Potential Problems with Fire Barrier Penetration SealsML031050108 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
09/19/1997 |
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From: |
Roe J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-97-070, NUDOCS 9709160254 |
Download: ML031050108 (8) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 September 19, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-70: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH FIRE BARRIER
PENETRATION SEALS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have
permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed
from the reactor vessel.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
addressees to problems in installed fire barrier penetration seals that have gone undetected
as a result of inadequate surveillance inspection procedures and inadequate acceptance
criteria. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their
facilities and consider actions as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
Description of Circumstances
The staff in NRC Region I inspected fire protection at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant
(Maine Yankee) from June 26 through 30, 1995. No safety concerns or violations were
identified at that time regarding the installed penetration seals. However, an unresolved item
was opened regarding the acceptability of penetration seal qualification and testing, and
qualifications of installers.
Subsequently, the licensee conducted a scoping study in preparation for a walkdown of fire
barrier penetration seals. The licensee reported that some penetration seals in fire barrier
walls had no damming material. On the basis of these findings, the licensee examined is
criteria for penetration seals and conducted a technical review of its penetration seal design
parameters. The licensee also found discrepancies between available test reports, procedural
guidance, and the in-plant penetration seal configurations. In response to the discrepancies, the licensee established compensatory fire watches and developed a corrective action
program. The planned corrective actions were (1) determining why the discrepancies had
not been found during previous reviews, (2) evaluating the adequacy of procedures, test
reports, acceptance criteria, and field inspections, (3) evaluating the adequacy of existing seal
configurations, and (4) inspecting all fire barrier penetration seals. In Licensee Event Report
(LER) 96-017-1, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Discrepancy," dated August 28, 1996 (Accession Number 9609030377), the licensee reported that it had found three additional
types of deficiencies: (1) inadequate thickness of silicone foam, (2) temporary seals that were
not upgraded to permanent seals for an indeterminate period, and (3) one seal in which the
expected pipe movement exceeded the design rating of the seal.
9709
IN 97-70
K> k September 19, 1997 During the week of May 12, 1997, NRR staff reviewed and observed the problems found at
Maine Yankee and the corrective actions taken by the licensee. During a telephone
conference on May 14, 1997, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff and Region I
staff obtained detailed information from the licensee regarding the seal problems found and
the corrective actions taken.
Discussion
The penetration seals at Maine Yankee were installed around 1978. Most of the original
seals used silicone foam. Since the original installation, the licensee has inspected all the
seals visually at each refueling outage. During the inspections and walkdowns that were
documented in LER 96-017-01, the licensee found that more than a thousand seals required
further evaluation, including destructive examination; about a thousand other seals had
defects; and a small number of seals had no defects. The licensee found seals with
inadequate thickness (the predominant problem), foreign materials in seals, no damming
material, and the wrong seal material installed. Although the licensee's design criteria
specified a minimum seal thickness of 7 inches, the average seal thickness was 5 to
6 inches, and some seals were only 2 to 3 inches thick. Although the licensee was once
planning to repair and replace the seals with silicone foam and silicone elastomer, the
licensee has since certified permanent cessation of power operation and is now proceeding to
decommission the facility.
The licensee told the staff that the installations were deficient because the quality assurance
and quality control procedures that were used by the installation vendor during original seal
installation were inadequate. The licensee also told the staff that it believes that the
deficiencies were not discovered for an extended period because its inspection and
surveillance procedures did not cover all important penetration seal attributes (e.g., the
presence of damming material was not a critical attribute) and because its inspectors had not
been properiy trained. The licensee has since completed a major effort, rewriting of its
procedures.
NRC requirements and guidelines for fire barrier penetration seals are in various documents:
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operation
Prior to January 1, 1979;' Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, "Guidelines
for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976;' and NUREG-
0800, "Standard Review Plan." The extent to which these requirements or guidelines are
applicable to a specific nuclear power plant depends on plant age, commitments established
by the licensee in developing the fire protection plan, the staff safety evaluation reports and
supplements, and the license conditions pertaining to fire protection. These requirements and
guidelines ensure that fire barrier penetration seals will remain in place and retain their
integrity when exposed to a fire. By so doing, there is reasonable assurance that the effects
of a fire will be limited to discrete fire areas and that one division of systems related to safe
shutdown will remain free of fire damage.
IN 97-70
September 19, 1997 The staff is revising Inspection Procedure 64704, "Fire Protection Program," March 18, 1994, contained in the NRC Inspection Manual, to include specific guidance for inspecting fire
barrier penetration seals. It should be noted that nonconforming conditions may go
undetected if the surface of the seal is covered by thermal insulation or damming material. In
addition, the staff has included guidance for inspecting fire barrier penetration seal programs
in its procedures for the new fire protection functional inspection program.
In July 1996, the NRC published NUREG-1552, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear
Power Plants," to document the findings of a comprehensive technical assessment of fire
barrier penetration seals. The assessment addressed reports of potential problems, and
determined the adequacy of NRC requirements, review guidance and inspection procedures.
The staff concluded that the general condition of penetration seal programs in the industry is
satisfactory and that there were no problems of safety significance. Previous acting along
with continued upkeep of existing penetration seal programs and continued inspections, are
adequate to maintain public health and safety. However, the staff is continuing to study this
issue to determine if further regulatory action is required. The staff also recommended
revisions to the NRC fire protection regulation and review guidance. The content of this
report was discussed with the NRC Commission before it was issued.
This information notice establishes no new NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required by this notice. However, recipients are reminded that they are
required by 10 CFR 50.65 to take industry-wide operating experience (including information
presented in NRC information notices) into consideration, where practical, when setting goals
and performing periodic evaluations. If you have any questions about the information in this
notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.
Alck W. Roe, Acting Director
(Dg ision of Reactor Program Management
'Offce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Christopher Bajwa, NRR
301-415-1237 E-mail: csbl@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
AnRS d
K) K Attachment
IN 97-70
September 19, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
97-69 Reactor Trip Breakers 09/19/97 All holders of OLs for
and Surveillance Testing pressurized water reactors
of Auxiliary Contacts except those who have per- manently ceased operat..ns
and have certified that
fuel has been permanently
removed from the reactor
vessel
97-68 Loss of Control of 09/03/97 Holders of a facility
Diver in a Spent or construction permit
Fuel Storage Pool issued for a power
reactor pursuant to
10 CFR Part 50
97-67 Failure to Satisfy 08/21/97 All holders of OLs for
Requirements for nuclear power reactors
Significant Manipula- except those who have
tions of the Controls permanently ceased
for Power Reactor operations and have
Operator Licensing certified that fuel has
been permanently removed
from the reactor vessel
97-66 Failure to Provide 08/20/97 All holders of operating licenses
Special Lenses for or construction permits for
Operators Using nuclear power and non-power
Respirator or Self- reactors and all licensed reactor
Contained Breathing operators and senior operators
Apparatus During
Emergency Operations
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 97-70
September 19, 1997 The staff is revising Inspection Procedure 64704, "Fire Protection Program," March 18, 1994, contained in the NRC Inspection Manual, to include specific guidance for inspecting fire
barrier penetration seals. It should be noted that nonconforming conditions may go
undetected if the surface of the seal is covered by thermal insulation or damming material. In
addition, the staff has included guidance for inspecting fire barrier penetration seal programs
in its procedures for the new fire protection functional inspection program.
In July 1996, the NRC published NUREG-1552, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear
Power Plants," to document the findings of a comprehensive technical assessment of fire
barrier penetration seals. The assessment addressed reports of potential problems, and
determined the adequacy of NRC requirements, review guidance and inspection procedures.
The staff concluded that the general condition of penetration seal programs in the industry is
satisfactory and that there were no problems of safety significance. Previous actions, along
with continued upkeep of existing penetration seal programs and continued inspections, are
adequate to maintain public health and safety. However, the staff is continuing to study this
issue to determine if further regulatory action is required. The staff also recommended
revisions to the NRC fire protection regulation and review guidance. The content of this
report was discussed with the NRC Commission before it was issued.
This information notice establishes no new NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required by this notice. However, recipients are reminded that they are
required by 10 CFR 50.65 to take industry-wide operating experience (including information
presented in NRC information notices) into consideration, where practical, when setting goals
and performing periodic evaluations. If you have any questions about the information in this
notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.
original signed by
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Christopher Balwa, NRR
301-415-1237 E-mail: csbl @nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 08/22/97
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
DOCUMENT NAME: 97-70.1N ___
Office Tech Contacts C:SPLB (A)C:PECB (A)D:DRPM
V97 Name JCarter/CBajwa* LMarsh* RDennig* JRr
Date 08/26/97 08/26/97 09/02/97 094/i/97
K) <7-xx
September xx, 1997 The staff is revising Inspection Procedure 64704, "Fire Protection Program," March 18, 1994, contained in the NRC Inspection Manual, to include specific guidance for inspecting fire barrier
penetration seals. It should be noted that nonconforming conditions may go undetected if the
surface of the seal is covered by thermal insulation or damming material. In addition, the staff
has included guidance for inspecting fire barrier penetration seal programs in its procedures for
the new fire protection functional inspection program.
In July 1996, the NRC published NUREG-1552, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear
Power Plants," to document the findings of a comprehensive technical assessment of fire barrier
penetration seals. The assessment addressed reports of potential problems, and determined
the adequacy of NRC requirements, review guidance and inspection procedures. The staff
concluded that the general condition of penetration seal programs in the Industry is satisfactory
and that there were no problems of safety significance. Previous actions, along with continued
upkeep of existing penetration seal programs and continued inspections, are adequate to
maintain public health and safety. However, the staff is continuing to study this issue to
determine if further regulatory action is required. The staff also recommended revisions to the
NRC fire protection regulation and review guidance. The content of this report was discussed
with the NRC Commission before It was issued.
This information notice establishes no new NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required by this notice. However, recipients are reminded that they are
required by 10 CFR 50.65 to take industry-wide operating experience (including Information
presented in NRC information notices) into consideration, where practical, when setting goals
and performing periodic evaluations. If you have any questions about the information in this
notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.
Jack W. Roe, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact Christopher Balwa, NRR
301- 415-1237 E-mail: csbl@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
DOCUMENT NAME: G:ITJC\PEN SEAL.IN3 I
Office Tech Contacts A\
lI
Name JCarter/CBajwa* JRoe
Date 08/26/97 09/02/97 09/ /97
4td4-) 142/?7
- AVgust xx, 1997 The staff is revising Inspection Procedure 64704, "Fire Protection Program," March 18, 1994, contained in the NRC Inspection Manual, to include specific guidance for inspecting fire barrier
penetration seals. It should be noted that nonconforming conditions may go undetected if the
surface of the seal is covered by thermal insulation or damming material. In addition, the staff
has included guidance for inspecting fire barrier penetration seal programs in its procedures for
the new fire protection functional inspection program.
InJuly 1996, the NRC published NUREG-1552, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear
Power Plants," to document the findings of a comprehensive technical assessment of fire
barrier penetration seals. The assessment addressed reports of potential problems, and
determined the adequacy of NRC requirements, review guidance and inspection procedures.
The staff concluded that the general condition of penetration seal programs In the Industry is
satisfactory and that there were no problems of safety significance. Previous actions, along
with continued upkeep of existing penetration seal programs and continued inspections, are
adequate to maintain public health and safety. However, the staff is continuing to study this
issue to determine if further regulatory action is required. The staff also recommended
revisions to the NRC fire protection regulation and review guidance. The content of this report
was discussed with the Commission before it was issued.
If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Jack W. Roe, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Christopher Bajwa, NRR
301- 415-1237 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TJC\PENSEAL.IN4 Office Tech Contacts C:SPLB (A)C:PECB (A)D:DRPM
Name JCarter/CBajwa LMarsh* RDenn.I' JRoe
Date 08/26/97 08/26/97 0) W97 08/ /97
_ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
7-'
August xx, 1997 The staff is revising Inspection Procedure 64704, "Fire Protection Program," March 18, 1994, contained in the NRC Inspection Manual, to include specific guidance for inspecting fire barrier
penetration seals. It should be noted that nonconforming conditions may go undetected if the
surface of the seal is covered by thermal insulation or damming material. In addition, the staff
has included guidance for inspecting fire barrier penetration seal programs in its procedures for
the new fire protection functional inspection program.
In July 1996, the NRC published NUREG-1552, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear
Power Plants," to document the findings of a comprehensive technical assessment of fire
barrier penetration seals. The assessment addressed reports of potential problems, and
determined the adequacy of NRC requirements, review guidance and inspection procedures.
The staff concluded that the general condition of penetration seal programs in the industry Is
satisfactory and that there were no problems of safety significance. Previous actions, along
with continued upkeep of existing penetration seal programs and continued inspections, are
adequate to maintain public health and safety. However, the staff Is continuing to study this
issue to determine if further regulatory action is required. The staff also recommended
revisions to the NRC fire protection regulation and review guidance. The content of this report
was discussed with the NRC Commission before it was issued.
This information notice establishes no new NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required by this notice. However, recipients are reminded that they are
required by 10 CFR 50.65 to take industry-wide operating experience (including information
presented in NRC information notices) into consideration, where practical, when setting goals
and performing periodic evaluations. If you have any questions about the information in this
notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.
Jack W. Roe, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: Christopher Bajwa, NRR
301- 415-1237 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TJC\PEN SEAL.IN3 Office Tech Contacts (A)C:PECB (A)D:DRPM
Name LMarsh RDennig JRoe
Date 08/2197 08QJ97 08/ /97 I08/ 97
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list | - Information Notice 1997-01, Improper Electrical Grounding Results in Simultaneous Fires in the Control Room and the Safe-Shutdown Equipment Room (8 January 1997, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1997-02, Cracks Found in Jet Pump Riser Assembly Elbows at Boiling Water Reactors (6 February 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-03, Defacing of Labels to Comply with 10 CFR 20.1904(b) (20 February 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-04, Implementation of a New Constraint on Radioactive Air Effluents (24 February 1997, Topic: Backfit)
- Information Notice 1997-05, Offsite Notification Capabilities (27 February 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-06, Weaknesses in Plant-Specific Emergency Operating Procedures for Refilling the Secondary Side of Dry Once-Through Steam Generators (4 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-07, Problems Identified During Generic Letter 89-10 Closeout Inspections (6 March 1997, Topic: Hot Short, Safe Shutdown, Weak link)
- Information Notice 1997-08, Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents (12 March 1997, Topic: Coatings, Weak link)
- Information Notice 1997-09, Inadequate Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Setpoints and Performance Issues Associated with Long MSSV Inlet Piping (12 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-10, Liner Plate Corrosion in Concrete Containments (13 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-11, Cement Erosion from Containment Subfoundations at Nuclear Power Plants (21 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-12, Potential Armature Binding in General Electric Type Hga Relays (24 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-13, Deficient Conditions Associated with Protective Coatings at Nuclear Power Plants (24 March 1997, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-14, Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (28 March 1997, Topic: Time to boil, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-15, Reporting of Errors and Changes in Large-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Models of Fuel Vendors and Compliance with 10 CFR 50. 46(a)(3) (4 April 1997, Topic: Coatings, Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1997-16, Preconditioning of Plant Structures, Systems, and Components Before ASME Code Inservice Testing or Technical Specification Surveillance Testing (4 April 1997, Topic: Stroke time, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-17, Cracking of Vertical Welds in the Core Shroud and Degraded Repair (4 April 1997, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-18, Problems Identified During Maintenance Rule Baseline Inspections (14 April 1997, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Coatings, Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1997-19, Safety Injection System Weld Flaw at Sequcyah Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (18 April 1997, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1997-20, Identification of Certain Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders That Do Not Comply with ANSI N14.1 Fabrication Standards (17 April 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-21, Availability of Alternate AC Power Source Designed for Station Blackout Event (18 April 1997, Topic: Main transformer failure)
- Information Notice 1997-22, Failure of Welded-Steel Moment Resisting Frames During Northridge Earthquake (25 April 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-23, Evaluation and Reporting of Fires and Unplanned Chemical Reaction Events at Fuel Cycle Facilities (7 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-24, Failure of Packing Nuts on One-Inch Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinder Valves (8 May 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-25, Dynamic Range Uncertainties in the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation (9 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-26, Degradation in Small-Radius U-Bend Regions of Steam Generator Tubes (19 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-27, Effect of Incorrect Strainer Pressure Drop on Available Net Positive Suction Head (16 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-28, Elimination of Instrument Response Time Testing Under the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 (30 May 1997, Topic: Enforcement Discretion)
- Information Notice 1997-29, Containment Inspection Rule (30 May 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-30, Control of Licensed Material During Reorganizations, Employee-Management Disagreements, and Financial Crises (3 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-31, Failures of Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barriers and Check Valves in Foreign Plants (3 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-32, Defective Worm Shaft Clutch Gears in Limitorque Motor-Operated Valve Actuators (10 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-33, Unanticipated Effect of Ventilation System on Tank Level Indications and Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Setpoint (11 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-34, Deficiencies in Licensee Submittals Regarding Terminology for Radiological Emergency Action Levels in Accordance with the New Part 20 (12 June 1997, Topic: Deep Dose Equivalent)
- Information Notice 1997-34, Deficiencies in Licensee Submittals Regarding Terminology for Radiological Emergency Action Levels In Accordance with the New Part 20 (12 June 1997, Topic: Deep Dose Equivalent)
- Information Notice 1997-35, Retrofit to Industrial Nuclear Company (Inc) IR100 Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility (18 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-35, Retrofit to Industrial Nuclear Company (INC) Ir100 Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility (18 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-36, Unplanned Intakes by Worker of Transuranic Airborne Radioactive Materials and External Exposure Due to Inadequate Control of Work (20 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-37, Main Transformer Fault with Ensuing Oil Spill Into Turbine Building (20 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-38, Level-Sensing System Initiates Common-Mode Faulure of High-Pressure-Injection Pumps (24 June 1997, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1997-39, Inadequate 10 CFR 72.48 Safety Evaluations of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (26 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-40, Potential Nitrogen Accumulation Resulting from Backleakage from Safety Injection Tanks (26 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-41, Revised - Potentially Undersized Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Oil Coolers (27 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-42, Management Weaknesses Resulting in Failure to Comply with Shipping Requirements for Special Nuclear Material (27 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-43, License Condition Compliance (1 July 1997, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1997-44, Failures of Gamma Metrics Wide-Range Linear Neutron Flux Channels (1 July 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-45, Environmental Qualification Deficiency for Cables & Containment Penetration Pigtails (2 July 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-46, Unisolable Crack in High-Pressure Injection Piping (9 July 1997, Topic: Flow Induced Vibration)
- Information Notice 1997-47, Inadequate Puncture Tests for Type B Packages Under 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3) (27 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-48, Inadequate or Inappropriate Interim Fire Protection Compensatory Measures (9 July 1997, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Unanalyzed Condition, Fire Barrier, Emergency Lighting, Continuous fire watch, Fire Protection Program, Fire Watch)
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