IR 05000528/1995002
| ML17311A734 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1995 |
| From: | Powers D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17311A733 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-95-02, 50-528-95-2, 50-529-95-02, 50-529-95-2, 50-530-95-02, 50-530-95-2, NUDOCS 9503290016 | |
| Download: ML17311A734 (30) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-528/95-02 50-529/95-02 50-530/95-02 Licenses:
NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box 53999 Phoenix, Arizona Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and
. Inspection At:
Wintersberg, Arizona Inspection Conducted:
February 13-17 and in-office review through March 10, 1995 Inspector:
C. Johnson, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Approved:
a e
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owers, C ie
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aintenance rane Division of Reactor Safety zo/'f s ate Iris ection Summar Areas Ins ected Units 1 and
No inspection of Units 1 and 3 activities was performed.
Areas Ins ected Unit 2
Routine, announced inspection of the inservice inspection program and implementing work activities.
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Plant 0 erations Not applicable during this inspection.
95032900i6 950324 PDR ADQCK 05000528
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Maintenance The licensee had established a well defined inservice inspection program, and had implemented the program effectively (Section 2. 1.2).
Inservice inspection procedures contained sufficient details and instructions.
Nondestructive examination reports were properly completed and evaluated.
Nondestructive examination records were readily retrievable (Section 2.2.2).
Nondestructive examination technicians appropriately performed ultrasonic and liquid penetrant examinations according to procedures.
Approved procedures were available at the work place (2.3.2).
Nondestructive examination technicians were knowledgeable of the procedural requirements.
Nondestructive examination technicians performance while conducting the examinations was good (Section 2.3.2).
Code replacement and repair work had been accomplished according to approved procedures and instructions.
Work instructions were'clear and provided sufficient detail (Section 2.4.2).
Nondestructive examination technicians were properly certified in accordance with the industry standard (Section 2.5.2).
During the inspection, the licensee's staff could not determine what its practice had been for applying lubricant to the containment airlock door seals and the equalizing valve 0-rings before conducting Type B local leakage rate testing (Section 2.6. 1).
En ineerin Not applicable during this inspection.
Not applicable during this inspection.
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Mana ement Overview Management overview of the Code repair and replacement work processes was good (Section 2.4.2).
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
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Unresolved Item 528/9349-02 was closed (Section 2.6, 1).
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Unresolved Item 528/9502-01; 529/9502-01; 530/9502-01 was opened (Section 2.6. I).
Attachment:
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Attachment
Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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Attachment
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Documents Reviewed
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DETAILS
PLANT STATUS During this inspection period, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, was in the second week of the fifth refueling outage.
INSERVICE INSPECTION (73753)
The objective of this inspection was to determine whether the performance of inservice inspection examinations and the repair and replacement of Class 1,
2, and 3 pressure retaining components were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, the applicable ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, requirements imposed by NRC and industry initiatives, and correspondence between the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the licensee concerning relief requests.
2. 1 Inservice Ins ection Pro ram and Plans 2.1.1 Discussion The inspector discussed the inservice inspection program and scheduled examinations with the licensee's inservice inspection staff.
The inspector reviewed the inservice inspection plan and schedule for the third inspection period of the first 10-year interval.
The inspector reviewed two relief requests submitted during the first 10-year inservice inspection program and found that the NRC had approved one of the requests dated December 10, 1992, and it's supplement, dated Harch 11,- 1993.
The second relief request was submitted February 3, 1995.
This relief request was submitted requesting approval to use the provisions of ASHE Code Case N-416-1, "Alternate Pressure Test Requirements for Welded Repairs or Installation of Replacement Items by Welding, Class 1,
2, 3,Section XI, Division 1."
This relief request had not been approved by the NRC staff as of this inspection.
The inspector determined that documents describing relief requests to the inservice inspection program were properly documented.
The inspector requested to see any changes made to the inservice inspection program.
The licensee's inservice inspection staff informed the inspector that no other changes were made to the current inservice inspection first 10-year program.
However, the inspector was briefed by the nuclear assurance department leader on an audit that had been conducted previously, and was informed that Audit Report No.95-001 identified that changes had been made to the inservice inspection program without review and approval.
The inspector held discussions with the licensee inservice inspection staff to discuss these changes.
The inspector briefly reviewed the issue that nuclear assurance had identified.
