containment steam concentration and result in large increases in containment pressure.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Containment Spray Pump(s)
- Charging Pump(s)
- Source of water:
- 1. RWT(s)
- 2. BAST(s)
- 3. Plant Fire System D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform one or more of the following:
- 1. Initiate containment spray per the appropriate CHLA.
- 2. Inject into the RCS per the appropriate CHLA.
- 3. Depressurize the RCS (to facilitate RCS injection and prevent high pressure melt-through) per the appropriate CHLA.
- 4. Provide additional sources of water to raise level in containment to approximately 10 feet (refer to Attachment I of ERPIP 611).
34
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 10. CHLA 10: Operate Hydroeen Recombiners A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Hydrogen Recombiners should not be operated in H2 environments exceeding 4% by volume, as their potential as an ignition source increases and they could be damaged by the exothermic reaction.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
/
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
Hydrogen Recombiner(s)
D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room start all available Hydrogen Recombiners using 01-41 A for guidance. The provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-41A cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
35
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 11. CHLA 11: Vent Containment K..
A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
0 None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
" Venting containment after severe core damage has occurred will lead to radionuclide release.
" Venting containment will likely lower the containment pressure, thus reducing the stress on the containment structure.
" Venting containment may actually increase the probability of a hydrogen bum in containment under certain circumstances (refer to Containment Challenged Calculational Aid ERPIP 611, Attachment 5 CA-7).
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Hydrogen Purge System D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the following:
- 1. Operate the Hydrogen Purge System using 01-41B as guidance. The provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-41B cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
- a. IF the CNMNT is to be vented, THEN INFORM the Chemistry Director so release monitoring and dose assessment can be performed per the appropriate ERPIP 800 series procedure.
36
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 12. CHLA 12: Spray the Outside of the Containment A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Spraying the outside of the containment can provide an alternate means for removing heat from the containment, thus reducing pressure (and stress) on the containment structure.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Fire Suppression System
- Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the following action to the Control Room:
- 1. Commence spray-down of outside of containment using the Fire Suppression System and any other means available. The objective is to apply as such water to the outside of the containment as possible.
37
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 13. CHLA 13: Spray the Auxiliary Buildine A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
0 None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Spraying the Aux. Bldg. can potentially jeopardize the operation of equipment needed for containment isolation and cooling.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Fire Suppression System
" Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the following actions to the Control Room:
- 1. Use fire hoses with spray nozzles to spray down selected areas of the Aux. Bldg.
- 2. Closely monitor MWRT level and pump to RCWPS as necessary to prevent overflowing floor drains.
K>.,,
38
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 14. CHLA 14: Flood the Auxiliary Building A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
Flooding the Aux Bldg. can compromise the performance of equipment necessary for adequate core cooling.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
Flooding the Aux Bldg. can potentially jeopardize the operation of equipment needed for containment isolation and cooling.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Fire Suppression System
- Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room use the fire system or hoses and nozzles as necessary to flood desired areas of the Aux. Bldg.
39
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 CHLAs AND ADDITIONAL OVERVIEW FOR RCS CONDITION: EX RCS Condition EX CHLA Implementation and Assessment Tracking Table TIME PRI CHLA.
SPRAY into CNTMT INJECT into RCS/ Flood Rx Cavity OPERATE CACs OPERATE H2 Recombiners INJECT into the S/Gs SPRAY the Outside of the CNTMT VENT CNTMT SPRAY the Aux Building FLOOD the Aux Building NOTE: The CHLAs are listed in recommended order of implementation. However, the TSC may re-prioritize them depending on plant conditions.
I In Use to Full Capacity T = In Use but Throttled N = Not In Use N/E = Not Yet Evaluated A =Available Immediately P = Available Pending Alternate Power Source or Equipment Lineup X = Not Available 40
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 1. CHLA 1: Spray into the Containment A.' Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
Spraying into the containment will scrub fission products from the atmosphere and reduce containment pressure. Use of containment spray should be coordinated with knowledge of the non-condensible gas volume in the containment to avoid undesired deinerting and potential hydrogen detonations.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Containment Spray Pump(s)
- Source of water:
- 1. RWT
- 2. Containment Sump D. Recommended Actions:
- 1. RECOMMEND the Control Room initiate containment spray.
41
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 2. CHLA 2: Iniect into the RCS/Flood Reactor Cavity A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- Injection into the RCS will provide cooling to any debris remaining in the vessel.
Water not vaporized will drain through the failed vessel and provide cooling to debris in the reactor cavity.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Rapid pressurization of the containment due to steam generation and production of hydrogen may challenge containment integrity. (Refer to ERPIP 611, Attachment 5 CA-7.)
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" HPSI Pump(s)
- LPSI Pump(s)
" Charging Pump(s)
- Source of water: K )
- 1. RWT
- 2. Containment Sump
- 3. BASTs
- 4. Plant Fire System D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room perform one or more of the following:
- 1. Initiate containment spray.
- 6. Provide makeup to the SI/CVCS system from alternate water sources (Refer to Attachment I of ERPIP 611).
42
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 3. CHLA 3: Operate Containment Air Coolers (CACs)
A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
" CACs promote mixing of non-condensible gases, thus reducing local high concentration pockets inside containment that could easily detonate.
" CACs will facilitate reduction of containment pressure.
" CACs could provide an ignition source during operation.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Containment Air Cooler(s)
- Service Water D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room start all available Containment Air Coolers in slow speed with maximum Service Water Flow using OI-5A as guidance. The provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-5A cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
43
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 4. CHLA 4: Operate Hydrogen Recombiners.
A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
0 None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Hydrogen Recombiners should not be operated in H2 environments exceeding 4% by volume, as their potential as an ignition source increases and they could be damaged by the exothermic reaction.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Hydrogen Recombiner(s)
D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room start all available Hydrogen Recombiners using 01-41 A for guidance. The provisions of IOCFR50.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-41A cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
K..)
44
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 5. CHLA 5: Feed the Steam Generators A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- If a SGTR exists, this CHLA will provide inventory for backflow to the RCS. The additional water may be released to the containment as steam through any RCS openings or out the bottom of the vessel onto the corium in the reactor cavity and increase the containment pressure challenge.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration
- One of the following sets of equipment:
- 1. Auxiliary Feedwater System
- At least one AFW Pump
- Source of makeup water
- 2. Appropriate system lineup. Main Feedwater System (unavailable if SIAS, SGIS or CSAS actuated unless bypassed, blocked or overridden):
" At least one SGFP (except for Condensate Booster Pump Injection)
- At least two Condensate Pumps (only one required for Condensate Booster Pump Injection)
- At least one Condensate Booster Pump
- Source of makeup water
" Appropriate system lineup D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the one or more of the following:
- 1. Verify CST availability and establish feed flow using Auxiliary Feedwater. (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
- 2. Verify CST availability and establish feed flow using the other Unit's electric-driven AFW pump. (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
- 4. Establish feed flow using Condensate Booster Pump Injection (Steam Generator pressure must be less than 500 psia for this method to be effective). (Refer to EOP-8, HR series).
45
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 6. CHLA 6: Spray the Outside of the Containment A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Spraying the outside of containment can provide an alternate means for removing heat from the containment, thus reducing pressure (and stress) on the containment structure.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer'to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Fire Suppression System
- Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
- RECOMMEND the following action to the Control Room:
- 1. Commence spray-down of outside of containment using the Fire Suppression System and any other means available. The objective is to apply as much water to the outside of the containment as possible.
46
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 7. CHLA 7: Vent Containment A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None R. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Venting containment after severe core damage has occurred will lead to radionuclide release.
0 Venting containment will likely lower the containment pressure, thus reducing the stress on the containment structure.
a Venting containment may actually increase the probability of a hydrogen bum in containment under certain circumstances (refer to Containment Challenged Calculational Aid ERPIP 611, Attachment 5 CA-7).
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
-NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Hydrogen Purge System D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room perform the following:
- 1. Operate the Hydrogen Purge System using OI-41B as guidance. The provisions of IOCFRS0.54(x) and (y) should be considered if the conditions of OI-41B cannot be met and operation of the system is deemed essential.
- a. IF the CNMNT is to be vented, THEN inform the Chemistry Director so release monitoring and dose assessment can be performed per the appropriate ERPIP 800 series procedure.
47
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 8. CHLA 8: Spray the Auxiliary Buildine A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
0 None B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Spraying the Aux. Bldg. can potentially jeopardize the operation of equipment needed for containment isolation and cooling.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
- Fire Suppression System
" Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the following actions to the Control Room:
- 1. Use fire hoses with spray nozzles to spray down selected areas of the Aux. Bldg.
- 2. Closely monitor MWRT level and pump to RCWPS as necessary to prevent overflowing floor drains.
48
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2
- 9. CHLA 9: Flood the Auxiliary Building A. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the RCS:
- None.
B. Special Considerations When Protecting the Integrity of the Containment:
- Flooding the Aux Bldg. can potentially jeopardize the operation of equipment needed for containment isolation and cooling.
C. Equipment Required to Implement CHLA:
- NOTE -
If use of an essential component or system is precluded by lack of power and/or interlocks/trips and normal restoration methods have not been successful, then refer to Attachments 2 and 3 of ERPIP 611 for additional possibilities for restoration.
" Fire Suppression System
" Fire hoses and spray nozzles D. Recommended Actions:
RECOMMEND the Control Room use the fire system or hoses and nozzles as necessary to flood desired areas of the Aux. Bldg.
49
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 1 of22 Rev. 2 Alternate Water Sources
- 1. DISCUSSION A. Two alternate sources of water to be considered for the affected Unit's RCS and Containment are the unaffected Unit's RWT and the Spent Fuel Pool. The use of either of these systems would require specialized system lineups and procedures for those lineups and would likely require application of the provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y).
B. If the Safety Injection Pumps and/or the Containment Spray pumps for the affected Unit are unavailable, it is possible to use the corresponding pumps from the unaffected unit.
Again, the use of these systems would require specialized system lineups and procedures and would likely require application of the provisions of IOCFR50.54(x) and (y).
C. Figures 1-19 of this attachment illustrate possible flowpaths for the alternate water sources mentioned above. These figures are for illustrative purposes only. When developing procedures based on these attachments always use the latest controlled copies of plant drawings and approved procedures for performing plant operations. The plant drawings used to develop Figures 1-19 are:
- 1. OM-58 (60-716) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Pool Fill & Drain Systems.
- 2. OM-74 (60-731) Unit-I Safety Injection & Containment Spray Systems.
- 3. OM-462 (62-731) Unit 2 Safety Injection & Containment Spray Systems.
- 4. OM-800 (60-583-E) Unit I Auxiliary Feedwater System.
- 5. OM-801 (62-583-E) Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System.
D. Figures 9 & 10 and 18 & 19 cross connect the SI System and the AFW System.
E. Additional water can be supplied through the Spent Fuel Pools by use of the plant fire system and fire hoses to add water to the Spent Fuel Pools. Because this is unborated water, consideration should be given to adding boric acid to the Spent Fuel Pool if fire system water is used, possibly by manually dumping bags of boric acid directly into the Pools.
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 2 of 22 Rev. 2
-NOTE -
The current AFW System drawing is to be used for actual valve alignments.
1.F. The Plant Fire System can be used to provide water to the S/Gs through the AFW system via one of the following methods:
- 1. Use of the Fire System via a siamese hose connection at 13 (23) AFW Pump
- a. ISOLATE and DRAIN (depressurize) 13 (23) AFW Pump.
- b. REMOVE 13 (23) AFW Pump Auto Recirc Valve.
- NOTE -
The AFW System Spool Piece is located in the Safe Shutdown Repair Locker in the Fire Pump House.
- c. INSTALL the AFW System Spool Piece.
- d. CONNECT fire hoses to stations.
- e. RUN both hoses through the Service Water Pump Room watertight double doors.
- f. CONNECT the hoses to the siamese connection installed in the AFW System.
- g. CLOSE AFW Pump Drain Valves, THEN PRESSURIZE the fire hoses.
- h. OPEN ADVs to depressurize S/Gs and lower S/G level to approximately
-350 inches,
- i. USING the AFW system, THEN FEED the S/G using the fire system.
- 2. Use of steam driven AFW pumps via a temporary fire hose connection. *1B11681
- a. ISOLATE selected AFW pump (that is, 11, 12, 21 or 22) by shutting Pump Discharge, Mini- Flow and Suction Valves.
- b. REMOVE suction spool piece.
- [BI 168] NRC Letter, R. W. Borchardt for I. E. Dyer to Holders of Licenses for Operating Power Reactors as listed in enclosure 1, NRC Staff Guidance for Use in Achieving Satisfactory Compliance with February 25, 2002, Order Section B.5.b, February 25, 2005.
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 3 of 22 Rev. 2
- NOTE -
The temporary fire hose flange is located in Warehouse 2; location number: 25-11-031-02-7, AFW Fire Hose Flange; Mech number:
R3254.
1.F.2.c. INSTALL temporary fire hose flange.
- d. ALIGN the Fire system to both AFW suction hose connections.
- e. UNISOLATE the selected AFW pump discharge AND mini-flow line.
- f. RUN the selected AFW pump, as needed.
G. If the protected area plant fire system is unavailable, the plant fire system outside the protected area can be cross-connected to it through valve 0-FP-557. Refer to drawing OM-56 (60-714) Plant Fire Protection System. This provides an additional motor-driven and diesel engine-driven pump along with an additional storage tank capacity of 200,000 gallons of unborated water.
- 2. INDEX OF FIGURES: ALTERNATE WATER SOURCES Either Unit Affected Fig. 1 Gravity transfer of RWTs through Spent Fuel Pool system Unit - 1 Affected Fig. 2 Pumping Unit-2 RWT to Unit-I RWT with #12 SFP Pump Fig. 3 Unit-2 RWT supplying Unit-I SI and CS Pumps Fig. 4 21/22 LPSI Pumps supplying Unit-i RCS from #21 RWT Fig. 5 21/22 CS Pumps supplying Unit-i Cntmt from #21 RWT Fig. 6 11/21 Spent Fuel Pools supplying Unit-1 SI and CS Pumps Fig. 7 21/22 LPSI Pumps supplying Unit-1 RCS from 11/21 Spent Fuel Pools Fig. 8 21/22 CS Pumps supplying Unit-1 Cntmt from 11/21 Spent Fuel Pools Fig. 9 U-1 AFW To U-1 SI X-Connect Using HP Hoses Fig. 10 U-1 SI To U-1 AFW X-Connect Using HP Hoses Unit -2 Affected Fig. 11 Pumping Unit-I RWT to Unit-2 RWT with #11 SFP Pump Fig. 12 Unit-I RWT supplying Unit-2 SI and CS Pumps Fig. 13 11/12 LPSI Pumps supplying Unit-2 RCS from #11 RWT Fig. 14 11/12 CS Pumps supplying Unit-2 Cntmt from # 11 RWT Fig. 15 11/12 Spent Fuel Pools supplying Unit-2 SI and CS Pumps Fig. 16 11/12 LPSI Pumps supplying Unit-2 RCS from 11/12 Spent Fuel Pools Fig. 17 11/12 CS Pumps supplying Unit-2 Cntmt from 11/21 Spent Fuel Pools Fig. 18 U-2 AFW To U-2 SI X-Connect Using HP Hoses Fig. 19 U-2 SI To U-2 AFW X-Connect Using HP Hoses
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 4 of 22 Rev. 2 FROM FROM
- 11 SFP #21SFP 0-SFP-203 O-SFP-206 OPEN OPEN 0-SFP-192 OPEN OPEN O-SFP-101 0-SFP-105 SHUT SHUT TO TO
- 11 SFP #12 SFP PUMP PUMP NOTE This is an alternate lineup to 01-24 H FIGURE 1 GRAVITY TRANSFER OF RWTs THROUGH SFP SYSTEM (EITHER UNIT AFFECTED)
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 5 of 22 Rev. 2 K2 FROM
- 21 RFP O-SFP-187 OPEN SHUIT TO TO FROM
- 21 $FP O-SFP-188 C OPEN
- 11SFPHX OUTLET FROM
- 11 SFP FILTER FROM
- 11 SFP IX U
FIGURE 2 PUMPING UNIT 2 RWT TO UNIT-1 RWT WITH #12 SFP PUMP (UNIT-1 AFFECTED)
K-
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 6 of 22 Rev. 2 1-MOV-4142 SHUT 1-SI-FROM (B 4146
- 11 RWT FROM h.
