ML031110293

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E-mail from J. Starefos to R. Bywater, Regarding Info from Last Weeks Meeting
ML031110293
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/2002
From: Starefos J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Russ Bywater
NRC Region 4
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0018
Download: ML031110293 (35)
v • d • e


Text

- M Joelle Starefos - Info from Last Week's From: Joelle Starefos To: Russ Bywater Date: 8/12/02 12:10PM

Subject:

Info from Last Week's Meeting Hi Russ, We put together the recommendations last week and I've attached a few different sorts of the info. Also, I attached the updated facts database to support your report writeup and the latest action items. Good luck.

Let me know if you need anything else.

Joelle Joelle Starefos, NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (256) 729-6196 CC: Robert Haag

- [_Aelpe Starefos - DBLLTFI~e~t nggMlsD200. . Paae 1 r

Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

RCPr-eDecisional -

Art Howell Ron Lloyd Ed Hackett Joe Donoghue Bob Haag Tom Koshy Pat Castleman Joelle Starefos Ronnie Bucci (Office of Inspector General)

Using modified IAEA approach: Fact Level; Conclusion Level; Root Cause. Conclusions are in bold and underlined; supporting facts are assigned beneath the conclusion. Other individual facts that require fact verification are shown as bold. Root Causes are designated by rc with associated conclusions mapped to each root cause.

WHY: NRC and industry failed to understandoperatin2 experience relevant to nozzle cracking andboric acid corrosion rcl The NRC and Industrv failed to assess operatingexperience relevant to Alloy 600 nozzle crackingz and boric acid corrosion of carbon steel b RC1 The NRC failed to adequately follow-up on relevant Generic Communications 59 B RCI 62001 not used for DB (precursor events) 61 B RCI 62001 used 15 reactors (all RIV PWRs) 62 B RCI No insp followup of GL97-01 66 B RCI NRC followup for 88-05 audited 10 plants; DB acceptable 84 B RCI RIII factored BU2001-01 commitments as part of Baseline prog.

129 B RCI TI on BU2001-01 didn't address BA issues 132 B RCI 2515 IP do not look at BA/GC followup 133 B RCI The old inspection program (9000 series) looked at OE issues 154 B RCI # of Generic Comm (NRC) not corrected with # of events 156 B RCI MD8.5 can't be followed because it hasn't been updated 160 B RCI No NRC programmatic guidance for effectiveness review of generic 161 B RCI Sample/shotgun method for verification of generic comm implementation 164 B RCI IP62001 deleted w/o considering why it existed 165 B RCI NRC generated 17 boric acid generic communication 187 B RCI 11/93 SER recommended inspection (visual or leak dete August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 1

I ioelle~Starefos '- BLLCTFMeetingMins20020805.wVd I ePage2 --

Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

NR-PreDedsionan-189 B RC1 11/93 SER recognized circumferential cracking, but didn't make recommendations 201 B RCI GL97-01 closeout for DB based on generic info 202 B RCI DB was the only B&W licensee that didn't do inspections (ref I GL97-01) NRC 232 B RCI 1972 requested enhanced ISI for BA corrosion 304 B RCI 1991 Action Plan - no evidence that it was done 310 B RCI 50.7 Ie and Reg Guide changes to BA analysis not required in FSAR

__ _ _update ci RCU The NRC failed to implement adequate programs and guidance to address implications of Alloy 600 nozzle cracking and boric acid corrosion 14 CI RCI Licensee stated that NRR knew about BA on head 15 CI RCI SRI saw CR on BA on head 28 CI RCI BA CRs not selected for PIR 29 CI RCI Abbreviated version (issue) of BA CRs not represented 33 Cl RCI No apparent NRC followup of 96, 98 PCAQs 42 Cl RCI Aware of BA on RPV head and didn't inspect 43 CI RCI SRI knew of flange leaks 49 CI RCI DRP BC and former SRI (only) knew of flange leaks 50 CI RCI Flange leaks not pursued 65 CI RCI 1992 precursor insp no perf issues/no F/U of BA control prog 95 CI RCI RIII saw RC-2 as a material control problem -vs- boric acid prog

__ prob 116 CI RCI BC/SRI/RI didn't observe RPV head videos 128 CI RCI RI reviewed CR/equivalent in some manner 130a CI RCI BA buildup not a safety issue by NRC 169 CI RCI NRC 1993 SER addressed RVH nozzle cracks as not immed. safety issue 222 CI RCI NRC staff believed dry boric acid not corrosive 227 CI RC1 Industry and NRC were managing BA issue by leakage 229 CI RC1 NUMARC 1993 and NEI 1995 letters - GL88-05 will let the industry locate leaks before a real problem is identified 233 CI RCI 1993 2.206 Greenpeace response - cracking issues 295 CI RCI Licensee asserted that NRC questioned how the licensee was able to do a visual insp. given that boron was left on the head, but never followed up August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 2

I

- lJoelle Starefos -9 eetingMins20020805.wpd Paae 3.1 JoeleStrefs BLLT~eeing~ns202O85.wp

- Paa-3i Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002) 1XRCEPreDecisional.

cp RC1 The NRC failed to establish adequate procedures and guidance to address the implications of Alloy 600 nozzle cracking and boric acid corrosion 45 CP RCI Neither of Residents received training on BA 105 CP RCI NRC doesn't review owner's group input 155 CP RCI NUREG 6245 (CRDM crack) NRC not aware of B&W content 226 CP RCI Postulated breech of RPV not considered 228 CP RCI NRC doesn't review all of the industry guidance on BA 167 F RCI AEOD had 80+ FTE; now 2.5 FTE for OE (RES) h RC1 The NRC failed to identify and integrate relevant operating experience 157 H RCI OE review in NRC not performed by independent or long review 163 H RCI NRR is reactive for short-term/current event 166 H RCI NRC generic issue program takes too long/too hard...use bulletins instead 170 H RCI Foreign OE was reviewed by NRC 171 H RCI 70 LERs about Boric Acid leaks 172 H RCI Axial cracks known from early 1970s, Circumferential from 1980s 173 H RCI LIC-503 references some wrong procedures in RES 183 H RCI No clear process for using foreign experience 184 H RCI French corrective actions were documented but never used 185 H RCI Mind set that French CA was an over reaction from NRC

- perspective; aggressive inspection was reponse 186 H RCI NRC never asked the French why they were replacing their RPV

_ _heads 188 H RCI Swedish, Spanish, Japanese, French have replaced heads 193 H RCI NRR staff not aware BA leakage OE 196 H RC1 Conclusion in the EPRI guidebook not supported 209 H RCI RES procedure 2i not used/not known by staff 210 H RCI Cracking/BA corrosion not considered by either NRR or RES to be a GI (MD 6.4) 221 H RCI License Renewal report (GALL) addresses acceptability of GL88-05 for aging management to be updated to reflect lessons learned 230 H RCI GI program relies on user needs before taking action 231 H RCl Preferred process flow for OE: nothing; IN; BU; GL; GI (all else fails) 242a H RCI MNSA and roll expansion- repair ofjoints, boric acid issues NRC 303 H RCI NRR did not review the French experience August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 3

- [_Joe!Le Starefos - DBLLTFMeetngMins2002O805.wepd Paae 4

\C Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meetina (8/5-8/2002)

NBC-PreDecisional 312 H RCI NUREG 5576 events RE: TP4 & Salem 2 not known within NRC 313 , H RCI Circumferential cracks not picked up by GIP screening program 314 H RCI All B&W plants experienced circ cracks (except 1) 315 H RCI Tracking of foreign experience cost 316 H RCI NUREG 6245 CRDM experience not known within NRC/Industry i RC1 The Licensee failed to understand implications of boric acid corrosion.

