IR 05000445/2024012
| ML24164A134 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/2024 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Peters K Vistra Operating Co. (VistraOpCo) |
| References | |
| IR 2024012 | |
| Download: ML24164A134 (18) | |
Text
June 17, 2024
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2024012 AND 05000446/2024012
Dear Ken Peters:
On May 16, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Al Marzloff, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Signed by Gaddy, Vincent on 06/17/24 Docket Nos. 05000445, 05000446 License Nos. NPF-87, NPF-89
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000445 and 05000446
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000445/2024012 and 05000446/2024012
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-012-0007
Licensee:
Vistra Operations Company LLC
Facility:
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Glen Rose, TX
Inspection Dates:
April 29, 2024 to May 16, 2024
Inspectors:
W. Cullum, Senior Reactor Inspector
R. Kumana, Senior Reactor Inspector
F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to assure that purchased material conformed to the procurement documents for commercial grade O-rings Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024012-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.
Inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for failure to assure that purchased material conformed to the procurement documents for commercial grade O-rings.
Failure to review a change in design of a commercial grade item for suitability of parts and materials for safety related chillers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024012-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III Design Control, when the licensee failed to review a new commercial grade refrigerant filter-drier for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components specific to the unit 1 and 2 safety chillers.
Failure to test for the critical characteristics for Teflon gaskets used in the Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024012-03 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.
Inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, when the licensee failed to test for the identified critical characteristics for Teflon gaskets used in the Emergency Diesel Generator starting air system.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status NOV 05000445,05000446/20 22003-01 Failure to Restore Compliance for Non-Cited Violation 05000445/2019001-02 "Failure to Evaluate a Change to the Facility DC Power System" 71153 Closed
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N.03 - Commercial Grade Dedication Commercial Grade Dedication
- (1) IID 341695, Seal, Oil, Inboard/Outboard, Diesel Generator 1-01 Auxiliary Jacket Water Pump 1-02
- (2) IID 347632, Valve, Relief, 1 1/4 Inch, Screwed Connection, Coolant Charging Pump CCP 1-01 Lube Oil Pump Discharge Pressure Regulating Relief Valve
- (3) IID 410103, Helical Spring, Relief Valve, Jet Oil Pump, Safety Chiller, Safety Chiller 2-(4)
IID 432179, Flexitallic Gaskets, Coolant Charging Pump, CCP 2-02 Alternate Miniflo Pressure Relief Valve
- (5) IID 450123, Gasket, Teflon, Diesel Generator 1-01 Starting Air Receiver 1-01 Inlet Valve
- (6) IID 405413, Block, Terminal, Unit 2 Containment Elevation 906 Hydrogen Detector 5506D
- (7) IID 430717, Block, Fuse, Cable Termination Rack 1-TC-07
- (8) IID 431343, Diode, Zener, Isolation Module Annunciator Battery Fan Room
- (9) IID 509723, Capacitor 12uF, 2800V, Diesel Generator 1-02 Local Control Panel 1-02
- (10) IID 394966, Connector, Coax-BWC Male, Control Room Ventilation North Intake Radiation Detector 5895A
- (12) IID 339196, Valve, Check, Brass 3/8 Inch and 1/2 Inch, Threaded Ends, Safety Chiller 1-05
- (13) IID 361576, Strainer, Safety Chiller 2-06
- (14) IID 946144, Valve, Globe Hermetic, SS-316, 3/4 Inch, Pressurizer 1-01 Pressure Transmitter 0457 and Level Transmitter 0461/0462 Low Root
- (15) Evaluation Number PR 846232, Commercial Grade Dedication of Engineering Service, Revision of Calculation ME-CA-0000-3264
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee submittals:
- (1) Reply to a Notice of Violation, NOV 05000445/2022003-01, Failure to Evaluate a Change to the Facility DC Power System (ADAMS Accession No. ML22335A518).
On November 1, 2022, the NRC issued a cited violation for the failure to restore compliance involving a revision to the updated final safety analysis report concerning Class 1E electrical power supplies shared between Units 1 and 2. In response to the cited violation, on April 20, 2023, the licensee submitted a license amendment request permitting the sharing of systems (ADAMS Accession No.
