L-MT-12-095, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Fo
| ML12305A381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/2012 |
| From: | Grubb J Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| L-MT-12-095 | |
| Download: ML12305A381 (24) | |
Text
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 W County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 October 29, 2012 L-MT-12-095 10 CFR 50.54(f)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested bv NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012
References:
- 1. NRC letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. M L I2056A046.
- 2. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012," dated May 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12135A396.
- 3. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated June 11,2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12164A435.
This letter provides the EP Communications Assessment for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk L-MT-I2-095 Page 2 (NRC) in Recommendation 9.3 of Reference 1. Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, committed to provide this assessment and a schedule for implementation of the results of the communications assessment by October 31, 2012 (Reference 2). This letter and its enclosure provide the requested information and are submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f).
The MNGP EP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities." As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.
Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the NRC under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 3). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.
The following is a summary of actions under development to enhance EP communications:
Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities
/ 1 1 4.1.ICommunications from I Communications will be maintained post event 1 the Control Room, TSC and through the use of satellite phone technologies EOF with Offsite Response until normal systems are restored.
Facilities 2 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Control Room will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 3 Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 3 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Technical Support will be supported by a satellite communications Center phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.
4 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications between the site and the NRC via the HPN Network will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.
5 4.1.3 Emergency Response Communications between site ERFs will be Facility Communications (Site maintained post event through the enhanced ERFs) reliability of the site PBX system.
6 4.1.3 ERF Communications The Key Site functions with offsite officials with Offsite Response (Management links, Radiological support, etc)
Organizations will be maintained through the use of satellite phone capabilities in the site ERFs.
7 4.1.4 Field Team Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be Communications provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
EP communications enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Until the enhancements to EP communications at MNGP can be completed, interim corrective actions are being taken as described in Reference 3.
If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Ms.
Jennie Eckholt, Licensing Engineer, at 612-330-5788.
Summary of Commitments Submittal of the enclosed information completes a commitment in Enclosure 1 of Reference 2. This letter makes the following new commitment:
NSPM will implement recommendations from the Emergency Preparedness Communications Assessment in coordination with development of FLEX mitigating strategies four months prior to the beginning of the MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on October 29, 2012 Plant Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC NRR Project Manager, MNGP, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, MNGP, USNRC
ENCLOSURE Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 19 Pages, Follow
Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Revision 0: September 28, 2012 Revision 1: October 17, 2012 Revision 2: October 23, 2012 Page 1of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Index Purpose References
Background
Planned Actions Schedule ATTACHMENT 1: Communication Equipment - Location and Current Configuration 7 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources 12 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements 16 Page 2 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Purpose In response to the NRC Near-Term task force recommendations a Request for lnformation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations was issued.
Included in that request was information pertaining to communications capabilities following a beyond design basis event. Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) responded to this request for information in a letter dated May 1I , 2012 with a plan to respond to the various components of the request. This assessment provides the response to the following commitments. By October 31, 2012:
Provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large scale natural event meeting the conditions described for Recommendation 9.3.
Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to implement the results of the communications assessment.
This report documents the communications assessment required to be performed as a result of the March 2012 USNRC Request for lnformation pertaining to insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear event. Attachments Iand 2 provide the details on the current communications capabilities. Attachment 3 and the body of this assessment discuss enhancements and proposed schedules.
References
- 1. NRC Letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated March 12, 2012, ADAMs Accession No. ML12056A046
- 2. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) letter dated May 11, 2012 (L-MT-12-044),
60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012
- 3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities (NEI 12-01)
- 4. MNGP letter dated June II , 2012 (L-MT-12-057), Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012 Backaround Pursuant to the USNRC Request for lnformation (~eference1) Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) committed in Reference 2 to perform an assessment of communications capabilities using the methodology outlined in NEI 12-01 (Reference 3).
Page 3 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant The assessment involved reviewing pertinent documents, such as the Emergency Plan, associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and responses to INPO IER L1-11-4 (Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All Power in Response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Event).
The NRC information request indicates that the communications assessment must assume a total loss of all AC power with severe impact on the infrastructure within a 25 mile radius of the site. The current communications systems were designed and installed to assure reliability of communications, both on-site and off-site, during normal and emergency conditions, The potential on-site issues are related to the required assumption that all AC power is lost. Off-site impact assumptions outlined in NEI 12-01 assumed failure of key infrastructure (e.g. phone lines, radio towers) out to a radius of 25 miles. The assumed off-site issues stem from the assumption that public infrastructure, including public telephone networks, microwave towers, and cellular phone towers/networks are unavailable. Observations and recommendations for technology solutions to various challenges were discussed as the project progressed.
Assessment of Existina Communication Equipment Public Address Svstem The public address (PA) system and the evacuation siren are supplied from off-site power which is backed up by on-site essential batteries and emergency diesel generators.
Telephone Svstem The on-site telephone system for the plant and the technical support center are supplied from non-essential station batteries which are backed up by the non-essential diesel generator. The equipment is not located in safety related buildings.
The telephone system supplies normal off-site communications capability. Off-site communications with the telephone system are dependent on the functionality of the equipment powered off-site and within the 25 mile radius of the plant.
Radio Svstem The site 800 MHz radio equipment is located at the neighboring Sherco Power Plant (a coal plant owned and operated by Xcel Energy Inc., Northern States Power - Minnesota) and is supplied by normal off-site power and backed up by a dedicated liquid propane generator. MNGP also has local repeaters for the radio system which are supplied by the security batteries and security diesel generator.
Sound Powered Phones Sound powered phone jacks are located in the reactor building and the control room and provide alternates to the radios.
Page 4 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Assessment of Existinq Communications Equipment to Meet the Guidance in NEI 12-01.
Attachment 3 provides details of the specific functions supported by the communications enhancements.
Off-site Communications Communications with the off-site response organizations (OROs) depend on the on-site telephone system and the PBX system. Some of these telephones are direct lines and do not pass through the PBX; however, they do pass through the local phone company central office. Per the assessment assumptions, all such lines are assumed to be non-functional. Similarly, based on the assumptions of NEI 12-01, cell phones are assumed to be non-functional due to the impact on cell towers in the impacted 25-mile area. Ten-mile EPZ Off-site Response Organizations are required to receive timely (within15-minute) notifications of Classifications and/or Protective Action Recommendations.
For MNGP, the EOF for the assumed event is expected to be the approved back-up EOF located in downtown Minneapolis, outside the 25-mile impact zone. Dose Assessment and communication of key radiological data and any required Protective Action Recommendations will be performed from the fully functional back-up EOF.
Field Teams are dispatched from the site and use the 800 MHz radio system to communicate with the EOF with cell phone back-up. The radios in the vehicles are powered by the vehicle's electrical system. With the postulated loss of AC power to the on-site repeater, these radios will be limited to line of sight effectiveness. Satellite phones will be provided as a tertiary means of communication.
Planned actions:
The MNGP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of off-site power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05. As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.
Following a station blackout and loss of all power in the surrounding 25 miles, the plant telephone system will only be available for approximately 90 minutes, based on battery capacity. Procedural guidance will be developed to supply critical plant telephone system components from portable diesel generators. Existing satellite capabilities may be enhanced. An improvement being evaluated to the plant telephone system could allow the site telephone system to call off-site during a station blackout by integrating a satellite phone into the telephone system.
Page 5 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Off-site Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2b12 (Reference 4). Internal communications within the plant (i.e.,
Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) is planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key off-site response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.
A summary of actions under development include:
Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 1 4.1.1 Communicationsfrom the Communications will be maintained post event through the use of Control Room, TSC and EOF with satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.
Off-site Response Facilities 2 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a Control Room satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.
3 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Communications with the NRCvia the ENS line will be supported by a Technical Support Center satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.
4 4.1.2 NRC Communicationsvia the Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by HPN Network satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.
5 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event Communications (Site ERFs) through the enhanced reliability of the site PBX system.
6 4.1.3 ERF Communications with The Key Site functions with off-site officials (Management links, Off-site Response Organizations Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phones capabilities in the site ERFs.
7 4.1.4 Field Team Communications Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
Schedule The actions addressed above will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Page 6 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document Distributed, the Yes Yes Yes The plant evacuation siren is Plant Public Address handsets, amplifiers located on top of the reactor System (PA) and speakers are The essential part of The essential part of The essential part of building and is therefore located in various the system resides in the system is housed in the system is inside of protected from flooding but has areas of the plant seismic structures flood protected reinforced solid not been analyzed for seismic or buildings concrete structures wind.
Plant Private Branch Plant No Yes No None Exchange (PBX) Communications Telephone System Room in the Plant The communications The Plant The communications Administration room has not been Administration Building room is located in an Building seismically analyzed is within the flood interior room of the protection zone building but has not been analyzed for wind Distributed No No No The connection to the local Local Commercial commercial telephone is in an Telephone System unprotected building and the rest of the commercial network is outside of the plant's control No No No None TSC - OSC Emergency Work Status Plant PAB The Plant The PAB Communications Communications Administration Communications Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The Plant Communications PEB Engineering Building Engineering Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood Building has not Engineering Room has not protection zone been analyzed for Building been seismically wind analyzed Page 7 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document No No No None CR - TSC OGL (Ops Group Leader) Plant PAB The Plant The PAB Communications Communications Administration Communications Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The Plant Communications PEB Engineering Building Engineering Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood Building has not Engineering Room has not protection zone been analyzed for Building been seismically wind analyzed No No No None TSC EGL (Engineering Group Leader) - EOF Plant PAB The Plant The PAB TSS (Technical Support Communications Communications Administration Communications Supervisor) Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The PEB has not Communications PEB Engineering Building been analyzed for Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood wind Engineering Room has not protection zone The MTC has not Building been seismically The Training Center been analyzed for Communications analyzed is outside the flood wind Room in the MTC protection zone Monticello Training Communications Center Room has not been seismically analyzed Page 8 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document No No No None TSC ED - EOF ED -
SM - JIC Plant PAB The Plant The PAB Communications Communications Administration Communications Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The PEB has not Communications PEB Engineering Building been analyzed for Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood wind Engineering Room has not protection zone The MTC has not Building been seismically The Training Center been analyzed for Communications analyzed is outside the flood wind Room in the MTC protection zone Monticello Training Communications Center Room has not been seismically analyzed Voice Over Internet NA NA NA NA None Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)
On-site Portable NA Telephones (Spectralink)
(Not currently in EP Plan)
N/A if not applicable Page 9 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document NRC Communications Phones are in the No No No Much of the communication (ENS & HPN) Phone Technical Support circuits are not housed in LineICircuit Center in the protected structures and the Plant Engineering commercial portion of the system Buildihg is unprotected and outside of the The phone lines site's control are routed through the Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building The lines are routed through the Microwave House where they connect to the commercial telephone system Distributed No No No The off-site cellular system is Off-site Cellular unprotected and is outside of the Telephones site's control Distributed No No No None Satellite Telephones Sherburne County No No No The trunking controls for the 450/800/900 MHz Radio Generating Station system are housed in the System Security Building Neither of these The buildings are Neither of these security building at the (Trunking) and buildings have been outside the flood buildings have been neighboring coal generating plant Monticello seismically analyzed protection zone analyzed for wind and the repeaters at the site are Security Building housed in the security building (Repeaters)
Page 10 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this as defined in this Location document document document Distributedwithin the Yes Yes Yes None Sound Powered Reactor Building, Telephone System Turbine Building, and This system resides This system is located This system resides in Control RoomICable in seismic structures in structures within the re-enforced solid Spreading Room flood protection zone concrete structures 800 MHz Radio System No No No See the 800 MHz Radio System and Field Monitoring Team and Off-site Cellular Off-site Cellular Telephones Above Communications Telephones Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Emergency Diesel Day Yes Yes Yes None used for fueling portable Tank Rooms in the equipment used for Emergency Diesel This system resides in a This system is located in This system resides in a communications Generator Building seismic structure structures within the flood re-enforced solid protection zone concrete structure Technical Support Center Plant Engineering No No No The TSC is in an interior location of (TSC) Building the Plant Engineering Building but The Plant Engineering The Plant Engineering The Plant Engineering has not been analyzed for any of Building has not been Building is outside the Building has not been these criteria seismically analyzed flood protection zone analyzed for wind Emergency Operations Monticello Training No No No The EOF is in an interior location of Facility (EOF) If within 25 Center the Training Center but has not been miles of the station The Training Center has The Training Center is The Training Center has analyzed for any of these criteria not been seismically outside the flood not been analyzed for analyzed protection zone wind Page 11of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources -
Equipment Power Source(s)
Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the power availability (e.g.,
power source) source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?
YeslNo Plant Public Most of the local The PA system can Y-10 is also backed up No Address System speakers and alternatively be by the # I 3 Essential (PA) amplifiers are supplied by Y-10. Battery normally supplied L-34 and Y-10 are from L-34 (Plant backed up by Off-site Power) Emergency Diesel Generators.
Primary (Plant Y-90 Non-Essential Y-90 can also be Y-90 is backed up by A communications portable diesel has been purchased Admin Building) UninterruptableAC supplied from # I 3 # I 7 Non-essential and will be available as an alternate supply to the PBX Private Branch Power Panel is Non-Essential Diesel Batteries Exchange (PBX) normally supplied Generator Telephone System from LC-108 (Plant Off-site Power)
TSC (Plant Y-94 Non-Essential 12.5 KV Commercial Y-94 is also supplied No Engineering UninterruptableAC (Non-Plant) Off-site by # I 7 Non-essential Building) Power Panel (Plant Power Batteries Plant Private Off-site Power) 0r Branch Exchange # I 3 Non-Essential (PBX) Telephone Diesel Generator System EOF (Monticello Off-site Power (this 13.8 KV Plant Power None No Training Center) power source is via sub-yard breaker Plant Private different from the 1N3 Branch Exchange normal off-site (PBX) Telephone source for the plant System and is fed from the local community distribution grid)
Page 12 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources -
Equipment Power Source(s)
Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the power availability (e.g.,
power source) source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?
YeslNo Local Commercial Unknown Unknown Unknown The local commercial telephone system is not owned or Telephone System operated by the site and is therefore outside of the site's control Voice Over NIA NIA NIA Internet Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)
On-site Portable NIA NIA NIA Telephones (Spectralink)
(Not currently in EP Plan)
NIA if not applicable NRC Unknown Unknown Unknown The NRC phone lines and circuits rely on commercial Communications equipment which is not owned or operated by the site and (ENS & HPN) is therefore outside of the site's control Phone LineICircuit Off-site Cellular Unknown Unknown Unknown Off-site cellular telephones rely on commercial equipment Telephones which is not owned or operated by the site-andis therefore outside of the site's control Satellite Local Battery None Spare batteries are No Telephones (attached to the unit) located in each facility which has these devices 45018001900 MHz Trunking relies on Local Repeater is The Trunking system is No Radio System off-site power backed by security backed by a dedicated (local community UPS which is supplied liquid propane distribution grid) by the security diesel generator Local backup generator (backup repeater relies on repeater only provides plant power a single channel if off-site power is lost)
Page 13 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources -
Equipment Power Source(s)
Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the power availability (e.g.,
power source) source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?
YeslNo Sound Powered NIA (This system NIA NIA No Telephone System does not require any external power)
Field Monitoring See 800 MHz Radio See 800 MHz Radio See 800 MHz Radio No Team and Off-site Cellular and Off-site Cellular and Off-site Cellular Communications Telephone System Telephone System Telephone System Y-94 Non-Essential 12.5 KV Commercial Y-94 is also supplied No Technical support UninterruptableAC (Non-Plant) Off-site by # 7INon-essential Center (TSC) Power Panel (Plant Power Batteries Off-site Power) or
- 3INon-Essential Diesel Generator Emergency 1N3 or Off-site None None No Operations Facility Power (EOF) If within 25 miles of the station Page 14 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -
Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, w s [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.a]
Control Room e Shift Emergency Direct Phone 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Satellite Integrate Note 1 Communicator Line 1 Fax Line Telephone Satellite Phones (SEC) into Protected Plant PBX System Technical Support
- Emergency Direct Phone 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Satellite Integrate Note 1 Center (TSC) Communicators Line I Fax Line Telephone Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Emergency Operations Emergency Direct Phone 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Satellite Integrate Note 1 Facility (EOF) Communicators Line/ Fax Line Telephone Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System for Primary EOF Back-up EOF 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Requlatow Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.d]
Control Room
- Emergency Federal Satellite Satellite Satellite Integrate Note 1 Notification System Telephone Telephone Telephone Telephone Satellite Phones (ENS) System into Protected
- Emergency Plant PBX Response Data System System (ERDS)
Page 15 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -
Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Technical Support Emergency Federal Satellite Satellite Satellite lntegrate Note 1 Center (TSC) Notification System Telephone Telephone Telephone Telephone Satellite Phones (ENS) System into Protected a Health Physics Plant PBX Network (HPN) System 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emerqencv response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility. For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems.
Control Room 1 per unit Direct Phone No Portable Cell No Integrate Note 1 Line Plant Page Satellite Phones Monticello ERFs system into Protected will be Plant Radio Plant PBX supported by System System the enhanced Sound Powered PBX system.
CR to TSC ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
Page 16 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -
Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Technical Support I each for: Direct Phone Limited Satellite Satellite Integrate Note 1 Center (TSC) SeniorILead TSC Line Satellite Telephone Telephone multiple Satellite Manager Telephone Cell Phone Plant Page Phones into Operations Plant Page Plant Page system Protected Plant Coordination system system PBX System Maintenance 800 MHz Coordination Radio
- Engineering System
- Coordination Radiological Support Operational Support 1 each for: Direct Phone No Plant Page No Integrate Note 1 Center (OSC) SeniorILead OSC Line system Satellite Phones Monticello Manager Plant Radio into Protected ERFs will be Radiological System Plant PBX supported by Support System the enhanced PBX system.
Additional response ERO coordination links for responders multi-unit sites: requiring 1 for each position communication providing Unit In- with off-site Plant Team responders will Coordination. be provided an integrated capability.
Page 17 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -
Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method@) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Emergency Operations 1 each for: Direct Phone No Portable Cell No Integrate Note 1 Facility (EOF) SeniorILead Line Plant Page multiple Satellite Monticello ERFs Manager system Phones into will be Key Protective Plant Radio Protected Plant supported by Measures System PBX System the enhanced Operations or PBX system.
Technical Support (as ERO needed to support responders performance of dose requiring projections, communication formulation of PARS with off-site and plant status responders will updates to OR0 be provided an authorities). integrated capability.
Back-up Emergency There are no Normal Means Yes Any normally Yes Install additional NIA Operations Facility enhanced functional are Available available means Satellite requirements for the capability in Back-up Facility Back-up EOF (Greater than 25 miles from the site)
Joint Information The Joint NIA Portable Cell or NIA Integrate Note 1 Center (JIC) . 1 for Senior Manager Information other direct dial Satellite Phones Center is lines into Protected located outside Plant PBX the 25 miles System (this zone and is commitment protected by provides a line back-up power. from on-site Direct Phone ERFs to support Line information ,flow to the JIC Page 18 of 19 Revision 2
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 4.1.4 Communications with fieldloff-site monitorinq teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]
a Technical Support e TSC Field Team 800 MHz Radio Cell Phone No backup for No backup for Portable Center (TSC) Communicator cell phone cell phone satellite phones Emergency e TSC Field Team Operations Facility Communicator (EOF)
Field Team 1 Field Team I 800 MHz Radio Cell Phone No backup for No backup for Portable Field Team 2 Field Team 2 cell phone cell phone satellite phones 4.1.5 Communications with other Federal aqencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]
Emergency Operations EOF Off-site There are no There are no There are no There are no Proposed Note 1 Facility (EOF) Communicator commitments in commitments in commitments in commitments in satellite phone the Monticello the Monticello the Monticello the Monticello system would Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Emergency Plan provide for direct for direct for direct for direct communication contact with contact with contact with contact with as required.
other agencies. other agencies. other agencies. other agencies.
NOTE 1: Proposed satellite system provides satellite telephone access while PBX is on backup power. If the PBX has loss of power a direct satellite telephone line is routed to specific areas. The satellite telephone docking station will have backup power to maintain this secondary function. If the direct line between the satellite telephone dock and the specific areas is lost, the satellite telephone can be removed from the docking station and used outside on built-in battery source.
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