IR 05000528/1995020
| ML17311B297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1995 |
| From: | Vandenburgh C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17311B296 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-95-20, 50-529-95-20, 50-530-95-20, NUDOCS 9512080170 | |
| Download: ML17311B297 (20) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-528/95-20 50-529/95-20 50-530/95-20 Licenses:
Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box 53999 Phoenix, Arizona Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
Units
~
~
and 3 Inspection At:
Wintersburg,.Arizona Inspection Conducted:
October 30 through November 3, 1995 i vs sr on of Reactor Sa f ty Inspector:
William J.
Wagner, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch D'pproved:
res
.
an en urg
,.
se
,
ngsneersng rane Division of Reactor ety Ins ection Summar Areas Ins ected Units
2 and 3:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's fire protection program and NRC followup items.
Inspection procedures 64704 and 92904 were used.
Results Units
2 and
Plant 0 erations The licensee had maintained housekeeping at an outstanding level in all three units (Section 1.3).
Maintenance The inspector verified that the fire protection equipment, water suppression systems, and the emergency lights had been properly maintained to assure operability (Section 1.3).
95f2080i70 95f206 PDR ADOCK 05000528
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~Pi S
t The fire brigade had consistently demonstrated quick response to plant emergency fires and incidence investigations (Section 1.6).
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
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Followup Item 50-528/9428-01 was closed (Section 2. 1).
~
Unresolved Item 50-528/9429-01 was closed (Section 2.2).
Attachment:
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Attachment
- Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
-3-DETAILS
FIRE PROTECTION/PREVENTION PROGRAH (64704)
1.1 Palo Verde Fire Protection Re uirements Operating Licenses
~ NPF-41
~
NPF-51 and NPF-774 for Palo Verde Units 1,
and 3. respectively.
require that the'licensee implement and maintain in effect all the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in'the final safety analysis report for the facility.
Section 9.5.1 of the final safety analysis report contains the licensee's commitments for the fire protection systems and fire protection program.
1.2 Review of Fire Protection Procedures The inspector reviewed the licensee's approved fire protection program as defined in the final safety analysis report for the facility.
The inspector specifically reviewed the changes made to the following fire protection program implementing procedures.
The inspector performed this review to evaluate the effect of the programmatic and procedural changes made since the last NRC inspection of the fire protection program.
~
~
"Fire System Impairment." Revision
"Emergency Notification and Response,"
Revision
"Control of Transient Combustibles."
Revision 4
"Firewatch Duties'
" Revision
"Pre-Fire Strategies Manual Control." Revision 00.01
"Hot Work Permit," Revision
"PVNGS Fire Department Incident Command System,"
Revision
"Fire Protection Test Program," Revision 4
"Fire Protection Test Program Requirements,"
Revision
The inspector's review of procedure changes indicated that the changes would not reduce the technical adequacy of the procedures to implement the fire protection program.
1.3 Plant Tour The inspector toured various areas of the Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 control buildings.
The inspector performed this tour to visually inspect the fire protection equipment and features provided in these areas and to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's fire prevention program from a performance-based perspecti ve.
Specific plant areas in the control building included the upper and lower cable spreading room. diesel generator rooms and the remote shutdown rooms The inspector observed the following
i l'
ll f 1,
f
'
The inspector noted that the Unit 1 fire alarm annunciators located in the control room had been replaced and were in operating condition.
The inspector determined that the fire alarm annunciators located in Unit 1 were being replaced with a new computerized system that would give the specific location and area of the fire alarm.
Inspector interviews with the Unit 1 reactor operators indicated that the fire alarms were loud and recognizable.
Also, the inspector noted that the Units 2 and 3 remote fire alarm annunciators were in the process of being replaced with new units.
The inspector verified that roving fire watches were initiated as compensatory measures unti 1 the new fire alarm units were installed in Units 2 and 3.
The inspector noted that the fire sprinkler systems and deluge systems were operable and well maintained.