ML23110A156). On February 9, 2024, the NRC issued amendments to the facility operating licenses for Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML24023A296). The amendments authorize revision to the Comanche Peak updated final safety analysis report to provide clarifications regarding conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.81, Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to the cited violation and determined that the reason for the violation and the corrective actions taken are adequately addressed and captured on the docket.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to assure that purchased material conformed to the procurement documents for commercial grade O-rings Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024012-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.0 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, for failure to assure that purchased material conformed to the procurement documents for commercial grade O-rings.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed a purchase of commercial grade O-rings from Parker Hannifin by the licensee. In 2012, the licensee ordered a lot of 100 O-rings from Parker Hannifin. The licensee identified several critical characteristics which included dimensions, specifically, the inner diameter and cross-section. In the purchase specification, the licensee required the vendor to perform the dimensional checks at the vendors facility in Lexington, KY. The vendor facility is subject to periodic audits by Nuclear Procurement Issues Corporation (NUPIC) which the licensee credits for their dedication plan. For each order, the licensee requires the vendor to certify that the dimension checks were completed satisfactorily. The vendor performed the checks for the O-rings and sent the results to the licensee.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the dimensional checks. The vendors documentation included the vendor specified tolerances for both dimensional tests along with the results for each O-ring. The inspectors identified that a significant number (approximately 36%) of the O-rings were outside the vendors tolerances but were not identified as failing the test. The licensee received the O-rings, including the documented dimension checks, but did not identify that the vendors test results showed discrepancies with the specification. The O-rings were then released for use and installed in 22 safety-related instruments over the next 12 years.
Corrective Actions: The licensee developed a list of locations where the O-rings had been installed. The licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined that the associated equipment is operable since the dimensional errors did not represent a substantive safety impact.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-003033
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to assure that purchased material conformed to the procurement documents.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, multiple O-rings from the defective lot were installed in safety-related instruments.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors used Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and determined that the issue screened to Green because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability. Specifically, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined the affected components were still operable.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that purchased material conformed to the procurement documents.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to assure that the purchased O-rings conformed to the procurement documents. Specifically, the license received O-rings that did not meet the vendors dimensional test acceptance criteria and installed the O-rings in safety related SSCs.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to review a change in design of a commercial grade item for suitability of parts and materials for safety-related chillers Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024012-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.0 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III Design Control when the licensee failed to review a new commercial grade refrigerant filter-drier for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components specific to the unit 1 and 2 safety chillers.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed the procurement of refrigerant strainers for the safety chillers under the licensees commercial grade item dedication program. The licensee had developed a dedication plan for commercial grade strainers procured from Sporlan. The licensee had identified several critical characteristics to verify, one of which was the materials of construction. The licensees verification plans included testing of the body and connections materials, as well as steps to cut open a sample of the strainers to verify that the strainers contained the required 100 count stainless-steel mesh inside. The licensee purchased an order of strainers in March 2020. During the receipt inspection, the licensee discovered the parts were a new filter-drier design that used desiccant instead of the previous wire mesh strainer design. The licensee correctly identified this an unsatisfactory receipt and requested an engineering evaluation to determine how to proceed. The licensees engineering evaluation concluded that the new filter-drier was equivalent to the old strainers because the commercial vendor had used the same part number for the filter-drier and assumed that the vendor was responsible for the change of the design of the part. Based on this conclusion, the licensee revised the verification plan acceptance criteria to only verify the materials for the body and connections. They then accepted the new filter-driers and installed them on all four safety chillers.
The inspectors questioned the licensees conclusion that the parts were equivalent. Specifically, the inspectors considered the change in the parts design from a mechanical stainless-steel strainer to a desiccant-media based filter-drier to be a change in form, function, and materials. The industry guidance on acceptance of replacement items is EPRI NP-6406, Plant Support Engineering: Guidelines for the Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items in Nuclear Power Plants. This guidance is referenced in licensee procedure ECE-5.01-04, Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items (TERI), Revision 11.
