ML032690978
| ML032690978 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/2005 |
| From: | Gody A Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Venable J Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| References | |
| 50-382/03-301 50-382/03-301 | |
| Download: ML032690978 (199) | |
Text
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The plant is currently at 100% 400 EFPD
- 2. CEA 22 has been determined to be untrippable
- 3. No other CEA is inserted INITIATING CUE You are required to perform a Shutdown Margin calculation with one untrippable CEA TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Shutdown Margin calculated successfully STANDARD
- 1. Emergency Boration determined to be required TOOLS Calculator, plant data book, technical specifications, appropriate section of OP-903-090 and the appropriate attachment, straight edge ruler SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. TECH SPEC VIOLATION HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. STA SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-903-090, Section 7.3. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME_______
- 1.
Using current cycle burnup AND 545oF temperature, determine net worth worst pair stuck out (WPSO) from figure 1.5.6.
CUES:
§ None STANDARDS:
§ Examinee determines net worst pair stuck out value to be 5.75-5.95 % delta rho and records on att. 10.3 step 7.3.1.1.
SAT___UNSAT_____
- 2.
Determine Shutdown Margin required by COLR CUES:
§ None CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee determines required Shutdown Margin required from COLR to be 5.15
% K/K and records on att. 10.3 step 7.3.1.2.
SAT___UNSAT_____
- 3.
Subtract step 7.3.1.2 from step 7.3.1.1 to determine Shutdown Margin allowed Power Defect %K/K CUES:
§ None CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee determines Shutdown Margin allowed Power Defect to be.8 -.6 % K/K and records on att. 10.3 step 7.3.1.3.
SAT___UNSAT_____
- 4.
Record current Reactor Power on attachment 10.3.
CUES:
§ CUE: (If asked) plant is currently at 100 % power STANDARDS:
§ Examinee records 100% power on att. 10.3 step 7.3.1.4 SAT___UNSAT_____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 5.
Using result from step 7.3.1.3 AND Power Defect vs. Power Level, figure 1.2.1, determine Shutdown Margin allowed Power Level.
CUES:
§ None CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee determines Shutdown Margin allowed Power Level to be 25-35 % power and records on att. 10.3 step 7.3.1.5.
SAT___UNSAT_____
- 6.
Verify Shutdown Margin GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO that required by the COLR by verifying that current Power level is LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO the Shutdown Margin allowed Power level.
CUES:
§ None CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examine determines current Power level is greater than Shutdown Margin allowed power level and circles no on att. 10.3 step 7.3.1.6 SAT___UNSAT_____
- 7.
If Shutdown Margin does not meet the requirements of Technical Specifications, then commence Emergency Boration and go to OP-901-103, Emergency Boration.
CUES:
§ None CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee recommends commencing Emergency Boration and entering OP-901-103 SAT___UNSAT_____
- 8.
End of task.
STOP TIME______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITION
- 1. The plant is currently at 100% 400 EFPD
- 2. CEA 22 has been determined to be untrippable
- 3. No other CEA is inserted INITIATING CUE You are required to perform a Shutdown Margin calculation with one untrippable CEA
Review and Approve an EOS W3 RO PPA ADMIN 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 3 06/28/03 15 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-100-010 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-2-23 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. HPSI pump A tripped on overcurrent.
- 2. Reactor Power is 100 percent
- 3. Risk Assessment EOOS has been updated INITIATING CUE You are directed by the Shift Manager to review an EOS for HPSI pump A for accuracy TERMINATING CUE EOS checklist reviewed STANDARD 4 of 5 errors identified on EOS checklist TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. TECH SPEC VIOLATION
- 2. PROCEDURE VIOLATION HUMAN INTERFACES SM SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES PROVIDE COMPLETED COPY OF OP-100 -010 ATTACHMENT 7.2 CONTAINING FIVE ERRORS
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-100 -010, Section 5.3. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME_______
- 1.
Review EOS Checklist for errors CUES:
§ None STANDARDS:
§ Examinee recognizes 4 of the following 5 errors
§ Examinee recognizes Mode in block 4 is incorrect, correct Mode is Mode 1.
§ Examinee recognizes Mode changes allowed in block 5 is incorrect, T.S. 3.0.4 applies.
§ Examinee recognizes justification in block 20 and TS/TRM entry guideline has incorrect action being entered, correct action is 3.5.2.b
§ Examinee recognizes Attachment 7.1 TS/TRM entry guideline for TS 3.3.2, Engineering Safeguards is not applicable, TS 3.3.2 is instrumentation.
§ Examinee recognizes T.S. 3.8.4.1 Overcurrent Protective Device checked incorrect, this is for containment penetrations CRIT SAT___UNSAT___
- 2.
END OF TASK STOP TIME_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. HPSI pump A tripped on overcurrent.
- 2. Reactor Power is 100 percent
- 3. Risk Assessment EOOS has been updated INITIATING CUE You are directed by the Shift Manager to review an EOS for HPSI pump A for accuracy
Review and Approve a Gaseous Release Permit W3 SRO RMS NORM 6
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 2 06/25/2003 10 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path NO No NUMBER References OP-007-003 CE-003-515 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-3-6 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Gas Decay Tank A is to be discharged via Batch Release
- 2. Noble Gas Monitor PRM -IRE-0648 is INOPERABLE,TS 3.3.3.11 entered
- 3. Meteorological conditions:
- a. Primary Met Tower T @ 50m indicates -0.6
- b. Ten Meter Wind Speed is 2 meters per second
- c. Wind Direction 270°
- 4. RAB Exhaust Fan A is running
- 5. Waste Flow Rate Measurement Device GWM-IFT-0648 is INOPERABLE, TS 3.3.3.11 entered INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager directs you to review the Batch Release Permit for GDT A and OP-007-003 to determine required actions for release and if Meteorological conditions allow the release.
TERMINATING CUE Required conditions for GDT release identified.
STANDARD Determine independent lineup verification required and proper meteorological conditions exist for release.
TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. EXCEEDING OFFSITE RELEASE LIMITS HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. CHEMISTRY
- 2. SM SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-007-003, Section 6.4. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME_______
- 1.
Perform source check in accordance with OP-004-001 CUES:
§ CUE: NAO assigned for lineup verification CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee recognizes that with PRM IRE-0648 INOPERABLE, Independent Lineup Verification is required SAT____UNSAT____
- 2.
Verify flow rate calculations required every four hours CUES:
§ CUE: Chemistry notified to calculate flowrate every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee recognizes that with GWM-IFT-0648 inoperable, flow rate calculations are required every four hours SAT____UNSAT____
- 3.
Verify proper meteorological conditions exist for release CUES:
§ None CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee determines stability class is D and releases ARE permitted SAT____UNSAT____
- 4.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Gas Decay Tank A is to be discharged via Batch Release
- 2. Noble Gas Monitor PRM -IRE-0648 is INOPERABLE,TS 3.3.3.11 entered
- 3. Meteorological conditions:
- a. Primary Met Tower T @ 50m indicates -0.6
- b. Ten Meter Wind Speed is 2 meters per second
- c. Wind Direction 270°
- 4. RAB Exhaust Fan A is running
- 5. Waste Flow Rate Measurement Device GWM-IFT-0648 is INOPERABLE, TS 3.3.3.11 entered INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager directs you to review the Batch Release Permit for GDT A and OP-007-003 to determine required actions for release and if Meteorilogical conditions allow the release.
Determine Emergency Plan Classification W3 SRO PPE EMERG 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 0 6/24/03 10 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path NO No NUMBER References EP-001-001 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-4-29 2-4-40 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The Plant was at 58 percent Power
- 2. RCP 2B lower seal failed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago.
- 3. Charging pump A/B is OOS
§ The Reactor was manually tripped due to RCP 2B middle seal failure
§ A Small Break LOCA occurs due to the RCP 2B pump seal failure
§ HPSI pump A tripped on overcurrent when SIAS actuated
§ A fault on A2 bus occurred causing a loss of power to Train A safety Buses
§ EDG A failed to auto start requiring Manual Start
§ EDG A Manual Start and loading was successful INITIATING CUE Classify the event and determine the correct Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure to be entered TERMINATING CUE The correct level of emergency has been declared STANDARD Event classified as SITE AREA EMERGENCY B/SAE/II TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES Incorrect Emergency Classification HUMAN INTERFACES NONE SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES Use this JPM with Scenario E-NRC03 - 2
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with EP-001-001, Section 5.2. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME________
- 1.
Classify the Event CUES:
§ None CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee classifies event as SITE AREA EMERGENCY B/SAE/II due to RCS leakage in excess of Charging pump capacity.
SAT____UNSAT____
- 2.
Perform emergency actions of appropriate emergency plan implementing instruction CUES:
§ EP-001-030 in progress STANDARDS:
§ Examinee states EP-001-030 to be entered SAT____UNSAT____
- 3.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 5. The Plant was at 58 percent Power
- 6. RCP 2B lower seal failed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago.
- 7. Charging pump A/B is OOS
§ The Reactor was manually tripped due to RCP 2B middle seal failure
§ A Small Break LOCA occurs due to the RCP 2B pump seal failure
§ HPSI pump A tripped on overcurrent when SIAS actuated
§ A fault on A2 bus occurred causing a loss of power to Train A safety Buses
§ EDG A failed to auto start requiring Manual Start
§ EDG A Manual Start and loading was successful INITIATING CUE Classify the event and determine the correct Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure to be entered
MAKEUP TO THE VCT USING THE AUTO MAKEUP MODE W3 RO CVC NORM 9
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 4 04/03/2000 rfletch 04/05/2000 20 Min Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-002-005 NUMBER NRC KA Number 3.2-004-A3.01 3.2-004-A4.04 3.2-004-A4.07 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The plant is Shutdown
- 3. BAMT A concentration is 5000 ppm
- 4. BAMT Pump A is selected INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform an automatic makeup to the VCT using BAM Tank A TERMINATING CUE
- 1. VCT makeup has been restored to manual STANDARD
- 1. Automatic makeup to VCT performed and system restored to manual makeup mode TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. ABNORMAL VCT LEVEL
- 1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-002-005, Section 8.8 and Attachment 11.5. All components operated during the performance of this JPM are located on CP-4. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME_________
- 1.
Inform SM/CRS prior to performing this section.
CUES:
§ When operator notifies SM/CRS, perform paraphrased repeatback STANDARDS:
§ The operator informs the CRS that he is commencing alignment for automatic makeup to the VCT.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 2.
At SM/CRS discretion, calculate the boric acid flow rate to be used on att. 11.5, calculation of boric acid flow rate for VCT blended makeup.
CUES:
§ Cue the operator that blend rate has been calculated to be 50 gpm PMU to 18.5 gpm Boric Acid.
STANDARDS:
§ Operator acknowledges given flowrates SAT______UNSAT______
- 3.
Verify direct boration valve, BAM-143, control switch in CLOSE.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates the control switch for BAM-143 on CP-4 and verifies it is positioned to CLOSE SAT______UNSAT______
- 4.
Verify Boric Acid Makeup Pump Selector Switch aligned to desired Boric Acid Makeup Pump.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The operator verifies that the BAM Pump Selector Switch is selected to BAMT A SAT______UNSAT______
- 5.
Place Boric Acid Flow Controller, BAM-IFIC-210Y, in AUTO.
CRIT CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The Operator depresses the auto pushbutton on controller BAM-IFIC-210Y
§ Operator verifies that BAM-IFIC-210Y red auto light illuminates.
SAT______UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 6.
Set boric acid flow controller, BAM-IFIC-210Y, setpoint potentiometer to > 3 gpm flow rate.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The operator rotates the setpoint potentiometer on BAM-IFIC-210Y to raise the Boric Acid flow setpoint to the value calculated in att.11.5 of OP-002-005.
§ The operator ensures that setpoint is > 3 gpm.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 7.
Place Primary Makeup Flow Controller PMU-IFIC-0210X in AUTO.
CRIT CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The Operator depresses the AUTO pushbutton on controller PMU-IFIC-210X
§ Operator verifies that red AUTO light illuminates.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 8.
Set primary makeup flow controller PMU-IFIC-210X setpoint potentiometer to > 5 gpm flow rate.
CRIT CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The Operator rotates the setpoint potentiometer on PMU-IFIC-210X to raise the PMU flow setpoint to the value used in att.11.5 of OP-002-005.
§ The operator ensures that setpoint is > 10 gpm.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 9.
Place makeup MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to AUTO.
CRIT CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The operator rotates the makeup MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to the AUTO position.
§ Operator verifies MODE SELECTOR SWITCH red AUTO light illuminated
§ If makeup is initiated the Operator verifies the selected BAM A Pump starts, CVC-510 opens, and controllers are controlling flows at respective setpoints or takes manual control and adjusts flow to setpoint value.
SAT______UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 10.
While VCT makeup is in the automatic mode, monitor the following for proper indications:
§ count rate,
§ Reactor Power,
§ VCT level and pressure,
§ primary makeup water flow rate,
§ and boric acid flow rate.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The operator informs the CRS that automatic makeup to the VCT is aligned.
§ If VCT Makeup is in progress the Operator monitors listed parameters on CP-4 and CP-2 SAT______UNSAT______
- 11.
(ALT) Check VCT level periodically to verify makeup system is maintaining proper VCT level.
CRIT CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues; (ALT) BAM pump A trips STANDARDS:
§ The operator verifies that the auto makeup system controls VCT level between 37%
and 51%.
§ (ALT) Examinee determines need to secure auto makeup to prevent dilution.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 12.
(ALT) When the Auto Makeup Mode to the VCT is no longer desired, then perform the following:
Place MAKEUP MODE SELECTOR SWITCH in MANUAL.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ The operator rotates the MAKEUP MODE SELECTOR SWITCH to the MANUAL position.
§ This step is NOT critical if Examinee places PMU-IFIC-0210X in manual and lowers ouput to zero. Either action prevents dilution CRIT SAT______UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 13.
(ALT) Verify CVC-510 CLOSED.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates switch for CVC-510 to CLOSED postion
§ Examinee verifies CVC-510 green CLOSED light illuminated.
§ This step is NOT critical if Examinee places PMU-IFIC-0210X in manual and lowers output to zero. Either action prevents dilution SAT______UNSAT______
- 14.
(ALT) Places PMU-IFIC-0210X in MANUAL CRIT CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee depresses manual pushbutton PMU-IFIC-0210X
§ Examinee verifies white MAN light illuminated,
§ Examinee verifies red AUTO light extinguished
§ This step is NOT critical if Examinee places Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL and closes CVC-510. Either action prevents dilution SAT______UNSAT______
- 15.
(ALT) Adjust PMU-IFIC-0210X setpoint to zero.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates PMU-IFIC-0210X potentiometer to zero
§ Examinee verifies PMU-IFIC-0210X setpoint indicates zero.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 16.
(ALT) Verify PMU-144 closed.
CRIT CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee lowers output of PMU-IFIC-0210X to zero.
§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 green CLOSED light illuminated,
§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 red OPEN light extinguished.
§ This step is NOT critical if Examinee places Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL and closes CVC-510. Either action prevents dilution SAT______UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 17.
(ALT) Place boric acid flow controller BAM-IFIC-0210Y in manual.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee depresses BAM-IFIC-0210Y MANUAL pushbutton
§ Examinee verifies white MAN light illuminated,
§ Examinee verifies red AUTO light extinguished.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 18.
(ALT) Adjust BAM-IFIC-0210Y setpoint output to zero.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates BAM-IFIC-0210Y potentiometer to zero
§ Examinee verifies BAM-IFIC-0210Y setpoint indicates zero.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 19.
(ALT) Verify boric acid makeup control valve BAM-141 CLOSED.
CUES:
§ Simulator provides cues
§ (NOTE; Notify Operator that another Operator will align to flush MU line)
STANDARDS:
§ Examinee lowers output of BAM-IFIC-0210Y to zero.
§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 green CLOSED light illuminated,
§ Examinee verifies PMU-144 red OPEN light extinguished.
SAT______UNSAT______
- 20.
End of task.
STOP TIME ________
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The plant is Shutdown
- 3. BAMT A concentration is 5000 ppm
- 4. BAMT Pump A is selected INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform an automatic makeup to the VCTusing BAM Tank A
Perform a Mode 5 entering Mode 6 checklist W3 SRO ADMIN ADMIN 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 0 6/19/2003 10 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path NO No NUMBER References RF-004-001 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-1-20 2-2-26 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The Reactor was shutdown on 4/1/2003 at 0033.
- 2. Reactor Vessel Head removal was scheduled for 4/6/2003 at 1800 when available Head Bolt Tensioner pumping units were determined to be INOPERABLE.
- 3. The current date and time is 4/8/03 at 1100 and the Tensioner pumping units have been repaired.
- 4. A Mode 5 to 6 Checklist was completed for the previously scheduled work. Since that time the following status is applicable.
§ Charging pump A and AB breakers are racked in and ready to run.
§ LPSI pump B is tripped on overcurrent and repairs are in progress.
§ LPSI pump A is running at 4100 gpm.
§ PMU flowpaths to the RCS have been isolated.
§ Keff has been verified to be.93.
§ All support groups report ready to enter mode 6.
INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager directs you to use the previously completed Mode 5 entering Mode 6 checklist to determine surveillances that need to be performed prior to entering Mode 6.
TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Examinee has determined the surveillances that are required to be performed prior to entering Mode 6.
STANDARD Examinee determines that the following surveillances are required:
a) OP-903-001 att. 11.2 Tech Spec logs need to be verified for Source Range channel checks b) OP-903-001 Att. 11.2 return LPSI pump to service verify two SDC trains OPERABLE.
c) OP-903-001 att. 11.14 needs to be verified for performance of acceptable Boron concentration of the RCS and Refueling Canal.
TOOLS
- 1. Copy of RF-004-001 Attachment 9.2 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. TECH SPEC VIOLATION HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. SHIFT MANAGER SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with RF-004-001 Section 9.2. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME _______
- 1.
Review all of the completion dates for the surveillances listed in Attachment 9.2 Mode 5 Entering Mode 6 Checklist CUES:
§ Supply examinee with copies of attachment 9.2 STANDARDS:
§ Examinee determines that the following surveillances and checks are required.
§ OP-903-001, Att. 11.2 Tech Spec logs need to be verified for Source Range channel checks
§ OP-903-001, Att. 11.2 return LPSI pump to service, verify two SDC trains OPERABLE.
§ OP-903-001, Att. 11.14 needs to be verified for performance of acceptable Boron concentration of the RCS and Refueling Canal.
CRIT SAT___UNSAT____
- 2.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The Reactor was shutdown on 4/1/2003 at 0033.
- 2. Reactor Vessel Head removal was scheduled for 4/6/2003 at 1800 when available Head Bolt Tensioner pumping units were determined to be INOPERABLE.
- 3. The current date and time is 4/8/03 at 1100 and the Tensioner pumping units have been repaired.
- 4. A Mode 5 to 6 Checklist was completed for the previously scheduled work. Since that time the following status is applicable.
§ Charging pump A and AB breakers are racked in and ready to run.
§ LPSI pump B is tripped on overcurrent and repairs are in progress.
§ LPSI pump A is running at 4100 gpm.
§ PMU flowpaths to the RCS have been isolated.
§ Keff has been verified to be.93.
§ All support groups report ready to enter mode 6.
INITIATING CUE The Shift Manager directs you to use the previously completed Mode 5 entering Mode 6 checklist to determine surveillances that need to be performed prior to entering Mode 6.
Perform Anticipated Transient System Check W3 RO PPS SURV 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 0 06/17/2003 15 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path NO No NUMBER References OP-904-017 NUMBER NRC KA Number 3.7-012-A4.04 3.7 012-A2.03 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The plant is in mode 3 Shutdown for refueling
- 2. Both CEA MG SETS are operating INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform a DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION TEST per OP-904-017, Section 7.3 TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Proper indication documented on OP-904-017, Attachment 10.3 STANDARD
- 1. DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION successfully completed TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION SYTEM INOPERABILITY HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES Copy of OP-904-017, Attachment 10.3 with SM/CRS signoff completed given to examinee.
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-904-017, Section 7.3. ALL Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME__________
- 1.
Verify MG SET LOAD CONTACTOR indications CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates closed
§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates closed SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 2.
Verify DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE on CP-2 CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP red ENABLE light illuminated on CP-2
§ Candidate may verify annunciator DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE K-4, cabinet M clear
§ Candidate may verify annunciator DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP L-4, cabinet M clear SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 3.
Depress and release DRT 1 of 2 pushbutton CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee depresses and releases DRT 1 of 2 pushbutton on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 4.
Verify :
§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, cabinet M) in alarm
§ DRT white ACTIVE lights illuminated
§ AUX PANEL 4 terminal DH99 to DH108 voltage indicate approximately 120VAC
§ MG SET A and B load contactors closed CUES:
§ PMI informs examinee that voltage between Aux Panel 4 terminals DH99 and DH108 indicates 120VAC STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, cabinet M) in alarm
§ Examinee verifies DRT white ACTIVE lights illuminated
§ Examinee calls PMI for AUX PANEL 4 terminal DH99-DH108 voltage readings
§ Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates closed
§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates closed SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 5.
Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES:
§ None STANDARDS:
§ Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.4.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 6.
Place DRT switch to DISABLE CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee places DRTS switch on CP-2 to DISABLE SAT_____ UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 7.
Verify:
§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator (K-4, cabinet M) clear
§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP (L-4, cabinet M) annunciator clear
§ DRT ACTIVE white lights extinguished
§ DRT DISABLE green light illuminated CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator K-4, cabinet M on CP-8 clear
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP annunciator L-4, cabinet M on CP-8 clear
§ Examinee verifies DRT ACTIVE white lights on CP-2 extinguished
§ Examinee verifies DRT DISABLE green light on CP-2 illuminated SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 8.
Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES:
§ None STANDARDS:
§ Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.5.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 9.
Place DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE on CP-2 CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee places DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE
§ Examinee verifies red ENABLE light illuminated on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 10.
Depress and release DRT 2 of 2 pushbutton CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee depresses and releases DRT 2 of 2 pushbutton SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 11.
Verify:
§ DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, CABINET M) in alarm,
§ DRT white active lights illuminated,
§ Aux panel 4 terminal DH101 to DH108 voltage indicate approximately 120VAC,
§ MG SET A and B load contactors closed CUES:
§ PMI informs examinee that voltages between Aux Panel 4 terminals DH101 and DH108 indicates 120VAC STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE (K-4, cabinet M) on CP-8 in alarm
§ Examinee verifies DRT white ACTIVE lights on CP-2 illuminated
§ Examinee calls PMI for AUX PANEL 4 terminal DH101-DH108 voltage readings
§ Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates closed
§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates closed SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 12.
Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES:
§ None STANDARDS:
§ Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.7.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 13.
Place DRT SWITCH to DISABLE CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee places DRTS SWITCH to DISABLE on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 14.
Verify:
§ (K-4, cabinet M) DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator clear
§ (L-4, cabinet M) DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP annunciator clear
§ DRT active white lights extinguished CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTIVE/ TROUBLE annunciator (K-4, cabinet M on CP-8 clear
§ Examinee verifies DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP annunciator (L-4, cabinet M) on CP-8 clear
§ Examinee verifies DRT ACTIVE white lights on CP-2 extinguished SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 15.
Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES:
§ None STANDARDS:
§ Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.8.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 16.
Place DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH in ENABLE on CP-2 CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee places DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH to enable
§ Examinee verifies red ENABLE light illuminated on CP-2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 17.
Simultaneously depress BOTH DRT pushbuttons THEN release BOTH pushbuttons CUES:
§ Simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee depresses both DRT pushbuttons on CP-2
§ Examinee releases both DRT pushbuttons.
§ Examinee verifies MG SET A LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55842 indicates NOT CLOSED
§ Examinee verifies MG SET B LOAD CONTACTOR computer point D55843 indicates NOT CLOSED SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 18.
Document proper indications on attachment 10.3 CUES:
§ None STANDARDS:
§ Examinee initials steps for attachment 10.3 step 7.3.10.2 SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 19.
Document final status of DRTS on attachment 10.3 CUES:
§ CRS informs examinee to place DRTS switch to DISABLE STANDARDS:
§ Examinee places DRTS switch to DISABLE on CP-2
§ Examinee circles disabled status,
§ Examinee checks sat
§ Examinee signs performed by on step 7.3.12 SAT_____ UNSAT______
- 20.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME _________
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The plant is in mode 3 Shutdown for refueling
- 2. Both CEA MG SETS are operating INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to perform a DIVERSE REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION TEST per OP-904-017, Section 7.3
RESET MSIS ACTUATION Title Here W3 RO PPS Emerg 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 08/04/2003 15Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-901-009 APP. 5B Emergency Operating Procedures Standard Appendices 1.1 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-1-20 4.3 4.2 4.2-A40-AA2.05 4.1 4.5 4.2-A40-AK3.04 4.5 4.7 METHOD Evaluation Methods Simulate Simulator Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. A Main Steam Line Break occurred outside Containment
- 2. A MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL ACTUATION has occurred
- 3. Containment pressure is less than 17.1 psia
- 4. OP-902-009, appendix 5B is complete through step 4 INITIATING CUE The CRS orders you to reset the MSIS actuation in accordance with OP-902-009, Appendix 5B.
TERMINATING CUE
- 1. MSIS ACTUATION IS RESET STANDARD THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL HAS BEEN RESET.
TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. MSIS NOT RESET
- 2. REACTUATION OF CHANNELS PREVIOUSLY RESET HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. SM/CRS
- 2. NPO SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES
- 1. Ability to reset variable setpoints for Steam Generator pressure low trips
- 2. Ability to reset ESFAS actuations INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-902-009, Appendix 5B, Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME_______
- 1.
Place Channel Test Switch to 'B' and verify Test Power Supply is illuminated.
CRIT CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the Channel Test Switch in CP-10 Channel A and positions the switch to B.
§ The Examinee verifies the Test Power Supply Pushbutton located in CP-10 Channel A is illuminated.
SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 2.
Place Bistable Select Switch to Bistable '12' CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues
§ CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the B channel bistable select switch on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and positions the switch to the '12' position SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 3.
Place Meter Input Select Switch to 'Input' CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the B channel Meter Input select switch on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and positions the switch to the 'Input' position SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 4.
Record DVM reading CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the Digital Voltmeter on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and records the reading on Att. 5B SAT_____UNSAT_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 5.
Press and Hold the red Test pushbutton on Bistable Control Panel CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The Examinee locates the B channel Test pushbutton on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and depresses the pushbutton until directed by procedure to release the pushbutton. (Element 12)
SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 6.
Raise Test Pot output until DVM reads 3.9 vdc CUES:
The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the B channel Test Potentiometers on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and rotates the pot until the voltage on the Digital Voltmeter reads at least 3.9 vdc SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 7.
Press Lamp Reset pushbutton as necessary to clear Trip and Pretrip lights CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues STANDARDS:
§ The Examinee locates the B channel Lamp Reset pushbutton on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel, depresses the pushbutton.
§ The Examinee verifies the trip and pretrip lights on S/G 2 Pressure Lo bistable indicator are extinguished CRIT SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 8.
Lower Test Pot output until LO SG-2 PRESS Pretrip occurs CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the B channel Test potentiometer on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and rotates pot counter-clockwise
§ The Examinee verifies the LO SG-2 Press Pretrip light illuminates.
SAT_____UNSAT_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 9.
Press LOW SG PRESS SETPOINT RESET pushbutton CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the B channel LOW SG PRESS SETPOINT RESET pushbutton on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and presses the pushbutton SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 10.
Press Lamp Reset pushbutton and verify Pretrip clears CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues STANDARDS:
§ The Examinee locates the B channel Lamp Reset pushbutton on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel, depresses the pushbutton.
§ The Examinee verifies the trip and pretrip lights on S/G 2 Pressure Lo bistable indicator are extinguished.
CRIT SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 11.
When 10 seconds have elapsed, then repeat previous steps until EITHER DVM reads less than the reading recorded on Attachment 5-B, step 2c, with Low SG Pressure Trip and Pretrip clear OR DVM reads 0.0 vdc, corresponding to 0.0 psia CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cue CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee repeats elements 7-10 until the DVM reads less than reading recorded earlier on Att. 5B or 0.0 vdc and pretrip and trip lights are extinguished on LO SG-2 PRESS bistable indicator SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 12.
Release the Test pushbutton CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure STANDARDS:
§ The examinee releases the Channel B Test pushbutton SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 13.
Press Lamp Reset pushbuttons to clear Trip and Pretrip lights CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues STANDARDS:
SAT_____UNSAT___
§ The Examinee locates the B channel Lamp Reset pushbutton on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel, depresses the pushbutton.
§ The Examinee verifies the trip and pretrip lights on S/G 2 Pressure Lo bistable indicator are extinguished.
- 14.
Place Bistable Select switch to 'Off' CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues STANDARDS:
SAT_____UNSAT_______
§ The examinee locates the B channel bistable select switch on PPS Cabinet B Bistable Control Panel and positions the switch to the 'OFF' position
- 15.
Place Channel Test switch to 'Off' CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the Channel Test switch in CP-10 Channel A and positions the switch to 'OFF' SAT_____UNSAT_______
- 16.
Bypass channel C LO SG-1 PRESS (Bistable 11) and verify BYPASS light is lit CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates, unlocks, and opens the access door for the Bistable Bypass pushbuttons on PPS Channel C Bistable Control Panel and depresses
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure SAT_____UNSAT___
the pushbutton for LO SG-1 Press (Bistable 11).
§ The examinee verifies the Bistable Bypass pushbutton locks in and the amber bypass light is illuminated for LO SG-1 Press bistable on PPS Channel C Bistable Control Panel
- 17.
Bypass Channel C Lo SG-2 PRESS (Bistable 12) and verify BYPASS light is lit.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
SAT_____UNSAT___
§ The examinee locates, unlocks, and opens the access door for the Bistable Bypass pushbuttons on PPS Channel C Bistable Control Panel and depresses the pushbutton for LO SG-2 Press (Bistable 12).
§ The examinee verifies the Bistable Bypass pushbutton locks in and the amber bypass light is illuminated for LO SG-2 Press bistable on PPS Channel C Bistable Control Panel
- 18.
Reset MSIS Initiation relays on ALL four channels as follows:
§ Place the Reset Permissive switch to 'UNLK' position. (CP-10)
§ Press MSIS Reset pushbutton.
§ Verify the initiation relay indicator lit on the ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURES SYSTEM mimic.
§ Place the Reset permissive switch to 'LK' position CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The Examinee locates the Reset Permissive Switch on PPS Channel A.
§ The Examinee places the switch in the UNLOCK position.
§ The Examinee depresses the MSIS Reset pushbutton.
§ The Examinee verifies the red initiation relay light for MSIS illuminates on CP-10 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM mimic.
§ The Examinee places the Reset Permissive switch to the LOCK position.
§ NOTE; The Examine will repeat the previous steps for Channels B,C and D, the Initiation relay light colors are as follows;
§ Channel BYellow
§ Channel CGreen
§ Channel DBlue
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure SAT_____UNSAT___
- 19.
Reset MSIS actuation logic on BOTH trains as follows: Press the MSIS Reset pushbuttons (CP-33). Verify the actuation relay indicator lit on the ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM mimic (CP-10).
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues CRIT STANDARDS:
SAT_____UNSAT___
§ The examinee locates and depresses both MSIS Reset pushbuttons on CP-33
§ The examinee verifies that all four white action relay lights for MSIS on the ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM mimic on CP-10 are illuminated
§ Cue the Operator at this point that another Operator will complete Appendix 5B fromn this point.
- 20.
End of Task SAT_____UNSAT_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. A Main Steam Line Break occurred outside Containment
- 2. A MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL ACTUATION has occurred
- 3. Containment pressure is less than 17.1 psia
- 4. OP-902-009, appendix 5B is complete through step 4 INITIATING CUE The CRS orders you to reset the MSIS actuation in accordance with OP-902-009, Appendix 5B.
Synchronize and Load the EDG W3 RO EDG NORM 3
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 6 6/26/2003 15 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-009-002 NUMBER NRC KA Number 3.6-064-A4.01 3.6-064-A4.07 2-1-20 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Emergency Diesel Generator A was started by MANUAL REMOTE start to troubleshoot the Governor Circuitry
- 2. Emergency Diesel Generator A has been running at 600 rpm for 5 minutes
- 3. Emergency Diesel Generator A CONTROL MODE selected to "RTGB position.
INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to parallel Emergency Diesel Generator A to the A3 bus and load the Diesel to 4.4 MW and 1 MVAR from the Control Room in accordance with OP-009-002 Section 6.4 TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Emergency Diesel Generator loaded to the specified MW and MVAR values
- 2. (ALT) The Emergency Diesel Generator is shutdown STANDARD
- 1. Desired EDG synchronized and loaded
- 2. (ALT) The Diesel is tripped with no cooldown TOOLS Key for synchronizer SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. EQUIPMENT DAMAGE HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. SM/CRS
- 2. NAO SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-009-002, Section 6.4. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME______
- 1.
Verify Emergency Diesel Generator operating with voltage between 3920 and 4580 volts CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee checks EDG A voltmeter on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 2.
Verify Emergency Diesel Generator operating with frequency between 58.8 - 61.2 Hz CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee checks EDG A frequency meter on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 3.
Verify VOLT REGULATOR MODE SELECT switch in AUTO CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies EDG A VOLT REGULATOR MODE SELECT switch in AUTO SAT____UNSAT____
- 4.
Position the EDG A SYNCHRONIZER SWITCH to "GEN MAN" CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee obtains key (208) for EDG A synchronizer switch from locker and inserts into EDG A SYNCHRONIZER SWITCH
§ Examinee positions SYNCHRONIZER SWITCH to GEN MAN
§ Examinee verifies Running and Incoming voltmeters on CP-1 energize and EDG A Synchroscope on CP-1 energizes.
SAT____UNSAT____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 5.
Verify proper voltage response CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A VOLTAGE ADJUST switch on CP-1 to raise
§ Examinee rotates EDG A VOLTAGE ADJUST switch on CP-1 to lower
§ Examinee verifies proper EDG A voltage response on Incoming or Running Voltmeters on CP-1.
SAT____UNSAT____
- 6.
Adjust EDG A voltage slightly higher than system voltage CUES:
Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A VOLTAGE ADJUST SWITCH to obtain desired voltage.
§ Examinee adjusts Incoming voltage slightly higher than Running voltage on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 7.
Verify proper frequency response CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee adjusts EDG A SPEED ADJUST SWITCH on CP-1 raise
§ Examinee adjusts EDG A SPEED ADJUST SWITCH on CP-1 to lower
§ Examinee verifies proper response by checking EDG A Frequency meters and Synchroscope response on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 8.
Adjust engine speed until Synchroscope rotating slowly in the clockwise direction CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates speed adjust switch on CP-1 to raise or lower to obtain desired rotation
§ Examinee verifies EDG A on Synchroscope on CP-1 is rotating slowly in the clockwise direction
§ THIS STEP IS CRITICAL IF THE SYNCHROSCOPE IS ROTATING IN THE COUNTER-CLOCKWISE DIRECTION.
SAT____UNSAT____
- 9.
Verify EDG A red START light is illuminated CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies EDG A red START light on CP-1 illuminated SAT____UNSAT____
- 10.
Close EDG A breaker CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A output breaker c/s on CP-1 to CLOSE at approx. the 12:00 position on EDG A Synchroscope (CP-1)
§ Examinee verifies EDG A output breaker red CLOSED light illuminates on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 11.
Apply approximately 0.1 MW load on EDG A CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies a minimum of.1 MW load on EDG A MW meter on CP-1
§ THIS STEP IS CRITICAL IF EDG LOAD IS LESS THAN 0.1 MW AFTER CLOSING THE EDG OUTPUT BREAKER.
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure SAT____UNSAT____
- 12.
Position EDG A SNCHRONIZER SWITCH to OFF CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A synchronizer switch to OFF on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 13.
Adjust volt adjust c/s to obtain 1 MVAR CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates volt adjust switch to obtain 1 MVAR on EDG A MVAR meter SAT____UNSAT____
- 14.
Adjust real load to 1-1.2 MW CUES:
§ If required, as CRS direct examinee to adjust real load to 4 MW in accordance with OP-009-002, Section 6.4 STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates SPEED ADJUST switch to raise
§ Examinee verifies EDG A MW meter reads 1-1.2 MW at.5 MW / minute SAT____UNSAT____
- 15.
Hold at 1 MW for 5 minutes CUES:
§ Cue examinee that 5 minutes have elapsed STANDARDS:
§ Examinee states that EDG A real load would be held for 5 minutes SAT____UNSAT____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 16.
(ALT) Perform EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN of EDG A in TEST mode CUES:
§ Provide the following cue to the Examinee:
The NAO at EDG A reports major leak on EDG A lube oil line. The CRS instructs you to perform an EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN of EDG A with no cooldown from CP-1.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee depresses DIESEL A TRIP pushbutton on CP-1
§ Examinee verifies EDG A shutdown by verifying EDG A frequency meter on CP-1 pegged low and the green light on EDG A START switch on CP-1 is illuminated
§ Examinee may contact NAO to verify EDG A at 0 rpm SAT____UNSAT____
- 17.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME________
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Emergency Diesel Generator A was started by MANUAL REMOTE start to troubleshoot the Governor Circuitry
- 2. Emergency Diesel Generator A has been running at 600 rpm for 5 minutes
- 3. Emergency Diesel Generator A CONTROL MODE selected to "RTGB position.
INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to parallel Emergency Diesel Generator A to the A3 bus and load the Diesel to 4.4 MW and 1 MVAR from the Control Room in accordance with OP-009-002 Section 6.4
Synchronize and Load the EDG W3 RO EDG NORM 3
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 6 6/26/2003 15 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-009-002 NUMBER NRC KA Number 3.6-064-A4.01 3.6-064-A4.07 2-1-20 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Emergency Diesel Generator A was started by MANUAL REMOTE start to troubleshoot the Governor Circuitry
- 2. Emergency Diesel Generator A has been running at 600 rpm for 5 minutes
- 3. Emergency Diesel Generator A CONTROL MODE selected to "RTGB position.
INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to parallel Emergency Diesel Generator A to the A3 bus and load the Diesel to 4.4 MW and 1 MVAR from the Control Room in accordance with OP-009-002 Section 6.4 TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Emergency Diesel Generator loaded to the specified MW and MVAR values
- 2. (ALT) The Emergency Diesel Generator is shutdown STANDARD
- 1. Desired EDG synchronized and loaded
- 2. (ALT) The Diesel is tripped with no cooldown TOOLS Key for synchronizer SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. EQUIPMENT DAMAGE HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. SM/CRS
- 2. NAO SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-009-002, Section 6.4. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME______
- 1.
Verify Emergency Diesel Generator operating with voltage between 3920 and 4580 volts CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee checks EDG A voltmeter on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 2.
Verify Emergency Diesel Generator operating with frequency between 58.8 - 61.2 Hz CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee checks EDG A frequency meter on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 3.
Verify VOLT REGULATOR MODE SELECT switch in AUTO CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies EDG A VOLT REGULATOR MODE SELECT switch in AUTO SAT____UNSAT____
- 4.
Position the EDG A SYNCHRONIZER SWITCH to "GEN MAN" CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee obtains key (208) for EDG A synchronizer switch from locker and inserts into EDG A SYNCHRONIZER SWITCH
§ Examinee positions SYNCHRONIZER SWITCH to GEN MAN
§ Examinee verifies Running and Incoming voltmeters on CP-1 energize and EDG A Synchroscope on CP-1 energizes.
SAT____UNSAT____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 5.
Verify proper voltage response CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A VOLTAGE ADJUST switch on CP-1 to raise
§ Examinee rotates EDG A VOLTAGE ADJUST switch on CP-1 to lower
§ Examinee verifies proper EDG A voltage response on Incoming or Running Voltmeters on CP-1.
SAT____UNSAT____
- 6.
Adjust EDG A voltage slightly higher than system voltage CUES:
Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A VOLTAGE ADJUST SWITCH to obtain desired voltage.
§ Examinee adjusts Incoming voltage slightly higher than Running voltage on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 7.
Verify proper frequency response CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee adjusts EDG A SPEED ADJUST SWITCH on CP-1 raise
§ Examinee adjusts EDG A SPEED ADJUST SWITCH on CP-1 to lower
§ Examinee verifies proper response by checking EDG A Frequency meters and Synchroscope response on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 8.
Adjust engine speed until Synchroscope rotating slowly in the clockwise direction CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates speed adjust switch on CP-1 to raise or lower to obtain desired rotation
§ Examinee verifies EDG A on Synchroscope on CP-1 is rotating slowly in the clockwise direction
§ THIS STEP IS CRITICAL IF THE SYNCHROSCOPE IS ROTATING IN THE COUNTER-CLOCKWISE DIRECTION.
SAT____UNSAT____
- 9.
Verify EDG A red START light is illuminated CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies EDG A red START light on CP-1 illuminated SAT____UNSAT____
- 10.
Close EDG A breaker CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A output breaker c/s on CP-1 to CLOSE at approx. the 12:00 position on EDG A Synchroscope (CP-1)
§ Examinee verifies EDG A output breaker red CLOSED light illuminates on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 11.
Apply approximately 0.1 MW load on EDG A CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies a minimum of.1 MW load on EDG A MW meter on CP-1
§ THIS STEP IS CRITICAL IF EDG LOAD IS LESS THAN 0.1 MW AFTER CLOSING THE EDG OUTPUT BREAKER.
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure SAT____UNSAT____
- 12.
Position EDG A SNCHRONIZER SWITCH to OFF CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates EDG A synchronizer switch to OFF on CP-1 SAT____UNSAT____
- 13.
Adjust volt adjust c/s to obtain 1 MVAR CUES:
§ Simulator will provide required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates volt adjust switch to obtain 1 MVAR on EDG A MVAR meter SAT____UNSAT____
- 14.
Adjust real load to 1-1.2 MW CUES:
§ If required, as CRS direct examinee to adjust real load to 4 MW in accordance with OP-009-002, Section 6.4 STANDARDS:
§ Examinee rotates SPEED ADJUST switch to raise
§ Examinee verifies EDG A MW meter reads 1-1.2 MW at.5 MW / minute SAT____UNSAT____
- 15.
Hold at 1 MW for 5 minutes CUES:
§ Cue examinee that 5 minutes have elapsed STANDARDS:
§ Examinee states that EDG A real load would be held for 5 minutes SAT____UNSAT____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 16.
(ALT) Perform EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN of EDG A in TEST mode CUES:
§ Provide the following cue to the Examinee:
The NAO at EDG A reports major leak on EDG A lube oil line. The CRS instructs you to perform an EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN of EDG A with no cooldown from CP-1.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee depresses DIESEL A TRIP pushbutton on CP-1
§ Examinee verifies EDG A shutdown by verifying EDG A frequency meter on CP-1 pegged low and the green light on EDG A START switch on CP-1 is illuminated
§ Examinee may contact NAO to verify EDG A at 0 rpm SAT____UNSAT____
- 17.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME________
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Emergency Diesel Generator A was started by MANUAL REMOTE start to troubleshoot the Governor Circuitry
- 2. Emergency Diesel Generator A has been running at 600 rpm for 5 minutes
- 3. Emergency Diesel Generator A CONTROL MODE selected to "RTGB position.
INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to parallel Emergency Diesel Generator A to the A3 bus and load the Diesel to 4.4 MW and 1 MVAR from the Control Room in accordance with OP-009-002 Section 6.4
Placing CCW Pump A/B In Service To Replace CCW Pump A(B)
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 3 8/2/00 10 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-002-003 6.4 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM 13 5 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-1-20 4.3 4.2 3.8-008-A3.04 2.9 3.2 3.8-008-A4.01 3.3 3.1 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM SIMULATE SIMULATOR Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS 1 Maintenance is to be performed on CCW pump B
- 2. Plant is in Mode 3
- 3. TRM 3.7.3 for CCW pump B being inoperable has been entered INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to replace CCW pump B with CCW pump "AB" TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Pump AB has been secured, the AB assignment switch has been returned To NORMAL, and SM or CRS notified of oil leak STANDARD
- 1. AB CCW PUMP stopped after oil leak reported TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. EQUIPMENT DAMAGE HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. NAO
- 2. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-002-003, Section 6.4. Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME_____
- 1.
Verify the 3AB Bus is aligned to the 3B Bus.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the BUS AB STATUS lights on CP-8 and verifies the B light is illuminated.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 2.
Verify the CCW Pump A/B assignment switch is in the Normal position.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the CCW Pump A/B assignment switch on CP-8 and verifies the switch is in the NORM (middle) position.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 3.
Close the following valves:
§ CC-114B, CCW Pump B To AB Suction Cross connect,
§ CC-115B, CCW Pump AB To B Suction Cross connect
§ CC-126B, CCW Pump B To AB Discharge Cross connect
§ CC-127B, CCW Pump AB To B Discharge Cross connect CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
STANDARDS:
§ The Examinee locates the common switch for CC-126B/114B (NOTE; ONE SWITCH CONTROLS BOTH VALVES), places and holds the control switch in the CLOSE position
§ The Examinee verifies the upper and lower red lights are extinguished and the upper and lower green lights are illuminated.
§ The examine locates the common switch for CC-127B/115B, places and holds the control switch in the CLOSE position
§ The Examinee verifies the upper and lower red lights are extinguished and the upper and lower green lights are illuminated.
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure SAT___UNSAT___
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 4.
Place the CCW Pump A/B assignment switch in Position B.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the CCW Pump A/B assignment switch on CP-8 and positions the switch to the B position.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 5.
Verify the following valves Open:
§ CC-114B, CCW Pump B To AB Suction Cross connect
§ CC-115B, CCW Pump AB To B Suction Cross connect
§ CC-126B, CCW Pump B To AB Discharge Cross connect
§ CC-127B, CCW Pump AB To B Discharge Cross connect CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
STANDARDS:
§ The examine locates the common switch for CC-126B/114B and verifies that the upper and lower red lights are illuminated and the upper and lower green lights are extinguished.
§ The examine locates the common switch for CC-127B/115B and verifies that the upper and lower red lights are illuminated and the upper and lower green lights are extinguished.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 6.
If the CCW Pump suction and discharge cross-connect valves, CC-126B/114B and CC-127B/115B, did not open, then contact maintenance to trouble shoot and repair the valves.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
STANDARDS:
§ The examinee notifies maintenance if the appropriate valves did not open
§ The examinee skips the step if all valves operate as required.
SAT___UNSAT___
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 7.
Verify CCW Pump A/B bearing oil level is between the Off level marks.
CUES:
§ After the examinee requests the NAO to check bearing oil levels, cue the examinee that bearing oil level is between the Off level marks.
STANDARDS:
§ The examinee requests the NAO to verify bearing oil levels at CCW Pump A/B.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 8.
Start CCW Pump A/B.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee locates the CCW Pump A/B control switch on CP-8 and momentarily places the switch in the START position.
§ The examinee verifies the red light illuminates and the green light extinguishes on the CCW pump A/B control switch.
§ The examinee may check CCW Header flows and CCW Header pressures on CP-8 rise slighty when pump is started.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 9.
Verify CCW Pump A/B bearing oil level is between the Run marks.
CUES:
§ (ALT): NAO reports oil level dropping rapidly on pump outboard bearing due to a split in the oil line to the flow sightglass, the leak is not isolable.
STANDARDS:
§ NAO directed to check oil level.
§ (ALT): RO recommends to the CRS securing pump and realigning CCW Pump A/B assignment switch.
SAT___UNSAT___
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 10.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The examinee momentarily places the CCW Pump A/B control switch on CP-8 in the OFF position.
§ The examinee verifies that the green light illuminates and the red light extinguishes on the CCW Pump A/B control switch.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 11.
(ALT): Realign CCW Pump A/B assignment switch to NORM.
CUES:
§ The simulator provides the cues.
STANDARDS:
§ The examinee positions the CCW Pump A/B assignment switch to the NORM position. (Mid Position)
SAT___UNSAT___
- 12.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME _______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Maintenance is to be performed on CCW pump B
- 2. Plant is in Mode 3
- 3. TRM 3.7.3 for CCW pump B being inoperable has been entered INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to replace CCW pump B with CCW pump "AB"
ALIGN A LPSI PUMP TO REPLACE A CS PUMP W3 RO SI EMERG 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 2 8/03/2000 10 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path NO No NUMBER References OP-902-008 CTPC-CA SAFETY FUNCTION RECOVERY 12 00 OP-902-009 APP 29 Emergency Operating Procedure Standard Appendices 1.1 00 NUMBER NRC KA Number 4.4-E9-EA1.1 4.2 4 METHOD Evaluation Methods DISCUSS SIMULATE SIMULATOR Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 2. Containment pressure is 40 psia and rising rapidly.
- 3. Neither CS pump is available.
- 4. All ESFAS actuations have occurred as required. Assume all components actuated per design unless otherwise stated.
