IR 05000458/1993003
| ML20044C423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1993 |
| From: | Powers D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044C421 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-93-03, 50-458-93-3, NUDOCS 9303230016 | |
| Download: ML20044C423 (13) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Inspection Report:
50-458/93-03 Operating License: NPF-47 Licensee: Gulf States Utilities
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P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Facility Name:
River Bend Station Inspection At:
St. Francisville, Louisiana Inspection Conducted:
February 8-12, 1993 i
Inspectors:
C. E. Johnson, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Section
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Division of Reactor Safety L. E. Ellershaw, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Section Division of Reactor Safety Approved: h /1 h, ww 3/sS/93 Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Section Dite Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary Areas inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's maintenance program implementation.
Results:
Procedures contained sufficient detail to enable the licensee's staff to
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accomplish the subject work tasks.
Procedures appropriately conformed to the licensee's administrative requirements'for format, content, and vendor recommendations (Section 2.1).
The availability of Chiller ID of the heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning system was low (Section 2.2).
Maintenance work activities on the turbine electro-hydraulic control.
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system were appropriately performed as scheduled and in accordance with work instructions and procedures (Section 2.3)
9303230016 930317 PDR ADOCK 05000458 O
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-2-The licensee's control over maintenance activities affected-by.
- maintenance work orders and modification requests for'nonsafety-related
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equipment was weak. The licensee's practices; for replacing back into -
service equipment important to safety that was: removed'for maintenance-
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was weak. Two examples of. safety-related equipment were identified; that were not labeled or were improperly labeled-(Section 2.4).
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The licensee's effort to assure that maintenance work order activities
were clearly documented when work was cancelled or transferred was weak (Sections 2.5 and 2.6).
Observed maintenance work was appropriately performed in accordance with-
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applicable work documents by qualified personnel (Section 2.6).
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The licensee's preventive maintenance program appeared to be generally.
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functioning properly (Section 2.7).-
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Summary of In oection Findinos:
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Inspection Followup Item (458/9303-01) was opened (Section 2.2).
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Unresolved Items (458/9303-02 and 03)'were opened (Sections 2.4).
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Attachments:
Attachment l'- Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting j
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Attachment 2 - Documents Reviewed
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-3-DETAILS
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1 PUWT STATUS'
j During this inspection period, River Bend Station (RBS)' facility, was A
operating at 100 percent power and subsequently reduced power level to'
'i 70 percent to replace packing on a feedwater regulating valve...
2 NAINTDIANCE PROGRAN IMPLEMENTATION (62700)
3.i The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether the licensee's
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maintenance program was being implemented in.accordance with regulatory
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requirements, and determine the effectiveness of the maintenance program on
important plant equipment.
The inspectors selected two safety-related maintenance activities and three
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tonsafety-related maintenance activities for review. The nonsafety-related maintenance activities were. considered as important to safety.
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i 2.1 Procedure and Records Review 2.1.1 Discussion
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The inspectors reviewed maintenance procedures used to conduct-the activities
discussed in the following paragraphs. The majority of the procedures
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reviewed were incorporated into maintenance work orders (MW0s),- along with the.
necessary instructions.' Procedures reviewed conformed to the licensee's administrative requirements, including format, approval', and control. Quality
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control inspection holdpoints were included in the instructions or procedures used.
Appropriate controls for lifting of-leads and jumpers were' included in
the instructions.
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' The inspectors noted that the licensee had submitted changes-to their. quality.
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assurance program to the NRC staff. One of the changes was the removal.of the.
biennial review of procedures'as required by-ANSI N18.7. The inspectors.
c; reviewed the change submitted to the NRC staff dated October 26. 1992, and l
noted the subsequent approval by the NRC staff dated November 17, 1992.:
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The inspectors also reviewed the records associated with the maintenance
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activities selected and determined that:
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Required administrative approvals were obtained before~ the work'
was initiated.
Inspections were made in accordance with the licensee's
requirements..
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instructions.
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Parts and materials were identified in the work package.
- Corrective and preventive maintenance records were assembled and
stored as part of the maintenance history.
Maintenance procedures and associated maintenance records reviewed are listed in Attachment 2.
2.1.2 Conclusions Overall, the procedures reviewed contained sufficient detail to enable the licensee's staff to accomplish the subject work tasks. Procedures appropriately conformed to the licensee's administrative requirements for format, content, and vendor recommendations.
2.2 Control Rcom Heatino. Ventilation. and Air Conditionino (HVAC) Chillers 2.2.1 Discussion The inspectors selected this safety-related system because maintenance activities had apparently resulted in a significant unavailability of a HVAC chiller. The inspectors reviewed maintenance and preventive maintenance (PM)
activities of Chiller IA. Review of records indicated that maintenance and PM activities were performed as required. Condition reports were generated and dispositioned properly.
It did not appear that problems recurred because of
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inadequata maintenance activities. Discussion with the licensee and review of chiller availability charts, indicated that availability for Chillers IA, IB, and 1C were between 90 and 100 percent during 1991 and 1992.
However, Chiller ID's availability was below 60 percent for the same period of
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time. During this period, several things caused Chiller ID's availability to decrease. A breaker problem was one factor. A General Electric (GE) 480 volt
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breaker had been reworked by GE at their facility. Apparently, GE had incorrectly installed the lower primary finger assembly on the breaker. The finger assembly was installed with the mounting bolts pointing down instead of.
pointing up as required by design. When the breaker was racked in, this damaged the 52PS switch in the breaker cubicle, which in turn created problems with the chiller logic. There was also a faulty high discharge temperature
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switch in the air handling unit that contributed to the unavailability of Chiller 10. Following the licensee's effort to troubleshoot the _ logic problem, they discovered the problem with the finger assembly installation.
The licensee believed that the root cause of the chiller problems was the need to frequently shift the chillers to support PM activities. Specifically, these systems were designed to be put into service and run continuously for long periods. The licensee believed that with continued operations and maintenance support, the availability of the HVAC systems would improve.
The licensee had implemented Operations Policy No.11, which directed better coordination and communication with maintenance and system engineering
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f organizations in order to accurately identify problems, schedule the work, and complete repairs in a timely manner. This policy also gave instructions for preplanned maintenance activities.
The inspectors reviewed the MWO history of the control room HVAC system. The review indicated that there was a variety of problems that contributed to the unavailability of the system. Some examples were defective solenoids, switches, relays, vibration, and the frequent removal of chillers from service for maintenance (which caused a trip). The potential adverse impact of maintenance activities on HVAC chiller availability will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection. This issue is considered an inspection followup item
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(458/9303-01).
2.2.2 Conclusions
HVAC Chiller ID had a low availability. Of the small sample selection the inspectors examined, there was not conclusive evidence that the current PM practices contributed to the problems experienced.
It did appear that the.
licensee had moved towards improved control over the maintenance activities of HVAC equipment by the issuance of Operations Policy No. 11.
2.3 Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC)
2.3.1 Discussion The inspectors selected this nonsafety-reiated system because its malfunction could lead to a plant shutdown. A specific example was the scram from 96 percent power in late 1992. The root cause of the scram was attributed.to failures in the
"A" pressure amplifier card, and the "B" pressure transmitter.
The "A" pressure amplifier card and "B" pressure transmitter have been replaced.
The inspectors reviewed the EHC MWO history from 1991 to present. Review of records of the maintenance activities associated with the EHC _ system indicated that problems identified we.e evaluated and adequate corrective action was taken to reduce the probability of recurrence. Review of the MWO history indicated normal routine maintenance and repair had occurred. There did not appear to be continuous recurring problems with the EHC.
It appeared that maintenance-related activities associated with the EHC were performed in accordance with procedures and instructions.
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The inspectors also noted during a sample review of the EHC preventive maintenance (PM) schedule, that PM activities were performed as required and within the required timeframe. These PM activities were generally consistent with vendor recommendations.
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2.3.2 Conclusions It appeared that maintenance work activities on the EHC system were
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appropriately performed as scheduled and in accordance with work instructions and approved procedures.
2.4 Steam Vent (Auto Deoressurization-Main Steam Safety and Relief Valve)
2.4.1 Discussion The steam vent (SVV) system is a nonsafety-related system that supplies
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compressed air to the accumulators of the automatic depressurization system,
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which is safety-related. The purpose of the automatic depressurizationisystem -
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is to depressurize the reactor coolant system so that the low-pressure.
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emergency core cooling systems can inject water to mitigate the consequences.
a of a small break loss-of-coolant accident. The SVV system is comprised of a
compressor, dryers, pre-filters and after-filters. The purpose of the dryers
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is to remove moisture from the: system.
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report 93-0069, which discussed a discrepancy in the air dewpoint downstream of Dryer IA.. The indicated dewpoint was 60*F.
The allowable dewpoint was -40*F maximum. The111censee's
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investigation into the cause of this condition identified that-
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Dryer ISVV-DRYlA had been rep 1.ced. Modification Request-(MR)91-001 had been initiated to replace the dryer with a new type of dryer, that used a different
desiccant. Subsequent to dryer replacement, MWO P560965 was issued to have
maintenance change the desiccant. Maintenance completed this work' on
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September 14, 1992, but was unaware of the modification; thus, the new dryer's
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desiccant was replaced with desiccant specified for the old dryer.
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Review of MWO R152303, which included MR 91-0001, indicated several weaknesses
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which are listed below:
MR 91-0001 was complex and difficult-to follow, and'was a separate 1 document from the MWO package. This was a possible cause for required post-maintenance functional test steps being left out of the MWO.
There were seven field. change notices included in the MR. This number k
of field change notices' appeared to be excessive, which also 'added.to
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the complexity of the work package.
There appeared to_ be a lack of control pertaining to.MRs and PM
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activities.
PM activities were not necessarily coordinated when a-
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component had an MR working against it. This; lack of control. caused
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maintenance personnel to take out the correct desiccant.and'put in the wrong desiccant.; The' licensee's control over maintenance activities.
affected by MW0s and the MR for this activity was.. weak.- The inspectors
-observed that this lack of' control over MR and PM activities could occur
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on safety-related components. This issue, as it relates to safety--
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related equipment, will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection. This issue is considered an unresolved item (458/9303-02).
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The SVV system was returned to service; however, the partial completion
package associated with MR 91-0001 was not signed off by Engineering or Operations indicating approval to place the SVV system back into service.
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Operations placed the compressor back into service without its dryer
system operational based on a memorandum from engineering. The inspectors considered the. memorandum's justification for returning the component to service as an inadequate consideration of the system's design basis. The justification did not address how long this. system could operate in that condition nor the possible deleterious corrosion effects on the carbon steel piping without an operational dryer system.
The licensee's practices for restoring equipment previously removed from service will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection. This issue, as it relates to safety-related equipment, is considered an unresolved item (458/9303-03).
The length of time to perform maintenance and restore the SVV-system
back to normal service (with a functioning dryer) was approximately 6-7 months, which appeared excessive and not sound industry practice.
The licensee had identified several of the above problems in Condition Report 93-0069. The licensee stated that the above problems were being reviewed to determine what corrective measures would be necessary to resolve the issues.
Other observations made by the inspectors included:
Valve 50V 21A was labeled as nonsafety-related, when in fact it was
safety-related.
(An asterisk (*) in front-of the equipment.
identification number indicated safety-related; and a minus (-)
indicated nonsafety.)
Diesel Generator "HI PRESS AIR" Tank 1A was labeled nonsafety-related
when it was safety-related, and Diesel Generator "H1 PRESS AIR" Tank IC had no tag at all.
The licensee was informed of the labeling discrepancies identified by the inspectors. The licensee. informed the inspectors that they had an ongoing program in place to address the labeling problems. The licensee informed.the~
inspectors that early on in the labeling program, the machine used could not make asterisks. The licensee now has a machine that can make asterisks for labels. The licensee's representative indicated that they planned to correct the deficient labels.
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2.4.2 Conclusions The licensee and the inspectors identified several examples of poor maintenance practices on the nonsafety-related SVV.
From the small sample size selected, the inspectors could not determine whether these problems were confined to just nonsafety-related systems. The combination of an MWO and an MR work package made the overall. work package complex and difficult to follow.
The licensee's control over maintenance activities affected by MW0s and MRs was weak.
The licensee's practices for replacir.g equipment removed for maintenance back into service was weak. Two examples of safety-related equipment were identified that were either not labeled or were improperly labeled.
2.5 Feedwater Pumo IC 2.5.1 Discussion Review of the MWO history of Feedwater Pump IC s:.wed that two maintenance work requests had been issued to correct problems associated with cracks in the gear increaser casing. MWO 136954 was originated on January 30, 1990, to repair oil leaks on the motor side of the bearing and the end bearing cap.
MWO 160928 was originated on June 4, 1992, to replace the feed pump gear increaser because of numerous cracks in the casing. The instrumentation and control (!&C) job plan portion of MWO 160928 stated that the purpose of the job plan was to give instructions to remove the instrument rack and instrumentation on and around the gear increaser to allow the mechanical maintenance organization to remove the gear increaser.
Following that, there were 23 steps with very detailed instructions to accomplish the necessary war k.
The inspectors noted that each step of the instructions had been marked
"N/A - Work performed under MWO 136954." These steps were initialed and dated August 7, 1992. However, review of the I&C job plan portion of MWO 136954 did not reveal any steps resembling those in MWO 160928.
Licensee personnel, after being informed of these discrepancies, reviewed the MW0s and concluded that the gear increaser had not been removed; therefore, the extensive I&C work had not been required. The inspectors, upon detailed-review of the MWO packages, concluded that since the gear increaser had not been removed, most of the steps were not necessary. The licensee was able to show that the required steps for the other associated work had been performed.
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2.5.2 Conclusions The MWO packages were very difficult to follow and all of the actions taken were not readily apparent.
The licensee's effort to assure that maintenance activities were clearly documented was weak. There didn't appear to be a coordinated effort regarding the transfer of work from one MWO to another.
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2.6 Emeraency Diesel Generator - Division 1 2.6.1 Discussion The inspectors reviewed the MWO history for the Division 1 emergency diesel generator, and selected several MW0s that had been cancelled with the scheduled work transferred to other MW0s.
MW0s 174006 and 174010 were initiated on September 23, 1992, to replace two bolts missing on the exhaust header cover, and to troubleshoot and repair a water leak on the exhaust cover jacket water fitting on cylinder Number 7,.
respectively. Subsequently, on September 30, 1992, MWO cancellation forms were initiated to cancel and transfer the work of MW0s 174006 :nd 174010 to MWO 153398, whicn had been previously initiated on August 25, 1992, to repair a le;'/ in the jumper between the upper and lower jacket water exhaust cooler beht > cylinder Number 7.
On November 2,1992, an MWO cancellation form was initiated in which the work of MWO 153398 was cancelled and transferred to MWO 059324.
It was not apparent from the inspectors' review of MWO 059324, which had been initiated on October 14, 1992, and completed on November 9,1992 (final quality control review.and approval), that the work from the previously cancelled MW0s had actually been incorporated and performed.
In fact, licensee personnel were able to show that the work originally specified.on MWO 174006 h:d actually been performed on non-referenced MWO 170816, which was still open. Because the work performed under MWO 059324 was quits extensive and required a functional test, which would have identified the existence of leaks, it was reasonable to assume that the work, although not referenced, had been performed.
The inspectors observed maintenance activitics being performed on the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator. The work, specified on MWO 154978, consisted of replacing fuel filter cartridges and associated 0-rings. The inspectors also noted that the MWO contained two quality control hold points.
The work was performed in accordance with the steps delineated in the MWO and the actions required by the two quality control hold points were satisfactorily accomplished. The inspectors also verified that the two l
involved mechanical maintenance personnel had been properly qualified to.
perform the observed work. The inspectors reviewed the applicable classroom and laboratory lesson plans noted in the mechanical training matrix. The qualification records (including signed attendance sheets) showed that both
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maintenance personnel had successfully performed the requirements of the lesson plans in May and June 1991.
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2.6.2 Conclusions The licensee's process for assuring that documentation clearly reflected the status of MWO work that had been cancelled or transferred to other MW0s was weak. The observed work was appropriately performed in accordance with the applicable MWO by qualified personnel.
