IR 05000528/1995004
| ML17311A838 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1995 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17311A837 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-95-04, 50-528-95-4, 50-529-95-04, 50-529-95-4, 50-530-95-04, 50-530-95-4, NUDOCS 9505030110 | |
| Download: ML17311A838 (28) | |
Text
0 ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
, Inspection Report:
50-528/95-04 50-529/95-04 50-530/95-04 Licenses:
NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box 53999 Phoenix, Arizona Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2,
and
Inspection At:
Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Conducted; April 11-14, 1995 Inspectors:
A. D. Mcgueen, Team Leader Reactor Inspection Branch T.
H. Essig, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation G.
H. Good, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst Reactor Inspection Branch A.
E. HacDougall, Resident Inspector, Palo Verde B. J. Olson, Project Inspector Project Branch F, Division of Reactor Projects Accompanying Personnel:
D.
K. Faris, Senior Development Engineer Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories R.
D. Hogle, Senior Research Scientist/Health Physics Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Approved:
aine urray, hie
,
ea tor Inspect~on Branc ate 9505030iiQ 950427 PDR ADQCK 05000528 PDR
Ins ection Summar Areas Ins ected Units I
and
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance and capabilities during the full play exercise of the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
The inspection team observed activities in the Control Room (simulator), Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.
Results:
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The Control Room staff's performance in event analysis, classification, and notification of offsite authorities was good.
Control Room personnel used an analytical approach in problem solving and were innovative in seeking alternatives to equipment failures.
Overall command, control, and communications were good.
The use of the shift technical advisor was particularly effective (Section 3. 1).
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The Technical Support Center performed well during the exercise and provided timely and effective analysis of scenario plant conditions.
All functions of the lechnical Support Center were considered strong (Section 4. 1).
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The Operational Support Center was staffed and activated in a timely manner.
The center staff worked together as a team in an excellent manner (Section 5. 1).
The Emergency Operations Facility was activated promptly and generally performed well during the exercise.
Two exercise weaknesses were identified in the area of offsite notifications and protective action recommendations.
Radiological assessments were appropriate (Section 6. 1).
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The scenario provided sufficient challenges to demonstrate exercise objectives (Section 7. I).
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The licensee's critique process was satisfactory in properly characterizing exercise findings and was capable of identifying areas in need of corrective action (Section 8. 1).
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
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Exercise Weakness 50-528/9504-01; 50-529/9504-01; 50-530/9504-01 was opened (Section 6.1.1).
Exercise Weakness 50-528/9504-02; 50-529/9504-02; 50-530/9504-02 was opened (Section 6.1.1).
Attachment:
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FACILITY STATUS DETAILS
, The licensee was operating Units 2 and 3 at full power level during the week of the inspection.
Unit 1 was in a refueling outage.
PROGRAM AREAS INSPECTED (S2301)
The licensee's annual emergency preparedness exercise began at 8 a.m.
on April 12, 1995.
Licensee participants included the emergency response organizations Other participants in the exercise included NRC regional base and site teams, the NRC Headquarters Operations Center, the State of Arizona, and county and local officia'Is.
The performances of state and local response organizations were evaluated by representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEHA), which will issue a separate report.
The scenario for the exercise was dynamically simulated using one of the licensee's Control Room simulators.
The initial conditions of the scenario included Unit 3 operation at 100 percent power, and the operating crew was informed of plans to move a 16,000 pound security "pillbox" located near the containment building.
The operating crew was also informed of other on-going plant activities which had no bearing on later events.
The major events simulated were as follows:
t A leak developed in a reactor coolant system.
The magnitude of the leak results in the declaration of a Notice of Unusual Event.
During plant shutdown, the reactor coolant system leak increased and resulted in escalation to an ALERT.
Also, when the reactor was at 25 percent power, a Class 1E Emergency 4. 16kV bus sustained severe damage which rendered one train of the emergency core cooling system inoperable.
The reactor failed to trip when the trip switchbuttons were manually depressed which required the operators to use an alternative method to trip the reactor.
The reactor coolant leak rapidly increased after the reactor trip and caused an increase in containment pressure.
A stuck closed isolation valve prevented containment spray from functioning.
The crane moving the security "pillbox" swung in the wrong direction and struck containment.
The "pillbox" fell on a pipe and breached containment integrity.
The event was upgraded to a Site Area Emergency.
Containment radiation readings rapidly increased giving rise to indications of fuel cladding failure.
The event was upgraded to a
General Emergenc,
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The remainder of the scenario consisted of efforts to recover failed equipment, initiate containment spray, and continue with core cooling.
CONTROL ROON (82301'-03.02)
The inspection team observed and evaluated the Control Room staff as they performed tasks in response to exercise events indicated by the Control Room simulator used for the exercise.
These tasks included detection and classification of event-related conditions, detailed analysis of conditions, notification of licensee personnel, and notification of offsite authorities.
3.1 Discussion Shortly after the Control Room staff assumed shift duties, the primary operator announced that a reactor coolant system leak possibly existed, and an abnormal operating procedure was entered to determine the magnitude of the leak.
During the leakrate calculation, the Control Room staff evaluated control board indications and determined a probable location for the leak.
The site shift manager entered the Control Room during the initial leakrate calculation and received a briefing by the shift supervisor.
The site shift manager appropriately declared a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-02,
"Emergency Classification,"
based on reactor coolant system leakage greater than
gallons per minute.
The site shift manager assumed the responsibilities of the emergency coordinator and directed that offsite notifications be made.
Notifications to state and local agencies were made 5 minutes later in accordance with EPIP-03,
"Notification of Unusual Event Implementing Actions,"
and a site wide announcement was made.
The Control Room supervisor announced a plant shutdown after the reactor coolant system leakrate had been determined.
During plant shutdown, the primary operator observed-that reactor coolant system leakage had increased, and action was taken to maintain pressurizer level.
The emergency coordinator appropriately declared an Alert when reactor coolant system leakage was determined to be greater than 44 gallons per minute.
A site wide announcement was made 4 minutes later in accordance with EPIP-04,
"Alert, Site Area and General Emergency Implementing Actions," and notifications to state and local agencies were made 9 minutes after the Alert declaration.
The initial notification to NRC was made 42 minutes after the Notification of Unusual Event.
The inspector observed that all emergency notifications from the Control Room were made in accordance with applicable procedures.
After the emergency coordinator function was transferred from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center, the site shift manager remained in the Control Room and provided oversight while maintaining communications with the Technical Support Center.
During the exercise, the inspector observed the site shift manager reset annunciators on control boards and change a contro 1 board display of containment atmospheric conditions.
Although the site shift manager was a licensed operator, the inspector concluded that actions to
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operate control board equipment might detract from the site shift manager'
responsibility to provide oversight.
Prior to the'otification of Unusual Event, the:inspector observed that operators did not announce alarms as they do during normal operations.
Specifically, the licensee had recently changed standards of Control Room conduct; operators were expected to announce alarms, and the Control Room supervisor was expected to repeat back the announcement.
The inspector subsequently observed an appropriate response to alarms when the event developed, and the control room supervisor was informed of changing conditions.
Throughout the exercise, the Control Room staff appropriately analyzed
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changing plant conditions and coordinated efforts to mitigate the consequences of the event.
The Control Room staff quickly responded to challenges when the reactor would not initially trip, when an emergency electric bus lost power, and when battery power supplies were lost.
Additionally, the operators quickly isolated Control Room ventilation systems when containment integrity had been breached.
The inspector observed very good coordination between the primary and secondary operators during cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant system, and operators were observed to demonstrate good coordination in transferring the safety injection suction supply from the refueling water tank to the containment emergency sump.
The Control Room staff was also innovative in providing recommendations to the Technical Support Center for supplying containment spray through an alternate flowpath, for emergency equipment repairs, and for a method to possibly limit the atmospheric release from containment, The Control Room supervisor maintained good command of the Control Room staff, and the shift supervisor provided appropriate oversight of activities.
With one exception, briefings were held prior to changing plant conditions or when different Emergency Operating Procedures were implemented.
In that instance, activities were stopped when the third reactor operator requested a briefing prior to plant cooldown and depressurization.
During the briefings, the Control Room supervisor solicited comments from the Control Room staff including the shift supervisor and site shift manager.
The site shift manager kept the Control Room staff apprised of Technical Support Center actions and of escalated emergency classification declarations.
Throughout the exercise, the shift technical advisor was involved in analyzing conditions and making recommendations to the shift supervisor and Control Room supervisor.
The shift technical advisor quickly obtained piping drawings and determined the probable location of the reactor coolant system leak.
The shift technical advisor also provided an independent assessment of emergency classification declarations, and reviewed decisions regarding the selection of emergency operating procedures.
Finally, the shift technical advisor provided an independent review and meaningful comments to a procedure which was developed to provide an alternate containment spray flowpat I
3.2 Conclusions The Control Room staff's performance in event analysis, classification, and notification of offsite authorities was good.
Control Room personnel used an
. analytical approach in problem solving and were innovative in seeking alternatives to equipment failures.
- Overall command, control, and communications were good.
The use of the shift technical advisor was particularly effective.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (82301-03.03)
The inspection team observed and evaluated the Technical Support Center staff as they performed the full range of tasks necessary to respond to the exercise scenario.
These tasks included detection and classification of events; notification of Federal, State, and local response agencies; analysis of plant conditions; formulation of corrective action plans; prioritizing mitigating actions; and formulating recovery and re-entry plans.
4.1 Discussion The Technical Support Center was activated in a prompt and orderly fashion, and smooth transition of command and control from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center was executed.
The interface between the Emergency Operations Facility and the Technical Support Center was satisfactorily maintained.
All classifications were made correctly in the Technical Support Center from the data that was given.
Drill scenario data led to a conservative core damage assessment by the Technical Support Center which resulted in classification of the event as a Site Area Emergency and later as a General Emergency well ahead of the expected scenario time line.
The emergency coordinator exhibited excellent command and control skills utilizing frequent staff briefin Key player input and involvement was also an important part of these briefings.
During the course of the event the emergency coordinator formed a group led by his assistant of key individuals from all disciplines, which met in a separate room to assess current plant conditions and to formulate a recovery plan.
The Technical Support Center team demonstrated many unique ideas for'recovery actions (i.e.,
a nonprocedure method for establishing containment spray, patch cords for alternate power supplies, an alternate method to flash the field of an emergency diesel generator using'
car battery, and use of a fire hose at the containment bt each to reduce the spread of contamination).
Although the majority of the Technical Support Center mitigating actions were well analyzed and technically accurate, the decision to dispatch a repair team inside containment with a 75 gallons per minute reactor coolant system leak was not fully evaluated.
With the subsequent increase in leakage, dispatching a team prior to reactor coolant system cooldown and depressurization could have resulted in serious injury or fatality had the team not been held up for, administrative reason A plant status board at the Technical Support Center, used because of partial failure of the Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition and Display System, had no means of indicating when the information was last updated.
The emergency coordin'ator w'as overhead telling the*operations coordinator not to
~ trust the data, because he did not know when it was taken.
An "as of" time for posting of the status -boards may preclude this type incident.
There was no status board used to inform Technical Support Center personnel of work in progress, estimated time to completion, or job priorities.
This resulted in the maintenance coordinator asking for the current priority of jobs on at least one occasion.
The emergency coordinator and operations coordinator correctly assessed the impact of all failed equipment or instrument malfunctions, and personnel in both the Technical Support Center and Control Room were aware of this assessment.
