IR 05000528/2003002
| ML031120082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/2003 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Overbeck G Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| IR-03-002 | |
| Download: ML031120082 (27) | |
Text
April 21, 2003
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-528/03-02; 50-529/03-02; 50-530/03-02
Dear Mr. Overbeck:
On March 22, 2003, the NRC completed an inspection at your Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with members of your staff on April 2, 2003, and as described in Section 4OA6.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Linda Joy Smith, Chief Project Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Dockets: 50-528 50-529 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74
Arizona Public Service Company-2-
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-528/03-02; 50-529/03-02; 50-530/03-02
REGION IV==
Dockets:
50-528 50-529 50-530 Licenses:
NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74 Report No:
50-528/03-02 50-529/03-02 50-530/03-02 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company Facility:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location:
5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona Dates:
December 29, 2002, through March 22, 2003 Inspectors:
N. L. Salgado, Resident Inspector J. F. Melfi, Resident Inspector G. G. Warnick. Resident Inspector P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. E. Lantz, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved By:
Linda Joy Smith, Chief, Project Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Attachment:
Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-528/03-02; 50-529/03-02; 50-530/03-02 IR 05000528-03-02, IR 05000529-03-02, IR 05000530-03-02, Arizona Public Service Company; on 12/29/02 - 03/22/03, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; personnel performance during nonroutine evolutions and event followup.
The inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and two emergency preparedness inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
Inspectors Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at essentially full power for the duration of this inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at essentially full power for the duration of this inspection period.
Unit 3 operated at essentially full power for the duration of this inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
[REACTOR - R]
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
1.
Partial Walkdowns a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors completed a partial walkdown of the systems listed below to verify proper equipment alignment. This inspection included a review of the applicable plant procedures, plant drawings, outstanding modifications, work orders and condition report/disposition requests (CRDR). The inspectors verified that all valves were properly aligned; there was no leakage that could affect operability; electrical power was available as required; major system components were properly labeled, lubricated, and cooled; and hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional.
- January 8, 2003, auxiliary feedwater system Train B (Unit 2)
January 29, 2003, emergency diesel generator Train A (Unit 2)
March 6, 2003, high pressure safety injection system Train A (Unit 3)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
a.
Inspection Scope
During the weeks of March 10 and 17, 2003, the inspectors completed walkdowns of the accessible portions of Units 1, 2, and 3 CVCS. The inspectors verified that the system was capable of performing required safety functions, the licensee properly performed mechanical and electrical system alignments, and system valves did not exhibit leakage that would adversely impact function. The inspectors also checked major system components for correct labeling and lubrication, that hangers and supports were correctly installed, and that functional and essential support systems were operational.
-2-The inspectors reviewed the following documents to determine correct system alignment:
P&I Diagram 01-M-CHP-001, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 24
P&I Diagram 01-M-CHP-002, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 43
P&I Diagram 01-M-CHP-003, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 38
P&I Diagram 02-M-CHP-002, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 39
P&I Diagram 02-M-CHP-003, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 29
P&I Diagram 03-M-CHP-001, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 22
P&I Diagram 03-M-CHP-002, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 37
P&I Diagram 03-M-CHP-003, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"
Revision 26
Trend analyses for tagging errors
System health report for the CVCS
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report The inspectors also reviewed selected CRDRs, outstanding corrective maintenance requests, the system health report, temporary modifications, and outstanding design issues.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below that are important to reactor safety and referenced in the Prefire Strategies Manual to evaluate conditions related to licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the material condition,
-3-operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage from propagation of potential fires.
- January 22, 2003, auxiliary building 100-foot, 120-foot, and 140-foot elevations (Unit 3)
March 4, 2003, control building 74-foot, 100-foot, 120-foot, and 160-foot elevations (Unit 2)
March 17, 2003, diesel generator building - all accessible elevations (Unit 1)
March 21, 2003, diesel generator building - all accessible elevations (Unit 3)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the licensee's appropriate handling of structure, system, and component performance or condition problems during review of the following equipment failure. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the following equipment failure to verify that licensee personnel properly implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65,
"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants":
March 21, 2003, instrument air Compressor C trip reported in CRDR 2585270 and overall system health (Units 1, 2, and 3)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope Throughout this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed daily and weekly work schedules to determine when risk-significant activities were scheduled. The inspectors reviewed risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control for selected activities to verify compliance with Procedure 30DP-9MT03, "Assessment and Management of Risk When Performing Maintenance in Modes 1-4," Revision 7. The inspectors discussed emergent work issues with work control personnel and reviewed the potential risk impact of these activities to verify that the work was adequately planned, controlled, and executed. The inspectors verified that plant configurations allowed by the Plant
-4-Configuration Risk Indicator Matrix were consistent with actual plant conditions during maintenance. The specific activities reviewed were associated with planned and emergent maintenance on:
January 9, 2003, failure of Valve SGAUV134A position indication described in CRDR 2576766 and corrected using Work Order 2576764 (Unit 2)
January 24, 2003, elevated reactor coolant system leakage due to coolant charging Pump A discharge relief valve degradation corrected with Work Order 2571607 (Unit 3)
January 28, 2003, risk assessment for scheduled maintenance of auxiliary feedwater Train B valves (Unit 2)
January 29, 2003, scheduled online outage for emergency diesel generator, essential spray pond, essential chilled water, essential cooling water, and containment spray Train B (Unit 2)
February 4, 2003, risk assessment to perform maintenance on startup Transformer NAN-X02 and associated switchyard Breaker PL-948 (Units 1, 2, and 3)
February 7, 2003, evaluation of risk and actions implemented due to high pressure safety injection Pump B discharge header relief valve and balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system Sequencer B emergent equipment problems (Unit 1)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions (71111.14)
a.
Inspection Scope For the nonroutine evolutions described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs and plant computer data and/or observed operator performance to determine what occurred, how the operators responded, and whether the response was in accordance with plant procedures:
On February 7, 2003, inspectors observed performance and response to an unexpected actuation of fuel building essential ventilation signal Train B and control room essential filtration actuation signal Trains A and B. These activities were conducted in accordance with Procedures 40OP-9SA01, "BOP ESFAS Modules Operation," Revision 15, and 41ST-1ZZ02, "Inoperable Power Sources Action Statement," Appendix F, Revision 32. (Unit 1)
-5-
On February 7, 2003, the licensee discovered that leakage from the high pressure safety injection system outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident exceeded the safety analysis leak rate limit. The licensee determined that charging to high pressure Safety Injection A header isolation Valve 2PSIA-V811 was the source of the leakage. The valve was replaced using Work Order 2583413 on February 8. (Unit 2)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the operability determinations listed below for technical adequacy and assessed the impact of the condition on continued plant operation.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Technical Specification entries, CRDRs, and equipment issues to verify that operability of plant structures, systems, and components were maintained or that Technical Specification Actions were properly entered.
- January 30, 2003, emergency diesel generator Train B output breaker closure permissive setpoints found to be not within expected values during corrective maintenance (Unit 2)
March 5, 2003, containment entry identified a packing leak on Valve 2PSGEV295 as reported on CRDR 2590059 (Unit 2)
On February 28, 2003, a vendor identified a problem with an internal plastic part in a Rotork actuator and its applicability to possibly three other valve actuators as reported in CRDR 2589899 (Unit 1)
On March 5, 2003, related to an oil level increase seen on an emergency diesel generator Train B woodward governor as reported in CRDR 2590368 (Unit 3)
March 20, 2003, pressurizer spray Valve RCE-PV-100E inlet isolation Valve 3PRCEV240 packing leak as documented in deficiency Work Order 2592792 (Unit 3)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
-6-1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the control room deficiency log in Units 1, 2, and 3 to determine the number of operator workarounds that existed and the safety significance of existing operator workarounds. The inspectors interviewed operators, shift technical advisors, and work control supervisors. Through the interviews and review of station documents, the inspectors assessed the cumulative effect of the workarounds on the ability of operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and emergency response. The inspectors also assessed the adequacy of the compensatory actions for existing workarounds.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed and/or evaluated the results from the following postmaintenance tests to determine whether the test adequately confirmed equipment operability. The inspectors also verified that postmaintenance tests satisfied the requirements of Procedure 30DP-9WP04, "Postmaintenance Retest Development,"
Revision 13.
