IR 05000483/1979006
| ML19249B650 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1979 |
| From: | Hansen W, Knop R, Phillips H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249B642 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-79-06, 50-483-79-6, NUDOCS 7909040634 | |
| Download: ML19249B650 (13) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAI! REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-483/79-06 Docket No. 50-483 License No. CPPR-139 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility:
Callaway, Unit 1 Inspection At:
Jallaway Site, Callaway County, Missouri Inspection Conducted: May 30, thru June 1, 1979
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Inspectors:
A. Hansen
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H. S. Phillip 6 /.? J7
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omlinson (Region IV)
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Approved By:
R. C. K o Chief
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Projects Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 30, 1979, thru June 1, 1979 (Report No. 50-483/79-06 Areas Inspected:
Safety related structural concrete work; safety related piping systems NDE review; activities relative to moving the steam generators.
The inspection involved a total of 63 onsite inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, two (2) items of noncompliance were identified (infraction) failure to follow established procedures and (infraction) failure to prescribe procedures to be used during the work phase to protect components stored in place.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Union Electric Company (UE)
- W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear Construction
- M.
E. Doyne, General Superintendent, Callaway Construction
- R.
L. Powers, Site Quality Assurance Group Leader
- W.
H. Stahl, Qualicy Assurance Enginaer
- J.
Laux, Quality Assurance Assistant Engineer J. C. Geachardt, Quality Assurance Engineer
- R.
Veatch, Quality Assurance Engineer Daniel International :orporation (Daniel)
- H.
J. Starr, Project Manager
- E.
D. McFarland, Construction Engineering Manager
- J.
A. Holland, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- J.
R. Cook, Quality Control Manager
- M.
Smith, Audit Response Coordinator Hartford Steam Boiler
- A.
A. Mcdonald, Authorized Nuclear Inspector The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel, including craftsmen, QA/QC, technical and engineering staff members.
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting.
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Section I Prepared by W. A. Hanser Reviewed by R. C. Knop, Chief Projects Section 1 1.
Observation of Work Related to the Off Loading and Movement of the Steam Generator Two steam generators arrived at the river front off loading area during the inspection.
The inspector observed that one steam generator had been removed from the shipping barge and moved to a Reliance Truck Company transporter.
Handling of the steam generator was performed in accordance with Reliance Truck Company procedure 102 rev. 4, titled, " Unloading Steam Generator, hauling to job site and placing on Daniel International Transporter."
No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.
2.
Review of Receipt Inspection Material Control Reports for Subcontractors Providing Piping Assemblies Material control reports for Dravo Corporation, Pullman Kellog a.
Company and Gulf Western Company for the time period of about July 15, 1978 through January 15, 1979 were reviewed.
These contractors supply pipe spools and/or formations to the Callaway construction site.
The review was to determine if any shipments were returned to the contractor because of shipping damage. The review was in each case restricted to those spools or formations purchased for use in safety related areas, except one formation supplied by Gulf Western Coneany.
The results of the review were:
(1) Dravo Corporation: Approximately 50 Mat..ial Control Reports were on file.
The MCRs were marked to indicate that each item or assemblv received had not been famaged during shipment.
(2) Pullman Ke_llog Approximately 25 MCRs were on file. The MCRs were marked to indicate that each item or assembly received had not been damaged during transit.
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(3) Gulf Western MCRs on file, written between March 27, 1978 thru April 29, 1979 were reviewed. The Gulf Western work consists of constructing pipe formations.
Fourteen (14) MCRs were reviewed.
No safety related formations
, returned to Gulf Western because of damage in shipping.
However, radiographs that indis ated that pipe assembly /
formation welds did not meet specification requirements were identified in April et the SNUPPS Wo)~ Creek site.
This finding prompted a review of radiographs at the Callaway site by Union Electric and Daniel International Corporation personnel and resulted in rejecting many of the welds.
Gulf Western has been required by Union Electric to resolve ill nonconforming conditions.
Section III of tnis report describes an unresolved item regarding work done by Gulf Western.
During an inspection of piping assembly storage areas a nonsafety related formation was viewed.
The formation was described as having been delivered to the sit. after having apparently hitting a bridge abutment.
The formation consisted of a small tank roughly 36 inches in diameter and 10 feet hich with two 2 inch pipes attached at the top with nipples and ells.
The assembly observed was described to have been repaired by Gulf Western.
The original assembly had been heavily damaged during ship.ent.
It was explained that Gulf Western had replaced the tank and the 2 inch pipe attached at the tank top.
The assembly was to be installed in the radwaste building in a nonsafety related system.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Section II Prepared by H. S. Phillips Reviewed by R. C. Knop, Chief Projects Section 1 1.
Plant Tour A plant tour was conducted immediately following the entrance interview on May 30, 1979.
First the insp ctors observed the steam generators being unloaded at the dock facility as well as access road, lifting equipment and plan for loading and moving. Secondly, the lower three floors of the Auxillary building were inspected for housekeeping and work activities in process.
Finally, the Reactor building was not accessible because Chicago Bridge and Iron was removing a structural steel support in that building. Therefore, this area was inspected the next day, May 31, 1979. The following areas were found questionable during the tour and a detailed inspection followed:
Reinforcement installation Pour No. 2C111WO in Auxillary building elevation 1974' 0" - 1993' (AN to CA) (See Paragraph 2).
Water standing in base of Centrifagal Charging Pump, TBG-05A, in Auxillary building.
The inspector found that the water was in the base to promote curing of grout which had been placed.
Since the minimum curing time had been met, the licensee agreed that the water should be removed.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
ine reactor vessel wes stored in place inside the Reactor building. Moisture which was observed at the bottom of the reactor vessel was the result of " sweating" because of temper-ature differential.
Further investigation revealed t'lat moisture had also sotten inside the vessel.
See paragraph 3.
Three irstrumentatica thimble guides at the base of the vessel did not have caps.
All others did.
See paragraph 3.
The internals were stored in place inside the Reactor building.
A rusty stain was observed inside the Loles in the flow mixer plate.
The inspector also observed a hole in the top of the protective covering.
See paragraph 3.
Valve 2HB24-LLB-1003 was improperly stored.
See paragraph 3.
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2.
Auxillary Building, Area 1, Reinforcement Placement The inspector observed the preparation for a concrete placement at the south end of the Auxillary building. The inspector interviewed the cadwelding crew and found that the lead man, who performed the cadwell process, was qualified.
Two other helpers who were assisting were in training. The inspector observed the cadwelding being performed at the 1974' 0" - 1993' 0" elevation at the south side of the Auxillary Building lines AN to CA.
Number 6 reinforcement bar was being installed for a future pour, No. 2C111WO4.
The inspector observed the technique for vertical caldwelding one number 6 rebar. The bar was cleaned; asbestos packed; splice sleeve seated; fixture locked, crucible placed and loaded; powder fired and slag cleaned. The following cadwelds were visually inspected and were found to be sound, that is, void areas did not exceed the fo rmula (Void Area = W(D - 3/16): Splice Number (2C111WO4/DWG R0111029)
616 RA position V, 288 position H, 35 Bar 8 position H, 43 Bar 8 position 11; 80 Bar 8 position 11.
The latter had a void which was measured, but was found not to exceed the allowable tolerance.
Two bent dowels were observed at the top of this area and chunks of concrete had been knocked loose around each as a result of being struck.
The Daniel Quality Control inspector was aware of both areas which had been damaged; however, a nonconformance report No.
2SN-0591-C had been processed on only one of the areas.
A hold tag was also placed only on one area.
The inspector questioned thic and was informed that Daniel Construction Procedure QCP-1094 (refere..ce 2.5) does not require writing a nonconformance report unless the defect is as follows:
" Defects requiring approval prior to repair (a) any void where depth exceeds 1/3 the least dimensic.i of the beam, column, wall, or slab.
(b) Any void where reinforcing bars are exposed ateund their entire circumference for a length along the bar as follows:
1.
- 7 bars and smaller - 6 inches 2.
Larger than #7 bars - 9 inches" The licensee representative stated that unless rebar was exposed to the extent stated by the procedure no nonconformance would be written.
This policy was questioned because it has the effect of bypassing the requirement to identify nonconformances. It also bypasses engineering review and approval of correction / repair.
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This is an unresolved matter pending a review of other documents to be provided by Union Electric which should provide assurance that these voids (nonconformances) are factored into the trend analysis program and that voids affecting structural integrity are being correctly identified and classified. (483/79-06-01).
The inspector observed bent rebar in the same araa of the Auxillary building, pour 2C111WO4.
In this case, it was found that a #8 bar had been bent twice. The first bend was controlled, that is, it was approved by engineering, preheated, bent pr perly, and then straightened.
Quality control records documented this or may 10, 1979. On June 6, 1979 the bar was cold bent without approval.
Cold bending is not permitted.
Also reinforcement specification No. 10466-C112(Q1 paragraph 9.1.2 stated that #6-11 bar can be bent only once provided the bar is heated during bending and straightening.
The licensee wrote nonconformance report 2W-0611-C to cover this nonconformance.
The inspector has no further question regarding this matter.
3.
Storage and Protection of Components In place storage / protection of components inside the auxillary building was observed and the following were findings.
a.
Reactor Vessel Unit 1 The vessel was sweating profusely on the outside and one rusty spot was noted on the outside at the bottom of the vessel.
Three (3) caps were missing from the thimble guides located at the tottom of the vessel. More importantly, the inspector found that water had entered inside the vessel because of improper storage conditions.
A nonconformance report 2SN-0473-M stated that the vessel stored in the Reactor building at the 1998' 6" elevation had excessive condensation and numerous rust area.
Hold tags were placed The manhole entrance was left open allowing rain to enter. The moisture condensed on the plain carbon steel platform causing rust to enter the vessel.
The interior was cleaned by removing the water and by sanding the vessel with aluminum oxide abrasive cloth followed by acetone wipe down.
The platform was painted to prevent rust from collecting again.
The inspector contacted the Westinghouse Site Representative (WSR) to further inquire about their position in this matter relative to in place storage of the vessel.
When the vessel arrives at the site, it contains dessicant.
The WSR had recom-mended removal of the dessicant because of the possibility of spilling the dessicant inside the vessel.
The inspector asked what is the method of protection during the interim storage period.
The WSR stated there was no interim procedure / instruction-7-c, l' * i( s * n
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I to assure protection during this phase of construction. The inspector also asked if the Westinghouse specification /manufac-turers recommendations address such things as dissimilar materials that could rust and contaminate the vessel.
The answer was negative.
b.
Peactor Internals The inspector observed the internals that were stored in place adjacent to the reactor vessel. The internals were stored by stacking vertically on plain carbon steel racks. The internals were covered with a plastic covering, however, the top of the cover had been intentionally cut for entry.
The inspector viewed the flow mixer plate from the bottom and that stains were evident and appeared to be rust stains on five or six of the cylindrical holes in the mixer plate.
It appears that this problem was similar to the vessel problem.
No nonconformance repcrt had been written to describe this condition because the problem had not been previously idantified.
c.
Liquid Radwaste Valve (2HB24-LLB-1003)
This class 3 valve is a Q listed valve which should have been stored per ANSI N45.2.2 level
"B" requirements. The valve was found on the concrete floor which was wet and dirty.
The findings in Paragraphs 3a-c represent a noncompliance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII.
In responding to the above findings, please address the evaluation of the vessel cleaning in regard to contamination as well as interia protection instructions between placement until work is completed inside the vessel.
Also address the question as to why the problem with the internals was not identified subsequent to your identifying the vessel problem.
Finally discuss whether audits or surveillances have been or will be performea to assure that in place storage is uot a generic problem. (483/79-06-02).
4.
Auxillary Building Internal Wall Concrete Placement i
The inspector observed the placement (No. 2151WO3) of concrete to construct a internal wall at 'he 2047' 6" AK to A13-AL less 10" elevation. The complete pour was not observed - only load number 3.
a.
Observation of Work The inspector observed the following work activities which were performed in an acceptable manner:
(1) Form properly set (2) Rebar properly cleaned, placed, secured-8-c.a a s i a o J \\ > ' i U JL _
(3) Preplacement inspection complete prior to placement (4) Proper mix per specification (C-1, PTL138) was delivered (5) Mixing / transporting time (6) Piping
' rial controlled (7) Temperata,e controlled (8) Crew adequate to place mix vibrators; chutes.
Placing technique acceptabl e (9) Slump and air tents performed (10) QC inspectors at placement site (11) Rebar (No. 6) and embedments secured uith wire. Measured rebar spacing.
(12) Aggregate and cement storage (13) Batch Tickets 244195, 244196; 244197 showed design mix, number revolutions and time to discharge. The inspector traceu these back to the batch plant comparing the tickets to the punched card which gave weights.
(14) Drawing Nos. COC1946 (Rev 2) and C0C1918 (Rev 6) were reviewed to determine design mix and rebaz configuration.
b.
Review of Quality Records The following records were reviewed and were considered acceptable.
(1) Prepour checklists (5-30-79) for inspectors which covered preplacement.
(2) QC Inspection Report (3) Delivery and placement records (4) Batch plant placement and calibration records (5) No nonconformance reports were reviewed on this placement however, three reports were reviewed in paragraph 2 of this report regarding pour oo. 2C111WO4.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified above.
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5.