- 5. OP-902-008, SAFETY FUNCTION RECOVERY PROCEDURE has been implemented.
- 6. The CRS has implemented Containment Temperature and Pressure Control Continuing Actions and has decided to align LPSI pump A to replace CS pump A.
- 7. The TSC concurs with the decision.
INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you, the SNPO to align LPSI pump A to replace CS pump A in accordance with OP-902-009 Standard Appendices 29.
TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Spray flow is established to containment using the selected LPSI pump.
STANDARD
TOOLS Locked valve keys SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. Loss of containment integrity
- 2. Possible offsite dose
- 3. Damage to equipment HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with referenced procedure, OP-902-009, Appendix 29. All components operated are located on CP-8.
Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME _______
- 1.
Verify LPSI PUMP A control switch in OFF.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the C/S for LPSI pump A on CP-8and demonstrates the intended action, cue the operator that the switch is in OFF.
STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates the LPSI pump A C/S on CP-8.
§ The operator ensures that the C/S is in the OFF position.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 2.
Verify CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP A control switch in OFF.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the C/S for CS PUMP A on CP-8and demonstrates the intended action, cue the operator that the c/s is in OFF.
STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates CS PUMP A C/S on CP-8.
§ The operator ensures that the C/S is in the OFF position.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 3.
Place SI-129A, LPSI FLOW CONTROL VALVE to AUTO. [KEY 137]
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the C/S for SI 129A and demonstrates the intended action, cue the operator that the C/S was placed in the AUTO position and spring returned to the MID position.
STANDARDS:
§ The operator obtains KEY FOR SI-129A from key locker on side of NPO desk.
§ The operator locates the C/S for SI-129A on CP-8.
§ The operator inserts the key, momentarily places the C/S in the AUTO position, then releases the C/S to the MID position.
CRIT SAT___UNSAT___
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 4.
Place SI-IFIC-0307 LPSI FLOW CONTROLLER HEADER 2A/2B in MANUAL.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the flow controller on CP-8 and demonstrates process for placing the controller in MANUAL, cue the operator that the controller is in MANUAL and process output meter reads 100%.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates SI-IFIC-0307 on CP-8.
§ The operator depresses the MANUAL pushbutton on the controller and verifies the white light illuminates.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 5.
Adjust SI-IFIC-0307 LPSI FLOW CONTROLLER HEADER 2A/2B to 0% output.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the MANUAL OUTPUT DECREASE pushbutton on the controller and demonstrates action to lower output, cue the operator that process output meter reads 0%.
STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates SI-IFIC-0307 on CP-8.
§ The operator depresses the MANUAL OUTPUT DECREASE pushbutton on the controller until output reads 0%.
§ The operator verifies SI-129A closed on CP-8 by verifying green light illuminated and red light extinguished CRIT SAT___UNSAT___
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 6.
Verify the following valves closed:
§ SI-415A, SHUTDOWN TEMP CONTROL VALVE [KEY 138],
§ SI-138A, COLD LEG 2B,
§ SI-139A, COLD LEG 2A CUES:
§ When the operator locates each valve C/S on CP-8 and demonstrates the action to place each valve in the required position, cue the operator that the valve is closed.
§ (at the examiners discretion he may cue the operator that SI-138A OR SI-139A is not moving if the operator does not demonstrate overriding the SIAS signal to the valve)
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates the C/S for SI-415A on CP-8 and verifies the C/S is locked in the LESS position.
§ The operator verifies the analog valve position indicator reads 0% or that the green light is lit and red light is extinguished above the C/S.
§ The operator locates the C/S for SI-138A on CP-8 and places the C/S to the MORE position to override the SIAS signal and then back to LESS.
§ The operator verifies the digital indicator above the C/S reads 0% or the green light is lit and red light is extinguished on the C/S.
§ The operator locates the c/s for SI-139A on CP-8 and places the C/S to the MORE position to override the SIAS signal and then back to LESS.
§ The operator verifies the digital indicator above the C/S reads 0% or the green light is lit and red light is extinguished on the C/S.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 7.
Open SI-125A/SI-412A, SHDN HX A ISOL VALVES. [KEY 136]
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the switch for SI-125A/SI-412A on CP-8 and demonstrates action to open the valves, cue the operator that SI-125A and SI-412A are OPEN.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The operator obtains the key for SI-125A/SI-412A from the key locker on the side of the NPO desk.
§ The operator locates the switch for SI-125A/SI-412A on CP-8, inserts the key, momentarily places the C/S to OPEN, and releases the switch.
§ The operator verifies the valves OPEN by observing both red lights are lit and both green lights are extinguished above C/S.
SAT___UNSAT___
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 8.
Verify CS-125A, CNTMT SPRAY HEADER A VALVE open.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the C/S for CS-125A on CP-8 and demonstrates method for verifying valve position, cue the operator that CS-125A is OPEN.
STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates the C/S for CS-125A on CP-8.
§ The operator verifies that the red light is lit and the green Light is extinguished on the C/S.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 9.
Start LPSI pump A.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates LPSI pump A C/S on CP-8 and demonstrates action to start the pump, cue the operator that the pump is running.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates LPSI pump A C/S on CP-8, momentarily places the C/S to the start position, and verifies the red light is lit and the green light is extinguished on the C/S.
§ The operator verifies discharge pressure indicator on CP-8 increases.
§ The operator verifies current indication on CP-8 is steady and not pegged (20-60 amps) after starting current drops off.
SAT___UNSAT___
- 10.
Verify CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADER A flow.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADER A flow indicator on CP-8, cue the operator that flow is 2000 gpm.
STANDARDS:
§ The Operator locates CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADER A flow indicator on CP-8 and verifies flow indication meets acceptance criteria for safety function (1750 gpm).
SAT___UNSAT___
- 11.
END OF TASK
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure STOP TIME______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 2. Containment pressure is 40 psia and rising rapidly.
- 3. Neither CS pump is available.
- 4. All ESFAS actuations have occurred as required. Assume all components actuated per design unless otherwise stated.
- 5. OP-902-008, SAFETY FUNCTION RECOVERY PROCEDURE has been implemented.
- 6. The CRS has implemented Containment Temperature and Pressure Control Continuing Actions and has decided to align LPSI pump A to replace CS pump A.
- 7. The TSC concurs with the decision.
INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you, the SNPO to align LPSI pump A to replace CS pump A in accordance with OP-902-009 Standard Appendices 29.
RECOVER DROPPED CEA (CONTINUOUS CEA MOTION)
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 2 06/26/2003 5 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-901-102 NUMBER NRC KA Number 3.1-001-A2.03 3.1-014-A2.03 4.2-A01-AA1.05 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Reactor Power is at 58 percent
- 2. CEA 27 has dropped
- 3. Repairs to CEA 27 have been completed
- 4. OP-901-102 Subsection E1, is in progress, steps 1-14 have been completed INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to withdraw CEA 27 per step 15 of OP-901-102 using CEAs in MANUAL INDIVIDUAL mode TERMINATING CUE
- 2. (ALT) Reactor is tripped STANDARD
- 2. (ALT) Reactor manually tripped TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. REACTIVITY EVENT HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES Consequences of uncontrolled reactivity additions INSTRUCTOR NOTES
- 1. Reset to IC 28 or special snap
- 2. insert RD02A27 to drop rod, then delete malfunction
- 3. Adjust RCS temperature
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-102, Section E.1. STEP 15. All components to be operated are located on CP-2.
Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
Note: Examinee may initiate Boration at beginning of Task START TIME_______
- 1.
Position INDIVIDUAL CEA selection switches to CEA 27 CRIT CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee positions individual CEA selection switch tens to 2
§ Examinee positions individual CEA selection switch units to 7 SAT____UNSAT_____
- 2.
Position GROUP SELECT switch to group P CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee positions GROUP SELECT switch to group P SAT____UNSAT_____
- 3.
Place mode select switch to MI CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee positions MODE SELECT switch to MI SAT____UNSAT_____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 4.
Verify:
§ MI light illuminates
§ white lights on GROUP SELECTION MATRIX for group 27 illuminates
§ white selection light for CEA 227 illuminates CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies MI light illuminates,
§ Examinee verifies white lights on GROUP SELECTION MATRIX for Group P illuminates
§ Examinee verifies white selection light for CEA 27 illuminates SAT____UNSAT_____
- 5.
Place CEA MANUAL SHIM switch to WITHDRAW CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee places CEA MANUAL SHIM switch to WITHDRAW SAT____UNSAT_____
- 6.
Monitor CEA 27 position indicator moving outward CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee moves CEA 27 at less than 15 in/min SAT____UNSAT_____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 7.
Monitor:
§ Reactor Power
§ RCS temperature
§ Axial Shape Index CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee monitors to meters on CP-2 or PMC indications for:
§ Power
§ Temperature
§ ASI SAT____UNSAT_____
- 8.
(ALT) NOTE: Continuous outward CEA motion will begin when OUT SHIM switch released Attempt to stop outward CEA rod motion CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues STANDARDS:
§ Examinee recognizes continuous CEA withdrawal
§ Examinee places MODE SELECTOR switch to OFF SAT____UNSAT_____
- 9.
(ALT) manually trip Reactor CUES:
§ The simulator will provide the required cues CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee recognizes continuous CEA withdrawal and recommends tripping the Reactor to CRS
§ Examinee Depresses both REACTOR TRIP pushbuttons on CP-1
§ Examinee Verifies all ROD BOTTOM lights illuminated SAT____UNSAT_____
- 10.
END OF TASK.
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure STOP TIME________
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Reactor Power is at 58 percent
- 2. CEA 27 has dropped
- 3. Repairs to CEA 27 have been completed
- 4. OP-901-102 Subsection E1, is in progress, steps 1-14 have been completed INITIATING CUE You are directed by the CRS to withdraw CEA 27 per step 15 of OP-901-102 using CEAs in MANUAL INDIVIDUAL
RESET EFW PUMP AB MECHANICAL OVERSPEED DURING CR EVACUATION WITH FIRE W3 NAO EFW EMERG 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 0 06/18/2003 5 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path NO No NUMBER References OP-901-502 NUMBER NRC KA Number 3.4-061-A2.04 3.4-061-K4.07 4.2-68-AA1.02 METHOD Evaluation Methods SIMULATE Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The Control Room has been evacuated due to a fire in CP-2
- 2. A mechanical overspeed trip of Emergency Feedwater Pump AB has occurred
- 3. The Reactor has been shutdown for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
- 5. Power is deenergized to 3A Safety Bus and MS-407, EFW Pump AB Drip Pot to Normal Drain Bypass is failed open INITIATING CUE The Primary NPO directs you to reset the EFW Pump AB Mechanical Overspeed Trip and reopen the Stop Valve, MS-416 in accordance with OP-901-502, Subsection E2, Step 16.2 TERMINATING CUE
- 1. The MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP DEVICE is reset and the stop valve is reopened.
STANDARD
- 1. The EFW Pump AB Mechanical Overspeed Trip Mechanism has been successfully reset TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. LOSS OF EFW PUMP CAPABILITY HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. PNPO SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-502, Subsection E.2 STEP 16.2. Components to be operated during this JPM are located on the - 35 elevation near EFW pump AB.
Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME______
- 1.
Close both Pump AB TURB STM SUPPLY VALVES - MS 401A & B.
CUES:
§ CUE: Primary NPO reports MS-401A & B are CLOSED STANDARDS:
§ Examinee requests that Primary NPO close MS-401A & B at Remote Shutdown Panel (LCP-43).
SAT____UNSAT______
- 2.
Verify:
§ MS-407 EFW PUMP AB DRIP POT TO NORMAL DRAIN BYPASS is OPEN
§ Steam supply header is depressurized by cycling MS-409, EFWPT MS SUPPLY DRIP POT NORMAL DRAIN BYPASS.
CUES:
§ CUE: MS -407 is failed open and steam header is depressurized, MS-409 is closed STANDARDS:
§ Examinee verifies MS-407 is open by visual indication of limit switches on the valve
§ Examinee simulates cycling MS-409 by using local C/S
§ Examinee verifies steam header depressurized by no steam issuing to floor drain SAT____UNSAT______
- 3.
Verify MS-407, EFW PUMP AB DRIP POT TO NORMAL DRAIN BYPASS is closed CUES:
§ CUE: MS-407 is closed STANDARDS:
§ Examinee simulates closing MS-407by using manual handwheel on valve actuator.
Direction to close or open valve is indicated on handwheel.
§ Examinee may isolate air to valve actuator.
SAT____UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 4.
Locally close MS-416 EFW PUMP AB TURBINE STOP VALVE CUES:
§ CUE: MS-416 is closed CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee simulates closing MS-416 EFW Pump AB Turbine Stop Valve by depressing the motor declutch lever and turning the handwheel clockwise until handwheel travel stops.
§ Examinee verifies latch arm on valve is positioned to accept latch SAT____UNSAT______
- 5.
Verify EFW PUMP AB MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP ASSEMBLY reset.
CUES:
§ CUE: Mechanical overspeed linkage is reset CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee simulates pushing connecting rod lever towards stop valve.
§ Examinee verifies tappet nut fully recessed in Overspeed Trip Mechanism.
§ Examinee verifies latch fully engaged with latch arm.
§ Examinee simulates releasing the connecting rod.
§ Examinee verifies latch remains engaged with latch arm.
SAT____UNSAT______
- 6.
Locally open MS-416, "EFW Pump AB TURBINE STOP VALVE".
CUES:
CUE: MS-416 is open CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Examinee simulates opening MS-416 EFW Pump AB Turbine Stop Valve by depressing the motor declutch lever and turning the handwheel counterclockwise until handwheel travel stops
§ Examinee may verify external OPEN Limit switch on valve made up SAT____UNSAT______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 7.
Open both Pump AB TURB STM SUPPLY VALVES - MS 401A & B.
CUES:
§ CUE: Primary NPO reports MS-401A & B are open, EFW PUMP AB is running at normal speed STANDARDS:
§ Examinee requests Primary NPO open MS-401A & B.
§ Examinee Requests NPO open MS-401A & B.
SAT____UNSAT______
- 8.
END OF TASK.
STOP TIME_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. The Control Room has been evacuated due to a fire in CP-2
- 2. A mechanical overspeed trip of Emergency Feedwater Pump AB has occurred
- 3. The Reactor has been shutdown for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
- 5. Power is deenergized to 3A Safety Bus and MS-407, EFW Pump AB Drip Pot to Normal Drain Bypass is failed open INITIATING CUE The Primary NPO directs you to reset the EFW Pump AB Mechanical Overspeed Trip and reopen the Stop Valve, MS-416 in accordance with OP-901-502, Subsection E2, Step 16.2
Restore Power to Dry Cooling Tower Sump Pumps During a Control Room Evacuation and Loss of Offsite power W3 NAO SP OFFNORM 1
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 1 11/19/2001 15 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path NO No NUMBER References OP-901-502 Evacuation Of Control Room And Subsequent Plant Shutdown 08 00 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-4-11 3.4 3.6 2-4-34 3.8 3.6 4.2-A68-AK3.18 4.2 4.5 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM SIMULATE Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. A loss of offsite power concurrent with Control Room Evacuation.
- 2. Emergency Diesel Generator B is supplying power to the B Safety busses.
- 3. Emergency Diesel Generator A failed to start.
INITIATING CUE The NPO orders you to restore power to the B train powered Dry Cooling Tower Sump Pumps in accordance with OP-901-502, Subsection E1, Step 16.
TERMINATING CUE
- 1. Power has been restored to the B train powered Dry Cooling Power Sump Pumps.
STANDARD
- 1. Power restored to B train powered Dry Cooling Tower Sump Pumps.
TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. Possible flooding of DCT area HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. NPO
- 2. NAO SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-502, Subsection E2, Step 16. All steps performed in the +1 FHB SWGR room.
Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
START TIME______
- 1.
IF Emergency Diesel Generator B is supplying power to Train B Safety busses, THEN perform the following:
(NOTE; Emergency Diesel Generator B is supplying power to the B Safety busses).
Place the following switches to bypass:
(Switches located on respective pump breaker cubicles at MCC 314B in the+1 FHB SWGR room. )
§ (West) DCT #1 Sump Pump B Radiation Monitor bypass switch SP-EBKR-314B-4F
§ (East) DCT #2 Sump Pump B Radiation Monitor bypass switch SP-EBKR-314B-5F CUES:
§ When examinee locates and simulates placing the radiation monitor bypass switches to Bypass cue examinee the switches are in Bypass CRIT STANDARDS:
§ DCT 1 and 2 sump pump B radiation monitor bypass switches placed to the Bypass position SAT___UNSAT___
- 2.
Locally Open ALL non-safety bus load breakers on MCC-314B.
CUES:
§ When examinee locates and simulates opening all non-safety-related bus load breakers on MCC-314B, cue examinee the breakers are open
§ (all breakers are to the LEFT side of the Safety to Non-Safety Tie Bkr)
STANDARDS:
§ All non-safety-related bus load breakers on MCC-314B are open SAT___UNSAT___
- 3.
Locally Close SSDEBKR314B-2M, MCC 314B Safety to Non-Safety Tie.
CUES:
§ If Examinee asks condition of Closing Spring Indicator, Cue the Examinee Indicator shows CHARGED
§ When Examinee locates and simulates closing the safety to non-safety tie breaker by depressing CLOSE pushbutton or operating MANUAL Closing Spring Latch Lever, cue the examinee the breaker is closed CRIT STANDARDS:
§ Safety to non-safety tie breaker is closed
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure SAT___UNSAT___
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 4.
Locally close SP EBKR 314B-4F, West Dry Cooling Tower Sump Pump B.
CUES:
§ When examinee locates and simulates closing the West DCT sump pump breaker, cue examinee the breaker is closed CRIT STANDARDS:
§ West DCT sump pump breaker is closed SAT___UNSAT___
- 5.
Locally close SP EBKR 314B-5F, East Dry Cooling Tower Sump Pump B.
CUES:
§ When examinee locates and simulates closing East DCT sump pump breaker, cue examinee breaker is closed CRIT STANDARDS:
§ East DCT sump pump breaker is closed SAT___UNSAT___
- 6.
End of task STOP TIME______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. A loss of offsite power concurrent with Control Room Evacuation.
- 2. Emergency Diesel Generator B is supplying power to the B Safety busses.
- 3. Emergency Diesel Generator A failed to start.
INITIATING CUE The NPO orders you to restore power to the B train powered Dry Cooling Tower Sump Pumps in accordance with OP-901-502, Subsection E1, Step 16.
RETURNING A, B, OR AB BATTERY CHARGERS TO SERVICE W3 NAO DC NORM 7
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 6 8/3/00 15 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical Critical Time Alternate Path Yes No NUMBER References OP-006-003 8.1 125 DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OPERATION 09 02 NUMBER NRC KA Number 2-1-20 4.3 4.2 3.6-063-A4.02 2.8* 2.9 3.6-063-K1.03 2.9 3.5 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM SIMULATE Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Maintenance has been completed on BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A
- 2. The remote power supply breakers for BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A were left open after maintenance.
INITIATING CUE The NPO directs you to place BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A in service.
TERMINATING CUE 1 The battery charger is in service and operating normally.
- 2. Faulted: the battery charger is deenergized and the SM/CRS is Informed.
STANDARD
- 1. Battery charger DC-EBC-1A has been returned to service.
TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS Energized Electrical Equipment PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES 1 Equipment damage
- 2. Personnel injury
- 3. Loss of vital instrumentation HUMAN INTERFACES 1 NPO
- 2. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Perform the task in accordance with referenced procedure OP-006-003, section 8.1. All components are located in the RAB
+ 21 MSL, A Switchgear Room along the North wall.
NOTE: This JPM requires opening battery charger doors. Permission is required from the On-shift Shift Manager to open these doors (Ext. 3104).
START TIME ________ Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
- 1.
Verify Battery Charger AC isolation and Battery Charger DC Isolation Breakers for applicable Battery Charger OPEN.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the applicable breaker at the selected Battery Charger cue the operator that the breaker is OPEN. (breakers are located inside front panel of the selected Battery Charger)
STANDARDS:
§ The Operator locates the selected Battery Charger.
§ The Operator checks that the AC Isolation Breaker of the selected Battery Charger is OPEN. (DC-EBKR-1161-A1)
§ The Operator checks that the DC Isolation Breaker of the Selected Battery Charger is Open (DC-EBKR-1A2)
SAT____ UNSAT_____
- 2.
Verify remote power supply breakers for applicable battery charger are closed.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the applicable breaker and demonstrates action to close the breaker, then cue the operator that the applicable breaker is closed.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The Operator locates the applicable 480vac Motor Control Center and (simulates) closes the correct breaker. (DC-EBKR-311A-14D) (EAST END OF MCC 311A, second row in, second breaker from top)
§ The Operator locates the applicable DC distribution panel and (simulates) closes the correct breaker. (DC-EBKR-A-34) (PDP A-DC, right hand section, third breaker from bottom on right facing panel)
SAT____ UNSAT_____
- 3.
Set EQUALIZE/FLOAT switch (inside cabinet) to float position.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates the EQUALIZE/FLOAT switch inside The Battery Charger cabinet, cue the operator that the Switch is in FLOAT.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The Operator locates the EQUALIZE/FLOAT switch.
§ The Operator verifies the switch is in the FLOAT position.
SAT____ UNSAT_____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 4.
Place load sharing switch to off.
CUES:
§ When the Operator locates the LOAD SHARING switch on the front panel of the Battery Charger, then cue the operator That the switch is in OFF.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The Operator locates the LOAD SHARING switch.
§ The Operator verifies the switch is in the OFF position.
SAT____ UNSAT_____
- 5.
Close Battery Charger Isolation (DC) Breaker and check the following:
§ DC voltmeter equals battery potential
§ NO CHARGE lamp Illuminates
§ PHASE FAIL lamp illuminates CUES:
§ When the Operator demonstrates the action to close the DC breaker, then cue the Operator that the Battery Charger Isolation (DC) breaker is CLOSED.
§ When the Operator locates the DC voltmeter, then cue the Operator that the voltmeter indication equals battery Potential (~135 vdc).
§ When the Operator locates the NO CHARGE lamp on the Front panel of the Battery Charger, then cue the Operator That the NO CHARGE lamp is illuminated.
§ When the Operator locates the PHASE FAIL lamp, then cue The Operator that the PHASE FAIL lamp is ON.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The Operator locates and (simulates) closes the Battery Charger Isolation (DC) breaker.
§ The Operator verifies indication of DC voltage and lamp status.
SAT____ UNSAT_____
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure
- 6.
When 25 seconds have elapsed, then close Battery Charger AC isolation Breaker and check the following:
§ DC voltmeter remains at battery potential
§ NO CHARGE lamp extinguishes
§ PHASE FAIL lamp extinguishes CUES:
§ When the Operator locates the Battery charger AC isolation Breaker and demonstrates the action to close it, then cue the operator that the Battery Charger AC isolation breaker is CLOSED.
§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the DC voltmeter, then cue the operator that the voltmeter read 148 vdc for a short period and then dropped down to battery potential
(~135 vdc).
§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the NO CHARGE lamp, then cue the operator that the NO CHARGE lamp extinguished for a short period and then illuminated.
§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the PHASE FAIL lamp, then cue the operator that the PHASE FAIL lamp is extinguished.
§ (Alternate path): when the operator locates the HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp, cue the operator that the HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp is illuminated.
CRIT STANDARDS:
§ The operator locates and (simulates) closes the battery charger ac Isolation breaker after waiting at least 25 seconds since closing the DCisolation breaker.
§ The operator verifies DC voltmeter indication and indicator Status.
SAT____ UNSAT_____
- 7.
(ALTERNATE PATH): IF HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp is illuminated and output voltage is < 144 vdc, then depress the HIGH VOLTAGE RESET pushbutton located on HV SHUTDOWN CARD inside cabinet.
CUES:
§ When the operator locates and resets the HIGH VOLTAGE RESET pushbutton, then cue the operator that the HI-V SHUTDOWN lamp extinguished for a short period and then reilluminated.
STANDARDS:
§ The operator (simulates) opens the BATTERY CHARGER AC ISOLATION BREAKER.
§ The operator (simulates) opens BATTERY CHARGER ISOLATION (DC) BREAKER.
§ The operator notifies SM/CRS of condition.
CRIT SAT____ UNSAT_____
- 8.
STOP TIME_______
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. Maintenance has been completed on BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A
- 2. The remote power supply breakers for BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A were left open after maintenance.