Because the change reflected a change in the materials and method for removing impurities from the refrigerant, the change would have required evaluation by the licensee. Procedure ECE-5.01-04 would require the licensee to evaluate the change, or in the case of delegating design control to the vendor, to review the vendor documentation for the change evaluation.
The licensee had not requested or reviewed information regarding the change in design. In the licensees evaluation, the licensee assumed the material was acceptable because it was viewed as an improvement. However, the licensee did not consider the potential for new failure modes. Specifically, the available vendor information on the part suggests the desiccant material is susceptible to disintegration due to vibrations. The licensee did not document any evaluation of this potential failure. While the vendor part included a device for retention of particles, the licensee failed to ensure this was sufficient to prevent failure following a design basis event. Furthermore, the licensees revised verification plan did not verify the presence of either the desiccant or the retention device. The inspectors determined that at least one subsequent order was received with no verification of the internal materials.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed an operability determination and determined that the safety chillers were still operable with the new design of the filter drier.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-002731
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Specifically, the licensee did not review the suitability of the desiccant material in new design of the filter-drier in the safety chillers.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the new filter-driers were installed in all four safety chillers without determining if the material was suitable for use.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors used Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and determined that the issue screened to Green because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability. Specifically, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined the safety chillers were still operable.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures shall be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components. Design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and be approved by the organization that performed the original design unless the applicant designates another responsible organization.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials and parts essential to safety-related components. Specifically, the license failed to ensure that the new filter-drier design was suitable for use in the safety chillers.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to test for the critical characteristics for Teflon gaskets used in the Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2024012-03 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.0 Inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, when the licensee failed to test for the identified critical characteristics for Teflon gaskets used in the Emergency Diesel Generator starting air system.
Description:
Item ID 450123 is a commercially procured Teflon gasket. The licensee used procedure ECE-6.02-03 Form 1 to identify the critical characteristics used to dedicate the item for use in safety-related applications. The critical characteristics documented were description, part number, dimensions, and material. Due to the lack of information provided by the vendor regarding the material composition and dimensions, the licensee decided to perform a VT-2 post-installation test to verify the critical characteristics of material and dimensions. The acceptance criteria for the VT-2 test was no leakage from the gasket location. Inspectors questioned the use of a VT-2 post-installation test to verify these critical characteristics. Inspectors reviewed WO 4-02-144198 which installed the Teflon gasket in the body to bonnet location of DG-1-01 Starting Air Valve 1DO-0135, and WO 4-05-160488-00 which installed the Teflon gasket on the body to bonnet location of DG-2-01 Starting Air Valve 2DO-0135. The work orders did not contain any guidance to adequately verify the gasket dimensions or material.
Corrective Actions: The licensee did material analysis testing on the remaining gaskets in stock and verified that they are Teflon.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-002692
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to test for the identified critical characteristics for Teflon gasket used in the Emergency Diesel Generator starting air system.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the Teflon gaskets were installed in two plant locations without verifying the components met the acceptance criteria for the critical characteristics of material and dimensions.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The issue was screened in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The issue screened to Green because there was no impact to the operability or PRA functionality of the mitigating SSC. Specifically, there were no identified failures of the gaskets and they have been installed in the plant since 2002 and 2005 for Units 1 and 2 respectively.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee did not establish a test program to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, the gaskets used in the body to bonnet location of EDG 1-01 starting air valve 1DO-0135 and EDG 2-01 starting air valve 2DO-0135 were not tested for the critical characteristics identified in the commercial grade dedication for ECE-6.02-03 Form
1. Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
- On May 16, 2024, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Al Marzloff, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.03
Calculations
IMT-CA-EQ-
0099-MS-20A.1
Generic Qualification of Small-Bore Rockwell Valves
71111.21N.03
Calculations
ME-CA-0000-
264
Safe Shutdown Impoundment Hydrothermal Analysis
71111.21N.03
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-
2005-000488, 2005-002672, 2011-001876, 2012-001241,
2012-004468, 2012-005154, 2013-010782, 2013-010882,
2016-003267, 2020-000934, 2020-004537, 2020-007357,
21-001086
71111.21N.03
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
IR-2024-
2600, 002684, 002692, 002697, 002731, 002733,
2824, 002818, 002824, 002829, 002862, 003033,
003051
71111.21N.03
Drawings
D-364773-01
P.C.B
- D. SCHEMATIC, ISOLATION MODULE 4 CH.
