IR 05000458/1993014
| ML20058A279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1993 |
| From: | Chamberlain D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Mcgaha J GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9312010027 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20058A279 (4) | |
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pRREcu UNITED STATES
[- 7% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION "g REGloN IV &[ 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 - o,. AR LINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064 <, ,
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ts 171993
Docket: 50-458 License: NPF-47 Gulf States Utilities ATTN: John R. McGaha, Vice President River Bend Nuclear Group P.O. Box 220 . ' St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-458/93-14 i Thank you for your letter of July 22, 1993, in response to our letter and Notice of Violation dated May 17, 1993. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.
Sincerely, [.s MP h Dwight D. Chamberlain Acting Director Division of Radiation Safety ' and Safeguards CC: Gulf States Utilities ATTN: J. E. Booker, Technical Assistant P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Gulf States Utilities ATTN: Harold W. Keiser, Senior Vice President P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 9312010027 931117 PDR ADDCK 05000458 G PDR
. . _. _ _ _ _ _ . . i Gulf States Utilities-2-Gulf States Utilities ATTN: Michael B. Sellman, Plant Manager P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 g L Gulf States Utilities l ATTN: James J. Fisicaro, Manager - Safety Assessment and Quality Verification ' P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
, Winston & Strawn l ATTN: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.
1401 L Street, N.W.
' Washington, D.C.
20005-3502 l ' Gulf States Utilities ATTN: Les England, Director Nuclear Licensing i l P.O. Box 220 i St. Francisville, Louisiana -70775 Mr. J. David McNeill, III William ~G. Davis, Esq.
l Department of Justice Attorney General's Office P.O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9095 H. Anne Plettinger o ! 3455 Villa Rose Drive Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 President of West Feliciana Police Jury P.O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Cajun Electric Power Coop. Inc.
ATTN: Philip G. Harris 10719 Airline Highway P.O. Box 15540 . Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70895 Hall Bohlinger, Administrator Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135
. . . Gulf States Utilities-3-DMB (IE04) bec w/ copy of licensee's letter dated July 22, 1993: J. L. Milhoan RBS Resident Inspector Section Chief (DRP/C) Section Chief (DRP/TSS Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 MIS System DRSS-FIPS File RIV File Senior Resident Inspector, Cooper A. B. Earnest, DRSS/FIPS
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i Gulf States Utilities-3-DMB (IE04) 4 bec w/ copy of licensee's letter dated July 22, 1993: J. L. Milhoan RBS Resident Inspector Section Chief (DRP/C) Section Chief (DRP/TSS Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 MIS System DRSS-FIPS File RIV File Senior Resident Inspector, Cooper A. B. Earnest, DRSS/FIPS . RIV;f)9[ C:FIPS'h AD;DRSS,. ---- AB h st:nh BMurray drlain \\ I / ///-f93 it//f/93 '\\ /\\
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& N A N C, l 'i v I L L E, LOU: $1ANA 70? Pi . A F4 C A C O D !. f$ r 4i 635 +i 0 9 4 346-8661 .. e ; ;, u.u mn July 22,1993 .e ,, , a t.c.a C o x m RBG-38778 f,jfl.,1"[[ File Nos. G9.5, G15.4.1 _ ... - ,.; . RBEXEC-93-379 l "S ' :;3 , l3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 26 P 'G $ c "' Attn: Document Control Desk i , . . --{ ~ ' ' Washington, D.C. 20555 ~ Gentlemen: - River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458/93-14 Pursuant to 10CFR2.201, this letter provides Gulf States Utilities Company's (GSU) response to the Notice of Violation 9314-01 identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-14. The inspection was conducted by Mr. A.B. Earnest on April 20-23,1993 of activities authorized by NRC Operating License NPF-47 for River Bend Station - Unit 1.
GSU's reply to the violation is provided in the attachment.
Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. D.N. Lorfing at (504) 381-4157.
Sincerely, P.D. Graham cc: Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-NRC Senior Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775 N(D fr 95-(4G o
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e 9 ~ NOTICE OF VIOLATION ATTACIIMENT I , REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (50-458/93-14) LEVEL IV REFERENCE - Notice of Violation from James L. Milhoan to P.D. Graham dated June 25,1993.
VIOLATION FAILURE TO FOLLOW ESTABLISIIED PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING SECURITY DRILLS Condition 2.D of River Bend Station Operating License NPF-47 requires the licensee to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the Commission approved Physical Security Plan.
This includes amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10CFR 50.54(p).
-The introduction Section of the Physical Security Plan states that security procedures provide the - detailed instmetions necessary to implement the Plan. Paragraph 2.1'of the Training and' ' Qualification Plan requires the licensee to conduct periodic exercises to maintain the effectiveness of the security force in contingency response tasks.
Procedure PSP-4-501, " Training' Program (Security Force Drills)," as revised by Interim - ' Procedure Change 4-501-3-2, dated October 29,1992, states in Section 5.0, in pan, that security force drills are conducted to provide training for the security force in reacting to safeguard contingencies.
Section 6.3 of this procedure, " Drill-Rules," states, in part, that: - 1) all.
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communications relating to a drill, by whatever means, shall be preceded and followed by. "This - is a drill"; and 2) revolvers and shotguns in firing order shall not be drawn or carried during the drill.
, Contrary to the above, on April 16, 1993, a security force drill was conducted to provide.
training of the security force in reacting to safeguard contingencies'and the above drill: rules- _ , were not followed. Specifically,1) all communications relating to the drill were not preceded. ! and followed by "This is a drill" (the term Code Blue was used instead); and 2) revolvers thaty were in' firing order were carried and drawn by drill panicipants.
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' R ASONS FOR THE VIOLATION J On April 16, 1993, in preparation for the NRC conducted operational safeguards response evaluation (OSRE) inspection, a nuclear security consultant was assisting with tactical training exercises of the security force at River Bend Station (RBS). Since September 1992, the consultant and other personnel in his organization had been conducting evaluations of the RBS security force capabilities. Between 1920 and 1940, the training " shadow" shift on completion of the first block of tactical training exercises began preparing to relieve the on-duty shift so that the on-duty shift could then panicipate in tactical training exercises. Between 1940 and 1945, a safety briefing and exercise briefing was given to the off-going duty shift as they assumed duties as the " shadow" shift. Between 2000 and 2005, the shadow shift (exercise participants) thenjoined the on-duty force at their designated exercise positions. The alarm station announced initiation of the second block of exercises by announcing on the radio " Code Blue, three adversaries located east of the services building running toward the PAP", or similar words to that effect.
The initial exercise for the new training shift thus began at about 2020. At this point, three adversaries moved from zone one just outside and east of the PAP building, running in a westerly direction from the perimeter barrier fence toward the diesel generator building. As the adversaries passed between the primary access point (PAP) building and the services building, they began firing blanks in the direction of the exit officer's position near the exit turnstiles.
Reacting to the adversaries' movement and weapons fire, the duty officer at the exit turnstile drew and discharged her weapon in the direction of the adversary team. No injury occurred.
After a thorough review of Plant Security Procedure (PSP)-4-501, " Training Program (Security Force Drills") Rev 3 the only extant security procedure which would appear to address the conduct of tactical training activities, it was determined that instances involving procedural noncompliance included a failure to adhere to PSP-4-501., Rev 3, section 6.3, " Drill Rules" which states that drills shall be preceded and followed by announcing that "This is a Drill".
Contrary to the above, 'l Code Blue", a phrase meaning "This is a drill", _was used to announce the initiation of training exercises and not "This js a drill" as required by procedure. The announcement of code blue and the stan location were being used to shorten the time lines development process involved with the start-stop characteristics of tactical training exercises.
Investigation of probable causes for the procedural noncompliance indicated that the security shift supervisor responsible for the conduct of shift drills felt that the tactical training exercises were directed by the Security Tmining Department in consultation with the consultant, and that the tactical exercises did not constitute on-duty shift drills. The exercises were not graded nor were they directly involved with the on-duty shift. Regardless, it was determined that the content of PSP-4-501 was inadequate in that it'did not lend itself to the conduct of tactical training exercises which were largely developmental in nature.
In addition, PSP-4-501, Rev 3, paragraph 6.3.7, stated that " Revolvers and shotguns in firing order shall not be drawn or carried during the drill". Contrary to the procedure, the shadow 2 of 4 i
'.. . ' . t i I force participating in the training exercises did utilize functional revolvers to discharge blank ammunition. An expired interim procedure change (IPC) to PSP-4-501 caused the confusion that allowed drill weapons in firing order to be used during the training exercises.
_COR.RECTIVE STEPS WIIICIIIIAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RFSULTS ACIIIEVED Funher tactical training exercises within the PA were immediately terminated. The local law enforcement agency (LLEA) and the NRC were notified of the incident, see SLER 93-S02 Rev.
1 (RBG-38122 dated July 8,1993). Within hours of the event, a high performance team from various disciplines was established by chaner to investigate the incident to determine root cause and develop recommended corrective actions. The immediate corrective action from the team was to discontinue all tactical exercises utilizing weapons as training aids until root cause and corrective action could be determined and implemented. The team interviewed key exercise panicipants and requested that the drill procedure be reviewed to determine if any procedural noncompliances existed.
PSP-4-501 was revised to incorporate additional precautions to be exercised before, during and following realistic type drills / exercises within the protected area. However, the prohibition by GSU management for conducting realistic tmining exercises using blank ammunition, remained in effect until a training exercise procedure fully addressing developmental training exercises within the PA could be published. Further realistic type tmining exercises within the PA will be conducted only upon approval of PSP-4-503, "Tmining Program (Security Training Exercises)", and upon permission from the plant manager or manager-site support.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TIIAT WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTIIER VIOLATION PSP-4-501 has been revised in order to clearly differentiate between security force drills and security training exercises.
PSP-4-503, Tmining Program (Security Training Exercises) Rev. O, has been created, approved and issued so that any future tactical training exercises have the procedural guidance necessary for the conduct of developmental contingency training such as that required for tactical exercises.
Training for personnel on all shifts for PSP-4-501, Rev. 5 and PSP-4-503, Rev. O has been. conducted and documented. In addition, formal classroom training on the above procedures was given to the security shift supervisors by the Security Training Depanment.
Since the event, RBS security has substantially reduced the number ofIPCs written on security - procedures and has discontinued the use ofIPCs as a method ofinitiating changes to procedures.
Security management has committed to review all plant security procedures (PSPs) by April 1, 1994 to ensure that they are concise, readable and accurate. During the revisic urocess, PSPs are now circulated to the security shifts for review and comments by rank and file security personnel as pan of an overall process of stressing procedural compliance. Additional activities 3 of 4 . - . -.
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.. ... . - ! involving procedural compliance are addressed in RBG-38648 (response to NOV dated June 16, }- 1993).
l DATE WIIEN 1ULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACIIIEVED Procedures PSP-4-501, Rev. 5 and PSP-4-503 were approved and implemented on June 28, l 1993. Training on these procedures has also been completed. The plant security procedure l review / revision process is ongoing and will be completed by April 1,1994 t i ! l.
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