- January 8, 2003, Work Order 2577145, retest following repair to water leak on emergency diesel generator Train B lube oil cooler (Unit 1)
January 29, 2003, various work orders for maintenance performed during emergency diesel generator Train B outage (Unit 2)
February 26, 2003, Work Order 2587684, retest following repair of control element drive mechanism motor Generator A output Breaker 3JSFNC02A (Unit 3)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the performance of and/or reviewed documentation for the following surveillance tests. Applicable test data was reviewed to verify whether they met Technical Specification, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and licensee procedure requirements. Also, the inspectors verified that the testing effectively
-7-demonstrated that the systems were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions and that identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
- January 30, 2003, Procedure 36MT-9SE14, "Excore Safety Channel Calorimetric Compensation," Revision 24 (Unit 2)
February 13, 2003, Procedure 73TI-9MT04, "Plant Data Collection For SGR and LP Turbine Replacement," Revision 1 (Unit 2)
February 19, 2003, Procedure 36ST-2SA03, "ESFAS Train A Subgroup Relay Functional and Response Time Test," Revision 0 (Unit 2)
February 26, 2003, Procedure 36ST-9SE03, "Excore Safety Linear Channel Quarterly Calibration," Revision 37 (Unit 3)
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP1 Emergency Preparedness (71114.01)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2003 biennial emergency plan exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the emergency plan. The scenario simulated a security event, a reactor coolant system leak, subsequent loss of reactor coolant and containment integrity, and a fire which resulted in a large, short-term release of radioactive materials to the environment.
The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and offsite dose consequences in the Simulator Control Room and in the following dedicated emergency response facilities:
Operations Support Center
Emergency Operations Facility The inspectors also assessed personnel recognition of abnormal plant conditions, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, protection of emergency workers, emergency repair capabilities, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan.
The inspectors attended the March 12, 2003, postexercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended the March 13, 2003, preliminary presentation of the exercise evaluation results to plant management. Final plant management evaluation of the
-8-exercise results were given to the inspectors on March 19, 2003, during a telephone conversation between the inspectors and the emergency preparedness manager.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-office review of the documents listed below and compared them to their previous revisions, NUMARC/NESP-007, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels," Revision 2, and 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the revisions decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Emergency Plan, Revision 27
EPIP-01, "Satellite Technical Support Center Actions;" Appendix A, "Emergency Action Levels;" and Appendix P, "EAL Technical Bases," Revision 12
EPIP-02, "Operations Support Center Actions;" Appendix A, "Emergency Action Levels;" and Appendix P, "EAL Technical Bases," Revision 25
EPIP-03, "Technical Support Center Actions;" Appendix A, "Emergency Action Levels;" and Appendix P, "EAL Technical Bases," Revision 31
EPIP-04, "Emergency Operations Facility Actions;" Appendix A, "Emergency Action Levels;" and Appendix P, "EAL Technical Bases," Revision 31 b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an on-site review of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan, Revision 28, which updated titles, corrected grammatical errors, and added information concerning emergency response organization staffing, security emergency action levels, local law enforcement support, and updated population statistics for the emergency planning zone. Revision 28 was compared to previous revisions of the plan and to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, to determine whether the revision decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
-9-b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluations (71114.06)
a.
Inspection Scope On February 5, 2003, the licensee conducted an emergency preparedness drill. Prior to the drill, the inspectors reviewed the scenario to determine whether it was of appropriate scope to be included in the performance indicator statistics as intended by the licensee.
During the drill, the inspectors observed performance of the operations crew in the simulator, as well as licensee performance in the technical support center and emergency operations facility. The inspectors observed activities involving event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors observations were compared with licensee identified findings to determine the adequacy of the licensees exercise evaluation process.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Drill and Exercise Performance a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following documents related to the drill and exercise performance indicator in order to verify the licensees reported data:
Drill schedules for calendar year 2002
Drill and exercise scenarios for a 100 percent sample of drills conducted during the 2nd through 4th quarters of Calendar Year 2002
Evaluator and participant logs and offsite notification forms for a 100 percent sample of drills conducted during the 2nd through 4th quarters of Calendar Year 2002
Drill evaluation worksheets
Performance indicator reports
-10-b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified. The performance indicators all remained in the licensee response band (Green).
.2 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following records related to emergency response organization participation in order to verify the licensees reported data:
List of key emergency response organization positions
Drill participation date summaries for key emergency responders for the 2nd through 4th quarters of Calendar Year 2002
Emergency response organization rosters for the 2nd through 4th quarters of Calendar Year 2002
Drill participation records for a sample of eight emergency responders
Performance indicator reports b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified. The performance indicators all remained in the licensee response band (Green).
.3 Alert and Notification System a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a 100 percent sample of siren testing records for the 2nd through 4th quarters of Calendar Year 2002 to verify the accuracy of data reported for this performance indicator.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified. The performance indicators all remained in the licensee response band (Green).
.4 Initiating Events Cornerstone a.
Inspection Scope (Units 1, 2, and 3)
The inspectors reviewed unit logs, plant thermal performance records, monthly operating reports, and licensee event reports from January 2002 to December 2002 for
-11-all three units to verify the accuracy and completeness of data used to calculate and report the following performance indicators:
Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours
Scrams with loss of normal heat removal
Unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified. The performance indicators all remained in the licensee response band (Green)
4OA5 Other
.1 Temporary Instruction 2515/149: Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Pilot Verification (Units 1, 2, and 3)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors and the Region IV Senior Reactor Analysts audited the licensees MSPI data for October 2002 through February 2003. The objective of the audit was to verify that the licensee was correctly implementing the MSPI pilot guidance for reporting unavailability and unreliability as required by temporary instruction (TI) 2515/149. The audit included interviews with the licensees risk analysts and other technical staff, reviews of operating logs, design basis documents, and equipment history. The inspectors also reviewed monthly reports, maintenance rule reports, CRDRs, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, system drawings, and the NRC SDP notebook. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees MSPI spreadsheets and the Reactor Oversight MSPI Pilot Basis Document, which provided a description of the boundaries and active components.
Sections 03.11.a and 03.11.c were not completed as written because the staff did not qualify the licensees updated PRA for use prior to or during the MSPI pilot. However, the activities conducted by the analysts and the results obtained for these sections are documented in an attachment to this inspection report.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees treatment of the following systems covered by this pilot:
high pressure safety injection system
essential cooling water system
essential spray pond system
-12-b.
Findings The licensee made a reasonable best effort to provide accurate and complete data for this voluntary pilot program. The specific audit results of TI 2515/149 are documented in Attachment 2.
4OA6 Management Meetings Exit Meeting Summary The resident inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear, and other members of licensee management on April 2, 2003.
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Crozier and other members of licensee management during a telephonic exit interview conducted on January 22, 2003.
The inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear, and other members of licensee management during a telephonic exit interview conducted on March 20, 2003.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT 1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee M. Banks, Communications Representative, Palo Verde Communications T. Barsuk, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning S. Bauer, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs D. Carnes, Department Leader, Operations G. Cerkas, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning P. Crawley, Director, Nuclear Fuels Management D. Crozier, Program Leader, Emergency Planning F. Gowers, El Paso Electric R. Henry, Site Representative, Salt River Project A. Kranik, Director, Emergency Services Division B. Lee, Coordinator, Emergency Planning D. Marks, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs D. Mauldin, Vice President, Engineering and Support M. ONeal, Coordinator, Emergency Planning G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear M. Pioggia, Coordinator, Emergency Planning T. Schoech, Coordinator, Emergency Planning D. Smith, Director, Operations M. Sontag, Department Leader, Nuclear Assurance D. Straka, Regulatory Affairs J. Taylor, Department Leader, Operations B. Wolfe, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning NRC D. Votolato, NMSS Intern DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:
Procedures NUMBER TITLE REVISION 40ST-9AF08 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFB-P01 Monthly Valve Alignment
73DP-9PP01 Thermal Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Process
40DP-9OP15 Operator Work Arounds and Discrepancy Tracking
40ST-9SI07 High Pressure Safety Injection System Alignment Verification
-2-40ST-9DG02 Diesel Generator B Test
40OP-9DG01 Emergency Diesel Generator A
Drawings 01-M-EWP-001, "P&I Diagram Essential Cooling Water," Revision 29 01-M-SPP-001, "P&I Diagram Essential Spray Pond System," Revision 35 01-M-SPP-002, "P&I Diagram Essential Spray Pond System," Revision 12 01-M-SIP-001, "P&I Diagram Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling System," Revision 25 01-M-SIP-002, "P&I Diagram Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling System," Revision 24 01-M-SIP-003, "P&I Diagram Safety Injection & Shutdown Cooling System," Revision 9 Work Orders 2577193 2464105 2511115 2548712 229614 2555498 2540559 Condition Report/Disposition Requests 2582719 2584029 2584185 2584844 2587397 2587686 2591656 2583410 2591656 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures EPIP-01, "Satellite Technical Support Center Actions," Revision 13 EPIP-02, "Operations Support Center Actions," Revision 26 EPIP-03, "Technical Support Center Actions," Revision 32 EPIP-04, "Emergency Operations Facility Actions," Revision 32 EPIP-08, "Emergency Planning Administration," Revision 10 EPIP-09, "Emergency Plan Implementation for Security Events," Revision 2 Miscellaneous PVNGS Pre-Fire Strategies Manual, Revision 14 NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2 Reactor Oversight Program MSPI Pilot Bases Document Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station dated November 6, 2002
ATTACHMENT 2 TI 2515/149 Mitigating System Performance Index Pilot Verification (Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3)
Inspection Requirements 03.02 Risk Significant Functions No discrepancies were noted. The licensee correctly identified the risk significant functions for trains within the selected systems.
03.03 Success Criteria No discrepancies were noted with the licensees implementation. Each of the above functions had an appropriate success criteria at the train level (none of the reviewed systems had a separable segment below the train level) which were consistent with the licensees PRA analysis, Technical Specifications, and design basis documentation. The senior reactor analysts reviewed the INEEL Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model for Palo Verde, Revision 3 (SPAR model) and the Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stations, Units 1, 2 and 3, Revision 1 (Risk-Informed Notebook) to determine if they were consistent with the licensees PRA functional success criteria for the MSPI. This comparison is provided in Table 1.
TABLE 1 Palo Verde Functional Success Criteria System Success Criteria Applicable Transients SPAR Notebook AFW One pump, 500 gpm, within 45 minutes Transients, MSLB, SGTR, SLOCA AFW-Trans Fault Tree Table 2 AFW AF-A, 500 gpm, for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in Station Blackout SBO AFW2 Fault Tree Blackout not specifically modeled AFW One pump, 750 gpm, during ATWS ATWS AFW-ATWS Fault Tree Increased flow rate not modeled HPSI One train aligned to hot leg Injection MLOCA, LLOCA HCI-INFF 1/2 MDPs HPSI Injection lines to 3 intact cold legs All Except SGTR, MLOCA, LLOCA modeled inconsistent
-2-HPSI One injection line for RCS makeup SGTR and RCP Seal Leak bounded 1/2 MDPs HPSI Sump suction to a running pump All Recirculation modeled 1/2 MDPs ESP Spray to DG/EW Header All NOTE5 Table 2 ECW Each train flow to SDC HX and EC Chiller All not modeled Table 23 ECW Train A to RCP Seals Transients NOTE4 Inconsisten t2 RHR One train through heat exchangers and swapover All Swapover not modeled Table 2 1 EDG Onsite Electric Power for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> All modeled Table 2 1Notebook only says 1/2 trains 2Not modeled in notebooks 3Notebook does not address flow paths 4Not modeled, only basic event for no cooling (RCS-MDP-LK-SEALS)
5System and check valves modeled ESP-MDP-**-A ESP-MDP-**-B ESP-CKV-**-**
03.04 Unreliability Boundary Definitions No discrepancies were noted with the licensee's implementation. The inspectors confirmed that the licensees definition of the system/train boundaries and the identification of active components was in accordance with the guidance.
Additionally, the senior reactor analysts reviewed the INEEL Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model for Palo Verde, Revision 3 (SPAR model) and the Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stations, Units 1, 2 and 3, Revision 1 (Risk-Informed Notebook)
to determine if they were complete and consistent with the licensees list of active components for the MSPI. This comparison is provided in Table 2.
-3-TABLE 2 Palo Verde Active Components System
/Train Component Function SPAR Basic Event Notebook Location AFW Pump AFA-P01 Secondary Makeup Pump AFW-MDP-**-A Table 2 Pump AFB-P01 Secondary Makeup Pump AFW-MDP-**-A Table 2 Pump AFN-P01 Secondary Makeup Pump AFW-MDP-**-A Table 2 Valve CTA-HV001 Suction Valve for Pump AFN-P01 AFW-MOV-CC-HV001 Table 2 6 Valve CTA-HV004 Suction Valve for Pump AFN-P01 AFW-MOV-CC-HV004 Table 2 6 HPSI A Pump SIA-P02 Injection Pump HPI-MDP-**-A3 Table 2 Valve SIA-UV673 Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-673 Table 2 Valve SIA-UV674 Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-674 Table 2 Valve SIA-UV617 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-617 Table 3.*45 Valve SIA-UV627 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-627 Table 3.*45 Valve SIA-UV637 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-637 Table 3.*45 Valve SIA-UV647 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-647 Table 3.*45 Valve SIA-HV698 Hot Leg Injection Not Modeled1 Not Modeled2 Valve SIA-HV604 Hot Leg Injection NOTE5 Valve SIA-HV321 Hot Leg Injection NOTE5 HPSI B Pump SIB-P02 Injection Pump HPI-MDP-**-B3 Table 2 Valve SIB-UV675 Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-675 Table 2
-4-Valve SIB-UV676 Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-676 Table 2 Valve SIB-UV616 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-616 Table 3.*45 Valve SIB-UV626 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-626 Table 3.*45 Valve SIB-UV636 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-636 Table 3.*45 Valve SIB-UV646 Cold Leg Injection HPI-MOV-CC-646 Table 3.*45 Valve SIB-HV699 Hot Leg Injection Not Modeled1 Not Modeled2 Valve SIB-HV609 Hot Leg Injection NOTE5 Valve SIB-HV331 Hot Leg Injection NOTE5 RHR A Pump SIA-P03 Injection Pump CSR-MDP-**-A Table 2 SIA-UV672 Hot Leg Injection CSR-MOV-CC-672 SIA-UV673 Containment Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-673 Not Modeled SIA-UV674 Containment Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-673 Not Modeled RHR B Pump SIB-P03 Injection Pump CSR-MDP-**-B Table 2 SIB-UV671 Hot Leg Injection CSR-MOV-CC-672 SIB-UV675 Containment Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-673 Not Modeled SIB-UV676 Containment Sump Suction HPR-MOV-CC-673 Not Modeled EDG-01 PEAG01 Emergency Onsite AC EPS-DGN-**-DGA Table 2 EDG-02 PEBG01 Emergency Onsite AC EPS-DGN-**-DGB Table 2 1Hot Leg Injection is not modeled in SPAR 2Hot Leg Injection not discussed in Risk-Informed Notebook 3The ** is replaced by FS, FR, TM (one each)
4The * is replaced by various SDP worksheet numbers 5Valves not specifically addressed, trains only 6Valves only listed as system MOVs
-5-03.05 Train/Segment Unavailability Boundary Definition No discrepancies were noted. The licensee appropriately defined the scope of the trains being monitored for Unavailability within the selected systems.
03.06 Entry of Baseline Data - Planned Unavailability No discrepancies were noted.
03.07 Entry of Baseline Data - Unplanned Unavailability No discrepancies were noted.
03.08 Entry of Baseline Data - Unreliability No discrepancies were noted.
03.09 Entry of Performance Data - Unavailability No discrepancies were noted.
03.10 Entry of Performance Data - Unreliability Minor discrepancies were noted. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the licensee had omitted the failure of Valve 3JSIAHV0698 as an entry for the performance data. The licensee generated CRDR 2571819 and corrected the item.
03.11 MSPI Calculation The analysts reviewed the licensees MSPI basis documents and spreadsheets to determine the validity of the Fussell-Vesely coefficients used in the MSPI calculation. The following observations were made:
The staff did not qualify the licensees updated PRA for use prior to or during the MSPI pilot. Therefore, these line items could not be performed as written.
All Fussell-Vesely coefficients were greater than zero, indicating that the associated components or trains were modeled in the licensees PRA.
A review of a sample of coefficients for each site indicated that the relative significance of the components and/or trains were in keeping with their expected relative risk significance.
Most Fussell-Vesely coefficients were too small to verify using hand calculations because the associated core damage frequencies were equal out to 4 significant digits.
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Based on a sample of coefficients, large enough to verify using hand calculations, the Fussell-Vesely coefficients provided by the licensee were consistent with those produced by the licensees model of record.
Based on a sample of coefficients, the SPAR model results were within a factor of 2 of the Fussell-Vesely coefficients provided by the licensee.
No discrepancies were noted in the licensees performance.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AFW auxiliary feedwater ATWS anticipated transient without scram CKV check valve CSR containment spray recirculation DGN diesel generator ECW essential cooling water EDG emergency diesel generator EPS electric power system FTR failure to run FTS failure to start HPI high pressure injection HPSI high pressure safety injection HPR high pressure recirculation HX heat exchanger INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory LLOCA large-break loss of coolant accident LECH loss of essential chilled water LOOP loss of offsite power M/D motor-driven MLOCA medium-break loss of coolant accident MDP motor-driven pump MOV motor-operated valve MSLB main steam line break MSPI mitigation systems performance indicator PRA probabilistic risk assessment RCP reactor coolant pump RCS reactor coolant system RHR residual heat removal system SBO station blackout SDC shutdown cooling SDP significance determination process SLOCA small-break loss of coolant accident SGTR steam generator tube rupture SI safety injection TM test and maintenance