25VDC I/O
A
71111.21N.03
Drawings
E1-0067, Sheet
108
Unit 1 Diesel Generator 1EG1 Excitation Schematic
71111.21N.03
Drawings
E1-0067, Sheet
109
Unit 1 Diesel Generator 1EG2 Excitation Schematic
71111.21N.03
Drawings
E1-0076, Sheet
30A
ANNUNCIATOR LAMP CABINET 1-ALB-11B
SCHEMATlC DIAGRAM
71111.21N.03
Drawings
E1-0076, Sheet
30B
ANNUNCIATOR LAMP CABINET 1-ALB-11B
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM
71111.21N.03
Drawings
E1-0080, Sheet
03A
SOLID STATE ISOLATION CABINET CP1-ECPRCR-07
EXTERNAL CONNECTION DIAGRAM
71111.21N.03
Drawings
E2-0067, Sheet
108
Unit 2 Diesel Generator 2EG1 Excitation Schematic
71111.21N.03
Drawings
E2-0067, Sheet
109
Unit 2 Diesel Generator 2EG2 Excitation Schematic
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
05-356643-01
Edwards Size 3/4 Figure 15104
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
1038748
Purchase Order 1038748
10/16/2020
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
1196650
Purchase Order 1196650
6/23/2022
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
2978
Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee (NUPIC)
5/10/2011
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Commercial Grade Item Survey of Parker Hannifin
Corporation, O-Ring Division
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
23-MS-20A.1
Manual and Self-Actuated Steel Valves
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
40119
Receipt for Parker Seal O-Rings
2/7/2012
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
21562
Purchase Order 521562
6/13/2018
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
611-6S853006
Procurement Document Review Summary for Item#
509723
04/15/2015
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
2777
Purchase Order 662777
1/21/2020
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
2741-01
TEST PROCEDURE, ISOLATION MODULE (AI-AII),
ACCEPT/REJECT CRITERIA
E
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
A-374026-01
TEST PROCEDURE FOR ISOLATION MODULE, 4
CHANNEL 125 VDC IN/OUT
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
Hermetic Turbopak Safety Related Chillers
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
CP-202000219
Sporlan C-052 Filter Materials
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
CPES-M-1057
Specification Pre-Engineered Items
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
CPSES 9804622
REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR FORNEY CORPORATION
SUPPLIED SOLID STATE ISOLATION EQUIPMENT
08/27/1998
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
NEE0601
Pre-Engineered Item Data Sheet (PEIDS) NEE 0601 -
Coaxial and Triaxial Cable Connections for Harsh and
Mild Environments
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
NEE0606
Pre-Engineered Item Data Sheet (PEIDS) NEE0606 -
Block, Fuse (For Class H, J, K, R, CC, and Midget Fuses)
for Mild Environments
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
NEE0623
Pre-Engineered Item Data Sheet (PEIDS) NEE0623 -
Block, Terminal, Safety Related, Class 1E, Harsh and
Mild Environments
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
NEE07492012
Block, Terminal, Safety Related, Class 1E, Harsh
Environments
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
NEM10532012
Pre-Engineered Item Data Sheet (PEIDS) Parker Seals
O-rings
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
NEM11192018
Strainer
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
NEM1328
Pre-Engineered Item Data Sheet (PEIDS) Valve, Check,
Brass
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
PO-319127
Purchase Order 319127 - Terminal Block, 600V, 35 Amp,
- 22-#10 AWG Wire Range, #8 Screw
01/29/2016
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
PO-337080
Purchase order for seal, oil, inboard/outboard
4/11/2016
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
PO-719668
Purchase order for flexitallic gaskets
7/22/2020
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RAL-2937
Design Report - Size 3/4 Figure 15104
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-018280
Connector, Coax-BNC Male
09/02/1995
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-023384
Diode - 1N4005; Transistor - 2N7000; Varistor -
1.5KE160C; Opto Coupler - 6N139; Zener Diode -
1N5245; Opto Coupler - TLP595G
05/12/1998
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-028556
Verification plan for Teflon gaskets
10/2/2002
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-037790
