Information Notice 1991-37, Compressed Gas Cylinder Missile Hazards

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Compressed Gas Cylinder Missile Hazards
ML070180064
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/10/1991
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-91-037, NUDOCS 9106040346
Download: ML070180064 (4)


UNITED STATES..

.. .. ........

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

~..

WASHINGTON, D.C.205

2 June 10, 1991 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 91-37:

COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDER MISSILE HAZARDS.

Addressees

All holders-of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

Thi s *ninformation notice is intended to alert addressees to an event involving

Halon surveillance testing which resulted in an uncontrolled acceleration

of the Halon gas cylinder.

It is expected that recipients will review this

I-nformatio!. for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriateto avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in

this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On February 26, 1991, biannual surveillance testing of the services building

Halon fire suppression system was being performed at the River Bend Station

9 (RBS).in order to verify the Halon content of each of the fire suppression

system cylinders.

The H-250 cylinders, which are nominally 3 feet long

and 16 inches in diameter, are pressurized to 350 pslg with 190 pounds of

Halon and weigh about 350 pounds when fully charged.

The technicians performing the surveillance disconnected a Halon cylinder

f*rom the fire suppression system,: removed the cylinder from its rack, and

transported the cylinder to the service building restroom/shower area

for weighing.

At the weighing station, the technicians removed peripheral

Jfittings, from the Halon cylinder as required by the surveillance procedure so

an accurate weight measurement of the cylinder and its contents could be

obtained.

While removing these fittings, a technician incorrectly removed one

fitting which vented the cylinder valve and caused the cylinder valve to open.

The contents of the Halon cylinder rapidly discharged to the atmosphere, causing the Halon cylinder to'become an uncontrolled projectile.

...Two technicians were Injured, one, .seriously, as-a result of this mishap and

extensive damage was caused in .the shower. and restroom area where the work

{i was being done., For example, gouges .wire made in..the tile of a shower wall,

-;

ceramicttile was knocked off a concrete:.floor leaving a two inch deep gouge

in the concrete, tiles were .knocked off a suspended ceiling, and a hole

(approximately one foot square) was made in a six-inch cinder block wall.

9106040346

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,

i

IN 91-37 dune 10, 1991 The licensee reviewed the circumstances surrounding this event and determined

that the surveillance was not properly conducted.

First, after the cylinder

had been disconnected from the fire suppression system, the technicians

failed to install the anti-recoil plug in the cylinder valve outlet port.

Installation of this anti-recoil plug would have prevented the rapid release

of Halon that occurred.

Second, the fitting that was removed which vented

the cylinder valve and caused the cylinder valve to open was a Schraeder valve, which should have been left installed.

The surveillance procedure was not

very detailed, however, and reliance was placed on the qualifications and

training of the individuals performing the surveillance.

Discussion:

The event that occurred at RBS fortunately did not result in any damage to

safety-related equipment.

However, compressed gas cylinders are typically

located throughout the plant in both safety-related and nonsafety-related

areas, and different circumstances could easily have resulted in extensive

damage to safety-related equipment.

For example, the control room cabinets at'

RBS contain small spherical Halon cylinders which are subjected to the same

biannual surveillance testing as the services building Halon cylinders

previously described.

The spherical Halon cylinders are pressurized to

360 psig with 25 pounds of Halon and weigh about 50 pounds when fully charged.

An uncontrolled acceleration of one of these cylinde, s in the control room

could cause serious injury to control room personnel and significant damage to

safety-related equipment located in the control room.

NUREG/CR-3551,

"Safety Implications Associated with In-Plant Pressurized Gas

Storage and Distribution Systems in Nuclear Power Plants," May 1985 provides

additional information related to this topic and cautions that portable

compressed qis cylinders can pose a significant missile hazard if not properly

controlled.

2ortable compressed gas cylinders are used throughout nuclear

power plants to provide, for example, fire suppression agents, breathing air, nitrogen and hydrogen for instrument calibration and surveillance testing

purposes, and gases for various welding applications.

Factors that contributed to the event that occurred at RBS include inadequate

procedures and inadequate training and qualification of the technicians

performing the surveillance.

The licensee provided additional training to

individual!t who perform maintenance and surveillance on compressed gas

cylinders, ind additional details were included in the maintenance and

surveillance procedures to avoid future mishaps of this nature.

IV,

IN 91-37 June 10, 1991 This information noticerequires no specific action or written response.. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project

manager.

Charles E.s

E

ssi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

Phillip H. Harrell, RIV

(817) 860-8250

James E. Tatum, NRR

(301) 492-0805 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

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