IR 05000282/2001019
| ML020720563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/2002 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Nazar M Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-01-019 | |
| Download: ML020720563 (32) | |
Text
March 13, 2002
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/01-19; 50-306/01-19
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On February 14, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on February 14, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. During this inspection, Temporary Instruction 2515/145, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, for Unit 2 and 2515/146, Hydrogen Storage Location, were closed.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, Original signed by Roger D. Lanksbury Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-282/01-19; 50-306/01-19
REGION III==
Docket Nos:
50-282, 50-306 License Nos:
50-282/01-19; 50-306/01-19 Licensee:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location:
1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates:
December 30, 2001, through February 14, 2002 Inspectors:
S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector S. Thomas, Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector, Monticello D. Kimble, Resident Inspector, Monticello R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst D. Jones, Reactor Engineer M. Mitchell, Radiation Specialist Approved by:
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000282-01-19; IR 05000306-01-19, on 12/30/2001-2/14/2002; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2, Resident Inspector Report.
This report covers a 7-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, region-based emergency preparedness, radiation protection and inservice inspection specialists. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation.
A.
Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except that power was briefly reduced to about 40 percent on January 19-20, 2002, for turbine valve testing. Unit 2 was operated at or near full power until January 18, 2002, when the operators began a gradual coastdown in power. Power had decreased to 88 percent on February 1, 2002, at which time Unit 2 was shutdown for a refueling. Unit 2 remained in a refueling shutdown for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed walkdowns of risk significant equipment trains to verify that the redundant train was in the correct lineup while the opposite train was unavailable.
The inspectors used the checklists and drawings listed at the end of this report to determine the correct lineups. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders (WOs) and condition reports (CRs) associated with each train to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. Significant WOs and CRs reviewed are listed at the end of this report. The inspectors used the information in the sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and Technical Specifications (TS) listed at the end of this report to determine the functional requirements of the systems. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also observed the material condition of the equipment to verify that there were no significant conditions not already in the licensees work control system. The inspectors also reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the walkdowns were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
Walkdowns were conducted on the following trains:
!
the D6 diesel generator while the D5 diesel generator was unavailable for preventive maintenance, and
!
the Unit 1 containment spray system while the 13 containment fan coil unit inlet valve was unavailable for corrective maintenance.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Area Walkdowns a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use, that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits, and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the walkdowns were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The following areas were inspected:
!
Fire Area 59: Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, 715 foot elevation; and
!
Fire Area 74: Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, 715 foot elevation.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 (Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/146: Hydrogen Storage Locations a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors completed the inspection requirements of the TI to confirm that distances between any hydrogen storage capacity and ventilation intakes or risk significant tanks, systems, structures, or components were greater than 50 feet. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed heat exchanger performance testing on the 21 and 22 component cooling heat exchangers, performed in accordance with the procedure listed at the end of this report. The inspectors reviewed the testing to verify that it was performed with the maximum practical heat load on the heat exchangers, that the test acceptance criteria appropriately considered the difference between the test conditions and design conditions, that the test results met the pre-established acceptance criteria, and that the design assumptions were consistent with the actual condition of the heat exchangers with respect to tube plugging. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI)
program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary and the risk significant piping system boundaries. Specifically, the inspectors observed in-process ultrasonic and magnetic particle inspections of feedwater weld 24 (2-ISI-49) and conducted a record review of the ultrasonic examination of RHR weld 18 (2-ISI-51) to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements. The inspectors also conducted a review of work packages and radiographs of the pressurizer spray valve (CV 31228 and CV 31229) replacement and reviewed inservice inspection procedures and personnel and equipment certifications.
The inspectors reviewed the NIS-2 forms for Code repairs performed during the last outage (Refueling Outage No. 20) to confirm that ASME Code requirements were met.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports concerning inservice inspection issues to verify that an appropriate threshold for identifying issues had been established.
The inspectors also evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for identified issues.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed systems to verify that the licensee properly implemented the maintenance rule for structures, systems, or components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:
!
whether the SSC was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
!
whether the performance problem constituted a maintenance rule functional failure;
!
the proper safety significance classification;
!
the proper 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSC; and
!
the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).
