Information Notice 1997-08, Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents
KJ
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 12, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-08: POTENTIAL FAILURES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC
MAGNE-BLAST CIRCUIT BREAKER
SUBCOMPONENTS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
addressees to potential failures of six subcomponents in General Electric (GE) type AM or
AMH 4.16-kV circuit breakers that can render the breakers inoperable. The subcomponents
in question are (1) the trip crank, (2) the CR2940 contact blocks that make up the power
switch assembly, (3) the manual trip lever and its supporting "L" bracket in the AMH
horizontal drawout breakers, (4) the cotter pin that holds the latch pawl hinge pin in place,
(5) the spring charging motor tie bolts, and (6) the type HMA control relay. It is expected that
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
DescriDtion of Circumstances
Trip Crank Failures
The NRC has learned that several plants have experienced failures of the trip crank (GE Part
No. 105C9316G1, Piece No. 28 of Figure 1 in GE ML-13 Mechanism Renewal Parts Bulletin
GEF-4379) in Magne-Blast circuit breakers. These failures occurred when the pin at the end
of the crank broke off. The pin may break off the crank when the trip coil is energized. The
trip crank pin inserts into a hole in the lower end of the link between the trip crank and the
trip coil armature. If the pin breaks off before the trip crank can successfully rotate the trip
shaft (which has been the case in most instances), the breaker will fail to trip electrically
(although it can still be tripped with its local manual pushbutton).
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IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 Discussion
Trip Crank Failures
GE has attributed the broken pins to three principal factors: (1) lack of adequate control of
one of the critical machined dimensions on the pin during the early 1970s, (2) lack of
adequate fusion in some of the pin-to-plate welds, and (3) grinding of the weld
reinforcements flush on the back of the trip crank plates. Upon being informed of the first
instances of pin failure in 1988 (at Tennessee Valley Authority's Wafts Bar Nuclear Plant),
GE instituted more rigorous quality control checks on the pins and finished trip cranks. GE
also revised the pin weld detail on is trip crank fabrication drawing (105C9316) and added
"DO NOT GRIND FLUSH." Several failures were reported after the initial Watts Bar report, and many potentially susceptible breakers were found in the field, all with their original trip
cranks made in the early 1970s. However, no instances of failures of trip cranks
manufactured after 1988 have been reported.
Also, if the remote trip signal (either from a protective relay or a manual hand switch) is
applied for more than a few seconds (which it normally is) and the breaker fails to trip (such
as it would if the trip crank pin broke), neither the breaker-mounted auxiliary switch nor the
stationary (cubicle-mounted) auxiliary switch will signal control circuits that the breaker has
opened, and thus the trip signal will normally remain applied. Energizing the trip coil (which
is normally energized only momentarily) for an extended period may open-circuit the coil, thereby rendering it permanently inoperable.
Trip cranks that are potentially susceptible to this failure can be identified without
disassembly of the breaker mechanism. With the mechanism front cover removed, the gap
between the trip crank and the right side of the mechanism frame may be seen. It is then
possible to see whether the weld reinforcement has been ground off. GE is preparing a
service advisory letter (SAL) on this problem in which it intends to recommend replacement
of any trip cranks that do not have the proper thickness of pin weld reinforcement (1/32-1/16 inch). GE Philadelphia Operation (GE PO) can furnish replacement cranks.
DescriDtion of Circumstances
Contact Block CR2940 Contact Resistance
On February 12, 1996, the FitzPatrick licensee experienced failure of two residual heat
removal service water (RHRSW) pumps to start, on demand because their supply breakers
failed to close. RHRSW pump C failed to start on demand during monthly surveillance
testing and RHRSW pump A failed to start when attempting to place it in service as part of a
suppression pool cooling evolution. The licensee's investigation found that the Magne-Blast
breakers failed to close because high resistance across one of the power switch assembly
contacts prevented the closing coil from being energized.
I IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 Discussion
Contact Block CR2940 Contact Resistance
The power switch assembly consists of three GE type CR2940 contact blocks stacked
together so that all three sets of contacts are actuated by a single striker. Two of the
contacts (1-2 and 3-4) are normally open and are held closed by the striker during the spring
charging operation. When the charging cycle is complete, the contacts spring-return to the
open position to cut off power to the spring charging motor and the control (anti-pump) relay
(52Y). The third set of contacts (5-6) is normally closed and is included as an option to allow
remote indication of the closing spring status (charg.d/discharged), usually by means of a
white indicator light in the control room. This third contact is often called the "white lighr'
contact for this reason. This contact is wired Into the breaker control circuitry such that
failure of the contact to close will prevent the breaker closing coil (52X) from being energized
and the breaker cannot be closed electrically.
The licensee determined that the CR2940 contacts were misapplied in the Magne-Blast
breaker control circuitry because the contacts are rated for only 2.2 amps dc and are
required to interrupt 6.0 amps dc (Licensee Event Report 50/333 96-002, Accession No.
960410298). The licensee also observed that the contacts seemed to show signs of arcing
(blackened, pitted surface) after about 2,000 operations, even though the recommended
breaker service life is 10,000 operations. General maintenance Instructions in GE Technical
Manual GEI-88771D, "Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker," states that the 1,200-amp breakers are
capable of performing up to 5,000 operations and the 2,000-amp breakers are capable of
performing 3,000 operations before any replacement of parts should be necessary.
Resistance measurements across the failed contacts varied between 200-1000 ohms.
Contacts with 1,500 operations or less did not have the arcing indications, nor did they have
high resistance readings. The licensee also noted that there were no recommendations to
check the contact resistance during periodic preventive maintenance in the vendor's
maintenance manual. There was disagreement between the plant's drawings and the
manufacturer's wiring diagrams. The manufacturer's wiring diagram indicates that the 5-6 contact should be jumpered out when not used. One of the plant drawings shows that when
the 5-6 contact is "not fumished," it should be jumpered. The 5-6 contact is not shown at all
on the plant RHRSW pump circuit breaker elementary drawing.
The FitzPatrick licensee has also experienced failure of CR2940 contact blocks used as latch
checking switches in Magne-Blast breakers, even though the contacts do not experience
significant "make" or "break" current. The licensee believes that these failures could be
related to aging or the number of operations and is evaluating whether periodic replacement
may be necessary.
In a letter dated June 14, 1996, GE Nuclear Energy informed the FitzPatrick licensee that the
suitability of the CR2940 contact blocks in the ML-1 3 operating mechanism for the Magne- Blast breaker was confirmed by testing the breaker in accordance with applicable American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) and National Electrical Manufacturers Association
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 (NEMA) standards. Operability of the contacts was demonstrated by breaker life cycle testing
of 10,000 operations with no failure of the contact blocks, and there is no requirement to
replace the contacts on the basis of age or the number of operations. However, GE stated
that according to applicable NEMA standards, the maximum number of operations between
servicing is 2,000. The operations are listed on the basis of servicing at intervals of
6 months or less. GE also stated that although the published instructions do not specifically
address the contact block resistance, instructions for checking the control power during
servicing include measuring the operating voltage at the closing coil, the trip coil, and the
charging motor terminals. GE believes that this type of testing would reveal whether the
contacts required replacement. GE stated that the wiring diagram clearly indicates that the
5-6 contact should be jumpered out when the 'White light" function is not utilized. In addition, the drawing shows that another CR2940 contact used as a latch check switch in the closing
coil circuit should also be jumpered out when this feature is not used.
GE concluded that although the contact blocks were suitable for use in the Magne-Blast
breakers, the operability demands of the nuclear po~wer industry and the recently reported
problems from the field indicated that the contact blocks were a weak link in the design of the
control circuitry. GE recommended the following actions in the June 14, 1996 letter
- In control schemes where the "52 SM/LS" (5-6) contact is installed but not utilized, it
should be jumpered out of the circuit.
- In control schemes where the "52 SM/LS" (5-6) contact is installed and utilized for
"white light" indication, but the "auto reclose" function is not used, the wiring should be
revised to remove the contact from the close coil circuit. GE can furnish a revised
wiring diagram and nameplate.
- For the CL/MS application, where the contact block is used to break charging motor
current, GE is evaluating a replacement device. The new switch will have a higher de
interrupting rating and will be furnished for those applications where breaker
applications require the increased durability.
GE plans to issue a SAL concerning the CR2940 contact blocks in March- 1997.
Description of Circumstances
Bent Manual Trip Lever and Cracked "L" Bracket
During surveillance testing in June and July 1996, the licensee for Calvert Cliffs identified two
problems with type AMH-4.76-250 (horizontal drawout) Magne-Blast circuit breakers. In the
first case, a low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump breaker failed to close. The licensee
found that the trip lever was bent and there was no gap between the trip lever and the
manual trip rod. Although no gap value is given in the vendor manual, there is generally a
small gap between the trip lever paddle and the manual trip rod. The bent trip lever
prevented the trip latch from fully rotating onto the stop pin, resulting in a less than optimal
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 area of contact (wipe) between the latch and the stop pin. As a result, the breaker would
experience intermittent failure to close.
A second LPSI pump circuit breaker failed to close during monthly testing at Calvert Cliffs in
July 1996. Investigation found that in addition to the trip levers being bent, the "L" bracket
support for the trip lever was also cracked. The "L"bracket is designed to support the trip
lever and provide additional stiffness. A subsequent inspection of other breakers at Calvert
Cliffs found that one other breaker had a bent trip lever and two other breakers had cracked
"L" brackets.
Discussion
Bent Manual Trip Lever and Cracked "L" Bracket
GE performed extensive testing on one of the failed Calvert Cliffs breakers and concluded
that the most probable cause was insufficient trip latch reset spring force caused by either
incorrect or damaged springs originally installed at the factory. GE recommended a
modification to the Calvert Cliffs breakers to prevent further cases of trip lever bending and
"L" bracket failures. The modification consists of replacing the trip paddles, the support
bracket, and the spring discharge link. The trip lever material was changed from American
Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) 1005 carbon steel to AISI 1018 carbon steel. The "L" bracket
was changed from AISI 1005 steel to aluminum. The configuration of the components was
also changed.
The modification corrects for the weak spring and allows the breaker to retain operability with
the weak spring installed. Replacement of the trip latch reset spring is not part of the normal
maintenance or overhaul activity. Replacement of the spring requires that a V-notch be cut
into the breaker angle support to allow removal of the trip shaft. The Calvert Cliffs licensee
plans to replace the weak springs in the breakers during the next scheduled overhaul.
The modification kit is available as Catalog No. 0172C8186G001. GE plans to issue a SAL
on this issue by April 30, 1997.
Description of Circumstances
Cotter Pins for the Latch Pawl Hinge Pin and Charging Motor Tie Bolts
On September 13, 1996, the licensee for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station discovered
during a tagging procedure that the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) was inoperable.
The EDG output circuit breaker (GE type AMA4.16 kV Magne-Blast) was found in its normally
open position, but its closing springs were discharged. With the springs discharged, the
breaker was incapable of closing.
Subsequent investigation by the Vermont Yankee licensee determined that the spring
charging motor had run to failure because the cotter pin that holds the latch pawl hinge pin in
position broke. The ears of the cotter pin had apparently broken and allowed the cotter pin
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 to fall out, thus allowing the hinge pin to work its way out of position and prevent the latch
pawls from holding the ratchet wheel in place during the charging operation. The charging
springs were not compressed, and the charging motor continued to run until it overheated
and the motor winding open-circuited. Three of the four charging motor tie bolts that connect
the motor portion to the gear housing were also found lying on the floor of the breaker cell.
Vermont Yankee personnel inspected other similar breakers and found that 18 cotter pins
were either degraded (one or both "ears" broken off) or undersized, and in one case a cotter
pin was missing from the latch pawl hinge pin. Three breakers were also found with one or
more loose charging motor tie bolts.
On November 25, 1996, after learning of the event at Vermont Yankee, the licensee for
FitzPatrick performed an inspection and identified 10 out of 18 safety-related Magne-Blast
breakers with degraded coffer pins latch pawl hinge pins. Similar to the failure at Vermont
Yankee, the cotter pins had one or both ears broken off. One undersized cotter pin was also
found, but it was not broken and the licensee determined that it had been installed by plant
personnel.
Discussion
Coffer Pins for the Latch Pawl Hinge Pin and Charging Motor Tie Bolts
The latch pawl hinge pin was originally designed in 1962 to be held in place by cotter pins at
either end. In 1979, GE enhanced the design of the hinge pin assembly by tapping an
existing hole in the hinge pin support bracket and installing a bolt with a washer large enough
to overlap the hinge pin. Using the bolt and washer to hold the hinge pin in place precluded
the need for coffer pins. According to GE, this enhancement was made only to aid in
disassembly and reassembly of the breaker during maintenance, and not because of any
perceived problem with the cotter pins. As a result, GE did not deem it necessary to inform
customers of the change in 1979. Testing performed by GE in 1996 demonstrated that the
cotter pins may experience damage after approximately 2,000 operations. GE plans to issue
a SAL on this issue in March 1997.
Two different styles of charging motors are used in Magne-Blast breakers. Initially, GE used
motors manufactured by the Sioux Tool Company of Sioux City, Iowa. In the early 1970s, GE switched to motors made by Millers Falls (later bought by Ingersoll/Rand). In the late
1970s, GE went back to using the Sioux Tool Company as the charging motor supplier for
the Magne-Blast breakers and still uses it today when customers order replacements.
The two different types of charging motor can be easily identified. Two black cover plates
conceal the tie bolts on the Sioux motors, and thus the bolts are not visible from the outside.
The cover plates have to be removed to gain access to the four bolt heads, and the tie bolts
are inserted from the motor housing into the gear housing. In contrast, the tie bolts on the
Millers Falls (Ingersoll/Rand) motors have exposed heads and are inserted from the gear
housing into the motor housing. The motors with the loose bolts at Vermont Yankee were
Millers Falls motors.
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997
Description of Circumstances
Type HMA Control Relay
On December 1, 1996, a Magne-Blast breaker serving as a vital bus feed breaker failed to
close on demand during surveillance testing at Salem Nuclear Generating Station. The
licensee determined that the HMA control relay (the anti-pump relay [52YJ) normally closed
contacts failed to reclose when the relay was deenergized because of binding of the
armature against the molded phenolic post. With the contacts stuck in the open position, the
closing circuit cannot be completed and the breaker cannot be closed electrically.
Discussion
Type HMA Control Relay
The relay was sent to the vendor (GE Power Management [GE PM], Malvem, Pennsylvania)
for detailed failure analysis. The vendor found that there was no clearance between one side
of the armature tailpiece and the molded post. Normally, when an HMA relay is assembled
at the factory, the armature is centered between the two molded posts with a gap of
0.005 inch on each side.
The vendor recalled that a similar situation occurred in 1982 and prompted the issuance of
SAL 721-PSM No. 171.1, "HMA Relay Armature Binding," on December 17, 1982. The
original SAL stated that a tool problem at the factory in 1974 caused several relays to have
improper clearance between the armature and the molded posts. The SAL suggested that
the proper clearance could be achieved by first removing the armature stop clamping nut and
lifting the stop and armature tailpiece from between the molded posts, and then removing
some of the phenolic post material.
The NRC discussed this issue with GE PM. The vendor stated that the armature could be
checked for the proper clearance between the armature and the molded posts by use of
feeler gauges. A gap of less than 0.002 inch on either side indicates an adjustment is
needed. However, the original SAL stated that the solution was to remove some of the
phenolic material from the posts and did not mention that customers could first try to adjust
the armature to achieve the proper clearance. If the relay does not have the proper
clearance, usually all that is needed is to loosen the armature stop clamping nut, center the
armature between the two posts, retighten the nut, and then check the clearances again.
The vendor also stated that although the recommended minimum gap given in the original
SAL is 0.005 inch on each side, a gap of 0.002 inch is considered adequate for reliable
operation.
Related Generic Communications
GE issued SAL 073-352.1, "Latest Design Configuration: GE Type AM Circuit Breakers and
Medium Voltage Switchgear," on July 7, 1995, to alert customers to design changes made in
the circuit breakers, their operating mechanisms, and the switchgear. Some of the listed
design changes were discussed in previous SALs, while other changes were not originally
conveyed to customers because the changes were made to facilitate assembly, maintenance,
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 or operation of the equipment. The SAL states that customers should evaluate each item
listed and consider the applicability to their particular equipment.
Recent NRC information notices (Ins) concerning Magne-Blast circuit breakers are as follows:
IN 90-41, "Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit
Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.
IN 93-91, "Misadjustment Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their
Associated Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.
IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," issued
August 1, 1994.
IN 96-43, "Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers," issued August 12,
1996.
IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective Coatings in
Refurbished Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Direct
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR
(301) 415-2980
E-mail: kmenrc.gov
Stephen Alexander, NRR
(301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
v72kVVLPU J
Attachment
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
97-07 Problems Identified 03/06/97 All holders of OLs
During Generic Letter or CPs for nuclear
89-10 Closeout power reactors
Inspections
97-06 Weaknesses in Plant- 03/04/97 All holders of OLs
Specific Emergency or CPs for nuclear
Operating Procedures power reactors with
for Refilling the with once-through
Secondary Side of Dry steam generators
Once-Through Steam
Generators
91-85, Potential Failures of 02/27/97 All holders of OLs
Rev. 1 Thermostatic Control or CPs for nuclear
Valves or Diesel power reactors
Generator Jacket
Cooling Water
97-05 Offsite Notification 02/27/97 All holders of OLs
Capabilities or CPs for nuclear
power reactors and
test and research
reactors
97-04 Implementation of a New 02/24/97 All materials, fuel
Constraint on Radioactive cycle, and non-power
Air Effluents reactor licensees
97-03 Defacing of Labels to 02/20/97 All material licensees
Comply with 10 CFR involved with disposal
20.1904(b) of medical waste
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 or operation of the equipment. The SAL states that customers should evaluate each item
listed and consider the applicability to their particular equipment.
Recent NRC information notices (Ins) concerning Magne-Blast circuit breakers are as follows:
IN 90-41, "Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit
Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.
IN 93-91, "Misadjustment Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their
Associated Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.
IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," Issued
August 1, 1994.
IN 96-43, "Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers," issued August 12,
1996.
IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective Coatings in
Refurbished Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
original signed by M.M. Slosson
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR Stephen Alexander, NRR
(301) 415-2980 (301) 415-2995 E-mail: km@nrc.gov E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 02/26/07 DOCUMENT NAME: G:XDLS\IN97-XX.BKR *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
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DAE DSkeen*
02/27/97 02/27/97 j03/_ _ __ _ _
__97_
__ _ __ _ _ __ _ _
OFFICIA REORCOPY
IN 97-XX
March XX, 1997 or operation of the equipment. The SAL states that customers should evaluate each item
listed and consider the applicability to their particular equipment.
Recent NRC information notices (Ins) concerning Magne-Blast circuit breakers are as follows:
IN 90-41, "Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit
Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.
IN 93-91, "Misadjustment Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their
Associated Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.
IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," issued
August 1, 1994.
IN 9643, "Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers," issued August 12,
1996.
IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective Coatings in
Refurbished Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you, have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR Stephen Alexander, NRR
(301) 415-2980 (301) 415-2995 E-mail: kmenrc.gov E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC PECB:DRPM PSIB:DISP CIPSIB:DISP JCIPECB:DRPM
NAME D. Skeene K. Naidu R. Gallo A. Chaffed
DATE IA 97 02 125197 02/25197 ,94R97 t : In AL -
OFC I DIDRPM 4r.v 9LS7/6W77 NAME IT. Martin
DATE I /97 UFFIUIAL RECORDU LCVYJ DOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLSXIN97-XX.BKR
IN 97-XX
February XX, 1997 Page 8of 8 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR
(301) 415-2980
E-mail: km@nrc.gov
Stephen Alexander, NRR
(301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC PECB:DRPM PSIB:DISP CIPSIB:DISP C/PECB:DRPM
NAM l DSke K. Naidu R. Gallo l 9F l
DATE k .Q797 02 /25/97 02/25/97 , G97 -JK9
9\C
OFC D/DRPM
NAM T. Martin
E I_/97 DATE / /97
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: G:%DLS\IN97-XX.BKR
U-
K> IN 97-XX
February XX, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program anagement
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Kamalakar Naidu, NRR
(301) 415-2980
E-mail: km@nrc.gov
Stephen Alexander, NRR
(301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC PECB:DRPM j PSIB:DISP C/PSIB:DISP C/PECB:DRPM
NAM l
eViu ,dGF A. Chaffee
DATE 24. 97 l, /7g97 97 I/ /97 OFC D/DRPM
NAM T. Martin
DATE / /97
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLSUlN97-XX.BKR