IR 05000458/1993001
| ML20044G262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1993 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Graham P GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9306020247 | |
| Download: ML20044G262 (4) | |
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ja Rico UNITED STATES I
['y 7g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
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j R EGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 o
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 760118064
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MAY 2 51993
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Docket:
50-458 License: NPF-47 Gulf States Utilities ATTN:
P. D. Graham Vice President (RBNG)
P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-458/93-01 Thank you for your letter dated April 12, 1993, in response to the emergency exercise weakness identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-01 dated March 11, 1993. We have examined your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our inspection report. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future i.1spection.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter. please contact Dr. D. Blair Spitzberg of my staff at (817) 860-8191.
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Sincerely,
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@ Division of Radiation Safety L.
. Callan. Director
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and Safeguards i
CC Gulf States Utilities i
ATTN:
J. E. Booker, Manager-Nuclear Industry Relations
P.O. 30x 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704
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Winston & Strawn ATTN: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.
1401 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005-3502 Gulf States Utilities ATTN:
Les England, Director Nuclear Licensing P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 h[\\
9306020247 930525 i
PDR ADDCK 05000458 h
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Gulf States Utilities-2-Mr. J. David McNeill, III l
William G. Davis, Esq.
Department of Justice Attorney General's Office P.O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge Louisiana 70804-9095 H. Anne Plettinger 3456 Villa Rose Drive Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 r
President of West Feliciana
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Police Jury P.O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Cajun Electric Power Coop. Inc.
ATTN:
Philip G. Harris 10719 Airline Highway P.O. Box 15540 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70895 Hall Bohlinger, Administrator Radiation Protection Division i
P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 Chief, Technological Hazards Branch FEMA Region 6 Federal Center 800 North Loop 288
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Denton, Texas 76201-3698
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Gulf States Utilities-3-bcc to DMB (IE35)
bcc w/ copy of licensee's letter dated April 12, 1993:
J. L. Milhoan B. Murray, DRSS/FIPS D. B. Spitzberg, FIPS DRP Section Chief, DRP/C Project Engineer, DRP/C Section Chief, DRP/TSS DRS Resident Inspector (2) - River Bend Senior Resident Inspector - Cooper Senior Resident Inspector - Fort Calhoun MIS System
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DRSS/FIPS File RIV File
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Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 E. Baker, NRR Project Manager (MS 13 HIS)
C. A. Hackney, RSLO
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Gulf States Utilities-3-bcc to DMB (IE35)
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bcc w/ccpy of licensee's letter dated April 12, 1993:
J. L. Milhoan B. Murray, DRSS/FIPS D. B. Spitzberg, FIPS DRP Section Chief, DRP/C Project Engineer, DRP/C Section Chief, DRP/TSS DRS Resident Inspector (2) - River Bend Senior Resident Inspector - Cooper Senior Resident Inspector - Fort Calhoun MIS System DRSS/FIPS File RIV File Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 E. Baker, NRR Project Manager (MS 13 H15)
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GULF STATES UTELETEES CTOMPANY ptivta DEND 8? Aft 0N POST OF##ct sox 220 tt FRANCISVILLt. LountiAhA 70776 ma eces so.
us.m m e.v April 12,1993'
RBG-38327 File Nos. 09.5, G15.4.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentle. men:
River Bend Station - Unit 1 Dasket No. 50L.458/Rmort 93-01 This letter provides Gulf States Utilities Company's (GSU) insponse to the
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exercise weaknesses noted in NRC Inspection Report No. 5N58/93-01. This letter describes GSU's corrective actions regarding the weaknesses observed during our annual emergency planning exercise conducted on February 24,1993.
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Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. L.A. England at (504) 381-4145.
Sincerely,
,b J.E. Booker Manager - Ovenight
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011
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ATTACHMENT 1
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Resnse to Weaknas 56 429301-01 REFERENCE Letter - L.J. Callan to P.D. Graham, dated March 11, 1993 DESCRIPTION The inspectors observed that the licensee's accident mitigation efforts were weak following the initial radiological release. At about 12 p.m., the Emergency Director (ED) was away from his normal position in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and was involved in a telephone dialogue about the protective action recommendations with state and local agencies. His telephone discussion took place in the communications room of the TSC and lasted between 5 to 7 minutes. In addition, during this time, the TSC Manager was away from his normal position to conduct a relM turnover briefing. During the period when both the lid and TSC Manager were away from the command table, the initial radiological release began.