The inspector's review indicated that pen-and-ink changes had been made to the inservice inspection program plans; however, no change appeared to be a change to Code requirements or NRC commitments.
Audit Report No.95-001 was not ready for review during this inspectio f f
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The inspector selected inservice inspection records of Class 1, 2, and
components examined during previous inspection periods to determine if the licensee had followed its inservice inspection program and was meeting the required ASHE Code completion percentages for components to be examined each inspection period.
The inspector selected the following ASHE Code Item Nos. for review:
Pressurizer circumferential welds Item No. 82. 11 Cat. 8-8; Pressurizer longitudinal welds Item No. 82. 12 Cat. 8-8; Shutdown cooling heat exchanger Item No. C2.21 Cat.
C-A (nozzle to shell weld);
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Shutdown cooling heat exchanger Item No. C2.22 Cat., C-A (nozzle to radius weld);
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Class 3 pressure test for the auxiliary feedwater pump (AFB-P01);
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Class 3 pressure test for the Essential Cooling Water Train 8; and
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Class 3 pressure test for the Essential Chilled Water System Train B.
The inspector determined that necessary records were readily available for review.
The inspector concluded from the selection of records reviewed that the licensee had followed its inservice inspection program from previous inspection periods of the first 10-year interval for Class 1, 2, and
components.
No deficiencies were identified.
2. 1.2 Conclusions The inspector's review of the licensee's inservice inspection program and its implementation for Unit 2 indicated that the licensee had established a well defined inservice inspection program and had implemented the program effectively.
2.2 Inservice Ins ection Procedures and Records Review 2.2. 1 Discussion The inspector reviewed certain nondestructive examination procedures associated with the inservice inspection examinations observed.
The inspector determined that the sampled procedures used were consistent with the requirements of the applicable ASHE Cod I
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The inspector determined that procedures contained sufficient details and instructions to perform the intended examinations.
The inspector verified that nondestructive examination reports had been properly completed and submitted to appropriate nondestructive examination personnel for review and evaluation.
The inspector determined that necessary nondestructive examination records were readily retrievable for review.
2.2.2 Conclusions The inservice inspection procedures contained sufficient details and instructions.
Nondestructive examination reports were properly completed and evaluated.
Nondestructive examination records were readily retrievable.
2.3 Observation of Nondestructive Examinations 2.3.1 Oiscussion The inspector observed several different types of nondestructive examinations that were performed by nondestructive examination technicians on Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger B.
Specifically, the inspector observed ultrasonic examinations performed on Weld Nos.
75-76, 75-78, and 75-79 and a liquid penetrant examination performed on Weld No. SI-72.
The inspector verified that ultrasonic calibration reports were conducted before performing the examinations; equipment was calibrated properly; nondestructive examination technicians used proper scanning techniques; approved procedures were used; and correct weld identification was performed.
The inspector verified that dye penetrant materials used were acceptable by procedure for the liquid penetrant examinations conducted.
The inspector observed that the surface condition of piping appeared clean.
Observation by the inspector verified that penetrant dwell time, drying time, and develop time were performed according to procedure.
The nondestructive examination technicians performing the examinations were knowledgeable of procedural and ASME Code requirements.
guestionable indications noted by the nondestructive examination technicians were properly documented.
The performance of the nondestructive examination technicians was observed to be good.
t 2.3.2 Conclusions The inspector determined that nondestructive examination technicians were appropriately performing the ultrasonic and liquid penetrant examinations according to procedures.
Approved procedures were available at the work place.
The nondestructive examination technicians were knowledgeable of the procedural requirements.
The nondestructive examination technicians performance while conducting the examinations was goo,
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2.4 Code Re air and Re lacement Activities 2.4. I Discussion The inspector reviewed inspection records and observed ASME Code replacement work in progress on the Unit 2 pressurizer.
Babcock and Wilcox personnel performed this ASME Code replacement.
The inspector was informed that Babcock and Wilcox personnel conducted the same work on Units I and 3 previously.
Maintenance Work Order No. 00694487 implemented Design Change Package 2PM-RC-182.
The design change involved replacing the pressurizer thermoweld, and two instrument pressure taps with Inconel 690 material.
The original material, which was made of Inconel 600, was susceptible to cracking due to primary water stress corrosion, The inspector observed magnetic particle testing conducted around the area of existing instrument taps.
Magnetic particle testing was conducted to establish a baseline of the condition of the material before work began.
The inspector observed different phases of the work (i.e., cutting of instrument taps, and preparation for heat treatment)
being performed.
The inspector also observed portions of the automatic welding process on the weld pad.
Hot work permits were appropriately posted in vicinity.
The inspector verified that welding parameters were established as required by procedure.
The inspector determined that work was being implemented according to work instructions included in the process work traveler.
Management overview of the work processes were good.
The inspector reviewed various work drawings and work travelers for the work being conducted.
Work instructions were clear and provided sufficient detail.
Interviews and observation of personnel performing work indicated that they were knowledgeable of ASME Code and work procedure requirements.
The inspector determined from observations during the inspection that Babcock and Wilcox personnel were performing the work in an excellent manner.
No discrepancies were noted'.4.2 Conclusions Code replacement and repair work had been accomplished according to approved procedures and instructions.
Work instructions were clear and provided sufficient detail.
Management overview of the work processes was good.
2.5 Personnel ualifications and Certifications 2.5. I Discussion The inspector reviewed the qualifications and certifications of Level II and III contractors (Lambert, MacGill, Thomas, Inc.,
and Babcock and Wilcox) and the licensee (Arizona Public Service)
nondestructive examination technician,
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Lambert, MacGill, Thomas, Inc.,
and Arizona Public Service personnel performed nondestructive examinations for the Unit 2 inservice inspection plan.
Babcock and Wilcox personnel performed Code replacement work on the Unit 2 pressurizer.
The inspector reviewed the certifications of the nondestructive examination technicians and verified that the technicians observed performing the examinations were qualified to perform the work.
The inspector observed several nondestructive examination technicians perform various nondestructive examinations.
The inspector determined that nondestructive examination technicians were knowledgeable of procedural requirements, examination techniques, and test equipment.
The inspector verified that qualification and certification records properly reflected the employer's name; person certified; activity qualified for performance; level of certification; effective period of certification; and the annual visual acuity and color vision examination.
The inspector determined that nondestructive examination technicians designated as qualified to perform the examinations were properly certified according to industry standard American Society for Nondestructive Testing's
"Recommended Practice SNT-TC-IA."
The inspector noted several observations during review of Arizona Public Service nondestructive examination certification records:
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Nondestructive examination personnel performing nondestructive examinations could also sign off as the reviewer, and
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Nondestructive examination personnel taking an annual visual acuity and color vision examination could also sign off as the reviewer.
The inspector was concerned about the possibility for inadequate review of nondestructive examination results because of the lack of independent review.
Discussions with nondestructive examination personnel in the field indicated that they had independent review o results, The inspector reviewed current nondestructive examinations and verified that current test results had an independent review.
Discussions with the engineering section leader indicated that management's expectations pertaining to independent review of work was that an independent person should review work and sign as the reviewer.
This applied to all inservice inspection/inservice testing work processes that required review (i.e., nondestructive examination reports, eye examinations, and procedures),
except for emergent work situations.
During emergent work situations (i.e.,
call out in the middle of night) it may not be possible to find an independent reviewer and a self review may be allowed.
However, such documentation was to be reviewed the next business day by an independent reviewer.
The licensee issued Memorandum No. 315-00629-TCC, dated February 17, 1995, reiterating management's expectations pertaining to independent review of wor '
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2.5.2 Conclusions The documents reviewed by the inspector indicated that nondestructive examination technicians were qualified and certified to perform the assigned examinations.
The nondestructive examination technicians were properly certified in accordance with the industry standard.
2.6 FOLLOWUP (92902)
2.6. 1 CLOSED Unresolved Item 528 9349-02
"LLRT - Airlock Door E ualizin Valves" This unresolved item was identified during a review of local leak rate testing of containment penetrations.
The concern was that the inner door equalizing valves for both the 140 foot containment airlock and the 100 foot emergency airlock in all three units were not being individually tested according to
CFR 50, Appendix J, requirements.
During pressure testing, the inboard door equalizing valves were clamped shut to prevent the valves from opening during the 51.5 to 52.0 psig pressure test applied to the entire airlock penetration.
