DCL-03-145, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Update

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Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Update
ML033220548
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 11/10/2003
From: Tompkins J
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
DCL-03-145, GL-81-027
Download: ML033220548 (21)
v • d • e


Text

PacificGas and ElectricCompany Diablo Canyon Power Plant PO. Box 56 Avila Beach. CA 93424 800.545.6000 November 10, 2003 PG&E Letter DCL-03-145 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Update

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

In accordance with Section V, "Implementing Procedures," of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, enclosed is an update to the Emergency Plan (EP) implementing procedures for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 as indicated in Enclosure 1.

As provided under 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes have been made without prior NRC approval since they do not decrease the effectiveness of the EP. The EP, as changed, continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

This update contains privacy/proprietary information that has been bracketed in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-27. Enclosure 2 provides the location of the privacy/proprietary information.

If there are any questions regarding this update, please contact Mr. Mark Lemke of my staff at (805) 545-4787.

Sn I mes E. Tomkins irector- Site Services ddm/1345 Enclosures cc: David L. ProuIx Girija S. Shukla cc/enc: Bruce S. Mallett Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (RGN-IV/DRS)

STARS A member of the (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway . Comanche Peak . Diablo Canyon

  • Palo Verde . South Texas Project
  • Wolf Creek

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Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL-03-145 LOCATION OF PRIVACY/PROPRIETARY INFORMATION IN EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 Privacy/

Procedure Proprietary Number Information Title/Location of Privacy/Proprietary Information EP G-1, No Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Revision 33 Activation EP G-2, Yes Interim Emergency Response Organization Revision 27 Attachment 6.3, page 1 of 1 EP RB-8, Yes Instructions for Field Monitoring Teams Revision 17 Attachment 7.6, page 1 of 2 EP EF-1, Yes Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Revision 31 Center Attachment 6.20, page 1 of 2 EP EF-3, Yes Activation and Operation of the Emergency Revision 24 Operations Facility Attachment 5.6, page 1 of 5 Attachment 5.7, page 1 of 1 Attachment 5.8, page 1 of 1 Attachment 5.12, page 1 of 1 Attachment 5.17, page 1 of 1

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-145 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Table of Contents - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume 1A (OMIO.1D3 only), Volume 1B (OM10.DC1 only), and Volume 3B Proc. No. Rev. Title OM10.DC1 2A Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises EP G-1* 33 Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation EP G-2* 27 Interim Emergency Response Organization EP G-3 41 Notification of Off-Site Agencies and Emergency Response Organization Personnel EP G-4 21 Assembly and Accountability EP G-5 9A Evacuation of Nonessential Site Personnel EP R-2 21 Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials Initial Assessment EP R-3 8C Release of Radioactive Liquids EP R-7 13A Off-Site Transportation Accidents EP OR-3 6A Emergency Recovery EP RB-1 5B Personnel Dosimetry EP RB-2 5 Emergency Exposure Guides EP RB-3 4 Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking EP RB-4 4A Access to and Establishment of Controlled Areas Under Emergency Conditions EP RB-5 5 Personnel Decontamination EP RB-8* 17 Instructions for Field Monitoring Teams EP RB-9 11A Calculation of Release Rate EP RB-10 10 Protective Action Recommendations EP RB-1 1 12 Emergency Offsite Dose Calculations EP RB-12 6 Plant Vent Iodine and Particulate Sampling During Accident Conditions EP RB-14 7A Core Damage Assessment Procedure EP RB-15 11 Post Accident Sampling System EP EF-1* 31 Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center EP EF-2 27 Operational Support Center EP EF-3* 24 Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility EP EF-4 14 Activation of the Off-Site Emergency Laboratory EP EF-9 8 Backup Emergency Response Facilities EP EF-10 5 Joint Media Center Activation and Operation

  • Procedure included in this submittal
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP G-1 NUCLEAR POWER-GENERATION REVISION 33 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - PAGE 1 OF 3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE UNITS TITLE: Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation 1 AND 2 10/10/03 EFFECTIVE DATE PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE SCOPE ...............

DISCUSSION .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

D EFIN ITION S....................................................................................................................................................I RESPONSIBILITIES .............. 2 INSTRUCTIONS .............. 3 RECORDS .............. 3 ATTACHMENTS .............. 3 REFERENCES .............. 3

1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure describes accident classification guidelines and Emergency Plan activation responsibilities.
2. DISCUSSION 2.1 The steps required by this procedure are in addition to the steps required to maintain the plant in, or restore the plant to, a safe condition.

2.2 Events not meeting the minimum classification criteria contained in this procedure should be reviewed for reportability in XI 1ID2, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements and Reporting Process."

3. DEFINITIONS 3.1 Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) 3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) - characterized by off-normal conditions that:
a. May not in themselves be particularly significant from an emergency preparedness standpoint, but could reasonably indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant if proper action is not taken or if circumstances beyond the control of the operating staff render the situation more serious from a safety stand point. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP G-1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 33 PAGE 2 OF 3 TITLE: Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation UNITS I AND 2 3.1.2 Alert - events in progress or having occurred, involving an actual or potentially substantial degradation of the plant safety level.

a. Small releases of radioactivity may occur (greater than Technical Specification limits for normal operation, but only a small fraction of the EPA Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels at the site boundary). It is the lowest level where emergency offsite response may be anticipated.
b. The lowest classification level where off-site emergency response is anticipated.

3.1.3 Site Area Emergency (SAE) - events which are in progress or have occurred involving actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public, but a core meltdown situation is not indicated based on current information.

a. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guides except near the site boundary. However, because the possible release is significant, care must be taken in alerting offsite authorities to distinguish whether the release is merely potential, likely, or actually occurring.

Response of offsite authorities will be guided initially by this determination.

3.1.4 General Emergency (GE) - event(s) in progress or having occurred which indicate:

a. Imminent substantial core degradation or melting.
b. Potential for containment loss.
c. Radioactive releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAGs off-site for more than the immediate area.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Interim Site Emergencv Coordinator (Interim SEC or ISEC) - Control room shift manager is responsible for initial event classification and emergency plan activation. The ISEC may upgrade the event classification until relieved by either the SEC or RM. In addition, the ISEC may downgrade a NUE to no ECL.

4.2 Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) - The SEC may upgrade the classification of an event until relieved by the recovery manager.

4.3 Recovery Manager (RM) - The RM, once staffed, is responsible for upgrading or downgrading ECLs, and may direct the SEC to change ECLs.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP G-1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 33 PAGE 3 OF 3 TITLE: Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation UNITS 1 AND 2

5. INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 The Interim Site Emergency Coordinator shall:

5.1.1 Initially classify and declare the event using ONLY the guidance in Attachment 7.1 of this procedure.

NOTE: Simultaneous EALs that increase the probability of release require escalation of the ECL to one level above the higher EAL.

5.1.2 Formally announce all emergency classification declarations to the control room, TSC, or EOF, respectively.

5.2 The ISEC or SEC may:

5.2.1 Upgrade the event to a higher ECL until the recovery manager arrives at and assumes responsibility in the EOF. However, the ISEC and SEC shall not downgrade an event classified at the Alert or higher level at any time. The ISEC may downgrade a NUE to no ECL.

5.2.2 Only the recovery manager may downgrade an ECL at the Alert or higher level according to the most current controlling EAL.

6. RECORDS 6.1 There are no quality or nonquality records generated by this procedure.
7. ATTACHMENTS 7.1 "Emergency Action Level Classification Chart," 10/1/03
8. REFERENCES 8.1 EP EF-1, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center."

8.2 EP EF-2, "Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center."

8.3 EP EF-3, "Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility."

8.4 EP OR-3, "Emergency Recovery."

8.5 EP G-3, "Emergency Notification of Off-Site Agencies."

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10/1/03 Page I of 9 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP G-1 ATTACHMENT 7.1 AND TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. FIRE 1. Fire not under control within 15 minutes 1. Fire not under control within 1. Fire causing the complete loss of 1. Site Emergency Coordinator judges (All Modes) of initiating fire fighting efforts AND 15 minutes of initiating fire fighting function of any one of the following that a fire could cause common affecting plant equipment or power efforts AND threatening the loss of safety related systems required for damage to plant systems which is supplies inor near the Protected Area(s). function of any of the following safe shutdown: determined to have the potential to Safety Related systems required for
  • Vital Power Supplies: DIGs, release radioactive material in safe shutdown: DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, quantities sufficient to cause
  • Vital Power Supplies: DIGs, or 125VDC exposures comparable to General DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC,
  • Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: Emergency #4.

or 125VDC RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging-and

- Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: Boration RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and

  • Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, Boration 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or
  • Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, MSIVs 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or
  • Control Room, Cable Spreading MSIVs Rooms, or HSDP.
  • Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSOP.

II. FUEL DAMAGE 2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by: 2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown See SAE #14 for Steam Line Break 2. Degraded core with possible loss of OR by: coolable geometry as indicated by:

VESSEL DAMAGE Confirmed RCS sample shows (Modes 1-4) > 1001 E pCilgm specific activity Confirmed RCS sample > 300 pCilcc 5 or more thermocouple readings (Tech Spec 3.4.8) of equivalent 1.131 specific activity > 1200 deg. F.

OR OR equivalent fuel failure is measured OR Confirmed RCS sample shows dose by exposure rate from systems LOCA with no indication of ECCS equivalent 1-131 activity > Tech Spec carrying reactor coolant per EP RB-14 flow AND indication of fuel damage limit for Iodine Spike (Tech Spec (See Alert #2)

Fig. 3.4-1). OR LOCA with containment rad levels

> values for 100% gap release in EP RB-14.

Category 11Continued on next page. Category 11 Continued on next page. Category II Continued on next page. Category 11 Continued on next page.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY II. FUEL DAMAGE 3. Pressurized Thermal Shock isverified by 3. Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product OR entry into EOP FR-P.1 Barriers:

VESSEL DAMAGE AND (Modes 1-4) Left of Limit Acurve (EOP F-0). A) Indication of fuel damage (See (Continued) Alert #2)

AND Determination of aSteam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTRI which requires entry into AND Steam release from ruptured SIG, either used for plant cooldown purposes or due to asteamline break.

B) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2)

AND Determination of aSGTR requiring entry into EOP E.3 AND Indication of asteam line break inside containment AND High potential for loss of containment integrity (e.g., loss of function of both Containment Spray trains OR loss of function of one Containment Spray train and four CFCUs).

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 11.FUEL DAMAGE 3. Pressurized Thermal Shock isverified by C) Indication of Fuel Damage (See OR entry into EOP FR-P.1 Alert #2)

VESSEL DAMAGE AND AND (Modes 1-4) Left of Limit Acurve (EOP F-0). Determination of aSGTR which (Continued) (Continued) requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of asteam line break outside containment with inability to isolate the break.

D) Potential fuel damage indicated by 5 or more thermocouple readings > 700 deg. For RVLIS

<32%

AND LOCA as indicated by RCS leakage and SI AND Loss of containment integrity.

Ill. FUEL 3. Fuel Handling Accident causing a 2. Fuel Handling Accident causing a HANDLING release inContainment or the Fuel release in Containment or the Fuel ACCIDENT Handling Building Handling Building (All Modes) WITH WITH The potential to exceed the criteria The potential to exceed the criteria listed inAlert #4 or #5. listed inSAE #3.