CNTMT SUMP "
1-MOV-4144 1-SI-SHUT 4148 FIGURE 3 UNIT-2 RWiT SUPPLYING UNIT-1 SI AND CS PUMPS (UNIT-1 AFFECTED)
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 7 of 22 Rev. 2 K>
FROM
- 12 SDCHX FIGURE 4
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 8 of 22 Rev. 2 2-SI-314 #21
- 21 HPSI 2-MOV- 4143 2 SHUT PUMP ISHUT 4142 OPEN #21 SUCT i OPEN T SPRAYI CNTMT TO 2-SI- #21 CNTMT
. TO SPRAY HDR 41472 #23 HPSI 2-SI- 2-I 1 2SHUT3 PUMP L SUCTION 2-MOV-662 SHUT 2-SI-329 SPRAY SHUT TO o
--- - *4- m #22 CNTMT PUPUT SPRAY HDR 2-SI-323 2-SO-32 #22 2-S_31EPE SDCHX OPN#22 2-SI-457 OPEN CNTMT SPRAY PUMP TO
- 21 SFP 2-SI-458 TO OPEN
- 21 RFP TO 0-SFP-150 #21 RWT SHUT A 2-SI-460 0-SFP-149H SHUT SHUT~ 0-SFP-1 52 2-SI-458 FROM OPEN OPEN II II TO
- 12 SFPHX O-F-2
-SFP-120H '/
- 1II/I;*;C',
SPOOL PIECE I 2-CrV-57 -1 U-2 RCS SHI 0-SFP-128 INSTALLED j2-SI-464 SHUT A SHUT TO SHUT
- 11 SFP 0-SFP-124 FILTER OPEN TO FILTER 0-SFP-127 CVCS SHUT 1-CV-657 0-SFP-115 _-___ SPOOL PIECE 1-SI-458 SHUT FROM SHUT INSTALLED OPEN
- 11 TO SFPHX U-1 RCS O-SFP-154 I-SI-464 OPEN TO O-SFP-157tF 0-SFP-1551 SHUT
- 12 CNTMT SPRAY HDR FIGURE 5
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 9 of 22 Rev. 2 FROM
- 11 RWT O-SFP-192 SHUT TO TO 4
- 11 SFP #12 SFP FROM FROM PUMP PUMP #21 RWT #21 RFP FIGURE 6 11 AND 21 SFPs SUPPLYING UNIT-1 SI AND CS PUMPS (UNIT-1 AFFECTED)
K~ 9
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 10 of 22 Rev. 2 FR:OM FROM FROM
0-SFP-197 OPEN 0-SFP-194 O*
-SFP-t 99 0-SFP-192 SHUT O-SFP--F1 OPEN
"-FP-1011 F O-SFP-10$
FROM "II RWT SHUT SHUT O-SFP-18i 0-SFP.l7 T SHUT SHUT TO TO OIISFP XI2SFP PUMP PUMP FROM FROM 121 RWT 121 RFP 2-SI-447 2-SI-444 2-SI445 OPEN NORMAL SHUT TO TO ro SOCWW8 RCS RCS SUCT MR , t TO1 ro SPOOL INST S 'MT 2-St-441 RCS R:CS 2--'
OPEN PIECE 621 Lpst PUMP 246 10V. 2-MOV.
2-SI-442 NORMAL OPEN 2-St440
'P.'
P 24-4434 2_U 2-143-1 2-SI435 OPEN Op 2-MOV-658 SHUT G1s SHUT t 645 OPEN ,2-MOV-NIOREAL - - 2-&V-SUCT HDR s25" 'I 635 2W32 SHUT SHUT LPSI 2-MOV° 2-51-306 PUMP OPEN 399 SHIUT 2-SI-457 TO SHUT LPSIPUMP FROM SUCTIONS O22 SOcKHX- v FROM
-p.4-021 TO TO 2-S/-456 SOCr4X 021 SFP CVCS SHUT TO 0121RFP
. "TO 0"5FP-149 0-SFP-150 I S24-SI4641r- 121 RWT SHUT ,F SHUT SHUT j 2-- 2-SI--4,0 0-SFP-152
- 45 SHUT FROM 91l2 SFPHX *-SFP-120 SPOOL PIECE 2-CV-657 SHUT 10 INSTALLED OPEN 0.SFP-128 TO TO SHUT cVCS Oil SFP SO-SFP-124 O FILTER 0-SFP.127 OPEN 141.464?
SHUT SHUT T 1-SI- I-CV-657 O-SFP-Ill SPOOL PIECE 45 OPEN FROM SHUT INSTALLED OPEN TO oil SFPHX O-SFP-154
-*~---~ IU-I RC3 OPEN #11TORWT 1I-S60 O-SFP-157 0-SFP.155 SHUT SHUT I t-460 1)SHUT SHUT TO 011 HPSI I PUMP TO TO SUCTION 1-1-456 FROM Ili RFP ill ISFP LPSI DISCH 1-S.1-4 57 SHUT FROM FIGURE 7 912 SOCx
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 11 of 22 Rev. 2 2-MOV-4142 FROM FROM FROM
- 21 RWT .I-MOV-4143 SHUT INSTALLED TO
- 21 RVVT U
FROM TO
- 12 U-2 RCS SFPHX FROM TO il1 U-I RCS SFPHX TO cVcS TO O11CRYNT 111SFP SPRAY NOR TO 012 CNUMT SPRAY MDR FIGURE 8
- 21 (22) CS PUMPS SUPPLYING UNIT-1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY FROM 11/211SFPs (UNIT-1 AFFECTED)
K>
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 12 of 22 Rev. 2 1-S1-114 TO RCS FROM AFW PUMPS DISCH 1 DRAIN LII HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example) 1-SI-124 TO RCS FROM AFW PUMPS DISCH 1"DRAIN I HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example)
AFW drain valves am located in 5' East Pen. Room. Sl drain valves are in the 27' East Pen Room.
The example hose is rated for 800 psi. Higher pressure hoses may be available.
Estimated flow with 300 psig between AFW and RCS is 100 gpm FIGURE 9 U-1 AFW TO U-1 SI X-CONNECT USING HP HOSES
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 13 of 22 Rev. 2 1-SI-133 TO RCS FROM AFW PUMPS - 1-SI-544 DISCH OPEN 1-SI-543 OPEN V DRAIN I HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example) 1-SI-143 TO RCS 1-SI-546 OPEN I-S1-545 OPEN U
HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example)
Notes AFW drain valves are located in 5' East Pen. Room. SI drain valves are in the 27' East Pen Room.
The example hose is rated for 800 psi. Higher pressure hoses may be available.
Estimated flow with 300 psig between AFW and RCS is 100 gpm FIGURE 10 U-1 SI TO U-1 AFW X-CONNECT USING HP HOSES
AT1TACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 14 of 22 Rev. 2 FROM
- 11 RFP O-SFP-190 SHUT TO TO
- 11 SFP O-SFP-192 (
OPEN
- 12 SFP HX FROM FROM OUTLET #11 SFP ail SFP FILTER Ix FIGURE 11 PUMPING UNIT 1 RWT TO UNIT-2 RWT WITH #11 SFP PUMP (UNIT-2 AFFECTED)
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 15 of 22 Rev. 2 2-MOV-4142 SHUT 2-SI- K>
4146 FROM
TO TO 4
- 11 SFP #12 SFP FROM FROM PUMP PUMP #21 RWT #21 RFP FIGURE 12 UNIT-1 RVVT SUPPLYING UNIT-2 SI AND CS PUMPS (UNIT-2 AFFECTED)
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 16 of 22 Rev. 2 FIGURE 13
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 17 of 22 Rev. 2 1-SI-314 #11
- 11 1-81-313 OPEN SDCHX RWT 1-MOV-663 I 1-S-SHUT 319 TO 1O 1-MOV- I-SI-52 # 11 HPSI SHUT 1-MOV- 4143 #11 SHUT PUMP 4142 OPEN CNTM*T SUCT TO 4 OPEN SPRAY #11 CNTMT P-sU- PU TO SPRAY HDR
.414- OPEN*. # SHUT A
-S-453 IF SUCTIN PUMP - SHU 1-SI-329 SHUT TO
-*4---, #12CNTMT I -Si-323 I-SI-324 #12 SPRAY HDR I-SI-321 OPEN SDCHX OPEN 1-SI-457
- 12 OPEN CNTMT SPRAY PUMP TO
- 11 SFP -- 04<1 1-SI-456 TO OPEN
- 11 SFPHX O-SFP-115 U-1 RCS SPOOL PIECE 1-CV-657 SHUT D-SF-127 INSTALLED SHUT 1-SI-464 SHUT TO
- 11SFP FILTER SHUT 0-SFP-128 OSFP.124 OPEN TO CVCS K-,
SHUT 2-CV-657 O-SFP-120 SPOOL PIECE 2-SI-458 SHUT FROM SHUT INSTALLED OPEN 10 . 6 -- I 6-6aIbd .- -" -~ TO
- 12 V .4 U-2 RCS SFPHX O-SFP-152 O-SFP-1494 OPEN 2-S.-464 TO O-SFP-1501 SHUT t #21 RVVT SHUT SHUT A 2-SI-460 SHUT TO 2-SI-456 CVCS TO OPEN TO TO #21 CNTMT
- 22 CNTMT SPRAY HDR FIGURE 14
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 18 of 22 Rev. 2 FROM
.FROM
- 21 RWT O-SFP-192 SHUT TO TO 4 +
- 11 SFP #12 SFP FROM FROM PUMP PUMP #21 RWT #21 RFP FIGURE 15 11 AND 21 SFPs SUPPLYING UNIT-2 SI AND CS PUMPS (UNIT-2 AFFECTED)
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 19 of 22 Rev. 2 FIGURE 16
ATTACHMENT I ERPIP 611 Page 20 of 22 Rev. 2 TO cvcs FROM TO 512 t'.2 RCS SFPVC SHUT TO 4I & V'S OPEN TO TO TO E ICNTMT 021 RFP 021 SFP SpRAy OPEN TO on CNTMT SPRAYNOR FIGURE 17
- 11 (12) CS PUMPS SUPPLYING UNIT.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY FROM 11/21/SFPs (UNIT-2 AFFECTED)
ATTACHMENT 1. ERPIP 611 Page 21 of 22 Rev. 2 2-SI-114 TO ReS FROM AFW PUMPS DISCH 1VDRAIN LI HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example) 2-SI-124 TO Res FROM AFW PUMPS DISCH 1 DRAIN I U
HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example)
Notes AFW drain valves are located in 5' East Pen. Room. SI drain valves are in the 27' East Pen Room.
The example hose is rated for 800 psi. Higher pressure hoses may be available.
Estimated flow with 300 psig between AFW and RCS is 100 gpm FIGURE 18 U-2 AFW TO U-2 SI X-CONNECT USING HP HOSES
ATTACHMENT 1 ERPIP 611 Page 22 of 22 Rev. 2 Text
-+§4- TO RCS 2-AFW-162 2-MOV-616 TO FROM SHUT FROM OPEN AFW PUMPS .-
DISCH 2-CV-4521 2-CV-4511
- 21SG HPSI PUMPS DISCH 4-.1 TO SHUT OPEN 2-SI-121 RCS OPEN 2-MOV-626 SHUT 2-AFW-203 OPEN 4___TO 2-MOV-636 RCS 2-SI-122 SHUT OPEN 11 TO V DRAJN LINE-. --- RCS 2-MO444-646 SHUT HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example)
Text TO RCS TO RCS TO RCS TO RCS 2-MOV-647 SHUT HIGH PRESSURE HOSE MECH# 75U17 (for example)
AFW drain valves are located in 5' East Pen. Room. SI drain valves are in the 27' East Pen Room.
The example hose is rated for 800 psi. Higher pressure hoses may be available.
Estimated flow with 300 psig between AFW and RCS is 100 gpm FIGURE 19 U-2 SI TO U-2 AFW X-CONNECT USING HP HOSES
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 2 ,J Page 1 of 4 Electrical Power Supplies A. The methods listed below are possible means to AC supply power to an essential component that could be operated if power were available. The provisions of 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) likely apply to these actions and should be evaluated as such.
I1. ALIGN the OC DG to more than one 4KV Vital Bus simultaneously.
- b. CLOSE the desired "06" disconnect then close the associated "06" breaker.
(There are no interlocks to prevent closure of more than one "06" breaker at a time.)
2.. SWAP breakers between cubicles. (If a breaker problem is keeping an otherwise available component from service.)
- a. VERIFY open OC DG Output Breaker 152-0701.
- b. STRIP the DGs normal bus except for Saltwater, Service Water and the associated reactor MCC, i.e.1 14R, 104R, 204R, or 214R. K,_
- c. STRIP the 4KV bus to be powered up.
- NOTE -
IA DG requires 152-1703, 152-1701 and 152-1103 to be closed to feed another bus from 11 4KV Bus. The below operation pertaining to the "03" breakers will apply to 1703, 1701 and 1103 if IA DG is used.
- d. REMOVE the trip power fuses (to defeat interlocks) from the "03" breaker for the bus normally supplied by the available DG.
- e. REMOVE the trip and control power fuses (to defeat interlocks) from the "06" breaker for the bus normally supplied by the available DG.
- f. VERIFY open, THEN REMOVE the trip and control power fuses from the "06" breaker of the bus to be supplied.
- g. GET the EOP disconnect keys from the control room key locker and CLOSE both "06" disconnects associated with the "06" breakers from which the fuses have been removed.
- h. LOCALLY CLOSE the "06" breaker for the normal bus.
- i. LOCALLY CLOSE the "06" breaker for the other bus to be powered.
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 of 4
- j. START loads on either bus as desired (monitor DG loading limits).
- 4. IF a DG is available and it is desired to energize another 4KV bus to power an essential component, BUT the DG cannot be realigned to a another 4KV bus as per 3. above of this attachment, THEN CONSIDER backfeeding the DG up through the 13KV transformer and back down to the desired bus.
- 5. Single engine operation of the SACM DGs. (If an engine has a rotational problem, i.e.,
bearing seizure, then the engine will have to be uncoupled.)
- a. SELECT the engine to be used with the engine selector keyswitch on the local control panel. (Along with Emergency Start, this overrides the damaged engine's trips. There will be a significant differential between the fuel rack settings.)
- b. OPEN the cylinder vents on the damaged engine to allow the engine to windmill, or
- c. UNCOUPLE the damaged engine from the generator.
- d. EMERGENCY START the SACM DG and energize the desired bus.
- 6. Fuel can be supplied to the diesels without a Fuel Oil Transfer Pump using the head of the Day Tank by connecting a hose at the "Y" strainer at the Fuel Oil Transfer Pump from the Day Tank.
- 7. TIE a temporary generator into a selected 480V cubicle and BACKFEED power to an essential component.
- 8. TIE a temporary generator into a OC DG Building breaker cubicle (Bus 07) and BACKFEED to energize the 07 Bus as follows:
- a. VERIFY OC DG Output Breaker 152-0703 open.
- b. TIE the temporary generator into a breaker cubicle on Bus 07.
- c. ENERGIZE Bus 07 via backfeed from the temporary generator.
- d. CLOSE OC DG Tie Breaker 152-0701.
- e. ENERGIZE the selected 4KV vital bus by closing the "06" breaker for the bus to be energized.
- 9. An additional potential source is to use the SBO transformer from SMECO, OXO1, (1500KVA). Remove trip and control power fuses to defeat interlock then close 152-0704 and 152-0701 to energize a 4KV Bus via an "06" breaker.
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 3 of 4 B. The methods listed below are possible means to DC supply power to an essential component that could be operated if power were available. The provisions of I0CFR50.54(x) and (y) likely apply to these actions and should be evaluated as such.
I1. ALIGN a 250 V DC battery to replace a 125 V DC static battery. *1B11681
- a. OPEN circuit the selected 125 V DC battery.
- b. INSTALL electrical jumper between the selected 250 V DC battery.
-NOTE-The following is a list of possible parts that might be needed for use and can be found in Warehouse 2:
Quantity Needed Mech#
1000 88450 3/c 2/0 cable (2 runs 500')
4 75E64 500 Raychem WCSF-500 86 96M96 1/22" Burndy flat washers 48 96M99 1/2'" Bumdy lock washers 48 96M93 Y2" Burmdy nuts 48 96M84 Y2" X I Y2" Bumdy bolts 24 96M42 2/0 two hole Y2" Bumdy lugs 4 96A43 Scotch 33+ tape )
(1). REMOVE 250 V DC battery cells from service (as needed) to supply 125 V DC battery.
- c. ALIGN the selected 250 V DC battery to take the place of the selected 125 V DC battery (approximately Y2 of the battery cells may be needed).
- d. ENERGIZE 125 V bus as needed.
- [BI 168] NRC Letter, R. W. Borchardt for J. E. Dyer to Holders of Licenses for Operating Power Reactors as listed in enclosure 1, NRC Staff Guidance for Use in Achieving Satisfactory Compliance with February 25, 2002, Order Section B.5.b, February 25,2005.
c ERPIP Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 4 of 4 BUS 17 BUS 07 T152-1 701 152-0701 152-0703 )
152-1703 189-1703> 2 189-0703 152-2103
)
CDC 189.2103 Q) 189-2103A FIGURE 1 DIESEL GENERATOR LINEUPS
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Overriding Interlocks/Trips A. The items listed below are suggested as possible methods that can be used to restore a particular component or system to useable status by overriding interlocks and/or trips that otherwise would prevent the system or component from operating. The provisions of IOCFR50.54(x) and (y) likely apply to these actions and should be evaluated as such.
- 1. RCP's (remove close fuses on breakers to override interlocks).
- 2. Pull ESFAS modules at the logic cabinets for ESFAS function desired to be overridden (i.e., SIAS, CSAS, etc.).
- 4. Reset ESFAS signals at cabinets to override handswitch position interlock.
- 5. Remove the 35 amp control fuses from needed component's breaker (i.e., HPSI, LPSI, CNMNT Spray) to override interlocks/trips then close breaker locally.
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of2 Instrument Used Alternate Indication Comments Core Exit Temperature (CETs) 1) EOP Att. 12 Use RVLMS to determine if
- TI-131A-D, 132A-D 2) RVLMS core covered
- 3) Th (up to 705°F) CETs can also be read from recorders or Subcooling Margin Monitor RVLMS
- CETs If CETs are not superheated LI-20A, 20B then core is covered, also TbIPZR Press NI's can also be used to help determine if the core is covered.
RCS/PZR Press.