The licensee representative stated that due to the design of the equalizing valve, it could not be tested at pressure (from the airlock side)
greater than the spring force which holds the valve closed at approximately
to 15 psig.
The licensee representative informed the inspector during the previous inspection that although the licensee maintained the position that current testing assured the operability of the equalizing valves in accordance with Technical Specification and their commitments to Appendix J, the licensee planned to consider more rigorous testing of individual operating mechanisms.
This testing would include the equalizing valve 0-ring seals.
The inspector determined from licensee staff statements that the existing method for testing the containment airlock inner door equalizing valves satisfied the testing requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Type B, testing requirements.
The inspector was informed by the licensee representative that containment airlock equalizing valves were tested as part of the overall containment airlock test, as required by Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.3.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's method for testing the containment airlock doors.
Appendix J, Type B, testing was the method used for testing the airlock doors.
The licensee considered the equalizing valves as part of both the outer and inner containment airlock door operating mechanisms.
Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that during pressure testing the inboard door equalizing valve was clamped shut to prevent the valve from opening.
The licensee representative stated that clamping of the inboard door equalizing valve was necessary because this valve was not designed to be tested in the reverse accident direction.
The vendor (Trentec) technical manual recommended clamping the inboard equalizing valve during testin,
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-10-The containment airlock was designed such that internal containment pressure experienced during a design basis accident would assist in seating both the door seals and the equalizing valve 0-rings.
The licensee representative stated that during a barrel leakage test, pressure was applied to the inner containment door opposite the accident pressure direction.
Pressure applied in this reverse direction causes the valve disc to liftoff its seat.
The licensee representative stated that it was, there'fore, necessary to use strong backs on the inner door and C-clamps on the inner door equalizing valve during the overall containment airlock test.
The inspector reviewed the requirements of Appendix J to determine if the licensee was performing the required Type B test for the containment airlock equalizing valves, Appendix J, Type B, paragraph II.G.2, discusses testing of containment airlock doors.
It requires testing containment airlock door seals, including door operating mechanism penetrations, which are part of the containment pressure boundary.
The inspector determined that the equalizing valves were part of the containment airlock door operating mechanism.
The inspector also concluded that Type B testing was the appropriate test method used.
The use of strong backs for the inner containment airlock door and C-clamps to secure the equalizing valves were appropriate.
The inspector based this conclusion in part on the following:
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The containment inner door equalizing valve was tested in accordance with Type A testing requirements (integrated leak rate testing) in the accident direction, and
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The containment outer door equalizing valve was tested in accordance with Type B testing requirements (local leak rate testing)
in the accident direction.
Therefore, both the inner and outer door equalizing valves were tested as required.
The inspector concluded that the licensee was testing these valves in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Type B, testing requirements.
The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel to determine what other tests, if any, were conducted on the containment airlock doors, and specifically, the equalizing valves.
The inspector was informed by a licensee representative that:
(1)- containment airlock doors were tested every 6 months at Pa (approximately 52 psig)
as required by Technical Specifications, (2) containment door seals were tested at 15 psig within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after opening of containment airlock doors, and (3) equalizing valves were visually inspected after every airlock test and upon removal of the C-clamp,
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-11-The inspector asked the licensee representatives several questions pertaining to the containment equalizing valves.
(1)
What post-maintenance test requirements and procedures we e in place to verify the integrity of the equalizing valves after corrective maintenance?
(2)
How was the integrity of the equalizing valve 0-rings verified when clamps were removed?
(3)
Were the test ports on the equalizing valves used to verify leakage after repair or post-maintenance testing?
(4)
Were the containment door seals and equalizing valve 0-rings lubricated before or after the test?
The licensee staff reviewed corrective maintenance work orders for the equalizing valves and informed the inspector that no corrective maintenance had been conducted on these valves within the past 5 years.
The licensee staff could not address what specific post-maintenance tests were conducted during that time frame.
However, they informed the inspector that visual examination of the valves would be the method used for verifying the integrity of the seals in conjunction with Type B testing of the containment airlock doors, if corrective maintenance was necessary.
The licensee staff stated that visual inspections were conducted on the equalizing valves after the containment airlock test when the C-clamps were removed.
The licensee staff also informed the inspector that the test ports on the equalizing valves have never been used, because the vendor recommended the use of the test ports only as an option to conduct individual penetration leak tests after maintenance, During the onsite inspection, the licensee staff could not answer the question on lubrication of the containment air lock door seals and equalizing valve 0-rings.
However, on March 3, 1995, a licensing engineer and the engineer responsible for local leak rate testing informed the inspector during a
telephone conference call that lubrication was applied to both the door seals and the equalizing valves before Type B testing was conducted.
The inspector questioned the licensee staff why they lubricated the seals and o-rings before conducting the test.
The inspector's review of Procedures 73ST-9CL04 and -9CL05,
"Personnel Airlock Overall Leak Test and Interlock Test," for the 100-and 140-foot elevations did not indicate that lubrication should be applied to the airlock door seals.
The inspector asked the licensee staff how they assured themselves that correct "as-found" penetration leakages were achieved inasmuch as lubricant was applied to the seals before testing.
The licer see staff informed the inspector that Appendix J,
Type B testing does address
"as-found" conditions.
The licensee staff also informed the inspector that they did not believe applying lubricant to the airlock door seals would affect or mask any leakag J
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-12-The inspector informed the licensee staff that all three tests (Type A, B, and C) were inter-related.
The inspector also discussed with the licensee staff that overall containment leakage measured by Type A testing was adjusted to account for "as-found" penetration leakages identified during the Type B
and C local leak rate tests.
As such, excessive leakages determined from local leak rate tests can result in the failure of one or more Type B and/or Type C tests and the Type A (due to adjustment, to accommodate
"as-found" Type B and C leakages).
The inspector informed the licensee that applying lubricant to the containment door seals and equalizing valve 0-rings appeared to be inappropriate preconditioning prior to testing.
On Harch 8, 1995, further discussions with the licensee staff indicated that preventive maintenance work order dates did not coincide with the Appendix J, Type B testing dates conducted every 6 months on the containment airlock.
The licensee staff informed the inspector that maintenance technicians stated that normal practice was to lubricate the containment airlock door seals before conaucting the Type B test.
However, review of the preventive maintenance work orders by the licensee staff indicated inconsistencies between preventive maintenance records and the technician statements.
On October 12, 1994, records indicated that preventive maintenance and prelubrication was performed on the Unit 2, 140-foot containment airlock door seals and equalizing valves before conducting Type B testing.
On Harch 9, 1995, the licensee's representative informed the inspector by telephone that the information given on Harch 8, 1995, was incorrect.
The licensee's representative informed the inspector that more time was needed to discuss this issue with the personnel involved.
Later that morning, the inspector and his supervisor were contacted by telephone to discuss the information previously given to the inspector.
The engineering section lead, maintenance supervisor, licensing engineer, and the engineer responsible for the containment airlock testing participated in this telephone conference.
The licensee staff stated that review of preventive maintenance records from the last Type B testing conducted indicated that containment airlock door seals were not lubricated prior to performing the test.
The maintenance supervisor also confirmed this statement.
The inspector asked the licensee staff if they had discussed this issue with the responsible technician who stated that normal practice was to lubricate the seals prior to conducting the test.
The licensee staff had not discussed or confirmed whether the responsible technician statements were valid.
The licensee informed the inspector that further review would be conducted, and they would inform the inspector of the results, The inspector reviewed the licensee's quality assurance plan which commits the licensee to Regulatory Guide 1.33, "guality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)"
and ANSI N18.7-1976,
"Administrative Controls And guality Assurance For The Operational Phase Of Nuclear Power Plants."
ANSI N18.7, paragraph 5.2 '9 (3), "Test Control," states, in part, that the test program shall cover all required tests including surveillance tests during the operational phase to provide assurance that failures or substandard performance do not remain undetected and that the required reliability of
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The apparent preconditioning of the containment airlock door seals and the equalizing valve 0-rings prior to performing the local leak rate tests would not necessarily permit the detection of containment airlock door seals and equalizing valve 0-ring leakage.
It appeared that the licensee maintenance practice may be inappropriate in that lubricant may have been applied to the containment airlock door seals and equalizing valve 0-rings before conducting Type B
testing, which would not assure
"as-found" condit'ions.
However, pending a
further NRC review of the preventive maintenance data, this issue will remain as an unresolved item (528/9502-01; 529/9502-01; 530/9502-01).
In regard to post-maintenance testing, discussions with the licensee staff on March 7, 1995, indicated that no procedures were in place to conduct post-maintenance testing for the containment airlock equalizing valves.
However, the licensee staff informed the inspector that if corrective maintenance was to be performed on these equalizing valves, Type B testing would be the method used to verify 0-ring integrity.
Discussions with the licensee staff indicated that plans were developed this outage to gather some empirical data to verify the adequacy of the existing methodology for leak rate testing and post-maintenance testing of the inner door equalizing valves with C-clamps installed during the overall airlock test.
The licensee planned to conduct the following:
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Install a Thaxton plug into the equalizing port on the door without C-clamps installed on the equalizing valve and measure the leakage rate at 5 psi intervals up to 50 psig (if possible),
Remove the Thaxton plug and use the test port on the equalizing valve, without C-clamps installed, to measure leakage rate between 0-rings at 5 psi intervals up to 50 psig (if possible),
and Repeat the above steps with the C-clamps installed.
The licensee staff informed the inspector that if the above testing proves to be acceptable, they would utilize the best method to conduct an adequate post-maintenance test to verify equalizing valve 0-ring integrit ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED AND EXIT HEETING
Persons Contacted 1. 1 Arizona Public Service Com an
- W. Ahlstrom, Inservice Inspection Engineer
¹*T. Cannon System Engineering, Inservice Inspection/Testing
¹*B. Eklund, Licensing Engineer
- D. Garchow, Director, Systems Engineering
¹*B. Grabo, Section Leader Compliance, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
¹ A. Krainik, Hanager, Nuclear Licensing
- W. Hontefour, Strategic Commission
- A. Horrow, Team Lead, Inservice Inspection
- S. Penick, Haintenance Support
- G. Shanker, Department Leader, Nuclear Assurance Engineering
¹N. Spooner, Integrated Leak Rate Test Engineer
- T. Weber, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- J. Wilson, Nuclear Assurance Engineering 1.2 Other Personnel T
R. Garrison, Task Leader, Babcock and Wilcox H. Gerlach, guality Assurance Hanager, Babcock and Wilcox
- F. Gowers, Site Representative, El Paso Electric
- R. Henry, Site Representative, Salt River Project J.
Ruck, Project Hanager 1.3 NRC Personnel
- K. Johnston, Senior Resident Inspector
¹ D. Powers, Chief, Haintenance Branch In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspector contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
- Denotes those persons that attended the exit meeting on February 17, 1995.
¹Denotes those persons that attended the supplemental telephonic exit meeting on Harch 10, 1995.
EXIT HEETING An exit meeting was conducted on February 17, 1995, and a supplemental telephonic exit was conducted on Harch 10, 1995, during which the inspector summarized the scope and findings of this inspection.
The licensee did not express a position on the inspection findings documented in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspecto i I
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PROCEDURES ATTACHMENT 2 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 73PR-2XI01,
"ASME SECTION XI INSERVICE INSPECTION," REVISION 01.04 73TI-OZZ02,
"ULTRASONIC THICKNESS MEASUREMENTS," REVISION 05.00 73TI-9ZZ05,
"DRY PARTICLE EXAMINATION," REVISION 4 73TI-9ZZ07,
"LIQUID PENETRANT EXAMINATION," REVISION 4 73TI-9ZZ09,
"ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF PIPE WELDS," REVISION 06.01 73TI-9ZZ10,
"ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF WELDS IN FERRITIC COMPONENTS,"
REVISION 3 73TI-9ZZ12,
"ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF NOZZLES INNER RADIUS AREAS," REVISION 2 73AC-OEE04,
"QUALIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NDE PERSONNEL,"
REVISION 2 CORRESPONDENCE
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MEMO FROM TRENTEC TO ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, DATED FEBRUARY 16, 1995 (AIRLOCK LEAK TESTING)
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UNIT 2 INSERVICE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT, DATED OCTOBER 11, 1993
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UNIT 2 R5 INSERVICE INSPECTION PLAN NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION REPORTS 94-2005 94-2004 94-2006 91-2204 91-2203 91-2233 91-2220 91-2232 91-2226 91-2225 91-2218 88-2343 88-2358 88-2366 88-2362 95LR-2007 95-2065 95-LRD2004 95-2001 95-2043 95-2044 95-2045 95-2042
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