The emergency coordinator set correct. goals and priorities in every instance based on a thorough assessment of potential hazards.
Continued reassessment of these goals and priorities was performed as plant conditions changed continuing into a plan for cleanup following termination of the release.
4.2 Conclusion The Technical Support Center performed well during the exercise and provided timely and effective analysis of scenario plant conditions.
All functions of the Technical Support Center were considered strong.
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (82301-03.05)
The inspectors evaluated the performance of the Operations Support Center staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise.
These tasks included activation of the Operations Support Center and providing support to operations, including the coordination of emergency in-plant response teams.
5.1 Discussion The'Operations Support Center was staffed, declared activated, and fu'lly functional 26 minutes after the Alert was declared.
A delay in obtaining emergency medical technician entry into the protected area prevented even earlier activation.
The Operations Support Center coordinator displayed very good command and control throughout the exercise.
The coordinator ensured that all the tasking came from the emergency maintenance coordinator in the Technical Support Center.
The coordinator was observed to deny requests for action until he was notified by the Technical Support Center to proceed.
Additionally, communications between emergency facilities were frequently conducted and were observed to be adequate.
After the initial activation briefing, the Operations Support Center coord'nator did not make periodic plant status briefings to the entire staff and provided limited briefing information to most of the key positions working in the Operations Support Center office.
The balance of the Operations
Support Center staff received only generic plant status updates from announcements over the public address system.
As a result of not being briefed on the overall status of the plant, some auxiliary operators did not understand why they were -asked to perform some tasks.
Also, the inspectors found that no general announcement was made about eating, drinking or chewing prohibitions.
A player was observed smoking in the breezeway during the General Emergency, downwind of the plume.
Over 30 in-plant teams were dispatched during the exercise.
With the exception of providing plant status, most bri,efings and debriefings of the in-plant teams were good.
The inspectors observed that health physics technicians had a unique query card attached to their badge lanyard that was used to ensure that briefing items are adequately covered.
Overall, good control of teams was displayed.
The team briefing forms were very useful in the control and tracking of dispatched teams.
When the Control Room informed the Operations Support Center that a change in auxiliary building radiation levels was about to occur, the Operations Support Center knew what teams were in the area and promptly evacuated them.
The performance of the in-plant response teams was found to be generally good.
Team members were knowledgeable on the use of anticontamination clothing and, with one exception, self-contained breathing apparatus.
In that instance, a
team member assigned to enter containment was found to be not qualified for self-contained breathing apparatus use.
The inspectors observed that proper radiation protection practices were employed, and that safety equipment considerations were implemented throughout the exercise.
Also, communications with the dispatched teams were effective through utilization of both in-plant phones and radios.
The inspectors observed one questionable practice where an auxiliary operator returned to the Operations Support Center after completing an assigned task in the turbine building, but the health physics technician remained in the turbine building to conduct an independent radiation survey.
The inspectors concluded that this undirected split in the team could affect the ability to account for personnel and reduced the ability for assistance, if needed, from a fellow team member.
The inspectors noted that team members were not briefed on details of when to keycard in and out of the Operations Support Center.
On several occasions, teams were delayed in dispatch or were slowed in entering areas due to improper keycarding.
Improper keycarding could also affect the ability to account for personnel.
The inspectors observed that auxiliary operators were delayed to fill out team briefing forms to perform critical tasks outside of the radiological control area.
As a result, in one instance, an emergency diesel generator was running without cooling water and could not be stopped within prescribed time limits.
Two areas involving delays were identified.
These areas concerned the need for a method for rapidly dispatching auxiliary operators into the plant for critically needed operations and training of personnel regarding the use of keycards for accountability requirement i
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5.2 Conclusions The Operations Support Center was staffed and activated in a timely manner.
The center staff worked together as a team in an excellent manner.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (82301 03. 04)
The inspectors observed the Emergency Operations Facility staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise.
These tasks included facility activation; development and issuance of protective action recommendations; notification of federal, state, and local response agencies; dose assessment and coordination of field monitor teams; analysis of plant conditions; and direct interactions with the NRC site team and the state response teams.
6. 1 Discussion 6. 1. 1 Command and Control The inspectors observed that the Emergency Operations Facility was activated 29 minutes after the Alert declaration.
Personnel initially began activating the Emergency Operations Facility at the Unusual Event classification level; however, the lead facility controller properly asked the players to leave since the facility would not normally be activated unless an Alert had been declared.
During the initial stages of activation, the emergency operations director made a prompt decision to use the status boards to compensate for the limited availability of the Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition and Display System.
Facility management, technical, and administrative support personnel demonstrated adequate knowledge of their duties throughout the exercise.
The emergency operations director conducted frequent and comprehensive briefings of the entire staff, and logs were conscientiously maintained.
Several examples of poor information control were identified.
First, offsite agency notifications via the Notification Alert Network at the General Emergency were not conducted within 15 minutes of event declaration as required by Section 6.3 of the Emergency Plan.
The General Emergency was declared at 11:20 a.m,,
and notifications over the Notification Alert Network began at 11:45 a.m.
It should be noted that the emergency operations director personally communicated the classification changes, protective action recommendations, and plant status to the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 13 minutes after event declaration.
The delay in the Notification Alert Network notifications occurred because the government liaison could not get the emergency operations director's signature" (approval)
on the notification form.
Notification Alert Network notifications include the Maricopa County Sheriff's Department and Department of Emergency Management, and the State of Arizona Department of Public Safety and Division of Emergency Management.
The failure to make required offsite agency notifications within 15 minutes was identified as an exercise weakness (50-528/9504-01, 50-529/9504-01, and 50-530/9504-01).
Second, conflicting and potentially confusing information regarding protective
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action recommendations was provided to the offsite agencies at the Site Area
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-10-Emergency.
The initial emergency message form (Appendix 0 to EPIP-04, "Alert, Site Area and General Emergency Implementing Actions" ) included a check in Section 3.a which states that there are no protective action recommendations; however," the form. also states that sheltering a 2-mile radius was recommended.
In addition, the form initially indicated that sheltering to 5 miles in Sectors E,
F, and G was recommended.
Prior to completion of the form, the emergency operations director had informed the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency that the protective action recommendation was to shelter a 2-mile radius.
The assistant emergency operations director noted the discrepancy on the form before the incorrect protective action recommendations were communicated over the Notification Alert Network; however, the emergency operations director had already approved the message form which included the incorrect recommendations.
Providing conflicting and confusing information to offsite agencies was identified as an exercise weakness (50-528/9504-02, 50-529/9504-02, and 50-530/9504-02).
Third, draft news release Nos.
7 and 8 generated by Emergency Operations Facility personnel incorrectly stated that the plant was in a Site Area Emergency.
The purpose of the Emergency Operations F..cility news releases was to provide technical information to the Joint Emergency News Center.
Both draft news releases were approved by the emergency operations director or assistant emergency operations director.
The draft news releases were issued at 12:36 p.m.
and 1 p.m., respectively.
A General Emergency had been declared at 11:20 a.m.
6. 1.2 Radiation Protection Habitability surveys of the Emergency Operations Facility were frequent and of appropriate depth.
Exposure rate measurements were performed with a hand-held survey instrument, as well as with a portable alarming area radiation monitor.
Air samples were also collected.
A contamination control point was established, as was an area for dosimeter issuance, should the need have arisen.
Field monitoring teams were activated and staffed in a timely manner, Two teams were deployed, and initial radio contact established with the Emergency Operations Facility within approximately 30 minutes of the declaration of the Alert.
These teams measured exposure rates and collected air samples effectively throughout the exercise to identify, monitor, and characterize the plume.