INITIATING CUE The NPO directs you to place BATTERY CHARGER DC-EBC-1A in service.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: ____________________________
Operators: __________________________
Initial Conditions: IC-30, 100%, EOC Turnover: RCP 2B Lower Seal failed two days ago (RC08D). Charging pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace a cracked pump block. CS Pump A has been OOS for 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> to replace the pump impeller.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
ED02C C-SRO After the crew takes the shift, SUT A fails requiring evaluation of operability of AC offsite circuits, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1. OP-903-066 must be performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
2 CC03A C-BOP/SRO After the crew evaluates Tech Specs for the SUT failure, CC Pump A bearing seizes. This causes CC Pump A to trip on overcurrent. The crew should implement OP-901-510, CCW Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E2 and evaluate actions for TS 3.7.3, TRM 3.7.3 and OP-100-014 (cascading Tech Specs).
3 RC21A I-BOP/RO/SRO After the crew starts CC Pump AB and evaluates Tech Specs, Reactor Regulating System Hot Leg 1 temperature input fails low affecting the PZR Level Control Setpoint. The crew should implement OP-901-110, PZR Level Control Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E2.
4 CV05B2 C-RO/SRO While the crew is implementing OP-901-110, the in-service letdown back-pressure control valve fails closed. The crew should implement OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E2.
5 RC03D RD11A73 RD11A58 C-RO/SRO M-All After the crew places the alternate letdown back-pressure control valve in service, RCP 2B shaft seizure occurs, resulting in a reactor trip and loss of the offsite power source to Train A safety buses.
Three CEAs fail to insert on the reactor trip. This requires the RO to initiate emergency boration. The crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.
6 OVR45-OVR MS13A I-BOP or RO M (All)
After emergency boration is initiated and the crew has transitioned to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery, a Main Steam Line Break on S/G 1 outside Containment occurs. MSIS fails to actuate automatically. This requires manual initiation of MSIS. The crew should re-diagnose to OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
E-NRC03-1 Page 1 of 15 Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC03-1 Author: avest Scenario Status: APPROVED Approval: rfletch Revision Number: 1 6/11/2003 Estimated Time: 60 Minutes References Verified: avest 6/11/2003 Initial Conditions: 100%, EOC (IC-66)
Applications: Initial Exam Scenario
Description:
The plant is at 100% reactor power. RCP 2B lower seal failed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago and required steps of OP-901-130 have been taken. After the crew takes the shift, SUT A fails requiring operability evaluation of AC offsite circuits. The crew should enter 3.8.1.1.a and 3.8.1.1.d, perform OP-903-066 within one hour and verify all required Train B components and EFW Pump AB operable. After the crew evaluates Tech Specs for the SUT failure, CC Pump A bearing seizes and the pump trips on overcurrent. After the crew starts CC Pump AB and evaluates Tech Specs (or at examiner discretion), RRS Hot Leg 1 temperature input fails low affecting PLCS setpoint. While the crew is implementing OP-901-110, the in-service letdown back-pressure control valve fails closed. After the crew places the alternate back-pressure control valve in service RCP 2B shaft seizure occurs, resulting in a reactor trip and loss of the Offsite power source to Train A busses. Two CEAs fail to insert on the reactor trip. After emergency boration is in progress and the crew has transitioned to OP-902-001, an unisolable Main Steam Line Break occurs on S/G 1 outside containment. SG 1 Pressure Lo bistables fail to actuate. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to secure feeding SG 1 with EFW and take action to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure.
Scenario Notes:
- 1. Reset Simulator to IC-66.
- 2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded
- a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:
- 1. CS Pump A Bkr - Rackout
- 2. Charging Pump A/B Breaker - Rackout
- 3. Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - Closed
- 4. DT07,Annun Cab. D_T07 Switching Station trouble-FAIL ON - Event Trigger 1
- b. Malfunctions
- 5. RC08D, RCP 2B LOWER SEAL FAILURE - LOAD - 25%
- 6. RD11A73, CEA 73 MECHANICALLY STUCK - LOAD - TRUE
- 7. RD11A58, CEA 58 MECHANICALLY STUCK - LOAD - TRUE
- 8. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line
- 3. Danger Tag and place to OFF:
- b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4
- 4. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.
- 5. Ensure CW pumps B and D are running.
- 6. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in AB
- 7. Ensure CCW temperature is lowered to 80-85 degrees F.
E-NRC03-1 Page 2 of 15
- 8. Complete the simulator setup checklist.
EVENT 1 - Startup Transformer A Failure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.
- 2. If TB watch sent to investigate SUT A alarms report flags on SUT A Differential Current, Transformer Ground, and SUT Sudden Pressure relays.
- 3. If TB watch sent to the Transformer report that there is evidence that the transformer relief lifted, but is not lifting at this time.
- 4. If Work Week Manager or Electrical Maintenance is contacted, inform the caller that a team will be sent to the SUT.
EVENT 2 - CC Pump A Bearing Seizure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2.
- 2. If an NAO is sent to the CC Pump Breaker, report Overcurrent Relay flags on all 3 phases.
- 3. If and NAO is sent to the pump room report that there is no oil in the bubbler oil is on the floor, and the bearing housing is discolored.
- 4. If Work Week Manager or Mechanical Maintenance is contacted, inform the caller that a team will be sent to the CC pump.
EVENT 3 - PZR Level Setpoint Malfunction/Hot Leg 1 Temperature Instrument Fails Low
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3.
- 2. If Work Week Manager or I&C Maintenance is contacted, inform the caller that a team will be sent to the Control Room.
EVENT 4 - In-service Letdown Backpressure Control Valve Fails Closed
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 4.
- 2. When called as RAB Place the Alternate Backpressure Control Valve in service using the following remotes:
- a. CVR03, CVC-121A LTDN BPCV INLET ISOL - 100% @ 1 minute ramp
- b. CVR04, CVC-121B LTDN BPCV INLET ISOL - 0% @ 1 minute ramp EVENT 5 - RCP 2B Shaft Seizure/Reactor Trip/Loss of Power to Train A Buses/Emergency Boration
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 5.
EVENT 6 - Unisolable MSLB Outside Containment S/G 1/Failure of S/G 1 Low Pressure Trips
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 6.
- 2. If an NAO is sent to verify secondary safeties status, report that no safeties are lifting.
E-NRC03-1 Page 3 of 15 Scenario Timeline:
Item Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger Event 1
ED02C 1 MIN TRUE 1
T3811 SUT A TRANSFORMER FAILURE 2
CC03A 10 MIN TRUE 2
A510, e2 CCW PUMP A BEARING SEIZURE 3
RC21A 15 MIN 0%
3 A110, e2 RCS HOT LEG 1 CONTROL TT FAILS LOW (0-100%)
4 CV05B2 25 MIN TRUE 4
A112,e2 LETDOWN BACK-PRESSURE REGULATOR VALVE B FAILS CLOSED 5
RC03D 35 MIN TRUE 5
E000 RCP 2B SHAFT SEIZURE 6
MS13A 45 MIN 10%
6 E004 MS LINE 1 BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT BEFORE MSIV (0-100%)
Manip #
Manipulation Description 14 Loss of CC Trains or CC to an Individual Component 20 Conditions Requiring Emergency Boration 24 Malfunction of RCS Pressure or Level Control (includes loss of letdown/charging) 25 Reactor Trip 26B Main Steam Line Break, Outside Containment 9
Loss of Electrical Power or Degraded Power Source
E-NRC03-1 Page 4 of 15 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 1 - Startup Transformer A Failure Event
Description:
After the crew takes the shift, SUT A fails requiring operability evaluation of AC offsite circuits. The crew should enter 3.8.1.1.a and 3.8.1.1.d, perform OP-903-066 within one hour and verify all required Train B components and EFW Pump AB operable.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Evaluate the effects of the transformer failure on plant operations.
- 2. Evaluate Technical Specifications to determine and implement required actions.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Identify Startup Transformer A failure by verifying annunciator response procedures and breaker indications on CP-1.
SUT A to Bus A2 Feeder Breaker Open SUT A to Bus A1 Feeder Breaker Open SUT A Motor Operated Disconnect Open Generator Output Breaker A Open PMC alarms for SUT A Differential Current, Sudden Pressure, and Ground Switching Station Trouble Annunciator S/U XFMR A 86 Trip/Trouble CRS Review Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 and determine the following:
3.8.1.1.a applies 3.8.1.1.d requirements are met OP-903-066 must be performed within one hour SNPO Perform OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Check.
CRS Notify Electrical Maintenance or Work Week Manager of failure.
Termination Termination point for event
E-NRC03-1 Page 5 of 15 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 2 - CC PUMP A Bearing Seizure Event
Description:
After the crew evaluates Tech Specs for the SUT failure, CC Pump A bearing seizes and the pump trips on overcurrent. The crew starts CC Pump AB and evaluates Tech Spec implications.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Restore and properly align CCW in accordance with off-normal operating procedure OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Recognize and report CC Pump A trip.
CCW Pump A Trip/Trouble (CP -8)
Amber light on CC Pump A C/S (CP-8)
Lower CCW Flow and Pressure Indications on CP-8 PMC alarm for CC Pump A Overload CRS Enter OP-901-510, CCW Malfunction and implement Subsection E2, CCW Pumps.
SNPO/CRS Align CCW Pump AB Assignment Switch on CP-8 to position A.
SNPO/CRS Verify Suction and Discharge Cross Connect Valves from Train A are open on CP-8.
CC-126A/CC-114A, CCW Suct & Disch Header Tie Valves AB to A CC-127A/CC-115A, CCW Suct & Disch Header Tie Valves AB to A SNPO/CRS Start CCW Pump AB using C/S on CP-8.
SNPO/CRS Evaluate AB electrical bus alignment for Technical Specification impact.
Enters:
T. S. 3.7.3 Cascading Tech Specs per OP-100-014 TRM 3.7.3 Termination Termination point for event
E-NRC03-1 Page 6 of 15 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 3 - PZR Level Setpoint Malfunction/Hot Leg 1 Temperature Instrument Fails Low Event
Description:
After the crew starts CC Pump AB and evaluates Tech Specs (or at examiner discretion), RRS Hot Leg 1 temperature input fails low affecting PLCS setpoint. The crew should implement OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Determine faulty temperature channel(s) and take corrective actions to restore pressurizer level control back to normal.
- 2. Properly perform general subsequent operator actions in accordance with OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO Report indications and alarms to CRS.
Pressurizer Level Hi/Lo annunciator on CP -2 Pressurizer Level Hi-Hi annunciator on CP-2 All Backup heaters ON at CP-2 Setpoint Dropped suddenly on RC-ILR-0110 on CP-2 Letdown Flow rising on CP-4 Th Loop 1, RC-ITI-0110, instrument reading low on CP-2 CRS Determines need to enter and implement OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.
PNPO/CRS Place PZR Level Controller on CP-2 to MANUAL and adjust output slowly to restore Pressurizer Level (CP-2).
Takes manual control of RC-ILIC-0110 by momentarily depressing the MANUAL pushbutton Lowers output of RC-ILIC-0110 to obtain a letdown flow that results in stable or rising PZR Level on CP-2 indicators and recorders.
CRS Diagnose into Subsection, E2, Pressurizer Level Setpoint Malfunction PNPO/CRS Verify normal indications on all Safety Measurement Channel Hot Leg And Cold Leg Temperature Indicators on CP-7.
Determines that all Hot and Cold Leg Temperature Indicators on CP-7 are reading normally PNPO/CRS Determine affected channel(s) by checking RRS TAVG Recorders (RC-ITR-0111 AND RC-ITR-0121 ON CP-2).
Determines that both RRS Channels are affected.
E-NRC03-1 Page 7 of 15 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Cycle Charging Pumps (CP-4) as necessary to maintain Pressurizer Level above minimum level for operation per Attachment 1, PZR Level vs. Tave curve.
Using pre-failure Tave indication and Attachment 1, determines minimum level for operation is 40-45%
CRS gives instructions to PNPO to maintain PZR level above minimum level or gives a band to maintain that ensures that minimum level is always met PNPO/CRS If PZR Backup Heaters have energized, then place unnecessary Backup Heater banks to OFF on CP -2. (One bank may be left in ON)
PNPO/CRS Check RRS Hot and Cold Leg Temperature meters on CP-2 for abnormal readings.
Determines that Hot Leg instrument RC-ITI-0110 is failed low SNPO/CRS If Hot Leg 1 indicates abnormally high or low, select Loop 2 for Tave Loop Selector in both RRS local cabinets (inside cabinet drawer on side of drawer).
CRS directs performance of this step Locates RRS system cabinets behind main panels and places both Tave Loop Selector Switches to Loop 2.
PNPO/CRS Verify setpoint of Pressurizer Level Controller (RC-ILIC-0110 on CP-2) returns to program setpoint per Attachment 1, PZR Level vs. Tave curve and perform the following:
Place PZR Level Controller in AUTO by momentarily depressing AUTO pushbutton and verify PZR level is controlling at setpoint Place backup Charging Pumps in AUTO as necessary (CP-4)
Place desired Pressurizer Backup Heaters in AUTO; one bank may be left in ON Reset both Proportional Heater banks by momentarily placing each C/S on CP-2 to ON Termination Termination point for event
E-NRC03-1 Page 8 of 15 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 4 - In-service Letdown Backpressure Control Valve Fails Closed Event
Description:
While the crew is implementing OP-901-110, the in-service Letdown Backpressure Control Valve fails closed.
The crew should implement OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction and place the Alternate Letdown Backpressure Control Valve in service and restore Letdown to automatic operation.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Adjust letdown flow in manual, in the event of a letdown malfunction.
- 2. Locate and isolate leaks and/or faulted letdown system components in accordance with OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction.
- 3. Place available standby components in service.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO Reports alarms and indications to CRS.
Letdown HX Outlet Pressure Hi annunciator on CP-4 Letdown Flow Hi/Lo Annunciator on CP-4 Pressure cycling on Letdown Back Pressure Controller CVC-IPIC-0201 on CP-4 Letdown Flow indicator on CP -4 indicates 0 gpm In-Service Letdown Back Pressure Control Valve CVC-123B shows closed (green) on CP-4 with output of the Letdown Back Pressure controller at 100%
CRS Determines need to implement OP-901-112, Charging Or Letdown Malfunction CRS Determine need to implement Subsection E2, Letdown Malfunction.
PNPO/CRS If necessary, maintain Pressurizer level by adjusting Letdown Flow Controller (RC-IHIC-0110 on CP-4) in manual.
PNPO/CRS Operate Charging Pumps (CP-4) as necessary to maintain Pressurizer Level iaw Attachment 1.
Determines minimum level for operation is between 40-45%
E-NRC03-1 Page 9 of 15 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS If Backpressure Regulating Valve is not operating properly, place the Backup Backpressure Regulating Valve in service by:
Place Letdown Backpressure Controller (CVC-IPIC-0201 on CP-4) in manual and make adjusts to maintain pressure during transfer.
Place Letdown Backpressure Control Valve Selector Switch on CP-4 to both Direct an NAO to locally unisolate the Backup Letdown Backpressure Control Valve and isolate the Normal Letdown Backpressure Control Valve.
Place Letdown Backpressure Control Valve Selector Switch on CP-4 to alternate.
If letdown is still in service, place letdown backpressure controller (CVC-IPIC-0201 on CP-4) in AUTO PNPO/CRS If Letdown has been secured and all malfunctions found and corrected, restore Charging and Letdown in accordance with OP-002-005, Chemical and Volume Control.
Termination This event may be terminated after The Alternate Letdown Backpressure Control Valve is placed in service or at the Lead Examiner's discretion.
E-NRC03-1 Page 10 of 15 OP Test 1, Scenario 1, Event 5 - RCP 2B Shaft Seizure/Reactor Trip/Loss of Power to Train A Buses/Emergency Boration Event
Description:
After the crew places the alternate letdown backpressure control valve in service, RCP 2B shaft seizure occurs, resulting in a reactor trip and loss of the Offsite power source to Train A busses. Two CEAs fail to insert on the reactor trip. After emergency boration is in progress and the crew has transitioned to OP-902-001, an unisolable Main Steam Line Break occurs on S/G 1 outside containment. SG 1 Pressure Lo bistables fail to actuate. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to secure feeding SG 1 with EFW and take action to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a reactor trip.
- 2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 Establish Reactivity Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO initiates Emergency Boration using BAM Pumps and Emergency Boration Valve or Gravity Feed Valves prior to entry into the diagnostics section of OP-902-000.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS VERIFY REACTIVITY CONTROL Check Reactor Power dropping on Log Channel indicators and/or recorders on CP -2 and/CP-7 Check Startup Rate on CP -2 and/or CP-7 Is negative Emergency Borate from CP -4 by performing the following. CRITICAL o
Place Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL o
Align borated water source by performing one of the following:
§ Initiate Emergency Boration using Boric Acid Pump as follows:
Open Emergency Boration Valve, BAM-133.
Start one Boric Acid Pump.
Close recirc valve for Boric Acid Pump started:
o Boric Acid Makeup Pump Recirc Valve A, BAM-126A OR o
Boric Acid Makeup Pump Recirc Valve B, BAM-126B.
§ Initiate Emergency Boration using Gravity Feed as follows:
Open Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve A, BAM-113A
E-NRC03-1 Page 11 of 15 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
And Open Boric Acid Makeup Gravity Feed Valve B, BAM-113B.
o Close VCT Disch Valve, CVC-183.
o Verify at least one Charging Pump operating and Charging Header flow > 40 GPM.
Note: Critical Task SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:
§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1
§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1
§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:
§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts
§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:
§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2
§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2 PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:
§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP-2,
§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F (CP-2, CP-7, QSPDS) and
§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.
E-NRC03-1 Page 12 of 15 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP-1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level or
§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.
o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP -8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated PNPO/CRS Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7)
SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) by
§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,
§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and
§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters and
§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1)
PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by
§ Checking Containment pressure (CP-7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,
§ Check that no Containment. Area rad monitors are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and
§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.
SNPO/PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by
§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F
§ Verify Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia (CP-7 or CP-8)
CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:
§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery
§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 Termination Crew diagnoses a Reactor Trip Event and transitions to OP-902-001
E-NRC03-1 Page 13 of 15 Event Number 6 - Unisolable MSLB Outside Containment S/G 1/Failure of S/G 1 Low Pressure Trips Event
Description:
After emergency boration is in progress and the crew has transitioned to OP-902-001, an unisolable Main Steam Line Break occurs on S/G 1 outside containment. SG 1 Pressure Lo bistables fail to actuate. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to secure feeding SG 1 with EFW and take action to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure.
Event Objectives:
1 Verify the existence/location of an excess steam demand.
2 Ensure the reactor is maintained in a shutdown condition.
3 Ensure the conditions for pressurized thermal shock are minimized.
4 Mitigate the consequences of an excess steam demand by properly utilizing OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery Procedure.
Event Critical Tasks 1
Establish Reactivity Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The SNPO manually isolates EFW flow to SG 1 by placing both EFW flow controllers in manual on CP-8 prior to RCS Temperature lowering to 400 degrees F.
2 Establish RCS Temperature Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The SNPO takes action to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of the PT curve following blowdown of the affected SG.
3 Establish RCS Pressure Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the PT curve following blowdown of the affected SG. The pressure differential across the SG tubes will be
< 1600 psid.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Confirm diagnosis
§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list
§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip
E-NRC03-1 Page 14 of 15 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,
§ SIAS lights off on PPS ROM on CP -7
§ SIAS Initiation Alarms on CP-2 PNPO/SNPO/CRS If SIAS initiated,
§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,
§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2
§ available charging pumps (1) are running PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify MSIS actuation
§ MSIS lights off on PPS ROM on CP-7
§ MSIS Initiation Alarms on CP-2
§ Both Main Steam Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP -8
§ Both Main Feed Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP-8 PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs (CP-2) operating.
If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits
§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP-2/CP-8) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.
§ if Tc >500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.
SNPO/CRS Verify proper CCW operation
§ Verify a CCW Pump (CP-8) is running for Train A and B PNPO/SNPO/CRS Determine most affected SG
§ Determines SG 1 is most affected SG
§ SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)
§ SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP-8)
§ SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP -2/CP-7)
E-NRC03-1 Page 15 of 15 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Isolate SG 1:
§ Verify MSIV 1 Closed on CP-8
§ Verify MFIV 1 Closed on CP-8
§ Verify ADV 1 is Closed by taking controller on CP -8 to MANUAL and verifying 0% output
§ Verify EFW-228A SG 1 Primary isolation valve closed on CP -8
§ Verify EFW-229A SG 1 Backup isolation valve closed on CP-8
§ Places SG 1 EFW Primary and Backup flow controllers in MANUAL and verify 0% output on CP-8
§ Close MS-401A on CP-8
§ Verify MS-120A and MS-119A Main Steam Line 1 Drains are closed on CP-8
§ Verify SG 1 Blowdown Isolation Valves BD-102A and BD-103A are closed on CP-8
§ Notifies NAO to verify locally safeties not lifting on SG 1 NOTE: Critical Task PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify correct SG isolated
§ Isolated SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)
§ Isolated SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP -8)
§ Isolated SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP-2/CP-7)
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Stabilize RCS temperature and pressure using SG 2 when RCS Pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) starts to rise or CET Temperatures (CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) start to rise
§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on ADV 2 controller on CP-8 and raises output to 100%
§ SNPO manually initiates EFAS 2 by all EFAS 2 actuation switches on CP-7 and CP-8 to ACTUATE
§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on Primary or Backup EFW Flow Controller for SG 2 on CP-8 and raise output to initiate EFW Flow to SG-2
§ PNPO uses Normal (CP-2) and/or Auxiliary Spray (CP-4) to stabilize RCS pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) between 1500 and 1600 psia
§ SNPO throttles or stops HPSI flow if throttle criteria of Appendix 13 are met and CRS concurs NOTE: These Steps are Critical TERMINATION The scenario may be terminated when actions to stabilize RCS temperature and pressure have been addressed.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: ____________________________
Operators: __________________________
Initial Conditions: IC-27, 65%, EOC Turnover: RCP 2B Lower Seal failed two days ago (RC08D). Charging pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace a cracked pump block. CS Pump A has been OOS for 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> to replace the pump impeller.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
NI01E I-BOP/SRO After the crew takes the shift, ENI Channel A Middle Detector fails low, energizing Startup (SU) Channel 2. The crew should de-energize SU Channel 2. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.1 and bypass affected trip bistables.
2 CC12E2 I-BOP/SRO After the crew bypasses the trip bistables, a Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level switch fails which causes realignment of the CC system. The crew should enter OP-901-510, CCW Malfunction, Attachment 1 and evaluate TS 3.7.3, cascading Tech Specs and OP-100-014.
3 RC09D C-BOP/RO/SRO After the crew evaluates Tech Specs, RCP 2B middle seal fails, as a result of the CC malfunction. The crew should implement OP-901-130, RCP Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1.
4 N/A R-RO N-BOP/SRO The RCP seal failure requires the crew to perform a plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005.
5 RX14A I-RO/SRO After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, the in-service PZR pressure control channel fails high. The crew should implement OP-901-120, PZR Pressure Control Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1.
6 RC14B1 C-All After transferring to the non-faulted PPCS Channel. PZR Spray Valve B fails partially open requiring implementation of OP-901-120, Subsection E3. This requires a manual reactor trip and securing at least RCP 1B. Tripping the reactor requires implementation of OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. The crew should diagnose to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery.
7 SI01B RC23D M-ALL After the crew commences implementation of OP-902-001, a Small Break LOCA occurs due to RCP 2B seal failure. The crew should transition to OP-902-002. HPSI pump B trips on overcurrent.
EG08A After the crew starts to implement OP-902-002 a fault on A2 bus causes a loss of power to the Train A safety busses. EDG A fails to
E-NRC03-2 Page 1 of 18 Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC03-2 Author:
evines Scenario Status:
APPROVED Approval:
rfletch Revision Number:
1 6/13/2003 Estimated Time:
60 Minutes References Verified: 6/13/2003 Initial Conditions:
58%, EOC (IC-96)
Applications:
Initial Exam Scenario
Description:
The plant is at 58% Reactor power. RCP 2B lower seal failed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago and the required steps of OP-901-130 have been taken. Charging Pump A/B is OOS for pump block replacement. CS Pump A is OOS for pump impeller replacement. After the crew takes the shift, ENI Channel A Middle Detector fails low energizing Startup Channel 2 requiring the crew to de-energize SU channel 2. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 and bypass affected trip bistables. After the crew bypasses trip bistables a Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch fails. The crew should enter OP-901-510 CCW Malfunction and refer to Attachment 1. The crew should enter TS 3.7.4, and Cascading Tech Specs per OP-100-014. After the crew evaluates Tech Specs RCP 2B middle seal fails. The crew should implement OP-901-130, RCP Malfunction, Subsection E1 and commence a plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown. After the crew satisfies the Reactivity Manipulation, the middle seal fails completely requiring a manual Reactor trip. The crew should perform OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnose to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery. After OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery is entered, the in-service PZR pressure control channel fails high and Spray Valve B fails open. The crew should refer to OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction and implement Subsections E0, E1 and E3. After the crew secures RCP 1B at which point the Spray Valve will reclose. After the crew addresses the failed Spray Valve a small break LOCA occurs due to the RCP 2B seal failure. The crew should transition to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. HPSI pump B will trip on overcurrent when SIAS actuates. After the crew enters OP-902-002, a fault on A2 Bus occurs, causing a loss of power to Train A safety Busses. EDG A fails to auto start requiring the crew to manually start EDG A.