- 1)SIT level If SIT level is normal then PI-100A-D, PT-105B, LI-311,321,331,341 RCS press remains greater P1-103, PR-IOOX,Y than 200 psi CNMNT Press
- 1) RCS press 1) If large break LOCA PI-5307, 5310, (WR) 2) Assume saturated and use Possibly use disch. press on PI-5308 (NR) steam tables with CNMNT idle SI/CS pump with temperature CNMNT recirc valve open and RWT Out Shut CNMNT HI Range RMS
- Use ERPIP 800 series (core RI-5317A,B damage assessment)
NIs
- WR (Gammametrics)
CNMNT Sump Level Use RCS state and RWT level LI-4146,4147 (WR) to estimate LI-4145, 4144 (NR)
CNMNT H2
- PASS, grab sample 0-AR-6519, 6527 Use ERPIP 800 series (core damage assessment)
SI Flow Pump amps loop HPSI, loop LPSI, Total' FI-351 (HPSI Total) HPSI FI-311-341 (HPSI)
FI-312-342 (LPSI) "
RWT Level Local indication LIA-4341, 4342 Tail pipe Temperature Acoustic Monitor CNMNT temp if Quench tank TI-106,108 Quench Tank temp if intact ruptured CNMNT Temperature Use CaIc. Aid CA-10 TI-5309 (dome)
TI-5311 (cavity)
Subcooling
- PZR temp minus CET AI-11,12 temperature or Th
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Page 2 of 2 K>
Instrument Used' Alternate Indication Comments PZR Level
- LT-1IOX.Y CST Level
- 1/2-LI-5609 located on AFW suction line LIA-5610, 5611, 5603 in Unit-1 27' CNMNT Purge Air Supply Room S/G Level
- LIC-1113A-D, 1123A-D (NR)
LIC-1 114C, 1124D (WR)
S/G Press.
- T, and use steam tables PI-1013A-D, 1023A-D AFW Flow AFW Pump amps FIC-451 IA, 4525A 11-4540 FIC-4512A, 4535A S/G Steam Flow FI-1011, 1021 Th,Tc
- TR-1 12, 122 Instrument Air Pressure PI-2079 Condenser Vac.
PI-4404,4407,4410 RCP Parameters ~%-,
CNMNT Spray Flow Pump amps FI-4149, 4150 Feed Flow FR-1111, 1121 MWRT Level LI-2195, 2197 Aux. Bldg. Temperature TI-5275, 5276, 5279, 5280 (pen rooms)
Aux. Bldg. Rad. Levels RE-7004, 7005 (pen rooms)
SDC HX Out (TI-303X & Use for estimate of reactor 303Y) cavity sump water temp Bast Level LIA-206, 208
- denotes PAM instrument K.)
C C P
Figure 1-1 a Time to Uncover Top of Active Fuel Condition 1: RVLMS 71" Light 2a ev I IVolume of Liquid above a10tvlvfuel - 107¢t In,..IRC Initial RCS Pressure 250 P.O.
70 250 pile 60 Initial RCO Preaaut I IL. 1200 pals 0 50
- a. 40 30 Initil RCS Pressure rii I 20 - ---- ----- - - --------------------
CONDITIONS:
t Uncore previous y uncovired; RCS rsfdled aq 10 .Decay heat based on infinite operation IAll decay heat available to boil off inventory JNo SIG heat removal credited i.ventisuch am SRI.OCA. RT.OCA or teli vef situck noe 0
2 7 12 17 22 Time Since Reactor Shutdown,
Figure 1-lb Time to Uncover Top of Active Fuel Condition 2: RLMS 160 "Light ON" 300 Volume ofUquidabove ctivefuel 36883 ft 250 ........ ...... :.............................. ... ..........................
I,,*-, RCS Pressure 2.. .. ° .
U. 200 .............................................. ,..... .... .............................. * ....... ................................ ........ ......................
00 15 .............................................. .. ............ ... . . . "."
UV Wta RCS Prs E00 EI 10 .... ... .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. ... .. .. . .. . .. ..... .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. ... 40 p... . . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .
- Aladecay het available to boil off inzventory 27CC 12 17 22 Time Since Reactor Shutdown, Hours i 0201
CC C Figure 1-2 Coolint Level in Care Region vs. Timesincei Onset of Core Uncovery RCS Pressure-2400 Psis
¶0- "- 1k*ce~~~ t ,- "1 I~ 500A care uncovery implies a me~or aon~lon are dlmgl Timae sinec"'Reactor S hutdown 2 Hours - -
20 a*%*.*..
Hour's 30
.2
- 50 70 t.tA SO CONDlI"lONS: *"""
core prtvloully usncovered; Rcs ref'lld --.. ,
Decoy best based on isfinite op#rtstlono . --..
90 -- Alll decay No beat 0 heat available edted,---
removal to 1,oi] orflinventory .
0 10 20 30 40 so 00 Time Since Onset of Core Uncovery (min)
Figure 1-3 Coolant Level in Core Region vs. Time since Onset of Core Uncovery RCS Pressure=1200 Psia 0
F.-0% Core Uncovery Im plies 10 m~orcoredumge cndilonTime since Reactor Shutdown 20 2 Hours 8 Ifours N 24 Hours . . . .
CM30 C
40
,o _ -___.. __
- D 0 U70 CONDITIONS:
O *Core previously uncovered; RCS refilled "
CDcc y host based an 'infinite operatiton*
goI:J1 ecay heat available to bell off'invcntory
.--.- No SIO best removal credited 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 410 Time Since Onset of Core Uncovery (min) t'3-
C C C Figure 1-4 Coolant Level in Core Region vs. Time since Onset of Core Uncovery RCS Pressure=250 Psia lo 10* *. 10 F> 50% Core Uncovery Implies ima~jor moTime core damage condiuon... since Reactor Shutdown 20 2 Hours -
2~ 20 -. %8 Hours -
, .,24 Hours - - - -
C S30 CP O >""**,O Sso __.>
so 70 ONDITIONS:
> ore previously uncovered-, RCS refilled 0 u100 ecay heat based on infinite operation 4D 50 11decay heat available to boil off inventory 9L l o Sf0 heat removal credited 1001 0 10 20 30 40 6 so Time Since Onset of Core Uncovery (min)
CDo,
Figure I-S Percent of Active Fuel Region Uncovered Coolant Level in Core Region vs. Time since Onset of Core Un 7 20 so Chhon9pm m J '
800 Pumps Core previo aly' aoovered; RCS refilled . Flow So -D cecay heat based on infinito opartlion All dee 7y heot ovslloblo to boil offinvestory No SIO beat rtmoval oreditod 0 10 20 30 40 so t0 Tim lince mnost of Cot* Uneovery Iln)
<t'n C C -C
C Cf Figure 1-6 Coolant Level In Core Region vs. Time since Onset of Core 10 20 30
- 1 40 50 00 0
I 70 so go 100 10 20 o0 40 s0 s0 Time Since Onset of Core Uncovery (m In) qN
Figure 1.7 Coolant Level In Core Region vs. Time since Onset of Core Uncovery 0
10' 50% Care Uncovery Irnpll * ' Tim e since Reactor shutdown*. 2 h our ma'jor orto i dem ago condition RCS pressure: 260 pole R
20 30 * "- _ *.... 1ch -,,V* mpg, (,,80 p-
~40 L>
~~00 ICONDITIONS: U Ln eo JCore prefviously uncoverted; ACS Weillett 0 Decay lostbased an Inin~itel operation Ia. *All dilly bear available to boll onloiveniery No0 SIO host removal credited 010 20 30 40 so so lime Sinet OnsatofCore Uncovery (min)
C,..,,
C C
C CC Figure 2a-I Minimum Injection Flow Rate Required to Quench MoltenjCore (4000 deg. F)
_o_ Region of Expected Succes 750 650[rcvy rt
'600"I 400 250 450 150 CONDmTONS:
Cot, prw, oc.iy tcovenld; RC,5 rct1cI I________ ___ ___ ___ ___
100 Decay heaRbgied on htaine ope>ton _
0 4 6 8 t0 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 Tine Since 1f,,eter SUncverd. (lseMG)
Decay~~~~~~~b hetbsdo n o prto
Figure 2b-I a3 t2 300 h5 200 CDf 0 5 10 Is 20 25 Time Since Reactor Shutdown thrs)
C C C
C C C Figure 3a-1 Pressure Increase Upon injection of Loop Seat Water Into RV (Superheated Conditions, T=1500*)
'No RCS vents or SO heat removal considered 3500 - -
3000 Ag 2500 ____________
e 2000 _______ ______
Expected pressurization for I RCP 1500 Horizontal leg of loop seal water H."
,o~o11
- i Iote: peration of PSVs will Limit Pressur-0 above 2500 Psla 500 ( No Pres urzatlon 0
200 400 600 800 1000 1200' 1400 1600 11100 2000 Initial RCS Pressure, psia
Figure 3a-2 "
Pressure increase Upon injection oftLoop Seat Water into RV (Saturated Conditions, SO R~est Removal Considered)'
0 No RCS Vents 2500 T-1 SOTR PossIble In dry 50 2000 Max expected prlssurtrzalon.
1I0 M
ax Im ..... ... . -- - -: - . .. ..- .. . . . . .
u R 100 C
S Pr Ca su re, pa 500 In IdcdFlte Expected pressurization for RCP rettart.
Horlzontal lot of loop seelwator Injected.
0 200 400 SOO g00 100 120 140 160 is* 2000 initial R~CS Pressurei palm tQ C C C
C C C TABLE 3a-1: CONSEQUENCES OF RCP RESTART FOR VARIOUS PLANT ACCIDENT STATES PLANT STATE PRIOR TO RCP RESTART CASE PRE.EX]STING PORV(S) OPEN SO AVAILABLE PSV$ OPEN WHEN RCS PRESSURES FOLLOWINO RCP RESTART PRESSURE RELATED UNISOLATLD FOR HEAT CHALLENGED CONSEQUENCES OF RCP LOCA REMOVAL RESTART IA NO NONE NO NO SEE FICRE 3a-I RCS PRESSURIZATION MAY CHALLENGE OPERABILITY St INJECTION VALVES TT.SOTR
- IS POSSIBLE lB NO NONE NO YES SEE FIGURE 3&ol. NOTE THAT IF PRESSURE> . TI-SGTR iS POSSIBLE 2500 PSIATHE MAXINIULM SYSTEM PRESSURE IS EXPECTED TO BE LESS THAN 3000 PSIA 2 NO NO NO CHALLENGE PEAK PRESSURE IN THE RANGE OF 1900 TO 2500
- TI.SGTR IS POSSIBLE EXPECTEDm PSIA 3 NO 2 NO NO CHALLENGE PEAK PRESSURE IN THE RANGE OF 300 TO 2000 0 TI-SGTR IS POSSIBLE EXPECTED PSIA BUT LESS LIKELY THAN FOR CASE 2 4 YES 0 NO NO CHALLENGE PEAK PRESSURE IN THE RANGE OF 300 TO 2000 o TI.SOTRIS POSSIBLE
____EXPECTED PSIA ,.
5 YES IOR2 NO NO CHALLENGE VARIES FROM NEOUOIBLETO UP TO 2500 PSIA & TI-SO= UNUKELY EXPECTED DEPENDING UPON BREAK SIZE AND LOOP SEAL DUE TO LOW INITIAL DISCHARGE RCS PRESSURE AND CD 0r PORVS WHICH DIRECT STEAM FLOW AWAY FROM DRY SOL.
6 YES ANY COMBINATION YES,-, NO CHALLENGE RCS PRESSURE NEARMSSV SETPOINT * ]SOTR THREAT IS EXPECTED VERY UNLIKELY AND IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF NO CHALLEN GE S EEFIGM3* 3 a-4. OOURE ONE SO IS DRY NO 0 YFS'j 7
_ _ _EXPECTED 9 NO I OR 2 YESM" NO CHALLENGE RCS PRESSURE NEAR MSSV SETOINT I__II EXPECTED I
- 1. Steam generators with a water level on the secondary side greater than 10 feet above the tubesheet may be considered sufficientlywetted that TI-SG1tiilI not occur.
- 2. It is important that both SGs contain Inventory to assure TI-SGTR can be avoided 0%
I-
TABLE 31,-I: CONSEQUENCES OF CORE DEBRIS REFLOOD FOR VAiUOUS PLANT ACCIDENT STATES PLANT STATE PRIOR TO CORE DEBRIS REFLOOD"*"
CASE PRE-.EXISTINO PORV(S) OPEN SO AVAILABLE PSVt OPEN WHEN RCS PRESSURES 'OLLOWINO REFLOOD PRESSURE RELATED UNISOLATED FOR HEAT CHALLENOED CONSEQUENCES OF LOCA .....REMOVAL REFLOOD IA NO NONE NO NO RCS PRESSURE WILL EXCEED 2500 PSIA. MUCH
- TI-SGTR IS POSSIBLE GREATER PRESSURIZATION UNLIKELY DUE TO LIIffTATIONS IN THE ABILITY TO INJECT INTO A 1I( PRESSLRERCS. NOTE FIGUREL3a.-Vs-2 MAY BE USED TO ESTIMATE PRESSURIZATION.
FOR THIS APPLICATION THE LOWER BOUND LINE REPRESENTS THE EQUIVALENT I!NJECTION OF ABOUT 250 GALLONS OF WATER. WHILE THE UPPER BOUND LINE CORRESPONDS To THE INJECTION AND VAPORIZATION OF 200 OALLONS OF WATER
,B NO NONE NO YES PEAK PRESSURE L4 VICINITY OF 2500 PSIA ' TI.SGTR Is POSSIBLE 2 NO I NO CHALLENGE PEAK PRESSURE IN THE RANGE OF 1900 TO 2500
- TI.SOTR IS POSSIBLE POSSIBLE PSIA 3 NO 2 NO NO CHALLENGE PEAK PRESSURE IN THE RANGE OF 300 TO 2000
- TI-SOTR is POSSIBLE EXPECTED PSIA BUT LS LIKELY >
THAN FOR CASE 2 4 YES 0 NO NO CHALLENGE PEAK PRESSURE IN THE RANGE OF 2000 PSIA
- TI-SOTR IS POSSIBLE EXPECTED 3 YES IOR2 NO NO CHALLENOE VARIES FROM NEOUIIBLE TO UP TO 2500 PSIA
- TI.SGTR UNLIKELY EXPECTED DEPENDING UPON BREAK SIZE AND LOOP SEAL DUE TO LOW INITIAL DISCHARGE RCS PRESSU AND '-"
PORVS WHICH DIRECT STEAM FLOW AWAY FROM DRY SOs.
6 YES ANY COMBINATION YES'" NOCHALLENGE RCS PRESSURE NEAR ?dSSV SETIPOINT " TISOTRTHREATIS EXPECTED VERY UNLIKELY AND IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF ONESOIS DRY 7 NO 0 YES' NO CHALLENGE PEAK RCS PRESSURE BELOW 2000 PSIA
_ _ ~ EXPECTED_ __
a NO I OR 2 YESL NO CHALLENGE RCS PRESSURE NEAR MSSV SETFOINT
.... _EXPECTED I. Steam gbtm a waser el am the sweadFay side eaLer hn 10 feet aoew t?* tobalwet may be cmdLered ufisciderly wew that TI-SOTR wig nt cu.
vni*wh
- 2. Notedita linsotMt thart bot S&s co*tan (entyto T.SOTRcmnb tvolde&
wm*-e 0 RCS presures following rflood are appsdmate 01 Note pnuu~re tp&e will also be limited by the capbility md delivery oIrthe lnjctlon source 4'
t .
C C (
Figure 4a-l RV Head(Pressurizer Vent Steam Flow Rate as a Function of RCS Pressure 250 CONDIT*°O*S:
D--isoarg rate limited by 1/2" pipe ... . ............... . . ........................ .............. ..................... ...................
upsteam ofquenh ceak s c*sume$ ideal gas 200 -
.s...........................................
,* ; Saturated Steam 11501___
too _ _ _ __ _ _
............................. .................... .......... ru....... S petheated Wtas .-.........
50 ________ _______ T-I_____
o....o ......... . ~o
....... .. ............. .o.. . ..... . o o......... ............ oo.o..oo o ............. . .
0 500 100 ISO 2000 2500 RGS Pressute. psia tza
Figure 4a-2 Hydrogen"Discharge Rate from R.V/PZR Head Ventvs. RCS Pressure, 80 70 CONDITONS:
Discharge rate limited by 1/2" pipe upstream 'of quench tank Assumes Idea! gas HZ-tom pe~rature-50 40 H2 termperature 30 _ _ _;_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
S0010 IS000 2F0>
20 Soo0 100 ISO 2000 2500 RCS pressure(psla)
C C C
C C Figure 4a-3 Time Required to Vent Hydrogen From RCS as:a Function 0f-RCS Gas Temperature 10 9
ICOND ITIONS:'r -
- Dischargeof
[upstream rate limited quench by 1/2" pipe tank ssumes ideal gas _
E 3 Ita_0_
28 4 4- 4 I
100 MH2
- ýP volume 1 4 It f (14 4 + +
300 500 700 9o0 110 130 150 RCS Oas Temperature 0 F C%
Figure 4b-I PORV Mass Flow Rate as a Function of RCS Pressure ..
6000 .".......
PORV Steam Conditions "
IPORV 2 P Y 5000 Saturated Superheated(T-1500F) 4000 3000 ro CO 2000 1000 WW 0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 RCS Pressure (pola)
C C: C
C C C Figure 4b-2 PORV Energy Flow Rate as a Function of RCS Pressure PORV Steam Conditions 6.OOE*06 - I PORV 2 PORV*
Saturated 5.00E+06 - Superhested (T* )50OF) 4.00E+06 J 0ý- On>
2.00E.OOWOO
-1000O O.OOE+0 0 500 1000: 1500 2o00 2500 RCS Pressure (psia)
< 0%
Available ResourvesFiguFor4b-3 Highh Pressure InJection S
I >'
0 80w 7U3 50 10 1I00 1780 W0 2m5 2500 Pressure (pda)
<O~
C C C
C C C Figure 4c.1 RCS DeprCssurization Rate For Venting Saturatcd Steam 350 -
CONDITIONS; Core As IIIyin .?vrsa and iC' *z ti 4______
30"0 . - Flesh ainii ffeel4v l CS s 4ate a 4n 4st tes dcprse~rIsetlos Is aet tooeli4dtd I Spfseltrossakeq kiloII ISwunId Is Its$2 PORVS OPEN S10belrem oval*eIIlt sIser6d tC b kto t ezcept rer vils 250 1200 IMI OVOE N A>
150 _ _ _VENT_ "_"
100. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
0 L 500 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 2500 RCS PR3SSURE
< 0N
Figure 4c-2 RCS Depressurization Rate Venting Steam at 1500F 400
- CONDJTIJONS:
350 Core Mly uncovered and RCS mostly voided -f 2 PORVS OPEN Flashing of residual RCS waterto steam during depressutization is *notconsidered Superheat rate calculations assume ideal gas 300 - S/G heat removal not considered RCS intact except for vent 250 1___ ____0_E
- 200 100 oc _____
500 700: 900. 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 250C RCSdPRESSURE (PSIA)
C C C
C C C Table 5a-1
- i==:
.* !'!," iaction F Zircaloy :Oxidized and :C-ontainmentHydrogen. i ,* ii Scenario/ Event Fraction of Equivalent, Hydrogen Zircaloy Mass of Concentration j:7A:: .. :...2.... .2:: r . .olm.
(no Generated
_______________________ Reflood)_______
Station Blackout with Stuck open 0.50 1250 11.4 PORV or Extended total loss ofC feedwater- ___
Large LOCA wloSI .initial core 0.40 10001 9.3 CD 0
uncoveryý -P6 tA Small LOCA w/o SI- initial core 0.35 875 8.3.
uncovery
- .H2 concentrations are referenced to a dry containment atmosphere (no steam) at 100 F.
Radiolytic H2 production is comparatively small and is neglected.
For SBO, H2 mostly trapped in RCS until vessel breach.
For LOCAs, H2 mostly distfibuted in containment.
- e.C
Table 5a-2
.. F.cto
.x~ .. cao d C.........ontanmTent! Hydrogen
.~~~~~~
.... :-!J ry mteasurement d...
P.M ~
Scenario/ Event Fraction of Equivalent Hydrogen Zircaloy Mass of Concentration, OxidiZed Hydrogen.Dry (wfrefiood) Generated*
... ' i~ii*i*[i m :iii!i: i!...ii* b 6 : o : li
".*: ' .'V- . ; ....
- .:.:i:.i.:::h*!iiH::H:.::::
-'** : :::..t: .: ., . ,-m Station Blackout with stuck, open 0.75 1875 16.2 PORV or Extended total loss of feedwater_
Large LOCA Wlo:SI -initial core 0.65: 1625 '14.3, uncovery ILA Small LOCA w/o SI - initial. core 0.6 1500 13.4 uncovery
- H2 concentrations are referenced to a dry containment atmosphere (no steam) at 100 F.
Radiolytic H2 production isý comparatively small and is neglected.
For SBO, H2 mostly trapped in RCS until vessel breach.
For LOCAs; HI2 mostly distributed in containtmenet tz.
C C C
C C C Figure.Sb-l. Hydrogen Production Event and Progression Decision Tree Zircaloy Oxidation Reflood Successful Core Relocates RCS Pressure Prior Core Relocates Final State index due to Initial to Lower Head to VB > 250 psia to Cavity (for Use with Table I)
Transient (EX)
InHWTramient >
Event I FY-es No TYes NoN' E___
Table 5b-1.
Fraction Ziicaloy Oxidized and Y/o Hydrogen in Containment dry measurement_
- St~inarii0IEvent- Paramter *.l Final State Final State Final State Final State Final State De"scripoio: 1 , .. Index A Index B Index C Index D Index E
- Core Reflooded EXup-WETC E%:HP.DRYC EX:LP.WETC MXLP-DRYC Fraction of Zr 0.75 0.78 0.73 0.77 >1.0 Oxidized Station Blackout Mass of H2 1875 1950 1825 1940 >2500 with stuck open produced Obm)
PORV or Extended total loss of feedwater Vohlme % H2 16.2 16.7 15.8 16.6 >20.5 Fraction of Zr 0.65 0.74 0.68 .73 >1 C)
Oxidized Large LOCA w/o Mass of H2 1625 1840 1690 1830 >2500 SI -initial core produced (ibm) uncovery ,_....
Volume % H2 .14.3 15.9 14.8 15.8 >20.5 Fractio of7Zr 0.60 0.71 0.65 .70 >1 Small LOCA w/o Mass of H2 1500 1785 1622 1770 >2500 SI - initial core produced (lbmn .. ..
Volume % H2 13.4 15.5 14.3 15.4 >20.5 (I C C
C C C Figure Sc-I Hydrogen Generation Rate due to Corrosion of Containment Materials 2 5 .0o .. _ . .. .. . . . . ..
CONWON.
Ccrpsd bWWOnuy~cm WWO OMU~
20.00 ADdmcy ,- w43" it bod ofrbwady oo .15.00
- N P.00 2... ..
210.00 -
5.00 _
0.00 "
0.00 50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 300.00 350.00 Containment Temperature (F)
Figure 5c-2 Long Term Hydrogen Productl6n Due To Containment Metal Oxidation*
(PH = 7.6) 45M,_ _ _
5000¸
.0 0
.2 0f IL 0
20 00 E 2300 1500" I
500 0
0 5 10 it 20 25 Time Since Initiation of Loss of Inventory Accident, t.J-C C C
C C C Table 6-1 USE OF EX-CORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) TO ASSESS CORE DAMAGE PROGRESSION INSTRUMENTrNORMAL OPERATION SEVERE ACCIDENT RESPONSE STARTUP AND WIDE DECREASING CPS AS BT* DECAYS AT A RATE OF 1/3 AT INITIAL CORE UNCOVERY, CPS MAY STABILIZE RANGE CHANNELS DECADE PER INUM CPS ICEASES AS CORE UNCOVERY PROGRESSES NI DEVICE USED AS A FALL OFF RATE DECREASES IN 20 MINUTES AS (DUE TO INCREASE NEUTRON LEAKAGE)
NEUTRON DET7ECTOR NEUTRON SOURCE IS DOMINATED BY DzO-GAMMA.
NEUTRON REACTION. UNCOVERY RESPONSE MAY BE INITIALLY MASKED BY CHANGES IN WATER AVAILABILITY EXTERNAL TO THE REACTOR VESSEL Note:
Activities contributing tor. (a) RV Refill, (b)cavity floodin& (c) temporary relocation ofwater into the core or (d) relocation of core material to the lower plium will be evident by a decrease in neutron commt rate.
Caution:
Once significant core umcovezy has occurr, the decrease in water availability wll caue the neutron prduction rate to drop (decrease in D10 reaction). Care should be taken not to interpret this signal as an indlcaton ofcore ecovery.
Table 6-1 USE OF EX-CORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) TO ASSESS CORE DAMAGE PROGRESSION INSTRUMENT NORMAL OPERATION SEVERE ACCIDENT RESPONSE POWER RANGE DATA SHOULD BE INTERPRETED BASED ON CURRENT INCREASING GAMMA FLUXES MAY INDICATE UNCOVERY, DETECTORS TYPICAL OF STARTUP AND REACTOR SHUTDOWN. HOWEVER, GAMMA FLUXES ARE NOT VERY SENSITMVE TO WATER LOSS MAY BE USED AS GAMMA CHANGING GAMMA FLUXES MORE INDICATVE OF FLUX INDICATORS VIA RELOCANION OF FISSION PRODUCTS DIRECT SENSING OF DEECTOR CURREN LARGE DOSE INCREASES (CURRENT) UPON RV FAILURE (TRANSITORY)
CURRENT MONITORS SENSE GAMMA FLUX FROM EXTERIOR CORE LARGE DOSE READINGS IF COR]UM BED FORMS IN CAVITY Noe: 0d BUNDLES C) 10 DC OTPUTOF HE PWERTy*a detectorcurrens during core unemcy maron the ardero( 10' amps.
DC OUTPUT OF THE POWER Following a scemna inchuins a lower head wve*
- tm (VB) Us current will 0*~
RANGENI MUST BE READ abrpty rise. 'Ie mapde ot . wU d upon MANUALLY USING A PICO- 1. c e cavkyfkoft
- o AMMETER 2. ltCsppNavuae e l owkcSpeure(<2.*50pil)w erowdurvto molte" pool trawfon Malower WasolizW hlioei pv&dul.i Current increa. myvay fcn a facter of 2 to upto $ ordenr oma*ide for' hier preusw melt ejcto conditiona. (See Fi~urv 641)
.~ a~
C C (I
Figure 6.1 Estimated Powilr~quivatifnc.o,aNeutron W ide Range a Gamm a Power C hann*IDC Output for a Rapid Uncovery Transient 11:10 $:tours pp. wife# so*,pq..m te r '141 so for a lovef. soo~ldeasoso It~ :lewer 9 Is.3 inletv ci 10.