The radiological assessment communicator kept field teams informed of changing plant conditions, meteorology, and source term information.
The dose assessment health physicist periodically computed the ratio of the external dose equivalent to the total effective dose equivalent so that field team members could evaluate their total effective dose equivalent by appropriately scaling pocket dosimeter results.
The radiological assessment coordinator made a decision at 11:32 a.m. to deploy a third field monitoring team in light of the containment breach.
The team was not actually available to perform surveys, however, until 1:35 p.m.,
approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later.
This delay was considered excessive.
The dose assessment health physicist's staff completed its first dose assessment at 9:20 a.m.,
approximately 15 minutes prior to the Emergency
Operations Facility being declared operational.
The staff initially focussed on dose assessment for a steam generator tube rupture, since early indications pointed to this as a possibility.
At 10 a.m., prior to any significant releases of radioactive materials, the radiological assessment coordinator recognized the need to avoid the downwind quadrant for assembly/evacuation of
'onsite staff, should conditions have worsened.
The focus rapidly and appropriately switched to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), when plant conditions suggested that this was the actual (in an exercise context)
situation.
Dose assessments were performed and the associated emergency operations director briefing form completed at reasonable intervals.
However, relatively large gaps (of approximately 1.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and nearly 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />)
were noted during the period of increased releases of radioactive materials following the General Emergency declaration.
Following the dropping of the pillbox which caused a leak in a containment penetration, the emergency operations facility technical analysis manager'
staff began to estimate the leakage flow rate through the containment breach as a supporting activity for the dose assessment function.
The following problems were noted:
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The initial leak rate was provided in units of lb/hr (pounds per hour)
to the dose assessment staff.
The HESOREN computer program required input in units of cc/sec (cubic centimeters per second),
a conversion.
which required time and represented an opportunity for error.
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Although subsequent leak rates were provided in units of cc/sec, the engineering staff had apparently estimated a "choke flow", which was the maximum flow rate possible through the orifice in question, irrespective of the driving head (containment pressure).
The "choke flow" method did not come to light until around 3:45 p.m.,
when the dose assessment staff questioned the approximate factor of 10 disconnect between calculated offsite radiation levels compared with field team measurements.
Rather than resolve this discrepancy with the engineering staff, the dose assessment staff simply reduced the containment leak rate by a factor of 10 to permit a better correlation between calculated and measured offsite radiation levels.
6.2 Conclusions The Emergency Operations Facility was activated promptly and generally performed well during the exercise.
Two exercise weaknesses were identified in the area of offsite notifications and protective action recommendations.
Radiological assessments were appropriate.
SCENARIO AND EXERCISE CONDUCT (82301)
The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and realism of the scenario and to evaluate the conduct of the exercis.1 Discussion Inspectors noted several instances where negative training may have resulted from.scenario driven events or activities.
For example:
There were several unrealistic hold points that were introduced by controllers to get the results needed from the scenario.
This appeared to lead to confusion and frustration from team players and challenged the realistic nature of the scenario.
The emergency coordinator was prevented in some cases from carrying out his normal actions (i.e.,
plant assembly and accountability, termination of work in progress)
due to controller direction.
Inconsistent data was given to Technical Support Center team players.
Chemistry data for the reactor coolant system sample at 9 a.m.
gave a
Xe-133 value 2 decades higher than expected during normal operations on Unit 3.
With no base-line data for pre-event conditions, the technical engineering manager and his team saw this as a large increase in reactor coolant system activity over what they had observed in the plant.
Utilizing EPIP-58, Appendix A, as a guide for core damage assessment, this increased Xe-133 data led to the assumption of failed cladding.
This core damage assessment combined with the reactor coolant system leak rate combined for a Site Area Emergency classification prior to the scenario time line.