The inspector observed that the fire protection equipment, such as hoses, hose reels, detectors.
and fire extinguishers were in good material condition.
The inspector noted, that housekeeping was well maintained.
The inspector noted the emergency lights were properly located and maintained.
During the Unit 2 walkdown, the inspector verified that eight valves required for safe shutdown during a control room fire, were accessible and well labeled.
1.4 Internal Corrosion to Fire Su ression S stem
.
Upon disassembly of a vertical section of piping on the fire. sprinkler system in the Unit 2 cable spreading room. the licensee discovered that corrosion products'ad blocked a section approximately 90 percent.
The licensee issued a Potentially Significant Condition Report/Disposition Request 9-5-0968 to address the concern.
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to address this problem.
The licensee had removed 26 droplegs and found 8 with greater than 80 percent blockage.
Droplegs are vertical sections of piping from the deluge system with sprinkler heads attached.
The licensee determined that the blockage was due to corrosion activity at the water to air interface inside the galvanized carbon steel pipe.
The licensee considered part of the corrosion to be microbiologically induced.
The corrosion was characterized by localized pitting with little volumetric wastage and, therefore, did not impact the structural integrity of the dropleg J
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-5-The licensee tested sections of the three "worst case" plugged droplegs to
'etermine the operability of the fire suppression system.
The licensee conducted these tests at normal system pressure which ranges from 107 to 125 pounds per square inch.
The licensee determined that normal system pressure would flush the corrosion material out through the sprinkler heads and would not affect operation of the fire suppression system.
The inspector determined that the licensee had not considered the impact of reduced pressure due to such factors as head loss at higher elevations.
In'esponse to this concern.
the licensee revised the condition report/
disposition request evaluation to include the affect of impact of reduced pressure.
This evaluation concluded that head loss at higher elevations had no affect on the pressure at the most remote sprinkler nozzles.
The licensee's long-term resolution to the corrosion problem includes the addition of'
chemical addition system for the fire protection system scheduled for completion by the end of 1995.
The new chemical addition system will inject a
pH modifier to raise the water pH above 9.0 and an oxygen scavenger to remove oxygen from the water.
These licensee actions are designed to prevent microbiologically induced corrosion from occurring in the fire suppression system.
The inspector's review of the response and actions taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence of the internal corrosion problem determined that their performance was reasonable and would not impact safe operation of the fire suppression systems.
1.5 Fire Res onse E ui ment The inspector inspected the emergency fire brigade equipment inventory located in four emergency equipment cabinets stationed in Units 1 and 3.
The inspector found that the emergency equipment cabinets contained the required items specified on the equipment list.
Also. the inspector verified that.
other fire response equipment.
such as turn-out gear, self-contained breathing apparatus'ire extinguishers. fire hoses.
and nozzles.
were well maintained
'nd readily accessible.
1.6 Fire Bri ade Res onse The inspector reviewed 28 fire response/incident investigation reports.
written from January 1995 to October 1995'o determine the responsiveness of the fire brigade to plant emergencies.
This review indicated that the typical response times ranged from one to five minutes.
On the average.
the fire brigade was on the scene within two minutes from the time the incident was reported.
Through interviews with fire protection personnel the inspector determined that the fire department monitors the extension 4444 emergency phone to the control room.
As a result of monitoring these phone calls. the fire department had immediately reacted to plant emergencies and, in some cases.
had responded prior to receiving
.he official notification from the security department.
The inspector considered the fire brigade response time to plant emergencies to be a strengt,
t
-6-1.7 Fire Bri ade Trainin The inspector reviewed the fire brigade training records for Training Courses NPL39-01 "Fire Drill." and NPL69-01 "Laboratory Practice Exercise."
Course NPL39-01.
dated October 23.
1995
~ was a fire drill simulating fire damage to electrical cables.