The above aspects were evaluated by using the maintenance rule scoping and report documents listed at the end of this report. For each SSC reviewed, the inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and CRs listed at the end of this report to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered in the licensees corrective action system.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following SSCs:
!
the main turbine electro-hydraulic (EH) systems;
!
the D5 diesel generator starting air system; and
!
the nuclear instrumentation (NI) system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities or activities during a time when more than one significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration, where practical, and that contingency plans were in place, where appropriate. The licensees daily configuration risk assessments, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, and the documents listed at the end of this report were used by the inspectors to verify that the equipment
configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were being communicated to the necessary personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance activities:
!
repair of the D5 diesel generator 1A starting air compressor while the D6 diesel generator was out-of-service for preventive maintenance;
!
troubleshooting and recovery from a high crankcase pressure problem on the D6 diesel generator following preventive maintenance; and
!
risk assessment, work controls, and protected equipment controls during periods of yellow risk rate categories on January 31 and February 1, 2002, when a relatively large amount of equipment was out of service simultaneously.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated plant conditions and selected CRs for risk significant components and systems in which the operability issues were questioned. These conditions were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and USAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the CRs below and documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were necessary to maintain operability, the inspectors reviewed the documents listed at the end of the report to verify that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed records to verify that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The conditions evaluated were:
!
the licensees action to bring four 1000-gallon propane tanks into the protected area;
!
the licensees investigation into whether the high crankcase pressure experienced on the D6 diesel generator could be generic to the D5 diesel generator; and
!
the licensees investigation into whether the safety injection accumulators could be considered operable after it discovered that not all inservice testing program requirements had been met.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating and support systems to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of TS and the USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end of this report, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and verify that the post-maintenance testing performed adequately demonstrated that the maintenance was successful and that operability was restored. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
Testing subsequent to the following activities were observed and evaluated:
!
the D5 diesel generator after 18-month preventive maintenance;
!
the D5 diesel generator after governor control repairs; and
!
the D6 diesel generator after an investigation of high oil pressure.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and/or observed activities associated with a Unit 2 refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed the outage plan and schedule to verify that risk had been appropriately considered and observed the unit shutdown, cooldown, establishment of residual heat removal, and reactor coolant system (RCS) draindown activities. The inspectors also observed portions of the fuel handling operations in containment to verify that the activities were performed in accordance with TS and approved procedures, and to verify that the locations of fuel assemblies were properly tracked. The inspectors also observed and/or reviewed several other miscellaneous outage activities. The inspectors regularly reviewed the licensees shutdown risk assessment classification and its control of protected equipment when defense-in-depth equipment was unavailable, especially electrical power sources. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor issues identified during the outage were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance testing and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance procedures (SPs) met TS, the USAR, and licensee procedural requirements, and also demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in verifying mitigating systems capability. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the testing met the TS frequency requirements; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. In addition, the inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The following tests were observed and evaluated:
!
SP 2218, Monthly 4KV [kilovolt] Bus 25 Undervoltage Relay Test; and
!
SP 1093, D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Modifications (71111.23)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification to install a tent and heater around the cooling water dump-to-grade line outside the plant. The purpose of the modification was to prevent ice buildup in the line. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification screening form and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening form listed at the end of the report to ensure that they were completed in accordance with licensee procedural guidance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the sections of the USAR and TS listed at the end of this report to verify that the installation did not affect the specified design function or operability of the system. The inspectors also reviewed installation and removal work orders listed at the end of this report and walked down the installation to insure that the temporary equipment was installed in accordance with the plan.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed Revisions 22 and 23 of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan to determine whether changes identified in Revision 23 reduced the effectiveness of the licensees emergency planning, pending onsite inspection of the implementation of these changes.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
.1 Plant Walkdowns and Radiation Work Permit Reviews a.
Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector conducted walkdowns of selected radiologically controlled areas within the plant to verify the adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Specifically, the inspector walked down several radiologically significant work area boundaries (high and locked high radiation areas) in the Unit 2 containment building and auxiliary buildings, and performed confirmatory radiation measurements to verify that these areas and selected radiation areas were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures, and theTSs. The inspector also reviewed the radiological conditions within those work areas walked down to verify adequate radiological housekeeping and contamination controls.
The inspectors reviewed selected radiation work permits (RWPs) used to access radiologically significant work areas (radiation areas (RAs) and high radiation areas (HRAs) during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Work activities in those areas included reactor head work, reactor cavity flood-up, ISI and corrosion inspection, steam generator manway removal and nozzle dam installation, and selected valve work. The inspector reviewed the RWPs to verify that they contained adequate work control instructions. In the case of HRA access, the inspector reviewed the RWP controls to verify that the licensee was in compliance with the specific requirements contained in the TSs. The inspector also reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm setpoints and compared them to area radiation levels and expected personnel exposures to verify that the alarm setpoints were adequately determined. Finally, the inspector evaluated established work controls to determine if worker exposures were maintained As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA).
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls a.
Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector reviewed the licensees controls for HRAs and very high radiation areas. In particular, the inspector reviewed the procedures for posting and controlling HRAs to verify compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 and the TSs.
