Information Notice 1997-05, Offsite Notification Capabilities

Offsite Notification Capabilities

ML031050382
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	02/27/1997
From:	Martin T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-97-005, NUDOCS 9702240071
Download: ML031050382 (10)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-05: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION CAPABILITIES

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors and test

and research reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform

addressees of the potential for severe natural events to disrupt communication systems that

the addressees would use to inform offsite governmental authorities of emergency conditions.

The NRC is also issuing this information notice to inform addressees of measures that some

power reactor licensees have adopted to ensure that offsite communication capabilities

remain reliable during and after severe natural events to which their sites are susceptible. It

is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and

consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained

in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Background

On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive onsite and

offsite damage near the Turkey Point site. An NRC/industry team reviewed the damage that

the hurricane caused the nuclear units and the utility's actions to prepare for the storm and

recover from it. The team also developed lessons learned that might benefit other nuclear

reactor facilities. The findings of this team were compiled in NUREG-1474, "Effect of

Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station from August 20-30, 1992,"

(Reference 1).

As part of an NRC task action plan to resolve the generic issues identified in the

NRC/industry team report, the NRC staff reviewed the existing requirements and guidance

pertaining to normal and backup offsite communication system design capabilities for

hurricanes. The objectives of this review were to consider the adequacy of the guidance for

other external events and to issue any revised guidance or requirements that might be

needed. The staff concluded that the existing requirements and guidance were adequate for

licensees to maintain reliable communication capabilities.

The staff also obtained information on the reliability of offsite communication systems at

selected sites. The NRC developed Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite

340071 An PbS IoT/IC97-0o0 f70oZ7

IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 Communication Capabilities" (Reference 2), which contained questions to be asked by

inspectors about the capabilities of the offsite notification systems to survive severe natural

events.

Description of Circumstances

NRC inspectors implemented the TI at 17 separate reactor sites in all 4 regions. The sites

varied in the particular external events to which they were prone. Consequently, they varied

in the systems used to minimize their vulnerability to these events. The inspectors noted two

conditions at a number of plants that could result in a sustained loss of communications after

a severe natural event. These conditions are described below:

Communication Circuit Routing

Of the 17 sites inspected, 9 had wiring schemes that routed more than one communication

circuit through common conduits or equipment rooms that were not designed to withstand all

possible external (or internal) hazards. At some of the sites, cabling arrangements were

such that a single communication room on site contained necessary components for all of the

external communication circuits.

Communication Contingency Procedures

The NRC asked licensees whether they had contingency procedures for rapidly restoring the

capability to communicate with offsite agencies after its loss as a result of a catastrophic

natural disaster. At 7 of the 17 sites inspected, no formally written contingency procedures

existed. At the other 10 sites, procedures or plans varied widely in their level of detail.

These ranged from callout lists for communication technicians to formal letters of agreement

with local communication companies that were contained in full-blown disaster recovery

plans.

Discussion

Communication Circuit Routing

The routing of all or most of the communication circuits through common conduits or

equipment rooms raises the possibility of those circuits being lost in the event of a single

failure within those conduits or rooms. Appendix A to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of

Federal Regulations requires independence and diversity of systems important to safety, but

these criteria are not applied to communication systems that do not interface with the reactor

plant. It is possible, therefore, to have offsite communication systems that meet the

regulatory requirements but that could not survive natural or man-made hazards. If these

circuits were all located in a single room or building that was destroyed by fire, hurricane, tomado, or earthquake, it would be possible to lose all offsite communication capability. If

the offsite termini of these systems were similarly configured, such an event at these

locations would also interrupt all emergency messages transmitted over these circuits.

IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 At least one licensee viewed this condition as serious enough to consider obtaining a self- contained microwave antenna communication system that would be independent of its other

communication systems and therefore not be susceptible to common mode failure. This

portable system would be used to transmit emergency messages to an adjacent power

reactor site for relay to the offsite authorities in the event all other systems were disabled.

Several licensees have obtained satellite communication equipment that enables them to

maintain communication capabilities after severe natural events such as hurricanes, tomados, and floods. Such systems do not rely on ground-based transmission, but instead orbiting

satellites are used to relay messages to remote networks. They will likely be one of the only

systems that would be operational immediately after a severe event such as a major

hurricane or earthquake. Some satellite systems are highly portable and self-contained, so

that they can be deployed from a secure location for immediate use.

Communication Contingency Procedures

It is highly probable that a severe disaster that directly affects a reactor site, as Hurricane

Andrew did at Turkey Point, will disable all offsite communication capability for some finite

period of time. One lesson learned from the Hurricane Andrew disaster was the need to be

able to restore this capability as quickly as possible.

As mentioned above, the contingency procedures adopted by the plants ranged from callout

lists for communication technicians to formal disaster recovery plans. For plants relying on

callout procedures for communication technicians, a suitable method for notifying those

technicians is required in case electronic communication capability is completely lost. These

plans or procedures are of greatest value when they have been validated under conditions

likely to exist after a severe natural event. For example, if personnel likely to be available on

site during and after such an event are trained on the plans or procedures, they can

implement them quickly.

Part of the ability to quickly restore lost communication capability involves the stocking of

spare parts on site for replacement of storm-, wind-, or water-damaged equipment. Although

it is clearly not feasible for the licensee to be able to repair damaged commercial telephone

systems anywhere along the transmission lines, damaged radio or microwave systems can

be repaired almost wholly on site. The TI results showed that at seven of the sites, spare

antennae and cabling were available to repair radio or microwave systems. At some of these

seven sites, these parts were stored in structures that were not qualified to withstand the

external events that could be encountered. If these spare parts could be stored in qualified

structures and installed by knowledgeable personnel who are already on site, the downtime

for these systems could be minimized.

Related Generic Communication

NRC Information Notice 93-53, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point Nuclear

Generating Station and Lessons Leamed," July 20, 1993.

IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

.A

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew

on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating

Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.

2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite

Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.

Technical contact: William A. Maier, NRR

(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment

IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

97-04 Implementation of a 02/24/97 All materials, fuel

New Constraint on cycle, and non-power

Radioactive Air reactor licensees

Effluents

97-03 Defacing of Labels to 02/20/97 All material licensees

Comply with 10 CFR involved with disposal

20.190(b) of medical waste

97-02 Cracks Found in Jet Pump 02/06/97 All holders of OLs

Riser Assembly Elbows at or CPs for boiling

Boiling Water Reactors water nuclear power

reactors models 3,

4, 5 and 6, except

those licenses that

have been amended to

possession-only

status

97-01 Improper Electrical Ground- 01/08/97 All holders of OLs

ing Results in Simultaneous or CPs for nuclear

Fires in the Control Room power reactors

and the Safe-Shutdown Equip- ment Room

96-72 Undetected Failure that 12/24/96 All teletherapy

May Occur During Patient licensees

Treatments with Teletherapy

Devices

96-71 Licensee Response to Indi- 12/27/96 All holders of OLs

cations of Tampering, Van- or CPs for nuclear

dalism, or Malicious Mis- power reactors

chief

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

original signed by

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew

on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating

Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.

2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite

Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.

Technical contact: William A. Maier, NRR

(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 12/09/96 DOCUMENT NAME: G:MARGIE\OFFSITEN.IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

To receive a copy of this document indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy

OFFICE Contacts: E BC:PERB IE BC:PECB D:D

NAME WMaier* CMiller* AChaffee:jkd* 4artin

JTappert*

DATE 01/10/97 01/10/97 01/16/97 02Pj/97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 97-05 February 27, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

original signed by

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew

on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating

Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.

2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite

Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.

Technical contact: William A. Maier, NRR

(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 12/09/96 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\MARGIE\OFFSITEN.IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

N = No copy

To receive a copy of his document, Indicate In the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy wth attachmentlenclosure

OFFICE Contacts: E BC:PERB E BC:PECB l

NAME WMaier* CMiller* AChaffee-jkd* artin

JTappert*

DATE 01/10/97 01/10/97 01/16/97 02JY/97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 97-05 February 12, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. NUREG-1474, -Effect of Hurricane Andrew

on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating

Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.

2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite

Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.

Technical contact: William A. Maier, NRR

(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wam@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 12/09/96 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\MARGIE\OFFSITEN.IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy

OFFICE Contacts: _ E BC:PERB IE BC:PECB IE D I

NAME WMaier* CMiller* AChaffee:jkd* Aitin

JTappert* .

DATE 01/10/97 0 /01/16/97 02-#97

-OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 97-xx

January xx, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew

on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating

Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.

2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite

Communication Capabilities," January 18, 1996.

Technical contact: William A. Maier, NRR

(301) 415-2926 E-mail: wamenrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\MARGIE\OFFSITEN.IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES I

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlendosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy

OFFICE Contacts: IE BC:PERB IE BC:PECB I D:DRPM f n l

NAME WMaier' CMiller AChaffee:jkd TMartin U

JTappert* _ a__

DATE 01/10/97 01/10/97 01/It'97 *3;/97 UrrI-NUAL KM;UKU UUVY

4qP, 111,31 7

IN 97-xx

January xx, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

References

1. NUREG-1474, "Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating

Station from August 20-30, 1992," March 1993.

2. Temporary Instruction 2515/131, "Licensee Offsite Communication Capabilities,"

January 18, 1996.

William A. Maier, NRR

(301) 415-2926 Email: wam@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\MARGIE\OFFSITEN.IN

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy wlo attachmentlenclosure E=Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy

OFFICE Contacts: BC:PERB IC BC:PECB l D:DRPM

NAME WMaier tA*'- CMiller AChaffee:jkd T~artin

l ~~JTappert 4fl c2 DATE o1-6 71/o/

42O-FFI-CIA I 12/ /96 >9\ 12/ /96 OFFICIAL RECO)RD COPY