Course NPL69-01, dated October 17, 1995
~
addressed subjects
~ such as driver training, basic fire-fighting communications.
and confined space rescue.
The inspector verified that the required training for all fire fighters was up-to-date and that the licensee had performed the minimum of two fire drills per year.
The inspector questioned one fire protection supervisor and three fire brigade members concerning the use of water on an electrical cable fire.
These questions were based on concerns identified at Waterford Steam Electric Station facility where the lack of training contributed to the fire brigade's delay in applying a water spray to an electrical fire.
All of the Palo Verde fire protection personnel had received the necessary training to fight electrical fires and none of the personnel expressed any hesitancy concerning the use of water on a deep-seated cable fire.
The inspector's review of training records confi rmed that cable fire training included classroom instructions practical instruction at a simulated cable tray facility, and on site fire dri1ls.
1.8 Emer enc Li htin The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency lighting summary report, dated November 1.
1995.
This report provided statistical data regarding the availability of the
CFR 50, Appendix R. emergency lighting systems at Palo Verde.
The inspector determined that the licensee uses three types of Appendix R emergency lighting systems:
Exide (6 total, 2 per Unit). Holophane (21 total, 7 per Unit) and Dual-Lites (numerous lights in each unit).
The actual availability of this equipment during the last quarter was 98 percent for the Exide and Dual-Lites, respectively, and 93 percent for the Holophane
.
lights.
The licensee had established a goal of 90 percent avai labi lity or greater.
The inspector reviewed the summary report and was satisfied that the licensee had adequate availability of emergency lighting at the time of this inspection.
1.9 ualit Assurance Audit The inspector reviewed Audit Report 94-009,
"Fire Protection,"
conducted August 30 through September 9.
1994.
The licensee conducted this audit to assess the implementation and effectiveness of the fire protection and loss prevention program at Palo Verde.
The scope of the audit included a review of documentation.
interviews with cognizant personnel, plant walkdowns and performance based observations to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of the fire protection program.
The audit included a technical specialist from Johnson and Higgins who provided an independent assessment of certain aspects
I
-7-of the fire protection program.
The audit identified program weaknesses regarding the timeliness of corrective actions
~ storage of combustible materials, and the need to clarify the role of the Phoenix Fire Department.
The licensee corrected these weaknesses and issued condition report/
disposition requests for further evaluation.
FOLLOMUP -
PLANT SUPPORT (92904)
2. 1 Close'd Ins ection Followu Item 528/9428-01:
Im act Review Process Im rovements Backcaround During an NRC integrated team inspection conducted on September 27 through October 7.
1994. the team noted that the licensee had reduced the number of outstanding electronic impacts reviews down to 32,000 and planned to improve the impact review process.
The licensee required impact reviews whenever a
design. change affected an organization.
This item was opened to review the actions the licensee had taken to reduce the backlog of impact reviews to.a-manageable level.
On November 15, 1994, the licensee presented to the NRC an action plan to work off all potential electronic impact flags by September 18, 1995.
Ins ector Followu Condition Report/Disposition Request 94-0078, dated June 16, 1994. identified the immediate actions the licensee had taken to prevent a buildup of impact reviews.
These actions included a planned software change and further training for engineers.
The long-term plans provided for continuous process monitoring and a self assessment of the impact process.
The long-term improvement plan
~ completed on September 1995, included:
~
A self assessment of the overall impact process (completed in Harch 1995).
~
A supplement action plan to eliminate the "Electronic Impact" process (completed April 10.
1995).
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Development of a decision making model to recommend improvements to the impact process (completed Apri 1 18, 1995).
Implementation of the decision making model (completed September 5,
1995).
The inspector'erified that the licensee had completed the action plan as scheduled.
The licensee had implemented a central database to track the status of impacts.
As of September 5,
1995, the electronics impacts backlog had been reduced to 256.