Subsequent increase in reactor coolant system leakage and failure of the containment spray with preconditions of reactor coolant system leakage and fuel damage led to a classification of General Emergency based on failure of two barriers and a potential failure of the third (containment/no containment spray with 8.5 psig containment pressure)
2 I/2 hours ahead of the scenario time line.
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An arbitrary insertion of fuel failure into the scenario at I:30 p.m.
had team players questioning the validity of the indications.
There was no reactor coolant system plant data to support this sudden failure, and containment activity samples were inconsistent with radiological indications of 600-800 R/hr.
Team players spent considerable time and resources attempting to analyze the situation without coming to any reasonable conclusions.
This situation was questioned by the NRC team during the scenario brief prior to the drill.
Some conversations and interactions between controllers and players in the Emergency Operations Facility were considered inappropriate for an exercise environment.
On one observed occasion a player corrected an error based on a
controller's question.
Other interactions had similar potential.
The inspectors observed that the Emergency Operations Facility was double staffed in 12 of 18 positions and triple staffed in 5 positions.
This hampered the inspectors'bility to determine whether required actions could be implemented with identified base/minimum staffing levels.
Some individuals identified as second shift personnel on the staffing roster functioned as alternates/second alternates throughout the entire exercise.
Had this been a
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-13-real emergency, these individuals would not have been able to provide second shift coverage over a prolonged period.
With regard to the post-exercise critiques, the inspectors observed that only key players were requested to participate in the critique in the Emergency Operations Facil=ity.
This may have precluded useful input from other facility players.
7.2 Conclusions The scenario provided sufficient challenges to demonstrate exercise objectives.
LICENSEE SELF-CRITIQUE (82301-03. 02. b. 12)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's formal exercise self-critique on April 13, 1995, to determine whether the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective action.
8. 1 Discussion The inspectors attended the individual facility critiques immediately following the exercise on April 12, 1995, and determined the facility critiques provided good input into the formal critique process.
The formal corporate critique held on April 13, 1995, involved the reviewed findings from each facility.
The critiques identified exercise weaknesses and areas For improvement.
Several of the areas for improvement identified by the NRC team were similarly characterized and discussed during the licensee's critiques.
8.2 Conclusions The licensee's critique process was satisfactory, properly characterized exercise findings, and was capable of identifying areas in need of corrective actio ATTACHMENT
PERSONS CONTACTED e
1. 1 Licensee Personnel
- R. Aud, Planner, Maricopa County Department of Emergency Management
- J. Bailey, Vice Pr esi'dent, Nuclear Engineering T. Barsuk, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- S. Bauer, Acting Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- H. Bieling, Manager, Emergency Planning
- C. Bolle, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- S. Burns, Engineering Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering Department
- R. Buzard, Site Representative, Nuclear Assurance
- G. Cerkas, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- B. Dayyo, Owner Representative, Strategic Communications
- J. Draper, Site Representative, Southern California Edison
- R. Duncan, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- L. Fitzrandolph, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- D. Garchow, Director, Engineering
- F. Gowers, Site Representative, El Paso Electric R. Hazelwood, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- R. Henry, Site Representative, Salt River Project
- R. Horten, Evaluator, Nuclear Assurance
- L. Houghtby, Manager, Nuclear Security W. Johnson, Nuclear Assurance Operations P. Kikendall, Radiation Protection Senior
- M. Koudelka, Planner,.
Emergency Planning
'B.
Lee, Operations/Engineering Advisor, Emergency Planning
- H. Lines, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- P. Murphy, Technical Instructor, Nuclear Training
- M. O'Neal, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- G. Overbeck, Assistant to the Vice President, Nuclear Production M. Pioggia, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- W. Stewart, Executive Vice President, Nuclear
- R. Stroud, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- B. Wolfe, Coordinator, Emergency Planning 1.2 NRC Personnel
- K. Johnston, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting 2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on April 14, 1995.
During this meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or reviewed by, the inspection team during the inspectio '
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