IV. LOSS OF 4. Projected dose rate at the Site Boundary 4. Projected dose rate at the Site 3. Projected dose at the Site Boundary 4. Projected dose at the Site Boundary CONTROL OR (800 meters) is Boundary (800 meters) is (800 meters) is (800 meters) is RELEASE OF 2 0.057 mRemlhr TEDE 2 0.57 mRemlhr TEDE 2 100 mRem TEDE > 1,000 mRem TEDE RADIOACTIVE OR OR OR OR MATERIAL 2 0.170 mRem/hr Thyroid CDE for 2 1.7 mRemlhr Thyroid CDE for actual 500 mRem Thyroid COE for actual 2 5,000 mRem Thyroid CDE for (All Modes) actual or expected release. or expected release. or expected release. actual or expected release.

Category IVContinued on next page. Category IVContinued on next page. Category IVContinued on next page. Category IV Continued on next page.

Nfln: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY IV. LOSS OF 5. Avalid reading inexcess of the isolation 5. Valid alarm on plant vent high range CONTROL OR setpoint, which fails to isolate the noble gas monitor RE-29.

RELEASE OF release on any of the Radiological NOTE: ALARMS AT STATE OES RADIOACTIVE Process Effluent Monitors: SACRAMENTO.

MATERIAL RE.18 OR RE-23 (All Modes) During discharge only.

(Continued)

6. An actual liquid release which exceeds 6. An actual liquid release which exceeds the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, 1Ox the limits of 10 CFR 20, Table 2,Col. 2 per CY2.1D1. Appendix B,Table 2,Col. 2per CY2.1D1.
7. Radiological Effluent Process Monitor 7. Unplanned or unanticipated increase High Radiation Alarm with valid reading of 1R/hr or greater inany of the inexcess of alarm setpoint on any of the following areas:

following monitors: Passageways, OR RE-14114R Normally occupied areas, OR RE-24124R Accessible areas normally RE-28128R. < 100 mRlhr, OR Outside boundaries of Radiologically Controlled Areas AND, for any area above, apotential exists for EITHER an uncontrolled release to the environment OR aloss of ability to maintain plant safety functions.

8. Unplanned or uncontrolled release to the 8. Unexplained increase of 50 XDAC in environment exceeding alarm setpoints airborne radioactivity outside the on RE-3. boundary of the Radiologically Controlled Areas, but within the Plant Protected Area.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY V. LOSS OF 9. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room 4. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room CONTROL Accessibility," AND controls Accessibility," AND controls not ROOM established within 15 minutes. established within 15 minutes.

(All Modes)

VI. LOSS OF 9. Plant isnot brought to required operating 5. Complete loss for greater than 5. Loss of Heat Sink indicated by:

ENGINEERED Mode within any applicable Tech Spec 15 minutes of any of the following Entry into EOP FR H.1 SAFETY Action Statement time limit (Modes 1-4). functions needed to reach or maintain AND FEATURE Hot Shutdown (while in Modes 1-4): Loss of water inventory in 3 SIGs

