Information Notice 2002-01, Metal Clad Switchgear Failures and Consequent Losses of Offsite Power
| ML013540193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/2002 |
| From: | Beckner W Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TAC MB1793 IN-02-001 | |
| Download: ML013540193 (7) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555-0001
January 8, 2002
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-01:
METALCLAD SWITCHGEAR FAILURES AND
CONSEQUENT LOSSES OF OFFSITE POWER
Addressees
All holders of licenses for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform
addressees of electrical equipment failure modes and design vulnerabilities identified following
recent transients at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and at a foreign nuclear power
station. The most interesting aspect in both events was propagation of damage from an
electrical fault in one breaker cubicle to other breakers and buswork in the same enclosure. It
is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and
consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific actions or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Event
On February 3, 2001, the reactor at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 (SONGS-3), was at 39 percent power following a refueling outage. While shifting loads to the
unit auxiliary transformers, a fault on a 4.16 kV supply circuit breaker from the unit auxiliary
transformer caused a fire and loss of offsite power.
The fault was caused by failure of the 4.16 kV breakers C phase main contacts to close fully.
This resulted in arcing and a production of a thick, dark ionized smoke. The breaker was a
Brown Bovari Type HK three pole, medium-voltage ac power circuit breaker rated for 3000
amps (continuous) and 350 MVA (interrupting). The breaker was approximately 25 years old
and had its last preventive maintenance performed in 1997. Due to the extensive fire damage, the cause of the breakers failure to close could not be definitively established.
Offsite power was lost when ionized smoke (which is conductive) diffused through holes
(through which wires passed) and conduits between adjacent cubicles. This shorted the
energized incoming terminals of the offsite power supply from the reserve auxiliary transformer.
The fault blew open the cubicle door of the offsite supply circuit breaker and blew off an
insulating boot that covered the A phase bus bar. The high voltage supply breakers upstream
of the reserve auxiliary transformer opened to clear the fault. This interrupted non-vital offsite
power to the unit.
As a consequence of the loss of offsite power, neither turbine ac lube oil pump started. Failure
of the ac pumps to start should have initiated an automatic start of the backup emergency dc
turbine lube oil pump; however, the backup dc pump failed to start. This failure to start was
caused by a defect in the trip setting device of the dc lube oil pumps power supply breaker.
The breakers trip setting device (a mechanical device that maintains spring tension and thus
the breakers trip setting) was found damaged and incapable of maintaining spring tension and
thus the trip setting. The dc pump supply breaker is a 250 volt dc General Electric molded case
circuit breaker, Type TBC 400. The dc pump failure led to extensive damage to the unit main
turbine, generator and exciter resulting from inadequate lubrication.
Foreign Nuclear Power Station Event
On March 18, 2001, at a foreign PWR, a fault in a 4.16 kV load center caused a fire and loss of
offsite power while the reactor was shutdown but with significant decay heat. This, combined
with a subsequent independent failure in the onsite standby power supply, resulted in a station
blackout (i.e., a loss of ac power to both redundant safety systems). Recovery from the event
was further complicated by smoke and dependence on ac powered emergency lighting and
ventilation.
This foreign plant is a PWR in commercial operation since the mid 1980s. Offsite power is
provided by two independent circuits from the transmission network (see Attachment 1). The
circuit from the 345 kV transmission network is the normal source of offsite power to each of
the two redundant 4.16 kV safety-related trains. The circuit from 161 kV transmission network
provides a backup offsite source to each train.
For several days prior to the event, foggy, misty weather had caused salt deposition on the
insulators on the 345 kV transmission system and consequent power fluctuations and
interruptions. On March 17, the day prior to the failure, the 345 kV transmission system had
been interrupted, resulting in an automatic reactor shutdown and transfer to the backup 161 kV
offsite source. On March 18, with the reactor shutdown and with off-site power being supplied
to the unit from the 161 kV backup source, the 345 kV source was recovered and the circuit into
the plant re-energized.
After the switchyard 345 kV circuit breaker was closed (energizing the 345/4.16 kV transformer
and the 4.16 kV circuits into the vital load centers while the 4.16 kV supply breakers were still
open), a fault occurred in the A train 4.16 kV load center. The fault was caused by insulator
failure on one phase of the A train 4.16 kV safety-related switchgear on the supply side of the
supply breaker from the 345/4.16 kV transformer. The cause of the insulator failure is
unknown. The resulting fault de-energized the 345 kV offsite source to both the A and B
4.16 kV safety-related switchgear. The fault also produced voluminous smoke and ionized gas.
Migration of the smoke through the A train 4.16 kV switchgear enclosure resulted in multiple
arcing faults. One of these faults, apparently on the supply side of supply breaker from the
161 kV source caused loss of the 161 kV supply to both the A and B trains. Both trains were affected because they share a common feeder cable downstream of the step-down transformer
from the 161 kV system. Another fault in the internal bus-work of the switchgear caused the A
train EDG supply breaker to trip after the EDG started and came to rated voltage.
These faults resulted in unavailability of power to A train safety systems from either the A train
onsite emergency diesel generator or from either the 345 kV or the 161 kV offsite sources. The
faults inside the A train load center on the supply side of each of the offsite source circuits
tripped and locked out the high voltage supply breakers for both the 345 and 161 kV circuits
and prevented the connection of offsite power to the B train safety systems as well.
The B train onsite emergency diesel generator failed independently. The diesel generator failed
to achieve normal voltage due to a failure in its excitation circuit. Further local starting attempts
were prevented by heavy smoke from the burning insulation in the A load center. The heavy
smoke could not be cleared from the corridors because of lack of ac power to operate either
normal ventilation or emergency blowers; also only very limited emergency lighting was
available in that area.
The remaining ac power supply (a station blackout diesel generator capable of being connected
to either of the two trains) was started but tripped on low lube oil pressure. It was later
determined that the blackout diesel had tripped because the loss of offsite power interrupted
power to the engines keep-warm system.
All primary injection systems were unavailable due to the loss of ac power. The steam-driven
auxiliary feed pump provided sufficient cooling for the primary system. The blackout diesel was
eventually restarted and the B train was energized about two hours after the event and the plant
was stabilized.
Discussion
These electrical events provide insight into possible collateral damage and cascading failures
resulting from a single electrical failure and consequent challenges to plant operation. At
SONGS-3, the event originated with the failure of a single non-safety-related 4.16 kV
switchgear supply breaker. Smoke from the event propagated causing loss of offsite power to
other non-safety-related equipment and partial loss of offsite power to safety-related equipment.
The loss of offsite power resulted in the need for dc backup power to operate the non-safety- related turbine lube oil pump. The failure of the dc supply breaker for the lube oil pump resulted
in significant damage to the main turbine.
At the foreign plant, the event was caused by a single failure of an insulator on the offsite
supply cable to one train of 4.16 kV safety-related switchgear. Smoke from the event spread, causing multiple failures in the switchgear, loss of both sources of offsite power to both trains, and total loss of power to one safety train. An unrelated failure of the other source of onsite
power led to a total loss of power to both trains. In addition, the loss of offsite power disabled
the backup station blackout power supply. An electrical fault occurring in medium voltage switchgear enclosure can cascade, causing
collateral damage within the switchgear and consequent loss of multiple circuits. When both
safety trains are supplied from the same offsite supply with a common upstream circuit breaker
(see Attachment 1), one fault in the supply circuit can disable offsite power to both redundant
trains. Operators ought to be aware of such a vulnerability and to have considered means to
isolate the faulted feeder if both offsite power sources could be affected by a fault in the feeder
circuit.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
/RA/
William D. Beckner, Program Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts:
Thomas Koshy, NRR
James Lazevnick, NRR
(301) 415-1176
(301) 415-2782 E-mail: txk@nrc.gov
E-mail: jjl@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. AC Power Distribution System Figure
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
ML013540193 Template No.: NRR-052 To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box C=Copy w/o attachment/enclosure E=Copy with attachment/enclosure N = No copy
OFFICE
REXB
Tech Editor*
C:EEIB
RORP
C
RORP/DRIP
NAME
EGoodwin*
JCalvo*
TKoshy /TK/
WBeckner /WDB/
DATE
01/02/02
7 / 31 /01
01/04/02
01/04/02
01/07/02
VVVVVV
VV VV
VVVVVV
VV VV
12
4.16 KV Safety Bus A
4.16 KV Safety Bus B
08 EDG A
EDG B
17
15
03
05
Startup
Transformer
161 KV
Startup
Transformer
Swing D/G
VVVVVV
VV VV
VVVVVV
VV VV
25
25
Attachment 1
AC Power
Distribution System
with Y Connection
to Safety Buses
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2001-19
Improper Maintenance and
Reassembly of Automatic Oil
Bubblers
12/17/2001
All holders of operating licenses
for nuclear power reactors, except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor vessel.
2001-18
Degraded or Failed Automated
Electronic Monitoring, Control,
Alarming, Response, and
Communications Needed for
Safety and/or Safeguards
12/14/2001 All uranium fuel conversion, enrichment, and fabrication
licensees and certificate holders
authorized to receive safeguards
information. Information notice is
not available to the public
because it contains safeguards
information.
2001-17
Degraded and Failed
Performance of Essential
Utilities Needed for Safety and
Safeguards
12/14/2001 All uranium fuel conversion, enrichment, and fabrication
licensees and certificate holders
authorized to receive safeguards
information. Information notice is
not available to the public
because it contains safeguards
information.
2001-08, Sup. 2
Update on Radiation Therapy
Overexposures in Panama
11/20/2001 All medical licensees.
2001-16
Recent Foreign and Domestic
Experience with Degradation of
steam Generator Tubes and
Internals
10/31/2001
All holders of operating licenses
for pressurized-water reactors
(PWR), except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor.