IR 05000528/1995009
| ML17311A843 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1995 |
| From: | Powers D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17311A842 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-95-09, 50-528-95-9, 50-529-95-09, 50-529-95-9, 50-530-95-09, 50-530-95-9, NUDOCS 9505050083 | |
| Download: ML17311A843 (20) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-528/95-09 50-529/95-09 50-530/95-09 Licenses:
NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box 53999 Phoenix, Arizona Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2,
and
Inspection At:
Wintersberg, Arizona Inspection Conducted:
April 10-14, 1995 Inspector:
L.
E. Ellershaw, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Approved:
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aintenance rane Division of Reactor Safety d5/ze/Ps Date Ins ection Summar Areas Ins ected Unit
Routine, announced inspection of the inservice inspection program and implementation of associated work activities.
In addition, followup inspection of an unresolved item was performed.
Areas Ins ected Units 2 and
No inspection of Units 2 and 3 was performed.
~RI<<I Plant 0 erations Not applicable during this inspection.
Maintenance
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An NRC-accepted inservice inspection program that met the requirements of the 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda of Section XI in the ASME Code 9505050083 95050l PDR ADOCK 05000528
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had been established.
Administrative controls were well established (Section 2.1.2).
Nondestructive examination personnel performed the specified examinations very well, and in accordance with approved procedures (Section 2.2.2).
Personnel employed to perform inservice inspection nondestructive examinations were properly certified (Section 2.3.2),
The nondestructive examination procedures contained sufficient details and instructions to allow proper performance of the specified examinations (Section 2.4.2).
Repair and replacement activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures (Section 2.5.2).
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The authorized nuclear inservice inspector was observed to be very active in his role of witnessing nondestructive examinations (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.5.2).
En ineerin t
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Not applicable during this inspection.
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Not applicable during this inspection.
bwana ement Overview
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Not applicable during this inspection.
Results Units 2 and
Not applicable.
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
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Unresolved Item 528/9502-01; 529/9502-01; 530/9502-01 was closed (Section 3.1).
Attachment:
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Attachment Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS
PLANT STATUS During this inspection period, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, was in the second week of the fifth refueling outage.
INSERVICE INSPECTION (73753)
The objective of this inspection was to determine whether the performance of inservice inspection examinations, and the repair and replacement of Class 1,
2, and 3 pressure retaining components was performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, the American Society of Hechanical Engineers (ASHE)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, requirements imposed by NRC and industry initiatives, and correspondence between the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the licensee concerning relief requests.
2. 1 Inservice Ins ection Pro ram and Plans 2.1. 1 Discussion The licensee's first 10-year interval inservice inspection program, in effect at the time of this inspection, was developed to meet the 1980 Edition through the Winter 1981 Addenda of Section XI of the ASHE Code.
Review of the inservice inspection program showed that it became effective on January 28, 1986, and was scheduled to end on July 17, 1998.
The NRC had authorized the licensee to establish a three-unit common Code edition and addenda, and a
common inspection interval date, including the three corresponding inspection periods.
Unit 1 was currently in its fifth refueling outage, which placed it in the third period of the first 10-year inspection interval.
The licensee had established Nuclear Administrative and Technical Hanual 73AC-OXI01,
"ASHE Section XI Inservice Inspection," Revision 01.04, to provide the method for preparing, controlling, and implementing the inservice inspection program.
In addition, a detailed description of the inservice inspection program for Unit 1 was contained in Program No. ISI-1, "Inservice Inspection Program Summary Hanual."
The inspector reviewed the current inspection plan, which was developed for the fifth refueling outage and which was based on inspection data (i.e.,
status)
contained in the 10-year inservice inspection program.
The inspector verified the adequacy of the inspection plan by comparing the plan to the Unit 1 inservice inspection summary report, which provided a compilation oF all inservice examinations performed through the fourth refueling outag l
2. 1.2 Conclusions
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The licensee had established an NRC-accepted inservice inspection program that met the requirements of the 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda of Section XI of the ASHE Code.
Administrative controls were well established, and no errors were identified in the Unit 1 outage inspection plan (i.e., it was consistent with the status of completed examinations as shown in the Unit
summary report).
2.2 Observation of Inservice Ins ection Examinations 2.2. 1 Discussion During this inspection, the inspector observed the following inservice inspection examinations performed by contractor (Lambert-HacGill-Thomas, Inc.)
nondestructive examination personnel:
Ultrasonic Examination - Pressurizer to Skirt Weld (Zone 5);
Ultrasonic Examination Safety Injection Pipe to Valve Weld 71-88 (Zone 9);
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Liquid Penetrant Examination - Low Pressure Safety Injection Pipe Weld 71-124 (Zone 101);
Liquid Penetrant Examination - High Pressure Safety Injection Pipe Meld 92207-21 (Zone 40);
and
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Liquid Penetrant Examination High Pressure Safety Injection Pipe Weld 2207-23 (Zone 40).
The inspector verified that all examinations observed were performed by qualified Level II or III examiners.
Prior to performance of the examinations, the examiners performed the proper surface preparation and verified component temperatures as required by the applicable procedures.
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of the observed examinations were performed in accordance with the applicable procedures.
The examiners were knowledgeable with respect to the examination procedures, techniques, and instrumentation.
Before the ultrasonic examinations were conducted, the inspector observed the system calibration, which included both axial and circumferential scans.
The transducer selection, sensitivity calibration, and construction of the distance amplitude correction curve was performed in accordance with the calibration procedure.
The inspector also verified, by review of the certified material test reports, that the correct calibration blocks were used (i.e., similar to the component to be examined in terms of material, diameter, and wall thickness).
The liquid penetrant materials used during the observed examinations had been properly certified
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and accepted.
The examiners documented their calibration and examination results on the appropriate reports, which were numerically identified and contained all pertinent information specified by procedure.
Where questionable indications were observed by the examiners, the appropriate notations were recorded in the examination reports.
The performance of the nondestructive examination personnel was observed to be very good.
The inspector also observed the authorized nuclear inservice inspector (a Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company representative)
to be actively performing his observation of examinations.
2.2.2 Conclusions The inspector determined that nondestructive examination personnel performed the observed examinations very well, and in accordance with approved examination procedures.
The authorized nuclear inservice inspector was actively performing his required observation of examinations.
2.3 Personnel ualifications and Certifications 2.3. I Discussion The inspector was informed that the individuals that performed the observed examinations were contractor personnel employed by Lambert-MacGill-Thomas, Inc.
The inspector reviewed the qualification files of those personnel and noted that the two examiners who performed the ultrasonic examinations were certified as Level III examiners, while the two examiners who performed the liquid penetrant examinations were certified as Level II examiners.
The records showed that they had been certified in accordance with the American Society of Nondestructive Testing Recommended Practice SNT-TC-IA, 1980.
As required by the ASME Code, all of the individuals had received annual near distance acuity and color vision examinations.
2.3.2 Conclusions The inspector determined that the contractor personnel employed to perform the inservice inspection nondestructive examinations were properly certified in accordance with ASME Code requirements.
2.4 Nondestructive Examination Procedure Review 2.4. I Discussion The inspector reviewed the following nondestructive examination procedures used during the observed examinations:
Procedure 73TI-9ZZ09, "Ultrasonic Examination of Pipe Welds," Revision 7; Procedure 73TI-9ZZ10, "Ultrasonic
Examination of Welds in Ferritic Components,"
Revision 4; and Procedure 73TI-9ZZ07, "Liquid Penetrant Examination," Revision 4.
The procedures contained sufficient details and instructions to perform the intended examinations.
The inspector verified that the procedures had been appropriately reviewed and approved by a licensee nondestructive examination level III examiner, designated System Engineering Department management personnel, and the authorized nuclear inservice inspector.
2.4.2 Conclusions The nondestructive examination procedures contained sufficient details and instructions to perform the intended examinations, and had been properly reviewed and approved by the designated personnel.
2.5 Section XI Re air and Re lacement 2.5. 1 Discussion The inspector was informed that ASME Code Section XI work (i.e., modification to Class 3 auxiliary feedwater piping)
had been scheduled during the week of April 10, 1995.
This work, including the fabrication (i.e., welding)
and nondestructive examination, was authorized by Work Order 698671.
The inspector observed the welding of three joints (695097-71, 698671-124, and 698671-125)
and the subsequent magnetic particle examinations.
The observed welding process used was shielded metal arc weldi'ng using Welding Procedure 73WP-OZZ05, Appendix A.
The inspector verified, by review of the applicable procedure qualification record (P(R 1, Revision 0) that the welding procedure specification had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code Section XI requirements.
The observed magnetic particle examinations of the three welds were performed by a licensee examiner using Procedure 73TI-9ZZ05, "Dry Magnetic Particle Examination," Revision 4.
The inspector also observed the examiner calibrate the equipment.
Subsequent to the examinations, the examiner properly completed the required magnetic particle examination reports.
The inspector verified that the examiner had been properly certified as a Level II examiner, and that the procedure met ASME Code requirements.
The inspector also observed the authorized nuclear inservice inspector actively witnessing the magnetic particle examination ~
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2.5.2 Conclusions
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The observed code repair and replacement work was accomplished in accordance with properly qualified and approved procedures.
The procedures were clear and provided sufficient detail to perform the specified welding and examination activities.
The examiner was properly certified to perform the required nondestructive examinations.
The authorized nuclear inservice inspector was actively witnessing work activities.
FOLLOWUP (92701)
3. 1 Closed Unresolved Item 528 9502-01 529 9502-01 530 9502-01
Potentiall Ina ro riate Preconditionin of Containment Airlock Door Seals Prior to A endix J T
e B Testin Ha Have Precluded Ac uisition of "As-Found" Conditions This unresolved item was identified during a review of an item pertaining to local leak rate testing of containment penetrations.
During the review, the inspector received conflicting information which precluded the inspector's ability to determine whether or not preconditioning of airlock door seals had occurred, and if so, what affect potential preconditioning had on the acquisition of meaningful
"as-found" leak rate data.
During that inspection, the inspector had been provided with the information listed below.
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Containment airlock doors were tested every 6 months as required by Technical Specifications.
Containment airlock door seals were tested within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after opening the doors.
A local leak rate test technician was stated to have said that the normal practice was to lubricate the containment airlock door seals before conducting the Appendix J, Type B tests.
The inspector questioned licensee personnel abo'ut the impact of lubricating door seals (i.e., preconditioning) prior to testing and was informed that Appendix J, Type B testing did not address
"as-found" conditions.
The licensee staff stated they did not believe applying lubricant to the airlock door seals would affect or mask any leakage.
The dates of preventive maintenance work orders (in which lubrication was performed) did not coincide with the Appendix J, Type B testing dates conducted every 6 months.
However, it was noted by the inspector that preventive maintenance and lubrication was performed on the Unit 2, 140-foot elevation containment airlock door seals before conducting the Type B tests, as evidenced by records dated October 12, 199 y)
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The review of preventive maintenance records from the last Appendix J, Type B test indicated that containment airlock door seals were not lubricated prior to performing the test.
The licensee staff indicated further review of this issue would be conducted.
In response to this issue, the licensee's Nuclear Regulatory Affairs department initiated Condition Report/Disposition Request (CRDR) 9-5-0172 on Harch 9, 1995.
Documentation (i.e., inspection and lubrication preventive work orders, and surveillance test work orders) pertaining to the containment penetration personnel doors and the containment penetration emergency personnel doors at the 140-foot and the 100-foot elevations, respectively, for each unit, was retrieved from the records center and a comparison of time and dates was made by the licensee's staff.
The records were dated from January 1994.
During this inspection, the inspector discussed the issue with licensee staff members, and reviewed the applicable documentation.
A review of the actual work orders was necessary in order to determine the exact dates of work performance, because the dates listed in computer printouts were generally related to the time that the work order was accepted (i.e., final review and approval).
With the exception of the following discussion on Unit 2, no other questions arose concerning the appropriate sequencing of maintenance activities on containment airlock door seals.
Regarding Unit 2 containment penetration personnel door activities which were performed on Harch 14, 1994, it was not clear whether the surveillance test or preventive. maintenance occurred first, in that the exact time for performance of preventive maintenance had not been entered in the work order.
However, these doors were tested again on September 7,
1994, prior to any preventive maintenance being performed, and the leak rate was well within the acceptance limits, thus, negating any concern pertaining to the consequences of the activity that occurred previously on Harch 14, 1994.
Further work order review showed another instance where preventive maintenance was performed on Unit 2 containment penetration emergency personnel doors on October 12, 1994, which was the day before post-maintenance tests were conducted.
The Appendix J, Type B test had been performed on September 7,
1994, followed by another Appendix J, Type B
test on April 2, 1995.
Consequently from this review, preconditioning of the containment airlock door seals was not performed.
Since the intended sequence of activities would be to perform (1) the Appendix J,
Type B test, (2) the preventive maintenance, and (3) the post-maintenance test, CRDR 9-5-0172 established actions to ensure following that sequence.
The CRDR indicated that the preventive maintenance tasks were independent from the surveillance tests, and were performed by a separate organization.
Thus,
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a preventive maintenance task could be scheduled to be performed just prior to a scheduled surveillance test without the potential for preconditioning to be recognized.
To minimize this potential, the CRDR recommended that the preventive maintenance documents have caution notes added stating that the door and equalizing valve seals were to be lubricated after the Appendix J, Type B test and prior to the subsequent post-maintenance test.
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs department personnel showed the inspector the action tracking system record (No. 041922) for this item and the specific actions being taken.
The inspector noted that the associated preventive maintenance documents were being revised to incorporate wording to the affect that the preventive maintenance tasks would be performed subsequent to the Appendix J, Type B tests, and prior to the subsequent post-maintenance tests.
The surveillance test procedures were also to be revised to reference the preventive maintenance tasks to ensure that the surveillance tests would not be performed immediately subsequent to the completion of the preventive maintenance tasks.
These actions, which were expected to be completed by April 28, 1995, should be sufficient to ensure meeting the intended testing sequence and preclude preconditioning of the airlock door seal e
ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED AND EXIT MEETING
Persons Contacted 1. 1 Arizona Public Service Com an
- S. Bauer, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- J. Bergstedt, Senior Evaluator, Nuclear Assurance Engineering
- B. Eklund, Consultant, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- D. Garchow, Director, Systems Engineering
- D. Leech, Section Leader, Nuclear Assurance Engineering
- A. Horrow, Team Leader, Inservice Inspection
- D. Oakes, Team Leader, System Engineering
- N. Spooner, Integrated Leak Rate Test Engineer 1.2 Other Personnel
- J. Draper, Site Representative, Southern California Edison Company
- F. Gowers, Site Representative, El Paso Electric Company
- R. Henry, Site Representative, Salt River Project 1.3 NRC Personnel
- K. Johnston, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Kim, Inspector, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspector contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
- Denotes those persons that attended the exit meeting on April 14, 1995.
EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on April 14, 1995, during which the inspector summarized the scope and findings of this inspection.
The licensee did not express a position on the inspection findings documented in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspecto ~j 0'
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