______________________________ < 23% 134 %Ja

~~~~( Wide Range).

10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for 10. Loss of function of both RHR trains AFW capability greater than 15 minutes while in for greater than 15 minutes in Steam Dump System and SIG Safety Mode 5-or 6. Modes 1-4. Valves
11. Aloss of function of all charging pumps 11. An unplanned shutdown of the RHR Loss of the capability to maintain RCS for greater than 15 minutes when System (while in Mode 5or 6)for inventory as evidenced by a loss of all normally used for RCS inventory control > 1hour with no other normal means charging pumps coincident with the (Modes 1-4). of decay heat removal available inability to depressurize and inject with (e.g., flooded reactor cavity or steam the Safety Injection pumps generators with loops filled).
12. An unplanned loss of function of the Loss of capability to increase the Boric RHR System (Mode 5 or 6)for greater Acid concentration sufficient to than 15 minutes maintain Keff less than .99 in Mode 4 AND with aloss of capability to trip control RCS thermocouple temperature is rods projected to exceed 200 deg.F within ASW or CCW Systems 1hour of RHR loss (see Appendix Bof OP AP SD series) Loss of electrical power or I&C for any OR of the above listed systems, causing a RCS thermocouple temperature complete loss of function.

exceeds 200 deg.F.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY VII. 12. Loss of all off-site power for greater 13. Loss of all off-site power for greater 6. Loss of all on-site AND off-site AC power See General Emergency Condition #5 LOSS OF POWER OR than 15 minutes AND at least 2DIGs than 15 minutes AND only 1DIG is for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4). under LOSS OF ENGINEERED ALARMS OR are supplying their vital busses supplying its vital bus (Modes 1-4). SAFETY FEATURE.

ASSESSMENT OR (Modes 1-4).

COMMUNICATIONS 13. Loss of all off-site power for greater 14. Loss of all off-site and on-site AC than 15 minutes AND at least 1DIG is power for greater than 15 minutes in supplying its vital bus (Modes 5 and 6). Modes 5 or 6.

14. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated 15. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated 7. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22), and 13(23) by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22) and 13 DC Bus 11 (21), 12 (22) and 13 (23) undervoltage for> 15 minutes (23) undervoltage for < 15 minutes undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 5-and 6) (Modes 1-4). (Modes 1-4).
15. Loss of assessment capabilities as indicated by atotal loss of SPDS inthe Control Room AND simultaneous loss of all displays for any "Accident Monitoring" variable inTech Spec Table 3.3.3-1 for > 1hour while in Modes 1,2or 3. X
16. Main Control Room Annunciators 16. Main Control Room Annunciators 8. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 PKs 1through 5AND display capabilities PKs 1through 5 AND display through 5 AND display capabilities AND AND the seismically\qualified capabilities AND the seismically the seismically qualified annunciator annunciator display all do not respond to qualified annunciator display all do not display all do not respond to an alarm an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over respond to an alarm condition in condition inMODES 1-4 for over 15 minutes. MODES 1-4 for over 15 minutes 15 minutes AND AND the plant isin asignificant transient the plant isin asignificant transient AND (plant trip, SI, or generator runback backup, nonannunciating systems are not

>25 MwImin), nonannunciating available (PPC, SPDS).

systems available.

NOIE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY VIl. 17. Total loss of communication capability LOSS OF POWER OR with off-site agencies (all Modes) as ALARMS OR indicated by the inability to communicate ASSESSMENT OR with SLO County (by telephone and COMMUNICATIONS radio)

(Continued) OR the NRC Operations Center.

Vill. 18. Ground motion felt and recognized as an 17. Earthquake > 0.2 gverified by 9. Earthquake > 0.4 gverified by Seismic 6. Site Emergency Coordinator's NATURAL earthquake by aconsensus of Control Seismic Monitors. Monitors. judgment that major internal or PHENOMENA Room operators on duty AND measuring external events (e.g.,

(All Modes) greater than O.Olg on the Earthquake earthquakes, wind damage, Force Monitor. explosions, etc.) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.

19. Flooding of any plant structure that 18. High water exceeding Intake Structure 10. High water causing flooding of ASW causes initiation of entry to Mode 3 due main deck elevation or low water pump compartments or low water to aTech Spec action statement. causing cavitation and shutdown of causing the shutdown of both ASW both ASW pumps for < 15 minutes. pumps for > 15 minutes.
20. Tsunami or Hurricane Warning from the 19. Sustained wind of 85 mph (38 misec) 11. Sustained wind speed > 100 mph State, NOAA, NWS, Coast Guard or at any elevation on the Met. Tower. (45 mlsec). at any elevation on the Met.

System Dispatcher Tower.

OR Observation of low or high water levels at the Intake Structure indicative of a Tsunami or Hurricane.

21. A tornado sighted within Site Boundary. 20. Tornado strikes the plant protected area.

NffIE SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY IX. 22. Report of airplane crash within the Site 21. Confirmed missile, airplane crash or 12. Missile, airplane crash or explosion See General Emergency #6above.

OTHER HAZARDS Boundary or unusual airplane activity explosion involving aplant structure in causing complete loss of asafety (All Modes) threatening the plant. the protected area, system function that causes entry into aTech Spec Action Statement.

23. Confirmed explosion on-site.
24. Turbine failure causing casing 22. Turbine failure generating missiles penetration OR damage to turbine or that cause visual damage to other generator seals safety related structures, equipment, controls OR power supplies.
25. Significant release of flammable OR 23. Release of flammable OR toxic gas OR toxic gas OR liquid that prevents, even liquid that jeopardizes operation of with SCBAs, operations inside the safety related systems by either power block OR intake structure (ref. preventing required access OR by CP M-9a). threatening imminent damage.

X. 26. RCS unidentified OR pressure boundary 24. Primary leak rate > 50 gpm. 13. Known primary system LOCA during See General Emergency #3under PRIMARY OR leakage that exceeds 10 gpm OR which RCS subcooling cannot be Fuel or Vessel Damage.

PRIISEC OR identified leakage that exceeds 25 gpm. maintained >201F OR PZR level cannot SECONDARY LEAK) be maintained >4%(128% with adverse containment).

(Modes 1-4 27. SI Actuation with ECCS injection into 25. Determination of aSGTR which 14. Determination of aSGTR coincident the RCS resulting from avalid signal results in entry into EOP E-3. with steam release from ruptured SIG, based on actual plant conditions. either used for plant cooldown purposes NOTE: SI ACTUATION ALSO ALARMS or due to asteamline break.

AT DES INSACRAMENTO.

28. Steam line break which results in SI 26. Determination of asteam line break actuation. with > 10 gpm Primary to Secondary leakage.
29. Failure of a PZR PORV AND Block Valve OR Safety Valve fails to reseat, excluding allowable leakage, following apressure reduction below the reset point.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1 TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Xl. 27. Anticipated Transient Without Scram 15. An ATWS condition with no fuel damage 7. ATWS with Fuel Damage REACTOR (ATWS) as indicated by: evident indications (see Alert Condition PROTECTION Failure of an automatic reactor trip to AND #2under FUEL DAMAGE)

SYSTEM FAILURE trip the reactor. An additional failure of asystem OR (Modes 1-4) required for Hot Shutdown (See SAE ATWS with potential Core Melt

  1. 5)to actuate. indicated by 5 or more thermocouple readings > 700 deg. FAND RVLIS < 32%.

XlI. 30. Security reports the notification of a 28. Security reports ongoing security 16. Security reports ongoing physical attack 8. Security reports ongoing security SECURITY THREAT credible site-specific security threat or threat involving physical attack on the on the facility or asabotage device threat which causes loss of (All Modes) attempted entry or attempted sabotage. facility or asabotage device has been causing aconfirmed loss of function of control of the operations of the detected that threatens the operability any one of the following safety related plant to hostile forces.

of safety related equipment (see systems required for safe shutdown:

Alert #1).

  • Vital Power Supplies: DIGs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125V0C Primary Systems and Auxiliaries:

RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or MSIVs Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.

XIII. 31. Site Emergency Coordinator determines 29. Site Emergency Coordinator judges 17. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that 9. Site Emergency Coordinator SITE EMERGENCY conditions warrant increased awareness plant conditions exist that warrant conditions exist that warrant activation judges conditions exist which COORDINATOR'S on the part of off-site authorities of precautionary activation of the TSC of the emergency centers and have apotential to release JUDGMENT initiation of aplant shutdown per Tech and placing the EOF and other key monitoring teams or a precautionary radioactive material inquantities (All Modes) Spec LCOs or involve other than normal emergency personnel on stand-by. notification to the public near the site. sufficient to cause exposures controlled shutdown. comparable to General Emergency

  1. 4.

NaME SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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_.UNCONTROLLEDPROCEDURE- DO NOT USE TOPERFORMWORK orISSUEFOR USE PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP G-2 NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REVISION 27 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT PAGE 1 OF 3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE UNITS TITLE: Interim Emergency Response Organization 1 AND 2 10/23/03 EFFECTIVE DATE

1. SCOPE This procedure provides emergency response actions to be taken by the interim emergency response organization in the control room during a declared emergency.

This procedure was rewritten; therefore, revision bars are not included.

2. DISCUSSION The checklists are intended to provide quick reference to all possible emergency response actions and require judgment in prioritizing activities based upon available resources and unforeseen circumstances.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES Interim Site Emergency Coordinator (ISEC)

Shift manager assumes the duties of the ISEC and takes command and control of the emergency response effort until relieved. The ISEC has the responsibility and authority to:

  • Declare emergency classifications. per EP G- 1.
  • Notify off-site authorities of the event and make protective action recommendations per EP G-3.
  • Conduct assembly and accountability on-site, at the Site Area Emergency Level, per EP G4.
  • Authorize extraordinary emergency measures such as authorizing emergency response personnel to exceed normal established dose limits.
  • Provide direction for all emergency response operations.
  • Maintain liaison with off-site authorities.
  • Authorize the evacuation of the plant site per EP G-5.
  • Approve press releases.
  • Initiate on-site and off-site radiological monitoring.

Emergency Operations Coordinator The shift foreman of the affected unit assumes this position to manage control room operational activities and advise the ISEC of needed event reclassifications.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP G-2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 27 PAGE 2 OF 3 TITLE: Interim Emergency Response Organization UNITS 1 AND 2 Control Room Communicator #1 This position is assumed by the shift foreman of the unaffected unit.

  • Ensures completion of the Emergency Notification Form 69-20596.
  • Ensures completion of offsite emergency notifications to: San Luis Obispo County, California State Office of Emergency Services (OES), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) until relieved.

Control Room Communicator #2

  • The control room Communicator #2 is responsible for VANS activation to notify the emergency response organization and management personnel.
  • The Communicator #2 is also responsible for control room accountability, if required.

Emergency Evaluation Coordinator (EEC)

The EEC performs technical evaluations of plant response, dose assessments, and protective action recommendations (PARs) for approval by the ISEC.

4. INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 Interim Site Emergency Coordinator (ISEC) 4.1.1 Upon declaration of an emergency, use the ISEC Emergency Checklist, form 69-20644.

4.2 Emergency Evaluation Coordinator (EEC) 4.2.1 Perform EP R-2 calculations and dose assessments.

4.2.2 Provide technical evaluations of plant response, dose assessments, and protective action recommendations (PARs).

4.2.3 Use Emergency Evaluation Coordinator Checklist, form 69-20645.

4.3 Emergency Operations Coordinator 4.3.1 Manage the control room operational activities.

4.4 Communicator # 1 4.4.1 Communicator # 1 shall ensure offsite emergency telephone notifications to San Luis Obispo County and the California State Office of Emergency Services (OES) are completed within 15 minutes of a declared emergency.

4.4.2 Communicator #I shall ensure the NRC is notified within 60 minutes of a declared emergency.

4.4.3 Follow up notifications should be completed approximately every 45 minutes.

4.4.4 Use Communicator#1 Checklist, Form 69-20646.

4.5 Communicator #2 4.5.1 Communicator #2 shall ensure VANS is activated within 10 minutes of a declared emergency to notify appropriate emergency response organization and management personnel.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER EP G-2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 27 PAGE 3 OF 3 TITLE: Interim Emergency Response Organization UNITS 1 AND 2 4.5.2 If VANS is unavailable, the paging phone shall be used in conjunction with the manual call out of personnel using the recall roster.

4.5.3 Communicator #2 shall ensure the assembly and accountability process is initiated, if appropriate, in accordance with EP G-4.

4.5.4 Use Communicator #2 Checklist, Form 69-20647.

5. RECORDS Documents generated by this procedure are non-quality good business records and are maintained for a period of three years, in accordance with AD IO.1D2.
6. ATTACHMENTS 6.1 Form 69-20644, "ISEC Checklist," 10/20/03 6.2 Form 69-20645, "Emergency Evaluation Coordinator," 10/20/03 6.3 Form 69-20646, "Communicator#1 Checklist," 10/20/03 6.4 Form 69-20647, "Communicator #2 Checklist," 10/20/03 6.5 Form 69-20649, "VANS Manual Operation," 10/20/03 6.6 Form 69-20648, "Paging Phone Activation," 10/20/03
7. REFERENCES None 00105127.DOC 03B 10313 1023.1135
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69-20644 10/20/03 Page 1 of 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP G-2 ATTACHMENT 6.1 AND TITLE: ISEC Checklist Print Name Date D 1. Declare the appropriate emergency classification within 15 minutes of meeting EP G-1 EAL criteria.

FjJ 2. Direct the control room staff to assume emergency response roles and obtain their position binders.

3. For an Unusual Event:
  • Direct Communicator #2 to activate VANS as soon as possible. This notifies senior management only.
  • Direct Communicator #I to fill out the notification form and complete off-site agency notifications within 15 minutes of classification. (For closeout of an UnusualEvent go to Step 10)

D 4. For an ALERT or hipher:

  • Direct Communicator #2 to activate VANs within 10 minutes of the ALERT (even if already activated at the UE level). This will activate the ERO.
  • Direct Communicator # I to fill out the notification form and complete off-site agency notifications within 15 minutes of classification.

D 5. If an ALERT has been declared, make the following PA announcement.

Attention, allplantpersonnel. has been declaredforUnit__

(Emergency classification)

All emergency response personnelreport toyour assigned emergency responsefacilities.

6. For a Site Area Emerigencv or higher, or if assembly and accountability is required,
  • Sound the Site Emergency Signal for 60 seconds, and make the following PA Announcement.

Attention, allplantpersonnel, has been declaredfor Unit__

(Emergency Classification)

All emergency response personnelreport toyour assigned emergency responsefacilities. The Assembly andAccountabilityprocess has been activated. All non-essentialpersonnel,placeyour work in a safe condition, leave the power block, and returnto your normaldesks.

  • Refer to G-4 and direct Communicator #2 to complete On-shift accountability and fax the form to the Security Watch Commander.

E:] 7. Evaluate initiation of early work release or site evacuation. Refer to EP G-5.

n 8. Authorize Kl administration if required. Refer to EP RB-3.

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69-20644 10/20/03 Page 2 of 2 EP G-2 (UNITS I AND 2)

ATTACHMENT 6.1 TITLE: ISEC Checklist 1 9. When ready to turn over to the SEC or the RM, activate the Video Conference Unit, and use form 69-20437, ISEC/SEC/RM Turnover Checklist to turnover ISEC responsibilities.

Unusual Event Termination - When plant conditions no longer meet any Unusual Event criteria:

D 10. Ensure offsite notifications are made in accordance with EP G-3.

LII 11. Ensure an AT REPT action request is initiated with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of termination.

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69-20645 10/20/03 Page I of I DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EP G-2 ATTACHMENT 6.2 1AND2 TITLE: Emergency Evaluation Coordinator Print Name Date

1. If a radiological release is indicated, perform an assessment of site boundary dose rate in accordance with EP R-2 and notify the ISEC.
2. Compare the EP R-2 calculation results with EP G-I EALs and assist the ISEC with emergency classifications.

F1 3. Activate ERDS on SPDS within 30 minutes of emergency classification.

F-1 4. If the EOF is activated, contact the UDAC radiological manager to provide a briefing of plant status, radiological conditions, status of field monitoring teams, and the status of KI administration.

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