Information Notice 2002-14, Ensuring a Capability to Evacuate Individuals, Including Members of the Public, from the Owner-Controlled Area
ML020980006 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Issue date: | 04/08/2002 |
From: | Beckner W NRC/NRR/DRIP/RORP |
To: | |
Robert Benedict, 415-1157 | |
References | |
IN-02-014 | |
Download: ML020980006 (11) | |
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 APRIL 8, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-14: ENSURING A CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE
INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE
PUBLIC, FROM THE OWNER-CONTROLLED
AREA
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, including those who have ceased
operations but have fuel on site.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform
addressees of inspection findings concerning a licensees capability to evacuate individuals, including members of the public, from the owner-controlled area in the event of an emergency.
The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and
consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, the suggestions
contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Background
Title 10, Section 100.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 100.3) defines an
exclusion area for power reactors and §100.11(a)(1) prescribes how to determine the
boundary of the exclusion area. Specifically, §100.3 states that residents shall be subject to
ready removal in case of necessity. Activities unrelated to operations of the reactor may be
permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that no significant
hazards to the public health and safety will result. Exposure to more than routinely permitted
concentrations of radioactive material could result in a significant hazard to the health and
safety of the public.
Section 20.1003 defines several terms applicable to this discussion:
- A member of the public is any individual, except when he or she is receiving an
occupational dose.
- Occupational dose is the dose received by an individual in the course of employment in
which the individuals assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or radioactive
material from licensed and/or unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession
of the licensee or another person. Occupational dose does not include the dose
received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has
received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material
and released in accordance with §35.75 [10 CFR 35.75], from voluntary participation in
medical research programs, or as a member of the public.
- Public dose is the dose received by a member of the public from exposure to radiation
or radioactive material released by a licensee, or any other source of radiation under the
control of a licensee. Public dose does not include occupational dose or the dose
received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has
received, from exposure to individuals who have been administered radioactive material
and released in accordance with §35.75, or from voluntary participation in medical
research programs.
- The owner-controlled area is an area outside of a restricted area, but inside the site
boundary, to which the licensee can limit access for any reason.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) states that Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis
on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g.,
listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with
the news media for dissemination of information during an emergency (including the physical
location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination
of information to the public are established.
The planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), states that A range of protective actions has been
developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for emergency
workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to
evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide
(KI), as appropriate. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.
The importance of protecting individuals, including members of the public, in the owner- controlled area is reflected in the emergency preparedness cornerstone of the NRCs reactor
oversight process (ROP). The ROP identifies the planning standard as a risk-significant
planning standard (RSPS).
The following section describes one licensees failure to adequately meet the requirements of
the planning standard defined by §50.47(b)(10). That failure prevented the licensee from
ensuring protection of the public in the owner-controlled area.
Description
The facility owned by a certain licensee has two partially completed nuclear power reactors
within the exclusion area of an operating reactor. Construction of these units has been
suspended and they have been in a maintenance regime for several years. No nuclear fuel or
other significant radioactive sources are stored at the inactive sites. The staff at the operating reactor did not exercise oversight responsibility for the incomplete
plants. This responsibility had been transferred to a separate business unit in the licensees
corporate organization after construction was suspended. The business unit maintains an
office in the area. The business unit has been leasing space in otherwise unused buildings
(primarily vacant offices and warehouses originally constructed to support the inactive plants)
to various general businesses without the direct involvement of staff at the operating reactor.
As reported in Inspection Report 50/397/01-008 (Accession Number ML 012880417), the NRC
inspected this site in July 2001. The inspection revealed weaknesses in the licensees ability to
notify and evacuate members of the public (lessee employees) from the exclusion area, to
monitor the evacuating people for radioactive contamination, and to decontaminate them as
necessary. The NRC determined that these weaknesses constituted a violation of §50.54(q),
which requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power
reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in
§50.47(b), and a violation of the planning standard, §50.47(b)(10), which requires that a range
of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway emergency
planning zone for emergency workers and the public. The violation was determined to be
safety-significant because members of the public could be exposed to radiation and/or
radioactive material in the event of an emergency if appropriate protective actions were not
taken.
The licensee stated that lessees would be notified of an exclusion area evacuation by external
audible sirens and security sweeps; additional methods were available to notify licensee and
licensee contractor personnel. One of the sirens was under the direct control of the staff at the
operating reactor; others would have to be locally activated at the inactive sites. Signs along
the plant access roads would inform people how to respond to the sirens. The licensee also
expected that the business unit representative would contact each lessee by telephone when
notified of an evacuation decision. General procedures were in place to establish security
roadblocks along plant access roads during an exclusion area evacuation and to perform
limited sweeps of the exclusion and owner-controlled areas.
The licensee had established a pre-designated assembly and decontamination center at a
company location outside the EPZ for use by licensee and licensee contractor personnel
following an evacuation. Licensee and licensee contractor personnel received initial and
refresher training on expected actions for evacuation, offsite assembly, radiological monitoring, and personnel decontamination. However, the licensee did not provide similar training and
information to the members of the public within the owner-controlled area.
The NRC and the licensee agreed that (1) lessee operations were permitted under §100.3,
(2) lessee employees in the exclusion area were members of the public, (3) the licensee was
responsible for promptly evacuating lessee employees as necessary, (4) the licensee was
required to have the capability to effectively notify lessees of an exclusion area evacuation
within about 15 minutes of the evacuation decision, and (5) the licensee was responsible for
providing radiological monitoring to lessee employees and decontaminating them as required.
The NRC identified the following weaknesses in the licensees ability to effectively notify, evacuate, monitor, and decontaminate lessee personnel: * Licensee test data indicated that the external sirens could not be heard inside some
lessee buildings, and the primary siren was out of service for 13 consecutive months.
- The licensee had not prepared written procedures for activating the business unit call- tree, and the process relied on someone to answer a specific telephone in the lessees
office.
- The licensee had no detailed written procedures for security sweeps, had not identified
the locations of occupied spaces, had given security officers little or no training on the
exclusion area evacuation process (including performing sweeps), and had not tested
the effectiveness of sweeps by drills or other means.
- Although the licensee gave lessees a copy of an emergency plan specific to the
incomplete reactor units, the plan mainly covered industrial accidents and pertained only
to licensee and licensee contractor operations. The plan did not address radiological
monitoring or decontamination. Specifically, the licensee did not give lessees
information on the evacuation route and the assembly area. The NRC interviewed
employees at several lessee sites and found that only half knew about the proper
response to an emergency siren.
- The licensee did not ensure that lessee employees received training on emergency plan
requirements, the expected response to a notification siren, evacuation routes, the
offsite assembly area, or radiological monitoring and decontamination.
- Some members of the emergency response organization at the operating reactor were
not aware of the presence of lessees (members of the public) within the exclusion area
boundary. As a result, key decision makers may have been unaware of the need to
protect the lessees and their employees.
- The licensee stated that it would establish a security roadblock along the access road to
the inactive construction sites to inform lessee employees of the emergency and direct
them to the offsite assembly area for radiological monitoring. However, the licensee
acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which the single roadblock would be
delayed or not established, thereby delaying evacuation of the exclusion area.
- The licensee had not evaluated or exercised the capability to evacuate members of the
public from the owner-controlled area as part of the licensees drill program.
Discussion
The evaluation criteria for the planning standard §50.47(b)(10) are based, in part, on
NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,Section II.J.1.: Each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise
onsite individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the operator, including:
a. Employees not having emergency assignments;
b. Visitors;
c. Contractor and construction personnel; and
d. Other persons who may be in the public access areas on or passing through the
site or within the owner controlled area.
The term owner-controlled area, as used in NUREG-0654, encompasses all areas contiguous
to the reactor site property that is owned or leased by the licensee (or by any of its associated
business units) over which the licensee exercises control. The owner-controlled area is usually
larger than, and encompasses, the exclusion area.
The planning standard and the evaluation criteria in NUREG-0654 provide a basis for licensee
actions that are necessary to protect the health and safety of members of the public who are in
the owner-controlled area. The range of actions may include, but is not limited to, evacuation, sheltering, decontamination, and the use of potassium iodide (KI) for those licensees in States
that have adopted its use for members of the public.
Situations that could have individuals, including members of the public, in a licensees owner- controlled area include the following examples:
- visitors at the visitor center or media center
- employee and family recreational facilities or areas
- visitors in physical fitness center
- lessee employees in leased buildings
- hunters or fishermen
- individuals using biking or walking trails
- individuals making deliveries or providing services (catering, filling drink machines, etc).
This list is not intended to be all-inclusive but to indicate the potential scope of situations that
require adequate planning. Inclusion of these situations in the licensees emergency
preparedness drill and exercise program can provide valuable insights regarding the quality and
capability of the planning effort.
Furthermore, the planning standard, §50.47(b)(7), requires licensees to provide members of the
public, in the owner-controlled area and beyond the site boundary, with information on how they
will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency.Section II.G of
NUREG-0654 establishes the related evaluation criteria. Effective integration of licensees onsite plans with State and local plans can ensure that
essentially all members of the public will be notified of protective actions to be taken and that
the actions can be implemented in a timely manner.
This information notice does not require any specific action or written response. If you have
any questions about this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the
appropriate project manager in the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
/RA/
William D. Beckner, Program Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Thomas B. Blount, NRR Gail M. Good or Paul Elkmann, RIV
301-415-1501 817-860-8215 or 817-276-6539 Email: txb1@nrc.gov E-mail: gmg@nrc.gov or pje@nrc.gov
Attachment
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\REXB\RAB1\IN-EVAC8.WPD *See previous concurrence
OFFICE RSE:OES:DRIP Tech Editor IOLB:DIPM RIV (A)SC:OES:DRIP PD:RORP:DRIP
NAME RABenedict* PAG* GMTracy* GMGood* TKoshy* WDBeckner*
DATE 03/28/2002 03/25/2002 04/03/2002 03/28/2002 04/05/2002 04/08/2002
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2002-13 Possible Indicators of Ongoing 04/04/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Reactor Pressure Vessel Head for pressurized water nuclear
Degradation power reactors, except those who
have permanently ceased
operations and certified that fuel
has been permanently removed
from the reactor.
99-28, Supp 1 Recall of Star Brand Fire 03/22/2002 All holders of licenses for nuclear
Protection Sprinkler Heads power, research, and test
reactors and fuel cycle facilities.
2002-12 Submerged Safety-Related 03/21/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Electrical Cables or construction permits for
nuclear power reactors
2002-11 Recent Experience with 03/12/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Degradation of Reactor for pressurized-water reactors
Pressure Vessel Head (PWRs), except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor.
2002-10 Nonconservative Water Level 03/07/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Setpoints on Steam for nuclear power reactors, Generators except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor.
2002-09 Potential for Top Nozzle 02/13/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Separation and Dropping of for nuclear power reactors, and
Certain Type of Westinghouse non-power reactors and holders
Fuel Assembly of licenses for permanently
shutdown facilities with fuel
onsite.
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit