ML15288A005

Issuance of Amendment No. 285, Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors

ML15288A005
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/15/2015
From:	Lyon C Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District
Lyon C
References
CAC MF5466
Download: ML15288A005 (29)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 15, 2015 Mr. Louis P. Cortopassi Site Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station 9610 Power Lane, Mail Stop FC-2-4 Blair, NE 68008

SUBJECT:

FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: UPGRADE TO EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME (CAC NO.

MF5466)

Dear Mr. Cortopassi:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 285 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 for the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1.

The amendment consists of changes to the emergency action level (EAL) scheme in response to your application dated December 26, 2014, as supplemented by letters dated September 11, September 18, November 2, and December 8, 2015.

The amendment revises your current EAL scheme to a scheme based on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," November 2012.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Docket No. 50-285

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 285 to DPR-40

2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv Sincerely, Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT DOCKET NO. 50-285 FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 285 Renewed License No. DPR-40

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by the Omaha Public Power District (the licensee), dated December 26, 2014, as supplemented by letters dated September 11, September 18, November 2, and December 8, 2015, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is amended by changes as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.8. of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is hereby amended to read as follows:

8.

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 285, are hereby incorporated in the license. Omaha Public Power District shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by June 30, 2016.

Attachment:

Changes to the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION William M. Dean, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance: December 15, 2015

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 285 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-40 DOCKET NO. 50-285 Replace the following page of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a vertical line indicating the area of change.

License Page REMOVE INSERT (4)

Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source, or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form for sample analysis or instrument calibration or when associated with radioactive apparatus or components; (5)

Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by operation of the facility.

3.

This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; and is, subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

A.

Maximum Power Level Omaha Public Power District is authorized to operate the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1, at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 1500 megawatts thermal (rate power).

B.

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 285 are hereby incorporated in the license. Omaha Public Power District shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

C.

Security and Safeguards Contingency Plans The Omaha Public Power District shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 1 O CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 1 O CFR 73.21, are entitled: "Fort Calhoun Station Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan," submitted by letter dated May 19, 2006.

OPPD shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The OPPD CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 266 and modified by License Amendment No. 284.

Renewed Operating License No. DPR-40 Amendment No. 285

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 285 TO RENEWED FACILITY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-40 OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-285 By application dated December 26, 2014, as supplemented by letters dated September 11, September 18, November 2, and December 8, 2015 (References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 19, respectively), Omaha Public Power District (OPPD, the licensee) requested changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 for the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, to revise the emergency action level (EAL) scheme.

The proposed amendment supports a conversion from the licensee's current EAL scheme to a scheme based on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," dated November 2012 (Reference 5).

The supplemental letters dated September 11, September 18, November 2, and December 8, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on February 3, 2015 (80 FR 5801 ).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed revision against the following regulations and guidance described below.

2.1 Regulations Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.47, "Emergency plans," sets forth emergency plan requirements for nuclear power plant facilities. The regulations in 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1 )(i) state, in part, that

[... ] no initial operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Section 50.47(b) establishes the standards that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans must meet for the NRC staff to make a positive finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Planning Standard (4) of this section requires that onsite and offsite emergency response plans must meet the following standard:

A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

Section 50.47(b)(4) emphasizes use of a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, so that implementation methods will be relatively consistent throughout the industry for a given reactor and containment design while simultaneously providing an opportunity for a licensee to modify its EAL scheme as necessary to address plant-specific design considerations or preferences.

Section IV. B of Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," to 10 CFR Part 50, states, in part:

The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant.

The proposed changes were submitted to the NRC for a technical and regulatory review prior to implementation by the licensee. The proposed changes include EALs based on the licensee's current spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation, and a set of revised EALs that will be implemented after the completion of SFP instrumentation installation pursuant to NRC Order EA-12-051, "Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," dated March 12, 2012 (Reference 6). This review is based upon a revision to the site-specific EAL scheme provided in the licensee's application letter and supplemented by the licensee's responses to the NRC staff's request for additional information dated July 14, 2015 (Reference 7).

2.2 Guidance EAL development guidance was initially established via NRC Generic Letter (GL) 79-50, "Emergency Plans Submittal Dates," dated October 10, 1979 (Reference 8), and was subsequently established in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 (Reference 9), which was endorsed as an approach for the development of an EAL scheme via NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.101, Revision 2, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," October 1981 (Reference 10).

As industry and regulatory experience was gained with the implementation and use of EAL schemes, the industry issued revised EAL scheme development guidance to reflect lessons learned. To date, NUMARC/NESP-007, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," January 1992 (Reference 11 ), NEI 99-01, Revision 4 (Reference 12), NEI 99-01, Revision 5 (Reference 13), and NEI 99-01, Revision 6 (Reference 5), were provided to the NRC for review and endorsement as generic (non-plant-specific) EAL development guidance.

Revisions 3 and 4 of RG 1.101, dated August 1992 and July 2003, respectively (Reference 10),

endorsed NUMARC/NESP-007 and NEI 99-01, Revision 4 as acceptable alternatives for licensees to consider in the development of their plant-specific EAL schemes. By letter dated February 22, 2008 (Reference 14), the NRC staff endorsed NEI 99-01, Revision 5 as generic (non-plant-specific) EAL scheme development guidance. NEI 99-01, Revision 6, was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (Reference 15), as generic (non-plant-specific)

EAL scheme development guidance.

The EAL development guidance contained in GL 79-50, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, NUMARC/NESP-007, and NEI 99-01, Revisions 4, 5, and 6, are all considered generic EAL scheme development guidance, as they are not plant-specific and may not be entirely applicable for some reactor designs. However, the guidance contained in these documents bounds the most typical accident/event scenarios for which emergency response is necessary, in a format that allows for industry standardization and consistent regulatory oversight. Most licensees choose to develop their plant-specific EAL schemes using the latest endorsed EAL development guidance with appropriate plant-specific alterations as applicable. Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.8(2), a revision to an EAL must be approved by the NRC before implementation, if the licensee is changing from one EAL scheme to another EAL scheme.

In summary, the NRC staff considers the following methods acceptable for use in developing plant-specific EALs that meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), with the understanding that licensees may want to develop EALs that differ from the applicable guidance document as allowed in RG 1.101 and in the applicable endorsement letters:

Appendix 1, "Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants," to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," January 1992; NEI 99-01, Revision 4, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," January 2003; NEI 99-01, Revision 5, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," February 2008; and NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," November 2012.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2003-18, "Use of NEI 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," dated October 8, 2003, with Supplement 1, dated July 13, 2004, and Supplement 2, dated December 12, 2005 (Reference 15), also provides guidance for developing or changing a standard EAL scheme. In addition, this RIS and its supplements provide recommendations to assist licensees, consistent with Section IV.B of Appendix E to Part 50, in determining whether to seek prior NRC approval of deviations from the guidance.

Regardless of the generic EAL scheme development guidance document used by a licensee to develop its EAL scheme, or if a licensee chose to develop its EAL scheme using an alternative approach not endorsed by the NRC, or a combination of the two (most typical), the NRC staff reviews the EAL scheme to assure it meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

In its application, the licensee proposes to revise its current EAL scheme to one based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6. In its application and supplemental letters, the licensee submitted the proposed EAL scheme, the technical basis, a comparison matrix, the EAL numbering scheme, and an explanation for any difference or deviation from NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The comparison matrix provided a cross-reference relating the proposed EAL scheme to the EAL scheme in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The NRC staff reviewed the proposed site-specific EAL schemes as provided by application dated December 26, 2014, and as supplemented by letters dated September 11, September 18, November 2, and December 8, 2015.

The application states that the licensee used the terms "difference" and "deviation" as defined in RIS 2003-18, as supplemented, when comparing its proposed plant-specific EALs to the generic EALs in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. The NRC staff notes that both the current and proposed EALs have modifications from the guidance due to specific plant designs and licensee preference.

Although the EALs must be plant-specific, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed EALs for the following key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme to ensure consistency and regulatory stability:

Consistency (i.e., the EALs would lead to similar decisions under similar circumstances at different plants), up to and including standardization in intent, if not in actual wording; Human factors engineering and user friendliness; Potential for classification upgrade only when there is an increasing threat to public health and safety; Ease of upgrading and downgrading; Thoroughness in addressing and disposing of the issues of completeness and accuracy raised regarding Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654 (i.e., the EAL scheme is functional and complete as a whole);

Technical completeness for each classification level; Logical progression in classification for multiple events; and Objective and observable values.

To aid in understanding the nomenclature used in this safety evaluation, for each category of EALs reviewed the following naming/numbering convention is used: the first letter signifies the category; the second letter signifies the classification level (G = General Emergency (GE),

S = Site Area Emergency (SAE), A= Alert, and U = Notification of Unusual Event (UE)); and the number is the applicable number from the plant-specific EAL scheme.

For ease of use, this safety evaluation will use the numbering system from the plant-specific EAL scheme; however, the numbering system from the generic EAL scheme development guidance is also annotated in [brackets] to aid in cross-referencing the site-specific EAL numbering convention with that of the guidance when the numbering is different.

3.1 Category 'R' - Abnormal Radiological Release/Radiological Effluent 3.1.1 EAL Set RU1/RA1/RS1/RG1 [AU1/AA1/AS1/AG1]

This EAL set is based upon plant-specific indications of a release of radioactivity (gaseous and/or liquid). Based on its review of the licensee's submission, the NRC staff has determined that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

In its submission, the licensee stated that it chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided. Furthermore, the licensee used an updated dose modeling software program and chose to utilize a different set of input parameters consistent with the guidance in NEI 99-01, Revision 6 for developing EALs RU 1, RA 1, RS 1, and RG 1 than what was originally approved for its current EAL scheme. This resulted in a slight difference of EAL threshold values between its currently approved scheme and the scheme included in this amendment. The NRC staff reviewed the technical basis provided by the licensee for the input parameters and concludes that the resulting EAL threshold values provide for a progression from UE to GE, which is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.1.2 EAL Set RU2/RA2 [AU2/AA2] (prior to installation of SFP instrumentation)

This EAL set is based upon plant-specific indications of fuel uncovery, including spent fuel in the refueling pathway or stored in the SFP. Based on its review of the licensee's submission, the NRC staff has determined that the progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.1.3 EAL Set RU2/RA2/RS2/RG2 [AU2/AA2/AS2/AG2] (post-installation of SFP instrumentation)

The licensee provided its proposed EALs RA2.3, RS2, and RG2 for pre-implementation review.

Pending installation of EA-12-051 SFP instrumentation, this EAL set is based upon plant-specific indications of fuel uncovery, including spent fuel in the refueling pathway or stored in the SFP. Based on its review of the licensee's submission, the NRC staff has determined that the SFP instrumentation-related EAL set (RU2, RA2, RS2, and RG2) progress from UE to GE appropriately and are consistent with the EAL scheme development guidance.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this pending EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the pending plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable for implementation pending installation of EA-12-051 SFP instrumentation. The licensee will notify the NRC, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.4, following implementation of EA-12-051 SFP instrumentation.

3.1.4 EAL RA3 [AA3]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that this EAL is based upon radiation levels in the plant that limit normal access. This Alert EAL is primarily intended to ensure that the plant emergency response organization is activated to support the control room in removing the impediment to normal access. Indications of increasing radiation levels in the plant are bounded by indication of fission product barrier loss or potential loss, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and has determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.1.5 EAL RU3 [SU3]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that this EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when reactor coolant system (RCS) activity is greater than Technical Specification allowable limits. The Alert, SAE, and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA 1, RS 1, and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2 Category 'C' - Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction 3.2.1 EAL Set CU6/CA6/CS6/CG6 [CU1/CA1/CS1/CG1]

This EAL set is based upon a loss of reactor pressure vessel inventory and/or RCS leakage.

Based on its review of the application, as supplemented, the NRC staff has determined that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. Based on its review of the licensee's modifications, the NRC staff has determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.2 EAL Set CU1/CA1 [CU2/CA2]

This EAL set is based upon a loss of available alternating current (AC) power to emergency power electrical busses. Based on its review of the application, as supplemented, the NRC staff has determined that the progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff further finds that the SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.3 EAL Set CU5/CA5 [CU3/CA3]

This EAL set is based upon an inability to maintain control of decay heat removal. Based on its review of the application, as supplemented, the NRC staff has determined that the progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff also finds that the SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.4 EAL CU3 [CU4]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that the EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when a loss of direct current (DC) power event occurs, as this condition compromises the ability of the licensee to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during cold shutdown or refueling modes of operation. The application also stated that the Alert, SAE, and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RA 1, RS 1, and RG1. Based on its review, the NRC staff agrees.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.5 EAL CU4 [CU5]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that the EAL's intent is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or for offsite response organizations including the NRC, are lost.

The NRC staff has determined that no escalation path is necessary for this EAL.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2.6 EAL CA2 [CA6]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that the EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when hazardous events lead to potential damage to safety systems. Based on its review of the application, the NRC staff agrees that the SAE and GE classification levels for this accident progression are bounded by indications available in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.3 Category 'E' - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 3.3.1 EAL E-HU1 This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that the EAL's intent is limited to radiological events at the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). Based on its review of the application, the NRC staff agrees that, while security-related events at the ISFSI are also of concern, they are bounded by the licensee's EAL HA 1.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.4 Category 'F' - Fission Product Barrier Matrix The application explained that this category is unique in the overall EAL scheme, as the thresholds are not intended to be stand-alone indicators of a particular event occurring at the plant. Rather, they are to be used as triggers within the particular logic configuration needed to reflect a loss or potential loss of a fission product barrier. Nuclear power plants in the United States have three fission product barriers: fuel cladding, RCS, and primary containment.

Licensees are to develop thresholds that provide EAL decision-makers input into making an event declaration based upon degradation of one or more of these fission product barriers.

There are numerous triggers used as logic inputs to decide on the appropriate classification based upon the number of loss and/or potential loss indicators that are triggered for each barrier. By design, these indicators are redundant with other similar indicators in the Category 'R' and Category 'S' EAL sets, due to the importance for licensees to be able to recognize reactor and/or fission product barrier events as timely as possible using the best available indicators from several different perspectives.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's application and verified that the logic used to determine the appropriate emergency classification is consistent with the generic EAL scheme development guidance.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The licensee chose to modify this EAL category by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL category is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, and while different than that provided in the generic EAL development guidance, continues to meet the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.5 Category 'H' - Hazards 3.5.1 EAL Set HU1/HA1/HS1/HG1 This EAL set is based upon security-related events originally developed in accordance with the guidance from NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," dated July 18, 2005 (Reference 17), or RIS 2006-12, "Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance 'Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action,"' dated July 19, 2006 (Reference 18), for licensees to implement regardless of the specific version of the generic EAL scheme development guidance used, or if the particular licensee developed its EAL scheme using an alternative approach. Based upon lessons learned from the implementation and use of this EAL set, particularly the insights gained from combined security and emergency preparedness drills, the NRC staff and the industry worked to enhance the language of these EALs so as to eliminate any confusion without changing the intent of the EAL set as set forth in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff has also determined that this EAL set is consistent with the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and RIS 2006-12, as further enhanced by the lessons learned from implementation and drills, which were incorporated in NEI 99-01, Revision 6.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.5.2 EAL HU4 [HU2]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that this EAL is based upon the effect that a seismic event may have on the facility. Based on its review of the application, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the Alert, SAE, and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA 1, RS1, RG1, CA6, and SA9.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.5.3 EAL HU6 [HU3]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that this EAL is based upon the effect that natural and destructive hazards may have on the facility. Based on its review of the application, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the Alert, SAE, and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA1, RS1, RG1, CA6, and SA9.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.5.4 EAL HU3 [HU4]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that this EAL is based upon the effect that fires may have on the facility.

Based on its review of the application, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the Alert, SAE, and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA 1, RS 1, RG 1, CA6, and SA9.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and therefore, it is acceptable for implementation.

3.5.5 EAL HAS This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The application, as supplemented, stated that this EAL is based upon the effect that toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases may have on the facility. Based on its review of the application, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.5.6 EAL Set HA2/HS2 [HA6/HS6]

This EAL set is based upon control room evacuation with the inability to control critical plant systems remotely. Based on its review of the application, as supplemented, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the progression from Alert to SAE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The GE classification level for this specific accident progression is bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EAL RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.5.7 EAL Set HU7/HA7/HS7/HG7 This EAL set is based upon providing the decision-makers with EALs to consider when, in their judgment, an emergency classification is warranted.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6 Category 'S' - System Malfunction 3.6.1 EAL Set MU1/MA1/MS1/MG1 [SU1/SA1/SS1/SG1]

This EAL set is based upon a loss of available AC power sources to the emergency busses.

The EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when a loss of AC power event occurs, as this condition compromises the performance of all safety systems requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal, and the ultimate heat sink. Based on its review of the application, as supplemented, the NRC staff has determined that the progression from UE to GE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance, as well as renaming the NEI 99-01, Revision 6, EAL SGS to MG1. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation, values, and listing of applicable power sources derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 1 O CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6.2 EAL Set MU4/MA4 [SU2/SA2]

This EAL set is based upon the effect that a loss of available indicators in the control room has on the facility. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submission and determined that the progression from UE to Alert is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. Based on its review, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the SAE and GE classification levels for this specific accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part SO and 1 O CFR S0.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6.3 EAL MU6 [SU4]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when the plant has indications of RCS leakage. Based on its review of the application, as supplemented, the NRC staff determined that, by design, this EAL is redundant with corresponding indicators from a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized regardless of the particular EAL table a licensee may be referring to. The NRC staff also found that EAL escalation is bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RA 1, RS 1, and RG 1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part SO and 10 CFR S0.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6.4 EAL Set MU3/MA3/MS3 [SUS/SAS/SSS]

This EAL set is based upon the effect that a failure of the reactor protection system may have on the plant. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submission and determined that the progression from UE to SAE is appropriate and consistent with EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff also found that the GE classification level for this event is bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EAL RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL set by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering and format of this EAL set is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the instrumentation and set points derived for this EAL set are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6.5 EAL MU? [SU6]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to highlight the importance of emergency communications by ensuring that an EAL is declared if normal communication methods for onsite and offsite personnel, or for offsite response organizations including the NRC, are lost. Based on its review of the application, as supplemented, the NRC staff determined that no escalation path is necessary.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff also found that the communication methods derived for this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, address the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL set is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6.6 EAL MU8 [SU?]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure an EAL is declared when the plant has indications containment barrier degradation. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submission and determined that, by design, this EAL is redundant with corresponding indicators from a loss or potential loss of fission product barriers, as well as radiation monitoring, to ensure reactor and/or fission product barrier events are recognized regardless of the particular EAL table a licensee may be referring to. The NRC staff also found that EAL escalation is bounded by fission product barrier indicators or EALs RA 1, RS 1, and RG1.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance, are consistent with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided, and are consistent with a standard EAL scheme, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme, meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6.7 EAL MS2/MG2 [SS8/SG8]

This EAL is based upon a loss of site DC power sources. The EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when a loss of DC power event occurs, as this condition compromises the ability of the licensee to monitor and control the removal of decay heat.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a site-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format and EAL sequence other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL is consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the site-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.6.8 EAL MAS [SA9]

This EAL is not part of an EAL set within the overall EAL scheme. The EAL's intent is to ensure that an EAL is declared when hazardous events lead to potential damage to safety systems.

Based on its review of the licensee's submission, the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that the SAE and GE classification levels for this accident progression are bounded by indications available in the fission product barrier matrix, as well as in EALs RS1 and RG1.

The licensee chose to modify this EAL by using a plant-specific implementation method that uses a modified numbering format other than that provided in the generic EAL scheme development guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modifications and determined that the numbering, sequencing, and format of this EAL category are consistent with the overall EAL scheme development guidance and with the plant-specific implementation strategies provided.

The NRC staff concludes that the plant-specific implementation method for this EAL is in alignment with the key characteristics of an effective EAL scheme and meets the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.7 Summary The NRC staff has reviewed the technical bases for the proposed EAL scheme, the modifications from NEI 99-01, Revision 6, and the licensee's evaluation of the proposed changes. The licensee chose to modify its proposed EAL scheme from the generic EAL scheme development guidance provided in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, in order to adopt a format that is better aligned with how it currently implements its EALs, as well as with plant-specific writer's guides and preferences. The NRC staff determined that these modifications do not alter the intent of any specific EAL within an EAL set, EAL category, or within the entire EAL scheme as stated in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. NEI 99-01, Revision 6, contains guidance related to SFP instrumentation and the development of EALs that use this instrumentation, as well as guidance for EAL development prior to the installation of SFP instrumentation. FCS appropriately followed the guidance and developed an EAL set that will be acceptable for implementation without SFP instrumentation, and a revised EAL set that will be acceptable for implementation with the NRC-ordered (EA-12-051) SFP instrumentation.

Based on its review, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed EAL scheme uses objective and observable values, is worded in a manner that addresses human factors engineering and user friendliness concerns, follows logical progressions for escalating events, and allows for event downgrading and upgrading based upon the potential risk to the public health and safety. Risk assessments were appropriately used to set the boundaries of the emergency classification levels and ensure that all EALs that trigger an emergency classification are in the same range of relative risk. In addition, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed EAL scheme is technically complete and consistent with EAL schemes implemented at similarly designed plants.

3.8 Conclusion Based on the above, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed changes meet the requirements in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b).

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's proposed EAL scheme is acceptable and provides reasonable assurance that the licensee can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. This conclusion is based, in part, on the licensee's current SFP instrumentation which does not include SFP instrumentation pursuant to NRC Order EA-12-051. The NRC staff has pre-approved the licensee's proposed EALs RG2, RS2, and RA2.3 which will be implemented following the installation of SFP instrumentation as required by NRC Order EA-12-051. Specifically, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's site-specific EAL basis document provided by letter dated November 2, 2015, as revised by supplemental letter dated December 8, 2015, is acceptable for implementation.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Nebraska State official, Ms. J. Schmitt, was notified on November 4, 2015, of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on February 3, 2015 (80 FR 5801 ). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 REFERENCES

1.

Cortopassi, L. P., Omaha Public Power District, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "License Amendment Request 14-06 to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," dated December 26, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14365A123).

2.

Cortopassi, L. P., Omaha Public Power District, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "OPPD Response to Request for Additional Information RE: License Amendment Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6," dated September 11, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15287A284).

3.

Cortopassi, L. P., Omaha Public Power District, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "OPPD Response to NRC Request for Clean Copy of Emergency Action Level Technical Basis Document," dated September 18, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15264A070).

4.

Cortopassi, L. P., Omaha Public Power District, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Supplemental OPPD Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RE: License Amendment Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6 (TAC No. MF5466)," dated November 2, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15308A095).

5.

Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," November 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A805).

6.

Leeds, E. J., and Johnson, M. R., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to AIL Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," EA-12-051, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679).

7.

Lyon, C. F., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Louis P. Cortopassi, Omaha Public Power District, "Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Re: License Amendment Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6 (TAC No. MF5466)," dated July 14, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15194A272).

8.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter 79-50 transmittal of Documents on the Basis of Emergency Action Levels, dated October 10, 1979 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031320278).

9.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040420012).

10.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors," October 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090440294), Revision 3, August 1992 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003740302), and Revision 4, July 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032020276).

11.

Nuclear Management and Resources Council/National Environmental Studies Project (NUMARC/NESP) - 007, Revision 2, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," January 1992 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041120174).

12.

NEI 99-01, Revision 4, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,"

January 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML041470143).

13.

NEI 99-01, Revision 5, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,"

February 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080450149).

14.

Miller, C. G., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Alan Nelson, Nuclear Energy Institute, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and Endorsement of NEl-99-01, Revision 5, February 2008," dated February 22, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080430535).

15.

Thaggard, M., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Ms. Perkins-Grew, Nuclear Energy Institute, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and Endorsement of NEl-99-01, Revision 6, November 2012," dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463).

16.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-18, with Supplements 1 and 2, "Use of NEl-99-01, 'Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,' Revision 4, dated January 2003," dated October 8, 2003 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML032580518, ML041550395, and ML051450482).

17.

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18.

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19.

Cortopassi, L. P., Omaha Public Power District, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Supplemental OPPD Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RE: License Amendment Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6 (TAC No. MF5466)," dated December 8, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15342A409).

Principal Contributor: R. Hoffman, NSIR/DPR/ORLOB Date: December 15, 2015

December 15, 2015 Mr. Louis P. Cortopassi Site Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station 9610 Power Lane, Mail Stop FC-2-4 Blair, NE 68008

SUBJECT:

FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: UPGRADE TO EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME (CAC NO.

MF5466)

Dear Mr. Cortopassi:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 285 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 for the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1.

The amendment consists of changes to the emergency action level (EAL) scheme in response to your application dated December 26, 2014, as supplemented by letters dated September 11, September 18, November 2, and December 8, 2015.

The amendment revises your current EAL scheme to a scheme based on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Revision 6, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," November 2012.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Docket No. 50-285

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 285 to DPR-40

2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPL4-1 Reading RidsAcrs_MailCTR Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource Sincerely,

/RAJ Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RidsNrrDorllpl4-1 Resource RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource RidsNrrOd Resource RidsNrrPMFortCalhoun Resource RidsNsirDpr Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource RHoffman, NSIR/DPR ADAMS A ccess1on N ML15288A005

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DATE 12/9/15 10/15/15 10/7/15 11/13/15 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL4-1 /BC NRR/DORL/D NRR/D NRR/DORL/LPL4-1/PM NAME RPascarelli**

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FL yon DATE 11/18/15 12/10/15 12/14/15 12/15/15 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY