LIC-07-0046, Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
ML071380058 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Fort Calhoun ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/16/2007 |
From: | Reinhart J Omaha Public Power District |
To: | Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/ADRO |
References | |
LIC-07-0046 | |
Download: ML071380058 (128) | |
Text
"WIN OmahaPublic Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha NE 68102-2247 May 16, 2007 LIC-07-0046 U. S. Nuclear Regular Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 References 1. Docket No. 50-285
- 2. Letter from OPPD (R. T. Ridenoure) to NRC (Document Control Desk), "Response to Generic Letter (GL) 2003-01, Control Room Habitability," dated December 5, 2003 (LIC-03-0150)
SUBJECT:
Application to Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications (TS) for Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 (FCS). The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements related to control room envelope habitability in accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3. The submittal of this proposed amendment fulfills a commitment made in Reference 2.
Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed changes, the requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific verifications. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS and Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 3 provides a table showing where the TSTF-448, Revision 3 changes are located in the FCS TS.
Attachment 4 provides revised (clean) TS and Bases pages.
OPPD requests approval of the proposed License Amendment by May 1, 2008 with the amendment being implemented within 270 days of approval.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the designated State of Nebraska Official.
A/ 09 _
Employment with Equal Opportunity
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-07-0046 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (Executed on May 16, 2007.)
If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Thomas C.
Matthews at (402) 533-6938.
SJ y A. &
Reinhart e Director - Fort Calhoun Station JAR/MLE/mle Attachments: 1. OPPD's Evaluation for Amendment of Operating License
- 2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)
- 4. Revised Technical Specification Pages (Clean) c: B. S. Mallett, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager J. D. Hanna, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Director of Consumer Health Services, Department of Regulation and Licensure, Nebraska Health and Human Services, State of Nebraska
LIC-07-0046 Page 1 Omaha Public Power District's Evaluation For Amendment of Operating License
1.0 DESCRIPTION
2.0 ASSESSMENT
3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION
5.0 REFERENCES
LIC-07-0046 Page 2
1.0 DESCRIPTION
The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) proposes to modify Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 (FCS) technical specification (TS) requirements related to control room envelope (CRE) habitability. These requirements are located in TS 2.8.2(4), TS 2.8.3(5), and TS 2.12.1. Surveillance requirements (SR) are contained in TS 3.1 and 3.2. Corresponding Bases changes are also included. A new Specification (TS 5.24) pertaining to the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program is also proposed.
The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS change TSTF-448, Revision 3.
The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on January 17, 2007 as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).
2.0 ASSESSMENT 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation OPPD has reviewed the safety evaluation dated January 17, 2007 as part of the CLIHP.
This review included a review of the NRC staff s evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support TSTF-448. OPPD has concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to FCS and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the FCS TS.
2.2 Optional Changes and Variations The proposed FCS TS changes are consistent with the markup of the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) Standard Technical Specifications (STS) of NRC approved TSTF-448, Revision 3. Since FCS has custom TS, the numbering of the proposed TS and the location of the information differs from that of TSTF-448, Revision
- 3. Attachment 3 identifies the location of the TSTF-448, Revision 3 changes in the FCS TS. OPPD is not proposing any variations or deviations from the TS changes described in TSTF-448, Revision 3, or the applicable parts of the NRC staff's model safety evaluation dated January 17, 2007 except as noted below.
The TSTF-448, Revision 3, note allowing the CRE boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative control was incorporated in TS 2.8.2(4), TS 2.8.3(5), and TS 2.12.1.
These limiting conditions for operation (LCO) are equivalent to LCO 3.7.11 of CEOG STS. TS 2.8.2(4) and TS 2.8.3(5), which are applicable when FCS is in Refueling Shutdown (Operating Mode 5), are equivalent to Conditions D and E of LCO 3.7.11. TS 2.12.1 is applicable when reactor coolant temperature Tcold is > 210'F and is equivalent to Conditions A, B, C, and F of LCO 3.7.11.
LIC-07-0046 Page 3 The TSTF-448, Revision 3, note concerning placement in toxic gas protection mode during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is inoperable was added to TS 2.8.2(4) and TS 2.8.3(5). However, the note was revised to encompass the plant-specific licensing basis of the FCS control room.
Amendment 248 relocated LCO (TS 2.22) and SR (TS 3.1, Table 3-3, Item 29) requirements on the toxic gas monitors to the FCS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). Therefore, the note was revised to apply when automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is "not functional" rather than "inoperable." This terminology is appropriate for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) not controlled by TSs (Reference 1).
TS 2.8.2(4) currently requires the control room ventilation system (CRVS) to be in operation in filtered air mode during core alterations and refueling operations inside containment. TS 2.8.3(5) currently requires the CRVS to be in operation in filtered air mode during refueling operations in the spent fuel pool. By definition, "in operation" means that the system or component is "operable" and performing its design function.
It is proposed that TS 2.8.2(4) and TS 2.8.3(5) be revised such that if a failure of the CRVS train that is in operation should occur, the opposite CRVS train must immediately be placed in operation or core alterations and/or refueling operations must immediately be suspended. This prevents unnecessary interruption of core alterations and/or refueling operations during the momentary transfer to the opposite CRVS train yet preserves the requirement to halt these activities if that train cannot be placed in operation in filtered air mode. The proposed revision is consistent with Condition D of LCO 3.7.11.
To facilitate the adoption of the LCO 3.7.11 Bases, it is proposed to revise the title of TS 2.12 and the table of contents from "Control Room Systems" to "Control Room Ventilation System." Whether called "Control Room Systems" or "Control Room Ventilation System," both titles encompass the control room air filtration system (TS 2.12.1) and the control room air conditioning system (TS 2.12.2). This revision makes TS 2.12 consistent with TS 2.8.2(4) and TS 2.8.3(5) in that all three Specifications will use the same terminology.
The title change is also necessary because as it applies to FCS, a portion of the Bases of LCO 3.7.11 is applicable to the CRVS as a whole. Placing all of the LCO 3.7.11 Bases statements into the Bases of TS 2.12.1 for the control room air filtration system would be inaccurate and misleading. Therefore, a section on the CRVS was added to the Bases of TS 2.12. The CRVS Bases section contains those portions of the Bases of LCO 3.7.11 that are applicable to the CRVS as a whole. This pertains primarily to the description of the CRE boundary and the CRVS emergency mode of operation.
These changes clarify the title of TS 2.12 for consistency with TS 2.8.2(4) and TS 2.8.3(5), do not expand or reduce the scope of TS 2.12, and are consistent with CEOG STS as revised by TSTF-448, Revision 3. Therefore, these changes are considered editorial in nature.
LIC-07-0046 Page 4 For conciseness, the acronym "CRVS" is proposed for utilization in TS 2.8. This is an editorial change.
TS 3.1, Table 3-3, Item 10 was revised to clarify that it pertains to the control room ventilation "system." TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item 10a was revised to clarify that it pertains to the control room "air filtration system." These changes are editorial in nature.
To correct a misspelling of the word "assemblies," TS 3.2, Table 3-4, Footnote (4) is revised.
Several minor revisions to TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item 10a.3.a are proposed. The current SR requires each circuit (train) to be operated for ten hours every month but does not specify that the hours be continuous nor does it specify operation of the heaters. The term "circuit" is revised to "train" and the frequency is revised to require that the hours be continuous with heaters operating. These revisions are editorial in nature to achieve consistency with CEOG STS. The surveillance test is consistent with the continuous run requirement and the system is designed such that the heaters are automatically operational when the filter fans are running.
For consistency with CEOG STS, a minor revision to TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item 1Oa.4, which tests automatic and manual initiation of the control room air filtration system is proposed. The proposed revision will require automatic and manual initiation of "each train" rather than "the system." This change is editorial in nature as the conduct of the surveillance test is unaffected.
Two minor variations from the Specification for the Control Room Habitability Program of TSTF-448, Revision 3 are proposed. First, the FCS TS does not contain a definition for "STAGGERED TEST BASIS" as does CEOG STS. Therefore, TS 5.24d was revised to apply to the CRVS, which means that each CRVS train will be operated each time that the SR is performed. Since each train will be operated, at each surveillance interval, the proposed revision is more conservative than TSTF-448, Revision 3 and thus is acceptable.
Secondly, as FCS does not have a ventilation filter testing program (VFTP), the required flow rate for the CRVS was revised to "operating within the tolerance for design flow rate." The design flow rate is that required by TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item 10a.3.c.
Surveillance requirements for the control room charcoal and HEPA filters are located in TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item 10a.
Finally, OPPD proposes to renumber many of the pages in TS 2.12.1, and TS 3.1 and their associated Bases in order to accommodate the additional text added for consistency with CEOG STS as revised by TSTF-448, Revision 3. In order to remove an inconsistency in the page-numbering scheme, OPPD also proposes to renumber pages in TS 3.2.
LIC-07-0046 Page 5 The changes proposed above are necessary to adapt the requirements of TSTF-448, Revision 3 to the FCS TS or achieve additional consistency with CEOG STS, or are clearly editorial in nature. As such, these variations are minor and do not have any safety significance.
Accompanying the proposed TS changes are appropriate conforming technical changes to the TS Bases. The Bases of TS 2.8.2(4) and TS 2.8.3(5) does not include the statement from the Bases of LCO 3.7.11 stating that the system is required to cope with the release from a rupture of a waste gas decay tank (WGDT). The plant-specific accident analysis does not credit CRVS filtered air mode for the rupture of a WGDT (Reference 2).
The proposed revisions to the FCS TS Bases conform with TSTF-448, Revision 3 and also include editorial and administrative changes.
The applicability of Section 3.0 of the model safety evaluation (SE) to FCS is as follows:
- 1. FCS has custom TS. Therefore, the location of TSTF-448, Revision 3 changes in the FCS TS are not as described in Section 3.0 of the model SE. Attachment 3 identifies the location of the TSTF-448, Revision 3 changes in the FCS TS.
- 2. The first paragraph of Section 3.0 and all of Section 3.1 are applicable to FCS.
- 3. Section 3.2 is applicable but should be revised to incorporate the editorial changes noted above.
- 4. Section 3.3, Evaluations 1, 3, and 5 are not applicable to FCS.
- 5. Section 3.3, Evaluation 2 is applicable to FCS.
- 6. Section 3.3, Evaluation 4 is applicable to FCS in part. During core alterations and refueling operations, TS 2.8.2(4) and TS 2.8.3(5) require the CRVS to be in operation in filtered air mode. Therefore, to achieve the effect of the TSTF-448, Revision 3, CEOG STS, Condition E, "OR" statement, a new required action was added to TS 2.8.2(4) and 2.8.3(5). The new action requires the suspension of core alterations and refueling operations if one or more CRVS trains are inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary.
- 7. Section 3.3, Evaluation 6 is applicable to FCS. However, please note that the description in Evaluation 6 is not accurate regarding OPPD's Generic Letter 2003-01 response. OPPD committed to submit a license amendment request based on the approved revision of TSTF-448 but did not state that the control room pressurization surveillance is inadequate to demonstrate operability of the CRE boundary. The paragraph following Evaluation 6 is also applicable to FCS.
OPPD is not proposing any exceptions'to Sections C. 1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0.
- 8. Section 3.4 is applicable in part to FCS. However, the Section 3.4 paragraph concerning measurement of CRE pressure is not accurate. As stated above, the FCS TS do not contain a definition for staggered test basis nor do they contain requirements for a VFTP. TS 5.24d of the CRE Habitability Program requires each CRVS train to be operated within the tolerance for design flow rate each time that the SR is performed.
LIC-07-0046 Page 6 2.3 License Condition Regarding Initial Performance of New Surveillance and Assessment Requirements The last successful tracer gas test at FCS was performed more than 6 years ago. This was discussed with the NRC Project Manager and it was agreed that the license condition in the model license amendment request would be modified accordingly. Therefore, OPPD proposes the following as a license condition to support implementation of the proposed TS changes:
Upon implementation of Amendment No. xxx adopting TSTF-448, Revision 3, the determination of control room envelope (CRE) unfiltered air inleakage as required by TS 3.1, Table 3-3, Item 10.b. in accordance with TS 5.24c.(i), the assessment of CRE habitability as required by Specification 5.24c.(ii), and the measurement of CRE pressure as required by Specification 5.24d, shall be considered met. Following implementation:
(a) The first performance of TS 3.1, Table 3-3, Item 10.b., in accordance with Specification 5.24c.(i), shall be within the next 18 months as the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas test is greater than 6 years.
(b) The first performance of the periodic assessment of CRE habitability, Specification 5.24c.(ii), shall be within the next 9 months as the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas test is greater than 3 years.
(c) The first performance of the periodic measurement of CRE pressure, Specification 5.24d., shall be within the next 138 days.
3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS
3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination OPPD has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register as part of the CLIIP. OPPD has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to FCS and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (a).
3.2 Commitments No regulatory commitments are necessary. OPPD's license amendment implementation process requires all procedure changes, design basis documentation updates, and training necessary to comply with the amended technical specifications be completed prior to implementation of the amendment.
LIC-07-0046 Page 7 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION OPPD has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation dated January 17, 2007 as part of the CLIIP. OPPD has concluded that the staff's findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to FCS and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application.
5.0 REFERENCES
- 1. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20: Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, "Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability," September 26, 2005
- 2. Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 14.19, "Gas Decay Tank Rupture"
LIC-07-0046 Page 1 Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Markup)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS DEFINITIONS 1.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 Safety Limits - Reactor Core 1.2 Safety Limit, Reactor Coolant System Pressure 1.3 Limiting Safety System Settings, Reactor Protective System 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.0.1 General Requirements 2.1 Reactor Coolant System 2.1.1 Operable Components 2.1.2 Heatup and Cooldown Rate 2.1.3 Reactor Coolant Radioactivity 2.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Limits 2.1.5 Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen and Halogens Concentrations 2.1.6 Pressurizer and Main Steam Safety Valves 2.1.7 Pressurizer Operability 2.1.8 Reactor Coolant System Vents 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System 2.4 Containment Cooling 2.5 Steam and Feedwater System 2.6 Containment System 2.7 Electrical Systems 2.8 Refueling 2.9 Radioactive Waste Disposal System 2.10 Reactor Core 2.10.1 Minimum Conditions for Criticality 2.10.2 Reactivity Control Systems and Core Physics Parameter Limits 2.10.3 DELETED 2.10.4 Power Distribution Limits 2.11 DELETED 2.12 Control Room Ventilation Systems TOC - Page 1 Amendment No. !1,1 5,27,32,38,52,54, 57,67,80,81,86,146,152,167,169,182,1-88-2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility 5.2 Organization 5.3 Facility Staff Qualifications 5.4 Training 5.5 Not Used 5.6 Not Used 5.7 Safety Limit Violation 5.8 Procedures 5.9 Reporting Requirements 5.9.1 Not Used 5.9.2 Not Used 5.9.3 Special Reports 5.9.4 Unique Reporting Requirements 5.9.5 Core Operating Limits Report 5.9.6 RCS Pressure-Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) 5.10 Record Retention 5.11 Radiation Protection Program 5.12 DELETED 5.13 Secondary Water Chemistry 5.14 Systems Integrity 5.15 Post-Accident Radiological Sampling and Monitoring 5.16 Radiological Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Programs 5.16.1 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program 5.16.2 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program 5.17 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) 5.18 Process Control Program (PCP) 5.19 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program 5.20 Technical Specification (TS) Bases Control Program 5.21 Containment Tendon Testing Program 5.22 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program 5.23 Steam Generator (SG) Program 5.24; Control Room Habitability Program 6.0 INTERIM SPECIAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 6.1 DELETED 6.2 DELETED 6.3 DELETED 6.4 DELETED TOC - Page 3 Amendment No. 32,31,43,54,55,57, 73,80,86,89,93,99,141,152,157,184,185, 221 236, 237, 21-6
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling 2.8.2 Refuelina Operations - Containment 2.8.2(3) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Sianal (VIAS)
Applicability Applies to operation of the Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.
Objective To minimize the consequences of an accident occurring during CORE ALTERATIONS or REFUELING OPERATIONS that could affect public health and safety.
Specification VIAS, including manual actuation capability, shall be OPERABLE with one gaseous radiation monitor OPERABLE.
Required Actions (1) Without one radiation monitor OPERABLE, or VIAS manual actuation capability inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS.
2.8.2(4) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVSý Applicability Applies to operation of the control room Yentilation s)ýstem
. RVS during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.
Objective To minimize the consequences of a fuel handling accident to the control room staff.
Specification Required Actions (1) If the con.trol roo ventilation
. system a ORVS train is not IN OPERATION o in the Filtered Air mode, immediately pc th tIO terA ode OR immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS.
2.8 - Page 7 Amendment No. 188,201,-204
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling 2.8.2 Refueling Operations - Containment 2.8.(4) Gon~trol Room Ventiation-System (CRVS) (Continue~d)
'Require&d Actions (Cont-inued)
(2 If one or more GRVS trains are inoperable due to an inoperable control 2.8.3 Refueling Operations - Spent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(1) Spent Fuel Assembly Storage Applicability Applies to storage of spent fuel assemblies whenever any irradiated fuel assembly is stored in Region 2 (including peripheral cells) of the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operation are not applicable.
Obiective To minimize the possibility of an accident occurring during REFUELING OPERATIONS that could affect public health and safety.
Specification The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region 2 (including peripheral cells) of the spent fuel pool shall be within the acceptable burnup domain of Figure 2-10.
Required Actions (1) With the requirements of the LCO not met, initiate action to move the noncomplying fuel assembly immediately.
2.8 - Page 8 Amendment No. 4-88
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling 2.8.3 Refueling Operations - Spent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(5) Control Room Ventilation System (CRys)
Applicability Applies to operation of the control room. vontilation system. GRVS during REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool area. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operation are not applicable.
Obiective To minimize the consequences of a fuel handling accident to the control room staff Specification (1) The conRtFrol room ventilation system,RVS shall be IN OPERATION and in the Filtered Air mode.
(2) A spent fuel pool area radiation monitor shall be IN OPERATION.
r - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - --- -N o e_ - - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- --- - -- -
- 11. The control roo envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermi4tpptint under administrative control.
P.l~ace in toxic gas protection mode immediately if automatic trnfer totoxic~
gas protection mode is not4fnctional.
Required Actions (1) If th.e control room 'entilatio, sy.tomaP train
.RVSis not IN OPERATION er-net in Filtered Air mode, immediately *opposite place the train IN OPERANONin Fiered Air modeOR immediately suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS.
(2) If a spent fuel pool area radiation monitor is not IN OPERATION, immediately suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS.
,() If one or more CRVS trains are inoperabledue to an~inoperable con~tro!,
room envelope (CRE) boundary, im~mediately suspen EFUELI4NG OPERATIONS.
2.8 - Page 13 Amendment No. 1 "88,201
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.2(3) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) (Continued)
Requiring one (1) radiation monitor to be OPERABLE and aligned to monitor the containment atmosphere [or stack effluents] is a conservative measure to reduce exposure.
Radiation monitoring will assure operators are alerted if a radiological incident occurs in containment to enable implementation of administrative controls as specified in the Bases for 2.8.2(1) "Containment Penetrations." During CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS, the OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system is addressed by Specification 2.8.2(4). The control room ventilation system is placed in Filtered Air mode as a conservative measure to reduce control room operator exposure. Specification 2.8.2(4) allows the radiological consequences analysis for a fuel handling accident to credit the Filtered Air mode at the time of the accident.
When VIAS is inoperable, CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS in containment are immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.8.2(4) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS4 Operating the contro-l rooM Ventilation
.. stem
. , RVS in the Filtered Air mode is a conservative measure to reduce control room operator exposure. This allows the radiological consequences analysis for a fuel handling accident to credit the Filtered Air mode at the time of the accident.* IiaCk8tani o Not*fN nFlee i oe h pot train mi't mrediately be placed INOPERATION in FilteredqAir mode. This action ensure that theremnaining train is OPERABLE, and that any aciefiuewl b edl eetd An alternative is to immediately suspend activitis CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIO&NS)that could result in a release of radioactivity that mi'9ht require isolation of the.
Similarly, with~ one o~r more CRVS trains in~operable"due to an inoperable CRE __b&o ndary, ac6tion must be taken~immediately tosuspend activities (CR LEAIN n REFUELING OPERATIONS) that could' result in a release of raiatvt ha i~ eur isolation of th eCRE.
Thse ations place the' unit in acondition thatV mihnimz"'e 'tYfie acci'dent risk*-
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.8 - Page 23 Amendment No.,88,201,204, 239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(1) Spent Fuel Assembly Storage (Continu Gontrol Room Ventilation Syste, C~RTSY. (Continued.),
The Specification is modefied byftwo notesn. Thefirst note allows theaRE boungdary to be opened interm ittently under adminitrtiv c~ontrols. This nyapist pnnsi h R bounodary that canbe rapidly restoredl t the condition, s such t asdoors, hatches,tfloo plugs and access panels. For enynd exit through doors, the administrative control of the Aospenint fus aerfrmedbly the per ) etering orexiting the area . For other openings,-
tRse controls shodld be procedurealiverfand onsist of stationing a dedited individual at, the opening who is in continuous communication with theorarsith R.Ts individual will have a method raidly a close the openingfaned o restre th2e RE boundary to, a confdition fquivalent to the design condition when a need for GRE isolation is indicated.
he secrnd w note rhquires the CRVStodbteaitoxic gas protetiont mode ift utomaticrasfue to txic ga protvetion mode is noth unctional GORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIS must asem susented immsed ot pel. Toxic gas ismonitored atthe cutside aReinr intake duct. Actu~ation of th sytmtGoi 3 rtcinmd rp RVS fanis and isolates the outside air dapelrs. The blRVSa then placedin recirculation mode. ln recircultion rpemain~ byumn mode, thyfilter s< 0.95rb the trains pool~sare bypassed.
tbeforddwtnortdwtr Fire and smoke detection is provided at the outlet of th eiclto ast rtc gis smoke develop~ed from sources in th usd i temo from sources inside the control room. As in toxic gpsprotection mode, C1VS -- fas are trippedand the outsidear dapers are isolated.
2.8.3(1) Spent Fuel Assembly Storage The spent fuel pool is designed for noncriticality by use of neutron absorbing material. The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool, according to Figure 2-10, and the accompanying LCO, ensures that the keff of the spent fuel pool always remains < 0.95 assuming the pool to be flooded with unborated water.
A spent fuel assembly may be transferred directly from the reactor core to the spent fuel pool Region 2 provided an independent verification of assembly burnups has been completed and the assembly burnup meets the acceptance criteria identified in Figure 2-10. When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 (including the peripheral cells) is not in accordance with Figure 2-10, immediate action must be taken to make the necessary fuel assembly movement(s) to bring the configuration into compliance with Figure 2-10.
Acceptable fuel assembly burnup is not a prerequisite for Region 1 storage because Region 1 will maintain any type of fuel assembly that the plant is licensed for in a safe, coolable, subcritical geometry.
2.8 - Page 24 Amendment No. 188,201,204, 239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued)
ý.8.3(1) Spen Fuel Assembly Sorac (qqnt~n ueq.)
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
2.8.3(2) Spent Fuel Pool Water Level The minimum water level in the spent fuel pool meets the assumption of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident. When the water level is lower than the required level, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool is immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring in the spent fuel pool. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation.
Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
2.8.3(3) Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration The basis for the 500 ppm boron concentration requirement with Boral poisoned storage racks is to maintain the keff below 0.95 in the event a misloaded unirradiated fuel assembly is located next to a spent fuel assembly. A misloaded unirradiated fuel assembly at maximum enrichment condition, in the absence of soluble poison, may result in exceeding the design effective multiplication factor. Soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water, for which credit is permitted under these conditions, would assure that the effective multiplication factor is maintained substantially less than the design condition.
This LCO applies whenever unirradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool.
The boron concentration is periodically sampled in accordance with Specification 3.2.
Sampling is performed prior to movement of unirradiated fuel to the spent fuel pool and periodically when unirradiated fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool.
2.8 - Page 25 Amendment No. 188,201,204, 239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2,8.3(j3).Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration (Cniud The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of refueling operations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.8.3(4) Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation The spent fuel pool area ventilation system contains a charcoal filter to prevent release of significant radionuclides to the outside atmosphere. The system does not automatically realign and therefore must be IN OPERATION prior to REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool. When the spent fuel pool area ventilation system is not IN OPERATION, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool is immediately suspended.
This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring in the spent fuel pool.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
2.8.3(5) Control Room Ventilation System (CRV.
Operating the control ,,,ventilation ro, m RVS in the Filtered Air mode and requiring a syste..
radiation monitor to be IN OPERATION are conservative measures to reduce control room operator exposure. This allows the radiological consequences analysis for a fuel handling accident to credit the Filtered Air mode at the time of the accident.
Radiation monitoring will assure operators are alerted if a radiological incident occurs. This specification can be satisfied by using a permanent spent fuel pool area radiation monitor or a portable area radiation monitor.
2.8 - Page 26 Amendment No. 239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(5) Control Room ,Ventilation ~System ((j ,V8~) (Continued)
Tf a CR~VS traini is notIN~OPERATION inFilterd; Aiode, the opposite train must, immediately'be placed INOPERATION~ inFlee i oe This action ensures tha the remaining train is OPERA~BLE~, and that any active failure~will be readily detected. An alter~native is to imnmediately4 suspend activities (REFUELING OPERATIONS) that c;ould result in a release of radioactivity that. might require isolation of the control room ervl~p When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
Fi~re and smok~e detection is provided at the outlet of the recircultion fans to protect against smoke developed from sources in the outside air stream or from ~sources inside the control room. As in toxic g~as protection mode, CRVS fans are tripped an heoutside airda are ~is~t~erd 2.8 - Page 27 Amendment No. 239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(6) Spent Fuel Cask Loading (1) Soluble Boron The basis for the 800 ppm minimum boron concentration requirement during spent fuel cask loading operations is to maintain the keff in the cask system less than or equal to 0.95 in the event a mis-loaded unirradiated fuel assembly is located anywhere in the cask with up to 31 other fuel assemblies meeting the burnup and enrichment requirements of LCO 2.8.3(6)(2). This boron concentration also ensures the keff in the cask system will be less than or equal to 0.95 if an unirradiated fuel assembly is dropped in the space between the spent fuel racks and the cask loading area during cask loading operations next to a spent fuel assembly. A mis-loaded or dropped irradiated fuel assembly at maximum enrichment condition, in the absence of soluble poison, may result in exceeding the design effective multiplication factor.
Soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water, for which credit is permitted during spent fuel cask loading operations, assures that the effective multiplication factor is maintained substantially less than the design basis limit.
This LCO applies whenever a fuel assembly is located in a spent fuel cask submerged in the spent fuel pool. The boron concentration is periodically sampled in accordance with Specification 3.2. Sampling is performed prior to movement of fuel into the spent fuel cask and periodically thereafter during cask loading operations, until the cask is removed from the spent fuel pool.
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of refueling operations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.3 - Page 28 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(6) Spent Fuel Ca*sk Loadin* (Co*tinued)
(2) Burnup vs. Enrichment The spent fuel cask is designed for subcriticality by use of neutron absorbing material. The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool, according to Figure 2-11, and the accompanying LCO, ensure that the keff of the spent fuel pool always remains - 0.95 assuming the pool to be flooded with borated water and <1.0 assuming the pool is flooded with unborated water, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4).
A spent fuel assembly may be transferred directly from the spent fuel racks to the spent fuel cask provided an independent verification of assembly burnups has been completed and the assembly burnup meets the acceptance criteria identified in Figure 2-11. If any fuel assembly located in the spent fuel cask is not in accordance with Figure 2-11, immediate action must be taken to make the remove of non-complying fuel assembly from the spent fuel cask and return it to the spent fuel rack.
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
References (1) USAR Section 9.5
,() USAR Section 14-.1891 2.8 - Page 29 AmnendmentNo.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Vetilatioi* Systems 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating Applicability Applies to the operational status of the control room air filtration system when the reactor coolant temperature T.od -> 210°F.
Objective To assure operability of equipment required to filter control room air following a Design Basis Accident.
Specification Two control room air filtration trains shall be OPERABLE.
Required Actions (1) With one control room air filtration train inoperable for reas*onsother than2),
restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Witf one or more co-n1trol rom- a~irfiltration~trais inoper~able due to inoperable, V
GRE boundary:.
(2ý3) With the required actions of (1) or (*) not met, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
(34) With two control room air filtration trains inoperable or reasons other thani2) enter LCO 2.0.1 immediately.
2.12 - Page 1 Amendment No. 15,128,130, 188
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation Systems 2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditioning System Applicability Applies to the operational status of the control room air conditioning system when the reactor coolant temperature Tcold > 210 0 F.
Obiective To assure operability of equipment required to maintain air temperature within the control room following a Design Basis Accident.
Specification Two control room air conditioning trains shall be OPERABLE.
Required Actions (1) With one control room air conditioning train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 30 days.
(2) With the required actions of (1) not met, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
(3) With two control room air conditioning trains inoperable, enter LCO 2.0.1 immediately.
2.12 - Page 2 Amendment No. 1-88
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.o LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPEP.ATION 2.12 R
,-n+rol-GIom S"`e,,
Bases 2.12.1 Centroe,-.-Rm Air F*,F+,atE),*,System O..eratin, The control o*om.air filtration system is designed to maintain radiation doses to control room persRnnel within the limits of Gene*al .. Desig.n refrirn (GD) 19. When the contre! room ventilation system is placed in the filtered air makeup mode either manually or after FreeiVing a VIAS, the unfiltered outside air duct i prevent Significant radionucides froem entering the control roomRn.
A control room air filtrati;n traiR Is OPERABLE when the associated train level components and the system level components are OPERABLE and the train a provide filtered outside aiar and reciruation O air to the contFel room. Tra;in leveIl componRents conRsist of the outside air filter unit isolation dampers (PCV 6680A-41, PCV 6680B 1), the outside air filter unit fa* (VA 63A, VA 63B), the outside air filter unit
(\VA 64A, VA 61B), and the outside air filter unit iselation damper (PC'! 6680A 2, PC'! 6680B 2) and associlated ductwork.
Systemn level compn.- ents
- GRnsist of the urfiltered outside air duct isol;ation" dampeFs (PC'! 6681 A and PC'! 6681 B), the recirculation duct isolation damper (PC'! 6682) and associated ductwc).k. IF either or both unfiltered outside air duct isolati;n dampers (PC'!AV -1,P!6681 B) are inoperable, the controI room air filtration system is c-,ondered OPERABLE if the unfiltered outside air duct is isolated. If only a single unfilteFred utside air du ct isolation damper is OPERABLE and the unfiltered outside air duct is ot isolated, then the 7 day LCD applies. if both unfiltered outside air duct isolat*ion dampers are inrperable ncRurrently with an unisolated flwpath through the unfiltered outside air ductwor~k to the conRtrol roomn, then both trains are inoperable and LCO 2.0.1 applies.
The rFeir-ulatin duct does RGt require redundant dampers to Meet si*gle failure proot criteria. Damper PCV 6682 meets the accriteria for the damper repair option described in.Standard Review Plan 6.4, Appendix A. A radioactivity release requires PC'! 66821to ope, should PC'! 6682 fail to o~pen, it can be repaired orF repo)sitionRed open before control room doses exceed the allwable limnits of GDC 19.
With the reactor cooliant temperature TGGl z 21 0Fo two trains of the cont-rol room ai filtration. system a. e required to be OPERABLE. If one traiRn it shall be re6eored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this conditon the remaining ta*in i-adequate to perfo.rm the controFrl room, r proftction functionr.
madiatio"n The 7 day comrple~tion time8 is based on the low probability of an accident occurring duing thsie peid, and the ability of the rming train to provide the required functionR.
2.!2 P~nn 3 Amrendm.~nt .Mn IRR
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases 2.12 Control Roomt Ventilationi Systemr The actions tak~ii in thee toxic gaJsislation -sateare -similar, except th~at the signal switches theCRVS to an iso~lation mode, minimizing ~outside air e terin thORE through the GRE boundary.' Toxic gas is mo~nitored at the outside air itake duct.
Actuatio'n of the system o toxic gas protection ~mode trips CRVS fans and isolates~ the outside air damnpers. The CRVS is then p~aced in recirculafi'on Imade. In recirculation~
m'ode, the filter trains are bypassed.
n moke detection is provided at the outletof the recircul~ation fans to protect Iýr-a~gainst soedeveloped from sources in the outside air stream or from sources' insiided the con~trol room.~ As in toxic gas protection mode, CRVS fans are tripped and thlo outside air dampers are isolate6d.
2.12 - Pa4ge_ 3 ~ Amendm~en~tNo. -&ý
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Roo Sstm 2.2. GRtv,4rI DRerm A;r FolratmR, Syte Qpaw~R1 (G'tRwUw,.w if the inoperable train cannot bo Festored to OPERABLE within tho allowed completion time, the plant must be placed in a MODE where the specification is no longer applicable. With two trains inoperable, the controlI roomr air filtrationR system may not be capable of performing its design function and the plant must be placed in a MODE where the specificationR is no longer applicable.
2.12.2 ConRtrol Room Air ConditioninQ System The control room air conditioning systemA is required to ensure the contro~l room1 temperature will not exceed equipment OPER.AB-ILITY requiremenRts. The reactol protective system panels and the engineered safety features panels were designed for, and the isrmnaonwas tested at, 120 0F=.The temperature inside the control cabinets is at most 15'F warmer than the temperature of the control room due to heat produced by the electFroni circuit.Y'. Therefore, the temRperatur~e of the conRtrol room Will Rot affect OPERABILIT-Y of the control cabinets as lonRg as it doesn't exceed 105'F=.
During non emergency operation, the control roomn temperature may be maintained by using Component Cooling W.Aater (CCVV). During design basis accident conditions, the CCWV isolation valves to air conditionRing units (VA 46A and VA 46B) are automatically closed en a VIAS. This prevents CCWV that has been heated by co)mpoenRts following a desGign basis accident from adding heat to the control room. When VIAS is in override, closing these valves maintains the OPERABILITY of the associated ai GE)RnnGig-unit.
With the reactor coolant temnperature T 21Ftwo trains of the conRtrol roomai conditionin~g system are required to be OPERABLE. if one train isioeal tshall be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. in this condition the remaining train is-adequate to mnaintafin the control room temperature. With both trains ino~perable, the control room air co~nditioning system may Rot be capable of performing its intended function and LCO 2.0.1 must be entered imdaey Ref ereRGes (1) USAR Section 9.10 2.12 Page 41 Amendment No. 188
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Vhentilation~ System Bases (Continued).
2.1 ontrol~Room Ventilation System_~(Continued)'
C~
The radiation mronitori ng syste p~rovides an airborne radiation monpitor (RMA 65),
which~ starts after a ventilation iso6lation actuato sinl(IS oveiycnrlro habitability followuing a designf b~asis acciden~t. The air enteingtheCREiscontinuously monitored ,by toi ga deetr.Oedtco uptaoethe setpifnt will cause actuation of the toxic gas isolation stte The ations ofthe toxic g'as isolaion sate ar more restrictive, and will override th~e a~ctin of he emergency radiation state.
ThCV provides protetiforn frmsoeadhzrosceiast h R occu~pants. The analysis of hazardous chemical releases demonstrates that the toxicity, limts renotexceed~edin the ORE following a hazardous chemical release (Ref. 3)
The eval uation ofasmk challenge demonstrates t~hat it will not result in t~he inabilit:y of he CR occupants to control the -re~actor e~ither frorn he control r~oom or fromn the remote shutdown panels (Ref. 4).
T~he worst case single active failu're'of atcomponent of the CR~S, ~assuminpg alos~s of o6ffsite powerdoes not imp~air the ability.pfjthe, system to perform its design function The CRVS satisfies Criterion. 31 of 110CFR 50.36c()ii).1 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating Each cont~rol room air filtration sytm(RAS ri contain~s a heaterad> demnister, a high efficiency pa rticulateairr(H EPA) filter,,an aciae hrolasre eto o removal of gaseous activty (principally iodines), an~d a fan. Du~ctwork, valves or da mpers, doors, barrersjnd instru mentation 'also form part of the systemn, as well as demisters that remove water droplets from the airstream. A seodbn fHP filters fllows the dsorber section to collect carbon fines and provides back-up ini case of failure ofthe main HEPA filter, bank.
The ORAFS is-an~ emergency 'systemn, part of whc na-- ooprt during normal unit operations in the standby modeofoperaton Upn reep faVAnra i supply to the CRE is diverted to the filtertrains,~and the streami of ventilation a ir is reciruatedthrough the filter trains oftesse.Te lmsesrmv any entrained water droplets present to preventexcessive loading ofthe HEPA filte~rs and chiarcoal adsodrbers. Conitinujous operation ofec ri o tlat1 or e mionth, with the hbeaters onri)educe moisture buil~du~pon the HEPA filters and adsrbers. Boith he dqejistegr and he~ater are. importat to the effectiveness of the carcoalads~orb~ers.
2~.12 -Pae 4 Amendmnent No. 188
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Bases (Continued) 2.12.1 Control Roomniri FiItra-i6h'System -Operating (Continued),
The QRAFS provides airborne radioogical protection for the ORE pocupants as demonstrated4b the CRE occupant dose analyasesior thezimost lirniting design basis accident fission product release presented in the USAR, Section 14.15 (Rf.2).
2.12 - Page 5 Amendmentii No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Bases(Continued) 212.1 ,.Conftrol Room Air Filtration System - Operatingi (C~tiu a.Fan is OPERABLE, b HEPAfilters and charcoal adsorb~er ar not excessvely r~estirictingflow,~and are.
capable of performinig thier filtration function, and,
- c. Heater, demnister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, andair, circulation can be mainhtaine>d, In order for th~e CRAFS trains to be considerjedOPERABLE. the CRE boundary must be manandsc htCEocpn dose from a large radioactive release does not exceed the calculated dose in the licensing basis consequene analys~es for~ IDBs, and
~that CRE occupants are protectedfromi hazardous ch~emickals and smoke.
APP0LF--- ILITY~
With the reactor~ coolant tempertr t4Tcd!:2 Q'F, the CRAFS m"y-st -be0 ERA BLE --
to ensure that the CRE will remnain habitable during andfollowving a I2BA.
2.12 - Pqgt 6 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.12.1 Control Room Air Fi'Itmbton System - Opertinag ontinye-dj
,(2)a, (2)b, and (2)d Ifthe unfiltered~ inleakage of potentially contam~inated air past the CRE ounda ry and into the CRE canresult in CREoccupant radioloica d~osegreater than ~the calIculated dose of th liesn ai nlsso B osqecs(loe ob up~to 5 rem TEDE~), or inade~quate protection of CFE occupants fom_ hazardous chemicals or smoke, the CR bounidaryis. inoperable. Actions~must be takeni to re~tore an OPERABLE CRE boundary wit~hin_190days.
'2.12 -Pag 7l Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITONS FOR OPERAT~ION i2.12Control Roonm Ven~tilation System Bas~es (ontinued) 2.12.1 tbrol Room Air Filtration Systemn - Operating (Cotinued Con 0&)
(4) 2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditioning System The control room air conditioning system is required to ensure the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements. The reactor protective system panels and the engineered safety features panels were designed for, and the instrumentation was tested at, 120°F. The temperature inside the control cabinets is at most 15'F warmer than the temperature of the control room due to heat produced by the electronic circuitry. Therefore, the temperature of the control room will not affect OPERABILITY of the control cabinets as long as it doesn't exceed 105'F.
During non-emergency operation, the control room temperature may be maintained by using Component Cooling Water (CCW). During design basis accident conditions, the CCW isolation valves to air conditioning units (VA-46A and VA-46B) are automatically closed on a VIAS. This prevents CCW that has been heated by components following a design basis accident from adding heat to the control room. When VIAS is in override, closing these valves maintains the OPERABILITY of the associated air conditioning unit.
2.12 - Page 8 Aýrnendrnent No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation Systemn
- 2. 12.2 CQontrol Room Air Conditioning System &Qornt L!di With the reactor coolant temperature Tcold > 21 0°F, two trains of the control room air conditioning system are required to be OPERABLE. If one train is inoperable it shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this condition the remaining train is adequate to maintain the control room temperature. With both trains inoperable, the control room air conditioning system may not be capable of performing its intended function and LCO 2.0.1 must be entered immediately.
References (1) USAR Section 9.10 2.12 - Pagp'O 4
Aml.endmenlt No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 30 sIU* *tEILLANE RdEQUIREMENTS 3.1 Instrument~ation and Control (Continued)
Rýýeferernces 3.1- Page 3 Amen Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. Power Range Safety a. Check: S a.
Channels
- 1) Neutron Flux 1) CHANNEL CHECK
- 2) Thermal Power 2) CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Adjustment D(3) b. Channel adjustment to a gree with heat balance calculation.
- c. Test Q(1) c. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 2. Wide-Range a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Logarithmic Neutron Monitors
- b. Test(2) P b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 3. Reactor Coolant Flow a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Test Q(1) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 3 4. Amendment No. ,60, !63,1f82
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 4. Thermal Margin/Low a. Check S a.
Pressure 1) Pressure Setpoint 1) CHANNEL CHECK
- 2) Pressure Input 2) CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Test Q(0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL f FEST
- c. Calibrate: R c.
- 1) Temperature Input 1) CHANNEL CALIBRATI ON
- 2) Pressure Input 2) CHANNEL CALIBRATI ON
- 5. High-Pressurizer a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure
- b. Test Q(1) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page -45 Amendment No. 163, 18 2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 6. Steam Generator a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Level
- b. Test Q(0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 7. Steam Generator a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure
- b. Test Q(0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 8. Containment Pressure a. Test Q(0) a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 9. Loss of Load a. Test P a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 10. Manual Trips a. Test P a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 11. Steam Generator a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Differential Pressure
- b. Test Q(0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 5 Amendment No. 77,1-6v, !8v
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 12. Reactor Protection a. Test Q(1) a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST System Logic Units
- 13. Axial Power a. Check: S a.
Distribution
- 1) Axial Shape Index 1) CHANNEL CHECK Indication
- 2) Upper Trip 2) CHANNEL CHECK Setpoint Indication
- 3) Lower Trip 3) CHANNEL CHECK Setpoint Indication
- b. Test Q(1) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION NOTES: (1) The quarterly tests will be done on only one of four channels at a time to prevent reactor trip.
(2) Calibrate using built-in simulated signals.
(3) Not required unless the reactor is in the power operating condition and is therefore not required during plant startup and shutdown periods.
3.1 - Page 6 C01 Amendment No. 77,!22,1673-1-82
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. Pressurizer Pressure L_ow a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Test Q(l)p(4) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 2. Pressurizer Low a. Calibrate R a. CHANNEL CALIBRATION Pressure Blocking Circuit
- 3. Safety Injection a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation Logic (Simulation of PPLS or CPHS 2/4 Logic)
- b. Test R(7) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 3.1 - Page -7118" Amendment No. 54,163,4-2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 4. Containment Pressure a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST High Signal
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 5. Containment Spray a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation Logic (Simulation of PPLS and CPHS 2/4 Logic)
- b. Test R(7) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 6. Containment Radiation a. Check D a. CHANNEL CHECK High Signal (2) 3.1 - Page 8 91, Amendment No. 152,163,173, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES. INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 6. (continued) b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. Secondary and Electronic Calibration performed at refueling frequency.
Primary calibration performed with exposure to radioactive sources only when required by the secondary and electronic calibration.
- 7. Manual Safety Injection a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation
- 8. Manual Containment a. Check R a. Observe isolation valves closure.
Isolation Actuation
- b. Test R b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 9. Manual Containment a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Spray Actuation
- 10. Automatic Load a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Sequencers
- 11. Diesel Testing See Technical Specification 3.7 3.1 - Page 9 10, Amendment No. 54,111,152,163,173, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 12. Diesel Fuel Transfer a. Test M a. Pump run to refill day tank.
Pump
- 13. SIRW Tank Low a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Level Signal
- b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 14. Safety Injection a. Check S(5) a. Verify that level and pressure Tank Level and Pressuire are within limits.
3.1 - Page 4-0 11 Amendment No. 111,163,171, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 14. (continued) b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 15. Boric Acid Tank Level a. Check W a. Verify that level is within limits.
- 16. Boric Acid Tank a. Check W a. Verify that temperature is within limits.
Temperature
- 17. Steam Generator Low a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure Signal (SGL 3) 3)
- b. Test Q( b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 44 LTj2"_ Amendment No. 131,163,172, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 18. SIRW Tank Temperature a. Check a. Verify that temperature is within limits.
- b. Test R b. Measure temperature of SIRW tank with standard laboratory instruments.
- 19. Manual Recirculation a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation
- 20. Recirculation Actuation a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Logic
- b. Test b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 21. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus a. Check S a. Verify voltage readings are above Low Voltage (Loss of alarm initiation on degraded voltage Voltage and Degraded level - supervisory lights "on".
Voltage) Actuation Logic
- b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (Undervoltage relay)
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 22. Manual Emergency Off-site a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Power Low Trip Actuation 3.1 - Page 42- Amendment No. 411,153,163,172,182 249
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 23. Auxiliary Feedwater a. Check: S a.
- 1) Steam Generator 1) CHANNELCHECK Water Level Low (Wide Range)
- 2) Steam Generator 2) CHANNELCHECK Pressure Low
- b. Test: b.
- 1) Actuation Logic 1) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate: R C.
- 1) Steam Generator 1) CHANNEL CALIBRATION Water Level Low (Wide Range)
- 2) Steam Generator 2) CHANNEL CALIBRATION Pressure Low
- 3) Steam Generator 3) CHANNEL CALIBRATION Differential Pressure High
- 24. Manual Auxiliary Feedwater a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation NOTES: (1) Not required unless pressurizer pressure is above 1700 psia.
(2) CRHS monitors are the containment atmosphere gaseous radiation monitor and the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Stack gaseous radiation monitor.
(3) Not required unless steam generator pressure is above 600 psia.
(4) QP - Quarterly during designated modes and prior to taking the reactor critical if not completed within the previous 92 days (not applicable to a fast trip recovery).
(5) Not required to be done on a SIT with inoperable level and/or pressure instrumentation. 0 (6) Not required when outside ambient air temperature is greater than 50'F and less than 105 F.
(7) Tests backup channels such as derived circuits and equipment that cannot be tested when the plant is at power.
3.1 - Page 3 14 Amendment No. 41,54,65,122,163,171,172, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. Primary CEA Position a. Check S a. Comparison of output data with secondary CEAPIS.
Indication System
- b. Test M b. Test of power dependent insertion limits, deviation, and sequence monitoring systems.
- c. Calibrate R c. Physically measured CEDM position used to verify system accuracy. Calibrate CEA position interlocks.
- 2. Secondary CEA Position a. Check S a. Comparison of output data with primary CEAPIS.
Indication System
- b. Test M b. Test of power dependent insertion limit, deviation, out-of-sequence, and overlap monitoring systems.
- 3. Area and Post-Accident 1
- a. Check D a. CHANNEL CHECK Radiation Monitors( )
- b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. Secondary and Electronic calibration performed at refueling frequency. Primary calibration with exposure to radioactive sources only when required by the secondary and electronic calibration.
RM-091 A/B - Calibration by electronic signal substitution is acceptable for all range decades above 10 R/hr. Calibration for at least one decade below 1-R/hr. shall be by means of calibrated radiation source.
(')Post Accident Radiation Monitors are: RM-063, RM-064, and RM-091A/B. Area Radiation Monitors are: RM-070 thru RM-082, RM-084 thru RM-089, and RM-095 thru RM-098.
3.1 - Page 44 ES Amendment No. 8,81,86,93,137,152,164,171
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 4. DELETED
- 5. Primary to Secondary a. Check D a. CHANNEL CHECK Leak-Rate Detection Radiation Monitors b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (RM-054A/B, RM-057)
- c. Calibrate R c. Secondary and Electronic calibration performed at refueling frequency. Primary Calibration performed with exposure to radioactive sources only when required by the secondary and electronic calibration.
- 6. Pressurizer Level a. Check S a. Verify that level is within limits.
- b. Check M b. CHANNEL CHECK
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 7. CEA Drive System a. Test R a. Verify proper operation of all CEDM system Interlocks interlocks, using simulated signals where necessary.
- b. Test P b. If haven't been checked for three months and plant is shutdown.
3.1 - Page 4-5 1,6 Amendment No. ! 5 2 ,171, !82
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 8. Dropped CEA Indication a. Test R a. Insert a negative rate of change power signal to all four Power Range Safety Channels to test alarm.
- 9. Calorimetric Instrumen- a. Calibrate R a. CHANNEL CALIBRATION tation
System
- b. Test Rln accordance b. Check contrl* room for p*sitive pressure.Perform with CRE required control room eneoe(R)uflee ~
H~abitabilty inleaIkage testing ýn acodac wa~ith the G'RE Program
- 11. Containment Humidity a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Detector
- 12. Interlocks-Isolation Valves a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on Shutdown Cooling Line
- 13. Control Room Air Conditioning a. Test R a. Verify each train has the capability to remove the System assumed heat load through combination of testing and calculations.
3.1 - Page 4-6 17 Amendment No. 16,32,123,157,182, 188
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 14. Not Used
- 15. Reactor Coolant System a. Check a. Calculation of reactor coolant flow rate.
Flow
- 16. Pressurizer Pressure a. Check S a. CHANNELCHECK
- 17. Reactor Coolant Inlet a. Check S a. CHANNELCHECK Temperature
- 18. Low-Temperature Set- a. Test PM a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (excluding point Power-Operated actuation)
Relief Valves
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION (1) Required to be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after >95.00% reactor thermal power following power escalation.
3.1 - Page 41-7 1 Amendment No. 8,32,39,96,182,193, 228
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIB RATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATIOI NAND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 19. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow a. Check M CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 20. Subcooled Margin Monitor a. Check M CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 21. PORV Operation and Acoustic a. Test M CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Position Indication
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 22. PORV Block Valve Operation a. Check Q Cycle valve. Valve is exempt from and Position Indication testing when it has been closed to comply with LCO Action Statement 2.1.6(5)a.
- b. Calibrate R Check valve stroke against limit switch position.
- 23. Safety Valve Acoustic a. Test M CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Position Indication
- b. Calibration R CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 24. PORV/Safety Valve Tail a. Check M CHANNEL CHECK Pipe Temperature
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 4-8 Amendment No. 39,54,110,161, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 25. Containment Purge Isolation a. Check M a. Verify valve position using control Valves (PCV-742A, B, C, & D) room indication.
- 26. Not Used
- 27. Containment Water Level a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK Narrow Range (LT-599
& LT-600) b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION Wide Range (LT-387 & a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK LT-388) 0
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 28. Containment Wide Range a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure Indication
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 29. Not Used 3.1 - Page 4-92d Amendment No. 54,68,82,87,107,182,183, 234, 248
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 30. Core Exit Thermo- a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK couple
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 31. Heated Junction Thermocouple (YE-116A and YE-116B) a. Check M a. CHANNELCHECK
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION PM - Prior to scheduled cold leg cooldown below 300°F; monthly whenever temperature remains below 300'F and reactor vessel head is installed.
3.1 - Page 20,ý2:1 Amendment No. 87,107,110,122,182, 183
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3A MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANELS (Al-185 AND AI-212)
AND EMERGENCY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PANEL (AI-179) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL CIRCUITS Surveillance Channel Des cription Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. WIDE RPANGE a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LOGARI THMIC POWER AND SOURCEE RANGE MONITORS b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATIOI N (AI-212)
- 2. REACTOR COOLANT COLD a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEG TEMPERATURE (AI-1 85) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 3. REACTOR COOLANT HOT a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEG TEMPERATURE (A1-1 85) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 4. PRESSURIZER LEVEL a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK (A1-1 85)
- b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 5. VOLUME CONTROL a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK TANK LEVEL (Al-185) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 6. ASP CONTROL a. TEST R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CIRCUITS (Al-185) 3.1 - Page 24- 22 Amendment No. 125,!82
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3A (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANELS (Al-185 AND AI-212)
AND EMERGENCY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PANEL (AI-179) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL CIRCUITS Surveillance Channel Desscription Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 7. STEAM GENERATOR a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEVEL, WIDE RANGE (Al-1 79) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATIO1'
- 8. STEAM GENERATOR a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEVEL, NARROW RANGE (AI-1 79) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATIOI*
- 9. STEAM GENERATOR a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK PRESSURE (Al-1 79) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 10. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE a. CHECK M a. CHANNELCHECK (Al-1 79)
- b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 11. EAFW CONTROL a. TEST R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CIRCUITS (AI-1 79) 3.1 - Page 2-2 E3 Amendment No. 125, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests Applicability Applies to plant equipment and conditions related to safety.
Objective To specify the minimum frequency and type of surveillance to be applied to critical plant equipment and conditions.
Specifications Equipment and sampling tests shall be conducted as specified in Tables 3-4 and 3-5.
Basis The equipment testing and system sampling frequencies specified in Tables 3-4 and 3-5 are considered adequate, based upon experience, to maintain the status of the equipment and systems so as to assure safe operation. Thus, those systems where changes might occur relatively rapidly are sampled frequently and those static systems not subject to changes are sampled less frequently.
The control room air treatmen filtraiq system (JAfS consists of redundant high efficiency particulate air filters (HEPA) and charcoal adsorbers. HEPA filters are installed before and after the charcoal adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of iodine to the control room. The in-place test results will confirm system integrity and performance. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 99.825 percent for expected accident conditions.
3.2 - Page 1 Amendment No. 1-5,67-,122,129
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests (continued)
The spent fuel storage-decontamination areas air treatment system is designed to filter the building atmosphere to the auxiliary building vent during refueling operations. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment. In-place testing is performed to confirm the integrity of the filter system. The charcoal adsorbers are periodically sampled to insure capability for the removal of radioactive iodine.
The Safety Injection (SI) pump room air treatment system consists of charcoal adsorbers which are installed in normally bypassed ducts. This system is designed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine in SI pump rooms during the recirculation period following a DBA. The in-place and laboratory testing of charcoal adsorbers will assure system integrity and performance.
Pressure drops across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, of less than 9 inches of water for the control room filters (VA-64A & VA-64B) and of less than 6 inches of water for each of the other air treatment systems will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by amounts of foreign matter that would interfere with performance to established levels. Operation of each syste- for 10Q hours every' month will demo.nstrate operability and remoeexsve Remisture build Up in the adsorbcrs.
The hydrogen purge system provides the control of combustible gases (hydrogen) in containment for a post-LOCA environment. The surveillance tests provide assurance that the system is operable and capable of performing its design function. VA-80A or VA-80B is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation (67 SCFM) associated with 1)
Zirconium - water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of sump water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment. The system should have a minimum of one blower with associated valves and piping (VA-80A or VA-80B) available at all times to meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.7 (1971).
If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, testing will be performed to confirm system performance.
Demonstration of the automatic and/or manual initiation capability will assure the system's availability.
Verifying Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage to be within the LCO limits ensures the integrity of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is maintained. Pressure boundary leakage would at first appear as unidentified leakage and can only be positively identified by inspection. Unidentified leakage is determined by performance of an RCS water inventory balance. Identified leakage is then determined by isolation and/or inspection. Since Primary to Secondary Leakage of 150 gallons per day cannot be measured accurately by an RCS water inventory balance, note "***" for line item 8a on Table 3-5 states that the Reactor Coolant System Leakage surveillance is not applicable to Primary to Secondary Leakage. Primary to secondary leakage is measured by performance of effluent monitoring within the secondary steam and feedwater systems.
3.2 - Page 2 Amendment No. 15,67,128,138,169,246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests (continued)
Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new fuel oil, but does not represent a failure to meet the LCO concern since the fuel oil is not added to the storage tanks. Within 31 days following the initial new fuel oil sample, the fuel oil is analyzed to establish that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 3) are met for new fuel oil when tested in accordance with ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 2), except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM D1 29-00 (Ref. 2) or ASTM D2622-87 (Ref. 2). The 31 day period is acceptable because the fuel oil properties of interest, even if they were not within stated limits, would not have an immediate effect on DG operation. This Surveillance ensures the availability of high quality fuel oil for the DGs.
Fuel oil degradation during long term storage shows up as an increase in particulate, due mostly to oxidation. The presence of particulate does not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. The particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment, however, which can cause engine failure. Particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM 6217-98 (Ref. 2) with the exception that the filters specified in the ASTM method may have a nominal pore size of up to 3 microns. This method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/l. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing. For those designs in which the total stored fuel oil volume is contained in two or more interconnected tanks, each tank must be considered and tested separately. The Surveillance interval of this test takes into consideration fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance intervals.
Table 3-5, Item 9d ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. A start cycle is defined as the cranking time required to accelerate the DG to firing speed. The pressure specified in this Surveillance Requirement is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished. The 31 day Surveillance interval takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.
Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel storage tanks once every 92 days per Table 3-5, Item 9e, eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, and contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance interval is established to ensure excessive water does not accumulate in the fuel oil system, which meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 4). This Surveillance Requirement is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this Surveillance Requirement provided the accumulated water is removed during performance of the Surveillance.
3.2 - Page 3a 4 Amendment No. 272-9
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests (continued)
Table 3-5, Item 8b verifies that primary to secondary LEAKAGE is less or equal to 150 gallons per day through any one SG. Satisfying the primary to secondary LEAKAGE limit ensures that the operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in the Steam Generator Program is met. If this surveillance requirement is not met, compliance with LCO 3.17, "Steam Generator Tube Integrity," should be evaluated. The 150 gallons per day limit is measured at room temperature as described in Reference 5. The operational LEAKAGE rate limit applies to LEAKAGE through any one SG. If it is not practical to assign the LEAKAGE to an individual SG, all the primary to secondary LEAKAGE should be conservatively assumed to be from one SG.
The Surveillance is modified by a Note which states that the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishment of steady state operation. For RCS primary to secondary LEAKAGE determination, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
The Surveillance Frequency of daily is a reasonable interval to trend primary to secondary LEAKAGE and recognizes the importance of early leakage detection in the prevention of accidents. The primary to secondary LEAKAGE is determined using continuous process radiation monitors or radiochemical grab sampling in accordance with the EPRI guidelines (Ref. 5).
References
- 1) USAR, Section 9.10
- 2) ASTM D4057-95(2000), ASTM D975-98b, ASTM D4176-93, ASTM D129-00, ASTM D2622-87, ASTM D287-82, ASTM 6217-98, ASTM D2709-96
- 3) ASTM D975-98b, Table 1
- 5) EPRI, "Pressurized Water Reactor Primary-to-Secondary Leak Guidelines" 3.2 - Page 3b Amendment No. 229, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-4 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR SAMPLING TESTS Type of Measurement Sample and Analysis and Analysis Frequency
- 1. Reactor Coolant (a) Power Operation (1) Gross Radioactivity 1 per 3 days (Operating Mode 1) (Gamma emitters)
(2) Isotopic Analysis for (i) 1 per 14 days DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 (ii) 1 per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />(1 ) whenever the radioactivity exceeds 1.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
(iii) 1 sample between 2-8 hours following a thermal power change exceeding 15% of the rated thermal power within a 1-hour period.
(3) E Determination 1 per 6 months(2)
(4) Dissolved oxygen 1 per 3 days and chloride (b) Hot Standby (1) Gross Radioactivity 1 per 3 days (Operating Mode 2) (Gamma emitters)
Hot Shutdown (2) Isotopic Analysis for (i) 1 per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />(') whenever (Operating Mode 3) DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 the radioactivity exceeds 1.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
(ii) 1 sample between 2-8 hours following a thermal power change exceeding 15% of the rated thermal power change exceeding 15% of the rated thermal power within a 1-hour period.
(3) Dissolved oxygen 1 per 3 days and chloride 3.2 - Page-4"6-' Amendment No. 28,67,124,133,-57
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-4 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR SAMPLING TESTS Type of Measurement Sample and Analysis and Analysis Frequency
- 1. Reactor Coolant (Continued)
(c) Cold Shutdown (1) Chloride 1 per 3 days (Operating Mode 4)
(d) Refueling Shutdown (1) Chloride 1 per 3 days(3)
(Operating Mode 5) (2) Boron Concentration 1 per 3 days(3)
(1) Chloride (e) Refueling Operation 1 per 3 days(3)
(2) Boron Concentration 1 per 3 days(3)
- 2. SIRW Tank Boron Concentration M
- 3. Concentrated Boric Boron Concentration W Acid Tanks
- 5. Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration See Footnote 4 below
- 6. Steam Generator Blowdown Isotopic Analysis for Dose (Operating Modes 1 and 2) Equivalent 1-131 (1) Until the radioactivity of the reactor coolant is restored to <1 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
(2) Sample to be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of power operation have elapsed since reactor was subcritical for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or longer.
(3) Boron and chloride sampling/analyses are not required when the core has been off-loaded. Reinitiate boron and chloride sampling/analyses prior to reloading fuel into the cavity to assure adequate shutdown margin and allowable chloride levels are met.
(4) Prior to placing unirradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool or placing fuel assemblies in a spent fuel cask in the spent fuel pool, and weekly when unirradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool, or every 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> when fuel assemblies are in a spent fuel storage cask in the spent fuel pool.
(5) When Steam Generator Dose Equivalent 1-131 exceeds 50 percent of the limits in Specification 2.20, the sampling and analysis frequency shall be increased to a minimum of 5 times per week. When Steam Generator Dose Equivalent 1-131 exceeds 75 percent of this limit, the sampling and analysis frequency shall be increased to a minimum of once per day.
3.2 - Page 5 Amendment No. 28,67,86,124,133,152 172,!88, 230
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference
- 1. Control Element Drop times of all full-length CEA's Prior to reactor criticality after each 7.5.3 Assemblies removal of the reactor vessel closure head
- 2. Control Element Partial movement of all CEA's Q 7 Assemblies (Minimum of 6 in)
- 3. Pressurizer Safety Verify each pressurizer safety valve R 7 Valves is OPERABLE in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift settings shall be 2485 psig
+/-1% and 2530 psig +/-1% respectively.
- 4. Main Steam Safety Set Point R 4 Valves
- 5. DELETED
- 6. DELETED
- 7. DELETED 8a. Reactor Coolant Evaluate D* 4 System Leakage***
8b. Primary to Secondary Continuous process D* 4 Leakage**** radiation monitors or radiochemical grab sampling 9a Diesel Fuel Supply Fuel Inventory M 8.4 9b. Diesel Lubricating Oil Lube Oil Inventory M 8.4 Inventory 9c. Diesel Fuel Oil Test Properties In accordance with the Diesel Fuel 8.4 Properties Oil Testing Program 9d. Required Diesel Air Pressure M 8.4 Generator Air Start Receiver Bank Pressure 3.2 - Page 6 Amendment No. 15,24,128,160,166, 69,171,219, 229, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS
- Whenever the system is at or above operating temperature and pressure.
Not applicable to primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
Verify primary to secondary LEAKAGE is - 150 gallons per day through any one SG.
This surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishment of steady state operation.
3.2 - Page 7 9 Amendment No. 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 9e. Check for and Check for Water and Remove Q 8.4 Remove Accumulated Water from Each Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1Oa. Charcoal and HEPA 1 In-Place Testinq** 9.10 Filters for Control - Charcoal adsorbers and HEPA On a refueling frequency or every 720 Room Air Filtration filter banks shall be leak hours of system operation or after each
ý -qCRAFS tested and show >99.95% complete or partial replacement of the Freon (R-11 or R-112) and charcoal adsorber/HEPA filter banks, or cold DOP particulates after any major structural maintenance on removal, respectively. the system housing or following significant painting, fire or chemical releases in a ventilation zone communicating with the system.
- 2. Laboratory Testing**
Verify, within 31 days after removal, On a refueling frequency or every 720 that a laboratory test of a sample of hours of system operation or after any the charcoal adsorber, when obtained structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or in accordance with Regulatory charcoal adsorber housing or following Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide significant painting, fire or chemical release in 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, shows a ventilation zone communicating with the methyliodide penetration less than system.
0.175% when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of 30 0 C (86 0 F) and a relative humidity of 70%.
- Tests shall be performed in accordance with applicable section(s) of ANSI N510-1980.
3.2 - Page 8 ýQ Amendment No. 15,24,128,169,198,229,246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 10a. (continued) 3. Overall System Operation
- a. Each GiG6uit *r*in Ten continuous hours every month-shall be operated. with heaters.operpting.
- b. The pressure drop across the R combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall be demonstrated to be less than 9 inches of water at system design flow rate.
- c. Fan shall be shown to operate R within + 10% design flow.
- 4. Automatic and manual initiation of R ach rain the-sys t em shall be demonstrated.
10b. Charcoal Adsorbers 1 In-Place Testinq**
for Spent Fuel Charcoal adsorbers shall be On a refueling frequency or every 720 6.2 Storage Pool Area leak tested and shall show hours of system operation, or after 9.10
>99% Freon (R-1 1 or R-1 12) each complete or partial replacement of removal. the charcoal adsorber bank, or after any major structural maintenance on the system housing or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in a ventilation zone communicating with the system.
- 2. Laboratory Testing Verify, within 31 days after removal, On a refueling frequency or every 720 that a laboratory test of a sample of hours of system operation or after any the charcoal adsorber, when obtained structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or in accordance with Regulatory charcoal adsorber housing or following Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide significant painting, fire or chemical release in 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, shows a ventilation zone communicating with the methyliodide penetration less than system.
10% when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of 30'C (86°F) and a relative humidity of 95%.
- Tests shall be performed in accordance with applicable section(s) of ANSI N510-1980.
