Information Notice 2002-06, Design Vulnerability in BWR Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Backfill Modification

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Design Vulnerability in BWR Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Backfill Modification
ML013470481
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/18/2002
From: Beckner W
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
To:
Koshy T, NRR/OD, 415-1176
References
TAC MB3218 IN-02-006
Download: ML013470481 (6)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 18, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-06: DESIGN VULNERABILITY IN BWR REACTOR

VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION BACKFILL

MODIFICATION

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for boiling water reactors (BWRs).

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to a potential design vulnerability in a hardware modification to the reactor vessel

water level instrumentation system. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Background

NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 93-03, Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level

Instrumentation in BWRs, issued on May 28, 1993, requested that licensees implement

hardware modifications necessary to ensure the level instrumentation system design is of high

functional reliability for long-term operation. In response to this bulletin, all BWR licensees with

the exception of Big Rock Point, which does not use cold-reference-leg instrumentation, have

either implemented or committed to implement modifications. The majority of these licensees

have decided to install a reference leg backfill system to supply a continuous flow of water from

the control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic system through the reference legs. The back-fill system

precludes migration of dissolved noncondensible gases down the legs. In August 2001, a

design vulnerability in this backfill modification was found at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

Description of Circumstances

It was discovered that, under certain conditions, the safety-related reactor vessel water level

indicators that provide certain safety-related initiation signals could give nonconservative water

level readings. During a reactor trip at Pilgrim, both trains of the emergency core cooling

system (ECCS) reactor water level instruments indicated higher than actual levels. These

instrument inaccuracies were noted after operator actions were taken to isolate the CRD

system charging water header supply valve, CRD 301-25, to insert a control rod that had not

settled at position 00. Closure of the charging water header isolates the ECCS level indicator

reference-leg backfill system (see Attachment 1). The erroneous readings were attributed to

the reference legs draining back through the reference-leg keepfill system to the CRD hydraulic

control units (HCUs). With the CRD charging header valve shut, the reactor scram reset, and

reactor pressure rising, the reference legs drained back to the HCUs. This occurs when the

CRD system pump is secured or the charging header isolation valve is closed, the source of the

reference-leg keepfill system, is at a slightly lower pressure than the reactor so that the

differential pressure across the keepfill system check valve is not sufficient to fully seat the

check valves. The draining of the reference legs results in a transient false reference-leg

indication until the check valves seat and the reference legs refill via the condensate pots or

flow is reestablished through the CRD reference leg backfill system. Pilgrim concluded that this

phenomenon can occur with either the isolation of the reference leg backfill system or possibly

with the loss of the running CRD pump.

During the reactor scam at Pilgrim, this event resulted in both the wide-range vessel level

instruments indicating higher than actual water level with the A train reaching a maximum

deviation of 26 inches and the B train reaching a maximum of 11 inches. These erroneous high

readings occurred for approximately 30 minutes. During this time, the automatic emergency

core cooling system initiation function would not have occurred on low-low water level as

designed. This false reading is due to the relative locations of the reactor vessel instrument

nozzles and the differential pressure corresponding to the ECCS initiation setpoint.

Related Generic Communications:

NRC Information Notice 93-89 Potential Problems With BWR Level Instrumentation

Backfill Modifications, November 26, 1993 NRC Information Notice 92-54 Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Caused by Rapid

Depressurization, July 24, 1992 Generic Letter 92-04 Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water

Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR

50.54(f), August 19, 1992 NRC Information Notice 93-27 Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During

Normal Plant Depressurization, April 8, 1993 NRC Bulletin 93-03 Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water

Level Instrumentation in BWRs, May 28, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions regarding the information notice, please contact the technical contacts listed below or

the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/RA/

William D. Beckner, Program Director

Operating Reactor Improvements Program

Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: R. Arrighi, Region I Thomas Koshy, NRR

508-747-0565 301-415-1176 E-mail: rja1@nrc.gov E-mail: txk@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. Sketch of Backfill Modification

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

ML013470481

  • See previous concurrence

OFFICE RORP TECH ED REG I:RI DSSA/SRXB (A) SC:RORP PD:RORP

NAME TKoshy PKleene* RArrighi* JWermiel* TKoshy* WDBeckner*

DATE 01/ /2002 12/04/2001 12/17/2001 01/17/2002 01/17/2002 01/18/2002

Attachment 1 IN 2002-06 RWL Reference Leg Backfill

Condensing Chamber

Reference Leg Reference Leg

Variable Leg Variable Leg

LT LT

Needle Valve

CRD

Charging Water Line 301-25 Scram Vlvs CRD Pumps

HCUs

Attachment 2 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2002-05 Foreign Material in Standby 01/17/02 All holders of licenses for nuclear

Liquid Control Storage Tanks power reactors.

2002-04 Wire Degradation at Breaker 01/10/02 All holders of operating licenses

Cubicle Door Hinges for nuclear power reactors.

2002-03 Highly Radioactive Particle 01/10/2002 All holders of operating licenses

Control Problems During Spent for nuclear power reactors, Fuel Pool Cleanout holders of licenses for

permanently shutdown facilities

with fuel onsite, and holders of

licenses for non-power reactors.

2002-02 Recent Experience with 01/08/2002 All holders of operating licenses

Plugged Steam Generator for pressurized-water reactors

Tubes (PWRs), except those who have

permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the reactor.

2002-01 Metalclad Switchgear Failures 01/08/2002 All holders of licenses for nuclear

and Consequent Losses of power reactors.

Offsite Power

2001-19 Improper Maintenance and 12/17/2001 All holders of operating licenses

Reassembly of Automatic Oil for nuclear power reactors, Bubblers except those who have

permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has

been permanently removed from

the reactor vessel.

2001-18 Degraded or Failed Automated 12/14/2001 All uranium fuel conversion, Electronic Monitoring, Control, enrichment, and fabrication

Alarming, Response, and licensees and certificate holders

Communications Needed for authorized to receive safeguards

Safety and/or Safeguards information. Information notice is

not available to the public

because it contains safeguards

information.

______________________________________________________________________________________

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit