Information Notice 1991-37, Compressed Gas Cylinder Missile Hazards

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Compressed Gas Cylinder Missile Hazards
ML070180064
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/10/1991
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-91-037, NUDOCS 9106040346
Download: ML070180064 (4)


UNITED STATES..

NUCLEAR

............ REGULATORY COMMISSION

. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

~.. WASHINGTON, D.C.205

2 June 10, 1991 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 91-37: COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDER MISSILE HAZARDS.

Addressees

All holders-of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

Thi s *ninformation notice is intended to alert addressees to an event involving

Halon surveillance testing which resulted in an uncontrolled acceleration

of the Halon gas cylinder. It is expected that recipients will review this

I-nformatio!. for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriateto avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On February 26, 1991, biannual surveillance testing of the services building

Halon fire suppression system was being performed at the River Bend Station

9 (RBS).in order to verify the Halon content of each of the fire suppression

system cylinders. The H-250 cylinders, which are nominally 3 feet long

and 16 inches in diameter, are pressurized to 350 pslg with 190 pounds of

Halon and weigh about 350 pounds when fully charged.

The technicians performing the surveillance disconnected a Halon cylinder

f*rom the fire suppression system,: removed the cylinder from its rack, and

transported the cylinder to the service building restroom/shower area

for weighing. At the weighing station, the technicians removed

Jfittings, from the Halon cylinder as required by the surveillance peripheral

procedure so

an accurate weight measurement of the cylinder and its contents could be

obtained. While removing these fittings, a technician incorrectly removed one

fitting which vented the cylinder valve and caused the cylinder valve to open.

The contents of the Halon cylinder rapidly discharged to the atmosphere, causing the Halon cylinder to'become an uncontrolled projectile.

...Two technicians were Injured, one, .seriously, as-a result of this mishap and

extensive damage was caused in .the shower. and restroom area where the work

{i was being done., For example, gouges .wire made in..the tile of a shower wall,

-; ceramicttile was knocked off a concrete:.floor leaving a two inch deep gouge

in the concrete, tiles were .knocked off a suspended ceiling, and a hole

(approximately one foot square) was made in a six-inch cinder block wall.

9106040346  ;"c-L. ,...

i

IN 91-37 dune 10, 1991 The licensee reviewed the circumstances

that the surveillance was not properly surrounding this event and determined

had been disconnected from the fire conducted. First, after the cylinder

failed to install the anti-recoil plugsuppression system, the technicians

Installation of this anti-recoil plug in the cylinder valve outlet port.

of Halon that occurred. Second, the would have prevented the rapid release

fitting

the cylinder valve and caused the cylinder that was removed which vented

which should have been left installed. valve to open was a Schraeder valve, very detailed, however, and reliance The surveillance procedure was not

training of the individuals performing was placed on the qualifications and

the surveillance.

Discussion:

The event that occurred at RBS fortunately

safety-related equipment. However, did not result in any damage to

located throughout the plant in both compressed gas cylinders are typically

safety-related and nonsafety-related

areas, and different circumstances

damage to safety-related equipment. could easily have resulted in extensive

RBS contain small spherical Halon For example, the control room cabinets

biannual surveillance testing as thecylinders which are subjected to the same at'

previously described. The spherical services building Halon cylinders

360 psig with 25 pounds of Halon and Halon cylinders are pressurized to

An uncontrolled acceleration of one weigh about 50 pounds when fully charged.

could cause serious injury to controlof these cylinde, s in the control room

safety-related equipment located in room personnel and significant damage

the control room. to

NUREG/CR-3551, "Safety Implications

Storage and Distribution Systems in Associated with In-Plant Pressurized Gas

additional information related to this Nuclear Power Plants," May 1985 provides

compressed qis cylinders can pose a topic and cautions that portable

significant missile hazard if not properly

controlled. 2ortable compressed gas cylinders are

power plants to provide, for example, used throughout nuclear

nitrogen and hydrogen for instrument fire suppression agents, breathing air, purposes, and gases for various welding calibration and surveillance testing

applications.

Factors that contributed to the event

procedures and inadequate training and that occurred at RBS include inadequate

performing the surveillance. The licensee qualification of the technicians

individual!t who perform maintenance and provided additional training to

cylinders, ind additional details were surveillance on compressed gas

surveillance procedures to avoid future included in the maintenance and

mishaps of this nature.

IV,

IN 91-37 June 10, 1991 This information noticerequires

you have any questions about the no specific action or written response.. If

information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project

manager.

Charles E.s

E ssi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Phillip H. Harrell, RIV

(817) 860-8250

James E. Tatum, NRR

(301) 492-0805 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

June 14otl"!

i-

1.11? 10O111CbM1,1 IslWS

.RICtimroelikON Mallts

11e1tic, me. submt Issuance 1011104 to-

021-6 Rectler plant %Wt 06/10191 All holdersIt if 1. or CPS

uarkleq Wart for nueclear power reactors.

92.39 1.614licq Ieq..tr,..tS tor HA/0IM All U.S. Ructeer Iealehor~y

Tra~psortibig ialti..qezerE commission (114C)licenseeqs.

Radioactive Mlaterila,

91-34 Potenitial problem In 04/03/92 All houlder$ of Ott of CPS

IdentifyIng Cowles of for mauglor poberreactors.

  • oilsc Dise 01..1Berator
  • tallfeections

9.1-3 Reactor Siftt Information os/31/91 All hoilders -f OLS a. CPS

for States During feercitse .for nuclear poer reactori.

end 1xerqt0cl*1

11.32 possible flow* fogCortaie @1~, All itoldeni of 01e or CPS

plt"g $fitlms Fabric$eto f or nuclear powerreactori.

  • by 110-clatro Plot" 1 CAd

91-31 Sounco"iFormesg M41aqflus WWI0I/ All holderso of 0O..or CPS

PM1ect ic Particle (lOAM) for etctear over reactors.

Prepaeds lath .

92.40 Isftomue"to Calibration of W231I91 All fuelcycle licteoe I and

?bernoiwtne.sont Dqoti othar licensees rouitine, motors Utilized to Moioetor

Wareelty, Doi@ at Ureanium

Processing and Fabrication

Facilities

86-21. Reoaviltliion atAmrica* 04/16191 All holders of O1e of cps

Suipp.2 Society of peceanical Ci09i. for nuclear power reactors

noers accreditation. Pro- andall recipients Of

from for I Stamp VItoer OUeW..O04. 'License* Coam- trecto nd toi w~aooleoplection

Statwo *"art* (White look).

Ci. CennetIni License

C? Coe.,trvctto" Per'it

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 01111TCL.dIMAIL1

057AGOl PS

Fil PASoI

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $s00