IR 05000528/1995022
| ML17311B337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1995 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17311B336 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-95-22, 50-529-95-22, 50-530-95-22, NUDOCS 9601160278 | |
| Download: ML17311B337 (42) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-528/95-22 50-529/95-22
, 50-530/95-22 Licenses:
'NPF-51 NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box,53999 Phoenix.
Arizona Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection At:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Conducted:
November 27 through December
~
1995 Inspectors:
Arthur D.
McQueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Ryan E. Lantz, Reactor Inspector Approved:
aine urray, ie
.
nt uppor rane Division of Reactor S
ety ate Ins ection Summar Areas Ins ected Units
2 and
Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the emergency preparedness program including changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures; emergency facilities'quipment, and supplies:
organization and management control: training; internal reviews and audits; effectiveness of licensee controls; and followup on previous inspection findings.
Results:
Plant Su ort The licensee had properly reviewed and submitted to NRC changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures (Section 1).
The licensee had maintained an effective relationship with offsite emergency response organizations (Section 1).
960ii60278 960i04 PDR ADOCK 05000528
l I
-2-
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Emergency facilities, equipment.
and supplies had been maintained in a proper state of operational readiness (Section 2).
Emergency response organization members were adequately trained to successfully perform their emergency functions.
A formal electronic trhcking system accurately and reliably maintained a current 'qualified list of site emergency responders (Section 4. 1).
The performance of operating crews in implementing emergency response actions during walkthrough evaluations was generally good.
Crew communications.
command and control, and use of procedures was good, with some exceptions noted (Section 4.2).
Quality assurance audits and performance observations of emergency preparedness and planning had been performed by qualified personnel and were of proper scope.
depth, and effectiveness (Section 5).
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An effective system of controls had been maintained regarding safety issues, events'nd problems.
This system emphasized early detection and elevation to an appropriate management level.
and timely, effective implementation of corrective actions (Section 6).
t
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No emergency event had been declared at the site since the last routine emergency preparedness inspection (Section 8).
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
Exercise Weakness (528/9504-01, 529/9504-01 and 530/9504-01)
was closed (Secti on 7,. 1).
Exercise Weakness (528/9504-02, 529/9504-02 and 530/9504-02)
was closed (Section 7.2).
Attachments:
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Attachment
- Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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Attachment 2 - Emergency Preparedness Inspection Scenario Narrative Summaries
-3-DETAILS
EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (82701-02.01)
The inspectors reviewed changes in the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures to veri,fy that these changes had not decreased the effectiveness of emergency planning and that the changes had been reviewed properly and submitted to NRC.
Since the previous inspection, two emergency plan revisions had been implemented (Revisions 15 and 16).
These were submitted to NRC for review prior to implementation and were found acceptable by NRC.
For each emergency plan revision, the licensee had performed a documented review in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine that the revisions did not decrease the effectiveness of emergency preparedness.
The inspectors also reviewed documentation pertaining to selected portions of the 43 revisions to the emergency plan implementing procedures implemented since the last routine inspection.
The inspectors reviewed changes in procedures and noted that the changes were consistent with regulatory requirements and the licensee's commitments.
Review, approval, and distribution of the plan and procedure changes were conducted in accordance with licensee Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 16DP-OEP01,
"Review of Emergency Planning.Procedures in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)," Revision 2, effective September 8,
1995.
All but one procedure change had been submitted to the NRC on a timely basis and within the required 30 days.
This apparent violation of regulatory requirements had been appropriately identified by the licensee in Nuclear Assurance Evaluation Report (ER 95-0965)
and Condition Report/Disposition Request 9-5-Q590 295-0254 was initiated for corrective action.
The procedure was promptly forwarded to NRC.
The inspector determined that the late submittal did not involve any significant safety issues.
Corrective actions were reviewed and appeared appropriate to prevent recurrence.
The licensee maintained an effective relationship with offsite agencies.
Changes in emergency action levels were coordinated, in writing, with those agencies annually or as appropriate.
This coordination occurred on virtually a weekly basis.
The inspectors reviewed letters. of agreement established with support agencies and determined that they had been reviewed annually and were updated as required.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, INSTRUMENTATION, AND SUPPLIES (82701-02.02)
The inspectors toured onsite emergency facilities and reviewed the licensee's emergency equipment inventories and maintenance to verify that facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of operational readines A tour was made of each emergency response facility which included the inspection of various equipment items.
instrumentation, and supplies.
Facilities inspected were the three control rooms. the technical support center, three operations support centers, and the emergency operations facility.
The facilities were observed to be well maintained and ready for emergency use.
No substantive changes had occurred at any emergency response facility since the last inspection with one exception.
The technical support center had been enlarged by removing some walls.
This appeared to be an enhancement of the center.
Random inspections were performed of radiation monitoring and respiratory equipment at each emergency response facility. All selected items were verified as being in calibration or had been appropriately inspected on a scheduled basis.
Equipment and supplies placed in response facilities and in emergency equipment lockers matched scheduled inventories.
Current copies of the implementing procedures and emergency telephone di rectories were maintained in all facilities.
Primary and backup communications in each facility were as described in the emergency plan.
The inspectors reviewed documentation pertaining to inventories, testing, and maintenance of emergency response facilities and noted that they had been performed as required.
ORGANIZATION AND HANAGEHENT CONTROL (82701-02.03)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response organization staffing levels to determine whether sufficient personnel resources were available for emergency response.
The emergency planning organization was reviewed to ensure that an effective programmatic management system was in place.
The Arizona Public Service Company emergency preparedness staff for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station consists of an emergency planning group.
The group is responsible for onsite and offsite emergency planning and reports to the site emergency planning program leader, who reports to the Vice President.
Nuclear Support.
The group has 12 personnel assigned to support emergency planning.
The emergency planning organization was fully staffed with qualified personnel.
The site emergency response organization was made up of about 750 personnel.
The primary callout system for activating the emergency response organization was by pager or by auto-dialer during off-duty hours.
The auto-dialer was capable of 32 calls at a time, and asks pertinent fitness for duty questions when responded to.
A list of personnel trained and experienced to function in emergency response organization positions was being maintained by emergency planning.
At the time of the inspections the organization had a depth of about five qualified personnel per position and more for many positions.'ll personnel are called in the event of an emergency response organization activation, and a response organization is then staffed by those reporting to emergency response facilities.
Unneeded responding personnel are released for subsequent shifts or other duties.
Positions are designated for fi11 by a
I
-5-cognizant division in coordination with the emergency planning group.
lJpon transfer or departure of an incumbent, his/her replacement is designated by the cognizant manager.
The licensee had trained and qualified an appropriate number of emergency response personnel to ensure a good depth in the organization.
No significant changes in offsite emergency response organizations had occurred since the last routine emergency preparedness inspection.
TRAINING (82701-02. 04)
a The inspectors reviewed the emergency response training program and interviewed selected individuals to determine whether emergency response personnel had received the required training and complied with the requirements of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station administrative procedures and emergency plan
~
CFR 50.47 (b)(15)
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and
CFR Part 50, Appendix E. IV.F.
1
~Trainin The inspectors reviewed 15 training records of emergency response organization members to verify that they had obtained the requi red training in accordance with Procedure 15DP-OTR34,
"Emergency Plan Training'
" Revision 7.
The records
'f training were maintained in an electronic database, updated from class attendance records, drill critique records, and other documentation.
Three of the individuals had not yet completed their annual required training, which was consistent with the current list of qualified emergency response organization responders.
The remaining reviewed records indicated that the individuals had completed the required training and were accurately designated as qualified'or thei r respective positions in the emergency response organization.
Individual participation of emergency response organization members in annual drills and exercises was also tracked accurately and efficiently on a similar, but separate database from the training/qualification database.
The inspector noted that members of the emergency response organization were not formally required to participate in an annual drill or exercise at an established frequency, although Procedure 16AC-OEP05,
"Emergency Preparedness Drills,"
Revision 3, Section 5.5, states.
in part. that "drills for the emergency response organization are conducted periodically
.
.
. to ensure that each member of the emergency response organization is fami liar with and can perform his duties."
The inspector questioned the licensee as to the intent of this section of the procedure.
The licensee had previously identified this issue during an emergency plan review and had issued a condition report/distribution request (CRDR 9-5-Q432, dated September 15, 1995) to clarify this element in the procedure and the emergency plan.
Action was pending on that ite j I
-6-4.2 Malkthrou hs with 0 eratin Crews The inspectors conducted a series of emergency response walkthroughs with three operating crews to evaluate the adequacy and retention of'kills obtained from the emergency response training program.
Two walkthrough scenarios were developed'y the facility, approved by the NRC, and administered by the NRC to the crews to determine.
through demonstrated performance, whether control room personnel were proficient in their duties and responsibilities as emergency responders during a simulated accident scenario.
Attachment 2 to this inspection report contains a narrative summary of -the walkthrough scenarios.
The inspectors observed three crews using the control room simulator in the dynamic mode.
The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring an escalation of emergency classifications'ulminating in a general emergency.
The scenario was developed to run approximately.75 minutes.
The inspectors observed the interaction of the response crews to verify that authorities and responsibilities were clearly defined and understood.
The walkthroughs also allowed the evaluation of the crews'bilities to assess and classify accident conditions, utilize abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
perform dose assessments, develop protective action recommendations, and make corresponding notifications to offsite authorities.
The performance of operating crews during walkthrough evaluations was generally good.
The following observations were noted in communications.
command and control.
and operating procedure usage:
One crew's emergency coordinator did not inform the control room operators of the escalation of the emergency declaration for 5 minutes in one instance and 7 minutes in another.
One control room supervisor misinterpreted Step 2.2 of 41A0-1ZZ08,
"Steam Generator Tube Leakage."
This step called for a reactor trip if steam generator tube leakage was greater than 80 gallons-per-minute or pressurizer level could not be maintained.
The control room supervisor interpreted the step to require both loss of pressurizer level control and leakage greater than 80 gallons-per-minute prior to requiring a
Actual leakage rates established by the facility simulator operators were less than 80 gallons-per -minute and did not requi re a reactor trip, howevers the control room supervisor should have directed a reactor trip based on the direction of Step 2.2 in 41A0-1ZZ08, and reports of estimated leakage rates of greater than 80 gallons-per-minute.
Control of auxiliary feedwater flow post-reactor trip was weak.
In one crew, the control room supervisor's direction was non-specific, in that he di rected the control board operator to "reduce flow a bit" from the greater than 1000 gallons-per-minute that was being fed'nd gave a
minimum flow of 500 gallons-per-minute.
The control room supervi'sor did not follow up on his order to reduce flow. and the secondary operator
H
-7-only reduced feed to the intact steam generator, but maintained total feed flow at approximately 1000 gallons-per-minute.
In a second crew, the secondary operator established post-trip feed rate of 1826 and 521 gallons-per-minute to the ruptured and intact steam generators,
.
respectively.
Standard post-trip actions direct'
minimum of only 500 gallons-per-minute total and cautions to not cause an excessive cooldown rate with feed flow.
However, facility management stated in a
debriefing with the inspector that this was considered an excessive feed rate for standard post-trip actions.
An excessive feed rate could establish an excessive cooldown rate of the reactor coolant system, potentially masking indications of other failures and needlessly complicating mitigation actions for the casualty.
~
The shift technical advisor from two crews mistakenly identified that harsh containment conditions existed when the radiation monitoring system units were mistakenly read as rem/hour instead of'illirem/hour.
This unit inconsistency between the radiation monitoring system and the emergency response facility data acquisition and display system caused some delay with the dose assessment.
The inspectors'bservations were discussed with licensee training personnel.
The licensee stated that the observations would be evaluated and improvements would be made to the training program as appropriate.
The training organization had maintained an effective emergency response training program with minor challenges noted.
All members of the emergency response organization designated as qualified had been trained in accordance with applicable station procedures.
The performance of operating crews in implementing emergency response actions during walkthrough evaluations was generally good.
INDEPENDENT AND INTERNAL REVIEWS AND AUDITS (82701-02.05)
The inspectors met with quality assur ance personnel and reviewed independent and internal audits. of the emergency preparedness program performed since the last inspection to determine compliance with the requirements of
CFR 50.54(t).
The inspectors reviewed and discussed with the nuclear assurance plant support department leader and the principle emergency preparedness auditor the most recent annual audit (Audit Report 95-002) of the emergency preparedness program, which had been performed from February 21 through Harch 3.
1995.
The audit team members appeared to be well qualified.
All team members were certified auditors with current recertification as set forth in the licensee's Procedure 60AC-OTR01, "Training, Qualification and Certification of Nuclear Assurance Personnel,"
Revision 3, dated August 18, 1995, which incorporates
-8-certification criteria to perform audits in accordance with ANSI Standard N45.2. 12.
The team included personnel familiar with and experienced in emergen'cy planning.
The inspectors reviewed the audit plan, scope of the audit, and the audit check list.
The audit appeared to be thorough and complete.
The audit report was issued to appropriate levels of management at the plant and to the corporate level.
Nuclear assurance maintained a tracking system which established suspense dates for response by cognizant managers for items identified in a report that required correction or improvement.
Condition reports/disposition requests were issued for tracking each audit finding and enhancement item.
Since the last routine NRC inspection.
the nuclear assurance organization had conducted about 21 survei llances related to emergency preparedness.
A sample surveillance was reviewed by the inspectors and was verified as being appropriate to observed activities and findings.
EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE CONTROLS (82701-02.06)
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the licensee's controls systems pertaining to safety issues, events, or problems.
The review included discussions with nuclear assurance and emergency preparedness staff personnel and review of procedures and documentation of problem identification, root cause analysis'anagement review of problem identification and solution.
and corrective actions.
The licensee's controls systems were effective in identifying'esolving, and preventing problems by providing for review of such areas as corrective action systems.
root cause analyses'afety committees, and self assessment in the area of emergency preparedness.
The principle tool in managing corrective actions was the condition reports/disposition requests.
All personnel were trained in use of the condition report/disposition request system in their site general employee training.
They were encouraged to initiate the appropriate documentation through their supervisors but are also instructed in how to submit the reports without going through supervisors.
This system was managed by a condition reports/disposition request committee, which meets daily to perform review, assignment.
tracking, and closure of reports/
requests.
For focusing on items of interest to the Executive Vice Presidents Nuclear, a
Level 1 nuclear project list was established.
At the time of this inspection, three items pertaining to emergency planning/preparedness were on the Level I list.
Status of these items must be briefed on a scheduled basis to senior management along with projected completion actions and dates.
Additionally, a tracking system used by emergency planning for tracking problems.
issues.
etc.
~ was the emergency planning action items list. which contained items for followup by emergency plannin The inspectors reviewed sample condition report/disposition requests and emergency planning action items list items and determined that the corrective action program was properly implemented.
The licensee had maintained an effective system of controls pertaining to safety issues'vents.
or problems which emphasized early detection and elevation by an appropriate management level, and effective implementation of corrective actions.
FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS (92904)
7.1 Closed Exercise Weakness 528/9504-01 529/9504-01 and 530/9504-01:
Late Notification During the 1995 annual emergency exercise, offsite agency notifications via the notification alert network at the general emergency were not conducted within 15 minutes of event declaration as requi red by Section 6.3 of the emergency plan.
The fai lure to make requi red offsite agency notifications within 15 minutes was identified as an exercise weakness.
By letter-dated June 1,
1995. File:
102-03378 'he Arizona Public Service Company responded to the NRC setting forth immediate corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence for this weakness.
Corrective actions indicated in the Arizona Public Service Company letter had been completed and appeared appropriate to prevent recurrence.
Notifications to the offsite agencies were specifically observed during the simulator walkthrough sessions with three control room crews and support personnel regarding this weakness.
All notifications were timely and in accordance with procedures.
7.2 Closed Exercise Weakness 528/9504-02 529/9504-02 and 530/9504-02:
Confusin Information Sent to Offsite A encies During the 1995 annual emergency exercise.
conflicting and potentially confusing information regarding protective action recommendations was provided to the offsite agencies at the site area emergency.
Providing conflicting and confusing information to offsite agencies was identified as an exercise weakness.
By letter dated June 1.
1995. File:
102-03378, the Arizona Public Service Company responded to the NRC setting forth immediate corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence for this weakness.
Corrective actions indicated in the Arizona Public Service Company letter had
.been completed and appeared appropriate to prevent recurrence.
Notifications to the offsite agencies were specifically observed during the simulator walkthrough sessions with three control room crews and support personnel regarding this weakness.
No confusion was indicated in notifications to offsite agencies.
ONSITE FOLLOWUP OF EVENTS AT OPERATING POWER REACTORS (93702)
No emergency event had been declared at the site since the last routine emergency preparedness inspectio If I
PERSONS CONTACTED 1. 1 Licensee Personnel ATTACHMENT 1
- T. Barsuk, Senior Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- H. Bieling. Manager.
Emergency Planning G. Cerkus, Emergency Planner.
Drills/Exercises R.
Duncan.
Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- R. Fullmer. Department Leader.
Plant Support.
Nuclear Assurance
- F. Gower. Site Representative.
El Paso Electric
- R. Henry. Site Representative, Salt River Project
- D. Larkin, Engineer.
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs B. Lee. Operations/Engineering Advisor. Emergency Planning
~J.
Levine. Vice President, Nuclear Production
- J. Nielson
~ Evaluator, Nuclear Assurance
- R. Nunez.
Department Leader, Operations Training M. Pioggia.
Emergency Planner.
Program Support
- J. Velotta. Director. Training The inspectors also held discussions with and observed the actions of other station and corporate personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on December 1,
1995.
During this meeting.
the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of'he materials provided to. or reviewed by, the inspection team during the inspectio )
ATTACHMENT 2 SCENARIO OVERVIEW
Scenario Title: TUBE RUPTURE/ESD Scenario PNJU07-00-XS-001-000 ATTACHNfNT 2.
SCENARIO OVERVIEW The unit is at 100% power with AFA-P01 out ofservice, when a RCS Loose Parts /Vibration alarm is received. After the loose parts alarm, a Steam Generator Tube Leak occurs in 0 IS/G. The Crew responds to alarms and enters 41AO-IZZ08, Steam Generator Tube Leak. After classification, (ALERT)the leak degrades to a rupture. Pressurizer level and pressure decreases.
The Crew should manually trip the reactor or respond to an automatic trip and perform the Standard Post-Trip Actions (SPTA's). Failure of the SBCS System results in MSSVs liftingand one MSSV sticks in the open position. The event should be upgraded from an ALERT to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY. After the STPA's are completed, the crew enters 40EP-9EO08, Functional Recovery Procedure, due to a dual event in progress.
A Failed Fuel element occurs requiring upgrading the event classification to a GENERAL EMERGENCY. The session continues until the ruptured Steam Generator is isolated and primary pressure is approximately equal to the ruptured Steam Generator Pressur Scenario Title: TUBE RUPTURE/ESD Scenario 4:NUU07-00-XS-001-000 APPENDIX A SCENARIO AllowOperators time to assume responsibility for their assigned positions.
I.
EVENT ONE Loose Parts/ Vibration Annunciator on 7C14B, Loose Parts Vibration Monitoring Cabinet Alarm.
A.
Annunciator Response I.
Crew verifies channels in alarm Channels 11 and 12 Core Internals (vibration) are in alarm Vibration group contacted to perform analysis within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
II.
EVENT TWO-STEAM GENERATOR ¹1 TUBE LEAKOCCURS A.
B.
D.
Crew responds to RMS alarms per 74RM-9EF41 Crew recognizes indications of a Steam Generator //I Tube Leak and enters 41AO-1ZZ08.
1.
The SS may notify the Site Shift Manager at this time.
2.
The SS addresses applicable tech. specs. for primary to secondary leakage limits, and may direct the crew to a plant shutdown.
SS/SSM Classifies the Event as an ALERT per EPIP-02 and implements EPIP-03 for notifications, etc.
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Minimum Classification is an Alert due to indicated SGTL of greater than 44 GPM( Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier.). This classification may not occur until the crew has completed the 15 minute leak rate calculation, However, the SS may have classified an NUE based on preliminary leak rate data.
The STA verifies the Emergency Plan Classification, determines reportability and communicates the results to the SS.
SS notifies SSM of Emergency situation and conducts transfer of EC responsibilities to the SSivl upon SSM arrival in the Control Room.
EC directs STSC Communicator to complete The NAN EMERGENCY Message Form and notificatons to State and County commence within 15 minutes ofClassification.
NRC willbe contacted immediately following notification of State/County Agencies and within 60 minutes of the Classification The NRC phone willbe manned by an STA, RO, or an SRO.
The EC willdetermine ifAssembly/Accountability is needed.
CRS tailboards event including trip criteria III.
EVENT THREE-STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE / STUCK OPEN MSSV/ REACTOR TRIP.
A.
Crew manually trips the reactor or an automatic trip occurs on low Pressurizer pressure.
B.
STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 1.
RCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria is NOT met due to Pressurizer level not recovering.
RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria is NOT met due to Pressurizer pressure remaining below SIAS setpoint.
c
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Crew Ensures one RCP is stopped in each loo l(
I
Scenario Title: TUBE RUPTURE/ESD Scenario N:NUU07-00-XS-001-000 APPENDIX A
D.
3.
Containment Isolation acceptance criteria is NOT met due to RU-139/142 alarms 4.
CRS diagnoses events (SGTR with an ESD).
The STA verifies SPTA, verifies the diagnosis and communicates the results to the CRS.
5.
Crew enters Functional Recovery Procedure (40EP-9EO08),
EC reclassifies the event as a Site Area Emergency due to SG tube leakage with release
~
ofcontaminated steam to atmosphere 1.
The STA verifies the Emergency Plan Classification, determines reportability and communicates the results to the SS.
EC directs completion of the NAN Emergency Message form and notificaton ofreclassiflications commence 3.
EC implements EPIP-03 for Assembly and Accountability and Protective Action Recommendations ofSHELTER within a 2 mile radius.
Crew verifies Th of less than 550'F using ADV's 1.
The crew isolates SGP I E.
Verifies SG 41 pressure less than 1135 psia F.
Crew Depressurizes the RCS while maintaining:
1.
Within the P/T curve 2.
Less than 1135 psia 3.
Approx. equal to pressure ofaffected S/G.
G.
When HPSI throttle criteria is met the crew willthrottle HPSI flow.
V.
A.
Crew responds to RMS indications of RU-148 )1.2 E+6 Mr/Hr and performs alarm responses.
B.
EC/SS reclassifies event as a General Emergncy due to Loss of the Fuel Clad, RCS, and Containment Barriers.
1.
The STA verifies the Emergency Plan Classification; determines reportability and communicates the results to the SS.
EC directs completion of the NAN Emergency Message form and notificaton of
"
reclassifications commence 3.
EC calls for SITE EVACUATION.
4.
EC implements EPIP-03 and makes Protective Action Recommendations of EVACUATION for a 5 mile radius and 10 miles in potentially affected sectors.
Direct Chemistry to sample the RCS every 30 minutes for BOTH of the following:
a)
Activity.
b)
Boron concentration.
Maintain isolated steam generator level 40- 80% NR.
The scenario may be terminated when the crew has control over the affected=
SG level and Primary and Secondary pressures are approximately equal and notifications of General Emergency have been complete Scenario Ti 8/ RUPTURE/ESD Scenario l/:
7-00-XS-001-000 NDIX B
'3 rvrN r TIME SYNTAX" DESCRIPTION MISC.
APPENDIX 8 T= 5 T=35 (Approx.
time) Aftercrew completes a leak rate calculation, the Alert Classification is made, and the NAN Notifications are made.
Enter Approx. 10 sec. after trip.
IOR AN:7CI481 ALARM ON IOR ZLRCECHI IVI ON IOR ZLRCECI-112VI ON (Link these commands to an available trigger, and activate trigger)
IMFTHO6A 7.25 2:00 MMFTH06A 50 IMF RV02:SGEPSV572 100 Reactor Coolant Core Internals vibration alarm., and willturn LED's 11 and 12 on at the LPVM Cabinet.
//1 SG tube leak ( approx 60gpm)
SGTR (1 Tube) on S/G //I Main Steam Safety Valve Stuck Open (S/G//I) at 100% ( auto.
operation ofthe SBCS has been disabled in the setup)
When STA responds to alarm response, inforn> him that LED 11 and 12 are lit and in alarm status and the alarm does not clear.
Should not have to prompt the STA Ifrequested to do Aux. Steam lineup, use P&ID, MS I I to position ASNV015 Ifasked to investigate, steam is seen coming from the roofofthe MSSS, possibly from a S/G safety. Also, if RP or EFF. is asked to monitor, there willbe increased activity in the area ofthe //I S/G safety that is lifting.
T=50 (Approx.time)
After Site Area Emerg. is declared and notifications. are made IMFTH05 10 2:00. After this malfuntion has been entered, Activate CAE! NUU07fuelfail 10 % Fuel Failure over a 2 min.
period The CAE ramps RU-148, up to values for a GE classificatio i li
Scenario Title:LOCAwith no C.S.
Scenario 4:NUU09-00-XS-001-000 SCENARIO OVERVIEW This scenario starts with an RCS leak at >44 GPM. The crew will address 41AO-IZZI4, Excessive RCS Leakage The leakrate will require the EC to declare an ALERT. The crew determines the need to start a plant shutdown. The leak degrades to a LOCA. The reactor will.
trip on low pressurizer pressure or the crew will manually trip the reactor based on plant trends.
The crew willperform the SPTA's and enter the LOCA procedure. Shortly after the SIAS, fuel failure develops.
The event now will be upgraded in Classification to a SITE AREA EMERGENCYdue to high radiation levels in containment and a loss of RCS subcooling. On CSAS actuation, Containment Spray Valve 672 ( A Train) fails to open. A loss of vital bus PBB-S04 ocurrs, which eliminates the only source of Containment Spray Flow. The crew will transition from the LOCA procedure to the Functional Recovery Procedure (FRP). The EC will now upgrade the event to a GENERAL EMERGENCY. The scenario willterminate when the plant is stabilized and all E-Plan notifications are made or starte '
Scenario Title:LOCAwith no C.S.
Scenario PNJU09-00-XS-001-000 APPENDIXA SCENARIO
" Allowoperators time to assume responsibility for their assigned positions I.
EVENT ONE - RCS LEAKAT> 44 GPM Crew performs leakrate calculation IAW 41AO-IZZ14
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The crew addresses Tech. Specs. and determines a plant shutdown is needed
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The SS/EC declares an ALERT per EPIP-02, based on RCS Leakage >44 GPM (Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier). However the SS may have classified an NUE based on preliminary data.
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"The SS/EC implements EPIP-03 for notifications etc
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The STA verifies the Emergency Plan Classification, determines reportability and communicates the results to the SS.
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SS notifies SSM of Emergency situation and conducts transfer of EC responsibilities to the SSM upon SSM arrival to the Control Room.
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EC directs STSC Communicator to complete The NANEMERGENCY Message Form and notificatons to State and County commence within 15 minutes ofClassification.
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NRC will be contacted immediately following notification of State/County Agencies and within 60 minutes of the Classification
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The NRC phone willbe manned by an STA, RO, or an SRO.
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The EC willdetermine ifAssembly/Accountability is needed.
~
CRS tailboards event including trip criteria II.
EVENT TWO -LOCA, REACTOR TRIP Crew performs the SPTAs with applicable contingency actions taken:
].
CRS performs diagnostic and refers to Break I.D. chart and determines a LOCA is in progress in Containment.
CRS tailboards the event and transitions to the LOCA Procedure.
1.
Crew determines that RCS subcooling has been lost and stops all RCP's.
2.
The crew should recognize that SIA-UV-672, the 'A'rain Containment Spray Valve did not open on a Containment Spray actuation.
3.
The EC determines that the RCS Barrier has been LOST.
STA Performs the following:
~
The STA verifies the Emergency Plan Classification, determines reportability,verifies mitigation strategies, and communicates the results to the SS/EC.
~
The STA performs the event specific safety function status check.
~
The STA checks indications for unacceptable parameters and trends. Ifany are noted the STA communicates this to the cre Scenario Title:LOCAwith no C.S.
Scenario P:NUU09-00-XS-001-000 APPENDIX A III.
EVENT THREE FUEL FAILURE f
A.
B.
Crew responds to Radiation alarms The EC declares a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on high radiation levels in
'ontainment as seen on RU-148 and RU-149. This represents a Loss of the fuel clad barrier.
1.
The STA verifies the Emergency Plan Classification, determines reportability and communicates the results to the SS.
2.
EC directs completion of the NAN Emergency Message form and notificaton ofreclassifications commence 3.
EC implements EPIP-03 for Assembly and Accountability and Protective Action Recommendations ofSHELTER within a 2 mile radius
~ 1 i
Scenario TitleiLOCAwith no C.S.
Scenario 4:NUU09-00-XS-001-000 APPENDIXA
IV.
EVENT FOUR LOSS OF VITAL 4160V. BUS (PBB-S04),'OSS OF CONTAINMENTSPRAY A.
B.
Crew recognizes loss ofa safety function.
CRS transitions to the Functional Recovery Procedure
.
1.
CRS Performs FRP Entry Procedure Steps 1-7
~
Safety Function Tracking (Section 4.0), Enters the EOP Entry Time
~
Selects a success path to satisfy each safety function for which Success Path 1 acceptance criteria are not met.
~
Determines whether the selected success paths are in jeopardy.
CRS direct the STA to perform the Safety Function Status Check The CRS Directs the performance of the Success Paths needed to regain Safety Functions.
4 STA Performs the following:
~'he STA, verifies the diagnosis and communicates the results to the CRS.
~
The STA verifies mitigation of the event by monitoring trends and indications and comparing them to expected results. Ifthe event is not being mitigated, a
modification to the plan of action is developed and communicated to the CRS.
~
The STA checks indications for unacceptable parameters and trends. Ifany are noted the STA communicates this to the crew.
C.
3.
4.
EC recognizes a potential Loss of Containment Barrier 1.
EC upgrades event classification to a GENERAL EMERGENCY due to Loses of RCS and FUEL CLAD Barriers AND a Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier.
2.
The STA verifies the Emergency Plan Classification, determines reportability and communicates the results to the SS/EC.
EC/SS directs completion of the NAN Emergency Message form and notificaton of reclassifications commence EC calls for SITE EVACUATION.
5.
EC/SS implements EPIP-03 and makes Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) of EVACUATIONfor a 5 mile radius and 10 miles in potentially affected sectors.
The scenario willterminate when the plant is in a stable condition and all notifications for the Emergency Plan have been made or have been initiate ~ I l
l
','
Scenario 'I i Scenario I/:
A with no C.S.
9-00-XS-001-000 APPE
.
B EVENT fIME T= I T=25 (Approx.
'tiille)
wllen leak rate is determined, ALERT is classi fied, and NAN notifications are completed.
AfterAlert Notifications are completed.
When Requested When Requested SYNTAX IMFTHOIC..009 MMFTH01C 10 5:00 activate: CAE!
RMSAFUELFAIL mrfED72 override CLS mrfED74 override CLS mrfED76 override CLS mrfch05 acknowledge mrfch06 acknowledge DESCRIPTION RCS Leak at.approx. 65 GPM Large LOCA causing a loss ofsubcooling. Ramped in over 5 minutes.
The Reactor trips, a SIAS/CIAS,and possible CSAS are acuated.
The CAE willmake RU-148,149,150, and 151 trend appropriately Re-Energizes SIAS Load Shed MCCs on the 'A'rain Reset H2 Analyzer "A"Alarm Reset Hz Analyzer "B"Alarm MISC.
When CSAS actuates, the crew may request that an AO try to manually open valve 672.
The intent is to give the crew back valve 672, but only after RP has given the OK to enter the AUX. Bldg. AND after PBB-S04 has been lost.
See event
//4.
and the next page for instructions to manually open the valv Scenario I I A witlino C.S.
Scenario //:
-00-XS-001-000 APPE
'4 T=50(Approx
. time)
AfterSAE notifications are made.
(containment press. has to bc >8.5psig when this malfunction is p.ut in.)
When requested to.
manually open CS valve 672, wait about 10 min., TIIEN IMF EDI IC DMF MV06:SIAUV672 (malfunction was entered in Sim. setup)
mrfmv09:siauv672 Normal Supply breaker to PBB-S04 trips on a 86 L/0 When this malfunction is deleted, the valve can be manually opened, OR, opened from the control room. Call up RFS to report when valve is full open.
When this remote function is entered, the valve is manually opened.
Ifasked to investigate or to try to reset the 86 L/O,report that the relay will not reset IfElec. Maint. is asked to investigate, advise the control room that there is a faulty 86 L/0 relay and that it willtake about 45 minutes to replace.
Wait until the Aux. Operator is at the valve, locally, to delete this malfunction. ( ifthc control room H.S. is taken to open after this malfunction is deleted, the valve willopen.)
A