JAFP-92-0436, Forwards Plant Evaluation of Results of NRC Observed Licensed Operator Requalificaton Exams Conducted During Wks of 920510 & 17.Concludes That Program Meets All Criteria Specified in NUREG-1021,ES-601 for Satisfactory Program

Forwards Plant Evaluation of Results of NRC Observed Licensed Operator Requalificaton Exams Conducted During Wks of 920510 & 17.Concludes That Program Meets All Criteria Specified in NUREG-1021,ES-601 for Satisfactory Program

ML20101F773
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	06/03/1992
From:	Harry Salmon POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20101F741	List: JAFP-92-0436, Forwards Plant Evaluation of Results of NRC Observed Licensed Operator Requalificaton Exams Conducted During Wks of 920510 & 17.Concludes That Program Meets All Criteria Specified in NUREG-1021,ES-601 for Satisfactory Program
References
RTR-NUREG-1021 JAFP-92-0436, JAFP-92-436, NUDOCS 9206250112
Download: ML20101F773 (8)

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. Harry P. Salmon, Jr.

Resident Manager June-3 1992

-JAFP-92-0436 L Mr. Thomas T.--Martin- -

. Regional Administrator-- Region I

' United States: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of. Prussia, PA :19406

Dear Mr. Martin:

r Attached is the James A.--FitzPatrick Plant's evaluation of the results of-the NRC observeC. licensed operator requalification ,

examinations conducted.during the weeks of May 10 and May 17, .

-1992'. We have concluded :: hat the program meets all of the criteria specified in NUREG 1201, ES-601, for a satisfactory .

program. Areds needing improvement-have been noted and will be

-addressed as; indicated-in the report.

.If-you:have questions regarding this report, please contact Fred Catolla, Operations Training Supervisor, at (315) 349-6475.

I would :like to take' this opportunity to commend Paul Bonnett and l -the NRC examination team for the professional manner in which the recently: concluded evaluations were conducted.

Very truly yours,-

L,r. . m

-HARRY . SALMON, JR

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1 NEW YORK FOWER AUTilORITY JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICSNFSD OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION MAY MAY 21, 1992 l

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1. -EXAMINEES Thirteen operators (10 SRO/3 RO) t ook all portions of the examination. Four l additional reactor operators participated in the simulator portion of the examination. ' llal f of the JAF licensed pnrsonnel took part in the examination. The results of this examination provide a sound representat ion of the competency of the JAF licensed staff.

2. E_XAMINATION_RESULTS RO SRO 1DTAL PASS / FAIL _ PASS /FAI.L_ _.P. ASS / FA_I L_

_WRI'ITEN 3/0 10f_0 13/0 SIMULATOR 7*/0 10f0 17*/0 JPN 3/0 10/0 _ 13/ 0__._

OVERALL 3/_0 10/0 _13 / 0__.__ _.

Includes 4 Ros who participated in the simulntor exnms only

3. PROGRAM EVALUATION RESU_L_TS Overall rating: SATISFA_CTOM An evaluation of the requalliication progrnm was performed based on the facility's examination results. The criterin for program ovaluation as specified in ES-601 were used. The sample s i r.o (13) exceeded the minimom requirement of ES-601,

n. Feci11ty pass / f ail decisions agreed with NRC dncisions in all cases.

This satisfies ES-601 criterion C.2.b(1)(a).

b. All operators passed all portions of the e wmination. This satisfies ES-601 criterion C 2.b(1)(b).

c. AlI crews - passed the simulator portinn_ nr the - examinntion. This satisfies ES-601 criterion C.2.b(1)(c).

d. The program satisfied cll of the secondary critoria listed in ES-601, section C.2.b(2),

e. The short term and long term corrective actions committed to following the 1991 unsatisfactory program evaluation have been completed.

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'4. SIWIAlt)R EVALUATLON i

All crews and individuals successfully completed this portton of the examination. All ISCTs were complet ed and t ho' crew competencies were  !

adequately demonstrated. i The following strengths and weaknesses were noted during the simulator portion of- the operating examination hased upon the crew competency checklists (ES-604-2).

a. -STRENGTHS:

(1) Consistent use of and adherence to procedures was noted.

(2) Administrative tasks such as Emergency Plan cl as s i f i ca t. f ons and Technical Specification determinations ware effectively carried out. In r<ome instances, the emergency plan classification was made at one level higher than expect ed, but the SR0s provided a sound basis for their determination.

(3) Operators demonstrated good familiarity with system controls and instrumentation and proficiency in system operation.

(4). Recognition of and attendance to alarms and off-normal trends was timely and appropriate.

b. FEAKNESSES:

(1) No generic weaknesses were not ed in this portion of the examination. ES-604-2 was completed for each crew for each scenario. No competency areas received more than one rating of "1", None were in common nor were they repented from one scenario to the.next for any given crew.

-(2) Although communications were adequate and much improved from last year, the crews did not meet management's expectations in this area at-all times. This area will-continue to receive increased attent' .n during routine simulator t raining and evaluation.

(3) One SRO, although he passed, demonstiated the need for more training -in AWS situations involving the power / level control mitigation strategy. He will receive individual coaching in this area and be reevaluated by the facility prior to returning to licensed duties.

c. SIMUIATOR PERFORMANCE:

During the conduct of a scenario involving .an AWS w i th a stuck open relief valve,'the power / level control strategy was implemented by the crew. Reactor power and water level did not respond as expected.

Although the crew operated within the bounds of the EOPs, level dropped at a rate which was beyond the control of the panel operator.

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The scenario sequence was_ recreated by the exam team and was found to be highly dependent upon the timing of SLC initintion and initial power level. The exam team could not control level in this sequence either.

Based on this, the scenario was invalidnted. Another scenario was developed by the team and was substituted for the AWS scenario. -l

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The AWS scenario was used subsequently with ShC initiated earlier and l

at a lower power level and the simulator responded in a satisfactory manner.

The problem has been documented arn! entered into the simulator 1 deficiency tracking system (DR// 6421) and will be resolved by 12/31/92. l d, PROCEDURE ENHANCEME_NT:

It was noted that the abnormal operat ing proce dura for a stuch open l relief valve (AOP-36) should provide more concise direction on i initiating a manual scram If the valve cannot be expeditiously closed.

This procedure will be revised accordingly by 7/15/92

5. JOB PERFORMANCE MEASIDSS EVALUATION The following strengths and weaknesses were not ed thiring the JPM portion of the operating examination,

a. STRENGTHS: ,

(1) Familiarity with the location and operation of all system controls and instrumentation.

(2) Consistent use of and adherence to procedures,

b. WE AF'"'SES : -

(1) so generic weaknesses were noted in the performance portion of the JPM examination. ,,

(2) Four questions were answered incorrectly by three to four operators. ,The questions denit- with the effecta of remot.e shutdown panel operation on EDG trips - RWR pump seal failure indications .and SBGT system design. WhI1e not necessarily indicative of a generic weakness, these it ems will be reviewed in conjur.ction with the next scheduled training sessions on the related systems or procedures or as stand alone topics.

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6. RI'! TEN EXAMINATION RESULTS The folicving strengths and weaknesses were noted dur inn the written portion of the examination.

a. STREN_GT}{S:

In general, operators performed very well on nll portions of the written enmination as evidenced by the scores. The best performance was in the " Limits and Controls" portion of t he examination.

b. VEAD{ ESSES:

Six questions were answered incorrectly by three to four operators.

These questions will be discussed vith 3perators during the review of the examinations, Based upon e re. of the questions and the answers gi"en by the operators, the fel m,<ing conclusions were reached:

(1) Based on the information available to the operator, a second answer may be considered to be plausible for one question. This question will be deleted or revised prior to future use. Since pass / fail de cisions will not be af fected, nn question delotion or regrading will be done for this examination.

(2) Several SR0s classified emergency events in two questions at one level higher than was indicated by the answer key. Based on the information availt.ble , these classifications can be justified, nce the classifications made by the operators are considered to be conservative in these instances, a generic weakness is not indicated. The questions will 'e deleted or revised such that they clicit only one answer.

(3) Two questions dealt with determining applienble technical specification LCOs for control rod operability and MSIV operability. While some knowledge deficiency was demonstrated, a

-inore conservative determination was made by the operators than was called fer in the answer key.

(4) In the sixth question, dealing w i t h' t'h'o status of the nitrogen supply to . the containment, three operators selected an answer which was partially correct. The correct answer takes into account the fait position of an SOV on a lots of power that the operators overlooked.

While some ambiguity is suggested for several questtons above, it is not indicative of a lack of quality control of the examination materials.

ES-601 criterion C.2.b. (2)(c) is met. since fewer thnn five percent of the questions may require revision.

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.. AlTAODil2ild SB1ULATION FAGLITLIEl'ORl Facility Licensee: James A, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Facility Docket No: 504333 Requalineation Examinations Administered on: May 11 20,1992

.This form is used to report observations. These observatious do not constitute audit or inspection 6ndings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55A5(b). These observations do not affect NRC certi6 cation or

- approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations.

During an ATWS scenario with a stuck open Safety Relief Valve (SRV), a simulator model malfunction occurred that resulted in invalidating the scenario as an evaluation tool. An investigation into the cause of the malfunction revealed that the operator's action taken had

._ allowed the simulator to reach a condition that prevented reasonable operator response from mitigating the consequences of the event.

The plant conditions for the scenario were as follows: 1) a failure to scram; 2) high initial reactor power (> 90%); nd 3) Boron injection started just prior to decreasing Reactor Level for Poiver/ Level control. As reactor level approached and went below Top of Active Fuel (TAF) with reactor power still above 2.5%, the thermo-hydraulic calculation and the core iieutronics became unstable and resulted in pressure and power oscillatious.

The scenario was used to examine all four crews as a common scenario. The malfunction occurred while evaluating the staff crew. Post review ofihe actions taken by the crew revealed that they were acting within the guidelines of their procedures. However, delays in performing certain actions that the operating crews were observed to promptly perform aided

-in establishing the simulator's malfunction condition. These actions included not fully reducing the recirculation pumps to 50% speed, not injecting Boron at a lower torus

temperature (95-100*F) when the operators realized thht the SRV could not be closed. Boron

.-was injected at 108"F which was within the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) guidelines, but two degrees away from the temperature requiring that reactor level be reduced

. for Power / Level control. The condition resulted in the condition that prevented reasonable operator actions to be taken which would have mitigated the consequences of the event.

Reactor level decreased quickly, which required the operator to add large amounts of water to maintain level. This action would have been contrary to the mitigation strategy of the EOPs.

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1 Attachment 4 (cn!!Cdl The initial investigation indicated that the simulator's conditional response was based on the -)

power level at which the power / level control was initiated and the duration of 11oron

-injection. The simulator's performance based on the actual sequence of operator actions was repeatable and recorded by the licensee fiir further review. However, the problem will require extensive evaluation te accurately determine where the instability begins and what correction will be required to reso!ve the problem. The facility has initiated a discrepancy report (DR-6421).

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