Block, Terminal, Safety Related, Class IE, Harsh and Mild
Environment
08/18/2010
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-038202
Module, Isolation
01/17/2011
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-038799
Block, Fuse
06/08/2011
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-043880
Capacitor, Metalized Polypropylene Film, Self-Healing
04/23/2015
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-057243
Block, Terminal, Safety Related, Class IE, Harsh
Environment
04/12/2012
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-
059057_1_NA
Verification plan for seal, oil, inboard/outboard
2/6/2007
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-
2065_1_NA
Verification plan for flexitallic gaskets
8/19/2020
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-103498
Receipt for globe valve
2/15/2020
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-20934
Verification plan for relief valve 1-1/4 Inch
2/1/1995
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-23278
Verification plan for helical spring, relief valve, jet oil
pump, safety chiller
2/5/1997
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-26281
Receipt for brass check valves
6/9/2000
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-85624
Receipt for engineering services
2/19/2019
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
RR-96297
Receipt for strainer
4/21/2020
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
s02101546s4
Purchase order for relief valve, stainless steel
11/14/1996
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
s02563036s4
Purchase order for spring, helical
4/13/1998
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
S02579316S4
Purchase Order S02579316S4
04/29/1998
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
S03265016S4
Purchase Order S03265016S4
6/29/2000
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
S06641476S4
Purchase Order S06641476S4
10/14/2010
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
S07060626S4
Purchase Order S07060626S4 - Block, Fuse, 600V, 1/10
to 30 AMP, 3 Pole, Screw Terminals 1200 Volts AC,
NEE0606
04/22/2011
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
S07291856S4
Purchase Order S07291856S4
10/6/2011
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
VDRT-5875664
Sealed Type Specifications
3/19/2020
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
VP 98-0024
PCB, 4 Channel Isolation Module
04/27/1998
71111.21N.03
Miscellaneous
VP-98-0023
Diode - 1 N4005* Transistor - 2N7000; Varistor -
1.5KE160C; Opto Coupler - 6N139; Zener Diode - 1
N5245; Opto Coupler - TLP595G
04/27/1998
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE 6.02-02
Procurement Engineering Review of Procurement
Documents
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE 6.02-03
Critical Characteristics Development
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE 6.02-06
Preparation of Verification Plans
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE-5.01-04
Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE-5.01-04
Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items (TERI)
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE-5.01-04
Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items (TERI)
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE-5.08-01
Comanche Peak (Utility) Design Change Process
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE-6.02-01
Procurement Levels
71111.21N.03
Procedures
ECE-6.02-03
Critical Characteristics Development
71111.21N.03
Procedures
EPG-731
ASME Section XI Repair / Replacement Activities
71111.21N.03
Procedures
INC-2319
Functional Testing of Solid-State Isolation Modules
71111.21N.03
Procedures
MSE-C0-7333
Centrifugal Water Chiller Overhaul
71111.21N.03
Procedures
MSE-P0-7333
Centrifugal Water Chiller Maintenance
71111.21N.03
Procedures
STA-421
Initiation of SmartForms
71111.21N.03
Procedures
STA-422
PROCESSING SMARTFORMS
71111.21N.03
Procedures
STI-422.01
Operability Determination Program
71111.21N.03
Procedures
STI-716.06
Design Attribute Review (DAR)
71111.21N.03
Procedures
WHS-002
Handling and Storage
71111.21N.03
Procedures
WHS-011
Warehouse Surveillance
71111.21N.03
Work Orders
5-95-500716, 3581645, 3801009, 4174383, 4748348,
5502005, 22-203492, 1-97-110113-00, 5000505_1,
28428_1, 5769058_1, 4-02-144198, 4-05-160488-00,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
5871390, 5957364, 5999400, 21-846435