The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to commence an RCS cooldown.
Scenario Notes:
- 1. Reset Simulator to IC-96.
- 2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded
- a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:
- 1. CS Pump A Bkr - Rackout
- 2. Charging Pump A/B Breaker - Rackout
- 3. Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - Closed
- b. Malfunctions
- 1. RC08D, RCP 2B LOWER SEAL FAILURE - LOAD - 25%
- 2. SI01B, HPSI PUMP B TRIPPED - LOAD - TRUE
- 3. EG08A, FAILURE OF DG A TO AUTOSTART - LOAD - TRUE
- 4. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line
- 3. Danger Tag and place to OFF:
- b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4
- 4. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.
- 5. Ensure CW pumps B and D are running.
- 6. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in AB
- 7. Ensure CCW temperature is lowered to 80-85 degrees F.
E-NRC03-2 Page 2 of 18
- 8. Complete the simulator setup checklist.
Procedures Used OP-010-005 OP-100-014 OP-901-120 OP-901-130 OP-901-510 OP-902-000 OP-902-001 OP-902-002 OP-903-013 OP-903-066 EVENT 1-ENI Safety Channel A Middle Detector Failure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.
EVENT 2-CCW Surge Tank Level Switch CC-ILS-7013A failure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2.
- 2. If called as RAB to investigate for leaks wait 3 minutes and inform no evidence of leakage.
- 3. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.
EVENT 3 - RCP 2B Middle Seal Degradation/Plant Shutdown
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3.
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.
EVENT 4-Manual Reactor Trip Due to RCP 2B Middle Seal Total Failure
- 1. When cued by Lead Examiner that Reactivity Manipulation completed, modify RC09D to 100 percent to require crew to initiate manual trip due to controlled bleedoff temperature exceeding trigger point in procedure.
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.
EVENT 5 - Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel X Fails High/Pressurizer Spray Valve RC-301B Fails Open
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 4.
- 3. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.
EVENT 6 - Small Break LOCA
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 5.
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.
EVENT 7 - Loss of 4.16 KV Bus A/Emergency Diesel Generator A Fails to Auto Start
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 6.
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control Room.
E-NRC03-2 Page 3 of 18 Scenario Timeline:
Item Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger Event 1
NI01E 1 min 0%
1 T331 SAFETY CHANNEL ENI DETECTOR FAILS 2
CC12E2 10 min TRUE 2
A510 CCW SURGE TANK LEVEL SWITCH FAILS 3
RC09D 20 min 25%
00:01:00 3
A130,e1a RCP MIDDLE SEAL FAILURE (0-100%)
4 N10005c PLANT SHUTDOWN 5
RC09D NOTE 100%
E000 RCP MIDDLE SEAL FAILURE (0-100%)
6 RX14A 30 min 100%
4 A120,e1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL INSTRUMENT FAILURE HIGH 7
RC14B1 30 min TRUE 4
A120,e3 PZR SPRAY VALVE FAILS OPEN/CLOSED 8
RC23D 45 min
.5%
00:05:00 5
E002 RCS COLD LEG RUPTURE (DBL-END 30" BREAK @100%)
9 ED05A 50 min TRUE 6
LOSS OF 4.16 KV BUS Manip #
Manipulation Description 14 Loss of CC Trains or CC to an Individual Component 2
Plant Shutdown 24 Malfunction of RCS Pressure or Level control (includes loss of letdown/charging) 25 Reactor Trip 27 Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction 7B LOCA, Inside Containment
E-NRC03-2 Page 4 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 1 - ENI Safety Channel A Middle Detector Failure Event
Description:
After the crew takes the shift, ENI Channel A Middle Detector fails low energizing Startup Channel 2 requiring the crew to de-energize SU Channel 2. The crew should enter TS 3.3.1 and bypass affected trip bistables.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Recognize failed instrument and verify RPS/CPC bistable functions as expected.
- 2. Bypass affected bistable channel.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO Recognize and report indications of failed channel ENI Channel A Log Channel indicator failed low on CP-7 ENI Channel A Linear Power Recorder on CP-7 reads low on CP-7 CPC PIDs 011 and 171 read low on CPC Channel A on CP-7 Startup Channel 2 is energized and indication on CP-2 and CP-4 are reading high Alarms associated with CPCs, Startup Channel 2 and PPS on CP-2 PNPO/CRS Verify RPS/CPC bistables respond as expected Reports trips/pretrips associated with bistables for Low DNBR and High LPD if present CRS Review and/or implement actions required by Technical Specification section 3.3.1 (RPS), 3.3.3.5 (Remote Shutdown), and 3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring)
Enters TS 3.3.1 Action 2 Determines that following trip bistables in PPS Channel must be bypassed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of time of failure:
o Linear Power Hi, o
DNBR Lo, o
LPD Hi o
The CRS may decide to bypass PPS Channel A Log Pwr Hi to ensure that on plant shutdown it is not missed, but it is not required in Mode 1 CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.5 and determines that minimum requirements are met CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.6 and determines that minimum requirements are met
E-NRC03-2 Page 5 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Directs SNPO to bypass the following PPS Channel A trip bistables within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of failure:
Linear Power Hi, DNBR Lo, LPD Hi The CRS may decide to bypass PPS Channel A Log Pwr Hi to ensure that on plant shutdown it is not missed, but it is not required in Mode 1 SNPO Bypasses affected bistable in PPS Channel A as follows:
Obtains Key 220 from Key locker on side of SNPO Desk Unlocks and opens front access door at CP-10 Channel A Unlocks and opens the Bistable Control Panel door in PPS Channel A Depresses the bistable bypass pushbuttons for the following trip bistables in PPS Channel A and verifies associated bypass lights illuminate on CP-10:
o Linear Power Hi, o
DNBR Lo, o
LPD Hi o
The SNPO bypass PPS Channel A Log Pwr Hi per CRS instructions, but it is not required in Mode 1 Termination BYPASS lights illuminated on BCP and ROM for the desired bistable channels
E-NRC03-2 Page 6 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 2 - CCW Surge Tank Level Switch CC-ILS-7013A failure Event
Description:
After the crew bypasses trip bistables a Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level Switch fails. The crew should enter OP-901-510 CCW Malfunction and refer to Attachment 1. The crew should enter TS 3.7.4, and Cascading Tech Specs per OP-100-014.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Identify failed level switch and determine the effects on CCW components.
- 2. Determine operability of the system.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Reports annunciators and indications to CRS:
CCW Surge Tank level on CP-8 is stable CCW Makeup Pump A running on CP -8 CCW Make Pump A Running/Power Lost annunciator on CP -8 CCW Surge Tank Makeup Valves are closed on CP-8 CCW A and B Safety Headers Cross-Connect Valves are closed on CP -8 A to AB Header Isolation Valves are closed on CP-8 Dry Cooling Tower A is bypassed and isolated on CP-33 Dry Tower A Isolated annunciator on CP-33 CCW Surge Tank A Level Lost annunciator on CP-18 SNPO/PNPO Reviews annunciator response procedures and determines that OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction should be entered.
CRS Enters OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction Determines need to refer to Attachment 1: CCW Surge Tank Level Switch Failures CRS/SNPO Determine correct level switch failure and effects of failure on the CCW system components Compares indications received at onset of event with Attachment 1 indications and determines that CC-ILS-7013A is the failed level switch
E-NRC03-2 Page 7 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Determine system operability requirements:
Reviews and enters TS 3.7.4 (may enter 3.7.3)
Reviews OP-100-014, Technical Specification and Technical Requirements Compliance and enters cascading Tech Specs (appropriate Tech Specs are listed in Attachment 6.6 of OP-100-014)
Determines need to perform OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Check within one hour of failure and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter Determines need to verify required Train B components and EFW Pump AB operable w/in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per TS 3.8.1.1.d.
SNPO Performs OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Check within one hour of failure Termination Event may be terminated after CRS determines operability requirements or at Lead Examiners discretion.
E-NRC03-2 Page 8 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 3 - RCP 2B Middle Seal Degradation/Plant Shutdown Event
Description:
After the crew evaluates CCW Tech Specs, RCP 2B middle seal fails. The crew should implement OP-901-130, RCP Malfunction, Subsection E1 and commence a plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown Event Objectives:
- 1. Monitor parameters for Reactor Coolant Pumps and take appropriate action when limits are approached.
- 2. Determine which Reactor Coolant Pump seal(s) have failed and take appropriate actions in accordance with OP-901-130, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction.
- 3. Reduce Reactor power and/or remove the unit from service by operating, securing, or realigning plant equipment as directed by precautions, limitations, and procedural guidance of OP-010-005, Plant Shutdown.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO Identifies second Seal Failure using Plant Computer alarms for Bleedoff flow and Seal pressures and/or CP-2 Seal pressure gauges.
SNPO may lower ACCW temp Setpoint to lower CCW temp and Controlled Bleedoff temp.
CRS Determines need to perform a Controlled Shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005 PNPO Maintain Tcold 541-558°F during downpower estimate boron addition using Thumbrule or OP-002-005 (~1200 gals) borate to reduce power at rate specified by CRS Performs Direct Boration lineup in accordance with OP-002-005 PNPO/CRS Maintains ASI using group 5, 6 or Group P control rods CRS provides direction on ASI Control - Preferred groups and CEA insertion limits per TS 3.1.3.6 PNPO uses CEAs in Manual Group in accordance with CRS direction and OP-004-004, Control Element Drive SNPO Reduces Generator load as required once Tave starts to drop to match reference temperature and Tave SNPO lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or PNPO instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 CRS Direct Turbine Building Operator to monitor Condenser Polisher Differential Pressure and remove Polishers as necessary to maintain system pressure
E-NRC03-2 Page 9 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/PNPO When < 50% power and B24006, UFM overall quality (QLEFM) indicates BAD remove UFM alarms from the COLSS master annunciator SNPO When power is 40%, remove one of the three Condensate Pumps from service in accordance with OP-003-003, Condensate Directs Turbine Building Operator to close selected CD Pump Discharge Valve locally Momentarily places selected CD Pump C/S on CP-1 to STOP Lead Examiner Note: When Reactivity Manipulation is satisfied modify RCP 2B Middle Seal Failure to 100%
CRS/PNPO If during the Shutdown Control Bleedoff temperature reaches 200 degrees F, perform the following:
§ Trip the Reactor
§ Secure Reactor coolant pump 2B
§ Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions Termination Terminate after Reactor is tripped and RCP 2B is secured.
E-NRC03-2 Page 10 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 4 - Manual Reactor Trip Due to RCP 2B Middle Seal Total Failure Event
Description:
After the crew satisfies the Reactivity Manipulation, the middle seal fails completely requiring a manual Reactor trip. The crew should perform OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnose to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a Reactor trip.
- 2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Verify Reactivity Control.
Check Reactor power dropping (CP-2 or CP-7)
Check startup rate is negative (CP-2 or CP-7).
Check less than 2 CEAs not fully inserted (CP -2)
SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:
§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1
§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1
§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:
§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts
§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:
§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2
§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2 PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:
§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia
E-NRC03-2 Page 11 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP-2,
§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F (CP-2, CP-7, QSPDS) and
§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.
SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP-1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level or
§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.
o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP -8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated PNPO/CRS Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7)
SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) by
§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,
§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and
§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters and
§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1)
PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by
§ Checking Containment pressure (CP-7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,
§ Check that no Containment. Area rad monitors are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and
§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.
SNPO/PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by
§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F
§ Verify Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia (CP-7 or CP-8)
E-NRC03-2 Page 12 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:
§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery
§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 Termination Crew diagnoses a Reactor Trip Event and transitions to OP-902-001
E-NRC03-2 Page 13 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event 5 - Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel X Fails High/Pressurizer Spray Valve RC-301B Fails Open Event
Description:
After OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery is entered, the in-service PZR pressure control channel fails high and Spray Valve B fails open. The crew should refer to OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction and implement Subsections E0, E1 and E3 or perform actions per Standard Post Trip Actions.
After the crew secures RCP 1B the Spray Valve will re-close.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Stabilize pressurizer pressure on alternate control channel according to off-normal operator procedure OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction.
- 2. Perform actions of OP-901-120, section E3 as necessary for a spray valve failed open.
- 3. Realign pressurizer spray components for failed closed spray valve(s).
Event Critical Tasks:
1 Establish RCS Pressure Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to secure Reactor Coolant Pump for affected Pressurizer Spray valve prior to subcooled margin dropping below 28 degrees F.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Verifies Pressurizer Pressure Instrument failure by checking X/Y recorder (CP-2)
Determines Channel X is failed high PNPO/CRS Places Pressurizer Spray Controller to MANUAL and adjusts output to 0%
PNPO/CRS Transfer Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Selector C/S Switch to Y on CP-2 PNPO/CRS If Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel is failed high, then perform the following:
Transfer Pressurizer Lo Level Cutout Selector Switch to Y (CP-2)
Verify all available Backup Heater Banks energize if RCS Pressure < 2200 psia (CP-2)
Reset Proportional Heater Banks #1 and #2 (CP-2)
PNPO/CRS If Spray Valve fails open, Selects Spray Valve A using Spray Valve Selector Switch on CP-2
E-NRC03-2 Page 14 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS If Pressurizer Pressure still dropping:
Verify Reactor tripped Stop Reactor Coolant Pump 1B o
Start at least 1 Lift Oil Pump for RCP 1B (CP-2) o Momentarily place RCP 1B C/S to OFF (CP-2)
Termination Initiate Event 6 at this point.
E-NRC03-2 Page 15 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event Number 6 - Small Break LOCA Event
Description:
After the crew addresses the failed Spray Valve a small break LOCA occurs due to the RCP 2B seal failure.
The crew should transition to OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery. HPSI pump B will trip on overcurrent when SIAS actuates. After the crew enters OP-902-002, a fault on A2 Bus occurs, causing a loss of power to Train A safety Busses. EDG A fails to auto start requiring the crew to manually start EDG A. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to commence an RCS cooldown.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Take appropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a large break loss of coolant accident in accordance with OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.
- 2. Monitor RCS/Core conditions and verify all critical safety functions are being addressed.
- 3. Ensure Reactor coolant pumps are secured as required, and the automatic & manual actions required for recirc actuation take place with two minutes of signal.
Event Critical Tasks 1
Stop All RCPs The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to stop all RCPs within 3 minutes of a loss of CCW flow or loss of subcooled margin.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
STA/CRS Confirm diagnosis
§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list
§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip PNPO/SNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,
§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,
§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2
§ available charging pumps (2) are running OR
§ perform any of the following:
§ Verify power to SI pumps.
§ Verify Cold Leg injection valves open.
§ Start additional SI pumps until flow is acceptable per app. 2.
§ Align HPSI AB to replace A or B
E-NRC03-2 Page 16 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.
If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A (Curve located on CP-6) secure all RCPs.
NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF CONDITIONS REACHED BEFORE CSAS INITIATES PNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits
§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP-8 and CP-2) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.
§ Secure all RCPs if CSAS is initiated.
§ if Tc > 500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.
NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF NOT PERFORMED IN PREVIOUS STEP SNPO/CRS Verify CCW operation by checking a CCW pump (CP-8) is operating for each energized 4 KV safety bus (CP-1) or
§ If AB bus aligned to same side as faulted CCW pump start the AB CCW pump
§ If AB bus aligned to opposite Side from faulted CCW pump start the AB CCW pump after the sequencer has timed out.
§ If CCW flow can not be restored, notify an NAO to pull the overspeed trip device on the affected EDG.
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Isolate the LOCA by:
§ Verifying letdown Containment isolations (CP-4) are closed.
§ Verifying RCS sampling isolations (CP-8) are closed.
§ Checking CCW AB rad monitor not in alarm (RMS CRT on CP-6) and no Abnormal rise in reading or stop all RCPs and close CCW Containment isolations.
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify LOCA not outside Containment by checking
§ RAB rad monitors,
§ sump levels (CP-8 and PMC), and waste tank levels (PMC).
§ If a leak is indicated, locate and isolate the leak and verify CIAS actuated per Appendix 4D.
SNPO/CRS Place Hydrogen Analyzers A and B in service (CP-33)
§ Open Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves
§ Start Hydrogen Analyzer sample Pumps
E-NRC03-2 Page 17 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO/CRS IF Containment Pressure is > 17.1 psia (CP-7 or CP-8)or Containment area rad monitors are in hi alarm (RMS CRT CP-6 or CP-14),
§ Verify CIAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP-8)
§ Verify all available CFCs are in the EMERGENCY MODE (CP-18)
§ If any CFC is not operating and Containment pressure is > 17.1 psia notify a NAO to perform OP-902-009, Appendix 22B and close the associated CFC CCW isolation valves.
SNPO/PNPO/CRS If Containment pressure is > 17.7 psia:
§ Verify CSAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP-8)
§ Verify all operating CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm (CP-8).
§ If any CS pump is not operating and its associated CS-125 valve is open, perform OP-902-009, Appendix 22A and close the associated valve. (not required - CS-111A and 118A tagged closed per initial conditions)
SNPO/CRS IF offsite power has been lost verify MSIVs and Blowdown Containment isolations are closed.
SNPO/CRS Restore IA
§ If a TCW pump and CW pump are not running notify NAO to align IA compressors to potable water
§ If IA pressure < 95 psig dispatch an operator to start all available air compressors
§ If IA press > 95 psig ensure IA Containment isolation valve ia-909 is open.
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Commence RCS Cooldown to less than 350 degrees F (after cooldown has been started the exam lead may terminate the scenario)
E-NRC03-2 Page 18 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 2, Event Number 7 - Loss of 4.16 KV Bus A/Emergency Diesel Generator A Fails to Auto Start Event
Description:
After the crew enters OP-902-002, a fault on A2 Bus occurs, causing a loss of power to Train A safety Busses.
EDG A fails to auto start requiring the crew to manually start EDG A.
Event Objectives:
Event Critical Tasks 1
Establish RCS Inventory Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The SNPO starts Emergency Diesel Generator A prior to Reactor Vessel Plenum level dropping below 20%.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Determines 3A bus deenergized by 2A to 3A Tie Bkr open (CP -1) 3A to 2A Tie Bkr open (CP -1)
SNPO Verifies Emergency Diesel Generator A Auto Starts SNPO determines that Emergency Diesel Generator A did not Start by o
Green Light on EDG A Start Switch (CP-1) o Voltage indication for 3A bus (CP-1) pegged lo o
EDG A frequency meter (CP -1) pegged lo o
EDG A Output Breaker (CP -1) indicates green SNPO Manually Starts Emergency Diesel A by momentarily placing EDG A Start Switch (CP-1) to START Verifies EDG A Frequency stabilizes at ~ 60 HZ (CP-1)
Verifies EDG A Output Breaker closes (Red Light CP-1)
Verifies 3A bus Voltage ~ 4100 V (CP-1)
EDG A Sequencer starts (White Lights illuminating for Sequencer CP-1)
NOTE: CRITICAL TASK Termination Continue in OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery.
8 ED05A C-BOP/SRO auto start. The crew should manually start EDG A.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: ____________________________
Operators: __________________________
Initial Conditions: IC-20, 100%, MOC Turnover: RCP 2B Lower Seal failed two days ago (RC08D). Charging pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace a cracked pump block. CS Pump A has been OOS for 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> to replace the pump impeller.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
SG10B I-BOP/SRO After the crew takes the shift, the PPS Channel B S/G 1 narrow range level instrument fails high. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and take required actions to bypass the S/G Level High, S/G Level Low and S/G Delta-P trips for S/G 1 in PPS Channel B within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
2 CV02A RC23A C-RO/SRO After the crew bypasses the trip bistables in PPS Channel B, an RCS leak in excess of Tech Spec limits occurs. The crew should implement OP-901-111, RCS Leak, and evaluate T.S. 3.4.5.2. The backup charging pump fails to start on lowering level. The crew should evaluate TS 3.1.2.4 and TRM 3.1.2.4.
3 RD02A20 C-BOP/RO/SRO After the crew addresses the RCS leak, CEA 20 drops into the core.
The crew should implement OP-901-102, CEDMCS or CEA Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1.
4 N/A R-RO N-BOP/SRO Within 15 minutes of the dropped CEA the crew must start a power reduction in accordance with OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.
5 RD02A02 C-RO/SRO After the crew reduces power to less than 70%, or at the lead examiners discretion, CEA 2 drops which requires a manual reactor trip. The crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.
6 OVR25-28 OVR53-56 RC23A I-RO M-ALL While the crew is implementing OP-902-000, a large break LOCA occurs. SIAS/CIAS/MSIS fail to automatically actuate, requiring manual actuation. The crew should complete the Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnose to OP-902-002.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
E-NRC03-3 Page 1 of 17 Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC03-3 Author: evines Scenario Status: APPROVED Approval: rfletch Revision Number : 1 6/13/2003 Estimated Time : 60 Minutes References Verified: evines Initial Conditions: 100%, MOC (IC-94)
Applications: Initial Exam Scenario
Description:
The plant is at 100% reactor power. RCP 2B Lower seal failed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago and required steps of OP-901-130 have been taken. Charging Pump A/B is OOS for pump block replacement. CS Pump A is OOS for pump impeller replacement. After the crew takes the shift, PPS channel B S/G 1 narrow range level instrument fails high. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5, and 3.3.3.6 and bypass S/G level high, low, and DP Bistables for S/G 1 in PPS channel B within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. After the crew bypasses trip Bistables a leak in excess of Tech Spec limits occurs. The crew should implement OP-901-111, RCS Leak and evaluate T.S. 3.4.5.2. After the crew addresses the leak, CEA 20 drops into the core. The crew should implement OP-901-102 CEDMCS or CEA Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1 and OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable.
Within 15 minutes of the dropped CEA, the crew must begin a power reduction to less than 70% IAW OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction. After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, or at the Lead Examiners discretion, CEA 2 drops into the core. Two CEAs misaligned by > 19 inches requires a manual reactor trip. The crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. Charging Pump A fails to auto start on level deviation or SIAS requiring a manual start. While the crew is implementing OP-902-000, a large break LOCA occurs. SIAS/CIAS/MSIS/CSAS fail to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation.
The crew should complete Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnose to OP-902-002. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to commence an RCS cooldown.
Scenario Notes:
- 1. Reset Simulator to IC-94
- 2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded
- a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:
- 1. CSR11, CS Pump A Bkr - Rack out
- 2. CVR22, Charging Pump A/B Breaker - Rack out
- 3. CSR04, Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - Closed
- 4. H_K08 - CEA Disabled - FAIL_ON - Event Trigger 3
- b. Malfunctions
- 1. RC08D, RCP2B LOWER SEAL FAILURE - LOAD - 25%
- 14. CV02A, CHARGING PUMP FAILS TO START - LOAD - TRUE
E-NRC03-3 Page 2 of 17
- 15. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line
- 3. Danger Tag and place to OFF:
- b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4
- 4. Ensure Protected Train B Sign is placed in SM office window.
- 5. Ensure CW pumps B and D are running.
- 6. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in AB
- 7. Ensure CCW temperature is lowered to 80-85 degrees F.
- 8. Complete the Simulator setup checklist.
Procedures Used OP-901-111 OP-901-403 OP-901-102 OP-901-501 OP-901-212 OP-902-000 OP-902-002 OP-903-013 OP-903-066 EVENT 1 - SG 1 NR Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1113B Fails High
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 2 - RCS Leak Cold Leg 1A
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2.
EVENT 3 - CEA 20 Drops
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3.
- 2. If RAB sent to CEDMCS Alley, report the CEA disconnect for CEA 20 is open, no other indications of problem are readily apparent.
EVENT 4-Rapid Power Reduction None EVENT 5-CEA 2 Drops/Manual Reactor Trip
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 4.
EVENT 6-Large Break LOCA in Cold Leg 1A
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 5.
