Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool CoolingML031050356 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000268, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
03/28/1997 |
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From: |
Martin T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-97-014, NUDOCS 9703270253 |
Download: ML031050356 (11) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000268, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000268]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000268]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
, -. . 4;
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 28, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-14: ASSESSMENT OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
addressees to results of an assessment performed by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation
of Operational Data (AEOD) on operating experience involving spent .jel pool (SFP) cooling
and inventory control. The AEOD assessment is detailed in NUREG-1275, Volume 12,
"Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling," February 1997. It is expected that recipients will review
the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid
similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
NRC's Executive Director for Operations directed AEOD to independently assess the
likelihood and consequences of an extended loss of SFP cooling or inventory. The
assessment focused on the collection and analysis of operating experience involving SFP
cooling and inventory control and comprised of six major tasks:
(1) Develop generic configurations delineating SFP cooling and inventory control
equipment for a boiling-water reactor (BWR) and a pressurized-water reactor (PWR).
(2) Review and assess more than 12 years of operating experience for domestic and
foreign reactors.
(3) Visit six sites to gain an understanding of the physical configurations, practices, and
operating procedures for the licensees' SFPs.
(4) Review applicable SFP regulations and the NRC Standard Review Plan
(NUREG-0800) for the acceptance criteria and the applicable regulatory guides.
(5) Perform independent assessments of electrical systems, instrumentation, heat loads, and radiation levels associated with the SFP.
(6) Estimate near-boiling frequencies utilizing probabilistic techniques.
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IN 97-14 March 28, 1997 The findings and conclusions of the AEOD assessment are summarized below.
The loss of SFP coolant inventory in excess of 1 foot has occurred 10 times over the
last 12 years at a rate of about once every 100 reactor-years. Loss of SFP cooling
with a temperature increase in excess of 11 OC [20 OF] has occurred 4 times in the
last 12 years at a rate of approximately 3 times every 1000 reactor-years. The
consequences of these actual events have not been severe; however, some events
resulted in loss of several feet of SFP coolant level and have continued for more than
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The primary cause of these events has been human error, most preva- lently, valve mispositionings. These errors are discussed in greater detail in
NUREG-1275, Volume 12.
- The relative risk due to loss of spent fuel pool cooling is low in comparison with the
risk of events not involving SFPs. The review determined that the likelihood and
consequences of SFP loss-of-cooling events are highly dependent on human
performance (e.g., valve manipulations, crane manipulations, spent fuel handling
equipr,lent manipulations) and individual plant design features.
- The efforts by utilities to reduce outage durations have resulted in full core off-loads
early in outages. This increased fuel pool heat load reduces the time available to
recover from a loss-of-SFP-cooling should such an event occur early in the outage.
On a plant specific basis the following observations are provided:
- Failures of reactor cavity seals or gate seals or ineffective antisiphon devices could
potentially cause loss of SFP coolant inventory, which could potentially result in
uncovering the fuel or endangering makeup capability.
- Ineffective configuration control was the most frequent cause of SFP loss-of-inventory
events and loss-of-cooling events.
- At multi-unit sites with common pools, there is the potential for SFP boiling conditions
to affect safe-shutdown equipment for the operating unit, particularly during full core
off-loads.
- Improved procedures and training which recognize the time frames over which SFP
events can proceed, the heat load and possibility of loss of inventory, could enhance
control room operator response to loss-of-inventory and loss-of-cooling SFP events.
- Insufficient control room instrumentation and non-safety-related power supplies to SFP
instrumentation may hinder operator response to SFP events.
1-.)
IN 97-14 March 28, 1997 Discussion
The AEOD assessment found large variations in the designs and capabilities of SFPs and
related systems at individual nuclear plants. The AEOD assessment identified that the
frequency of loss-of-inventory events was relatively high compared to loss-of-cooling events, and prompt off-loads will lead to reduced time to boil if cooling is lost. A loss of SFP
inventory in combination with higher heat loads reduces the time to respond to SFP events.