The inspector also reviewed records of HRA boundary and posting surveillances during the outage and performed walkdowns to verify the adequacy of boundaries, controls, and postings. In addition, the inspector reviewed the controls for highly irradiated material that was stored in spent fuel storage pools to verify that the licensee had implemented adequate measures to prevent inadvertent personnel exposures from these materials.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
.1 Job Site Inspections and ALARA Control a.
Inspection Scope
The regional radiation specialist inspector selected a number of refueling outage high exposure or high radiation area work activities to evaluate the licensees use of ALARA controls for each activity.
The inspector reviewed ALARA plans for each activity and observed work associated with each activity to verify the use of proper engineering controls to achieve dose reductions. The inspector conducted walkdowns of the areas to determine if workers were utilizing the low dose waiting areas for each activity and whether the first-line supervisor for each job ensured that the jobs were conducted in a dose efficient manner. The inspector made job site observations and reviewed individual exposures of selected work groups to determine if there were any significant exposure variations which may exist among workers and to verify that multiple dosimetry was employed during jobs that involved significant dose gradients.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Source Term Reduction and Control
Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector evaluated the source term reduction program to verify that the licensee had an effective program in place, and was knowledgeable of plant source term and techniques for its reduction.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Radiological Work Planning a.
Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector selected high collective dose refueling outage job activities to assess the adequacy of the radiological controls and work planning. For each job activity selected, the inspector reviewed ALARA evaluations including initial reviews, in-progress reviews, and associated dose mitigation techniques and evaluated the licensees exposure estimates and performance to assure that the licensee was using the established work planning procedures and tools. The inspector also assessed the integration of ALARA requirements into work packages to evaluate the licensees communication of radiological work controls.
The inspector reviewed the exposure results for the selected activities to evaluate the accuracy of exposure estimates in the ALARA plan. The inspector compared the actual exposure results with the initial exposure estimates, the estimated and actual dose rates, and the estimated and actual man-hours expended to assess the accuracy of planning estimates. The inspector reviewed each of the selected activity exposure histories to determine if management had reviewed the exposure status of each activity, in-progress ALARA job reviews were needed, additional engineering/dose controls had been established, and required corrective action documents had been generated.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71121.01 and 71121.02)
a.
Inspection Scope The regional radiation specialist inspector reviewed self-assessments and audits conducted since the last outage, as well as selected outage generated action requests, which focused on ALARA planning and Access Controls. The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of the licensees self-assessment process to identify, characterize, and prioritize problems. The inspector evaluated the licensees ability to identify repetitive problems, contributing causes, the extent of conditions, and corrective actions which would achieve lasting results.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the PI data listed below for completeness and accuracy for the Safety System Unavailability PIs in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. For each PI, the inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 1. The inspectors reviewed licensee computer databases to gather information regarding unavailable time for the systems, and compared those times to the data reported by the licensee. The inspectors also reviewed the CRs and WOs listed at the end of this report to identify unavailable time for the systems. The inspectors reviewed the following PIs:
!
High Pressure Injection System for the first three quarters of 2001; and
!
Heat Removal System (Auxiliary Feedwater) for the first three quarters of 2001.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees assessment of its PI for occupational radiation safety to determine if indicator-related data was adequately assessed and reported. Since no reportable elements were identified by the licensee for the last four quarters, the inspectors compared the licensees data with CRs to verify that there were no occurrences concerning the occupational radiation safety cornerstone.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 2-01-05: Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in Response to a High Differential Pressure Between the Turbine Steam Condensers, Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak This event was discussed in Inspection Report 50-282/01-17; 50-306/01-17, Sections 1R14 and 4OA3.1. As described in the LER, the inadvertent venting of one condenser was the result of an inadequate stress calculation for a leak sealing job and an inadequate contingency isolation procedure for the air ejector system. The inadequacies resulted in a reactor trip initiating event with the loss of the normal condenser as a heat sink. All other mitigation systems performed as expected. At the time of the event, it was screened by an NRC risk analyst and determined to be of very low safety significance. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action
system as CR 200185657. The inspectors reviewed the LER and no new significant issues were identified. This event did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements because the condenser air ejector system did not fall under the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, quality assurance requirements.
40A5 Other
.1 Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (Temporary Instruction 2515/145)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a review of the licensees activities in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, to verify compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.
In accordance with the guidance of NRC Bulletin 2001-01, the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant was characterized as belonging to the sub-population of plants (Bin 3) that were considered to have a moderate susceptibility to primary stress corrosion cracking based upon a susceptibility ranking of more than 5 but less than 30 effective full power years of operation from that of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 condition. As a result, the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant responded to NRC Bulletin 2001-01 by performing a direct visual examination of the reactor vessel head.