E-NRC03-3 Page 3 of 17 Scenario Timeline:
Item Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger Event 1
SG10B 1 min 100 %
1 T331 FAIL SG1 NR LVL XMTR SG-ILT-1113B - SG 1 NR LEVEL TRANSMITTER SG-ILT-1113B FAILS HIGH 2
RC23A 10 min
.002%
2 A111 RCS COLD LEG RUPTURE (DBL-END 30" BREAK @100%) - RCS LEAK IN COLD LEG 1A 3
RD02A20 20 MIN TRUE 3
A102,e DROPPED CEA - CEA 20 DROPS 4
30 MIN A212 RAPID POWER REDUCTION 5
RD02A02 40 MIN TRUE 4
E000 DROPPED CEA - CEA 2 DROPS/MANUAL REACTOR TRIP 6
RC23A 45 MIN 2 %
00:03:00 5
E002 RCS COLD LEG RUPTURE (DBL-END 30" BREAK @100%) - LARGE BREAK LOCA IN COLD LEG 1A Manip #
Manipulation Description 17 Loss of Protective System Channel 18 Mispositioned or Dropped CEAs 5
Power Change (>10%) Due to Changes in CEA Position 25 Reactor Trip 7D LOCA, Large Leak
E-NRC03-3 Page 4 of 17 OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 1 - SG 1 NR Level Transmitter SG-ILT -1113B Fails High Event
Description:
After the crew takes the shift, PPS channel B S/G 1 narrow range level instrument fails high. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5, and 3.3.3.6 and bypass S/G level high, low, and DP Bistables for S/G 1 in PPS channel B within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Recognize failed instrument and verify RPS/CPC bistable functions as expected.
- 2. Bypass affected bistable channel.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO Recognize and report indications of failed channel
§ Channel B SG 1 NR Level Indication pegged high on CP-8
§ RPS Channel B Trouble Annunciator on CP-2
§ RPS Channel Trip SG 1 Level Hi annunciator on CP-2
§ SG 1 Level Hi Pretrip B/D annunciator on CP-2
§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 1 Level Hi on Channel B PPS ROM on CP-7 PNPO/CRS Verify RPS/CPC function bistable respond as expected
§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 1 Level Hi on Channel B PPS ROM on CP-7
§ No trips or pretrips on SG 1 Level Hi on other 3 channels of PPS ROMs on CP-7 CRS Review and/or implement actions required by technical specification section 3.3.1 (RPS), 3.3.3.5 (Remote Shutdown), and 3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring)
Enters TS 3.3.1 Action 2 Enters TS 3.3.2 Action 13 Determines that following trip bistables in PPS Channel B must be bypassed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of time of failure:
o SG 1 Level Hi, o
SG 1 Level Lo, o
SG 1 Delta P Hi CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.5 and determines that minimum requirements are met CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.6 and determines that minimum requirements are met
E-NRC03-3 Page 5 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Directs SNPO to bypass the following PPS Channel B trip bistables within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of failure:
SG 1 Level Hi, SG 1 Level Lo, SG 1 Delta P Hi SNPO Bypasses affected bistable in PPS Channel B as follows:
Obtains Key 222 from Key locker on side of SNPO Desk Unlocks and opens front access door at CP-10 Channel B Unlocks and opens the Bistable Control Panel door in PPS Channel B Depresses the bistable bypass pushbuttons for the following trip bistables in PPS Channel B and verifies associated bypass lights illuminate on CP-10:
o SG 1 Level Hi, o
SG 1 Level Lo, o
SG 1 Delta P Hi TERM Bypass lights illuminated on BCP and ROM for the desired bistable channels
E-NRC03-3 Page 6 of 17 OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 2 - RCS Leak Cold Leg 1A Event
Description:
After the crew bypasses trip Bistables a leak in excess of Tech Spec limits occurs. The crew should implement OP-901-111, RCS Leak and evaluate T.S. 3.4.5.2.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Determine that an RCS leak exists and quantify leak according to OP-903-024 RCS Water Inventory Balance.
- 2. Take Tech Spec action and make notifications according to Off-Normal Operating Procedure OP-901-111, Reactor Coolant System Leak.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO Recognizes a RCS leak exists and checks that automatic actions occur as required
§ Letdown flow on CP-4 lowers to maintain Pressurizer at setpoint
§ Containment Water Leakage annunciator on CP-8
§ Containment PIG alarms and rising trend indication on RMS CRT at CP-6
§ Containment Pressure on CP-8 shows a slow rise over time
§ Containment Leakage recorder on CP-1 shows rising trend CRS Discusses contingency with crew for inability to maintain Pressurizer Level with available Charging Pumps
§ Trip Reactor
§ Manually initiate SIAS/CIAS,
§ Go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions PNPO Determines amount of RCS leakage by the difference between Charging flow (CP-4) and Letdown flow (CP-4) plus RCP Controlled Bleed Off flows (PMC)
CRS Refers to Tech Spec 3.4.5.2 and determines required actions
§ Enters TS 3.4.5.2 CRS Implements OP-901-403, High Airborne Activity in Containment in parallel with OP-901-111.
CRS Directs STA to commence OP-903-024, RCS Water Inventory Balance (Note: Event may be terminated any time after this step)
E-NRC03-3 Page 7 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Directs SM to refer to Emergency Plan (EP-001-001)
PNPO/SNPO Checks for SG activity
§ Condenser AE PIG Gas Channel (RMS CRT on CP-6)
§ Condenser Offgas WRGM (RMS CRT on CP -6)
§ SG Blowdown Rad Monitor (RMS CRT on CP-6)
§ Main Steam Line 1 Rad Monitor (RMS CRT on CP -6)
§ Main Steam Line 2 Rad Monitor (RMS CRT on CP -6)
§ PSLR Group on PMC PNPO/SNPO Checks for CCW activity (RMS CRT on CP-6)
§ CCW A Rad Monitor
§ CCW B Rad Monitor
§ CCW AB Rad Monitor CRS Determines Containment Walkdown is necessary from initial indications.
§ Starts preparations for Containment entry at power if conditions in Containment allow CRS/PNPO At CRS discretion, secure Charging/Letdown and walkdown system to determine source of leakage
§ Directs PNPO to secure charging and letdown per OP-002-005
§ Directs Auxiliary Operators to walkdown the system locally CRS/PNPO At CRS discretion, restore Charging/Letdown if determined not to be source of leakage
§ Directs PNPO to restore charging and letdown per OP-002-005 PNPO Take necessary actions to locate leaks to Quench Tank (CP-2, PMC) and/or Reactor Drain Tank (CP-4, PMC) if levels are rising:
§ Monitor Relief line Temperatures on CP -2
§ Monitor Vent Header Pressures on CP-8
§ Monitor Control Bleedoff Pressure on CP-4
§ Reduce temperature as necessary in applicable tank per OP-007-001 CRS Notify Radiation Protection for radiological support
§ Support needed if CRS plans containment entry at power or if leak indicated outside containment TERM Lead Examiner may terminate at any time after crew evaluates Tech Spec 3.4.5.2.
E-NRC03-3 Page 8 of 17 OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 3 - CEA 20 Drop s Event
Description:
After the Crew addresses the leak, CEA 20 drops into the core. The crew should implement OP-901-102 CEDMCS or CEA Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1 and OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable. Within 15 minutes of the dropped CEA, the crew must begin a power reduction to < 70% IAW OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Stabilize plant conditions following a dropped CEA.
- 2. Determine the cause and results of a dropped CEA.
- 3. Reduce reactor power and withdraw dropped CEA in accordance with Off-Normal Operating Procedure OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO Recognize and report indications of Dropped CEA
§ CEA 20 Amber Rod Bottom Light on CEA Rod Bottom Light Mimic on CP-2
§ CEA 20 Green Lower Electrical Limit Light illuminated on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2
§ CEAC CRT on CP-2 indicates CEA 20 inserted in core
§ RCS Tc, Th, and Tave lowering on indicators and recorders on CP -2, CP-7 and PMC
§ RCS Pressure slowly lowering on CP-2 and CP-7 indicators and recorders
§ CEA Disabled, CEA Group Minor Deviation, CEA Group Major Deviation annunciators on CP-2
§ COLSS Master annunciator on CP-36 (SNPO)
§ SG pressure lowering on CP-1 and CP-8 (SNPO)
CRS Determines need to enter OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction.
PNPO Place CEDMCS Mode Select Switch to OFF on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2.
CRS CRS transitions to Section E1, CEA Misalignment Greater Than 7 Inches
E-NRC03-3 Page 9 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
Crew Match TREF with TAVE
§ CRS directs the SNPO and PNPO to coordinate to match Tave and Tref
§ SNPO lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or PNPO instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1
§ PNPO instructs SNPO to place turbine in Hold when Tave and Tref are matched
§ Action is taken prior to reactor tripping on SG Pressure Lo CRS Notifies or directs notification of the Duty Plant Manager and Duty Engineer.
CRS/PNPO Record time of CEA misalignment.
PNPO Verify Pulse Counter indication for CEA 20 is correct or enter correct position in the PMC Database.
CREW If > 19 inches then:
§ CRS determines need to commence power reduction by boration of 30%
and implement OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction
§ CRS determines need to start downpower within 15 minutes of CEA deviation
§ CRS declares COLSS inoperable and enters OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable
§ CRS directs STA or board operators to start COLSS offnormal 15 minute logs TERM Termination Point is entry into OP-901-212 to perform downpower
E-NRC03-3 Page 10 of 17 OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 4 - Rapid Power Reduction Event
Description:
Within 15 minutes of the dropped CEA, the crew must begin a power reduction IAW OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction.
Event Objectives:
- 1. When plant conditions exist requiring a Rapid Plant Shutdown, implement the steps of OP-901-212 to establish the desired final plant conditions.
- 2. During a Rapid Plant Downpower, coordinate boration and Main Turbine load reduction to control RCS Tcold B between 541and 558.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO Initiate RCS boration
§ Performs Direct Boration lineup in accordance with OP-002-005 or aligns for emergency boration at CP-4 per CRS direction.
§ Estimates ~ 600 gallons of boric acid to reduce power to 70% and sets up Boric Acid Batch Counter at CP -4 for desired amount of Boric Acid PNPO Calculate Spray Nozzle Delta T using:
§ Pressurizer Water Temperature on CP-2 or PMC
§ Spray Line Temperatures on CP -2 or PMC PNPO Establish Boron Equalization.
§ Place all available Pressurizer Backup Heater C/Ss to ON on CP-2.
§ Lower Potentiometer on Spray Valve Controller on CP-2 until Spray Valves indicate intermediate PNPO/CRS Maintain ASI
§ CRS provides direction on ASI Control - Preferred groups and CEA insertion limits per TS 3.1.3.6
§ PNPO uses CEAs in Manual Group in accordance with CRS direction and OP-004-004, Control Element Drive CRS Notify Dispatcher of load reduction SNPO Initiate MT load reduction to maintain RCS Tcold 541 to 558.
§ SNPO lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or PNPO instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 Termination Terminate after reactivity manipulation is satisfied.
E-NRC03-3 Page 11 of 17 OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event 5 - CEA 2 Drop s/Manual Reactor Trip Event
Description:
After the Crew reduces power to less than 70%, or at Lead Examiners discretion, CEA 2 drops into the core which will require a manual reactor trip. Charging Pump A fails to auto start on level deviation or SIAS requiring a manual start. The Crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a reactor trip.
- 2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.
Event Critical Tasks:
Establish Reactivity Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO manually trips the Reactor within one minute of recognizing two CEAs dropped.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO Recognize and report indications of Dropped CEA
§ CEA 2 Amber Rod Bottom Light on CEA Rod Bottom Light Mimic on CP -2
§ CEA 2 Green Lower Electrical Limit Light illuminated on CEDMCS Control Panel on CP-2
§ CEAC CRT on CP-2 indicates CEA 2 inserted in core PNPO Manually Trip the Reactor using Manual Trip Pushbuttons on CP -2 NOTE: CRITICAL TASK PNPO/CRS Verify Reactivity Control
§ Check reactor power dropping on CP-2 or CP-7
§ Check startup rate is negative on CP-2 or CP-7
§ Check less than 2 CEAS not fully inserted using
§ CEDMCS LEL Lights illuminated on CP-2
§ CEA Rod Bottom Lights illuminated on CP -2
E-NRC03-3 Page 12 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:
§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1
§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1
§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:
§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts
§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:
§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2
§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2
§ PNPO notes Charging Pump A (CP-4) did not start on level deviation and performs manual starts and stops as necessary to control PZR Level PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:
§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia or
§ If PZR pressure is less than 1684 psia, the operator verifies that SIAS and CIAS (CP-7) initiate or performs manual initiation (CP-7 or CP-8)
§ If PZR pressure is less than 1621 psia, the operator verifies no more than two RCPs are operating
§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured at CP-2
§ Secures a RCP in Loop 1 and Loop 2 at CP -2
§ If PZR pressure is less than minimum RCP NPSH of App. 2A (curve located on CP-6) the operator secures all RCPS.
§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured on CP-2
§ Secures all RCPs at CP-2 PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP-2,
§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F, and
§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.
(may be N/A for LOCA event)
E-NRC03-3 Page 13 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP-1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level or
§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.
o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP-8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated PNPO/SNPO/C Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F or
§ If Tc is > 555 deg. F verify level is being restored to at least one S/G (CP-1 or CP-8) and verify SBCS (CP-1) or ADVS (CP-8) are maintaining RCS temp 535-555 deg. F.
§ If Tc is < 535 deg. F then verify feed flow (MFW-CP-1 or EFW-CP-8) is not excessive and verify SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS Tc 535-555 deg. F
§ If Tc is < 500 deg. F verify no more than 2 RCPs operating on CP-2 SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7) or
§ If S/G press < 925 psia verify steam bypass valves and ADVs are closed.
§ If S/G press less than or equal to 764 psia verify MSIS is initiated.
§ if S/G press > 1050 psia verify SBCs or ADVs are restoring S/G press to <
1050 psia SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1)by
§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,
§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and
§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm or
§ Manually operate feedwater system to restore level in at least one S/G to 50-70% NR.(N/A if MSIS is initiated)
SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters and
§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1) (N/A if MSIS is initiated)
E-NRC03-3 Page 14 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by
§ Checking Containment pressure (CP-7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,
§ Check that no Containment Area rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and
§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.
§ If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.1 psia verify CIAS, SIAS, and MSIS (CP-7) initiate or manually initiate each actuation (CP-7 or CP-8).
SNPO/PNPO/C Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by
§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F and Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia or
§ Verify at least 3 Containment Fan Coolers (CP-18) operating.
§ If Containment press is greater or equal to 17.1 psia verify all CFCs are operating in emergency mode.
o Verifies 4 CFCs operating in slow speed
§ If Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 17.7 verify CSAS is initiated, all available CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm, and secure all RCPs.
CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:
§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery
§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 TERM Crew diagnoses a LOCA event and exits to OP-902-002
E-NRC03-3 Page 15 of 17 OP Test 1, Scenario 3, Event Number 6 - Large Break LOCA in Cold Leg 1A Event
Description:
While the Crew is implementing OP-902-000 a large break LOCA occurs. SIAS/CIAS/MSIS/CSAS fail to automatically actuate requiring manual actuation. The crew should complete the Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnose to OP-902-002. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to commence an RCS cooldown.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Take appropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident in accordance with OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.
- 2. Monitor RCS/Core conditions and verify all Critical Safety Functions are being addressed.
- 3. Ensure Reactor Coolant Pumps are secured as required, and the automatic & manual actions required for recirc actuation take place with two minutes of Signal.
Event Critical Tasks 1
Establish RCS Inventory Control, Containment Isolation, and Containment Pressure Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO manually initiates SIAS/CIAS/MSIS/CSAS prior to Reactor Vessel plenum level going empty.
2 Stop All RCPs The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to stop all RCPs within 3 minutes of a loss of CCW flow or loss of subcooled margin.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
STA/CRS Confirm diagnosis
§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list
§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip
E-NRC03-3 Page 16 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,
§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,
§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2
§ available charging pumps (2) are running OR
§ perform any of the following:
§ Verify power to SI pumps.
§ Verify Cold Leg injection valves open.
§ Start additional SI pumps until flow is acceptable per app. 2.
§ Align HPSI AB to replace A or B NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF NOT PERFORMED IN SPTAs PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.
If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.
PNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits
§ verify CCW available to RCPs or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.
§ Secure all RCPs if CSAS is initiated.
§ if Tc >500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.
NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF NOT PERFORMED IN SPTAs SNPO/CRS Verify CCW operation by checking a CCW pump (CP-8) is operating for each energized 4 KV safety bus (CP-1) or
§ If AB bus aligned to same side as faulted CCW pump start the AB CCW pump
§ If AB bus aligned to opposite Side from faulted CCW pump start the AB CCW pump after the sequencer has timed out.
§ If CCW flow can not be restored, notify an NAO to pull the overspeed trip device on the affected EDG.
PNPO/SNPO/C Isolate the LOCA by:
§ Verifying letdown Containment isolations are closed.
§ Verifying RCS sampling isolations are closed.
§ Checking CCW AB rad monitor not in alarm and no Abnormal rise in reading or stop all RCPs and close CCW Containment isolations.
E-NRC03-3 Page 17 of 17 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify LOCA not outside Containment by checking
§ RAB rad monitors,
§ sump levels (CP-8 and PMC), and waste tank levels (PMC).
§ If a leak is indicated, locate and isolate the leak and verify CIAS actuated per Appendix 4D.
SNPO/CRS Place Hydrogen Analyzers A and B in service (CP-33)
§ Open Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves
§ Start Hydrogen Analyzer sample Pumps PNPO/SNPO/CRS IF Containment Pressure is > 17.1 psia (CP-7 or CP-8)or Containment area rad monitors are in hi alarm (RMS CRT CP-6 or CP-14),
§ Verify CIAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP-8)
§ Verify all available CFCs are in the EMERGENCY MODE (CP-18)
§ If any CFC is not operating and Containment pressure is > 17.1 psia notify a NAO to perform OP-902-009, Appendix 22B and close the associated CFC CCW isolation valves.
NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF NOT PERFORMED IN SPTAs SNPO/PNPO/CRS If Containment pressure is > 17.7 psia:
§ Verify CSAS is initiated (CP-7 or CP-8)
§ Verify all operating CS pumps are delivering > 1750 gpm (CP-8).
§ If any CS pump is not operating and its associated CS-125 valve is open, perform OP-902-009, Appendix 22A and close the associated valve. (not required - CS-111A and 118A tagged closed per initial conditions)
NOTE: CRITICAL TASK IF NOT PERFORMED IN SPTAs SNPO/CRS IF offsite power has been lost verify MSIVs and Blowdown Containment isolations are closed.
SNPO/CRS Restore IA
§ If a TCW pump and CW pump are not running notify NAO to align IA compressors to potable water
§ If IA pressure < 95 psig dispatch an operator to start all available air compressors
§ If IA press > 95 psig ensure IA Containment isolation valve ia-909 is open.
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Commence RCS Cooldown to less than 350 degrees F (after cooldown has been started the exam lead may terminate the scenario)
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: ____________________________
Operators: __________________________
Initial Conditions: IC-30, 100%, EOC Turnover: RCP 2B Lower Seal failed two days ago (RC08D). Charging pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace a cracked pump block. CS Pump A has been OOS for 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> to replace the pump impeller.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
RC15A2 I-RO/SRO After the crew takes the shift, in-service pressurizer level channel fails low requiring the crew to implement OP-901-110, PZR Level Control Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1. The crew should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.3.6.
2 CH01A C-BOP/SRO After the crew implements OP-901-110, Containment Fan Cooler A trips. The crew should start the idle Containment Fan Cooler in accordance with OP-008-003, Containment Cooling System, Subsection 6.1 and evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.2.2 and 3.4.5.1.
3 CV01B C-RO/SRO Charging Pump B trips on Overcurrent. The crew should implement OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1 and evaluate Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 and TRM 3.1.2.4.
4 SG04E I-BOP/SRO Sometime after the crew has commenced restoration of charging and letdown, S/G 1 pressure input to PPS channel A fails low. The crew should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5, and 3.3.3.6.
PPS Channel A trip bistables for S/G 2 pressure low and both S/G delta-pressures must be bypassed within one hour.
5 RP01A-D RP02A-D MS-13B I-RO/SRO M-All After the PPS Channel A bistables are bypassed a Main Steam Line Break outside containment occurs on S/G 2. The reactor fails to trip automatically or by manual pushbuttons, however, Diverse Reactor Trip pushbuttons do work. The crew should implement OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnose to OP-902-004, ESD Recovery.
6 SG01B M-ALL After the crew diagnoses to OP-902-004 and S/G dryout occurs, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs in S/G 2. The crew should implement OP-902-008.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
E-NRC03-4 Page 1 of 18 Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC03-4 Author:
evines Scenario Status:
Approved Approval:
rfletch Revision Number:
1 6/16/2003 Estimated Time:
75 Minutes References Verified: evines Initial Conditions:
IC-30 Applications:
Initial Exam Scenario
Description:
The plant is at 100% reactor power. RCP 2B Lower seal failed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago and required steps of OP-901-130 have been taken. Charging Pump A/B is OOS for pump block replacement. CS Pump A is OOS for pump impeller replacement. After the crew takes the shift, the in service pressurizer level channel fails low. The crew should implement OP-901-110 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6. After the crew implements OP-901-110 Containment Fan Cooler A trips. The crew should start the idle Containment Fan Cooler IAW OP-008-003, Containment Cooling System Subsection 6.1 and evaluate TS 3.6.2.2, 3.6.1.5, and 3.4.5.1. After the crew has evaluated Tech Specs, Charging Pump B trips on overcurrent. The crew should implement OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1 and evaluate TS 3.1.2.4 and TRM 3.1.2.4. After the crew has evaluated tech Specs and has commenced restoration of charging and letdown, S/G1 pressure input to PPS channel A fails low. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6. The crew must bypass PPS Channel A trip bistables for S/G 1 pressure low and both S/G D/P pressures within one hour. After PPS A bistables are bypassed, a Main Steam Line Break outside containment occurs on S/G 2. The Reactor fails to trip automatically or by manual pushbuttons. The crew should trip the Reactor using DRTS pushbuttons. The crew should implement OP-902-000 Standard Post Trip actions and diagnose to OP-902-004, ESD Recovery.
After the crew diagnoses to OP-902-004 and S/G dryout occurs, a SGTR occurs in S/G 2, requiring the Crew to implement OP-902-008. The scenario may be terminated after the crew performs steps to isolate SG and commence depressurization.
Scenario Notes:
- 1. Reset Simulator to IC-92
- 2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded
- a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:
- 1. CSR11, CS Pump A Bkr - Rack out
- 2. CVR22, Charging Pump A/B Breaker - Rack out
- 3. CSR04, Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - Closed
- b. Malfunctions
- 1. RC08D, RCP2B LOWER SEAL FAILURE - LOAD - 25%
- 10. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line
E-NRC03-4 Page 2 of 18
- 3. Danger Tag and place to OFF:
- b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4
- 4. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.
- 5. Ensure CW pumps B and D are running.
- 6. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in AB
- 7. Ensure CCW temperature is lowered to 80-85 degrees F.
- 8. Complete the simulator setup checklist.
Procedures Used OP-008-003 OP-901-110 OP-901-112 OP-902-000 OP-902-004 OP-902-008 OP-903-013 EVENT 1-Pressurizer Level Channel X Fails Low
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1.
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 2-Containment Fan Cooler A Failure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2
- 2. If called as RAB to investigate Brkr 317A inform OC trip flags all 3 phases
- 3. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 3-Charging Pump B Trips
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3
- 2. If called as RAB to investigate Charging pump B report OC flags on phase A.
- 3. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 4-SG 1 Pressure Safety Channel A Failure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 4
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 5-Main Steam Line 2 Break Outside Containment/RPS Auto and Manual Trip Failure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 5 EVENT 6-Steam Generator Tube Rupture in SG 2 Concurrent with MSLB on SG 2 Outside Containment
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 6
E-NRC03-4 Page 3 of 18 Scenario Timeline:
Item Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger Event 1
RC15A2 1 MIN TRUE 1
A110,e1 PZR CONTROL CHANNEL LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILS 2
CH01A 18 MIN TRUE 2
- AR002, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER FAILS OFF 3
CV01B 25 MIN TRUE 3
A112,e1 CHARGING PUMP TRIP 4
SG04E 32 MIN 0 %
4 T331 SG PRESSURE SAFETY CHANNEL FAILS 5
MS13B 45 MIN 8 %
00:05:00 5
E000,E004 MS LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CNTMT BEFORE MSIV (0-100%)(Dryout should occur 4-5 min before 004 transition) 6 SG01B 65 MIN 10 %
00:05:00 6
E008, E0, SGTR SG TUBE RUPTURE (Conditional on SG Dryout occurring and Transition to OP-902-004)
Manip #
Manipulation Description 17 Loss of Protective System Channel 24 Malfunction of RCS Pressure or Level Control (includes loss of letdown/charging) 25 Reactor Trip 26B Main Steam Line Break, Outside Containment 7A Steam Generator Tube Leak or Steam Generator Tube Rupture
E-NRC03-4 Page 4 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 4, Event 1 - Pressurizer Level Channel X Fails Low Event
Description:
After the Crew takes the shift, the in service Pressurizer level channel fails low. The crew should implement OP-901-110 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1. The crew should evaluate TS 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Establish manual control of Pressurizer level and reselect operable level channel for control.
