Information Notice 1991-59, Problems With Access Authorization Programs

Problems With Access Authorization Programs

ML031190245
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	09/23/1991
Revision:	0
From:	Rossi C E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-91-059, NUDOCS 9109170084
Download: ML031190245 (11)

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555September 23, 1991NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 91-59: PROBLEMS WITH ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAMS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information noticeto alert addressees to two areas of continuing problems with access authoriza-tion programs. One area involves licensee contractors or subcontractors notcompleting the requirements for background investigations or falsifying records;the other involves the improper administration or compromise of psychologicaltests. It is expected that recipients will review the information for appli-cability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoidsimilar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information noticeare not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response isrequired.

Description of Circumstances

In recent months, the NRC has received numerous reports and allegations thatsome licensee contractors or subcontractors have certified individuals assatisfactorily meeting the licensee's requirements for background investiga-tions without completing all required residence, employment, education, orreference checks. One contractor certified to a licensee that an employee wassuitable for unescorted site access before receiving a response to an investi-gative inquiry initiated in accordance with the licensee's approved securityplan. The contractor subsequently received derogatory information in responseto the inquiry that would have led to the denial of access but did not act uponthe information. The licensee discovered the information when reviewing thecontractor's screening files and immediately suspended the employee's unescortedaccess. The access was later withdrawn because of the information. This eventand similar problems in the past have prompted the licensee to require copiesof all contractor and subcontractor background investigations and to performthe adjudication reviews to determine access suitability instead of acceptingthe contractors' or subcontractors' determinations. Similar screening problemshave prompted other licensees to require copies of all derogatory informationdeveloped from background investigations conducted by their contractors orsubcontractors.91* 10114 IN 91-59September 23, 1991 The NRC has also recently received numerous reports concerning licensee con-tractors or subcontractors who have provided false certification regarding thelength of time individuals had been employed. In one case, a union businessagent (BA) certified to a licensee that certain individuals had been members ofthe union for 3 years and, to the best of the BA's knowledge, had shown noadverse character traits. The certification qualified the individuals for anexemption from background screening requirements as set forth in the licensee'sapproved security plan because of the BA's personal knowledge of the individ-uals resulting from the length of union membership. The licensee subsequentlydiscovered that the BA had falsified the certification. None of the individualshad been members of the union for 3 years, and in fact, were not even membersof the BA's union local.Licensees identified some of these problems when auditing contractor or sub-contractor programs. One effective audit technique used was telephone contactwith the applicant's previous employers and references to verify informationsupplied by the contractor or subcontractor doing the screening.In addition to receiving reports of problems with background investigations, theNRC has received allegations that some licensee contractors and subcontractorshave improperly administered or deliberately compromised psychological tests,or have falsified the results of such tests. Some of the allegations weresimilar to cases discussed in IN 88-91, "Improper Administration and Control ofPsychological Tests," in that individuals allegedly completed tests in unproc-tored settings. In one case, an individual allegedly took a psychological testfor employment at a nuclear facility in a motel room in which someone calledout the "correct" answers to produce the desired profile. It was also allegedthat some falsification of test results occurred because contractors exertedpressure on subcontractors to have certain numbers of craft workers certifiedas acceptable by certain dates for licensees during reactor outages.DiscussionThe NRC has issued IE Circular 78-17, "Inadequate Guard Training/Qualificationand Falsified Training Records," October 13, 1978; IE Circular 79-03, "Inade-quate Guard Training/Qualification and Falsified Records," February 23, 1979;Information Notice (IN) 82-07, "Inadequate Security Screening Programs,"March 16, 1982; IN 83-15, "Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records,"March 23, 1983; IN 87-64, "Conviction for Falsification of Security TrainingRecords," December 22, 1987; IN 88-26, "Falsified Pre-Employment ScreeningRecords," May 16, 1988; and IN 88-91, "Improper Administration and Controlof Psychological Tests," November 22, 1988. These documents alerted addressees IN 91-59September 23, 1991 to the possibility that contractors might submit falsified records to meetlicensees' commitments to the NRC, identified weaknesses in the administrationand control of psychological tests used in personnel screening programs, andreminded licensees of the importance of adequate program audits.On April 25, 1991, the NRC published Section 73.56 of Title 10 of the Codeof Federal Regulations (10 CFR 73.56), "Personnel Access AuthorizationRequirements for Nuclear Power Plants" (Access Authorization Rule) to provideincreased assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to protectedand vital areas are trustworthy and reliable and do not pose a threat tocommit radiological sabotage. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(a)(4),licensees may accept an access authorization program, or part of a program,used by its contractors or vendors for their employees provided it meets therule requirements. Clear specification of screening requirements in the workcontract is an effective method to safeguard against inadequate accessauthorization programs. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(g)(2), eachlicensee who accepts the access authorization program of a contractor orvendor must audit the program every 12 months to ensure that the requirementsof the Access Authorization Rule, as specified in their approved securityplan, are met. Some licensees have committed to ensuring nuclear securityexpertise on their audit and assessment teams.Failure to ensure that a proper access authorization program is conductedcould compromise nuclear safety. The NRC can take enforcement action in casesin which licensees fail, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to meetsecurity program plan commitments regarding their access authorization program.Furthermore, intentional violations may subject corporations, the individualwrongdoer, and others who knew and condoned such acts to criminal prosecution.In IN 85-97, "Jail Term For Former Contractor Employee Who

Intent

ionallyFalsified Welding Inspection Records," IN 86-54, "Criminal Prosecution of aFormer Radiation Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed an Unqualified Indivi-dual to Perform Radiography," and IN 87-64, "Conviction For Falsification ofSecurity Training Records," the NRC stated that the criminal sanctions avail-able may include a fine and/or imprisonment.On August 15, 1991, a final rule was published regarding misconduct byunlicensed persons (56 FR 40684). This rule amended the Commission'sregulations "to put on notice all persons whose actions relate to alicensee's activities subject to NRC regulation, that they may be subjectto civil enforcement action for deliberate misconduct" that causes thelicensee to be in violation. Periodically informing contractors, sub-contractors, and vendors that they may be subject to criminal prosecutionfor intentional wrongdoing may also be a deterrent against deliberatecompromise of background screening program IN 91-59September 23, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation project manager.har es E. l's1, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Nancy Ervin, NRR(301) 492-0946

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices AttachmentIN 91-59September 23, 1991 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to91-5891-5791-5691-55Dependency of OffsetDisc Butterfly Valve'sOperation on Orientationwith Respect to FlowOperational Experienceon Bus TransfersPotential RadioactiveLeakage to Tank Ventedto AtmosphereFailures Caused by AnImproperly Adjusted TestLink In 4.16 KV GeneralElectric SwitchgearFailures of UndervoltageOutput Circuit Boards Inthe Westinghouse-DesignedSolid State ProtectionSystemForeign Experience Regard-ing Boron DilutionPressurizer Safety ValveLift Setpoint ShiftFailure of Remote ShutdownSystem InstrumentationBecause of IncorrectlyInstalled Components09/20/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.09/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.09/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.09/16/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.09/10/91 All holders of OLs or CPs forWestinghouse (W)-designednuclear power reactors.09/06/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors (PWRs).09/05/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.09/04/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.85-18,Supp. 191-5489-90,Supp. 291-53OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit I'_ _ IN 91-59September 23, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate Office' of Nuclear ReactorRegulation project manager.Original Signed FiyCharles qrkbftf9SdirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact:Nancy Ervin, NRR(301) 492-0946

Attachment:

List of RecentlyIssued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEUC :KbSb:NRKK :ILLH EU :KRGB:NLRR :BC:RSGB:NRR :OGC :D:OE-------------------- :-----------7t--------------- :-------------- :-------------- :-------------NAME :NErvin:cb :JMain* /;:LLBushl :PMcKee fk :RFonnerst :JLieberman,*--:---------------:-------- ---:-------------:--------------:--------------:-------------DATE :09/10/91 :8/ /91 :09/10/91 :8/ /91 :8/ /91 :8/ /91OFC D:DRIS:NRR :D:DOEA:NRRNAME :BKGrimesy' :CBer ge r : : : :DATE :8/ /91 : /91 :09/ :OFFICIAL RECORDPPY Docu enT Name: IN-91-5 s' -" IN 91-XXAugust XX, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Nancy Ervin, NRR(301) 492-0946

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDistribution:Central FilesPDRRSGB r/fDRIS r/fJGPartlowWRussellCBerlingerJLiebermanRFonnerBKGrimesPMcKeeLBushNEErvin*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC :RSGB:NRR :TECH ED :RSGB:NRR :BC:RSGB:NRR :OGC :D:OENAME M $xr1vIfrn:cb* :JMain* :LLBieuf* :PMcKee* :RFonner* :JLieberman*__- -- ----__ -- -- -- -- ----:--- -----:----------------------------_DATE :r/&/91 :8/ /91 :f 91 :8/ /91 :8/ /91 :8/ /91OFC :D:DRIS:NRR :OGCB:NRR : : :NAME :BKGrimes * :CBerlinger : ceo: :DATE :8/ /91 :8/ /91 : :OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN 91XX IN 91-XXAugust XX, 1991 logical sabotage. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(a)(4), licensees mayaccept an access authorization program, or part of a program, used by its con-tractors or vendors for their employees provided it meets the rule requirements.Clear specification of screening requirements in the work contract is aneffective method to safeguard against inadequate access authorization programs.Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(g)(2), each licensee who accepts the accessauthorization program of a contractor or vendor must audit the program every12 months to ensure that the requirments. of the Access Authorization rule, asspecified in their approved security plan, are met. Some licensees have com-mitted to ensuring nuclear security expertise on their audit and assessment teams.Failure to ensure that a proper access authorization program is conducted couldcompromise nuclear safety. The NRC can take enforcement action in cases inwhich licensees fail, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to meet securityprogram plan commitments regarding their access authorization program. Further-more, intentional violations may subject corporations, the individual wrongdoer,and others who knew and condoned such acts to criminal prosecution. InIN 85-97, "Jail Term For Former Contractor Employee Who

Intent

ionally FalsifiedWelding Inspection Records," IN 86-54, "Criminal Prosecution of a FormerRadiation Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed an Unqualified Individual toPerform Radiography," and IN 87-64, "Conviction For Falsification of SecurityTraining Records," the NRC stated that the criminal sanctions available mayinclude a fine and/or imprisonment.Periodically informing contractors, subcontractors, and vendors that they maybe subject to criminal prosecution for intentional wrongdoing may be a deterrentagainst deliberate compromise of background screening programs.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontact listed below or the appropriate regional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Nancy Ervin, NRR(301) 492-0946

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDistribution:See next page*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC :RSGB:NRR :TECH ED :RSGB:NRR :BC B:NRR :OGC :D:O-------- ------------ ---------- -NAME ;NErvifi:cb- :JMain* :LLI -- :P- :RFonnerA :JLiebermanDATE :8/0ZC91 :8/ /91 :80 -91 :8/-5-: 91 :8/ /91 :8/11/91OFC :D:DRIS:NRR :OGCB:NRR-: -: -NAME :BKGrimes :CBerlinger : : :-_---- _-- -- ----- -- _--- --- -- -- _DATE :8/ /91 :8/ /91 : :OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN 91XX IN 91-XXAugust XX, 1991 logical sabotage. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(a)(4), licensees mayaccept an access authorization program, or part of a program, used by its con-tractors or vendors for their employees provided it meets the rule requirements.Clear specification of screening requirements in the work contract is aneffective method to safeguard against inadequate access authorization programs.Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(g)(2), each licensee who accepts the accessauthorization program of a contractor or vendor must audit the program every12 months to ensure that the requirments of the Access Authorization rule, asspecified in their approved security plan, are met. Some licensees have com-mitted to ensuring nuclear security expertise on their audit and assessment teams.Failure to ensure that a proper access author iation program is conducted couldcompromise ny he NRC k Aefenforcement action in cases inwhich licensees iase fai to meet security program plan commitments regardingthefr access authorizati program because ef inattention to detail, human error,or other unintentional acts. yiolations caused by intentional4-tes may subjectcorporations, the individual irongdoer, and others who knew and condoned suchacts to criminal prosecution. In IN 85-97, "Jail Term For Former ContractorEmployee Who

Intent

ionally Fal ified Welding Inspection Records," IN 86-54,"Criminal Prosecution of a For er Radiation Safety Officer Who Willfully Directedan Unqualified Individual to Pe form Radiography," and IN 87-64, "Conviction ForFalsification of Security Train g Records," the NRC stated that the criminalsanctions available may include fine and/or imprisonment.Periodically informing contractors subcontractors, and vendors that they maybe subject to criminal prosecution or intentional wrongdoing may be a deterrentagainst deliberate compromise of ba ground screening programs.No specific action or written respons is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this m tter, please contact the technicalcontact listed below or the appropriate egional office.Cha les E. Rossi, Director\ A4I Divi ion of Operational Events AssessmentOffic of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Nancy rvin, NRR(301) 492-0946

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDistribution:SKee next page '*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC :RSGB:N ~ :TECH ED :RSGB:NRR :BC:RSGB:NRR :Kv-1W DO----:-------------- :----- iF-.---: 1 -9---:-- or:-----Ot-b--s-----NAME :NErwfr ;eb :JMain* :LLBus :P r.. 0 ner :JLieberman_-- _ -- _- -_-_ __ -- ---- --_-DATE :8/;_/91 :8/ /91 :8/g /91 :8/1/91 :8/;0?91 :8/ /91OFC :D:DRIS:NRR :OGCB:NRR :_---- - _ _ _ _ ---------NAME :BKGrimes :CBerlinger : : :--_--- _--- --- --- --_- -- -- -- -DATE :8/ /91 :8/ /91 : :OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN 91XX I 4IN 91-XXApril XX, 1991 Records," 86-54, Criminal Prosecution of a Former Radiation Safety OfficerWho Willfully Directed an Unqualified Individual to Perform Radiography,"and 87-64, "Conviction For Falsification of Security Training Records," theNRC stated that the criminal sanctions available may include a fine and/orimprisonment. Periodically informing contractors, subcontractors, and vendorsthat they may be subject to criminal prosecution for intentional wrongdoingmay be an effective deterrent against deliberate compromise of backgroundscreening programs. No specific action or written response is required bythis information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, pleasecontact the technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator ofthe appropriate regional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Nancy Ervin, NRR(301) 492-0946

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDistribution:RSUB r/fDRIS r/fJGPartlowWRussellCBerlingerJLiebermanRFonnerBKGrimesPMcKeeLBushNErvinCentral FilesPDR*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC :RSGB:NRR :TECH ED :RSGB:NRR :BC:RSGB:NRR :D:DRIS:NRR :OGC______* _______________ ______ _______ ______ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _NAME :NErvin:cb :JMain 9g :LLBush :PMcKee :BKGrimes :RFonner-_- ________________.- - ------------- ______________ ____________DATE :5/ /91 :5/ /91 cH/ii :5/ /91 :5/ /91 :5/ /91 :5/ /91OFC :D:OE :OGCB:NRR :ADT:NRR :ADP:NRRNAME :JLieberman :CBerlinger :WRussell :JGPartlowDATE :5/ /91 :5/ /91 :5/ /91 :5/ /91OFFICIAL RECOLR COPY Document Name: IN 91XX 2 IN 91-XXAugust XX, 1991 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontact listed below or the appropriate regional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Nancy Ervin, NRR(301) 492-0946

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDistribution:Central FilesPDRRSGB r/fDRIS r/fJGPartlowWRussellCBerlingerJLiebermanRFonnerBKGrimesPMcKeeLBushNEErvin*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC :RSGB:NRR :TECH ED :RSGB:NRR :BC:RSGB:NRR :OGC :D:OENAME :NErvin:cb :JMain* :LLBush* :PMcKee* :RFonner* :JLieberman*DATE :8/ / 1 :8/ /91 :8/ /91 :8/ /91 :8/ /91 :8/ /91OFC :D NR :OGCB:NRR : : :: -----: : :NAME : s :CBerlinger : : :-S:---- --- -- --- --- ------- --- ---- ---- ----.- --DATE 4/A /91 :8/ /91 : : :?FFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN 91XX