IR 05000445/2024003
| ML24298A116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2024 |
| From: | Ami Agrawal NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBB |
| To: | Peters K Vistra Operations Company |
| References | |
| IR 2024003 | |
| Download: ML24298A116 (19) | |
Text
October 30, 2024
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2024003 AND 05000446/2024003
Dear Ken Peters:
On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. On October 10, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Heather Winn, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. None of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Ami N. Agrawal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000445, 05000446 License Nos. NPF-87, NPF-89
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000445, 05000446
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000445/2024003 and 05000446/2024003
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-003-0006
Licensee:
Vistra Operations Company LLC
Facility:
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Inspection Dates:
July 1 to September 30, 2024
Inspectors:
J. Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Hedger, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
P. Nwafor, Project Engineer
H. Strittmatter, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Ami N. Agrawal, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Identify Post-Maintenance Testing for a Modification Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000445,05000446/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152A The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding without a violation that occurred on September 4, 2020, when the licensee approved a modification to the main feed pump control system. Specifically, the licensee approved a modification to transition from the Mark V control system to the T3000 control system that did not include dynamic testing of the modification. This omission led to acceptance of a control system that was not able to control pump speed to preclude a reactor trip on the loss of a main feed pump.
Failure to Translate Design Input Requirements into the Final Design Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000445,05000446/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71152A The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding without a violation that occurred on September 4, 2020, and March 14, 2024, when the licensee failed to identify and incorporate design inputs into the final design. Specifically, the design modification for the T3000 did not incorporate power requirements for the servo valve and the amplifier addition mod did not incorporate vendor requirements for shielded cabling and ground separation.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Units 1 and 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1, train A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on August 27, 2024
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Units 1 and 2 battery/UPS systems on August 14-15, 2024.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)component cooling water on September 23, 2024
- (2) Unit 1 main feed and steam enclosures on September 23, 2024
- (3) Unit 2 main feed and steam enclosures on September 23, 2024
- (4) Unit 1 train B switch gear on September 27, 2024
- (5) Unit 2 train B switchgear on September 27, 2024
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on September 17, 2024.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a high trip risk activity switching Unit 1 circulating water lube water to a temporary strainer on July 24, 2024.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification training simulator exam session on July 24, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)instrument air system following entry into a(1) status
- (2) Unit 1, chemical and volume control system filter housing leaks
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)unplanned safety chiller inoperability and planned yellow risk for emergency diesel generator testing for the week of September 9, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)service water with electrical box secured by ratchet straps (2)untested thermal relief valves on safety-related equipment (3)inverter IV1EC1 current fluctuations
- (4) Unit 2, channel 1 N-16 with high voltage out of specification
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
(1)turbine-driven auxiliary feed water pump discharge to SG 2-01 flow control valve elastomer replacement on July 10, 2024 (2)fire panel power supply replacement on July 11, 2024 (3)containment spray pumps 1-01 and 1-03 bearing cooler clean/inspection and oil replacement on July 30, 2024
- (4) Unit 2, train B switchgear fire protection deluge valve diaphragm replacement on August 15, 2024 (5)diesel generator annunciator power supply replacement on August 21, 2024
- (6) Unit 1, IV1EC1 static switch control board replacement on August 28, 2024, under Work Order 22-527489
- (7) Unit 2, locked high radiation area ladder barrier on September 17, 2024
- (8) Unit 2, train C non-safeguards 125 VDC battery charger, BC2D2, component replacement, testing, and calibration on September 9 - 10, 2024
- (9) Unit 1, circulating water lube water strainer replacement on September 14, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2, visual examination (VT-2) of the residual heat exchanger on August 13, 2024
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)safety injection pump 2-02 inservice test on August 6, 2024
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)observed quarterly inspection of multipurpose high flow flex pumps on July 18 and 22, 2024
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system between November 12, 2022, and September 14, 2024.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization between November 12, 2022, and September 14, 2024. Inspectors also evaluated the licensee's ability to staff their emergency response facilities in accordance with emergency plan commitments.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the 10 CFR 50.54(q) emergency plan change process and practices between November 12, 2022, and September 14, 2024. The evaluation reviewed screenings and evaluations documenting implementation of the process. The reviews of the change process documentation do not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program between November 12, 2022, and September 14, 2024. The evaluation reviewed evidence of completing various emergency plan commitments, the conduct of drills and exercises, licensee audits and assessments; and the maintenance of equipment important to emergency preparedness.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) a drill involving a steam generator tube rupture on August 7,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024
EP03: Alert And Notification System Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)emergency operating procedure 3.0 adequacy to prevent overfilling of the pressurizer (2)plant trip due to loss of main feedwater pump
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in the licensee's review and implementation of nuclear safety advisory letters from Westinghouse on September 13 and 16,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Identify Post-Maintenance Testing for a Modification Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000445,05000446/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152A The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding without a violation that occurred on September 4, 2020, when the licensee approved a modification to the main feed pump control system. Specifically, the licensee approved a modification to transition from the Mark V control system to the T3000 control system that did not include dynamic testing of the modification. This omission led to acceptance of a control system that was not able to control pump speed to preclude a reactor trip on the loss of a main feed pump.
Description:
The licensee contracted with Siemens to develop a modification to the main feed pump control system in 2016. The licensee, with vendor support, installed the system for Unit 1 during 1RF22 (May 2022) and for Unit 2 during 2RF20 (May 2023). The new control system was designated the T3000. Following installation of the modification, the site experienced degraded performance of all four main feed pumps. Issues included feed pump speed oscillations, poor servo valve performance requiring replacements, and feed pump trips. These issues led to a Unit 1 trip on June 16, 2023, and a Unit 2 trip on March 12 and 17, 2024. In addition to control system issues, the pumps have a history of water intrusion into the lubricating/control oil system. The water intrusion has resulted in corrosion products inhibiting proper operation of the mechanical portion of the main feed pump.
During the design process, the licensee relied heavily on the vendor, Siemens, to provide the necessary expertise in designing system controls. In addition, the licensee contracted a third-party reviewer to provide a critical review of the design. Although the third-party reviewer identified that the bases to conclude the T3000 would behave as the predecessor Mark V system was weak, the comments were not addressed prior to site acceptance of the design nor before acceptance of the as-installed modification. Part of the third-party comments addressed the quality and detail of the site's acceptance testing procedure. However, these comments were not addressed. Licensee Procedure IP-ENG-001, Standard Design Process, states post-maintenance testing should validate performance through testing or demonstration.
In January 2024, engineering identified degraded performance of the Unit 2 A main feed pump. On February 2, the licensee reduced power on Unit 2 and replaced the servo valve. At the time of the replacement, the licensee attributed the performance to water intrusion and the impacts of corrosion products on servo performance. However, inspection of the servo did not support this attribution. Further investigation by the licensee revealed that the T3000 generated a +/- 30 mA signal but the servo had an operating range of +/- 250 mA. On March 12, 2024, the licensee performed a servo valve oil filter swap for the Unit 2 A main feed pump. Following the swap, the feed pump performance degraded. Control room operators initiated a manual runback to 700 MWe. The B main feed pump did not ramp up speed as designed. As steam generator level lowered to the Lo/Lo set point, operators determined a manual trip was required; however, an automatic trip occurred prior to insertion of the manual trip.
During the forced outage, the licensee installed amplifiers to match T3000 output to servo capabilities. However, this modification also led to a plant trip which is addressed as a separate finding in this report.
Corrective Actions: The licensee added current amplifiers to address the incompatibility between the T3000 output amperage and required amperage for the servo controlling feed pump speed. The licensee performed dynamic testing following amplifier addition.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-1805
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to establish a post-maintenance test that would ensure affected equipment was not adversely affected was a performance deficiency. Licensee Procedure ECE-5.08, Standard Design Process, revision 3, appendix 5, step 5.9, states the installer/operations/engineer should ensure that specified post-modification testing will verify that affected equipment has not been adversely affected by the modification. However, the design failed to specify dynamic testing that would validate system response. Weaknesses in specified post-modification testing were identified by the third-party reviewer but not addressed.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the inadequate post-maintenance test did not validate that the design would control the main feed pumps as required. This led to multiple plant trips.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened as Green in accordance with exhibit 1 of Appendix A to IMC 0609 question B. The issue caused a reactor trip but did not cause a loss of mitigating equipment.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, following installation of the T3000 modification, there were precursor indications of degraded main feed pump performance. These indications were not evaluated thoroughly to determine the cause.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Failure to Translate Design Input Requirements into the Final Design Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000445,05000446/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71152A The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding without a violation that occurred on September 4, 2020, and on March 14, 2024, when the licensee failed to identify and incorporate design inputs into the final design. Specifically, the design modification for the T3000 did not incorporate power requirements for the servo valve and the amplifier addition mod did not incorporate vendor requirements for shielded cabling and ground separation.
Description:
The licensee contracted with Siemens to develop a modification to the main feed pump control system in 2016. The licensee, with vendor support, installed the system for Unit 1 during 1RF22 (May 2022) and for Unit 2 during 2RF20 (May 2023). The new control system was designated the T3000. Following installation of the modification, the site experienced degraded performance of all four main feed pumps. Issues included feed pump speed oscillations, poor servo valve performance, and feed pump trips. These issues led to a Unit 1 trip on June 16, 2023, and a Unit 2 trip on March 12 and 17, 2024. In addition to control system issues, the pumps have a history of water intrusion into the lubricating/control oil system. The water intrusion has resulted in corrosion products inhibiting proper operation of the mechanical portion of the main feed pump. Following the plant trip on March 12, 2024, the licensee installed an amplifier on the output of the T3000 to address a design issue.
However, the modification also included a design error.
The original design for the T3000 did not include adequate current output from the T3000 to drive the servo. In February 2024, the licensee determined that the T3000 generated a
+/- 30 mA signal but the servo had an operating range of +/- 250 mA. The licensee determined in a root cause analysis that the T3000 design neglected to address the critical design parameter related to servo current requirements. The analysis documented that although the servo was included as a design input, critical characteristics related to the operating current range were not included. In addition, the third-party review identified technical rigor issues; however, these issues were not addressed.
With respect to modification to install a current amplifier, the licensee did not address amplifier vendor specifications to use shielded cabling and to use a star grounding pattern.
These omissions led to noise on the output signal and diagnostic alarms. Ultimately, the Unit 2 B main feed pump tripped causing a subsequent insertion of a manual trip. In the root cause, the licensee documented the omission of these specifications from the design and that these omissions led to pump trip and subsequent unit trip.
