Information Notice 1997-05, Offsite Notification Capabilities
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
February 27, 1997
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-05: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION CAPABILITIES
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors and test
and research reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform
addressees of the potential for severe natural events to disrupt communication systems that
the addressees would use to inform offsite governmental authorities of emergency conditions.
The NRC is also issuing this information notice to inform addressees of measures that some
power reactor licensees have adopted to ensure that offsite communication capabilities
remain reliable during and after severe natural events to which their sites are susceptible. It
is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and
consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained
in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Background
On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive onsite and
offsite damage near the Turkey Point site. An NRC/industry team reviewed the damage that
the hurricane caused the nuclear units and the utility's actions to prepare for the storm and
recover from it. The team also developed lessons learned that might benefit other nuclear
reactor facilities. The findings of this team were compiled in NUREG-1474, "Effect of
Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station from August 20-30, 1992,"
(Reference 1).
As part of an NRC task action plan to resolve the generic issues identified in the
NRC/industry team report, the NRC staff reviewed the existing requirements and guidance
pertaining to normal and backup offsite communication system design capabilities for
hurricanes. The objectives of this review were to consider the adequacy of the guidance for
other external events and to issue any revised guidance or requirements that might be
needed. The staff concluded that the existing requirements and guidance were adequate for
licensees to maintain reliable communication capabilities.
The staff also obtained information on the reliability of offsite communication systems at
selected sites. The NRC developed Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite
340071 An
PbS IoT/IC97-0o0
f70oZ7
IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 Communication Capabilities" (Reference 2), which contained questions to be asked by
inspectors about the capabilities of the offsite notification systems to survive severe natural
events.
Description of Circumstances
NRC inspectors implemented the TI at 17 separate reactor sites in all 4 regions. The sites
varied in the particular external events to which they were prone. Consequently, they varied
in the systems used to minimize their vulnerability to these events. The inspectors noted two
conditions at a number of plants that could result in a sustained loss of communications after
a severe natural event. These conditions are described below:
Communication Circuit Routing
Of the 17 sites inspected, 9 had wiring schemes that routed more than one communication
circuit through common conduits or equipment rooms that were not designed to withstand all
possible external (or internal) hazards. At some of the sites, cabling arrangements were
such that a single communication room on site contained necessary components for all of the
external communication circuits.
Communication Contingency Procedures
The NRC asked licensees whether they had contingency procedures for rapidly restoring the
capability to communicate with offsite agencies after its loss as a result of a catastrophic
natural disaster. At 7 of the 17 sites inspected, no formally written contingency procedures
existed. At the other 10 sites, procedures or plans varied widely in their level of detail.
These ranged from callout lists for communication technicians to formal letters of agreement
with local communication companies that were contained in full-blown disaster recovery
plans.
Discussion
Communication Circuit Routing
The routing of all or most of the communication circuits through common conduits or
equipment rooms raises the possibility of those circuits being lost in the event of a single
failure within those conduits or rooms. Appendix A to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations requires independence and diversity of systems important to safety, but
these criteria are not applied to communication systems that do not interface with the reactor
plant. It is possible, therefore, to have offsite communication systems that meet the
regulatory requirements but that could not survive natural or man-made hazards. If these
circuits were all located in a single room or building that was destroyed by fire, hurricane, tomado, or earthquake, it would be possible to lose all offsite communication capability. If
the offsite termini of these systems were similarly configured, such an event at these
locations would also interrupt all emergency messages transmitted over these circuits.
IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 At least one licensee viewed this condition as serious enough to consider obtaining a self- contained microwave antenna communication system that would be independent of its other
communication systems and therefore not be susceptible to common mode failure. This
portable system would be used to transmit emergency messages to an adjacent power
reactor site for relay to the offsite authorities in the event all other systems were disabled.
Several licensees have obtained satellite communication equipment that enables them to
maintain communication capabilities after severe natural events such as hurricanes, tomados, and floods. Such systems do not rely on ground-based transmission, but instead orbiting
satellites are used to relay messages to remote networks. They will likely be one of the only
systems that would be operational immediately after a severe event such as a major
hurricane or earthquake. Some satellite systems are highly portable and self-contained, so
that they can be deployed from a secure location for immediate use.
Communication Contingency Procedures
It is highly probable that a severe disaster that directly affects a reactor site, as Hurricane
Andrew did at Turkey Point, will disable all offsite communication capability for some finite
period of time. One lesson learned from the Hurricane Andrew disaster was the need to be
able to restore this capability as quickly as possible.
As mentioned above, the contingency procedures adopted by the plants ranged from callout
lists for communication technicians to formal disaster recovery plans. For plants relying on
callout procedures for communication technicians, a suitable method for notifying those
technicians is required in case electronic communication capability is completely lost. These
plans or procedures are of greatest value when they have been validated under conditions
likely to exist after a severe natural event. For example, if personnel likely to be available on
site during and after such an event are trained on the plans or procedures, they can
implement them quickly.
Part of the ability to quickly restore lost communication capability involves the stocking of
spare parts on site for replacement of storm-, wind-, or water-damaged equipment. Although
it is clearly not feasible for the licensee to be able to repair damaged commercial telephone
systems anywhere along the transmission lines, damaged radio or microwave systems can
be repaired almost wholly on site. The TI results showed that at seven of the sites, spare
antennae and cabling were available to repair radio or microwave systems. At some of these
seven sites, these parts were stored in structures that were not qualified to withstand the
external events that could be encountered. If these spare parts could be stored in qualified
structures and installed by knowledgeable personnel who are already on site, the downtime
for these systems could be minimized.
Related Generic Communication
NRC Information Notice 93-53, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point Nuclear
Generating Station and Lessons Leamed," July 20, 1993.
IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
.A
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew
on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating
Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.
2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite
Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.
Technical contact:
William A. Maier, NRR
(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment
February 27, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
97-04
97-03
97-02
Implementation of a
New Constraint on
Radioactive Air
Effluents
Defacing of Labels to
Comply with 10 CFR
20.190(b)
Cracks Found in Jet Pump
Riser Assembly Elbows at
Boiling Water Reactors
Improper Electrical Ground- ing Results in Simultaneous
Fires in the Control Room
and the Safe-Shutdown Equip- ment Room
Undetected Failure that
May Occur During Patient
Treatments with Teletherapy
Devices
Licensee Response to Indi- cations of Tampering, Van- dalism, or Malicious Mis- chief
02/24/97
02/20/97
02/06/97
01/08/97
12/24/96
12/27/96
All materials, fuel
cycle, and non-power
reactor licensees
All material licensees
involved with disposal
of medical waste
All holders of OLs
or CPs for boiling
water nuclear power
reactors models 3,
4, 5 and 6, except
those licenses that
have been amended to
possession-only
status
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors
All teletherapy
licensees
All holders of OLs
or CPs for nuclear
power reactors
97-01
96-72
96-71 OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
original signed by
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew
on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating
Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.
2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite
Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.
Technical contact:
William A. Maier, NRR
(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 12/09/96 DOCUMENT NAME: G:MARGIE\\OFFSITEN.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
To receive a copy of this document indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy
OFFICE
Contacts:
E
BC:PERB
I E
BC:PECB
D:D
NAME
WMaier*
CMiller*
AChaffee:jkd*
4artin
JTappert*
DATE
01/10/97
01/10/97
01/16/97
02Pj/97
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
original signed by
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew
on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating
Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.
2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite
Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.
Technical contact:
William A. Maier, NRR
(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 12/09/96 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\MARGIE\\OFFSITEN.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
To receive a copy of his document, Indicate In the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy wth attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
OFFICE
Contacts:
E
BC:PERB
E
BC:PECB
l
NAME
WMaier*
CMiller*
AChaffee-jkd*
artin
JTappert*
DATE
01/10/97
01/10/97
01/16/97
02JY/97
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 97-05 February 12, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1. NUREG-1474, -Effect of Hurricane Andrew
on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating
Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.
2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite
Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.
Technical contact:
William A. Maier, NRR
(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 12/09/96 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\MARGIE\\OFFSITEN.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
OFFICE
Contacts:
_ E
BC:PERB
I E
BC:PECB
IE D
I
NAME
WMaier*
CMiller*
AChaffee:jkd*
Aitin
JTappert*
.
DATE
01/10/97
0
/01/16/97
02-#97
-OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY
IN 97-xx
January xx, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew
on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating
Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.
2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite
Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.
Technical contact:
William A. Maier, NRR
(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wamenrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\MARGIE\\OFFSITEN.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
I
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlendosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
OFFICE
Contacts:
I E
BC:PERB
I E
BC:PECB
I
D:DRPM f
n l
NAME
WMaier'
CMiller
AChaffee:jkd
TMartin U
JTappert*
a__
_
DATE
01/10/97
01/10/97
01/It'97
- 3;/97 UrrI-NUAL KM;UKU UUVY
4qP,
111,31 7
IN 97-xx
January xx, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating
Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.
2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite Communication Capabilities,"
January 18, 1996.
Technical Contact:
William A. Maier, NRR
(301) 415-2926 Email: wam@nrc.gov
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\MARGIE\\OFFSITEN.IN
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy
OFFICE
Contacts:
BC:PERB
BC:PECB
l
D:DRPM
NAME
WMaier tA*'-
CMiller
AChaffee:jkd
T~artin
l
~~JTappert 4fl c2 DATE
o1-6
71/o/
CIA
I
12/ /96
>9\\
12/ /96 OFFICIAL RECO)RD COPY