Civil Test Labo atory Test Equipment Calibration The inspector inspected the laboratory test eouipment to assure that it had been calibrated within the specified frequency. All of this equiprent had calibration due date stickers which indicated that all the following equipment had been calibrated as follows:
Equipment No. 5 1C2-CQ-085, CQ-234,CQ-115, CQ-117, CQ-256, CQ-239, CQ-179, CQ-047, CQ-021, CQ-145, CQ-067, CQ-065 and CQ-146.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Section III Prepared by D. P. Tomlinson Rc seed by R. E. Hall, Chief Engineering Support Brarch 1.
Review of Safety-Related Piping Radiographs The IE inspector reviewed a randomly selected sample of piping weld radiographs. A total of sixteen field welded joints made by Daniel International and three welded joints made by Dravo Corporation were e xa.nin e d. This sample included radiographs of acceptable welds and welds requiring repairs. The sample was made up of six joints in the containment spray system, three joints ia the RHR system, three joints in the CVC system, and four joints in the HPCI system.
Each radiograph was first checked for conformance to code requirements relative to film quality and again to confirm the evaluation of indications.
Initial evaluation of the radiographs included proper identification, required densities, selection and placement of pene-t rameters, assurance of proper coverage and adherence to techniques specified in Section V of the ASME B&PV Code.
The IE inspector independently evaluated the radiographic indications and compared these with the tvaluation sheets for each welded joint.
Indications noted included incomplete fusion, porosity, tungsten inclusions, weld concavity and weld convexity. Although all indications appeared on each film and the degree of severity varied between films, the evaluations by Daniel International and the IE inspector agreed very closely.
Radiographs for two of the welos displayed indications that could have been interpreted several ways.
Visual inspection of the welds proved that the attendant reader sheets correctly identified both as " surface conditions."
No items of noncompliance were noted during this portion of the inspection.
2.
Qualification of Inspection Personnel The IE inspector reviewed the personnel qualification records for seventeen Technical Services Laboratory employees.
The records inspected included current employees, terminated employees, and off-site Level III personnel.
Test scores, percentile weights and
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total grades were noted along with results of current vision tests.
Personnel qualification records for five Daniel International weld inspectors were also reviewed for completeness and currentness.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were noted during this portion of the inspection.
3.
Review of Reactor Coolant System Piping An attempt was made by the IE inspector to review radiographs of the welded joints on the Reactor Coolant System piping.
In trying to retrieve the radiographs, it became apparent that they had not yet been received onsite.
Daniel International procedure AP-703 " Material and Equipment Receiving and Inspection" requires that subvendor data packages must be received within 60 days of receiving any material.
The procedure further requires that if the data package is not received a nonconformance is to be written to ider 'fy the data deficiency.
A nonconformance had not been written even though the material had been received in March of 1978.
In March of 1978, a Union Electric audit of Daniel International's receiving inspection system for Westinghouse furnished equipment had revealed incomplete implementation of the inspection program and omissions in the data packages. These errors and omissions in the data packages raised serious doubts concerning the validity of the Westinghouse quality release that accompanies each package.
Westinghouse then developed a matrix for receiving inspection listing each major component supplied by their subcontractors.
This matrix issued in August 1978 to UE, listed the documentation required for each component.
In January 1979, this matrix was presented to Daniel International but was not fully implemented due to a mis-understanding of responsibilties.
Receiving inspection was performing only a " paper count" review of the document packages and not a review for technical content.
Receiving inspection erroneously assumed that all radiographs would bypass them and be sent directly to the QC services branch for review, filing and storage.
In March 1979, a meeting was held with Daniel International QC and UE to clarify the matrix requirements and to clearly define all responsibilities.
At this time, the gap in the system was discovered and a list was coc. plied of all onsite radiographs received from Westinghouse subcontractors.
Film for the RCS piping was not on this list: although, the hardware had been onsite for at least seven months.
Another meeting in April 1979 established that receiving inspection will now verify the receipt of all radiographs and forward them to the QC services branch.
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Late in May 1979, a program was begun by UE for a comprehensive review o f thirty data packages selected at random from among the approximately four hundred furnished by Westinghouse suppliers and reviewed by Westinghouse. This review will ascertain not only if all required documentation is present, but also if it is technically adequate.
If an unacceptable trend is found to exist, based on this sample of thirty, a complete review by Westinghouse of all four hundred data packages will be required by UE.
Although action is being taken by Union Electric Company to obtain the data package the procedural requirements to document the absence of the data package by NCR was not accomplished.
This is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
(483/79-06-03)
The IE review of the RCS piping radiographs will be considered an unresolved item until they are received onsite and inspected by an IE inspector.
(483/79-06-04)
Unresolved Matter Unresolved items are mattei - about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section 11, Paragraph 2, and Section III, Paragraph 3.
Exit Meeting The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in the Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspections on June 1, 1979.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the items of noncompliance identified in Sections II and III.
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