32 J RCI BA on head was a "routine" CR 36 J RCI 1996 CR on BA stayed open for -2 years 130 J RCI BA buildup not a safety issue by DB 155a J RCI NUREG 6245 (CRDM crack) Industry not aware of B&W content 178 J_ RCI BACC person also had many other duties as a system engineer 194 J RCI BWOG rep didn't know the significance of Brown/red tinted BA buildup 197 J RCI Risk significance of BA on RPV head is low LIC 217 J RCI BA procedure not "QA" until 5/02 234 J RCI Mod on service structure delays 239 J_ RCI Ombudsman & cleaning statements 274 J_ RCI PRG staff didn't viewed head tapes 275 J RCI Former VP viewed as-found, not after tape until Fall2001 282 J RCI Only staff involved in head cleaning 296 J RCI PCAQ 96-0551 was one often oldest CRs before it was resolved 298 J RCI Multiple people involved in head cleaning w/o raising issues 302 J RCI ISI summary only included outside CRDMs 325 J RCI 1993 topical report is same issue as Davis-Besse 339 J RC1 DB banking on another 5-years beyond Oconee cracking experience 342 J RCI DB and ANO late in implementing service structure port mod 347 J RCI Former VP didn't see BA on head as important m RC1 The Licensee failed to learned from internal and external operating experience 68 M RCI DB's BACC didn't include Rx head/instr until 5/02 151 M RCI Oconee OE not evaluated at DB until 5/2002 152 M RCI OE in US...Boric acid leaks. #1 area was CRDM, DB considered not significant 153 M RCI 100% B&W units had RCS PB leakage 162 M RCI DB OE procedure doesn't require NRC LER review 168 M RCI I100% CE had RCS pressure boundary leakage August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 4

1 ___

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Page J-o-e-e6Stia-refos - DB-LL-TFMeetingMins20020805.wpd Joelle Starefos-DBLLTFMeetingMins2OO208bwpd Page 54 5

Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

NRCPreDecisional-174 M RCI 45% of Oconee cracking (CRDM) appears in the same quadrant as DB leakage problems 175 M RCI CE plants dominated RCS instrumentation nozzle leakage (10 of 13 leaks) 176 M RCI Average f#of operating years prior to CRDM leakage -22 years 179 M RCI Foreign experience would indicate that the "crack" model is flawed 191 M RCI NUREG/CR 6245 recommended enhanced online leakage detection systems (NRC?)

192 M RCI Calvert Cliffs LER indicated wet boron vs dry 198 M RC ] Annealing nozzle temps were different than required 200 M RCl 3 LERS involved pzr material wastage 242 M RCl MNSA and roll expansion- repair ofjoints, boric acid issues LIC 276 M RCl Two precursor BA events ...RC2, SG line 308 M RCI 1998 DB had a resin intrusion 314 M RCI All B&W plants experienced circ cracks (except 1) 316 M RCI NUREG 6245 CRDM experience not known within NRC/Industry 327 M RCI D-B should have been industry leader following the RC-2 event 345 M RC1 Many CRs on BAC but no evidence of tracking 346 M RCI RCS system engineer not aware of 1996 PCAQ August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 5

HJoelle Starefos- DBLLTFMeetingMins2002O8O5.wpd Pace 6,r Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

NR&PreDecisionai rc2 The Licensee failed to ensure that the source of previously identified boric acid deposits on the reactorpressure vessel headwas promptly identified and corrected i RC2 The Licensee failed adequately implement owners group and other industry guidance 202a I RC2 DB was the only B&W licensee that didn't do inspections (ref GL97-01) LIC 236 I RC2 No BWOG verification for implementation of GL97-01 237 I RC2 No BWOG verification for implementation of GL88-05 247 I RC2 No tracking system to ensure that industry guidance was included in site guidance/ processes.

261 I RC2 93 B&W report flange leaks need to be eval first 289 I RC2 BA corr handbook shows CAC/RM as evidence of RCS leak 322 I RC2 Former RCS system engineer not aware of 1993 B&W guidance 329 I RC2 Licensee did not view enhanced visual inspection to be commitment 341 1 RC2 B&W topical assumed that BA leakage was found and repaired k RC2 The Licensee failed to adequately address long-standing reactor coolant system leaks 24 K RC2 Routine CAC cleaning 108 K RC2 CAC/RM fouling may have been the impetus for TS change in # 107 109 K RC2 HEPA filter for RM may defeat the purpose of the RM workarounds

-vs- fix the problem 119 K RC2 Licensee not rigorous in finding RCS leaks 120 K RC2 Licensee deleted Mode 3 walkdown for BA 235 K RC2 CAC fouling and ALARA 244 K RC2 DB entered a 6-hour shutdown TS situation because of RM Problems with BA 248 K RC2 Ability to differentiate between flange leakage/ head penetration leakage 255 K RC2 Until RFO13 lic had flange leaks 262 K RC2 Heavy boron buildup on CACs 268 K RC2 No systematic leak search for 12RFO 269 K RC2 Deleted mode 3 walkdown 273 K RC2 Long history of thermowell leaks 280 K RC2 Triage plan for flange leak / didn't fix all flange leaks 287 - K RC2 100% NDE 5.7Rem estimate <past head cleaning 300 K RC2 Relief valve mod masking other leaks in 1998-99 time frame 330 K RC2 Containment >120F on several occasions August 8,2002 (8:07am) 6

i Joelle Starefos - DBLLTFMeebngqMins20020805.wp~d Pagie 71a o.r - Mis0O .wpd _

Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meetin2 (8/5-8/2002)

RVIMPreDecisionaL 331 K RC2 CAC cleanings occurred as early as 1997 332 K RC2 Lic root cause didn't identify CAC cleaning in 1997 334 K RC2 CAC cleaning being tracked as a high dose job 335 K RC2 CAC/RM not identified as a workaround 338 K RC2 SV temp mod failed to assess leakage 343 K RC2 Ops lack of ownership of plant material problems 344 K RC2 BACC program manager couldn't find all components in BACC program i RC2 The Licensee failed to develop and implement an adequate boric acid corrosion control program.

34 L RC2 1996 CR explicit on the BA concern 35 L RC2 -50% of RPV head cleaned in 1996 70 L RC2 BAC checklists not kept/tracked/trended 123 L RC2 None of the RPV head cleanings were 100%

124 L RC2 Lost control of video tapes 144 L RC2 BAC procedure wasn't followed 251 L RC2 Appropriate cleaning methods for RPV head (water-vs-vacuum) 254 L RC2 #4, 5 nozzles still had boron on them following cleaning 260 L RC2 Couldn't complete head cleaning due to schedule pressure 263 L RC2 Potential CRDM G9 leak was crack, not dispositioned 266 L RC2 RCS sys engr: scaffold was removed without permission 267 L RC2 RP considered head cleaning as decon, so no procedure 279 L RC2 No deviations from RFO12 WO to clean RPV head 281 L RC2 RCS sys engineer upset that they head wouldn't be totally cleaned 283 L RC2 Index of head tapes incomplete 284 L RC2 4/17/00 head mislabeled as as-left 285 L RC2 Head inspection tape not documented as to what was actually inspected - QA zip 301 L RC2 Molpus slides show that licensee understood BAC in 1999 [RC-2 event]

n RC2 The Licensee failed to provide adequate oversight and resources to ensure that sianificant conditions are promptly identified and corrected 159 N RC2 40-50% DB staff decrease over 10 years 238 N RC2 O&Mlcapital budget and actuals have decreased over last 10-years 246 - N RC2 Multiple job assignments depending on cycle (outage, ops, EP) 256 N RC2 VP - No NDE tools by 12/31 277 N RC2 Lack of system engineer continuity August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 7