Thus, the emphasis of the findings were on instrumentation to quickly alert the operators and
effective procedures and training to facilitate prompt operator response. The operating
experience review determined that loss-of-SFP-cooling events are infrequent and the
consequences of actual events have been small. The risk assessment indicates that the SFP
events are not a dominant contributor to overall plant risk. However, human error initiators
and operator actions required to mitigate an error are subject to large uncertainties, and there
are large variations in design vulnerabilities among plants. In summary the following areas
need emphasis:
(1) Procedures and training to detect and respond to SFP loss-of-inventory and loss-of- cooling events, including those caused by loss of offsite power are needed and should
address configuration controls that can prevent and/or mitigate such events. They
should be consistent with the time frames over which SFP events can proceed at the
specific plant, recognizing the plant-specific heat load and the possibility of loss of
inventory because of cavity seal or gate failures.
(2) Reliable instrumentation is necessary to monitor SFP temperature and level and SFP
area radiation, including periods following a loss of offsite power, in order to detect
SFP loss-of-inventory events and loss-of-cooling events in a timely manner.
(3) Testing, maintenance, and configuration control of plant features such as reactor
cavity seals, gate seals, or antisiphon devices need to be examined for those plants
where failures could potentially cause loss of SFP coolant inventory sufficient to
endanger makeup capability or result in fuel uncovery.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-6345 (301) 415-2841 E-mail: jgi@nrc.gov E-mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment
IN 97-14 March 28, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
97-13 Deficient Conditions 03/24/97 All holders of OLs
Associated with Pro- or CPs for nuclear
tective Coatings at power reactors
Nuclear Power Plants
97-12 Potential Armature 03/24/97 All holders of OLs
Binding in General or CPs for nuclear
Electric Type HGA power reactors
Relays
92-27, Thermally Induced 03/21/97 All holders of OLs
Supp. 1 Accelerated Aging or CPs for nuclear
and Failure of ITE/ power reactors
Gould A.C. Relays
Used in Safety-Related
Applications
97-11 Cement Erosion from 03/21/97 All holders of OLs
Containment Subfounda- or CPs for nuclear
tions at Nuclear Power power reactors
Plants
97-10 Liner Plate Corrosion 03/13/97 All holders of OLs
in Concrete Containments or CPs for power
reactors
97-09 Inadequate Main Steam 03/12/97 All holders of OLs
Safety Valve (MSSV) or CPs for nuclear
Setpoints and Perform- power reactors
ance Issues Associated
with Long MSSV Inlet
Piping
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 97-14 March 28, 1997 Discussion
The AEOD assessment found large variations in the designs and capabilities of SFPs and
related systems at individual nuclear plants. The AEOD assessment identified that the
frequency of loss-of-inventory events was relatively high compared to loss-of-cooling events, and prompt off-loads will lead to reduced time to boil if cooling is lost. A loss of SFP
inventory in combination with higher heat loads reduces the time to respond to SFP events.
Thus, the emphasis of the findings were on instrumentation to quickly alert the operators and
effective procedures and training to facilitate prompt operator response. The operating
experience review determined that loss-of-SFP-cooling events are infrequent and the
consequences of actual events have been small. The risk assessment indicates that the SFP
events are not a dominant contributor to overall plant risk. However, human error initiators
and operator actions required to mitigate an error are subject to large uncertainties, and there
are large variations in design vulnerabilities among plants. In summary the following areas
need emphasis:
(1) Procedures and training to detect and respond to SFP loss-of-inventory and loss-of- cooling events, including those caused by loss of offsite power are needed and should
address configuration controls that can prevent and/or mitigate such events. They
should be consistent with the time frames over which SFP events can proceed at the
specific plant, recognizing the plant-specific heat load and the possibility of loss of
inventory because of cavity seal or gate failures.
(2) Reliable instrumentation is necessary to monitor SFP temperature and level and SFP
area radiation, including periods following a loss of offsite power, In order to detect
SFP loss-of-inventory events and loss-of-cooling events in a timely manner.
(3) Testing, maintenance, and configuration control of plant features such as reactor
cavity seals, gate seals, or antisiphon devices need to be examined for those plants
where failures could potentially cause loss of SFP coolant inventory sufficient to
endanger makeup capability or result in fuel uncovery.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
original signed by
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-6345 (301) 415-2841 E-mail: jgienrc.gov E-mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE Tech Editor has reviewed & concurred on 01/09197
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY) DOCUMENT NAME: G:XSSK2\INSFP.D3 To receive a copy of this document, hIdicate hI the box: C - Copy w/o
attachment/enclosure 'E' - Copy w/attachment/enclosure 'N' - No copy
OFFICE TECH CONTS* I C:PECB/DRPM* D:D
NAME JIBarra/SW ik AChaffee T __rtin
DATE 101/13/97 03/10/97 031.I/97
IN 97-XX
March XX, 1997 Discussion
The AEOD assessment found large variations in the designs and capabilities of SFPs and
related systems at individual nuclear plants. The AEOD assessment identified that the
frequency of loss-of-inventory events was relatively high compared to loss-of-cooling events, and prompt off-loads will lead to reduced time to boil if cooling is lost. Both of these
conditions reduce the time to respond to SFP events. Thus, the emphasis of the findings
were on instrumentation to quickly alert the operators and effective procedures and training to
facilitate prompt operator response. The operating experience review determined that loss- of-SFP-cooling events are Infrequent and the consequences of actual events have been
small. The risk assessment indicates that the SFP events are not a dominant contributor to
overall plant risk. However, human error initiators and operator actions required to mitigate
an error are subject to large uncertainties, and there are large variations in design
vulnerabilities among plants. In summary the following areas need emphasis:
(1) Procedures and training to detect and respond to SFP loss-of-inventory and loss-of- cooling events, including those caused by loss of offsite power are needed and should
address configuration controls that can prevent and/or mitigate such events. They
should be consistent with the time frames over which SFP events can proceed at the
specific plant, recognizing the plant-specific heat load and the possibility of loss of
inventory because of cavity seal or gate failures.
(2) Reliable instrumentation is necessary to monitor SFP temperature and level and SFP
area radiation, including periods following a loss of offsite power, in order to detect
SFP loss-of-inventory events and loss-of-cooling events in a timely manner.
(3) Testing, maintenance, and configuration control of plant features such as reactor
cavity seals, gate seals, or antisiphon devices need to be examined for those plants
where failures could potentially cause loss of SFP coolant inventory sufficient to
uncover the fuel or endanger makeup capability.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-6345 (301) 415-2841 E-mail: jgienrc.gov E-mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC Tech Cont* C:TechBranch* C:PECBIDRPM l C:SPSBIDSS
NAME JlBarra/SKoenick LMarsh AChaffee* MRubl
DATE 01/13197 02/20/97 3/10/97 3/1197 OFC C: CblCIB D:DRPM I
NAME j as _ari
_
DATE 3//t97 j 3/2Q97 3/X17 I____
OFFICA RCORDC OCUMENT NAME- G SSK2%INSFP.D3
IN 97-XX
March XX, 1997 conditions reduce the time to respond to SFP events. Thus, the emphasis of the findings
were on instrumentation to quickly alert the operators and effective procedures and training to
facilitate prompt operator response. The operating experience review determined that loss- of-SFP-cooling events are infrequent and the consequences of actual events have been
small. The risk assessment indicates that the SFP events are not a dominant contributor to
overall plant risk. However, human error initiators and operator actions required to mitigate
an error are subject to large uncertainties, and there are large variations in design
vulnerabilities among plants. In summary the following areas need emphasis:
(1) Procedures and training to detect and respond to SFP loss-of-inventory and loss-of- cooling events, including those caused by loss of offsite power are needed and should
address configuration controls that can prevent andlor mitigate such events. They
should be consistent with the time frames over which SFP events can proceed at the
specific plant, recognizing the plant-specific heat load and the possibility of loss of
inventory because of cavity seal or gate failures.
(2) Reliable instrumentation is necessary to monitor SFP temperature and level and SFP
area radiation, including periods following loss of offsite power, in order to detect SFP
loss-of-coolant inventory and loss of cooling events in a timely manner.
(3) Testing, maintenance, and configuration control of plant features such as reactor
cavity seals, gate seals, or antisiphon devices need to be examined for those plants
where failures could potentially cause loss of SFP coolant Inventory sufficient to
uncover the fuel or endanger makeup capability.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-6345 (301) 415-2841 E-mail: jgienrc.gov E-mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC Tech Cont* C:TechBranch* C:PECBIDRPM D:DRPM
NAME JlBarra/SKoenick LMarsh AChaffee TMartin
DATE 01/13/97 02/20/97 1 /97 of /97 I 1~Ao4 N - -.-
OVI-IMAL K~LUIL)J LUUITJ
- - t r-Lrs LesIA&Ar!K^^
ULLUMMI'4 I PUVI.7 I%-'XZj' .J f3/007
. 1I
IN 97-XX
March XX, 1997 conditions reduce the time to respond to SFP events. Thus, the emphasis of the findings
were on instrumentation to quickly alert the operators and effective procedures and training to
facilitate prompt operator response. The operating experience review determined that loss- of-SFP-cooling events are infrequent and the consequences of actual events have been
small. The risk assessment indicates that the SFP events are not a dominant contributor to
overall plant risk. However, because human error initiators and operator action required to
detect and correct an error are subject to large uncertainties and the large variation in design
vulnerabilities, the NRC would like to highlight to the industry:
(1) The importance of procedures and training to detect and respond to SFP loss-of- inventory and loss-of-cooling events, including those caused by loss of offsite power.
The procedures and training needed to address configuration controls that can
prevent and/or mitigate such events. The procedures and training should be
consistent with the time frames over which SFP events can proceed at the specific
plant, recognizing the plant-specific heat load and the possibility of loss of inventory
due to cavity seal or gate failures.
(2) The importance of having reliable instrumentation to monitor SFP temperature and
level and SFP area radiation, including during periods when offsite power has been
lost, in order to detect SFP loss-of-coolant inventory and loss of cooling events in a
timely manner.
(3) The importance of testing, maintenance, and configuration control of plant features
such as reactor cavity seals or gate seals, or antisiphon devices for those plants
where failures could potentially cause loss of SFP coolant inventory sufficient to
uncover the fuel or endanger makeup capability.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-6345 (301) 415-2841 E-mail: jgienrc.gov E-mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC Tech Cont* C:TechBranch* C:PECBIDRPM D:DRPM
NAME JlBarra/SKoenick LMarsh AChaffee TMartin
m
DATE J 01/13/97 02/20/97
___._ . *. Ace5 h
/ /97 T :.IveeL &IsCE rI
1I
-
/97 UF+/-I(.AL Kt-LAJI(U tLUIYj UU~U~mr- I NiVhric %J--5KUr4rrA.LF
- * .-. * >
IN 97-XX
- March XX, 1997 conditions reduce the time to respond to SFP events. Thus, the emphasis of the findings
were on instrumentation to quickly alert the operators and effective procedures and training to
facilitate prompt operator response. The operating experience review determined that loss- of-SFP-cooling events are infrequent and the consequences of actual events have been
small. The risk assessment indicates that the SFP events are not a dominant contributor to
overall plant risk. However, because human error initiators and operator action required to
detect and correct an error are subject to large uncertainties and the large variation in design
vulnerabilities, the NRC would like to highlight to the industry:
(1) The importance of procedures and training to detect and respond to SFP loss-of- inventory and loss-of-cooling events, including those caused by loss of offsite power.
The procedures and training needed to address configuration controls that can
prevent and/or mitigate such events. The procedures and training should be
consistent with the time frames over which SFP events can proceed at the specific
plant, recognizing the plant-specific heat load and the possibility of loss of inventory
due to cavity seal or gate failures.
(2) The importance of having reliable instrumentation to monitor SFP temperature and
level and SFP area radiation, including during periods when offsite power has been
lost, in order to detect SFP loss-of-coolant inventory and loss of cooling events in a
timely manner.
(3) The importance of testing, maintenance, and configuration control of plant features
such as reactor cavity seals or gate seals, or antisiphon devices for those plants
where failures could potentially cause loss of SFP coolant inventory sufficient to
uncover the fuel or endanger makeup capability.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-6345 (301) 415-2841 E-Mail: jgi@nrc.gov E-Mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC Tech Cont* C:TechBranch* [C:PECB/DRPM D:DRPM
NAME JiBarra/SKoenick LMarsh AChaffee TMartin
DATE 01/13/97 j 02/20197 _ /197 /1 97 OFFICIALRECORD CiPY] DOCUMENT NAME: G:\SSK2\lNSFP.D3
1b3\,\
IN 97-XX
February XX, 1997 instrumentation to quickly alert the operators and effective procedures and
training to facilitate prompt operator response. The operating experience
review determined that loss-of-SFP-cooling events are infrequent and the
consequences of actual events have been small. The risk assessment indicates
that the SFP events are not a dominant contributor to overall plant risk.
However, because human error initiators and operator action required to detect
and correct an error are subject to large uncertainties and the large
variation in design vulnerabilities. the NRC would like to highlight to the
industry:
(1) The importance of procedures and training to detect and respond to SFP
loss-of-inventory and loss-of-cooling events, including those caused by
loss of offsite power. The procedures and training needed to address
configuration controls that can prevent and/or mitigate such events.
The procedures and training should be consistent with the time frames
over which SFP events can proceed at the specific plant. recognizing the
plant-specific heat load and the possibility of loss of inventory due to
cavity seal or gate failures.
(2) The importance of having reliable instrumentation to monitor SFP
temperature and level and SFP area radiation, including during periods
when offsite power has been lost, in order to detect SFP loss-of-coolant
inventory and loss of cooling events in a timely manner.
(3) The importance of testing, maintenance, and configuration control of
plant features such as reactor cavity seals or gate seals, or antisiphon
devices for those plants where failures could potentially cause loss of
SFP coolant inventory sufficient to uncover the fuel or endanger makeup
capability.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-6345 (301) 415-2841 E-Mail: jgi@nrc.gov E-Mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
I
Attachment:
NAME _
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Tech Cont C:TechBranch C:PECB/DRPM
AChaffee
D:DRPM
TMartin
DATE I /97 j 'v./097 / /97 / /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY] DOCUMENT NAME: G:\SSK2\INSFP.D2
- - . I
IN 97-XX
. =
February XX, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jose G. Ibarra, AEOD
(301) 415-6345 E-Mail: jgi@nrc.gov
Stephen Koenick, NRR
(301) 415-2841 E-Mail: ssk2@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
co -,vr
_ __ . _ _ _
OFC Tech Cont C:TechBr ch 'C:PECB/DRPM D:DRPM
lNAME &A1 . 5$0 wk-s .Rn4-+61 AChaffee TMartinl
ILOFFICIAL
DATE I //q/97 / /21/97 RECORD COPY] DOCUMENT NAME:
/ /97 G:\SSK2\INSFP.D2
/ /97 l
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list | - Information Notice 1997-01, Improper Electrical Grounding Results in Simultaneous Fires in the Control Room and the Safe-Shutdown Equipment Room (8 January 1997, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1997-02, Cracks Found in Jet Pump Riser Assembly Elbows at Boiling Water Reactors (6 February 1997, Topic: Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking)
- Information Notice 1997-03, Defacing of Labels to Comply with 10 CFR 20.1904(b) (20 February 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-04, Implementation of a New Constraint on Radioactive Air Effluents (24 February 1997, Topic: Backfit)
- Information Notice 1997-05, Offsite Notification Capabilities (27 February 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-06, Weaknesses in Plant-Specific Emergency Operating Procedures for Refilling the Secondary Side of Dry Once-Through Steam Generators (4 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-07, Problems Identified During Generic Letter 89-10 Closeout Inspections (6 March 1997, Topic: Hot Short, Safe Shutdown, Weak link)
- Information Notice 1997-08, Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents (12 March 1997, Topic: Coatings, Weak link)
- Information Notice 1997-09, Inadequate Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Setpoints and Performance Issues Associated with Long MSSV Inlet Piping (12 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-10, Liner Plate Corrosion in Concrete Containments (13 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-11, Cement Erosion from Containment Subfoundations at Nuclear Power Plants (21 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-12, Potential Armature Binding in General Electric Type Hga Relays (24 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-13, Deficient Conditions Associated with Protective Coatings at Nuclear Power Plants (24 March 1997, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-14, Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (28 March 1997, Topic: Time to boil, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-15, Reporting of Errors and Changes in Large-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Models of Fuel Vendors and Compliance with 10 CFR 50. 46(a)(3) (4 April 1997, Topic: Coatings, Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1997-16, Preconditioning of Plant Structures, Systems, and Components Before ASME Code Inservice Testing or Technical Specification Surveillance Testing (4 April 1997, Topic: Stroke time, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-17, Cracking of Vertical Welds in the Core Shroud and Degraded Repair (4 April 1997, Topic: Coatings, Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking)
- Information Notice 1997-18, Problems Identified During Maintenance Rule Baseline Inspections (14 April 1997, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Coatings, Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1997-19, Safety Injection System Weld Flaw at Sequcyah Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (18 April 1997, Topic: Boric Acid, Thermal fatigue)
- Information Notice 1997-20, Identification of Certain Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders That Do Not Comply with ANSI N14.1 Fabrication Standards (17 April 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-21, Availability of Alternate AC Power Source Designed for Station Blackout Event (18 April 1997, Topic: Main transformer failure)
- Information Notice 1997-22, Failure of Welded-Steel Moment Resisting Frames During Northridge Earthquake (25 April 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-23, Evaluation and Reporting of Fires and Unplanned Chemical Reaction Events at Fuel Cycle Facilities (7 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake, Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-24, Failure of Packing Nuts on One-Inch Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinder Valves (8 May 1997, Topic: Eddy Current Testing, Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-25, Dynamic Range Uncertainties in the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation (9 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-26, Degradation in Small-Radius U-Bend Regions of Steam Generator Tubes (19 May 1997, Topic: Eddy Current Testing, Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-27, Effect of Incorrect Strainer Pressure Drop on Available Net Positive Suction Head (16 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-28, Elimination of Instrument Response Time Testing Under the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 (30 May 1997, Topic: Enforcement Discretion)
- Information Notice 1997-29, Containment Inspection Rule (30 May 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-30, Control of Licensed Material During Reorganizations, Employee-Management Disagreements, and Financial Crises (3 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-31, Failures of Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barriers and Check Valves in Foreign Plants (3 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-32, Defective Worm Shaft Clutch Gears in Limitorque Motor-Operated Valve Actuators (10 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-33, Unanticipated Effect of Ventilation System on Tank Level Indications and Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Setpoint (11 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-34, Deficiencies in Licensee Submittals Regarding Terminology for Radiological Emergency Action Levels in Accordance with the New Part 20 (12 June 1997, Topic: Deep Dose Equivalent)
- Information Notice 1997-34, Deficiencies in Licensee Submittals Regarding Terminology for Radiological Emergency Action Levels In Accordance with the New Part 20 (12 June 1997, Topic: Deep Dose Equivalent)
- Information Notice 1997-35, Retrofit to Industrial Nuclear Company (Inc) IR100 Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility (18 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-35, Retrofit to Industrial Nuclear Company (INC) Ir100 Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility (18 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-36, Unplanned Intakes by Worker of Transuranic Airborne Radioactive Materials and External Exposure Due to Inadequate Control of Work (20 June 1997, Topic: Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1997-37, Main Transformer Fault with Ensuing Oil Spill Into Turbine Building (20 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-38, Level-Sensing System Initiates Common-Mode Faulure of High-Pressure-Injection Pumps (24 June 1997, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1997-39, Inadequate 10 CFR 72.48 Safety Evaluations of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (26 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-40, Potential Nitrogen Accumulation Resulting from Backleakage from Safety Injection Tanks (26 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-41, Revised - Potentially Undersized Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Oil Coolers (27 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-42, Management Weaknesses Resulting in Failure to Comply with Shipping Requirements for Special Nuclear Material (27 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-43, License Condition Compliance (1 July 1997, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1997-44, Failures of Gamma Metrics Wide-Range Linear Neutron Flux Channels (1 July 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-45, Environmental Qualification Deficiency for Cables & Containment Penetration Pigtails (2 July 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-46, Unisolable Crack in High-Pressure Injection Piping (9 July 1997, Topic: Flow Induced Vibration)
- Information Notice 1997-47, Inadequate Puncture Tests for Type B Packages Under 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3) (27 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-48, Inadequate or Inappropriate Interim Fire Protection Compensatory Measures (9 July 1997, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Unanalyzed Condition, Fire Barrier, Emergency Lighting, Continuous fire watch, Fire Protection Program, Fire Watch, Operability Assessment)
... further results |
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