The inspector review of these actions determined that the licensee effort to reduce the backlog of impact reviews to a
manageable level was successfu l j
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-8-2.2 Closed Unresolved Item 528/9429-01:
ualifications of Thermo-La Panels
~Back round This unresolved item involved the licensee's action to address the qualification of Thermo-Lag panels manufactured on site.
The licensee was specifically requested by the inspector to confirm the adequacy of the Thermo-Lag panels manufactured on site.
Ins ector Followu The licensee provided information on the Thermo-Lag 330-1 panels in their response to the NRC's request for additional information regarding Generic Letter 92-08,
"Thermal-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers."
Letter 102-03211-WLS/SAB/NLT, dated December 22.
1994. indicated that the licensee had some fire panels that had been supplied by Thermal Science.
Inc..
and other panels
.
that were manufactured on site.
The panels manufactured on site were constructed using materials that Thermal Science.
Inc., provided with a certificate of analysis certifying that the material had been tested for compliance with the listed Thermal Science, Inc., specification.
The panels were manufactured on site using a subcontractor's (Insulation Services.
Inc.)
installation instructions.
and verbal instructions from Thermal Science, Inc.,
technical representative.
The licensee's architect-engineer, Bechtel Services, provided quality assurance oversight on the manutacturing of the panels.
Bechtel's quality control verified the requi rements of minimum thickness of the panels, temperature control of the a;"ea and the manufacturing shop housekeeping.
The inspector reviewed the information the licensee provided to support their conclusion that the Thermo-Lag panels manufactured on site were of commensurate quality with those.manufactured by Thermal Science, Inc.
The inspector reviewed the Thermal Science.. Inc., quality control daily work sheet of February 23.
1983.
This work sheet verified that the applied wet thickness of the Thermo-Lag panels met the 5/8-inch minimum criteria.
The inspector also reviewed the Bechtel Quality Assurance Surveillance Report dated November 1,
1983.
This report verified that the minimum thickness of 1/2-inch was being met.
The inspector reviewed the results of density measurements taken from 78 Thermo-Lag panels.
These density measurements were taken by the licensee in response to a followup request for additional information regarding NRC Generic Letter 92-08 'ssued pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 (f).
The licensee had not issued their final report to the NRC; however.
the inspector review of the preliminary data indicated that the average of densiti es was 70.80 lbs/cu.ft.
The inspector verified that this density was within the required densities for a Thermal Science.
Inc., manufactured panel of 78 +10 percen k,
)
I
-9-Based on a review of the available documentation, the inspector determined that the licensee, had implemented an appropriate oversight process to ensure that the Thermo-Lag panels manufactured on site met the minimum wet and dry thickness requi rements specified by Thermal Science.
Inc.
The inspector also determined that the licensee.
as part of their response pursuant to
CFR 50.54(f).
had demonstrated that the densities of the site panels were within the Thermal Science, Inc.
~ specifications.
The inspector also discussed these observations with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation fire protection personnel.
who concurred with the inspector 's conclusion that the site panels had been manufactured to specifications equivalent to those used by Thermal Science, Inc.
~ for thei r pre-fabricated panel p t
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ATI'ACHMENT
PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel D. Agazzi, Fire Department Captain J. Auston, Senior Fire Protection Advisor D. Crozier, Section Leader.
Fire Protection F. Garrett, Department Leads Fire Protection R. Guron, Senior Mechanical Engineer R. Henry, Salt River Project, Site Representative W. Ide. Director, Operations S., Koski. Senior Project Manager, Nuclear Projects D. Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Assurance D. Neal, Senior Fire Protection Engineer E. O'eil'rimary Plant Investigator T. Rudolph.
System Engineer N. Turley. Senior Engineer.
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs The personnel above attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the personnel listed above.
the inspector contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
2'XIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on November 3.
1995.
During this meeting.
the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report.
The licensee did not express a position on the inspection findings documented in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to. or reviewed by, the inspector V lt
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