The inspectors interviewed inspection personnel, reviewed procedures and inspection reports, including photographic documentation, to assess the licensees efforts in conducting an effective visual examination of the reactor vessel head.
b.
Evaluation of Inspection Requirements 1.
Were the licensees examinations performed by qualified and knowledgeable personnel?
The inspectors reviewed records to verify that the examinations were performed by an individual certified as a Level II in the VT-1, VT-2, and VT-3 Methods. In addition, the licensees procedure required a review of the specific guidelines described in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Visual Examination for Leakage of PWR Reactor Head Penetrations.
2.
Were the licensees examinations performed in accordance with approved and adequate procedures?
The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that the examinations were conducted in accordance with an approved plant procedure, Unit 2 RV Head Canopy Seal Weld Inspection, WO 0107685, and the guidelines established in EPRI Document 1006296
"Visual Examination for Leakage of PWR Reactor Head Penetrations. The inspectors determined that the procedure was appropriate for the examinations.
3.
Were the licensees examinations adequately able to identify, disposition, and resolve deficiencies?
The inspectors determined through a review of post-examination records, discussions with the personnel that conducted the examinations, and a review of the procedure, that the examinations were sufficient to identify any deficiencies. The licensees examinations did not identify any deficiencies; therefore, the inspectors did not assess the licensees efforts to disposition or resolve deficiencies.
4.
Were the licensees examinations capable of identifying the primary stress corrosion cracking phenomenon described in the Bulletin?
The inspectors determined through interviews with inspection personnel, and reviews of procedures and inspection reports, including photographic documentation of the examinations, that the licensees efforts were capable of identifying the phenomenon described in the Bulletin. The inspectors determined that the inspection personnel had access to all the head penetrations, 41 in total, with no obstructions or interferences.
5.
What was the condition of the reactor vessel head (debris, insulation, dirt, boron from other sources, physical layout, viewing obstructions)?
The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant pressure vessel head had block contoured vessel head insulation, consisting of mirror panels fabricated of 4-inch thick perforated metal block insulation with viewing ports cut into the insulation. The inspectors determined that the licensee had complete viewable coverage. The inspectors also determined through discussions with the inspection personnel and review of the inspection photographs that the as-found pressure vessel head condition was clean.
(A small amount of debris in the form of metal shavings from the cutting of the viewing ports was noted; however, this did not obstruct the exam.)
6.
Could small boron deposits, as described in the bulletin, be identified and characterized?
The inspectors verified, through interviews with inspection personnel and review of the photographic record of the examination, that small boron deposits, as described in the Bulletin, could be identified, given the cleanliness and accessibility of the pressure vessel head penetrations. However, no indications were found on the 41 penetrations.
7.
What materiel deficiencies (associated with the concerns identified in the bulletin) were identified that required repair?
Through a review of the examination records, the inspectors determined the inspection personnel did not identify any materiel deficiencies associated with any of the 41 pressure vessel head penetrations.
8.
What, if any, significant items that could impede effective examinations and/or ALARA issues were encountered?
The inspectors conducted reviews to verify that there were no impediments to the examinations. The inspection ports eliminated the need for insulation removal and the radiation dose that would have been received. Collective radiation dose received as a part of the examinations was approximately 40 millirem.
c.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
Exit Meeting The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on February 14, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Interim Exit Meetings Senior Official at Exit:
M. Werner, Plant Manager Date:
February 7, 2002 Proprietary:
No Subject:
Biennial Inservice Inspection Senior Official at Exit:
M. Nazar, Site Vice President Date:
February 8, 2002 Proprietary:
No Subject:
Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas, ALARA Planning, and Occupational Radiation Safety Performance Indicator
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee P. Blaylock, ISI Coordinator T. Breene, Manager Nuclear Performance Assessment B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry R. Lingle, Operations Manager J. Maki, Production Planning Manager L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance M. Nazar, Site Vice President S. Redner, NDE Consulting Specialist J. Waddell, Superintendent Security M. Werner, Plant Manager D. Whitcomb, ISI Engineer L. Williams, Director of Engineering LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None.
Closed 2-01-05 LER Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in Response to a High Differential Pressure Between the Turbine Steam Condensers, Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak (Section 4OA3)
2515/146 TI Hydrogen Storage Locations (Section 1R05)
2515/145 TI Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (Section 4OA5.1)
Discussed None.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USES ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System AFW Auxiliary Feed Water ALARA As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DRS Division of Reactor Safety EH Electro-Hydraulic EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ERCS Emergency Response Computer System HRA High Radiation Area IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR
Inspection Report
Inservice Inspection
Inservice Testing
KV
Kilovolt
LCO
Limiting Conditions for Operation
LER
Licensee Event Report
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
NI
Nuclear Instrumentation
Nuclear Management Company
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Publicly Available Records
Performance Indicator
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Preventive Maintenance
Radiation Area
Radiologically Controlled Area
Radiation Work Permit
Significance Determination Process
Surveillance Procedure
Structure, System, or Component
TCN
Temporary Change Notice
TI
Temporary Instruction
TS
Technical Specifications
Updated Safety Analysis Report
Work Order
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R04
Equipment Alignment
D6 Diesel Generator
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-13
D6 Diesel Generator Valve Status
Revision 11
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-14
D6 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Local
Panels and Switches
Revision 5
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-15
D6 Diesel Generator Main Control Room
Switch and Indicating Light Status
Revision 4
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-16
D6 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and
Panel Switches
Revision 6
CR 200186994
D6 Stop Jack Partially Actuated Due to
Overspeed Trip Device Leaking Air
D6 1B Starting Air Compressor Not
Functioning Properly
Repair Oil Leak on D6 1B Starting Air
Compressor
D6 1B Air Dryer Has a Low Limit Reading
for Hygrometer
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 160
Unit 1 Containment Spray
Drawing NF-39237
Containment Internal Spray System
Revision AC
Operations Manual
Section B18D
Containment Spray System
Revision 4
USAR Section 6.2
Safety Injection System
Revision 22
USAR Section 6.4
Containment Vessel Internal Spray System
Revision 23
Engineered Safety Features
Revision 161
CR 20018150
Temporary Suction Strainers
CR 200200531
Criteria for Determining Locked Versus
Blocked Not Clear and Not Clearly
Controlled by a Process
CR 200200523
Drawing NF-39237 Denotes CS-15 and
CS-45 as Locked Open - They are
Maintained in a Blocked Open Condition
1R05
Fire Protection
Plant Safety Procedure F5
Fire Fighting
Revision 27
Plant Safety Procedure F5
Appendix F
Fire Hazard Analysis
Revision 12
Plant Safety Procedure F5
Appendix A
Fire Strategies
Revision 10
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001
Appendix B
Internal Fires Analysis
Revision 2
F5 Appendix D
Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room
Revision 7
Hydrogen Storage Locations
CR 200200274
Hydrogen House/Waste Gas Storage Area
is Not Identified in the Fire Strategies
CR 200200473
Resolution of NRC Resident Concern of
Possible Transient Combustibles in Auxiliary
Building
1R07
Heat Sink Performance
SP 2304, Unit 2 Component Cooling Heat
Exchanger Performance Test
CR 200201141
21 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger
Performance Test Indicates ERCS
[emergency response computer system]
Point 2T2703A Reads Low
1R12
Maintenance Rule Implementation
General
2000 Equipment Performance Annual
Report
April 20, 2001
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document,
Volume 1A
Revision 3
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report -
4th Quarter 2001
February 2002
Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline
for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
EH Systems
CR 19991123
EH Control System Year 2000 Testing
CR 200185746
Turbine Did Not Ramp to 1800 Revolutions
Per Minute as Expected During Turbine Roll
11/3/2001 During Unit 2 Startup Operations
CR 200186203
Review Problems Associated with Turbine
Rollup and Human Performance with
Regard to the Use of Diverse Indication
CR 20012102
Unit 1 Turbine Control Valves; 3 of 4 Dump
Valves Needed to be Cleaned and New
O-Rings Installed
21 EH Unloader Valve Has Small Leak
EH Controller Checkout
Excessive Oil Leakage at 21 EH Oil Pump
D5 Starting Air System
Replace D1 1A Air Compressor 2nd Stage
Head Gasket
D5 Compressor 1A Wont Pump to Pressure
Repair D5 1A Air Compressor, Lifting Relief
Valve
Repair D5 1A Air Compressor, Lifting Relief
Valve
D5 1A Air Compressor Has Blown Head
D5 1A Starting Air Compressor Head
Gasket Blown
NI System
CR 20014786
2N51 Source Range Counts and Log Power
Range Indication Cycles With Bank C
Pressurizer Heaters
CR 20017503
Evaluate Source Range 1N32 Failure and
NI System Source Range Trending