Pae8t186-I J6elle~ S~tarefos - DBLLTFMeetingMins200208_5.wpd I___ . .Page Joelie Starefos -DBLLTFMeetingM ;ns20020805.wpd Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

NR&PreDecisional.-

317 N RC2 Region I few resources/staff with materials backgrounds (NRC/DB) 333 N RC2 Inflation adjusted O&M decreased over period 1991-2001 q RC2 The NRC failed to provide and implement licensing process guidance 31 Q RC2 We rely on lic to give NRC correct info 115 Q RC2 NRR PM limited visits to DB 182 Q RC2 After the RPV head videos were shown to the NRC, a vote was taken: 3 for shutdown; remaining (10-13) voted to allow continued operation 204 Q RC2 No process for verifying licensee info for continued operation 207 Q RC2 Some PM haven't visited plants 208 Q RC2 PM didn't review commitment change reports 211 Q RC2 NRR not implementing procedures 212 Q RC2 LA/SE for RM for RCS leakage didn't consider DB OE 213 Q RC2 NRR perception was that DB was a good performer 297 Q RC2 No NRC review of submittals/reports (ISI)

August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 8

Ikiielle Siar-efio's -_DLLTFM-e-i-'Meis20280.wd Page 99 i I Joelle Starefos -DBLLTFMeetingMins2002O8O5.wpd Page Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

IVJW.-PreDeisional6 rc3 The NRC failed to accuratelyassess the safetE performance of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station a RC3 The NRC failed to adequately assess the symptoms of reactor coolant system leakage 12 A RC3 CAC/Rad Monitor cleaning known by NRC through BC level 13 A RC3 BA on head known by SRI during RFO12 16 A RC3 RIII (Grant) knowledge of Rad Monitor 18 A RC3 BCs logs on CAC/RMs & discussed in morning meetings 19 A RC3 CAC cleaning observed by inspectors (DRS) 20 A RC3 PM knew about CACs 22 A RC3 DRP BC listed CAC cleaning (2001) 23 A RC3 RIII didn't see CACIRM cleaning as important 37 A RC3 Long time to close out CRs 38 A RC3 No one suggested NRC look at RCS leakage in containment during PIR 41 A RC3 3 inspection reports discussing RMs without conclusions 52 A RC3 RIII didn't view leakage as a problem 58 A RC3 Multiple cleaning of CACs 76 A RC3 No documentation of CAC evaluation inspection 77 A RC3 No NRC doc of RM leak detection reliability insp.

83 A RC3 No open items for CAC/RM or BA on head 87 A RC3 Pzr safety valve mod increased leakage; NRC accepted without question 88 A RC3 Assumed Pzr safety valve leakage was reason for CAC fouling 97 A RC3 CR for CAC/RM not seen as safety-sig would be screened out 98 A RC3 NRC Briefing package for Merrified didn't include BA problems 107 A RC3 TS requirements for CAC/RM were relaxed 118 A RC3 BC didn't tell RI to pursue BA issues 125 A RC3 RA knew of CAC issues eia RC3 The NRC failed to adequately integrate Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station safety performance data I EIA RC3 Region viewed Davis-Besse as good performer.

21 EIA RC3 One PR summary listed CAC cleaning 46 EIA RC3 Inspection on RM didn't provide any performance issues 54 ELA RC3 CCW event (10/98) resulted in Spec Insp 55 EIA RC3 NRC prompted Lic regarding RCS leak on MUIA described as positive in IR August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 9

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_ q Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meetin2 (8/55-8/2002)

  1. CR-PreDevisionall 56 EIA RC3 DB PIR viewed as the best by RIII 121 EIA RC3 NRC thought that the licensee was rigorous in their leak hunt 138 EIA RC3 Range of opinions on whether an AIT/lIT/SI eii RC3 The NRC failed to adequately inspect the safety performance of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 25 EIl RC3 PI&R/40500 did not review area 27 EIl RC3 Gap of 2 12 years between CA inspections (missed events) 39 EIl RC3 Inspection reports don't list all docs reviewed (6 years of reports) 44 EIl RC3 RC-2 escalated enforcement didn't require closeout inspection 51 EII RC3 Former SRI did not perform any followup on leak hunt plan RFO12 72 EIl RC3 Verbatim comp. W/insp procedures (not there/can't do) 78 EIl RC3 1997 NOP/NOT walkdown by NRC found no leaks 96 EIl RC3 RIII had differing views for RC-2 violation followup 122 EIl RC3 RI thought the RPV head was 100% cleaned 127 EIl RC3 ALARA insp didn't show that CAC cleaning was largest dose 181 EIl RC3 (Other than SRI ) NRC not told about red/brown BA buildup until after the DB event 223 ElI RC3 Extending the inspection for DB was largely based on the belief that a "strong" VT-2 inspection was done at DB 270 EIl RC3 Kerosene burner not eval'd for ctmt 271 EII RC3 No oper eval for the clogging of CACs 272 EII RC3 Non-conservative assumption of LOCA steam clean CACs 278 EIl RC3 Lic didn't complete all RC2 CAs 290 EII RC3 No doc'd eval of CAC clogging 294 EII RC3 Inadequate temp mod safety eval on code safety seat leakage 309 EIl RC3 Region III 1998 ISI inspection reviewed flange bolts, housing but didn't indicate BA...corresponded with timing for BA on head and cleaning 340 ElI RC3 96, 98, 00 CRs indicate brown colored boron ... no record of NRC review of two f RC3 The NRC failed to provide adequate resources to the oversight of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 2 F RC3 NRC staffing level not filled for all positions 3 F RC3 One year period (1999), only one Resident on site.

4 F RC3 Project Engineer - two 8-month gaps.

5 F RC3 Resident inspectors not certified.

6 F RC3 SRI position delayed in filling.

7 F RC3 High Project Manager turnover rate (9 PMs in 10-years)

August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 10

IJoelle Starefos - DBLLTFMeetinqMins2O02O805.pd~ Pane I 1 9I Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

NRG-PreDecisionalh 9 F RC3 Limited commercial nuclear experience RI 10 F RC3 Resident inspector had a materials background 11 F RC3 SRI experience with only DB containment 40 F RC3 Low number of inspection hours compared to other RIII sites (1/2 in 1999) 53 F RC3 1998 events diverted inspection efforts re:BA issues 57 F RC3 Resident not aware of OOS logs 63 F RC3 PE little time at DB (1997&1999) 92 F RC3 Between PE coverage gaps, 8 months/3months coverage/8 months 93 F RC3 BC had Clinton 0350 plant coincident wIDB 110 F RC3 RPll resources decreasing 111 F RC3 RIll insp contractor support poor 112 F RC3 RIll too many competing priorities which detract from insp.

131 F RC3 No 1245 cert requirements for BA corrosion 158 F RC3 Contract support after '98 report dried up (staff decreased/# reports decreased) 215 F RC3 No guidance for background training for PM 317 F RC3 Region I few resources/staff with materials backgrounds (NRC/DB) 318 F RC3 ASME Code knowledge/representation g RC3 The NRC failed to adequately communicate critical information reaardin2 the safety performance of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 17 G RC3 Other than DD-DRP; limited recollection of CAC/RM issues by RIII SES managers 94 G RC3 NRR inspection branch has no feedback form on Plant status time as addressed by RI interview 101 G RC3 Procedure for RIII morning meeting isn't followed 102 G RC3 RIII not conducive to info exchange 103 G RC3 Senior RIII Managers not the audience for the morning meeting 117 G RC3 RI not aware of FeO on CAC 126 G RC3 RA didn't know about BA on head 136 G RC3 IRO didn't participate to follow MD8.3 for AIT determination 137 G RC3 NRRJRIII didn't follow MD8.3 180 G RC3 Story differences between what DB told NRC -vs- what NRC

__.__ thought they were told about BA by DB 203 G RC3 Deferral of DB shutdown not well documented 216 G RC3 Interviews indicate that NRR and RIII communications poor/nonexistent August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 11

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[ Joelle Starefos - DBLLTFMeetbnqMins20020805.wpd I Panel12i Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002) lJe reDecisional 291 G RC3 Late arrival of calcs for crack propagation o RC3 The Licensee failed to effectively communicate 150 0 RC3 Lic Response to BU200I-01 contained many inaccurate info

/response 177 0 RC3 Many licensee (DB) staff thought that a whole head

._ inspection/cleaning was done 180 0 RC3 Story differences between what DB told NRC -vs- what NRC thought they were told about BA by DB 181 0 RC3 (Other than SRI ) NRC not told about red/brown BA buildup until

_after the DB event 240 0 RC3 BU200I-01 documentation responses by DB not accurate 241 0 RC3 12-16 people at DB reviewed DB response to BU200I-01 257 0 RC3 VP -Ops last know 264 0 RC3 Lic Managers / staff knew of head cleaning %, lower staff thought that head was 100% cleaned 265 0 RC3 Lic managers said they showed NRC the as-found video tapes of the head 321 0 RC3 Current VP said that engineering would know before Ops 326 0 RC3 E-mail makes D-B look bad for RPV head cleaning 328 0 RC3 Unclear as to who viewed the post cleaning video tape (DB) 336 0 RC3 12RFO QA audit of head cleaning was positive 337 0 RC3 Discrepancies with internal documents on whether head cleaned or not 348 0 RC3 Ops didn't view video tapes August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 12

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tjgoelle Starefos - DBLLTFMeeting X5e pd0I-.- Page 1 1 Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Meeting (8/5-8/2002)

NRCPreDeisionalr rc4 The NRC and industry failed to establish adequate requirements and guidance for addressingAlloy 600 nozzle cracking and boric acid corrosion of carbon steel components d RC4 The NRC failed to provide adequate requirements.

139 D RC4 Enforcement history doesn't equate with OE 140 D RC4 Lack of enforcement for RCS leakage 141 D RC4 Enforcement/NRR trying to figure out what should be done for RCS leakage 142 D RC4 1997 SONGS nozzle cracking cited Maintenance Rule 143 D RC4 NRC response (policy) not consistent - SONGS/Oconee 145 D RC4 No ASME Code requirement (of inspections/RCS leakage) 146 D RC4 Code didn't require insulation to be removed for inspections 147 D RC4 VC Summer had RCS leakage and didn't report it 149 D RC4 Enf discretion issued for VCSummer and Oconee; no enf discretion or enforcement on ANO 205 D RC4 12/31/2001 was an arbitrary date for shutdown; basis question 219 D RC4 Code did not require insulation removal (VT-2) 243 D RC4 Enhanced visual meant for circ, not axial cracking (vol NDE) 245 D RC4 ANO a through wall CRDM crack is a statistical certainty 253 D RC4 Several CRDM nozzles cracked, some through wall NRC 305 D RC4 Nov 2001, NRC indicated that they did not like ASME code (VT-2) 307 D RC4 ASME code allows plant to start up from outage with known code class 1 flange leaks 319 D RC4 Age related risk from passive components not captured in PRA ep RC4 The NRC failed to provide adequate Reactor Oversight Process guidance 26 EP RC4 PI&R samples began 1999 for 3/01 (gap issue) 60 EP RC4 62001 cancelled in 10/01 64 EP RC4 Limited entries into containment by NRC 67 EP RC4 NRC audit (GL88-05) of BAC didn't include Rx head/instr 71 EP RC4 Two people felt that there were not enough hours in ROP for (BA) inspections didn't allow some inspection 73 EP RC4 Can't go outside of the baseline unless you have a >green finding 74 EP RC4 Baseline inspection doesn't include structures or passive components 75 EP RC4 Some good practices ceased following ROP implementation (ex.

containment closeout insp) 82 EP RC4 ISI didn't have inspection guidance to look at A600 nozzles 85 EP RC4 RIII issued SL3 for RC-2; would be a green finding today August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 13

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XR-PreDecisirrnayk 89 EP RC4 RIII invoked MC0350 w/o DB having met criteria 90 EP RC4 DB event risk not completed yet 91 EP RC4 SDP has taken 5 months 106 EP RC4 MC2515 AppD doesn't provide thorough guidance for review of CR 113 EP RC4 Only I SES manager inside containment since 1996 114 EP RC4 Limited senior manager visits to DB 134 EP RC4 No NRC requirement to review employee concerns 225 EP RC4 Over-reliance on a risk information -vs- deterministic 252 EP RC4 62001 intended for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> every other outage 293 EP RC4 All PI's green prior to event 311 EP RC4 Lessons learned weren't learned from previous lessons learned reviews (South Texas, Millstone, IP2)

P RC4 The Industry failed to provide adequate guidance for detecting and correcting Alloy 600 nozzle cracking and boric acid corrosion 196 P RC4 Conclusion in the EPRI guidebook not supported 199 P RC4 "Boric acid on the head is good."

214 P RC4 INPO ratings declined from Ito 2 within the last few ears 218 P RC4 B&W didn't recommend the service structure mod 220 P RC4 DB experienced no insulation deflections caused by BA buildup on

_ _ the head 259 P RC4 Lic did not eval use of power washer on head 306 P RC4 BWOG/Framatome indicated that they made no recommendations for service structure mods 323 P RC4 INPO noted chronic RCS leaks, but not BA on head 324 P RC4 INPO noted ALARA positive for CAC cleaning by power washer 350 P RC4 Vendor testing not representative of actual installation August 8, 2002 (8:07am) 14

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NAYtPreDecisional

_ w 7RC6 Awaiting additional review 345 lW RC6 Many CRs on BAC but no evidence of tracking x RC6 Deleted 8 X RC6 PM inspection approach changing.

30 X RC6 CRs reviewed for PI&R -7000 47 X RC6 Neither the old/new insp programs found/discussed RM issues 48 X RC6 SSDI insp in 2000 indicated performance was worse than expected 69 X RC6 40500 insp in '98 indicated that commitment tracking NG 79 X RC6 SRI 97-98 no recollection of flange leaks 80 X RC6 Former SRI works for FENOC 81 X RC6 1992 uptake event insp closeout, then 1998 uptake occurred 86 X RC6 RC-2 event would have not gone beyond baseline 99 X RC6 PI&R doesn't allow independent look by inspectors 100 X RC6 Some interviews indicated RI/SRI not as visible in ctmt and CR post ROP 104 X RC6 PI&R team leader thought that the short form description of CR was adequate 135 X RC6 RIII inspector was told that DB was SALP I didn't take findings seriously (arrogant) 138 X RC6 Range of opinions on whether an AlT/lIT/SI 148 X RC6 Nothing in allegation area was relevant to BA/cracking issues 190 X RC6 Staff action plan GL97-01 can't be found 195 X RC6 BACC person indicated that the next major nuclear accident will be caused by BAC 197a X RC6 Risk significance of BA on RPV head is low NRC 206 X RC6 PMs don't conduct site visits 224 X RC6 Risk informed process didn't alert the NRC to a potential risk 249 X RC6 Bonus correlation with operations 250 X RC6 Basis for dose estimates for RPV head inspections 258 X RC6 Eng received closed door talking to for CR initiation 286 X RC6 Lic is doing an assessment ofBU2001-01 submittal 288 X RC6 No VT-2 insp during RFO12 per RCS sys eng 292 X RC6 QA group didn't have a problem with BAC RFO 12 report shows

__ positive finding 299 X RC6 Same job done by Framatome at other plants?

320 X RC6 Too much focus on PRA vs deterministic 349 X RC6 High tumover on BWOG positions from DB staff August 8, 2002 (8:07amn) 15

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Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations kRCPreDecisionai 39 Consider issuing order for head inspections 109 H M EDO Assess whether lessons learned have/have not been learned 47 F H HR Conduct an assessment of staff needs in the materials area 60 F L HR Update training at TTC to include event lessons learned 61 F L HR Training for studies of OE 63 F L HR Retraining of staff on root cause processes 66 F L HR Resident cert. training should include important licensee logs 111 P H IND RES Reassess crack models 112 P H IND RES Assess other areas having A600 nozzles/materials 122 P L IND Attendance of plant staff at Owner's Group meetings 123 P L IND Framatome should sensitize its staff to BA corrosion 115 K M IND NRR Engage industry on enhanced leakage monitoring system 113 P M IND NRR NRC to work with industry to develop guidance for voluntary initiatives 116 P M IND Cost benefit analysis of RPV head inspections(dose, cost, time) 119 P M IND EPRI review/revise guidance 121 P M IND BWOG dissemination of info & holding members accountable 10 B H NRR Determine if other previous GCs need to be verified for implementation 11 B H NRR Establish a process for verifying GC implementation 38 D H NRR RES Recommend ASME Code changes for inspections of head 100 ElI H NRR Mini-DET to independently assess plant; compare and contrast conclusions with region and program adequacy 3 EP H NRR PI&R guidance should be strengthened

-Handoff of issues to the team

-Selection of issues

-Review of lic binning 96 EP H NRR With aging plants, do more inspection hours on

_ _ passive components August 8, 2002 (10:32am) 1

I-1-- -- . - - s I Joelle Starefos - DBLLRTRecommendationsRESORG Wpd Pagie 2 i Joelle Starefos DBLLRtRecornrnendationsRESaRGwod

- Pacze2l Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations 1 .YZIPreDecisionalo 7 F H NRR REG Provide training on BAC; increasing knowledge level on selected industry operational experience DB should be case study for inspector quals 30 H H NRR RES Assess overall process for reviewing OE (GC/GI/Study/Research Efforts/CAs) 62 H H NRR RES GC integrated story on events from the beginning of time Listing of NUREGs containing OE 124 H H NRR Assess unique vulnerabilities of B&W plants to cracking and BA corrosion 127 H H NRR Near term issue bulletins on BACC and bare metal NDE 114 P H NRR Bare metal inspections of systems having BA 22 B L NRR Periodic review of the status GCs 14 CP L NRR Revise/eval guidance on GC proposal 21 CP L NRR When making changes to a regulatory process (eg insp proc), ensure that Generic Inspections are not eliminated without specific review 40 CP L NRR RES Re-examine the GALL report for applicability to DB 118 D L NRR Reassess containment leakage from RCS (I gpm) 6 EP L NRR Consider allowing open items for followup inspections in ROP 19 EP L NRR Initiate GC-specific inspection procedures 20 EP L NRR Incorporate GC references in inspection procedures 35 EP L NRR Revisit the policy of not aggregating risk issues/subparts 36 EP L NRR Use traditional enforcement/deterministic SDP for all cross-cutting issues 43 EP L NRR Assess potential predictive PIs and inspections 82 EP L NRR Implement inspection of ECPs for SCWE 84 EP L NRR Inspection guidance for reviewing entry into LCOs 85 EP L NRR Assess ROP to allow inspection of Tmods, workarounds, etc. even if not on list 86 EP L NRR Review of deferred mods 89 EP L NRR Should review mode restraints 90 EP L NRR Develop guidance to focus on repetitive multiple tasks for significance (ALARA) 94 EP L NRR Focus more inspections on outage periods 98 EP L NRR Inspection guidance to sample licensing requests to

_ _ understand the basis August 8, 2002 (10:32am) 2

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Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations NRCPrelDecisional--

99 EP L NRR Followup on cited NOVs 103 EP L NRR Inspection guidance to sample all electronic media (videos, etc) 105 EP L NRR Review ROP guidance for inspecting plant hardware 106 EP L NRR Incorporate guidance for threshold of sensitivity to RCS leakage....absolute value and change trends 107 EP L NRR Review long-term fixes and their basis 108 EP L NRR Inspect commitments and closure (sample commitments) 120 EP L NRR Document requirements for video/visual exams (location, etc.)

129 EP L NRR Develop NRC criteria for inspection of industry

_ _ initiatives 13 F L NRR RES Training on MD8.5/6.4/LIC503 28 F L NRR Full-time PM on significant safety issues 41 F L NRR Reinforce Code options/requirements to staff 49 F L NRR Need for NRC ISEG 54 F L NRR Assessment of maximum turnover rate for PMs (ie.assignmentlreassignment) 57 F L NRR Reassess policy for selecting uncertified staff for resident positions 64 F L NRR Training on MC 0620 2 G L NRR Establish structure for Regional management interactions (NRC-Internal) 51 G L NRR RES Need for counterpart meetings HQ/Regions 58 G L NRR REG Uniform guidance for inspection debriefs 32 H L NRR Criteria for initiation of GCs 52 H L NRR RES Need for long-term analysis of OE by a single group 24 P L NRR Establish criteria for accepting "industry" resolution of GCs 45 Q L NRR Review guidance on management and PM visits to site 48 Q L NRR NRR needs to ensure implementation of commitment evaluation/closure 55 Q L NRR Implement the guidance provided in the PM handbook

__ (site visits, experience) 73 Q L NRR NRC should document basis for accepting a deviation from guidance 79 Q L NRR Determine if ISI summaries should be reviewed August 8, 2002 (10:32am) 3

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Joelle Starefos DBLLRTRecommendationsRESORG.wpd Pao 4A U i Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations

,?C-PreDeoisional-102 Q L NRR Implement LIC-900 126 Q L NRR Assess use of risk for quick turnaround licensing actions 18 B M NRR Establish criteria for closeout of each GCs from staff perspective 12 CP M NRR RES Update MD8.5/6.41LIC503 26 CP M NRR Enhance criteria for BACC program 1 EIA M NRR RIII Re-emphasize questioning attitude also long term 4 EP M NRR Review inspection expectations during refueling outages...are inspectors spending adequate time in containment 5 EP M NRR Assess need for improvements in Plant Status

__ inspection module 2515 App D 8 EP M NRR Provide inspection guidance to address selected industry operational experience 23 EP M NRR Resurrect 90700 33 EP M NRR RES Establish boundaries for use of risk information 34 EP M NRR Establish basis for using deterministic SDPs 53 EP M NRR Discussion threshold for mid-cycle/end of cycle review assessment 67 EP M NRR Have 'good practices' in the old inspection program been lost? Go back...