Corrective Actions: The licensee added current amplifiers to address the omissions in the T3000 modifications. For the amplifier error, the licensee required the grounding system for the amplifiers prior to unit restart.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-1805
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to ensure design inputs and bounding technical requirements were properly translated into design was a performance deficiency. Licensee Procedure ECE 5.08, Standard Design Process, revisions 3 and 4, require the design to meet design inputs and technical requirements. For both the T3000 design and amplifier addition, the licensee failed to do so.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the designers did not ensure design inputs and technical requirements were properly translated into the final design.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened as Green in accordance with exhibit 1 of Appendix A to IMC 0609 question B. The issue caused a reactor trip but did not cause a loss of mitigating equipment.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. As documented in the root cause, the licensee made assumptions regarding the adequacy of the design.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 8, 2024, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection results to Charles O'Dell, Director, Organizational Effectiveness, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 10, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Heather Winn, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OPT-215-11
Unit 1 Class 1E Electrical System Operability Data Sheet
OPT-215-21
Unit 2 Class 1E Electrical System Operability Data Sheet
Procedures
SOP-304A-AF-
V01
Unit 1 Train A Motor Driven Pump Lineup
Miscellaneous
Fire Drill Package for 778' Secondary Sample Room
09/17/2024
FPI-107A
Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elevation 852'-6" Electrical
Equipment Area and FW Penetration Area
FPI-107B
Unit 2 Safeguards Building Elevation 852'-6" Electrical
Equipment Area and FW Penetration Area
FPI-401
Auxiliary Building 790' Fire Pre-plan
Procedures
FPI-501
Electrical and Control Building Elevation 778'-0"
CR-YYYY-NNNN
23-5131, 2023-6269, 2023-7570, 2024-2000, 2024-2003,
24-2010, 2024-2041
Corrective Action
Documents
TR-YYYY-NNNN
24-2053
Miscellaneous
Guarded Equipment Posting Log for WO 23-135879
09/10/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
22-0303, 2022-1609, 2024-5165
Corrective Action
Documents
YYYY-NNNN
2014-6572, 2024-4137
MSM-P0-7308
Containment Spray Pump Lube Oil Cooler Maintenance
OPT-204B
SI System
Procedures
OPT-603B
TDAFW Accumulator Check Valve Leak Test
24-253003, 23-21800, 24-212112, 22-78400, 22-86828
Work Orders
5974223, 4865885
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
(CR-)
22-008723, 2023-001466, 2023-002171, 2023-008490,
23-008607
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Alert and Notification
System Design Report
STA-662
Administrative Control of the Siren System
Procedures
Staff Guideline
2
Alert and Notification System Surveillance
Work Orders
Work Order
Number
2-385578, 23-118099
Corrective Action
Documents
Tracking Report
(TR-)
22-008171, 2023-004091, 2023-004093, 2024-001480,
204-003418
Quarterly Augmentation Verification Results - 4th Quarter,
11/10/2022
11/16/2022
Quarterly Augmentation Verification Results - 1st Quarter,
03/13/2023
03/15/2023
Quarterly Augmentation Verification Results - 2nd Quarter,
05/31/2023
06/05/2023
Quarterly Augmentation Verification Results - 3rd Quarter,
09/8/2023
09/12/2023
Quarterly Augmentation Verification Results - 4th Quarter,
10/11/20203
10/17/2023
Quarterly Augmentation Verification Results - 1st Quarter,
03/5/2024
03/06/2024
Quarterly Augmentation Verification Results - 2nd Quarter,
06/3/2024
06/05/2024
Comanche Peak On-Shift Staffing Analysis
2/21/2012,
04/02/2024
Miscellaneous
Task #366
Callout
05/21/2019
Procedures
SG-005
Quarterly Augmentation Verification of the Emergency
Response Organization (ERO)
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
(CR-)
22-008425
Comanche Peak On-Shift Staffing Analysis
Miscellaneous
Activity No. AI-
CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screening - Document TRA-105
05/13/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
TR-2024-000402-
Changes
Activity No. AI-
TR-2024-003402-
CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screening - Changes to Documents
Procedures EPP-123, EPP-123-1, and EPP-123-2
06/25/2024
Activity No. EV-
TR-2023-000264-
CFR 50.54(q)(3) Screening and Evaluation - On-Shift
Staffing Analysis, Revision
04/01/2024
CP-
201800662/TXX-
18066
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Docket No. 50-445,
50-446, and 72-74; License Amendment Request 18-002 for
Revision of the Emergency Plan
10/31/2018
EPP-123
CFR 50.54(q) Screening and Evaluation of Changes to
Emergency Plan Documentation
3, 4
Procedures
TRA-105
Emergency Preparedness Training
Condition Reports
(CR-)
22-008423, 2022-008456, 2023-001209, 2023-001394,
23-002173, 2023-002252, 2023-005015, 2023-005115,
23-005016, 2023-006050, 2023-006961, 2024-000399,
24-000788, 2024-001178, 2024-002608, 2024-005204
Corrective Action
Documents
Tracking Report
(TR-)
22-002019-4
Plan of Instruction for Training of Local Officials for Fixed
Nuclear Facility Accident Response, December 14, 2023
01/25/2024
22 Fire Drill with Offsite Participation, 11/08/22
11/16/2022
23 Fire Drill with Offsite Participation (AI-TR-2023-002627-
2)
2/7/2023
Health Physics Drill, 6/21/2023
07/13/2023
Semiannual Health Physics Drill, 11/29/2023
01/22/2024
Health Physics Drill, 5/8/2024
05/15/2024
Offsite Radiological Monitoring Drill, 8/2/2023
08/08/2023
Offsite Radiological Monitoring Drill, 1/30/24
2/05/2024
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Emergency
Response Organization, Exercise Report - Red Team -
November 30, 2022
01/11/2023
Miscellaneous
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Emergency
05/04/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Response Organization, Exercise Report - Blue Team -
February 22, 2023
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Emergency
Response Organization, Exercise Report - Gold Team - June
21, 2023
06/21/2023
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Emergency
Response Organization, Exercise Report - Gold Team - July
26, 2023
07/26/2023
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Emergency
Response Organization, Exercise Report - Red Team -
September 27, 2023
09/27/2023
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Emergency
Response Organization, Exercise Report - Blue Team -
February 14, 2024
08/22/2024
CP-202300227
Annual Review of Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant
Emergency Action Levels
05/17/2023
CPP-202200246
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Docket
Nos. 50-445, 50-446, and 72-74; Comanche Peak 2022
Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis
08/25/2022
EVAL-2023-001
CPNPP Nuclear Oversight Audit Report, Emergency
Preparedness, Audit Dates: 01/26/2023 - 04/06/2023
05/06/2023
KLD TR-1324
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant 2023 Population
Update Analysis
05/15/2023
KLD TR-1410
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant 2024 Population
Update Analysis
05/14/2024
TR-2024-000037
Assessment of Emergency Preparedness Program Elements
to Determine if 10 CFR 50.54(t) Audit is Required in 2024
2/26/2024
Tracking Report
(TR-)
24-001149
ABN-907
Acts of Nature
EPP-100
Maintaining Emergency Preparedness
EPP-109
Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency
Coordinator/Recovery Manager
Procedures
EPP-121
Re-entry, Recovery, and Closeout
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EPP-304
Protective Action Recommendations
SG-003
Staff Guideline 003, Emergency Response Data System
(ERDS) Test Program
SG-014
Staff Guideline 014, Emergency Planning Master Guideline
2, 13
SG-021
Staff Guideline 021, Management of Emergency Drill and
Exercise Program
SG-025
Staff Guideline 025, Evaluation and Critique of Exercises
STA-421
Control of Issue Reports
STA-422
Corrective Action Program
STI-421.02
Issue Report Reviews
STI-433.01
Maintaining Equipment Important to Emergency Response
Work Orders
Work Order
Number
2-580800, 23-160710, 24-267048
Miscellaneous
August 7, 2024 Gold Team Drill Scenario Package
07/31/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
71151
Condition Reports
(CR-)
23-006517, 2023-007099, 2024-001757, 2024-003387,
24-003647
LO44.BBS.006
Loss of All AC - APDG Restoration, Simulator Exercise
Guide
LO44.BBS.007
BOS/SOER 99-1 Simulator Exercise Guide
LO44.BBS.011
ATWT Simulator Exercise Guide
Miscellaneous
71151
LO47.E23.PRA
Cycle 23-5 Practice Scenario
71151
Procedures
71151
Staff Guideline
2
Alert and Notification System Surveillance
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
23-4448
Corrective Action
Documents
YYYY-NNNN
20-1247, 2019-6855, 2020-6878, 2024-04603, 2020-2889,
2019-9336
Work Orders
5998393, 5668060