CR 200185685
Noisy Source Range Channel
CR 200185707
2N32 Went From 400 Counts Per Second to
100 Counts Per Second
CR 200186240
N51 Power Range Log Scale ERCS
Indication Failing Low
CR 200201534
Source Rance 2N31 Failed During Refueling
Outage - High Indication (10E4 Counts Per
Second) Due To Suspected Noise
CR 200201571
From 2/14/02 NRC Exit: Are N51 and N52 in
Scope of Maintenance Rule? Appears They
Should Be
Test the Source Range Preamplifiers
2N42B Was Spiking During SP 2006C
Check Bank C Heaters Effect on 2N51
Erratic Response on 1N-41 Digital Meter
Loud Buzzing Sound Coming From 2N35
Power Range N42 Giving Alarms
2N41 Upper Detector Current Display
Problem
2N31 Spiking During SP 2035A
2N52 Excessive Ripple Voltage on PS1
2N31 Reading 10E5 Counts With No
Change In 2N32
Replace 2NE-31 Source Range Detector
Assist CHAR Services in Performing Cable
Testing For the Unit 2 NI System
Observed Noise Spike on N52 During Fuel
Shuffle
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control
D5 Starting Air Compressor Repair
CR 200200633
D5 1A Starting Air Compressor 213-031
Blown Head Gasket Caused Excessive Run
Time and Receiver Less Than 510 Pounds
Per Square Inch
D5 1A Starting Air Compressor Head
Gasket Blown
D6 High Crankcase Pressure
CR 200200734
Aborted SP 2307 D6 Diesel Generator
6-Month Fast Start Test Due to Increasing
Crankcase Pressure During 18-Month PM
[preventive maintenance] Run
SP 2305
D6 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start
Test
Revision 16
SP 2307
D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start
Test
Revision 16
Work Schedule
D6 Recovery Schedule
January 25, 2002
Memorandum of
Telephone
Communication
Call Between Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant and Wartsila Nuclear
Service
January 25, 2002
Draft Root Cause
Memorandum
D6 Oil Issue
January 23, 2002
Complete Mark-up of SP 2307 and SP 2335
Memorandum
Resolution of D6 Emergency Diesel
Post-Overhaul Issues
January 26, 2002
Yellow Risk Condition on January 31-February 1, 2002
Risk Assessment for Proposed Work for
Week of 2B04
23 Charging Pump Quarterly Check
23 Charging Pump Will Only Run in
Minimum Speed
22 Battery Charger Inspect/Test/PM
[Preventative Maintenance]
22 Cooling Water Strainer Annual
Inspection
122 Safeguards Traveling Screen Annual
Inspection
12 Charging Pump Has a Leak Rate of
.5 Gallons Per Minute
Breaker Electrical 10-Year PM - 122 Cooling
Water Traveling Screen
SP 1305 - D2 Diesel Generator Monthly
Slow Start Test
D2 Diesel Generator 6-Month Inspection
PM Breaker 26-1 - Bus Tie
Overhaul Breaker 26-17 - Cooling Water
Bus 27 Feed
SP 2093 - D5 Diesel Generator Monthly
Slow Start Test
CV-31133 Failed to Open on Signal
PM Breaker 24-4 - 23 Condensate Pump
CR 200200735
D5 1A Starting Air Receiver and D5 Engine
1A Overspeed Detector Removed from
Service Due to Air Leakage
CR 200200887
D6 Overspeed Detector Has Air Leak
Indicating that the Device is Failing -
Isolated D6 2B Air Start System
Isolate Overspeed Trip Device or Field
Flash Speed Switch
02T113
D5 Field Flash Speed Sensor Bypass
1R15
Operability Evaluations
Propane Issue
CR 200200085
Quantity of Temporary Liquid Propane
Exceeded Nuclear Management Company
Guidelines as Directed in D14.9, Section 4.0
- Limit of Less Than 1000 Gallons
CR 200200130
Four 1000 Gallon Propane Tanks Were
Brought On Site Putting Us in an
Unanalyzed Situation for Control Room
Habitability
CR 200200144
8-Hour Non-emergency Event Notification
Due to Propane Tanks Exceeding Toxic
Gas Analysis for Control Room Habitability
Memorandum
Follow-up to Toxic Gas Issue Occurring on
January 4, 2002
January 6, 2002
Memorandum
Corrective Action Plan for Control Room
Habitability
January 8, 2002
Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear
Power Plant Control Room During a
Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release
Revision 1
Recommendations for Revision of
Safety Evaluation 50-520
Evaluation of Control Room Habitability
During a Postulated On-site Hazardous
Chemical Release
Addendum 0
Event Report 38609
Discovery that Propane Tanks On Site
Exceeded the Volume Assumed in the
Control Room Habitability Toxic Gas
Analysis
Report January 5,
2002 and
Retraction
January 22, 2002
USAR Section 2.9.4
Toxic Chemical Study
Revision 22
D5 Operability Issue
Draft Root Cause
Memorandum
D6 Oil Issue
January 23, 2002
CR 200200734
Aborted SP 2307 D6 Diesel Generator
6-Month Fast Start Test Due to Increasing
Crankcase Pressure During 18-Month PM
Run
SP 2295
D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start
Test
Revision 22
Safety Injection Accumulator Issue
CR 200200492
Previous IST [Inservice Testing] of
Accumulator Outlet Check Valves Does Not
Completely Meet the IST Program
Requirements
CR 200201278
Inadequate Operability Determination for
Safety Injection Accumulator Discharge
Check Valve for CR 200200492
NRC Information Notice 2000-21
Detached Check Valve Disc Not Detected
by Use of Acoustic and Magnetic
Nonintrusive Test Techniques
CR 20010025
Detached Check Valve Disc Not Detected
by Use of Acoustic and Magnetic
Nonintrusive Test Techniques
Guideline for Inservice Testing at Nuclear
Power Plants
April 1995
Inservice Inspection and Testing of Pumps
and Valves Requirements
Revision 60
1R19
Post Maintenance Testing
CR 200200289
Aborted SP 2295, Fast Start Test of D5
Because of Load Imbalance Between
Engines 1 and 2 as Directed by Engineer
SP 2295
D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start
Test
Revision 22
PM 3001-2-D5
D5 Diesel Generator 18-Month Inspection
-Mechanical
Revision 4
D5 Engine 1 Fuel Rack Positioner
Perform Post Maintenance Testing for D6
1R20
Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Operating
Procedure 2C1.4
Unit 2 Power Operation
Revision 27
Operating
Procedure 2C1.3
Unit 2 Shutdown
Revision 48
Operating
Procedure 2C1.6
Shutdown Operations - Unit 2
Revision 13
Operating
Procedure 2C4.1 (with
TCN [Temporary Change
Notice] 2002-0025)
RCS Inventory Control - Pre-refueling
Revision 14
Special Operating
Procedure 2D2
RCS Reduced Inventory Operation
Revision 13
Safety Evaluation 245
Refueling Operations Using One Source
Range Detector and One Gamma-Metric
Detector
Design Change 83Y390
Nuclear Instrumentation Upgrade Final
Package
Addendum 0
Install Temporary Modification for Gamma-
Metrics Audio Count Rate/Alarm
Pre-Operability Testing on Temporary
Modification on Gamma-Metrics Audio
Count Rate/Alarm
Refueling and Fuel Handling
Revision 151
USAR Section 14.5.1
Fuel Handling
Revision 22
Special Operating
Procedure D5.2
Reactor Refueling Operations
Revision 28
Checklist
Prairie Island Fuel Transfer Logs - Fuel
Shuffle for Unit 2 Cycle 21 Core
1R22
Surveillance Testing
SP 2218
Monthly 4KV Bus 25 Undervoltage Relay
Test
Revision 33
TS Table 3.5.1, Item 10
4KV Safeguards Busses Voltage
Restoration
Revision 103
TS 3.5-2B, Item 8
Loss of Power
Revision 161
TS 4.1-1B, Item 8
Loss of Power
Revision 111
SP 1093
D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start
Test
Revision 72
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 160
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
System
Revision 147
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-1
D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status
Revision 17
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-2
D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room
Cooling Local Panels
Revision 8
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-3
Diesel Generator D1 Main Control Room
Switch and Indicating Light Status
Revision 13
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-4
D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and
Panel Switches
Revision 11
CR 200201419
Locate or Prepare Justification for Leaving
D1 and D2 Local Vibration Alarm Out of
Service
1R23
Temporary Equipment
Evaluation Screening
Form
Temporary Modification 01T106
NMC [Nuclear
Management Company]
Standard 10 CFR 50.59
Screening 1323
Temporary Modification 01T106
Install Temporary Tent and Heater on
Cooling Water Dump to Grade
Remove Temporary Tent and Heater on
Cooling Water Dump to Grade
Administrative Work
Instruction 5AWI 6.5.0
Revision 10
TCN 2001-2066
5AWI 6.5.0, Temporary Modifications
USAR Section 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
1EP4
Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Revision 22
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Revision 23
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline
Revision 1
Computer Database
LCO [Limiting Conditions for Operation] Log
1/1/01 - 9/30/01
Computer Database
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room Logs
1/1/01 - 9/30/01
Solenoid Valve 33493 Did Not Vent
Completely Off
CR 20017083
Entered Unplanned LCO Action Due to
22 TDAWF Pump Recirculation Control
Valve 34419 Failure to Open During
CR 20017776
Replace AFW Pump Recirculation/Lube Oil
Cooling Solenoid Valves with Models Having
Elastomers Rated for Higher Temperature
CR 20017971
Modify AFW System to Remove the
Recirculation/Lube Oil Cooling Control
Valves
Procedure H.33.2
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
Unavailability Performance Indicator
Reporting Instructions
Revision 4
CR 20010354
Equipment Problems Were Encountered
During Installation of the Safety Injection
Mini Recirculation Flow Meter
CR 20015199
MV-32079, Refueling Water Storage Tank
Suction to U1 Pumps Cannot be Locally
Operated Due to Handwheel Against
CR 20003741
Safety Injection Mini Recirculation Flow
Failure
MV-32079, Reform Lagging to Allow Manual
Operation
Safety Injection Recirculation Line Low Flow
Alarm
4OA3 Event Followup
LER 2-01-05
Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in
Response to a High Differential Pressure
Between the Turbine Steam Condensers,
Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One
Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak
CR 200185657
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Condenser
Vacuum Differential Greater Than
2.5 Inches
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas
RPIP 1004
Radiation Protection Implementing
Procedures
Revision 3
RPIP 1160
ALARA Review
Revision 5
RPIP 1121
RWP Issue
Revision 16
RPIP 1131
Radiography
Revision 6
RPIP 1135
RWP Coverage
Revision 12
RWP 22015
ISI and Corrosion Inspection
Revision 0
RWP 22022
Steam Generator Primary Manway
Revision 0
RWP 22027
Steam Generator Nozzle Dam
Revision 0
RWP 22035
Reactor Head Lift
Revision 1
RWP 22038
Pressurizer Manway
Revision 0
RWP 22118
Replace Pressurizer Spray Valves
Revision 0
CR 20018107
Construction Electricians Enter Aux. Bld.