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2.7 Preventive Maintenance (PM)
2.7.1 Discussion The inspectors reviewed PM activities on some of the components associated
with the maintenance activities discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
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of the PM schedule indicated that PMs were scheduled and performed as required i
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within the specified time.
Review of the PM program indicated the following:
A weekly maintenance schedule was available for managements'
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PM procedures were available and sufficiently detailed,
The liransee had established a good lubrication program, and
Charts and data pertaining to late and incomplete PM activities l
were available for managements' review.
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2.7.2 Conclusions
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The licensee had a PM program in place which appeared to be functioning i
properly, except for the weakness identified in paragraph 2.4.
PM activities reviewed indicated that PMs were performed in accordance with the schedule.
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ATTACMENT 1 g
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1-PERSONS CONTACTED
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1.1 Licensee Personnel
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- D. Andrews, Director, Quality Assurance
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- J. Cook, Senior Technical Assistant,. Licensing
- W. Curran, Site Representative, Cajun Electric
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T. Fredieu, Supervisor, Maintenance Service i
' *E. Glass, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor
- J. Hamilton, Manager, Engineering
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-D. Jacobsen, Systems Engineer
- G. Kimmell, Supervisor, General' Maintenance
- V. Klco, Nuclear Safety Assessment Group Engineer D. Lorfing, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
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I. Malik, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance
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- C. Maxson, Human Performance. Evaluation System Coordinator W. McDougald.. Systems Engineer
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D. Melear, Design' Engineer-
- C. Miller, Supervisor, Maintenance Support
- W. Odell, Manager, Oversight
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- J. Schipport, Plant. Manager
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B. Smith, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance
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- M. Stein, Director,. Design Engineering
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- K. Suhrke, General Manager, Engineering and Administration-
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- J. Venable, Supervisor, Operations
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1.2 NRC Personnel
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- D. Lovelace, Resident Inspector
- W. Smith,~ Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes personnel-that attended the exit meeting.
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In addition to the personnel listed above, the. inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection period.
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2 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on February 12, 1993. During this meeting, the
~l inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee a
I did not identify as proprietary, any information provided to, or reviewed by the inspectors.
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ATTACMENT 2 i
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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED..
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Maintenance Work Orders f
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l MWO P562572 MWO-P547333:
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MWO R152303
, MWO 153398 MWO 174006
- MWO 174010 J
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MWO.168323:
MWO 160928
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MWO P521232:
MWO 158697
MWO 170816
- MWO 059324 i
MWO PS20440 MWO 153388.
- MWO 160941~
MWO 154978-MWO P560965 MWO P546944
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Modification Reauest
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MR 91-0001 j
d Condition Report CR 93-0069
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Procedures j
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MSP-0035, " Repair / Replacement Program," Revision OB
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ADM-0023, " Conduct of Maintenance," Revision.10C, effective date' June.'26, 1992
a ADM-0028, " Maintenance Work Order," Revision 11A, effective date June 24,41992.
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MSP-0003, " Preventive Maintenance Program,".. Revision 14, effective date
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November 8,1991-
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e CMP-9019, " Reactor feed Pump Disass'embly, Inspection, Rework and Reassembly," ~
- Revision'6B,' effective date June 15, 1992 '
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STP-202-6604, " ADS /SRV Air System Valve. Operability Test," Revision 2, effective date October 11, 1990
i CMP-9168, "lTMB-EIA-and B EHC Cooler Disassembly Inspection Rework and:
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Reassembly," Revision 3, effective date April 30, 1990.
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ENG-3-006, " River 8end. Station ~ Design and Modification Request Control Plan,";
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Revision 8, effective date May 19, 1992 y
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ADM-0003,:" Development, Control and Use Of Procedures, Revision 18C,.
effective date September 9,-.1992l
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GMP-0015,;" Lubrication Procedure," Revision 8A, effective date' January 1,'1991
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Other Documents Maintenance Work Order History for Feedwater Pump IC, since January 1,1991 Maintenance Work Order History for Emergency Diesel Generator - Division 1, since January 1,1991
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