1:::.,oil. saeviy~ i.b e
$494 Flire cap.
Dem 1"
mea 91*.s 1.0 ll' N o
pemue ~vlde or .c IfeIig .
a Na nO 11tre S60t so* .Paes.e ther 1001.00 lie fti U i woo eS 10- II 10 ft " 0 1 (01919 Time Aloai. to Atbiliary)
<o~
Figure 7-2 Hydrogen Combustibility Chart Based on Dry Hydrogen Measurement 20 10 pg°evre°Hydrogen - - - . -.-. I I Challenge Design Pressure: 50 psig Median Failure Pressure: 128 pald 85 psl -g ' .. - -"
Hydrogen Bum ENot *:
o
- Flammable >
Post-Bum Containment Pressure 85 pu10 85 pslg 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Containment Pressure, pslg SC C-
C C- C Figure 7-4 Hydrogen CombustibilityChart BaSed on Ory Hydrogen Measurement (Containment Vented 300%)
Design Pressure: 50 pesg 65 ~ Median Failure Pressure: 128 psig Hydrogen Not lo Famnmable N_- - _ >_-
Post Burn Containment Pressure
_____ _____ ______ ______65 Pslg 45 pig _
0 10 30 40 so 70 60 Containment Pressure, psig
Figure 8-1 Containment Pressure Following RCS Creep Failure or RV Lower Head Failure in the presence of a Dry Reactor Cavity 100 90 Pro-VS Contalmenta Pressure-50 80 70 60 Pressurization due to superheated steam, 50 _dhmlham Into ontaimint building' IPressurec15 psig Pr.-vB Conitainment 40 >i CL 30 20 Pr--VOP Contain ment io Pressurew I psig 0
2.50 500 750: 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000, 2250 2500 RCS PresSUre Pilor to VB (Pisla)
< o~
C C C
C- C¸ C Figure 8-2 Post VB Containment Pressure Following Corium discharge into a Wet.Reacior Cavity 120 110 100 90 E 70 !
0~0 tA kiRltlcontainmreril pr~sur=5(
I4Ig lnhtimlcontAtnmmt pre~ure, 15 pliq 1 40 30 20 so 100 ISO 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 RCS Pressure Prior to VB-psla
.< c.*
Figure 8-3 Containment Pressurefollowing Discharge of Corium' Debris into a "Wet" :ReAdtivity, 'Cavity Containment Pressure following Discharge of Corfum Debris Into a "Wet" Reactor Cavity 140 120 100 C0 80 60 40 n0 0
.30 35 40. 45 50 55. s0 65 70 Containment Pressure Prior to VB (P$10)'
C C C
C (C Figure 8-4 Minimum Expected Time to Pressurize the Containmerit to Various Pressure Levels following RVLH failure In the presence of a "Wet" reactor cavity 14 Note: Availability of passive heat sinks No Passive or Active CHR ited (wall/structures. etc.) Will significantly Increase RVLH fPalure Into a werCavity 12- pressurization time noted In Figure. ____filreIno_____cait ur 12 w 10" 0.IC oc tu 4
F ESSURE=85 PSI ,,j ,G 0I 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 48 48, 50 CONTAINMENT FAILURE PRESSURE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING FOLLOWING VB (P$1G)
CD~
Figure 8-5 Basemat Ablation Rate vs. Time 1.2 limestone common/sand concrete oxidation and stored energy excluded 0.8 0.6 ___R_ CAVITY_ _ _
0.4 0.2
- -m : m . m ' *. .
0-4 8 8 10' 12 14 16 11 20 22 24.
Time after Shutdown (HR) ti
C C
Figure 9.1 Venting Mass Flow Rate vs. Containment Pressure 10o 90 so 7O iso 0ediamet"r so 'a 0 50 Pipe liametmr 0
'JI
- pip. lemette I It 20 40 so 100 120 140 160 180 200 Contalnment Pressure (pslg)
- 4C
Figure 9-2 Mass Fraction of Air, Steam and Hydrogen In Containment Atmosphere 1
0.v 0.8 0.7 S08 c0.5
>~-
- u. 0.4 / ". i1- 1Fal, mas fra*Joan 0.3 02 hydrogen n racton based fs -
on MO0%Zr Oxidation
-o A lIj .
0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Containment Pressur (psig) 0~
(3 C C
C c C FIgure 9.3 MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE DIAMETER OF VENT PATHWAY'REQUIRED TO STABILIZE A LONG TERM CONTAINMENT PRESSURIZATION 8
7 is , . -PSTABLE PS 0$TABLE-$5 -3 PSI
>~c PSTASLEI110 PSTAL~lPPSIG ~ E15~
STABLE "135 PSIG
____________ CD 2
PSTABLE IS THE CONTAINMENT PRESSUREWHERE THE STEAM GENERATION WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT DUE TO DEBRIS COOLING AND THE VENT RELEASE BALANCE 3 6 9 12 is 18 21 24 TIME AFTER REACTOR SHUTDOWN lHR)
- ec.
Figure 10.1 Containment Temperature/Pressure Correlation 200 2W0 c"
U) 200 75 degrees W Super"at L.>
0P Saturated steam.=
100 4t, 0
50 e 0 it 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 T (deg. F) 1711(
C c Figure 10-2 Steam Partial Pressure vs. Containment Pressure (Saturated StearnlAir Mixture) t ... .. .. . .... .................. .....
.........- ....- - ........ ...- ........ +.. . .; .--.. '..."........... .......... .... .... .....-... -.-.. *- .... .-....
,...'....'....... -... .l... .J...'...,...... . ;. . ... ., .h ......'...'..... ....J... "....... :.... "..... .. "....: .*. _ ....,....'..." .... ... _......- ...
0 ...................
~. . ..
O.......J....~..
Oo.t . 4 .4 . F
- 4 4 .
S....................................... t... . . . . . .. ....... --- ...... ......... .
, .... ... ,... :..... I..
= ... L............- . ... ..."....'............. ............... . .-.. . .... ........ .. .. ..... ..-.-.. ..... ..'...:...-.....;...
.. .................. .. .. .... .. : ,.Oo .... oo.. .o....... o *.oo
.. .... .ooo o..................*°° . *
....... . .°.o
.,..oo....
.. .., . .00: . . ..
.... ........ . ........... .. ... .... ...... ....... 4..... .. . ..... g . ..
cc
... . ....... f....... t- .. ... . . . .. .1 .... ...
P'i o... :: :: : ... ....
- : :: .......... .".. ......... ....................... ... ... . 4. ................. .. ....
- M >
- 6 ' ----:. .., -: -- ' . .. ..- ..--
... ..... I........... ......... ... '-".. ..... .....--
30.
......... ... 7.. ......-- ..-....... ...... * . .. . i-.....-.. ........... ; .. ............
20 .. .-..
. t.. .,. . . .. ...*...*..... . . . . ............ ...*. . . ...... . . . ....... ,.... ..........: :.: . ::.:....:.:::: .. :: .:::'.:...-.:--..,..,.
0 10 20 30 40 so 50' 70 s0 Containment Pressure, psig l-a
.C t"3
Figure 10-3 Water Content of Containment Atmosphere (Saturated SteamlAir Mixture) 350000 J.
CD C.)
0 0 t0 20 30 40 50 60 70 so Containment Pressuri, pslg t0i C C (
Figure 10-4 Volume Percent Hydrogen (DRY)
Mass of Hydrogen In the Containment 25.00 20.00 15.00 >_,
0.00 0 250 SO 750 1000 1250 Io0 1750 20o 2250 250 Mass of Hydrogen Produced, Ibm
.n
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Cumulative NORMs changes to this revision: 1 PAGE REVISION EDITORIAL CORRECTION 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 0201 20 2 21 2 22 2 K_, ,
23 2 24 2 25 2 26 2 27 2 28 2 29 2 30 thru 39 2 40 thru 44 2 ATTACHMENT REVISION EDITORIAL CORRECTION , Pages 1-22 2 Attachment 2, Pages 1-4 2 Attachment 3 2 Attachment 4, Pages 1-2 2 , Pages 1 - 45 2 0201 (page 2)
ERPIP 611 Rev. 2 RECORD OF REVISIONS AND CHANGES Rev. Chg. Summary of Revision and Changes 2 Added steps for alternate 125 V DC battery line-up and alternate steam driven AFW pump fire hose connection using readily available material as defined under B.5.b. These actions were bases captured under B 1168.
0201 Editorial correction to perform the following:
" Correct typo on page 19: "to apply as such water" should read "to apply as much water."
- Update RVLMS indication which has been changed from 185 to 160.