68 EP M NRR Is barrier integrity cornerstone inspection adequate?

69 EP M NRR Develop usable barrier integrity PIs 83 EP M NRR Inspection guidance for outage influences on work scope 87 EP M NRR Fix ROP guidance to not focus solely on "high risk" systems/components 91 EP M NRR More review of containment components - walkdowns 92 EP M NRR Should have independent identification reviewed as

__ part of problems as part of PI&R inspections 93 EP M NRR Do more inside containment inspections as part of

__ License Renewals 95 EP M NRR More discretionary inspection hours in ROP 97 EP M NRR Defibrulate 62001 101 EP M NRR NRC insp guidance for head inspections (similar to SGs) 42 F M NRR REG Obtain staff subject matter experts on Code

_ _requirements August 8, 2002 (10:32am) 4

i Joelle Starefos - DBLLRTRecommendationsRESORG.wp~d Page Paqe5I5i Joelle Starefos DBLLRTRecommendationsRESORG.wpd Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations NRC-9j DerisionalI, 44 F M NRR Refresher training on scope of ROP 56 F M NRR REG Establish measurements for resident staffing - use guidance 65 F M NRR Consider 0350 impact on regional branch assignment of facilities 46 H M NRR RES Assess the need to enhance use of foreign operating experience 76 H M NRR Process for review of trip reports for OE issues 77 H M NRR Enhance the dissemination of foreign experience 78 H M NRR International experience database 110 H M NRR IND Boric acid leakage OE (graphics) 128 H M NRR Reexamine MNSA and roll expansions 9 Q M NRR NRC needs to review industry guidance documents (process change) 72 Q M NRR Criteria for deviating from NRC guidance should be established (deferral decision documentation) 74 Q M NRR REG Guidance for independent verification of info for significant licensing decisions 88 Q M NRR Verify the accuracy of incoming licensing

__ documentation 37 D M OE NRR Establish clear enforcement policy for RCS leakage 125 D M OE Shouldn't grant enforcement discretion for nozzle cracking 70 F L REG Review PE staffing and utilization 104 F L REG NRR End of outage meeting to discuss recurrent problems 71 G L REG NRR Clear expectations on "morning calls" 75 G L REG NRR Regional management involvement in morning

_ _ meetings (HQ to Regions) 27 J H RES Perform additional analysis of BA corrosion 17 B L RES NRR Establish criteria for short/long term mandatory followup of GI 15 CP L RES Is screening criteria for a candidate GI acceptable 16 CP L RES NRR Assess consolidation of GCs/GIP 29 H L RES Speed up research projects/ staged process 31 H L RES Review of effectiveness of research procedure review of OE Oi-2 117 H L RES Various annealing temps for CRDM nozzles - a generic issue?

25 X X X Establish a better way in determining "user-needs" August 8, 2002 (10:32am) 5

I Joe IIe Starefos - DBLI-RtRecom~e-n-d ation-sRE-S-O-R-G'.Wpd Page 66 A Paae I Joelle Starefos DBLLRTRecommendationsRESORG.wpd Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations NRG-PrDecisionalb Establish process for using plant condition August 8, 2002 (10:32am) 6

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&i 1 Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations ARC-PreDecisional}

39 Consider issuing order for head inspections 10 B H NRR Determine if other previous GCs need to be verified for implementation 11 B H NRR Establish a process for verifying GC implementation 17 B L RES NRR Establish criteria for short/long term mandatory followup of GI 22 B L NRR Periodic review of the status GCs 18 B M NRR Establish criteria for closeout of each GCs from staff perspective 14 CP L NRR Revise/eval guidance on GC proposal 15 CP L RES Is screening criteria for a candidate GI acceptable 16 CP L RES NRR Assess consolidation of GCs/GIP 21 CP L NRR When making changes to a regulatory process (eg insp proc), ensure that Generic Inspections are not eliminated without specific review 40 CP L NRR RES Re-examine the GALL report for applicability to DB 12 CP M NRR RES Update MD8.5/6.4/LIC503 26 CP M NRR Enhance criteria for BACC program 38 D H NRR RES Recommend ASME Code changes for inspections of

__ head 118 D L NRR Reassess containment leakage from RCS (I gpm) 37 D M OE NRR Establish clear enforcement policy for RCS leakage 125 D M OE Shouldn't grant enforcement discretion for nozzle cracking 1 EIA M NRR RIII Re-emphasize questioning attitude also long term 100 Ell H NRR Mini-DET to independently assess plant; compare and contrast conclusions with region and program adequacy 3 EP H NRR PI&R guidance should be strengthened

-Handoff of issues to the team

-Selection of issues

-Review of lic binning 96 EP H NRR With aging plants, do more inspection hours on

_ _ passive components 6 . EP L NRR Consider allowing open items for followup inspections in ROP 19 EP L NRR. Initiate GC-specific inspection procedures 20 EP L NRR Incorporate GC references in inspection procedures August 8, 2002 (10:30am) 1

I Joelle Starefos --DBECktk6-6-o-m-'m-en-dat-ionsRPTCONC.wpd Joefle Starefos DBLLRTRecornmendatknsRPTCONC.wpd Pao g Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations 35 EP L NRR Revisit the policy of not aggregating risk issues/subparts 36 EP L NRR Use traditional enforcement/deterministic SDP for all cross-cutting issues 43 EP L NRR Assess potential predictive PIs and inspections 82 EP L NRR Implement inspection of ECPs for SCWE 84 EP L NRR Inspection guidance for reviewing entry into LCOs 85 EP L NRR Assess ROP to allow inspection of Tmods, workarounds, etc. even if not on list 86 EP L NRR Review of deferred mods 89 EP L NRR Should review mode restraints 90 EP L NRR Develop guidance to focus on repetitive multiple tasks for significance (ALARA) 94 EP L NRR Focus more inspections on outage periods 98 EP L NRR Inspection guidance to sample licensing requests to understand the basis 99 EP L NRR Followup on cited NOVs 103 EP L NRR Inspection guidance to sample all electronic media (videos, etc) 105 EP L NRR Review ROP guidance for inspecting plant hardware 106 EP L NRR Incorporate guidance for threshold of sensitivity to RCS leakage ....absolute value and change trends 107 EP L NRR Review long-term fixes and their basis 108 EP L NRR Inspect commitments and closure (sample commitments) 120 EP L NRR Document requirements for video/visual exams (location, etc.)

129 EP L NRR Develop NRC criteria for inspection of industry initiatives 4 EP M NRR Review inspection expectations during refueling outages...are inspectors spending adequate time in containment 5 EP M NRR Assess need for improvements in Plant Status inspection module 2515 App D 8 EP M NRR Provide inspection guidance to address selected industry operational experience 23 EP M NRR Resurrect 90700 33 EP M NRR RES Establish boundaries for use of risk information 34 EP M NRR Establish basis for using deterministic SDPs August 8, 2002 (10:30am) 2

I Joelle Starefos - DBLLRTRecommendatonsTCONC.wpd I j .ae3 Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations iRE-PreDecisionadw 53 EP M NRR Discussion threshold for mid-cycle/end of cycle review assessment 67 EP M NRR Have 'good practices' in the old inspection program been lost? Go back...

68 EP M NRR Is barrier integrity cornerstone inspection adequate?

69 EP M NRR Develop usable barrier integrity PIs 83 EP M NRR Inspection guidance for outage influences on work scope 87 EP M NRR Fix ROP guidance to not focus solely on "high risk" systems/components 91 EP M NRR More review of containment components - walkdowns 92 EP M NRR Should have independent identification reviewed as part of problems as part of PI&R inspections 93 EP M NRR Do more inside containment inspections as part of License Renewals 95 EP M NRR More discretionary inspection hours in ROP 97 EP M NRR Defibrulate 62001 101 EP M NRR NRC insp guidance for head inspections (similar to SGs) 7 F H NRR REG Provide training on BAC; increasing knowledge level on selected industry operational experience DB should be case study for inspector quals 47 F H HR Conduct an assessment of staff needs in the materials area 13 F L NRR RES Training on MD8.5/6.4/LIC503 28 F L NRR Full-time PM on significant safety issues 41 F L NRR Reinforce Code options/requirements to staff 49 F L NRR Need for NRC ISEG 54 F L NRR Assessment of maximum turnover rate for PMs (ie.assignment/reassignment) 57 F L NRR Reassess policy for selecting uncertified staff for

__ resident positions 60 F L HR Update training at TTC to include event lessons

__ learned 61 F L HR Training for studies of OE 63 F L HR Retraining of staff on root cause processes 64 F L NRR Training on MC 0620 66 F L HR Resident cert. training should include important

__ licensee logs August 8, 2002 (10:30am) 3

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JoeDe Starefos DBLLRTRecommendationsRPTCONC.ff Paae4 I Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations RC-PreD&-i&i&,-naW 70 F L REG Review PE staffing and utilization 104 F L REG NRR End of outage meeting to discuss recurrent problems 42 F M NRR REG Obtain staff subject matter experts on Code requirements 44 F M NRR Refresher training on scope of ROP 56 F M NRR REG Establish measurements for resident staffing - use guidance 65 F M NRR Consider 0350 impact on regional branch assignment of facilities 2 G L NRR Establish structure for Regional management interactions (NRC-Internal) 51 G L NRR RES Need for counterpart meetings HQ/Regions 58 G L NRR REG Uniform guidance for inspection debriefs 71 G L REG NRR Clear expectations on "morning calls" 75 G L REG NRR Regional management involvement in morning meetings (HQ to Regions) 30 H H NRR RES Assess overall process for reviewing OE (GC/GI/Study/Research Efforts/CAs) 62 H H NRR RES GC integrated story on events from the beginning of time Listing of NUREGs containing OE 124 H H NRR Assess unique vulnerabilities of B&W plants to cracking and BA corrosion 127 H H NRR Near term issue bulletins on BACC and bare metal

__ NDE 29 H L RES Speed up research projects/ staged process 31 H L RES Review of effectiveness of research procedure review of OE 0i-2 32 H L NRR Criteria for initiation of GCs 52 H L NRR RES Need for long-term analysis of OE by a single group 117 H L RES Various annealing temps for CRDM nozzles - a

__ generic issue?

46 H M NRR RES Assess the need to enhance use of foreign operating experience 76 H M NRR Process for review of trip reports for OE issues 77 H M NRR Enhance the dissemination of foreign experience 78 H M NRR International experience database 109 H M EDO Assess whether lessons learned have/have not been learned 110 H M NRR IND Boric acid leakage OE (graphics)

August 8, 2002 (10:30am) 4

I Joelle Starefos --DBULLRTF~ec-ornre-n-datikOn TC-ONC.wpd Paae 5 I JolieStaefos-DBLRTecomendtiosRPCONCwpdPaa 51 Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations 128 H M NRR Reexamine MNSA and roll expansions 27 J H RES Perform additional analysis of BA corrosion 115 K M IND NRR Engage industry on enhanced leakage monitoring system Ill P H IND RES Reassess crack models 112 P H IND RES Assess other areas having A600 nozzles/materials 114 P H NRR Bare metal inspections of systems having BA 24 P L NRR Establish criteria for accepting "industry" resolution of GCs 122 P L IND Attendance of plant staff at Owner's Group meetings 123 P L IND Framatome should sensitize its staff to BA corrosion 113 P M IND NRR NRC to work with industry to develop guidance for voluntary initiatives 116 P M IND Cost benefit analysis of RPV head inspections(dose, cost, time) 119 P M IND EPRI review/revise guidance 121 P M IND BWOG dissemination of info & holding members accountable 45 Q L NRR Review guidance on management and PM visits to site 48 Q L NRR NRR needs to ensure implementation of commitment evaluation/closure 55 Q L NRR Implement the guidance provided in the PM handbook (site visits, experience) 73 Q L NRR NRC should document basis for accepting a deviation from guidance 79 Q L NRR Determine if ISI summaries should be reviewed 102 Q L NRR Implement LIC-900 126 Q L NRR Assess use of risk for quick turnaround licensing actions 9 Q M NRR NRC needs to review industry guidance documents (process change) 72 Q M NRR Criteria for deviating from NRC guidance should be established (deferral decision documentation) 74 Q M NRR REG Guidance for independent verification of info for significant licensing decisions 88 Q M NRR Verify the accuracy of incoming licensing documentation 25 X X X Establish a better way in determining "user-needs" August 8, 2002 (10:30am) 5

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IJoelle Starefos - DBLLRTRe--c-ornm en-d-at-onsRi-PzCONC viedI 2ane 6 Joefle Starefos - DBLLRTRecommendattonsRPTCONC.wpd Pa6i Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations NoPreA sioi August 8, 2002 (10:30am) 6

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PARKING LOT ISSUES Safety Culture (section 3.2; revisit 8/21/2002)

Communications aspects from licensee RC3/o (revisit 8/21/2002)

B&W CRDM design (recommendations or basic conclusion?; revisit 8/21/2002)

Order discussion INPO plant evaluation (revisit 8/21/2002)

ACTION ITEMS

  1. of DB CRs greater that 2 years (BOB)

Maintenance Rule...(JOELLE/PAT)

Schedules for US Head replacements and Units.(JOE)

Staff action plan reference in 97-01 is unknown (JOE)

Allegation on closed door talking to...(BOB)

Video tapes shown after meeting; that information considered when making decisions? (ED)

Al Heiser question about NDE and fact check for 256, 295 (ED)

Interview NEI (ED)

ACRS rundown (ED)

SRB minutes review (JOELLE)

OBF Mapping and designate by conclusion (ART/ELAINE)

Update OBF index (ELAINE)

INES meeting (RON)

ISEG (BOB)

Inspection prep hours (BOB)

Content/format for visual aids (ALL)

Draft report control (ARTIELAINE)

Briefing from NRR on BU2001-01 and currently written BUs next week (JOE)

FACT CHECK 17; 30; 54; 81; 82; 127; 129; 131; 134; 149; 190; 202; 210; 218; 237; 256; 288; 295; 299, 339 Recommendation 47 (RON)

August 8, 2002 (10:40am)

IJoelle Starefos - DB~LLRT~ie'o-mme-ndatio-ns-P-RIw-p~d Pag 11' Joelle Starefos DB LLRTRecornmendationsPRl.wpd Paqe ill Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations Nr e Deionuaba 39 Consider issuing order for head inspections 10 B H NRR Determine if other previous GCs need to be verified for implementation I B H NRR Establish a process for verifying GC implementation 38 D H NRR RES Recommend ASME Code changes for inspections of head 100 Ell H NRR Mini-DET to independently assess plant; compare and contrast conclusions with region and program

-adequacy 3 EP H NRR PI&R guidance should be strengthened

-Handoff of issues to the team

-Selection of issues

-Review of lic binning 96 EP H NRR With aging plants, do more inspection hours on passive components 7 F H NRR REG Provide training on BAC; increasing knowledge level on selected industry operational experience DB should be case study for inspector quals (previously #59) 47 F H HR Conduct an assessment of staff needs in the materials area 30 H H NRR RES Assess overall process for reviewing OE (GC/GI/Study/Research Efforts/CAs) 62 H H NRR RES GC integrated story on events from the beginning of time Listing of NUREGs containing OE (previously #81) 124 H H NRR Assess unique vulnerabilities of B&W plants to cracking and BA corrosion 127 H H NRR Near term issue bulletins on BACC and bare metal NDE 27 J H RES Perform additional analysis of BA corrosion 111 P H IND RES Reassess crack models 112 P H IND RES Assess other areas having A600 nozzles/materials 114 P H NRR. Bare metal inspections of systems having BA 17 B L RES NRR Establish criteria for short/long term mandatory

__ followup of GI 22 B L NRR Periodic review of the status GCs 14 CP L NRR Revise/eval guidance on GC proposal August 8, 2002 (10:37am) 1

I Joelle Starefos - DBLLRTRecommendationsPRI wDd Paae 2 9 I Joelle Starefos DBLLRTRecommendationsPRlwod

- Paae 2 Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations N,9 #PreDecisionaf 15 CP L RES Is screening criteria for a candidate GI acceptable 16 CP L RES NRR Assess consolidation of GCs/GIP 21 CP L NRR When making changes to a regulatory process (eg insp proc), ensure that Generic Inspections are not eliminated without specific review 40 CP L NRR RES Re-examine the GALL report for applicability to DB 118 D L NRR Reassess containment leakage from RCS (I gpm) 6 EP L NRR Consider allowing open items for followup inspections in ROP 19 EP L NRR. Initiate GC-specific inspection procedures 20 EP L NRR Incorporate GC references in inspection procedures 35 EP L NRR Revisit the policy of not aggregating risk issues/subparts 36 EP L NRR Use traditional enforcement/deterministic SDP for all

__ cross-cutting issues 43 EP L NRR Assess potential predictive PIs and inspections 82 EP L NRR Implement inspection of ECPs for SCWE 84 EP L NRR Inspection guidance for reviewing entry into LCOs 85 EP L NRR Assess ROP to allow inspection of Tmods, workarounds, etc. even if not on list 86 EP L NRR Review of deferred mods 89 EP L NRR Should review mode restraints 90 EP L NRR Develop guidance to focus on repetitive multiple tasks for significance (ALARA) 94 EP L NRR Focus more inspections on outage periods 98 EP L NRR Inspection guidance to sample licensing requests to understand the basis 99 EP L NRR Followup on cited NOVs 103 EP L NRR Inspection guidance to sample all electronic media (videos, etc) 105 EP L NRR Review ROP guidance for inspecting plant hardware 106 EP L NRR Incorporate guidance for threshold of sensitivity to RCS leakage....absolute value and change trends 107 EP L NRR Review long-term fixes and their basis 108 EP L NRR Inspect commitments and closure (sample

. _ commitments) 120 EP L NRR Document requirements for video/visual exams

__ _ (location, etc.)

August 8, 2002 (10:37am) 2

I Joelle Starefos - DBLLRTRecommendationsPRI~wpd Page 318 I Joelle Starefos DBLLRTRecommendatiOnsPRI.wDd

- Paqe 31 Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations 129 EP L NRR Develop NRC criteria for inspection of industry initiatives 13 F L NRR RES Training on MD8.5/6.4ALIC503 28 F L NRR Full-time PM on significant safety issues 41 F L NRR Reinforce Code options/requirements to staff 49 F L NRR Need for NRC ISEG 54 F L NRR Assessment of maximum turnover rate for PMs (ie.assignment/reassignment) 57 F L NRR Reassess policy for selecting uncertified staff for

__ resident positions 60 F L HR Update training at TTC to include event lessons learned 61 F L HR Training for studies of OE 63 F L HR Retraining of staff on root cause processes 64 F L NRR Training on MC 0620 66 F L HR Resident cert. training should include important licensee logs 70 F L REG Review PE staffing and utilization 104 F L REG NRR End of outage meeting to discuss recurrent problems 2 G L NRR Establish structure for Regional management interactions (NRC-Internal) 51 G L NRR RES Need for counterpart meetings HQ/Regions 58 G L - NRR REG Uniform guidance for inspection debriefs 71 G L REG NRR Clear expectations on "morning calls" 75 G L REG NRR Regional management involvement in morning

__ meetings (HQ to Regions) 29 H L RES Speed up research projects/ staged process 31 H L RES Review of effectiveness of research procedure review of OE Oi-2 32 H L NRR Criteria for initiation of GCs 52 H L NRR RES Need for long-term analysis of OE by a single group 117 H L RES Various annealing temps for CRDM nozzles - a generic issue?

24 P L NRR Establish criteria for accepting "industry" resolution of I GCs 122 - P L IND Attendance of plant staff at Owner's Group meetings 123 P L IND Framatome should sensitize its staff to BA corrosion 45 Q L NRR Review guidance on management and PM visits to site August 8, 2002 (10:37am) 3

I Joelle Starefos - DBLLRTRecornmendationsPR1.wPd Paae 4.

! oel tAreo I DBLTAcmnnains~~ Pae Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations l*PreDecisital=

48 Q L NRR NRR needs to ensure implementation of commitment evaluation/closure 55 Q L NRR Implement the guidance provided in the PM handbook (site visits, experience) 73 Q L NRR NRC should document basis for accepting a deviation from guidance 79 Q L NRR Determine if ISI summaries should be reviewed 102 Q L NRR Implement LIC-900 126 Q L NRR Assess use of risk for quick turnaround licensing actions 18 B M NRR Establish criteria for closeout of each GCs from staff perspective 12 CP M NRR RES Update MD8.5/6.4/LIC503 26 CP M NRR Enhance criteria for BACC program 37 D M OE NRR Establish clear enforcement policy for RCS leakage 125 D M OE Shouldn't grant enforcement discretion for nozzle cracking I EIA M NRR RIII Re-emphasize questioning attitude also long term 4 EP M NRR Review inspection expectations during refueling outages...are inspectors spending adequate time in containment 5 EP M NRR Assess need for improvements in Plant Status inspection module 2515 App D 8 EP M NRR Provide inspection guidance to address selected industry operational experience 23 EP M NRR Resurrect 90700 33 EP M NRR RES Establish boundaries for use of risk information 34 EP M NRR. Establish basis for using deterministic SDPs 53 EP M NRR Discussion threshold for mid-cycle/end of cycle review assessment 67 EP M NRR Have 'good practices' in the old inspection program been lost? Go back...

68 EP M NRR Is barrier integrity cornerstone inspection adequate?

69 EP M NRR Develop usable barrier integrity PIs 83 EP M NRR Inspection guidance for outage influences on work scope 87 EP M NRR Fix ROP guidance to not focus solely on "high risk" systems/components 91 EP M NRR. More review of containment components - walkdowns August 8, 2002 (10:37am) 4

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-l Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations i TNReD r7siona 92 EP M NRR Should have independent identification reviewed as part of problems as part of PM&R inspections 93 EP M NRR Do more inside containment inspections as part of License Renewals 95 EP M NRR More discretionary inspection hours in ROP 97 EP M NRR Defibrulate 62001 101 EP M NRR NRC insp guidance for head inspections (similar to ISGs) 42 F M NRR REG Obtain staff subject matter experts on Code requirements 44 F M NRR Refresher training on scope of ROP 56 F M NRR REG Establish measurements for resident staffing - use guidance 65 F M NRR Consider 0350 impact on regional branch assignment of facilities 46 H M NRR RES Assess the need to enhance use of foreign operating experience 76 H M NRR Process for review of trip reports for OE issues 77 H M NRR Enhance the dissemination of foreign experience 78 H M NRR International experience database 109 H M EDO Assess whether lessons learned have/have not been learned 110 H M NRR IND Boric acid leakage OE (graphics) 128 H M NRR Reexamine MNSA and roll expansions 115 K M IND NRR Engage industry on enhanced leakage monitoring

_ system 113 P M IND NRR NRC to work with industry to develop guidance for voluntary initiatives 116 P M IND Cost benefit analysis of RPV head inspections(dose, cost, time) 119 P M IND EPRI review/revise guidance 121 P M IND BWOG dissemination of info & holding members accountable 9 Q M NRR NRC needs to review industry guidance documents (process change) 72 Q M NRR Criteria for deviating from NRC guidance should be established (deferral decision documentation) 74 Q M NRR REG Guidance for independent verification of info for significant licensing decisions August 8, 2002 (10:37am) 5

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Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations i rzeakqinaL 88 Q M NRR Verify the accuracy of incoming licensing documentation 25 X X X Establish a better way in determining "user-needs" 50 X X X Establish process for using plant condition information 80 X X X How/What format should OE be documented and

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