October 3, 2001
CR 20018286
Radioactive Material Found Outside
RCA (715' Turbine Bld.)
October 5, 2001
CR 20018410
Aux. Bld. 715 Material Storage Area Not
Labeled Ra Material Area
October 10, 2001
CR 200185159
RP Doing Sample Liner #114 Cask
Decon, Contaminated Pants Pocket
October 17, 2001
CR 200185220
Condition Reports Not Written for All
Problems (RP Group)
October 19, 2001
CR 200185319
Lead Shielding Was Not Utilized to
Lower Worker Dose, U-2 Containment
Spray Pump Room
October 24, 2001
CR 200185377
Neutron Reading Taken in Integrate
Mode, Resurveyed at ISFSI Pad
October 25, 2001
CR 200185460
1R-11 Filter Paper Installed Incorrectly,
Control Room Alarm for Not in Motion
December 12, 2001
CR 200185753
Contaminated Folding Chair in Aux. Bld.
Clean Area
November 4, 2001
CR 200185878
Pre-job Brief Improvement Item-Dose
Rates for Existing Casks at ISFSI
November 8, 2001
CR 200186300
Worker Attempted to Enter Hi Rad Area
Under Wrong RWP
October 20, 2001
CR 200186530
Lack of Rad Protection Support to
Complete All Jobs
November 28, 2001
CR 200186648
Personnel Not Wearing ED Within Hand
December 2, 2001
CR 200186764
Worker Enter U-2 Containment At
Power Wearing Regular TLD and
Neutron TLD
December 5, 2001
CR 200186862
Area Radiation Field at Access Control
Doubled in 7 Years
December 7, 2001
CR 200200256
Exposure Estimate For RWP#405
(Placing Filters in Liner) 43%
Overestimated
January 10, 2002
CR 200200694
Radiography Controls Did Not Meet
Management Expectations Per RPIP
1131, Radiographing
January 24, 2002
CR 200201060
Engineer Received Dose Alarm
Inspection Reactor Head
February 3, 2002
CR 20021243
Radiation Dose For Reactor Head
Disassembly Exceeded Goal by 124%
February 7, 2002
1R08
Inservice Inspection
ISI-ET-1.0
Bobbin Coil Data Analysis
January 9, 2002
ISI-NDE-0
Equipment, Personnel and Material Reporting
October 18, 2001
ISI-MT-1
Dry Magnetic Particle Examination
October 18, 2001
ISI-UT-1A
Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Weld
to Appendix VIII
January 22, 2001
ISI-UT-3
Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Vessels
January 5, 2000
ISI-UT-5B
Ultrasonic Examination of Steam Generator
Feedwater Nozzle Inner Radii From the Blend
Radius
October 7, 1998
20.A.100-1989
Radiographic Examination of Welds (General
Requirements)
January 22, 1993
20.A.131-1989
Radiographic Examination of Welds
March 13, 1993
Unit 2 Inservice Inspection Summary Report,
Interval 3, Period 2, Refueling Outage Dates 4-
29-2000 To 6-7-2000
September 1, 2000
Pressurizer Spray Valve (CV 31229)
Replacement Shop Weld Radiographs
(Welds 1-5)
January 18, 2002
Pressurizer Spray Valve (CV 31228)
Replacement Field Weld Radiographs
(Welds 1 & 2)
February 7, 2002