3.2 - Page 9 11 Amendment No. 15,24,52,128,154,169,198,229, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 1Ob. (continued) 3. Overall System Operation
- a. Operation of each circuit Ten hours every month.
shall be demonstrated.
- b. Volume flow rate through R charcoal filter shall be shown to be between 4500 and 12,000 cfm.
- 4. Manual initiation of the R system shall be demon-strated.
1Oc. Charcoal Adsorbers 1 In-Place Testing"** On a refueling frequency or every 9.10 for S.I. Pump Room Charcoal adsorbers shall be 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation, or 6.2 leak tested and shall show after each complete or partial
>99% Freon (R-11 or R-112) replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank, removal. or after any major structural maintenance on the system housing or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system.
- 2. Laboratory Testingq Verify, within 31 days after removal, On a refueling frequency or following 720 that a laboratory test of a sample of hours of system operation or after any the charcoal adsorber, when obtained structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or in accordance with Regulatory charcoal adsorber housing or following Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide significant painting, fire or chemical release in 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, shows a ventilation zone communicating with the system.
methyliodide penetration less than 10% when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of 30'C (86°F) and a relative humidity of 95%.
- 3. Overall System Operation
- a. Operation of each circuit Ten hours every month.
shall be demonstrated.
- b. Volume flow rate shall be R shown to be between 3000 and 6000 cfm.
- Tests shall be performed in accordance with applicable section(s) of ANSI N510-1980.
3.2 - Page -0 12 Amendment No. 15,24,52,128,169,198, 229, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 1Oc. (continued) 4. Automatic and/or manual initi- R ation of the system shall be demonstrated.
- 11. Containment 1. Demonstrate damper action. 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, and every 5 9.10 Ventilation System years thereafter.
Fusible Linked Dampers 2. Test a spare fusible link.
- 12. Diesel Generator Calibral R 8.4.3 Under-Voltage Relays
- 13. Motor Operated Verify the contactor pickup value at R Safety Injection <85% of 460 V.
Loop Valve Motor Starters (HCV-31 1, 314, 317, 320, 327, 329, 331,333, 312, 315, 318, 321)
- 14. Pressurizer Heaters Verify control circuits operation R for post-accident heater use.
- 15. Spent Fuel Pool Test neutron poison samples for 1,2, 4, 7, and 10 years after Racks dimensional change, weight, neutron installation, and every 5 years attenuation change and specific thereafter.
gravity change.
- 16. Reactor Coolant 1. Verify all manual isolation During each refueling outage just Gas Vent System valves in each vent path are prior to plant start-up.
in the open position.
- 2. Cycle each automatic valve in the R vent path through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room. Verification of valve cycling may be determined by observation of position indicating lights.
- 3. Verify flow through the reactor R coolant vent system vent paths.
3.2 - Page 44 99 Amendment No. 41,54,60,75,77,80,155,169,182,218,229,26
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS Test Frequency
- 17. Hydrogen Purge 1. Verify all manual valves are operable by R System completing at least one cycle.
- 2. Cycle each automatic valve through at R least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room. Verification of the valve cycling may be determined by the observation of position indicating lights.
- 3. Initiate flow through the VA-80A and VA-80B blowers, HEPA filter, and charcoal adsorbers and verify that the system operates for at least (a) 30 minutes with suction from the a) M auxiliary building (Room 59)
(b) 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with suction from the b) R containment
- 4. Verify the pressure drop across the R VA-82 HEPAs and charcoal filter to be less than 6 inches of water. Verify a system flow rate of greater than 80 scfm and less than 230 scfm during system operation when tested in accordance with 3b. above.
- 18. Shutdown Cooling 1. Verify required shutdown cooling loops are S (when shutdown cooling is required by TS 2.8).
OPERABLE and one shutdown cooling loop is IN OPERATION.
- 2. Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated W (when shutdown cooling is required by TS 2.8).
power is available to the required shutdown cooling pump that is not IN OPERATION.
3.2 - Page 42-M14 Amendment No..3,169,188, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS Test Frequency
- 19. Refueling Water Level Verify refueling water level is > 23 ft. above Prior to commencing, and daily during CORE ALTERATIONS the top of the reactor vessel flange. and/or REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.
- 20. Spent Fuel Pool Level Verify spent fuel pool water level is > 23 ft. Prior to commencing, and weekly during REFUELING above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool.
in the storage racks.
- 21. Containment Penetrations Verify each required containment penetration is Prior to commencing, and weekly during CORE ALTERATIONS in the required status. and/or REFUELING OPERATIONS in containment.
- 22. Spent Fuel Assembly Verify by administrative means that initial Prior to storing the fuel assembly in Region 2 (including Storage enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in peripheral cells).
accordance with Figure 2-10.
- 23. P-T Limit Curve Verify RCS Pressure, RCS temperature, and This test is only required during RCS heatup and cooldown RCS heatup and cooldown rates are within operations and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.
the limits specified by the P-T limit Figure(s) While these operations are occurring, this test shall be performed shown in the PTLR. every 30 minutes.
- 24. Spent Fuel Cask Loading Verify by administrative means that initial Prior to placing the fuel assembly in a spent fuel cask in enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly the spent fuel pool.
is in accordance with Figure 2-11.
3.2 - Page 4-3 i, 6 Amendment No. 188, 221, 239, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 5ý.O0 -AMINlST~RATIVECON4TROLS,
,5.24 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program
- a. The definition of the ORE and the ORE boundary-
- b. Requiremenits for maintaining CRE bou~ndary in its design qonpdition including configuration control and preventive maintenance,
- d. Measurement, at deintdlctos f the ORE pressure relative to aill external areasI adjacent to the CRE~ boundary during th pressurization mode of oper~ation by the CRVS,
'oper~ating within the tolerance for design flow rate, at a Frequency of 18 months. The results shaIllbe trended and used as part of an 18 month assessment of-the ORE boundary.~
- e. The quanititativelimitjs on unfilter~ed air inleak-age into the CR-E. These im~its shall be stated in a manner to allo~w direct comparison to the unfiltered air finleakage measured by the testing described in paragraph c. The unfiltered air inleakage limitfor radiological challenges is the inleakage flow rate assumeid in the licensing basis analyses of DBAt consequences.~ Unitee ai iisfr kekhazardous chemnicals must ensure that exposure of CRE occupants to these hazards -willbe within the assumptions in the, licensing basis.
- 5. ~-Pae2 Amend men No.
LIC-07-0046 Page 1 Location of TST-448, Revision 3 Changes in FCS Technical Specifications CEOG STS, LCO 3.7.11 FCS TS Note concerning opening CRE TS 2.8.2(4), TS 2.8.3(5), TS 2.12.1 boundary under administrative control.
Condition A TS 2.12.1 (1)
Condition B TS 2.12.1(2)
Condition C (no change) TS 2.12.1(3) revised to apply to TS 2.12.1(1) or TS 2.12.1(2).
Condition D TS 2.8.2(4), TS 2.8.3(5)
Condition E (OR statement) TS 2.8.2(4)(2), TS 2.8.3(5)(3)
Condition F (no change) TS 2.12.1(4)
SR 3.7.11.1 (no change) TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item 10a.3.a revised for consistency with CEOG STS.
SR 3.7.11.2 TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item 10a.1, l0a.2 (No change -
SR 3.7.11.3 (no change) TS 3.2, Table 3-5, Item l0a.4 SR 3.7.11.4 TS 3.1, Table 3-3, Item 10.b.
Specification 5.5.18 TS 5.24 Bases 3.7.11 (Mode 1, 2, 3, & 4) TS 2.12.1 Bases Bases 3.7.11 (Mode 5 & 6) Bases of TS 2.8.2(4), and 2.8.3(5).
Bases SR 3.7.11.1 (no change) Basis of TS 3.2 Bases SR 3.7.11.2 (no change) Basis of TS 3.2 (No change - FCS does not have a VFTP.)
Bases SR 3.7.11.3 Basis of TS 3.2 Bases SR 3.7.11.4 Basis of TS 3.1 Bases References References 1 through 4 are located in the Basis of TS 2.12.1. References 5 through 7 are located in the Basis of TS 3.1.
LIC-07-0046 Page 1 Revised Technical Specification Pages (Clean)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS DEFINITIONS 1.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 Safety Limits - Reactor Core 1.2 Safety Limit, Reactor Coolant System Pressure 1.3 Limiting Safety System Settings, Reactor Protective System 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.0.1 General Requirements 2.1 Reactor Coolant System 2.1.1 Operable Components 2.1.2 Heatup and Cooldown Rate 2.1.3 Reactor Coolant Radioactivity 2.1.4 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Limits 2.1.5 Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen and Halogens Concentrations 2.1.6 Pressurizer and Main Steam Safety Valves 2.1.7 Pressurizer Operability 2.1.8 Reactor Coolant System Vents 2.2 Chemical and Volume Control System 2.3 Emergency Core Cooling System 2.4 Containment Cooling 2.5 Steam and Feedwater System 2.6 Containment System 2.7 Electrical Systems 2.8 Refueling 2.9 Radioactive Waste Disposal System 2.10 Reactor Core 2.10.1 Minimum Conditions for Criticality 2.10.2 Reactivity Control Systems and Core Physics Parameter Limits 2.10.3 DELETED 2.10.4 Power Distribution Limits 2.11 DELETED 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System TOC - Page 1 Amendment No. 11,15,27,32,38,52,54, 57,67,90,81,86,146,152,167,169,182, 18
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility 5.2 Organization 5.3 Facility Staff Qualifications 5.4 Training 5.5 Not Used 5.6 Not Used 5.7 Safety Limit Violation 5.8 Procedures 5.9 Reporting Requirements 5.9.1 Not Used 5.9.2 Not Used 5.9.3 Special Reports 5.9.4 Unique Reporting Requirements 5.9.5 Core Operating Limits Report 5.9.6 RCS Pressure-Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) 5.10 Record Retention 5.11 Radiation Protection Program 5.12 DELETED 5.13 Secondary Water Chemistry 5.14 Systems Integrity 5.15 Post-Accident Radiological Sampling and Monitoring 5.16 Radiological Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Programs 5.16.1 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program 5.16.2 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program 5.17 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) 5.18 Process Control Program (PCP) 5.19 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program 5.20 Technical Specification (TS) Bases Control Program 5.21 Containment Tendon Testing Program 5.22 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program 5.23 Steam Generator (SG) Program 5.24 Control Room Habitability Program 6.0 INTERIM SPECIAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 6.1 DELETED 6.2 DELETED 6.3 DELETED 6.4 DELETED TOC - Page 3 Amendment No. 32,34,43,54,55,57, 73,8,86,9,9399411,152,167,1184,185, 221
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refuelina 2.8.2 Refueling Operations - Containment 2.8.2(3) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS)
Applicability Applies to operation of the Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.
Obiective To minimize the consequences of an accident occurring during CORE ALTERATIONS or REFUELING OPERATIONS that could affect public health and safety.
Specification VIAS, including manual actuation capability, shall be OPERABLE with one gaseous radiation monitor OPERABLE.
Required Actions (1) Without one radiation monitor OPERABLE, or VIAS manual actuation capability inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS.
2.8.2(4) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS)
Applicability Applies to operation of the CRVS during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.
Obeective To minimize the consequences of a fuel handling accident to the control room staff.
Specification The CRVS shall be INOPERATION and in the Filtered Air mode.
Notes --------------------------
- 1. The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.
- 2. Place in toxic gas protection mode immediately if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is not functional.
Required Actions (1) If a CRVS train is not IN OPERATION in Filtered Air mode, immediately place the opposite train INOPERATION in Filtered Air mode OR immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS.
1 88 2 0 1 204 2.8 - Page 7 Amendment No. , ,
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling 2.8.2 Refueling Operations - Containment 2.8.2(4) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) (Continued)
Required Actions (Continued)
(2) If one or more CRVS trains are inoperable due to an inoperable control room envelope (CRE) boundary, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS.
2.8.3 Refueling Operations - Spent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(1) Spent Fuel Assembly Storage Applicability Applies to storage of spent fuel assemblies whenever any irradiated fuel assembly is stored in Region 2 (including peripheral cells) of the spent fuel pool. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operation are not applicable.
Obiective To minimize the possibility of an accident occurring during REFUELING OPERATIONS that could affect public health and safety.
Specification The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region 2 (including peripheral cells) of the spent fuel pool shall be within the acceptable burnup domain of Figure 2-10.
Reguired Actions (1) With the requirements of the LCO not met, initiate action to move the noncomplying fuel assembly immediately.
2.8 - Page 8 Amendment No. 488
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refuelinci 2.8.3 Refueling Operations - Spent Fuel Pool 2.8.3(5) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS)
Applicability Applies to operation of the CRVS during REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool area. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operation are not applicable.
Objective To minimize the consequences of a fuel handling accident to the control room staff.
Specification (1) The CRVS shall be IN OPERATION and in the Filtered Air mode.
(2) A spent fuel pool area radiation monitor shall be IN OPERATION.
Notes ----------------------------
- 1. The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.
- 2. Place in toxic gas protection mode immediately if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is not functional.
Required Actions (1) If a CRVS train is not IN OPERATION in Filtered Air mode, immediately place the opposite train IN OPERATION in Filtered Air mode OR Immediately suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS.
(2) If a spent fuel pool area radiation monitor is not IN OPERATION, immediately suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS.
(3) If one or more CRVS trains are inoperable due to an inoperable control room envelope (CRE) boundary, immediately suspend REFUELING OPERATIONS.
2.8 - Page 13 Amendment No. 1!8, 201
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.2(3) Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) (Continued)
Requiring one (1) radiation monitor to be OPERABLE and aligned to monitor the containment atmosphere [or stack effluents] is a conservative measure to reduce exposure. Radiation monitoring will assure operators are alerted if a radiological incident occurs in containment to enable implementation of administrative controls as specified in the Bases for 2.8.2(1) "Containment Penetrations." During CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS, the OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system is addressed by Specification 2.8.2(4). The control room ventilation system is placed in Filtered Air mode as a conservative measure to reduce control room operator exposure.
Specification 2.8.2(4) allows the radiological consequences analysis for a fuel handling accident to credit the Filtered Air mode at the time of the accident.
When VIAS is inoperable, CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS in containment are immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.8.2(4) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS)
Operating the CRVS in the Filtered Air mode is a conservative measure to reduce control room operator exposure. This allows the radiological consequences analysis for a fuel handling accident to credit the Filtered Air mode at the time of the accident. If a CRVS train is not IN OPERATION in Filtered Air mode, the opposite train must immediately be placed IN OPERATION in Filtered Air mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, and that any active failure will be readily detected. An alternative is to immediately suspend activities (CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS) that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room envelope (CRE).
Similarly, with one or more CRVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities (CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS) that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE.
These actions place the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.8 - Page 23 Amendment No. 88,201,204, 239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refuelinq Bases (Continued) 2.8.2(4) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) (Continued)
The Specification is modified by two notes. The first note allows the CRE boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. This only applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs and access panels. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.
The second note requires the CRVS to be in toxic gas protection mode if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is not functional. CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS must be suspended immediately. Toxic gas is monitored at the outside air intake duct. Actuation of the system to toxic gas protection mode trips CRVS fans and isolates the outside air dampers. The CRVS is then placed in recirculation mode. In recirculation mode, the filter trains are bypassed.
Fire and smoke detection is provided at the outlet of the recirculation fans to protect against smoke developed from sources in the outside air stream or from sources inside the control room. As in toxic gas protection mode, CRVS fans are tripped and the outside air dampers are isolated.
2.8.3(1) Spent Fuel Assembly Storage The spent fuel pool is designed for noncriticality by use of neutron absorbing material.
The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool, according to Figure 2-10, and the accompanying LCO, ensures that the keff of the spent fuel pool always remains < 0.95 assuming the pool to be flooded with unborated water.
A spent fuel assembly may be transferred directly from the reactor core to the spent fuel pool Region 2 provided an independent verification of assembly burnups has been completed and the assembly burnup meets the acceptance criteria identified in Figure 2-10. When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 (including the peripheral cells) is not in accordance with Figure 2-10, immediate action must be taken to make the necessary fuel assembly movement(s) to bring the configuration into compliance with Figure 2-10. Acceptable fuel assembly burnup is not a prerequisite for Region 1 storage because Region 1 will maintain any type of fuel assembly that the plant is licensed for in a safe, coolable, subcritical geometry.
2.8 - Page 24 Amendment No. 188,201,204, 239 I
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(1) Spent Fuel Assembly Storage (Continued)
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
2.8.3(2) Spent Fuel Pool Water Level The minimum water level in the spent fuel pool meets the assumption of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident. When the water level is lower than the required level, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool is immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring in the spent fuel pool. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable.
If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
2.8.3(3) Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration The basis for the 500 ppm boron concentration requirement with Boral poisoned storage racks is to maintain the keff below 0.95 in the event a misloaded unirradiated fuel assembly is located next to a spent fuel assembly. A misloaded unirradiated fuel assembly at maximum enrichment condition, in the absence of soluble poison, may result in exceeding the design effective multiplication factor. Soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water, for which credit is permitted under these conditions, would assure that the effective multiplication factor is maintained substantially less than the design condition.
This LCO applies whenever unirradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool.
The boron concentration is periodically sampled in accordance with Specification 3.2.
Sampling is performed prior to movement of unirradiated fuel to the spent fuel pool and periodically when unirradiated fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool.
2.8 - Page 25 Amendment No. 188,201,204, 239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(3) Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration (Continued)
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations- are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of refueling operations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.8.3(4) Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation The spent fuel pool area ventilation system contains a charcoal filter to prevent release of significant radionuclides to the outside atmosphere. The system does not automatically realign and therefore must be IN OPERATION prior to REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool. When the spent fuel pool area ventilation system is not IN OPERATION, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool is immediately suspended. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring in the spent fuel pool. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
2.8.3(5) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS)
Operating the CRVS in the Filtered Air mode and requiring a radiation monitor to be IN OPERATION are conservative measures to reduce control room operator exposure. This allows the radiological consequences analysis for a fuel handling accident to credit the Filtered Air mode at the time of the accident.
Radiation monitoring will assure operators are alerted if a radiological incident occurs.
This specification can be satisfied by using a permanent spent fuel pool area radiation monitor or a portable area radiation monitor.
2.8 - Page 26 Amendment No.-2-39
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(5) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) (Continued)
If a CRVS train is not IN OPERATION in Filtered Air mode, the opposite train must immediately be placed IN OPERATION in Filtered Air mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, and that any active failure will be readily detected. An alternative is to immediately suspend activities (REFUELING OPERATIONS) that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room envelope (CRE).
Similarly, with one or more CRVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities (REFUELING OPERATIONS) that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE.
These actions place the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of REFUELING OPERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
The Specification is modified by two notes. The first note allows the control room envelope (CRE) boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. This only applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs and access panels. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.
The second note requires the CRVS to be in toxic gas protection mode if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is not functional. CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS must be suspended immediately. Toxic gas is monitored at the outside air intake duct. Actuation of the system to toxic gas protection mode trips CRVS fans and isolates the outside air dampers. The CRVS is then placed in recirculation mode. In recirculation mode, the filter trains are bypassed.
Fire and smoke detection is provided at the outlet of the recirculation fans to protect against smoke developed from sources in the outside air stream or from sources inside the control room. As in toxic gas protection mode, CRVS fans are tripped and the outside air dampers are isolated.
2.8 - Page 27 Amendment No. 249
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(6) Spent Fuel Cask Loading (1) Soluble Boron The basis for the 800 ppm minimum boron concentration requirement during spent fuel cask loading operations is to maintain the keff in the cask system less than or equal to 0.95 in the event a mis-loaded unirradiated fuel assembly is located anywhere in the cask with up to 31 other fuel assemblies meeting the burnup and enrichment requirements of LCO 2.8.3(6)(2). This boron concentration also ensures the keff in the cask system will be less than or equal to 0.95 if an unirradiated fuel assembly is dropped in the space between the spent fuel racks and the cask loading area during cask loading operations next to a spent fuel assembly. A mis-loaded or dropped irradiated fuel assembly at maximum enrichment condition, in the absence of soluble poison, may result in exceeding the design effective multiplication factor. Soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water, for which credit is permitted during spent fuel cask loading operations, assures that the effective multiplication factor is maintained substantially less than the design basis limit.
This LCO applies whenever a fuel assembly is located in a spent fuel cask submerged in the spent fuel pool. The boron concentration is periodically sampled in accordance with Specification 3.2. Sampling is performed prior to movement of fuel into the spent fuel cask and periodically thereafter during cask loading operations, until the cask is removed from the spent fuel pool.
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner. Suspension of refueling operations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.
2.8 - Page 28 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.8 Refueling Bases (Continued) 2.8.3(6) Spent Fuel Cask Loading (Continued)
(2) Burnup vs. Enrichment The spent fuel cask is designed for subcriticality by use of neutron absorbing material. The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool, according to Figure 2-11, and the accompanying LCO, ensure that the keff of the spent fuel pool always remains < 0.95 assuming the pool to be flooded with borated water and <1.0 assuming the pool is flooded with unborated water, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4).
A spent fuel assembly may be transferred directly from the spent fuel racks to the spent fuel cask provided an independent verification of assembly burnups has been completed and the assembly burnup meets the acceptance criteria identified in Figure 2-11. If any fuel assembly located in the spent fuel cask is not in accordance with Figure 2-11, immediate action must be taken to make the remove of non-complying fuel assembly from the spent fuel cask and return it to the spent fuel rack.
The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operations are not applicable. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODES 4 or 5, LCO 2.0.1 would not specify any actions. If moving fuel assemblies in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. When "immediately" is used as a completion time, the required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
References (1) USAR Section 9.5 (2) USAR Section 9.10 (3) USAR Section 14.18 2.8 - Page 29 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating Applicability Applies to the operational status of the control room air filtration system when the reactor coolant temperature Tcold > 210°F.
Obiective To assure operability of equipment required to filter control room air following a Design Basis Accident.
Specification Two control room air filtration trains shall be OPERABLE.
Note ---------------------------------
The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.
Required Actions (1) With one control room air filtration train inoperable for reasons other than (2),
restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
(2) With one or more control room air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary:
- a. initiate mitigating actions immediately, AND
- b. verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, AND
(3) With the required actions of (1) or (2) not met, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
(4) With two control room air filtration trains inoperable for reasons other than (2),
enter LCO 2.0.1 immediately.
2.12 - Page 1 Amendment No. 15, 128,130 188
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System 2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditioning System Applicability Applies to the operational status of the control room air conditioning system when the reactor coolant temperature Tcold -> 210°F.
Objective To assure operability of equipment required to maintain air temperature within the control room following a Design Basis Accident.
Specification Two control room air conditioning trains shall be OPERABLE.
Required Actions (1) With one control room air conditioning train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 30 days.
(2) With the required actions of (1) not met, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
(3) With two control room air conditioning trains inoperable, enter LCO 2.0.1 immediately.
2.12 - Page 2 Amendment No. 1-88
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System The control room ventilation system (CRVS) provides a protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. The CRVS contains two independent, redundant control room air filtration trains that filter the air in the control room envelope (CRE), two independent, redundant air conditioning units that circulate and cool the air in the CRE, and a CRE boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air.
The CRE is the area within the confines of the CRE boundary that control room occupants inhabit to control the unit during normal and accident conditions. This area encompasses the control room, and may encompass other non-critical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is not necessary in the event of an accident. The CRE is protected during normal operation, natural events, and accident conditions. The CRE boundary is the combination of walls, floor, roof, ducting, doors, penetrations and equipment that physically form the CRE. The OPERABILITY of the CRE boundary must be maintained to ensure that the inleakage of unfiltered air into the CRE will not exceed the inleakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of design basis accident (DBA) consequences to CRE occupants. The CRE and its boundary are defined in the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.
Actuation of the CRVS places the system into either of two separate states of the emergency mode-of operation, depending on the initiation signal. Actuation of the system to the emergency radiation state of the emergency mode of operation closes the unfiltered outside air intake and unfiltered exhaust dampers, and aligns the system for recirculation of the air within the CRE through the redundant trains of HEPA and charcoal filters. The emergency radiation state also initiates filtered ventilation of the outside air supply to the CRE.
The actions taken in the toxic gas isolation state are similar, except that the signal switches the CRVS to an isolation mode, minimizing outside air entering the CRE through the CRE boundary. Toxic gas is monitored at the outside air intake duct.
Actuation of the system to toxic gas protection mode trips CRVS fans and isolates the outside air dampers. The CRVS is then placed in recirculation mode. In recirculation mode, the filter trains are bypassed.
Fire and smoke detection is provided at the outlet of the recirculation fans to protect against smoke developed from sources in the outside air stream or from sources inside the control room. As in toxic gas protection mode, CRVS fans are tripped and the outside air dampers are isolated.
2.12 - Page 3 Amendment No. 4-88
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases (Continued) 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System (Continued)
The radiation monitoring system provides an airborne radiation monitor (RM-065),
which starts after a ventilation isolation actuation signal (VIAS) to verify control room habitability following a design basis accident. The air entering the CRE is continuously monitored by toxic gas detectors. One detector output above the setpoint will cause actuation of the toxic gas isolation state. The actions of the toxic gas isolation state are more restrictive, and will override the actions of the emergency radiation state.
The CRVS provides protection from smoke and hazardous chemicals to the CRE occupants. The analysis of hazardous chemical releases demonstrates that the toxicity limits are not exceeded in the CRE following a hazardous chemical release (Ref. 3).
The evaluation of a smoke challenge demonstrates that it will not result in the inability of the CRE occupants to control the reactor either from the control room or from the remote shutdown panels (Ref. 4).
The worst case single active failure of a component of the CRVS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function.
The CRVS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating Each control room air filtration system (CRAFS) train contains a heater and demister, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodines), and a fan. Ductwork, valves or dampers, doors, barriers, and instrumentation also form part of the system, as well as demisters that remove water droplets from the air stream. A second bank of HEPA filters follows the adsorber section to collect carbon fines and provides back-up in case of failure of the main HEPA filter bank.
The CRAFS is an emergency system, part of which may also operate during normal unit operations in the standby mode of operation. Upon receipt of a VIAS, normal air supply to the CRE is diverted to the filter trains, and the stream of ventilation air is recirculated through the filter trains of the system. The demisters remove any entrained water droplets present to prevent excessive loading of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Continuous operation of each train for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> per month, with the heaters on, reduces moisture buildup on the HEPA filters and adsorbers. Both the demister and heater are important to the effectiveness of the charcoal adsorbers.
2.12 - Page 4 2Amendment No. -88
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases (Continued) 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating (Continued)
Outside air is filtered, and then added to the air being recirculated from the CRE.
Pressurization of the CRE minimizes infiltration of unfiltered air though the CRE boundary from all the surrounding areas adjacent to the CRE boundary.
A single CRAFS train operating at a flow rate of -<1000 cfm will pressurize the CRE to about 0.125 inches water gauge relative to external areas adjacent to the CRE boundary, and provides an air exchange rate in excess of 60% per hour. The CRAFS operation in maintaining the CRE habitable is discussed in USAR, Section 9.10 (Ref.
1).
Redundant supply and recirculation trains provide the required filtration should an excessive pressure drop develop across the other filter train. Normally open isolation dampers are arranged in series pairs so that the failure of one damper to shut will not result in a breach of isolation. However, the recirculation duct does not require redundant dampers to meet single failure proof criteria. Damper PCV-6682 meets the acceptance criteria for the damper repair option described in Standard Review Plan 6.4, Appendix A. A release of radioactivity requires PCV-6682 to open, should PCV-6682 fail to open, it can be repaired or repositioned open before control room doses exceed the allowable limits of General Design Criterion 19. The CRAFS is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements.
The CRAFS is designed to maintain a habitable environment in the CRE for 30 days of continuous occupancy after a Design Basis Accident (DBA) without exceeding a 5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). The CRAFS components are arranged in redundant, safety related ventilation trains. The location of components and ducting within the CRE ensures an adequate supply of filtered air to all areas requiring access.
The CRAFS provides airborne radiological protection for the CRE occupants as demonstrated by the CRE occupant dose analyses for the most limiting design basis accident fission product release presented in the USAR, Section 14.15 (Ref. 2).
2.12 - Page 5 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases (Continued) 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating (Continued)
Two independent and redundant trains of the CRAFS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available if a single active failure disables the other train.
Total system failure, such as from a loss of both filtration trains or from an inoperable CRE boundary, could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem TEDE to the CRE occupants in the event of a large radioactive release.
.Each CRAFS train is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit CRE occupant exposure are OPERABLE. A CRAFS train is considered OPERABLE when the associated:
- a. Fan is OPERABLE,
- b. HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration function, and
- c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.
In order for the CRAFS trains to be considered OPERABLE, the CRE boundary must be maintained such that CRE occupant dose from a large radioactive release does not exceed the calculated dose in the licensing basis consequence analyses for DBAs, and that CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.
The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the CRE boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. This Note only applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs and access panels. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.
APPLICABILITY With the reactor coolant temperature TcoId > 210°F, the CRAFS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRE will remain habitable during and following a DBA.
2.12 - Page 6 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases (Continued) 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating (Continued)
ACTIONS (1)
With one CRAFS train inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRAFS train is adequate to perform the CRE occupant protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CRAFS train could result in loss of CRAFS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.
(2)a, (2)b, and (2)c If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the CRE boundary and into the CRE can result in CRE occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem TEDE), or inadequate protection of CRE occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke, the CRE boundary is inoperable. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRE boundary within 90 days.
During the period that the CRE boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on CRE occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological or chemical event or a challenge from smoke.
Actions must be taken within.24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to verify that in the event of a DBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that CRE occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. These mitigating actions (i.e., actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable CRE boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRE boundary.
2.12 - Page 7 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases (Continued) 2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating (Continued)
(3)
With reactor coolant temperature TcoId -- 210*F, if the inoperable CRAFS or CRE boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
(4)
If both CRAFS trains are inoperable with reactor coolant temperature TcoId -- 21 0°F for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary (i.e., Condition 2), the CRAFS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 2.0.1 must be entered immediately.
2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditioning System The control room air conditioning system is required to ensure the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements. The reactor protective system panels and the engineered safety features panels were designed for, and the instrumentation was tested at, 120 0 F. The temperature inside the control cabinets is at most 15°F warmer than the temperature of the control room due to heat produced by the electronic circuitry. Therefore, the temperature of the control room will not affect OPERABILITY of the control cabinets as long as it doesn't exceed 105 0 F.
During non-emergency operation, the control room temperature may be maintained by using Component Cooling Water (CCW). During design basis accident conditions, the CCW isolation valves to air conditioning units (VA-46A and VA-46B) are automatically closed on a VIAS. This prevents CCW that has been heated by components following a design basis accident from adding heat to the control room. When VIAS is in override, closing these valves maintains the OPERABILITY of the associated air conditioning unit.
2.12 - Page 8 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.12 Control Room Ventilation System Bases (Continued) 2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditioning System (Continued)
With the reactor coolant temperature Tcold -> 21 0°F, two trains of the control room air conditioning system are required to be OPERABLE. If one train is inoperable it shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this condition the remaining train is adequate to maintain the control room temperature. With both trains inoperable, the control room air conditioning system may not be capable of performing its intended function and LCO 2.0.1 must be entered immediately.
References (1) USAR Section 9.10 (2) USAR Section 14.15 (3) USAR Section 14.23 (4) Engineering Analysis (EA)-FC-01-013, "Effects of Secondary Environment Resulting from a Fire Event" 2.12 - Page 9 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Instrumentation and Control (Continued)
The Control Room Envelope (CRE) surveillance requirement (SR) verifies the OPERABILITY of the CRE boundary by testing for unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary and into the CRE. The details of the testing are specified in the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.
The CRE is considered habitable when the radiological dose to CRE occupants calculated in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences is no more than 5 rem TEDE and the CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. This SR verifies that the unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE is no greater than the flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. When unfiltered air inleakage is greater than the assumed flow rate, Technical Specification (TS) 2.12.1(2) must be entered. TS 2.12.1(2)c allows time to restore the CRE boundary to OPERABLE status provided mitigating actions can ensure that the CRE remains within the licensing basis habitability limits for the occupants following an accident.
Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section C.2.7.3, (Ref. 1) which endorses, with exceptions, NEI 99-03, Section 8.4 and Appendix F (Ref.
2). These compensatory measures may also be used as mitigating actions as required by TS 2.12.1(2)b. Temporary analytical methods may also be used as compensatory measures to restore OPERABILITY (Ref. 3). Options for restoring the CRE boundary to OPERABLE status include changing the licensing basis DBA consequence analysis, repairing the CRE boundary, or a combination of these actions. Depending upon the nature of the problem and the corrective action, a full scope inleakage test may not be necessary to establish that the CRE boundary has been restored to OPERABLE status.
References
- 2. NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessment," June 2001
- 3. Letter from Eric J. Leeds (NRC) to James W. Davis (NEI) dated January 30, 2004, "NEI Draft White Paper, Use of Generic Letter 91-18 Process and Alternative Source Terms in the Context of Control Room Habitability." (Adams Accession No. ML040300694).
3.1 - Page 3 Amendment No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PF1OTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. Power Range Safety a. Check: S a.
Channels
- 1) Neutron Flux 1) CHANNEL CHECK
- 2) Thermal Power 2) CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Adjustment D(3) b. CIhannel adjustment to agree with heat balance calculation.
- c. Test Q(1) c. CIHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEEST
- 2. Wide-Range a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Logarithmic Neutron Monitors
- b. Test(2) P b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 3. Reactor Coolant Flow a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Test Q(l) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 4 Amendment No. 0, 63,12
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 4. Thermal Margin/Low a. Check S a.
Pressure 1) Pressure Setpoint 1) CHANNEL CHECK
- 2) Pressure Input 2) CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Test Q0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST-
- c. Calibrate: R c.
- 1) Temperature Input 1) CHANNEL CALIBRATI ON
- 2) Pressure Input 2) CHANNEL CALIBRATI ON
- 5. High-Pressurizer a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure
- b. Test Q01) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 5 Amendment No. 163, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 6. Steam Generator a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Level
- b. Test Q(0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 7. Steam Generator a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure
- b. Test Q(0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 8. Containment Pressure a. Test Q(0) a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 9. Loss of Load a. Test P a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 10. Manual Trips a. Test P a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 11. Steam Generator a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Differential Pressure
- b. Test Q0) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 6 Amendment No. 77,463, 1982
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 12. Reactor Protection a. Test Q(M) a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST System Logic Units
- 13. Axial Power a. Check: S a.
Distribution
- 1) Axial Shape Index 1) CHANNEL CHECK Indication
- 2) Upper Trip 2) CHANNEL CHECK Setpoint Indication
- 3) Lower Trip 3) CHANNEL CHECK Setpoint Indication
- b. Test Q(M) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION NOTES: (1) The quarterly tests will be done on only one of four channels at a time to prevent reactor trip.
(2) Calibrate using built-in simulated signals.
(3) Not required unless the reactor is in the power operating condition and is therefore not required during plant startup and shutdown periods.
3.1 - Page 7 Amendment No. 77,122,163-, 182 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. Pressurizer Pressure L-ow a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Test Q(l)p( 4) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 2. Pressurizer Low a. Calibrate R a. CHANNEL CALIBRATION Pressure Blocking Circuit
- 3. Safety Injection a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation Logic (Simulation of PPLS or CPHS 2/4 Logic)
- b. Test R(7) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 3.1 - Page 8 Amendment No. 54,163,182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 4. Containment Pressure a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST High Signal
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 5. Containment Spray a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation Logic (Simulation of PPLS and CPHS 2/4 Logic)
- b. Test R7) b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 6. Containment Radiation a. Check D a. CHANNEL CHECK High Signal (2) 3.1 - Page 9 Amendment No. 452,163, 173, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 6. (continued) b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. Secondary and Electronic Calibration performed at refueling frequency.
Primary calibration performed with exposure to radioactive sources only when required by the secondary and electronic calibration.
- 7. Manual Safety Injection a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation
- 8. Manual Containment a. Check R a. Observe isolation valves closure.
Isolation Actuation
- b. Test R b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 9. Manual Containment a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Spray Actuation
- 10. Automatic Load a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Sequencers
- 11. Diesel Testing See Technical Specification 3.7 3.1 - Page 10 Amendment No. 54,111,152,163,173, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 12. Diesel Fuel Transfer a. Test M a. Pump run to refill day tank.
Pump
- 13. SIRW Tank Low a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Level Signal
- b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 14. Safety Injection a. Check S(5) a. Verify that level and pressure Tank Level and Pressure are within limits.
3.1 - Page 11 Amendment No. 111, 163,171,182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 14. (continued) b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 15. Boric Acid Tank Level a. Check W a. Verify that level is within limits.
- 16. Boric Acid Tank a. Check W a. Verify that temperature is within limits.
Temperature
- 17. Steam Generator Low a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure Signal (SGL 3) 3)
- b. Test Q( b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST C. Calibrate R C. CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 12 Amendment No. 131,163,172, 182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES. INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 18. SIRW Tank Temperature a. Check a. Verify that temperature is within limits.
- b. Test R b. Measure temperature of SIRW tank with standard laboratory instruments.
- 19. Manual Recirculation a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation
- 20. Recirculation Actuation a. Test Q a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Logic
- b. Test b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- 21. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus a. Check S a. Verify voltage readings are above Low Voltage (Loss of alarm initiation on degraded voltage Voltage and Degraded level - supervisory lights "on".
Voltage) Actuation Logic
- b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (Undervoltage relay)
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 22. Manual Emergency Off-site a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Power Low Trip Actuation 3.1 - Page 13 Amendment No. 411,153,163,172,182,249
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-2 (continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Channel Description Surveillance Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 23. Auxiliary Feedwater a. Check: S a.
- 1) Steam Generator 1) CHANNEL CHECK Water Level Low (Wide Range)
- 2) Steam Generator 2) CHANNEL CHECK Pressure Low
- b. Test: b.
- 1) Actuation Logic 1) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate: R C.
- 1) Steam Generator 1) CHANNEL CALIBRATION Water Level Low (Wide Range)
- 2) Steam Generator 2) CHANNEL CALIBRATION Pressure Low
- 3) Steam Generator 3) CHANNEL CALIBRATION Differential Pressure High
- 24. Manual Auxiliary Feedwater a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Actuation NOTES: (1) Not required unless pressurizer pressure is above 1700 psia.
(2) CRHS monitors are the containment atmosphere gaseous radiation monitor and the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Stack gaseous radiation monitor.
(3) Not required unless steam generator pressure is above 600 psia.
(4) QP - Quarterly during designated modes and prior to taking the reactor critical if not completed within the previous 92 days (not applicable to a fast trip recovery).
(5) Not required to be done on a SIT with inoperable level and/or pressure instrumentation. 0 (6) Not required when outside ambient air temperature is greater than 50'F and less than 105 F.
(7) Tests backup channels such as derived circuits and equipment that cannot be tested when the plant is at power.
3.1 - Page 14 Amendment No. 41,54,65,122,163,171,172,182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. Primary CEA Position a. Check S a. Comparison of output data with secondary CEAPIS.
Indication System
- b. Test M b. Test of power dependent insertion limits, deviation, and sequence monitoring systems.
- c. Physically measured CEDM position used to verify
- c. Calibrate R system accuracy. Calibrate CEA position interlocks.
- 2. Secondary CEA Position a. Check S a. Comparison of output data with primary CEAPIS.
Indication System
- b. Test M b. Test of power dependent insertion limit, deviation, out-of-sequence, and overlap monitoring systems.
- 3. Area and Post-Accident a. Check D a. CHANNEL CHECK 1
Radiation Monitors( )
- b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
- c. Calibrate R c. Secondary and Electronic calibration performed at refueling frequency. Primary calibration with exposure to radioactive sources only when required by the secondary and electronic calibration.
RM-091 A/B - Calibration by electronic signal substitution is acceptable for all range decades above 10 R/hr. Calibration for at least one decade below 1-R/hr. shall be by means of calibrated radiation source.
( 1)Post Accident Radiation Monitors are: RM-063, RM-064, and RM-091A/B. Ar ea Radiation Monitors are: RM-070 thru RM-082, RM-084 thru RM-089, and RM-095 thru RM-098.
3.1 - Page 15 Amendment No. 8,81,86,9,3,137,452,164,17
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description ,Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 4. DELETED
- 5. Primary to Secondary a. Check D a. CHANNEL CHECK Leak-Rate Detection Radiation Monitors b. Test Q b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (RM-054A/B, RM-057)
- c. Calibrate R c. Secondary and Electronic calibration performed at refueling frequency. Primary Calibration performed with exposure to radioactive sources only when required by the secondary and electronic calibration.
- 6. Pressurizer Level a. Check S a. Verify that level is within limits.
- b. Check M b. CHANNEL CHECK
- c. Calibrate R c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 7. CEA Drive System a. Test R a. Verify proper operation of all CEDM system Interlocks interlocks, using simulated signals where necessary.
- b. Test P b. If haven't been checked for three months and plant is shutdown.
3.1 - Page 16 Amendment No. 152,474,-182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 8. Dropped CEA Indication a. Test R a. Insert a negative rate of change power signal to all four Power Range Safety Channels to test alarm.
- 9. Calorimetric Instrumen- a. Calibrate R a. CHANNEL CALIBRATION tation
System
- b. Test In accordance b. Perform required control room envelope (CRE) with CRE unfiltered air inleakage testing in accordance with the Habitability Program CRE Habitability Program.
- 11. Containment Humidity a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Detector
- 12. Interlocks-Isolation Valves a. Test R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on Shutdown Cooling Line
- 13. Control Room Air Conditioning a. Test R a. Verify each train has the capability to remove the System assumed heat load through combination of testing and calculations.
3.1 - Page 17 Amendment No. 16,32,123,15_,1 82, 18-I
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 14. Not Used
- 15. Reactor Coolant System a. Check a. Calculation of reactor coolant flow rate.
Flow
- 16. Pressurizer Pressure a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK
- 17. Reactor Coolant Inlet a. Check S a. CHANNEL CHECK Temperature
- 18. Low-Temperature Set- a. Test PM a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (excluding point Power-Operated actuation)
Relief Valves
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION (1) Required to be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after >95.00% reactor thermal power following power escalation.
3.1 - Page 18 Amendment No. 8,3239,96,1 82,193, 228
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 19. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow a. Check M CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATIOINT
- 20. Subcooled Margin Monitor a. Check M CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATIOW
- 21. PORV Operation and Acous *tic a. Test M CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL .TEST Position Indication
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATIOIý
- 22. PORV Block Valve Operatio n a. Check Q Cycle valve. Valve is exeimpt from and Position Indication testing when it has been closed to comply with LCO Action Statement 2.1.6(5)a.
- b. Calibrate R Check valve stroke against limit switch position.
- 23. Safety Valve Acoustic a. Test M CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Position Indication
- b. Calibration R CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 24. PORV/Safety Valve Tail a. Check M CHANNEL CHECK Pipe Temperature
- b. Calibrate R CHANNEL CALIBRATION 3.1 - Page 19 Amendment No. 39,564, 10,161,182
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 25. Containment Purge Isolation a. Check M a. Verify valve position using control Valves (PCV-742A, B, C, & D) room indication.
- 26. Not Used
- 27. Containment Water Level a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK Narrow Range (LT-599
& LT-600) b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION Wide Range (LT-387 & a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK LT-388)
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 28. Containment Wide Range a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK Pressure Indication
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 29. Not Used 3.1 - Page 20 Amendment No. 54,68,8,2,87,107,182,183, 231 248,
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS. CALIBRATIONS AND TESTING OF MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 30. Core Exit Thermo- a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK couple
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 31. Heated Junction Thermocouple (YE-1i16A and YE-116B) a. Check M a. CHANNEL CHECK
- b. Calibrate R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION PM - Prior to scheduled cold leg cooldown below 300°F; monthly whenever temperature remains below 300'F and reactor vessel head is installed.
3.1 - Page 21 Amendment No. 87,107,110,122,182, 183
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3A MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANELS (Al-185 AND Al-212)
AND EMERGENCY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PANEL (A1-179) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL CIRCUITS Surveillance Channel Description Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 1. WIDE RANGE a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LOGARITHMIC POWER AND SOURCE RANGE MONITORS b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION (AI-212)
- 2. REACTOR COOLANT COLD a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEG TEMPERATURE (Al-1 85) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 3. REACTOR COOLANT HOT a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEG TEMPERATURE (Al-1 85) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 4. PRESSURIZER LEVEL a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK (Al-1 85)
- b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 5. VOLUME CONTROL a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK TANK LEVEL (Al-1 85) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION
- 6. ASP CONTROL a. TEST R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CIRCUITS (AI-1 85) 3.1 - Page 22 Amendment No. !25, !82
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-3A (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR CHECKS, CALIBRATIONS AND FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANELS (Al-185 AND AI-212)
AND EMERGENCY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PANEL (AI-179) INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL CIRCUITS Surveillance Channel Des5cription Function Frequency Surveillance Method
- 7. STEAM GENERATOR a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEVEL, NIDE RANGE (Al-1 79) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATIOIN
- 8. STEAM GENERATOR a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK LEVEL, NARROW RANGE (Al-179) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATIOIN
- 9. STEAM GENERATOR a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK PRESSUIRE (AI-1 79) b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATIOIN
- 10. PRESSLJRIZER PRESSURE a. CHECK M a. CHANNEL CHECK (Al-1 79)
- b. CALIBRATE R b. CHANNEL CALIBRATIOQN
- 11. EAFW CONTROL a. TEST R a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CIRCUITS (AI-1 79) 3.1 - Page 23 2 Amendment No. 125 82
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests Applicability Applies to plant equipment and conditions related to safety.
Objective To specify the minimum frequency and type of surveillance to be applied to critical plant equipment and conditions.
Specifications Equipment and sampling tests shall be conducted as specified in Tables 3-4 and 3-5.
Basis The equipment testing and system sampling frequencies specified in Tables 3-4 and 3-5 are considered adequate, based upon experience, to maintain the status of the equipment and systems so as to assure safe operation. Thus, those systems where changes might occur relatively rapidly are sampled frequently and those static systems not subject to changes are sampled less frequently.
The control room air filtration system (CRAFS) consists of redundant high efficiency particulate air filters (HEPA) and charcoal adsorbers. HEPA filters are installed before and after the charcoal adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of iodine to the control room. The in-place test results will confirm system integrity and performance. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 99.825 percent for expected accident conditions.
CRAFS standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check on this system.
Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Each CRAFS train must be operated for Ž- 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. The monthly Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment, and the two train redundancy available.
Each CRAFS train is verified to start and operate on an automatic and manual actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle.
3.2 - Page 1 Amendment No. 1-5,67,1-22,!28
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests (continued)
The spent fuel storage-decontamination areas air treatment system is designed to filter the building atmosphere to the auxiliary building vent during refueling operations. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment.
In-place testing is performed to confirm the integrity of the filter system. The charcoal adsorbers are periodically sampled to insure capability for the removal of radioactive iodine.
The Safety Injection (SI) pump room air treatment system consists of charcoal adsorbers which are installed in normally bypassed ducts. This system is designed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine in SI pump rooms during the recirculation period following a DBA. The in-place and laboratory testing of charcoal adsorbers will assure system integrity and performance.
Pressure drops across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, of less than 9 inches of water for the control room filters (VA-64A & VA-64B) and of less than 6 inches of water for each of the other air treatment systems will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by amounts of foreign matter that would interfere with performance to established levels.
The hydrogen purge system provides the control of combustible gases (hydrogen) in containment for a post-LOCA environment. The surveillance tests provide assurance that the system is operable and capable of performing its design function. VA-80A or VA-80B is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation (67 SCFM) associated with 1)
Zirconium - water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of sump water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment. The system should have a minimum of one blower with associated valves and piping (VA-80A or VA-80B) available at all times to meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.7 (1971).
If significant painting, fire or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign materials, testing will be performed to confirm system performance.
Demonstration of the automatic and/or manual initiation capability will assure the system's availability.
Verifying Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage to be within the LCO limits ensures the integrity of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is maintained. Pressure boundary leakage would at first appear as unidentified leakage and can only be positively identified by inspection. Unidentified leakage is determined by performance of an RCS water inventory balance. Identified leakage is then determined by isolation and/or inspection. Since Primary to Secondary Leakage of 150 gallons per day cannot be measured accurately by an RCS water inventory balance, note "***" for line item 8a on Table 3-5 states that the Reactor Coolant System Leakage surveillance is not applicable to Primary to Secondary Leakage. Primary to secondary leakage is measured by performance of effluent monitoring within the secondary steam and feedwater systems.
3.2 - Page 2 Amendment No. 15,67,128,138,169, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests (continued)
Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new fuel oil, but does not represent a failure to meet the LCO concern since the fuel oil is not added to the storage tanks. Within 31 days following the initial new fuel oil sample, the fuel oil is analyzed to establish that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 3) are met for new fuel oil when tested in accordance with ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 2), except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM D129-00 (Ref. 2) or ASTM D2622-87 (Ref. 2). The 31 day period is acceptable because the fuel oil properties of interest, even if they were not within stated limits, would not have an immediate effect on DG operation. This Surveillance ensures the availability of high quality fuel oil for the DGs.
Fuel oil degradation during long term storage shows up as an increase in particulate, due mostly to oxidation. The presence of particulate does not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. The particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment, however, which can cause engine failure. Particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM 6217-98 (Ref. 2) with the exception that the filters specified in the ASTM method may have a nominal pore size of up to 3 microns. This method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/l. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing. For those designs in which the total stored fuel oil volume is contained in two or more interconnected tanks, each tank must be considered and tested separately. The Surveillance interval of this test takes into consideration fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance intervals.
Table 3-5, Item 9d ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. A start cycle is defined as the cranking time required to accelerate the DG to firing speed. The pressure specified in this Surveillance Requirement is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished. The 31 day Surveillance interval takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.
Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel storage tanks once every 92 days per Table 3-5, Item 9e, eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, and contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance interval is established to, ensure excessive water does not accumulate in the fuel oil system, which meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 4). This Surveillance Requirement is for preventative maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this Surveillance Requirement provided the accumulated water is removed during performance of the Surveillance.
3.2 - Page 4 Amendment No.-229
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 Equipment and Sampling Tests (continued)
Table 3-5, Item 8b verifies that primary to secondary LEAKAGE is less or equal to 150 gallons per day through any one SG. Satisfying the primary to secondary LEAKAGE limit ensures that the operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in the Steam Generator Program is met. If this surveillance requirement is not met, compliance with LCO 3.17, "Steam Generator Tube Integrity," should be evaluated. The 150 gallons per day limit is measured at room temperature as described in Reference 5. The operational LEAKAGE rate limit applies to LEAKAGE through any one SG. If it is not practical to assign the LEAKAGE to an individual SG, all the primary to secondary LEAKAGE should be conservatively assumed to be from one SG.
The Surveillance is modified by a Note which states that the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishment of steady state operation. For RCS primary to secondary LEAKAGE determination, steady state is defined as stable RCS pressure, temperature, power level, pressurizer and makeup tank levels, makeup and letdown, and RCP seal injection and return flows.
The Surveillance Frequency of daily is a reasonable interval to trend primary to secondary LEAKAGE and recognizes the importance of early leakage detection in the prevention of accidents. The primary to secondary LEAKAGE is determined using continuous process radiation monitors or radiochemical grab sampling in accordance with the EPRI guidelines (Ref. 5).
References
- 1) USAR, Section 9.10
- 2) ASTM D4057-95(2000), ASTM D975-98b, ASTM D4176-93, ASTM D129-00, ASTM D2622-87, ASTM D287-82, ASTM 6217-98, ASTM D2709-96
- 3) ASTM D975-98b, Table 1
- 5) EPRI, "Pressurized Water Reactor Primary-to-Secondary Leak Guidelines."
3.2 - Page 5 Amendment No. 229, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-4 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR SAMPLING TESTS Type of Measurement Sample and Analysis and Analysis Frequency
- 1. Reactor Coolant (a) Power Operation (1) Gross Radioactivity 1 per 3 days (Operating Mode 1) (Gamma emitters)
(2) Isotopic Analysis for (i) 1 per 14 days DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 (ii) 1 per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />(1 ) whenever the radioactivity exceeds 1.0 ,Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
(iii) 1 sample between 2-8 hours following a thermal power change exceeding 15% of the rated thermal power within a 1-hour period.
(3) E Determination 1 per 6 months(2)
(4) Dissolved oxygen 1 per 3 days and chloride (b) Hot Standby (1) Gross Radioactivity 1 per 3 days (Operating Mode 2) (Gamma emitters)
Hot Shutdown (2) Isotopic Analysis for (i) 1 per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />(1 ) whenever (Operating Mode 3) DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 the radioactivity exceeds 1.0 uCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
(ii) I sample between 2-8 hours following a thermal power change exceeding 15% of the rated thermal power change exceeding 15% of the rated thermal power within a 1-hour period.
(3) Dissolved oxygen 1 per 3 days and chloride 3.2 - Page 6 Amendment No. 28,67,124,133,157
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-4 (Continued)
MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR SAMPLING TESTS Type of Measurement Sample and Analysis and Analysis Frequency
- 1. Reactor Coolant (Continued)
(c) Cold Shutdown (1) Chloride 1 per 3 days (Operating Mode 4)
(d) Refueling Shutdown (1) Chloride 1 per 3 days(3)
(Operating Mode 5) (2) Boron Concentration 1 per 3 days (3)
(e) Refueling Operation (1) Chloride 1 per 3 days(3)
(2) Boron Concentration 1 per 3 days(3)
- 2. SIRW Tank Boron Concentration M
- 3. Concentrated Boric Boron Concentration W Acid Tanks
- 5. Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration See Footnote 4 below
- 6. Steam Generator Blowdown Isotopic Analysis for Dose (Operating Modes 1 and 2) Equivalent 1-131 (1) Until the radioactivity of the reactor coolant is restored to
- 1 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
(2) Sample to be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of power operation have elapsed since reactor was subcritical for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or longer.
(3) Boron and chloride sampling/analyses are not required when the core has been off-loaded. Reinitiate boron and chloride sampling/analyses prior to reloading fuel into the cavity to assure adequate shutdown margin and allowable chloride levels are met.
(4) Prior to placing unirradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool or placing fuel assemblies in a spent fuel cask in the spent fuel pool, and weekly when unirradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool, or every 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> when fuel assemblies are in a spent fuel storage cask in the spent fuel pool.
(5) When Steam Generator Dose Equivalent 1-131 exceeds 50 percent of the limits in Specification 2.20, the sampling and analysis frequency shall be increased to a minimum of 5 times per week. When Steam Generator Dose Equivalent 1-131 exceeds 75 percent of this limit, the sampling and analysis frequency shall be increased to a minimum of once per day.
3.2 - Page 7 Amendment No. 28,67,86,12,4,,1529-17 2, 18 &239
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-6 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference
- 1. Control Element Drop times of all full-length CEA's Prior to reactor criticality after each 7.5.3 Assemblies removal of the reactor vessel closure head
- 2. Control Element Partial movement of all CEA's Q 7 Assemblies (Minimum of 6 in)
- 3. Pressurizer Safety Verify each pressurizer safety valve R 7 Valves is OPERABLE in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
Following testing, lift settings shall be 2485 psig +/- 1% and 2530 psig +/-1%
respectively.
- 4. Main Steam Safety Set Point R 4 Valves
- 5. DELETED
- 6. DELETED
- 7. DELETED 8a. Reactor Coolant Evaluate D* 4 System Leakage***
8b. Primary to Secondary Continuous process D* 4 Leakage **** radiation monitors or radiochemical grab sampling 9a Diesel Fuel Supply Fuel Inventory M 8.4 9b. Diesel Lubricating Oil Lube Oil Inventory M 8.4 Inventory 9c. Diesel Fuel Oil Test Properties In accordance with the Diesel Fuel 8.4 Properties Oil Testing Program 9d. Required Diesel Air Pressure M 8.4 Generator Air Start Receiver Bank Pressure 3.2 - Page 8 Amendment No. 15,24,128,160,166,169,171,21 9, 229,
-246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS
- Whenever the system is at or above operating temperature and pressure.
Not applicable to primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
Verify primary to secondary LEAKAGE is < 150 gallons per day through any one SG.
This surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after establishment of steady state operation.
3.2 - Page 9 Amendment No. 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 9e. Check for and Check for Water and Remove Q 8.4 Remove Accumulated Water from Each Fuel Oil Storage Tank 10a. Charcoal and HEPA 1 In-Place Testinq** 9.10 Filters for Control Charcoal adsorbers and HEPA On a refueling frequency or every 720 Room Air Filtration filter banks shall be leak hours of system operation or after each System (CRAFS) tested and show >99.95% complete or partial replacement of the Freon (R-1 1 or R-1 12) and charcoal adsorber/HEPA filter banks, or cold DOP particulates after any major structural maintenance on removal, respectively. the system housing or following significant painting, fire or chemical releases in a ventilation zone communicating with the system.
- 2. Laboratory Testinq**
Verify, within 31 days after removal, On a refueling frequency or every 720 that a laboratory test of a sample of hours of system operation or after any the charcoal adsorber, when obtained structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or in accordance with Regulatory charcoal adsorber housing or following Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide significant painting, fire or chemical release in 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, shows a ventilation zone communicating with the methyliodide penetration less than system.
0.175% when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of 30 0 C (86 0 F) and a relative humidity of 70%.
- Tests shall be performed in accordance with applicable section(s) of ANSI N510-1980.
3.2 - Page 10 Amendment No. 15,24,128,160,198,22-, 216 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 1Oa. (continued) 3. Overall System ODeration
- a. Each train shall be operated. Ten continuous hours every month with heaters operating.
- b. The pressure drop across the R combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall be demonstrated to be less than 9 inches of water at system design flow rate.
- c. Fan shall be shown to operate R within + 10% design flow.
- 4. Automatic and manual initiation of R each train shall be demonstrated.
10b. Charcoal Adsorbers 1. In-Place Testing**
for Spent Fuel Charcoal adsorbers shall be On a refueling frequency or every 720 6.2 Storage Pool Area leak tested and shall show hours of system operation, or after 9.10
>99% Freon (R-11 or R-112) each complete or partial replacement of removal. the charcoal adsorber bank, or after any major structural maintenance on the system housing or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in a ventilation zone communicating with the system.
- 2. Laboratory Testinq Verify, within 31 days after removal, On a refueling frequency or every 720 that a laboratory test of a sample of hours of system operation or after any the charcoal adsorber, when obtained structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or in accordance with Regulatory charcoal adsorber housing or following Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide significant painting, fire or chemical release in 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, shows a ventilation zone communicating with the methyliodide penetration less than system.
10% when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of 30 0 C (86 0 F) and a relative humidity of 95%.
- Tests shall be performed in accordance with applicable section(s) of ANSI N510-1980.
3.2 - Page 11 Amendment No. 16,24,52,428,5* 54,69,19,229, 246 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MIMIMI IM I:l*l:t31 ll:kl*ll:_* Pno t' 11t IIDMI:MT TIrcQ USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 10b. (continued) 3. Overall System Operation
- a. Operation of each circuit Ten hours every month.
shall be demonstrated.
- b. Volume flow rate through R charcoal filter shall be shown to be between 4500 and 12,000 cfm.
- 4. Manual initiation of the R system shall be demon-strated.
10c. Charcoal Adsorbers 1. In-Place Testing** On a refueling frequency or every 9.10 for S.1. Pump Room Charcoal adsorbers shall be 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation, or 6.2 leak tested and shall show after each complete or partial
>99% Freon (R-1 1 or R-1 12) replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank, removal. or after any major structural maintenance on the system housing or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system.
- 2. Laboratory Testing Verify, within 31 days after removal, On a refueling frequency or following 720 that a laboratory test of a sample of hours of system operation or after any the charcoal adsorber, when obtained structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or in accordance with Regulatory charcoal adsorber housing or following Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide significant painting, fire or chemical release in 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, shows a ventilation zone communicating with the system.
methyliodide penetration less than 10% when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 at a temperature of 30 0 C (86 0 F) and a relative humidity of 95%.
- 3. Overall System Operation
- a. Operation of each circuit Ten hours every month.
shall be demonstrated.
- b. Volume flow rate shall be R shown to be between 3000 and 6000 cfm.
- Tests shall be performed in accordance with applicable section(s) of ANSI N510-1980.
3.2 - Page 12 Amendment No.,! 5,24,52,!28,!9,198, 229, 246 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS USAR Section Test Frequency Reference 1Oc. (continued) 4. Automatic and/or manual initi- R ation of the system shall be demonstrated.
- 11. Containment 1. Demonstrate damper action. 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, and every 5 9.10 Ventilation System years thereafter.
Fusible Linked Dampers 2. Test a spare fusible link.
- 12. Diesel Generator Calibral R 8.4.3 Under-Voltage Relays
- 13. Motor Operated Verify the contactor pickup value at R Safety Injection <85% of 460 V.
Loop Valve Motor Starters (HCV-311, 314, 317, 320, 327, 329, 331,333, 312, 315, 318, 321)
- 14. Pressurizer Heaters Verify control circuits operation R for post-accident heater use.
- 15. Spent Fuel Pool Test neutron poison samples for 1, 2, 4, 7, and 10 years after Racks dimensional change, weight, neutron installation, and every 5 years attenuation change and specific thereafter.
gravity change.
- 16. Reactor Coolant 1. Verify all manual isolation During each refueling outage just Gas Vent System valves in each vent path are prior to plant start-up.
in the open position.
- 2. Cycle each automatic valve in the R vent path through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room. Verification of valve cycling may be determined by observation of position indicating lights.
- 3. Verify flow through the reactor R coolant vent system vent paths.
3.2 - Page 13 Amendment No. 41,54,60,75,77,80,155,469,482,218,229, 216
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS Test Frequency
- 17. Hydrogen Purge 1. Verify all manual valves are operable by R System completing at least one cycle.
- 2. Cycle each automatic valve through at R least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room. Verification of the valve cycling may be determined by the observation of position indicating lights.
- 3. Initiate flow through the VA-80A and VA-80B blowers, HEPA filter, and charcoal adsorbers and verify that the system operates for at least (a) 30 minutes with suction from the a) M auxiliary building (Room 59)
(b) 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with suction from the b) R containment
- 4. Verify the pressure drop across the R VA-82 HEPAs and charcoal filter to be less than 6 inches of water. Verify a system flow rate of greater than 80 scfm and less than 230 scfm during system operation when tested in accordance with 3b. above.
- 18. Shutdown Cooling 1. Verify required shutdown cooling loops are S (when shutdown cooling is required by TS 2.8).
OPERABLE and one shutdown cooling loop is IN OPERATION.
- 2. Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated W (when shutdown cooling is required by TS 2.8).
power is available to the required shutdown cooling pump that is not IN OPERATION.
3.2 -Page 14 Amendment No. 138,169,188, 2A6 I
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3-5 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS Test Frequency
- 19. Refueling Water Level Verify refueling water level is > 23 ft. above Prior to commencing, and daily during CORE ALTERATIONS the top of the reactor vessel flange. and/or REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.
- 20. Spent Fuel Pool Level Verify spent fuel pool water level is > 23 ft. Prior to commencing, and weekly during REFUELING above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool.
in the storage racks.
- 21. Containment Penetrations Verify each required containment penetration is Prior to commencing, and weekly during CORE ALTERATIONS in the required status. and/or REFUELING OPERATIONS in containment.
- 22. Spent Fuel Assembly Verify by administrative means that initial Prior to storing the fuel assembly in Region 2 (including Storage enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in peripheral cells).
accordance with Figure 2-10.
- 23. P-T Limit Curve Verify RCS Pressure, RCS temperature, and This test is only required during RCS heatup and cooldown RCS heatup and cooldown rates are within operations and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.
the limits specified by the P-T limit Figure(s) While these operations are occurring, this test shall be performed shown in the PTLR. every 30 minutes.
- 24. Spent Fuel Cask Loading Verify by administrative means that initial Prior to placing the fuel assembly in a spent fuel cask in enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly the spent fuel pool.
is in accordance with Figure 2-11.
3.2 - Page 15 Amendment No. 188, 221, 239, 246
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.24 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program A Control Room Envelope (CRE) Habitability Program shall be established and implemented to ensure that CRE habitability is maintained such that, with an OPERABLE Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS), CRE occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the duration of the accident. The program shall include the following elements:
- b. Requirements for maintaining CRE boundary in its design condition including configuration control and preventive maintenance.
- c. Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, "Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors," Revision 0, May 2003, and (ii) assessing CRE habitability at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0.
- d. Measurement, at designated locations, of the CRE pressure relative to all external areas adjacent to the CRE boundary during the pressurization mode of operation by the CRVS, operating within the tolerance for design flow rate, at a Frequency of 18 months. The results shall be trended and used as part of an 18 month assessment of the CRE boundary.
- e. The quantitative limits on unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE. These limits shall be stated in a manner to allow direct comparison to the unfiltered air inleakage measured by the testing described in paragraph c. The unfiltered air inleakage limit for radiological challenges is the inleakage flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. Unfiltered air inleakage limits for hazardous chemicals must ensure that exposure of CRE occupants to these hazards will be within the assumptions in the licensing basis.
- f. The provisions of SR 3.0.1 are applicable to the Frequencies for assessing CRE habitability, determining CRE unfiltered leakage, and measuring CRE pressure and assessing the CRE boundary as required by paragraphs c and d, respectively.
5.0 - Page 21 Amendment No.