- 2. Perform all recovery action steps according to OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO Notify CRS of annunciators and indications of instrument failure
§ Letdown flow at minimum on CP -4
§ 3 Charging Pumps running on CP-4
§ Pressurizer Level Hi/Lo Annunciator on CP-2
§ Pressurizer Level Lo Lo Annunciator on CP-2
§ Pressurizer Level Channel X indicator and recorder on CP -2 pegged lo
§ All Pressurizer Heaters Off on CP-2 CRS Determines need to enter OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction and implements Subsection E0.
PNPO/CRS Place PZR Level Controller on CP-2 to MANUAL and adjust output slowly to restore Pressurizer Level on Channel Y (CP-2).
Takes manual control of RC-ILIC-0110 by momentarily depressing the MANUAL pushbutton Raises output of RC-ILIC-0110 to obtain a letdown flow that results in stable or rising PZR Level on CP-2 indicators and recorders.
CRS Transitions to Subsection E1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction PNPO Transfer Pressurizer Level Control Channel Select switch to Y on CP-2.
PNPO Transfer Channel Select Lo Level Heater Cutout switch to Y on CP-2 PNPO Verify desired backup Charging Pump C/S in Auto on CP-4 Verifies Charging Pump A C/S in Auto on CP-4
E-NRC03-4 Page 5 of 18 PNPO Verify all Proportional Heater and Backup Heater Banks reset on CP-2 Reset both Proportional Heater banks by momentarily placing each C/S on CP-2 to ON PNPO Place Pressurizer Level Controller RC-ILIC-0110 on CP-2 in AUTO and verify level being restored to setpoint (~55.6%)
CRS Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6
§ Enters TS 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation
§ Determines that 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation requires are met if PZR Level indication on QSPDS Channel 1, Page 103 is Operable
§ Requests PNPO to cross-check QSPDS PZR Level indication with Channel Y indication on CP -2 Termination
E-NRC03-4 Page 6 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 4, Event 2 - Containment Fan Cooler A Failure Event
Description:
After the crew implements OP-901-110 Containment Fan Cooler A trips. The crew should start the idle Containment Fan Cooler IAW OP-008-003, Containment Cooling System Subsection 6.1 and evaluate TS 3.6.2.2, 3.6.1.5, and 3.4.5.1.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Recognize failure of Containment Fan Cooler
- 2. Take action to start the standby Containment Fan Cooler.
- 3. Recognize and implement appropriate Technical Specification LCOs and action statements.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Report annunciators and indications to CRS
§ Trn A Cntmt Cooler Power Lost on CP -33
§ CFC/AC Power Lost alarm on PMC
§ No lights illuminated on Containment Fan Cooler A C/S on CP -18 CREW Refer to the appropriate Annunciator Response Procedure
§ OP-500-002, Control Room Cabinet B SNPO Start the Standby Containment Fan Cooler (CFC C)
§ Refers to OP-008-003, Containment Cooling, Section 6.4
§ Momentarily place Containment Fan Cooler C/S on CP-18 to Start/Fast
§ Verify CC-807A and CC-823A indicate open (red) on CP-18
§ Check Containment Fan Cooler C differential pressure indicates between 5.0 and 8.0 INWC on CCS-IDPR-5154A on CP-18.
§ Check CCW flow is greater than or equal to 625 gpm on CC-IFI-7570A on CP-18.
CRS Send an NAO to CFC A Breaker at MCC 317A to investigate fault CRS Notify Maintenance of failure and request assistance CRS Refer to TS. 3.4.5.1, 3.6.1.5, and 3.6.2.2.
§ Determines requirements of 3.4.5.1, 3.6.1.5, and 3.6.2.2 are met TERM Event may be terminated after Tech Specs evaluated or at Lead Examiner's discretion
E-NRC03-4 Page 7 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 4, Event 3 - Charging Pump B Trip s Event
Description:
After the crew has evaluated Tech Specs, Charging Pump B trips on overcurrent, the crew should implement OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, Subsection E0 and E1 and evaluate TS 3.1.2.4 and TRM 3.1.2.4.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Determine the cause of charging malfunction and realign system as necessary to restore charging capability.
- 2. Properly perform subsequent operator actions in accordance with off normal operating procedure OP-901-112, Charging and Letdown Malfunctions.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Recognize and report Charging Pump trip (alarms and indication)
§ Overload alarm on PMC
§ Charging Pump B Trip/Trouble on CP-4
§ Charging Pump Header Pressure Lo on CP-4
§ Charging Header Flow Lo on CP-4
§ Charging Header Flow = 0 gpm on CP-4
§ Regen HX Tube Outlet Temp rising on CP -4
§ Green light illuminated on Charging Pump B C/S on CP-4
§ Pressurizer Level slowly lowering on CP-2 SNPO/CRS Stop Turbine load changes (if applicable)
PNPO/CRS If Charging pumps have tripped: verify Charging Pump suction path
§ Verifies either CVC-183 or CVC-507 open (red) on CP-4 PNPO/CRS If Letdown is not isolated attempt to restart Charging pumps
§ Takes Charging Pump A C/S to ON on CP-4 if CVC-101 has not closed on High Regen HX Tube Outlet Temperature PNPO/CRS Close letdown stop valve (CVC-101) if charging pumps cannot be restarted
§ Momentarily places CVC-101 C/S to Close on CP-4
E-NRC03-4 Page 8 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Check Technical Specifications
§ Enters TS 3.1.2.4
§ Enters TRM 3.1.2.4 PNPO/CRS If the reason for the Charging Pump trip is corrected and pressurizer level is normal operating band, then place Charging and Letdown in Service
§ CRS directs PNPO to restore Charging and Letdown to Service in accordance with OP-002-005 TERM Event may be terminated when Tech Specs have been evaluated or if letdown has isolated the crew commences restoration of Charging and Letdown
E-NRC03-4 Page 9 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 4, Event 4 - SG 1 Pressure Safety Channel A Failure Event
Description:
After the Crew has commenced restoration of Charging and Letdown, S/G1 pressure input to PPS channel A fails low. The Crew should evaluate TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6. The Crew must bypass PPS Channel A trip bistables for S/G 1 pressure low and both S/G D/P pressures within one hour.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Recognize failed instrument and verify RPS/CPC bistable functions as expected.
- 2. Bypass affected bistable channel.
Event Critical Tasks:
None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO Recognize and report indications of failed channel
§ Channel A SG 1 Pressure Indicator pegged low on CP -8
§ RPS Channel A Trouble Annunciator on CP-2
§ RPS Channel Trip SG 1 Pressure Lo annunciator on CP-2
§ SG 1 Pressure Lo Pretrip A/C annunciator on CP -2
§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 1 Pressure Lo on Channel A PPS ROM on CP-7
§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 2 Delta P Hi on Channel A PPS ROM on CP-7 PNPO/CRS Verify RPS/CPC function bistable respond as expected
§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 1 Pressure Lo on Channel A PPS ROM on CP-7
§ Pretrip and Trip Lights illuminated for SG 2 Delta P Hi on Channel A PPS ROM on CP-7
§ No trips or pretrips on SG 1 Pressure Lo on other 3 channels of PPS ROMs on CP-7
E-NRC03-4 Page 10 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Review and/or implement actions required by technical specification section 3.3.1 (RPS), 3.3.3.5 (Remote Shutdown), and 3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring)
Enters TS 3.3.1 Action 2 Enters TS 3.3.2 Action 13 Determines that following trip bistables in PPS Channel A must be bypassed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of time of failure:
o SG 1 Pressure Lo, o
SG 1 Delta P Hi, o
SG 2 Delta P Hi CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.5 and determines that minimum requirements are not met CRS Enters 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation CRS reviews OP-903-013 and TS 3.3.3.6 and determines that minimum requirements are met CRS Directs SNPO to bypass the following PPS Channel A trip bistables within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of failure:
SG 1 Pressure Lo, SG 1 Delta P Hi, SG 2 Delta P Hi SNPO Bypasses affected bistable in PPS Channel B as follows:
Obtains Key 221 from Key locker on side of SNPO Desk Unlocks and opens front access door at CP-10 Channel A Unlocks and opens the Bistable Control Panel door in PPS Channel A Depresses the bistable bypass pushbuttons for the following trip bistables in PPS Channel A and verifies associated bypass lights illuminate on CP-10:
o SG 1 Pressure Lo, o
SG 1 Delta P Hi, o
SG 2 Delta P Hi TERM Bypass lights illuminated on BCP and ROM for the desired bistable channels
E-NRC03-4 Page 11 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 4, Event 5 - Main Steam Line 2 Break Outside Containment/RPS Auto and Manual Trip Failure Event
Description:
After PPS A bistables are bypassed a Main Steam Line Break outside containment occurs on S/G 2. The Reactor fails to trip automatically or by manual pushbuttons. The Crew should trip the Reactor using DRTS pushbuttons. The Crew should implement OP-902-000 Standard Post Trip actions and diagnose to OP-902-004, ESD Recovery Event Objectives:
- 1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a Reactor Trip.
- 2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.
Event Critical Tasks:
Establish Reactivity Control The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO trips the reactor within one minute of receiving automatic trips on common Bistables in at least two of four PPS channels by depressing the DRTs pushbuttons.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Verify Reactivity Control
§ Check reactor power dropping on CP-2 or CP-7 o
Trips reactor by depressing both DRTS Pushbuttons on CP-2
§ Check startup rate is negative on CP-2 or CP-7
§ Check less than 2 CEAS not fully inserted using
§ CEDMCS LEL Lights illuminated on CP-2
§ CEA Rod Bottom Lights illuminated on CP -2 NOTE: CRITICAL TASK
E-NRC03-4 Page 12 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:
§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1
§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1
§ Check Train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:
§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts
§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:
§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2
§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2 PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:
§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia or
§ If PZR pressure is less than 1684 psia, the operator verifies that SIAS and CIAS (CP-7) initiate or performs manual initiation (CP -7 or CP-8)
§ If PZR pressure is less than 1621 psia, the operator verifies no more than two RCPs are operating
§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured at CP-2
§ Secures a RCP in Loop 1 and Loop 2 at CP-2
§ If PZR pressure is less than minimum RCP NPSH of App. 2A (curve located on CP-6) the operator secures all RCPS.
§ Starts a lift oil pump for RCPs to be secured on CP -2
§ Secures all RCPs at CP-2 PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP-2,
§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F, and
§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.
E-NRC03-4 Page 13 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one S/G is both 15-80% NR (CP-1 or CP-8) and Main Feedwater is available to restore level or
§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.
o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP -8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated PNPO/SNPO/CRS Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F or
§ If Tc is < 535 deg. F then verify feed flow (MFW-CP-1 or EFW-CP-8) is not excessive and verify SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS Tc 535-555 deg. F
§ If Tc is < 500 deg. F verify no more than 2 RCPs operating on CP-2
§ If RCS Tc is being controlled by an ESD Perform Appendix 13 Using SG 1 when RCS Pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) starts to rise or CET Temperatures (CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) start to rise o
SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on ADV 1 controller on CP-8 and raises output to 100%
o SNPO manually initiates EFAS 1 by all EFAS 1 actuation switches on CP-7 and CP-8 to ACTUATE o
SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on Primary or Backup EFW Flow Controller for SG 1 on CP -8 and raise output to initiate EFW Flow to SG-1 o
PNPO uses Normal (CP-2) and/or Auxiliary Spray (CP -4) to stabilize RCS pressure (CP -2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) between 1500 and 1600 psia o
SNPO throttles or stops HPSI flow if throttle criteria of Appendix 13 are met and CRS concurs SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7) or
§ If S/G press < 925 psia verify steam bypass valves and ADVs are closed.
§ If S/G press less than or equal to 764 psia verify MSIS is initiated.
SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) by
§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,
§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and
§ Operating Feed Pumps are 3800 to 4000 rpm or
§ Manually operate feedwater system to restore level in at least one S/G to 50-70% NR.(N/A if MSIS is initiated)
SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters and
§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1)
E-NRC03-4 Page 14 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by
§ Checking Containment pressure (CP-7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,
§ Check that no Containment Area rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and
§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors (RMS CRT/CP-14/PMC) alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.
SNPO/PNPO/C Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by
§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F and Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia or
§ Verify at least 3 Containment Fan Coolers (CP-18) operating.
CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:
§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Recovery
§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 CRS Crew diagnoses an ESD event and exits to OP-902-004 CRS Confirm diagnosis
§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list
§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip PNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,
§ SIAS lights off on PPS ROM on CP -7
§ SIAS Initiation Alarms on CP-2 PNPO/SNPO/CRS If SIAS initiated,
§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,
§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2
§ available charging pumps (1) are running
E-NRC03-4 Page 15 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify MSIS actuation
§ MSIS lights off on PPS ROM on CP-7
§ MSIS Initiation Alarms on CP-2
§ Both Main Steam Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP -8
§ Both Main Feed Isolation Valves indicate closed on CP-8 PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs (CP-2) operating.
If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits
§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP-2/CP-8) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.
§ if Tc >500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.
SNPO/CRS Verify proper CCW operation
§ Verify a CCW Pump (CP-8) is running for Train A and B PNPO/SNPO/CRS Determine most affected SG
§ Determines SG 2 is most affected SG
§ SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)
§ SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP-8)
§ SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP -2/CP-7)
SNPO/CRS Isolate SG 1:
§ Verify MSIV 2 Closed on CP-8
§ Verify MFIV 2 Closed on CP-8
§ Verify ADV 1 is Closed by taking controller on CP -8 to MANUAL and verifying 0% output
§ Verify EFW-228B SG 2 Primary isolation valve closed on CP -8
§ Verify EFW-229B SG 2 Backup isolation valve closed on CP-8
§ Places SG 2 EFW Primary and Backup flow controllers in MANUAL and verify 0% output on CP-8
§ Close MS-401B on CP-8
§ Verify MS-120B and MS-119B Main Steam Line 2 Drains are closed on CP-8
§ Verify SG 2 Blowdown Isolation Valves BD-102B and BD-103B are closed on CP-8
§ Notifies NAO to verify locally safeties not lifting on SG 2
E-NRC03-4 Page 16 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify correct SG isolated
§ Isolated SG with lowest pressure (CP-8)
§ Isolated SG with Lowering or 0% WR level (CP -8)
§ Isolated SG with lowest RCS temperatures (CP-2/CP-7)
PNPO/SNPO/CRS If not performed in SPTAs, stabilize RCS temperature and pressure using SG 1 when RCS Pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) starts to rise or CET Temperatures (CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) start to rise
§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on ADV 1 controller on CP -8 and raises output to 100%
§ SNPO manually initiates EFAS 1 by all EFAS 1 actuation switches on CP-7 and CP-8 to ACTUATE
§ SNPO depresses MANUAL pushbutton on Primary or Backup EFW Flow Controller for SG 1 on CP-8 and raise output to initiate EFW Flow to SG-1
§ PNPO uses Normal (CP -2) and/or Auxiliary Spray (CP -4) to stabilize RCS pressure (CP-2/CP-7/QSPDS/PMC) between 1500 and 1600 psia
§ SNPO throttles or stops HPSI flow if throttle criteria of Appendix 13 are met and CRS concurs Terminate This Event may be terminated and next event initiated when SG dryout occurs
E-NRC03-4 Page 17 of 18 OP Test 1, Scenario 4, Event Number 6 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture in SG 2 Concurrent with MSLB on SG 2 Outside Containment Event
Description:
After the Crew diagnoses to OP-902-004 an S/G Dryout occurs a SGTR occurs in S/G 2 requiring the Crew to implement OP-902-008. The scenario may be terminated after the crew performs steps to isolate SG and commence depressurization Event Objectives:
- 1. Recognize entry criteria for the functional recovery procedure and take preliminary actions as required by OP-902-008.
- 2. Determine the safety function status and proceed to proper success path.
- 3. Respond to the identified safety functions in jeopardy by selecting the proper success paths and implementing them.
- 4. Demonstrate knowledge of OP-902-008 General Usage By recognizing when success path criteria are met or when transition to another success path is appropriate.
- 5. Respond to the containment isolation safety function not met by selecting the proper success path and implementing it.
- 6. Demonstrate knowledge of OP-902-008 General Usage by recognizing when success path criteria are met or when transition to another success path is appropriate.
- 7. Given a loss of the containment isolation safety function due to an identified steam generator tube rupture, perform the appropriate HR success path actions to restore the containment isolation safety function.
Event Critical Tasks None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CREW Announce event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip PNPO/CRS If Pzr press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs (CP-2) operating.
If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.
PNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits
§ Stop all if CSAS/loss CCW
§
< 500 degrees, stop 2 RCPs CRS Direct chemistry to sample both SGs for activity and boron
E-NRC03-4 Page 18 of 18 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Place Hydrogen Analyzers A and B in service (CP-33)
§ Open Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves
§ Start Hydrogen Analyzer sample Pumps CRS Identify Success Paths Using Resource Assessment Trees and Safety Function Tracking Sheet CRS Direct STA to perform Safety Function Status Checklist and independently prioritize safety functions CRS Prioritize success paths
§ Determines that CI-1 is first path to be implemented SNPO/CRS Determine most affected SG
§ High Rad Monitor readings (RMS CRT on CP -6)
§ SG level (CP-8) rise in SG 2 when not feeding
§ Determine need to go to HR-2 step 16 per step 2 of CI-1 PNPO/CRS Depressurize the RCS using Main or Aux. Spray to meet all of the following:
§ RCS pressure less than 1000 psia
§ RCS pressure within Appendix 2-A, "
§ If HPSI Throttle Criteria are met control Charging and Letdown flow and throttle HPSI flow SNPO/CRS When RCS T-hot is less than 520 degrees F isolate the most affected SG 2 by:
§ Place ADV 2 controller setpoint to 980 psig and verify the controller is in AUTO on CP-8
§ Verify MSIV 2 is CLOSED on CP-8
§ Verify MFIV 2 Closed on CP-8
§ If EFAS 2 is not initiated close EFW-228B and EFW-229B
§ place the EFW FCV controllers in manual and close EFW-224B and EFW-223B on CP-8 by verifying output of controller is )%
§ Close MS-401B on CP-8
§ Close the main steam line drains MS-120B and MS-119B
§ Direct an NAO to check Main Steam Safety Valves closed on SG 2 TERM Termination point
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Waterford III Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: ____________________________
Operators: __________________________
Initial Conditions: IC-29, 85%, EOC Turnover: RCP 2B Lower Seal failed two days ago (RC08D). Charging pump AB has been OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to replace a cracked pump block. CS Pump A has been OOS for 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> to replace the pump impeller.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A R-RO N-BOP/SRO After the crew takes the shift, a power reduction to 65% will be performed to remove FWPT A from service to repair an oil leak and replace oil soaked lagging.
2 PC01 I-All After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, the Plant Monitoring Computer fails. The crew should implement OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable. The crew should evaluate Tech Specs 3.2.1, 3.2.4, and 3.2.7.
3 SG05A I-BOP/SRO After the crew evaluates Tech Specs, a S/G1 Narrow Range control channel instrument fails low causing the controllers for FWCS 1 to shift to manual. The crew should implement OP-901-201 and control S/G 1 level manually. Post trip, the Main and Startup Feed Reg Valve controllers must be placed in a RTO condition.
4 FW12A C-All After the crew addresses the FWCS malfunction, the oil leak worsens on FWPT A requiring a manual trip of FWPT A and a Reactor Power Cutback. The crew should implement OP-901-101, Reactor Power Cutback.
5 FW03B FW07A FW05 C-BOP M-All After the crew stabilizes the plant, FWPT B trips on overspeed. The crew should manually trip the reactor in accordance with OP-901-101, Reactor Power Cutback. The crew should implement OP-902-000. When EFAS-1 or 2 is actuated, EFW Pump A fails to auto start and EFW Pump AB trips on overspeed. The crew should diagnose to OP-902-006, Loss of Main Feedwater.
6 SG01A M-ALL During implementation of OP-902-006, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs in S/G 1. The crew should re-diagnose and implement OP-902-007 Tube Rupture.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
E-NRC03-5 Page 1 of 16 Simulator Scenario Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant Simulator Scenario Number: E-NRC03-5 Author:
evines Scenario Status:
Approved Approval:
rfletch Revision Number:
16/16/2003 Estimated Time:
60 Minutes References Verified: evines Initial Conditions:
IC-29 Applications:
Initial Exam Scenario
Description:
The plant is at ~85% Reactor power. RCP 2B Lower seal failed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago and required steps of OP-901-130 have been taken. Charging Pump A/B is OOS for pump block replacement. CS Pump A is OOS for pump impeller replacement. After the crew takes the shift a power reduction to 60% is performed to remove FWPT A from service to repair an oil leak and replace soaked lagging. The TB NAO is standing by at FWPT A. After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, the Plant Monitoring Computer fails. The crew should implement OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable and evaluate TS 3.2.1, 3.2.4, and 3.2.7. After the crew evaluates Tech Specs, a S/G 1 Narrow Range Control Channel Instrument fails low causing FWCS 1 controllers to shift to manual. The crew should implement OP-901-201 and control S/G 1 level manually. After the crew addresses the FWCS malfunction, the oil leak on FWPT A worsens requiring a manual trip of FWPT A and a Reactor Power Cutback. The crew should implement OP-901-101 Reactor Power Cutback. After the plant is stabilized FWPT B trips on overspeed. The crew should manually trip the Reactor IAW OP-901-101.
The crew should implement OP-902-000. When EFAS-1 or 2 is actuated, EFW Pump A fails to auto start and EFW Pump AB trips on overspeed. The crew should diagnose to OP-902-006, Loss of Main Feedwater.
During implementation of OP-902- 006, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs in S/G 1. The crew should diagnose to OP-902-007. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to isolate S/G 1 and commence depressurization of the RCS.
Scenario Notes:
- 1. Reset Simulator to IC-95.
- 2. Verify Scenario Malfunctions, Remotes, and Overrides are loaded
- a. Remotes and Overrides are as follows:
- 1. CSR11, CS Pump A Bkr - Rackout
- 2. CVR22, Charging Pump A/B Breaker - Rackout
- 3. CSR04, Shutdown HX A Outlet Valve - Closed
- b. Malfunctions
- 1. RC08D, RCP2B LOWER SEAL FAILURE - LOAD - 25%
- 3. FW07A, EFW PUMP A FAIL TO START - LOAD - TRUE
- 4. Malfunctions per Scenario Time Line
- 3. Danger Tag and place to OFF:
- b. Chg Pump A/B C/S on CP-4
- 4. Ensure Protected Train B sign is placed in SM office window.
- 5. Ensure CW pumps B and D are running.
- 6. Place B/U Charging Pump Selector Switch in AB
- 7. Ensure CCW temperature is lowered to 80-85 degrees F.
- 8. Complete the simulator setup checklist.
E-NRC03-5 Page 2 of 16 Procedures Used OP-901-101 OP-901-201 OP-901-501 OP-902-000 OP-902-007 OP-010-005 EVENT 1 - Power Reduction to 60%
- 1. If called as TB to check oil leak inform caller oil leak unchanged.
EVENT 2 - Plant Monitoring Computer Failure
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 1
- 2. If called as NAO to continuously monitor equipment locally, acknowledge
- 3. If called as Shift Computer Tech to failover PMC, acknowledge
- 4. If called as Woodlands that PMC lost, acknowledge EVENT 3 - SG NR Range Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1105 Fails Low
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 2
- 2. If WWM called inform the caller work package will be assembled and team sent to Control room EVENT 4 - Main Feedwater Pump A Oil Leak and High Vibration
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 3
- 2. Inform Control Room as TB NAO that oil leak worsening and pump is vibrating badly.
- 3. If called as TB NAO to secure FWPT A lube oil system when pump stops acknowledge EVENT 5 - Main Feedwater Pump B Trip on Overspeed/Manual Reactor Trip
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 4
EVENT 6 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture in SG 1
- 1. On Lead Examiner's cue initiate Event Trigger 5
- 4. If called as Outside to check for safeties lifting inform no safeties lifting
E-NRC03-5 Page 3 of 16 Scenario Timeline:
Item Malfunction Time Severity Ramp TUA TRA Trigger Event 1
START N10005 POWER REDUCTION TO 60%
2 PC01 15 min TRUE 1
A501 PMC HOST A & B TOTAL FAILURE 3
SG05A 25 min 0%
2 A201 SG ILT NR LEVEL FAIL (1-100% )
4 FW12A 35 min 100%
3 A101 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE HIGH VIBRATION 5
FW03B 45 min TRUE 4
E000 MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP OVERSPEED TRIP 6
SG01A 55 min 10%
00:05:00 5
E007 SG TUBE RUPTURE Manip #
Manipulation Description 15 Loss of Main Feedwater or Main Feedwater System Failure 16 Loss of All Feedwater (Main, Aux, and Emergency) 7A Steam Generator Tube Leak or Steam Generator Tube Rupture
E-NRC03-5 Page 4 of 16 OP Test 1, Scenario 5, Event 1 - Power Reduction to 60%
Event
Description:
After the Crew takes the shift a power reduction to 65% is performed to remove FWPT A from service to repair an oil leak and replace soaked lagging TB NAO is standing by FWPT A.
Event Objectives:
Reduce Reactor power and/or remove the unit from service by operating securing, or realigning plant equipment as directed by Precautions, Limitations, and procedural guidance of Plant Shutdown, OP-010-005.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO Maintain Tcold 541-558 (CP-2/CP-8/PMC) during downpower.
PNPO Initiate RCS boration
§ Performs Direct Boration lineup in accordance with OP-002-005 at CP-4 per CRS direction.
§ Estimates ~ 500 gallons of boric acid to reduce power to 60% and sets up Boric Acid Batch Counter at CP -4 for desired amount of Boric Acid PNPO/CRS Maintain ASI
§ CRS provides direction on ASI Control - Preferred groups and CEA insertion limits per TS 3.1.3.6
§ PNPO uses CEAs in Manual Group in accordance with CRS direction and OP-004-004, Control Element Drive SNPO Initiate MT load reduction to maintain RCS Tcold 541 to 558.
§ SNPO lowers load reference and sets load rate per CRS or PNPO instructions and depresses GO pushbutton on DEH Control Panel on CP-1 CREW Between 90% and 80% re-evaluate CEA subgroup selection for Reactor Power Cutback CRS Following a Reactor power change of >15% within one hour notify Chemistry to sample the RCS for an Isotopic Iodine analysis 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> later CRS Direct Turbine building operator monitor Condenser Polisher Differential pressure and remove Polishers as necessary to maintain system pressure TERM This event may be terminated at any time at the Lead Examiner's discretion
E-NRC03-5 Page 5 of 16 OP Test 1, Scenario 5, Event 2 - Plant Monitoring Computer Failure Event
Description:
After the crew satisfies the reactivity manipulation, the Plant Monitoring Computer fails. The crew should implement OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable and evaluate TS 3.2.1, 3.2.4, and 3.2.7.
Event Objectives:
- 1) Respond to a loss of PMC/COLSS by notifying computer tech, and taking required Tech Spec actions, including calculations per (OP-901-501) PMC or COLSS System inoperable.
- 2) Restore COLSS to service following the restoration of the PMC.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/SNPO Report alarms and indications of PMC failure
§ Time not updating on PMC CRTs
§ Host Link Down message on PMC CRTs
§ COLSS Master and Computer Trouble alarms on CP -36 CRS Determine need to Implement OP-901-501, PMC or COLSS Inoperable CRS Directs STA or Board operators to commence taking 15 minute log OP-901-501, Attachment 6.2 PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify LPD, DNBR, and ASI within limits on operable CPC channels every 15 minutes by performing OP-901-501, Attachment 6.2
§ CRS determines that TS for DNBR, LPD, and ASI are met using CPC indications CRS Notify shift computer technician to reboot or failover PMC CRS Direct NAOs to continuously monitor local indications and plant equipment CRS/SM If PMC/SPDS is inoperable >12 hour, then an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification to NRC required CRS Inform Woodlands that PMC feed from Waterford 3 has been lost CRS Enter TRM 3.3.3.11(4a) Action 3
E-NRC03-5 Page 6 of 16 CRS Refer to 3.4.5.1 and determine if meeting minimum leak detection requirements
§ Determines requirements of TS 3.4.5.1 are met CRS Inform Chemistry that PSLR program is unavailable and alternate methods of measuring Primary to Secondary leakage is required.
CRS/PNPO/SNPO If COLSS LPD or DNBR are outside limits, reduce power to restore DNBR and LPD to limits of TS 3.2.4 and 3.2.1 or reduce power to <=20% rated thermal power CRS Direct STA to perform Azimuthal Power Tilt Calculation every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, as well as RCS flow calculation PNPO/CRS Verify at least 2 of 3 CEA position indicator channels required by TS 3.1.3.2 are operable.
CRS Direct chemistry to perform thermal discharge calculations every two hours PNPO/CRS Verify each regulating CEA group individual CEA position within transient insertion limit every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> TERM This event may be terminated at any time at the Lead Examiner's discretion
E-NRC03-5 Page 7 of 16 OP Test 1, Scenario 5, Event 3 - SG NR Range Level Transmitter SG-ILT-1105 Fails Low Event
Description:
After the Crew evaluates Tech Specs a S/G 1 Narrow Range control channel instrument fails low causing FWCS 1 controllers to shift to manual. The Crew should implement OP-901-201 and control S/G 1 level manually. The Crew should place the Startup and Main Feed Reg valves in a RTO position after the Trip Event Objectives:
- 1) Verify feedwater control systems respond to level deviation.
- 2) Restore and maintain steam generator levels in accordance with OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control System Malfunction.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Reports alarms and indications
§ SG 1 FW Contl Lvl Dev/Pwr Lost on CP -1
§ SG 1 & 2 NR levels are ~ 68% and steady (CP-1 CP-8)
§ SG-ILR-1105 has failed low on CP-1 recorder
§ FWCS 1 controllers in MANUAL for FWPT A, Main Feed Reg Valve 1, and Startup Feed Reg Valve 1 on CP -1 CRS Determines need to enter OP-902-201, Feedwater Control System Malfunction CRS If Reactor Trip occurs, go to OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.
SNPO/CRS Determine and note any controllers for the FWCS that are behaving erratically.
Place any erratic controllers in manual and control S/G level.
§ Determine that no FWCS controllers on CP-1 are operating erratically SNPO/CRS Verify both SGFP discharge pressures are matched (CP-1) and greater than S/G pressure (CP-1).
§ Determines step is met SNPO/CRS Stop Turbine load changes except to match Tave and Tref.
§ Determines no load changes in progress SNPO/CRS Restore S/G level to 60 - 70% NR by:
§ Uses FWPT speed controller 1 (CP-1)in manual to adjust speed or Main Feed Reg Valve 1 controller (CP-1) in MANUAL
E-NRC03-5 Page 8 of 16 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Determine if control channel has failed by checking all of the control channel indications on CP-1.
§ Determines SG-ILT-1105 has failed low SNPO/CRS If control channel has been determined to have deviated by >7%, verify applicable controllers have shifted to manual.
§ Verifies FWPT A Speed Controller on CP -1 in MANUAL
§ Verifies Main Feed Reg Valve 1 Controller in MANUAL
§ Verifies Startup Feed Reg Valve 1 Controller in MANUAL CRS Notifies I&C or Work Week Manager of instrument failure TERM Determine and correct the cause of the malfunction.
E-NRC03-5 Page 9 of 16 OP Test 1, Scenario 5, Event 4 - Main Feedwater Pump A Oil Leak and High Vibration Event
Description:
After the Crew addresses the FWCS malfunction, the oil leak on FWPT A worsens requiring a manual trip of FWPT A and a Reactor Power Cutback. The Crew should implement OP-901-101 Reactor Power Cutback.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Verify plant parameters are stabilizing in automatic or manual control as necessary, post Reactor Power Cutback.
- 2. Properly perform subsequent operator actions according to off-normal operating procedure OP-901-101, Reactor Power Cutback Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Reports FWPT A High Vibration alarm on CP-1 CRS Orders Manual Trip of FWPT A and Enters OP-901-101, Reactor Power Cutback.
SNPO Momentarily places FWPT A Trip/Reset switch on CP-1 to TRIP on CP-1 Verifies FWPT A Stop Valves close on CP -1 Verifies FWPT A speed lowering on CP-1.
PNPO Places CEDMCS Mode Select switch to AS and verifies selected Subgroups (5 and 11) (CEAC CRT and CEDMCS control panel on CP-2) drop Note: Placing the CEDMCS Mode Selector Switch has no affect on the scenario because the PMC is failed PNPO/SNPO/CRS Trip Reactor if:
§ Both main feedwater pumps tripped.
SNPO If Feedwater Pump lost, verify Turbine setback to 50% (<550 MW) at DEH Control Panel on CP-1 SNPO/PNPO/CRS Verify all Control Systems restoring parameters
§ Steam Generator levels (Manual control of FWCS 1) CP-1
§ Pressurizer level restoring to setpoint (CP -2)
§ Pressurizer pressure restoring to 2250 psia (CP-2)
§ Steam Bypass Control System maintaining SG pressure < 1000 psia (CP-1)
E-NRC03-5 Page 10 of 16 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS Announce Reactor Power Cutback on Plant Page SNPO/PNPO When Steam Bypass AMI received, place CEDMCS Mode Select switch on CP-2 to OFF PNPO Disable and reset RXC on CP-2
§ Depress Auto Actuation Out of Service Pushbutton on RXC module on CP-2 and Verify Auto Actuate Out of Service light illuminated on Pushbutton
§ Depress the Reset Pushbuttton on the RXC module on CP -2.
TERM Terminate event after RXC is taken out of service (Disable and reset RXC on CP-2)
E-NRC03-5 Page 11 of 16 OP Test 1, Scenario 5, Event 5 - Main Feedwater Pump B Trip on Overspeed/Manual Reactor Trip Event
Description:
After the plant is stabilized, FWPT B trips on overspeed. The Crew should manually trip the Reactor IAW OP-901-101. The Crew should implement OP-902-000. When EFAS-1 or 2 is actuated, EFW Pump A fails to auto start and EFW Pump AB trips on overspeed. The Crew should diagnose to OP-902-006, Loss of Main Feedwater.
Event Objectives:
- 1. Carry out all operator actions, including necessary contingency actions in accordance with OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, in the event of a Reactor trip.
- 2. Properly diagnose event in progress and transition to appropriate EOP recovery procedure.
Event Critical Tasks:
1 None Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO Reports FWPT B Overspeed Trip Alarm on CP-1 and Verifies FWPT B is tripped CRS Directs PNPO to manually trip the reactor PNPO Depresses both Manual Reactor Trip Pushbuttons on CP-2.
PNPO/CRS Verify Reactivity Control.
Check Reactor power dropping (CP-2 or CP-7)
Check startup rate is negative (CP -2 or CP-7).
Check less than 2 CEAs not fully inserted (CP -2)
SNPO/CRS Verify Maintenance Of Vital Auxiliaries by:
§ Checking the main turbine tripped by verifying all valves indicate green at Turbine Mimic on CP-1
§ Check the generator tripped by verifying green indication on both Generator Output Breakers and Exciter Field Breaker on CP -1
§ Check train A and B station loads are energized from offsite power by:
§ Voltage available to A1, A2, A3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ Voltage available to B1, B2, B3 busses (PMC or CP-1) and feeder breakers from Startup Transformer A indicate red on CP-1
§ A and B DC bus indicators on CP -1 read > 105 volts
§ Vital AC Instrument Bus Indicators on CP-7 read ~ 120 volts PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Inventory Control by:
§ Checking PZR level 7% to 60% and trending to 33% to 60% on CP-2
§ Checks Subcooling Margin greater than or equal to 28 deg. on CP -2
E-NRC03-5 Page 12 of 16 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS Verify RCS Pressure Control by:
§ Checks PZR pressure between 1750 psia and 2300 psia (CP-2, CP-7, PMC or QSPDS) and trending to between 2025 and 2275 psia PNPO/CRS Verify Core Heat Removal by:
§ Checking at least one RCP operating on CP -2,
§ Operating loop delta-T less than 13 deg. F (CP-2, CP-7, QSPDS) and
§ RCS Subcooling (CP-2) greater than or equal to 28 deg. F.
SNPO/CRS Check RCS Heat Removal by:
§ Verify EFW is available to restore level in at least one S/G.
o EFAS-1 or EFAS-2 actuation occurred if < 27.4% NR (PPS ROM lights extinguished CP-7) o EFW pumps operating (CP -8) if EFAS-1 or 2 actuated
§ Manually starts EFW Pump A using C/S on CP-8
§ Directs NAO to determine problem with EFW Pump AB locally PNPO/CRS Check RCS Tc (CP-2 or CP-7) is 535-555 deg. F SNPO/CRS Check S/G pressure 925-1050 psia (CP-1 or CP-7)
SNPO/CRS Check FWCS in Reactor Trip Override (CP-1) by
§ Checking Main Feed Reg Valves are closed,
§ Startup Feed Reg Valves are 13-21% open, and Note: This step may not be performed due to no FWPTs running SNPO/CRS Reset Moisture Separator Reheaters and
§ Check the Temp Control Valves closed (Reheat Control Panel CP-1)
PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Isolation by
§ Checking Containment pressure (CP -7 or CP-8) < 16.4 psia,
§ Check that no Containment. Area rad monitors are in alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity, and
§ Check that no steam plant rad monitors alarm or show an unexplained rise in activity.
E-NRC03-5 Page 13 of 16 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/PNPO/CRS Verify Containment Temperature And Pressure Control And Containment Combustible Gas Control by
§ Verifying Containment Temperature (CP-18 or QSPDS) less than or equal to 120 deg. F
§ Verify Containment pressure is < 16.4 psia (CP-7 or CP-8)
CRS Determines whether all Safety Function Acceptance Criteria were met and no contingencies were taken:
§ If answer is Yes CRS goes to OP-902-001, Reactor Trip Rec overy
§ If answer is NO then CRS performs diagnostics flowchart OP-902-009, Appendix 1 Termination Crew diagnoses a Loss of Main Feedwater event and transitions to OP-902-006
E-NRC03-5 Page 14 of 16 OP Test 1, Scenario 5, Event Number 6 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture in SG 1 Event
Description:
During implementation of OP-902- 006, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture occurs in S/G 1. The Crew should diagnose to OP-902-007. The scenario may be terminated after the crew takes action to isolate S/G 1 and commence depressurization of the RCS Event Objectives:
- 1. Verify a steam generator tube rupture exists and identify the affected Steam Generator.
- 2. Ensure adequate Core Cooling and sufficient RCS inventory exist.
- 3. Minimize radioactive effluents by isolating the affected Steam Generator in accordance with OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery Procedure.
Event Critical Tasks 1
Isolate the Most Affected SG The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The SNPO takes action to isolate SG 1 prior to commencing a cooldown to 350 degrees F 2
Prevent Opening of the SG Safety Valves The task is identified by at least one member of the crew. The PNPO takes action to reduce T-Hot to < 520 degrees F prior to isolating SG 1.
Event Action Steps:
Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
CRS Confirm diagnosis
§ CRS directs STA to perform safety function status check list
§ CRS notifies Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for activity CREW Announce the event using plant page CRS Directs SM to Refer to Emergency Plan CRS Implements Placekeeper and records time of Reactor Trip PNPO/CRS If PZR pressure < 1684 psia verify SIAS initiated,
§ SIAS lights off on PPS ROM on CP -7
§ SIAS Initiation Alarms on CP-2 PNPO/SNPO/CRS If SIAS initiated,
§ LPSI and HPSI pumps started,
§ Injection flow is acceptable per OP-902-009, Appendix 2
§ available charging pumps (2) are running
E-NRC03-5 Page 15 of 16 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
PNPO/CRS If PZR press < 1621 psia and SIAS is actuated verify no more than 2 RCPs (CP-2) operating.
If PZR PRESS does not meet Appendix 2A secure all RCPs.
PNPO/SNPO/CRS Verify RCP operating limits
§ Verify CCW available to RCPs (CP -2/CP-8) or secure affected RCPs if not restored within 3 minutes.
§ if Tc >500 deg. F, verify no more than 2 RCPs operating.
SNPO/CRS Verify proper CCW operation
§ Verify a CCW Pump (CP-8) is running for Train A and B SNPO Perform Rapid Cooldown of RCS to less than 520°F Th
§ Places Permissive switch for one Steam Bypass Valve on CP-1 to MANUAL
§ Places Controller for respective Steam Bypass Valve to Manual on CP-1 and raises output to initiate an RCS cooldown NOTE: CRITICAL TASK PNPO/CRS Depressurize the RCS using Main(CP-2) or Aux. Spray (CP-4) to meet all of the following:
§ RCS pressure less than 950 psia
§ RCS pressure within Appendix 2-A
§ If HPSI Throttle Criteria are met control Charging and Letdown flow and throttle HPSI flow PNPO/SNPO Reset MSIS initiation setpoints
§ Depress all 4 SG Pressure setpoint Reset pushbutton on PPS ROMs on CP-7 when SG Pressure Lo Pretrip alarms actuate on CP-2
§ Verify SG Press Lo Trip Setpoints Lower on all 4 indicators on CP-8 and clear SG pressure Lo Pretrips annunciators by depressing CLEAR pushbutton at CP -2 SNPO/CRS Determine most affected SG
§ High Rad Monitor readings (RMS CRT on CP -6)
§ SG level (CP-8) rise in SG 1 when not feeding
§ SG Activity Samples
E-NRC03-5 Page 16 of 16 Time:
Position:
Applicants Actions or Behavior:
SNPO/CRS When RCS T-hot is less than 520 degrees F isolate the most affected SG 1 by:
§ Place ADV 1 controller setpoint to 980 psig and verify the controller is in AUTO on CP-8
§ Verify MSIV 1 is CLOSED on CP-8
§ Verify MFIV 1 Closed on CP-8
§ If EFAS 1 is not initiated close EFW-228A and EFW-229A on CP-8
§ place the EFW FCV controllers in manual and close EFW-224A and EFW-223A on CP-8 by verifying output of controller is 0%
§ Close MS-401A on CP-8
§ Close the main steam line drains MS-120A and MS-119Aon CP -8
§ Direct an NAO to check Main Steam Safety Valves closed on SG 1 NOTE: CRITICAL TASK Termination
Perform SNPO Immediate Actions on CR Evacuation W3 RO PPO OFFNORM 5
Site Job System / Duty Area Mode Number 3 6/26/2003 5 Minutes Revision Approval Estimated Time Time Critical NO Critical Time N/A Alternate Path Yes NUMBER References OP-901-502 NUMBER NRC KA Number 4.2-A68-A1.15 4.2-A68-A1.16 4.2-A68-A3.12 METHOD Evaluation Methods PERFORM Trainee Evaluator Observer Date Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 2 OF 5 INITIAL CONDITIONS
- 1. REACTOR POWER WAS AT 100%.
- 2. A FIRE HAS OCCURRED IN CONTROL ROOM PANEL CP-7.
- 3. A CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS BEEN ORDERED.
- 4. THE PRIMARY NPO HAS TRIPPED THE REACTOR.
INITIATING CUE PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS AS SECONDARY NPO FOR CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION PER OP-901-502 TERMINATING CUE
- 1. IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS ARE TAKEN
- 2. EXITING CONTROL ROOM FOR + 35 RAB STANDARD
- 1. ALL IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR SNPO ARE TAKEN TOOLS NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS NONE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES
- 1. TURBINE NOT TRIPPED - EXCESSIVE COODOWN
- 2. MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATERS NOT RESET - EXCESSIVE COOLDOWN
- 3. GENERATOR NOT TRIPPED - GENERATOR DAMAGE HUMAN INTERFACES
- 1. SM/CRS SKILLS / KNOWLEDGES NONE INSTRUCTOR NOTES SIMULATOR SETUP
- 1. REACTOR TRIPPED,
- 2. (ALT) TURB FAIL TO AUTO TRIP ACTIVE
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 3 OF 5 Perform the task in accordance with OP-901-502, Section D. 2.1-2.5 Critical steps are denoted by CRIT.
- 1.
VERIFY TURBINE TRIP (ALT)
CUES:
§ ALL GOVERNOR AND THROTTLE VALVES ON CP-1 MIMIC INDICATE OPEN STANDARDS:
§ THE EXAMINEE RECOGNIZES ALL GOVERNOR /THROTTLE VALVES INDICATE OPEN ON CP-1
- 2.
VERIFY TURBINE TRIP CRIT CUES:
§ ALL GOVERNOR AND THROTTLE VALVES ON CP-1 MIMIC INDICATE CLOSED STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE DEPRESSES THINK AND TURBINE TRIP PUSHBUTTONS ON CP-1 AND VERIFIES ALL GOVERNOR /THROTTLE VALVES INDICATE CLOSED ON CP-1
- 3.
VERIFY GENERATOR TRIP CUES:
§ MAIN GENERATOR EXCITER FIELD BREAKER, GENERATOR BREAKER A GENERATOR BREAKER B,ON CP-1 INDICATES OPEN STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE VERIFIES EXCITER FIELD BREAKER, GENERATOR BREAKER A AND B INDICATE OPEN ON CP-1
- 4.
RESET MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER CONTROLS CRIT CUES:
§ MSR TCVS ON CP-1 INDICATE CLOSED STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINE DEPRESSES MSR RESET PUSHBUTTON ON CP-1 VERIFES RESET LIGHT ILLUMINATES AND ALL FOUR MSR VALVE CLOSED LIGHTS ILLUMINATE
- 5.
VERIFY SG ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE #1 IS CLOSED (ALT)
CUES:
§ SG ATMOSHERIC DUMP #1 CONTROLLER ON CP-8 INDICATES 20 %
STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE CHECKS SG ATMOSHERIC DUMP #1 CONTROLLER OUTPUT ON CP-8
- 6.
VERIFY SG ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE #1 IS CLOSED CRIT CUES:
§ SG ATMOSHERIC DUMP #1 CONTROLLER INDICATES 0 %
STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE PLACES SG ATMOSHERIC DUMP #1 CONTROLLER ON CP-8 IN MANUAL AND LOWERS SETPOINT TO 0%
- 7.
EXAMINEE VERIFIES SG ATMOSPHERIC DUMP #2 IS CLOSED CUES:
§ SG ATMOSHERIC DUMP #2 CONTROLLER INDICATES 0 %
STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE CHECKS SG ATMOSHERIC DUMP #1 CONTROLLER OUTPUT ON CP-8
§ SG ATMOSPHERIC DUMP #2 IS CLOSED
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 4 OF 5
- 8.
CLOSE MS-124A, MAIN STEAM ISO VALVE #1 CRIT CUES:
§ MS-124A, MAIN STEAM ISO VALVE #1INDICATES CLOSED STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE ROTATES MS-124A MAIN STEAM ISO VALVE #1 SWITCH ON CP-8 TO CLOSE AND VERIFIES GREEN CLOSED LIGHT ILLUMINATES
- 9.
CLOSE MS124B MAIN STEAM ISO VAVLE#2 CRIT CUES:
§ MS-124B, MAIN STEAM ISO VALVE#2 IS CLOSED STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE ROTATES MS-124B, MAIN STEAM ISO VALVE #2 SWITCH ON CP-8 TO CLOSE AND VERIFIES GREEN CLOSED LIGHT ILLUMINATES
- 10.
OBTAIN OPERATIONS SECURITY KEY RING AND PROCEED TO RAB +35 RELAY ROOM CUES:
§ EXAMINEE HAS OBTAINED REQUIRED KEYS STANDARDS:
§ EXAMINEE LOCATES SECURITY KEYS FROM SHIFT MANAGERS OFFICE AND STATES HE/SHE WILL ENTER THE +35 RELAY ROOM.
JPM MAY BE TERMINATED WHEN EXAMINEE HAS SIMULATED OBTAINING KEYS AND STATES HE/SHE WILL GO TO +35 RELAY ROOM
- 11.
END OF TASK.
Waterford 3 Job Performance Measure 5 OF 5 Examinee Copy INITIAL CONDITION
- 1. REACTOR POWER WAS AT 100%.
- 2. A FIRE HAS OCCURRED IN CONTROL ROOM PANEL CP-7.
- 3. A CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS BEEN ORDERED.
- 4. THE PRIMARY NPO HAS TRIPPED THE REACTOR.
INITIATING CUE PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS AS SECONDARY NPO FOR CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION PER OP-901-502