He absence of these two key personnel from the main TSC comtrand and control area contributed to confusion about the release. Subsequent events required a vent of the reactor vessel at about 12:23 p.m. which masked the first release; however, the ED has been informed of the 12 p.m. release at about 12:09 p.m. Also, during this time, the BD was in the process of being relieved which may Lave contributed to the incomplete understanding of the radiolegical release. Following the initiation of the release at 12 p.m., no action was taken to locate and stop the source of this release. Failure to take prompt action to mitigate a radiological release ns identiGed as an exercise weakness.
GULF STATES UTIT TTTES COMPANY'S RFSPONSE The ED was in the communications room on the hotline with the state and local governments
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confirming pmtective action recommendations. It should not be nmmyy for the ED to leave
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the area for this purpose. Motline has been placed on the commmi and control area table for at n this purposej %e TSC Manager was also not available during this period because of conducting a relief tumover briefing. IThere must always be someone designated to be in charge at the command and control area. If the ED has a need to be away from the area he should announce
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that the TSC Manager is in charge and the TSC Manager should remain in the saca until the ED returns and an announcement made that the ED is again in charge. This will be emphasized in i n 7.5 _
training for these position]s Had the initial release not coincidej with the time of absence of these two key personnel, actions to mitigate the release would have occurred and it would not have been med by the venting of the reactor vessel. It is therefore not necessary to take any corrective action on the failure to Iccate and stop the sou ce of the releas G-93 13:57 CSU/ LICENSING S
ID=504 B35 SIBO P.03
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ATTACHMENT 2
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Ramonne to Wantrnans 50-4S8/9301-02 REFERENCE Letter - L.J. Callan to P.D. Graham, dated March 11,1993 DESCRIPTION One of the objectives of the exemise was to collect and analyze a sample using the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS). Before the exercine, the inspection team was advised that the small volume liquid sampler of PASS was inoperative. A decision was made to collect and analyze a containment air sample to satisfy the exercise objective. A team consisting of a radiatinn technician and two chemistry technicians was dispatched from the Operational Support Center to collect the PASS air sample. The team received an adequate briefing nemry to accomplish the task in a safe manner. The inspectors noted several actions by the PASS team which caused umwemry delays as follow:
One team memoer had to shave so that he could wear the self-contained breathing apparatus requimd for entry into radiological contmiled area.
One team member had to be excessively coached by the radiation protection technician on proper dress-out procedures.
A defective radio had to be exchanged tefore entry into the radiological contmiled area.
The inspecton noted that the volume and weight of the equipment the team carried to get an air sample was excessive and inhibited the progress of the team to the' sampling area
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Upon aniving at the PASS facility, the tean Jrovered they did not have the required wrench to tighten a connection from the apressed nitrogen gas bottle to the postaccident sampling system purge system. Thirteen minutes elapsed before a wnnch was obtained.
The swhch on the portable air sampler was found to be defective and 15 minutes were
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eW in mplacing the air sampler.
In attempting to collect the PASS air siunple, a vacuum on the system could rot be drawn and, subsequently, the system had to be purged with nitrogen. This procedure took about 15 minutes. Two attempts were made la collecting the PASS air sample before an inspection of the PASS air sampling equipment revealed that the sample injection needle was bent. After considerable effort, the needle was straightened before finally being removed and replaced.
Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> were erpaaN in collectiing and analyzing the PASS air smple. This is in excess of the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> time fame for collecting and analyzing PASS specified in EIP-2
" PASS Operations," and NUREG4737, " Clarification of ThG Action Plan Requirements." Th
65-19-93 13:57 CSU/ LICENSING S
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failure to collect and analyze a PASS sample in an efficient and timely manner was identified u an exercise waab=u.
GULF STATES UTTIITTFR COMPANY'S RFSPONSE Eteam has been formed to evaluate the delays in obtaining a PASS con Additional surveilta-s, on-the-job-training, maintenance, and panel modif performed, as necessary, to enhance PASS performance such that a sample can be obuined and analyzed in the prescribed timpfihe ability to collect and analyze this PASS sample will be
"7# 4 satisfactorily demonstrated to NRC inspectors during an inpNinn whedn1*A for River Bend i
Station for the week of May 10,1993J i
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ATTACHMENT 3 Rewme to Weakness 50 458/9301-03 PFFERFECE 12tter - L.L Callan to P.D. Graham, dated March 11, 1993 DESCRIPTION During the collection of the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) sample, the inspectors identified several improper radiological practices as follows:
The PASS sampling team removed their self-contained breathing apparztus equipment before the area air sample results were known.
No provisions were made for respiratory protection for the PASS team beyond the 30 40 minute air supply provided by the initial self-contained breathing apparatus air tanks carried by the team to the postaccident sampling system facility.
The PASS sample team did not read their direct reading dosimeters during'the fint'50 minutes of their activities.
During the air sampling in the PASS facility, the inspectors noted that one of ths air sample filters had a hole in it. This would have resulted in a significant underestimation of the airborne radioactivity.
The failure to implement proper radiological contmis for in-plant response teams was identif as an exercise weakness.
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GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPASTS RESPONSE The Radiation Protection dqnrtment will take the steps necessary to empha Radiation Protection Technician sent with the PASS team casures that proper radiolo practices are performed during PASS samples. This will be accomplished through tra
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proper use of the self-contained brnthing apparatus (SCBA) (i.e., when they may be remov prmisions for respiratory protection beyond the 30-40 minute air supply provided by reading of their dosimeters frequently, and ensuring that the air sampler la functional and that the sample filters are not damageJd IProper radiological practices will be sadsfacto
demonstrated to NRC inspecton dunng an inspection scheduled for River Bend Station for t week of May 10,1993j
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ATTACHMENT 4 Renoonse to Weakness 50-458/9301-04 RFFERENCE I_etter - L.J. Callan to P.D. Grahnm, dated March 11, 1993 DESCRIPTION Some notifications to offsite authorities made during the exemise contained conflicting
informatien. For example, Notification Message 5 issued from the Technical Support Cente at 11:05 a.m., indicated protective action recommendations of evacuation for Sector 1 and shelter for Sectors 4,9, and 16 (Scenario 16). In the next Notification Message 6 issued from the Technical Support Center at 11:50 a.m., Item 5, " Protective Action Recommendations connicting infonnation. ne item was checked to indicate that previously issued protective action recommendations remained " unchanged". The specinc prote:tive action recommendatio listed, however, were changed from those previously issued. He new protective action recommendations were to evacuate Sectors 1, 4, 9, and 16, and Shelter Sectors 2, 3, and 8 (Scenario 26). His same message gase further conflicting information in Item 9, " Release Information." His item was marked to indicate that the release informationprovided was "n information, yet the message information continued to show "no release" as iwHat messages. Since the licensee was recommending that offsite populations be evettM, Item 9 should have been marked to indicate " potential for release."
A notification message was not promptly issued by the Emergency Operations Fac a significant change in plant conditions whca the initial radiological release bega about 12:06 p.m., when the radiological release was recognized, notincation to offsite a of this significant change in plant conditions was not made until about 46 minuteder at 1 p.m. His notification, contained in Message 7, indicated a release was in progress which ha started at 12:06 p.m.
ne incident conditions and comment Section 6 of this message did not contain any amplifying infonnation about the release, regazding its signincance or cause Emergency Implementing Procedure EIP-2-006, " Notifications," specifies that during emergency, prompt update notification messages will be issued to offsite authorities whenever there is a significant change in plant conditions.
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The licensee's failure to promptly notify offsite authorities of a significant change
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conditions, and the issuance of notification messages with conflicting information was ide as an exercise wWss (458/9301-04).
GULF STATES UTn rITFR COMPANY'S RERPONSE Procedure EIP-2-006, " Notifications", Revision 16, section 5.3 states that "
nottfications to offsite agencies are accomplished approximately every 60 m initial notification or more often if emergency conditions change significantly" radioactivity is a significant change in emergency conditions and shouki have A release of a notification message form (NMF).fTraining will be used to emphasize the ne
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NMP when sigrdficant changes in the ency condition warant and to fill out the fonn E propedy without conflicting infortnadon.
problem area or area that could be usc#tEl etter direct issuing b
nitir in the emergency condition warrant.1 I~brt of the problem with conflicting information on the NMF is that the present s NMP computer will not always let you change fmm "new" to " unchanged" information or from
" unchanged" to "new". His software problem has been conwtal and will be inm11M as soon as training has been completed on the new softwayre i
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