IR 05000445/1993035
| ML20058B786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1993 |
| From: | Runyan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058B762 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-93-35, 50-446-93-35, NUDOCS 9312020219 | |
| Download: ML20058B786 (41) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-445/93-35 50-446/93-35 Licenses:
NPF-87 NPF-89
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Licensee:
TU Electric Skyway Tower-400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81-Dallas, Texas Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: October 5-22, 1993 Acting Team Leader:
L hL_ 6 st - to -u
M. b Lunyan, Atting Team Leader Date Engineering Section Division of Reactor Safety Team Members:
P. A. Goldberg, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section Division of Reactor. Safety R. P. Mullikin, Senior Resident Inspector Division of Reactor Projects C. J. Paulk, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section Division of Reactor Safety R. B. Vickrey, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section Division of Reactor Safety I
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Approved; h }'
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//-/O-&3 T. F. Westerman, Chief, Engineering Section Date Division of Reactor Safety i
9312O20219 931122
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{M ADOCK 05000445 PDR
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SUMMARY A team of NRC staff members conducted an inspection of engineering and-technical support at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station facility. The inspection was conducted on site October 5-8 and 18-22, 1993, and in the NRC Region IV office October 11-15, 1993.
The NRC team utilized the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedure 37700,
" Design Change and Modifications"; 37702, " Design Changes and Modifications Programs"; and 40703, "Offsite Support Staff."
The inspection team reviewed the engineering organizational structure and interfaces, manpower and work backlogs, scheduling and prioritization of work activities, support of plant operations, and qualification of personnel. The quality of engineering performance was evaluated by reviewing' completed station modifications, design change work packages, temporary modifications, and engineering dispositions of nonconformance reports. The quality assurance audits and assessments of the engineering and technical support organization, ard the actions taken with respect to the assessments and audit findings were reviewed.
The inspection team observed the following:
The design modification process was well controlled and
satisfactorily documented. The overall process for controlling
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design modifications appeared effective.
The -safety evaluations and the modification packages were well
written and generally reflectici conservative engineering practices.
The basis for assigning priorities for minor modifications was-
arbitrary. The licensee stated that they would review a sample of minor modifications to check the appropriateness of the assigned priorities.
The temporary modification program appeared to be excellent. The
quality of the program was attributed to the improvements recommended by the licensee's temporary modification task team.
The use of separate drawing files in the control room and the work
control center for temporary modifications was considered a weakness.
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Design, system, and maintenance engineers possessed high morale and
good team spirit.
The experience level of the engineering staff was. considered to be a
significant strength.
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The establishment of a shift duty system engineer to provide a
continuous onsite system engineering presence was considered a strength.
The interfaces among design engineering, system engineering, and
operations appeared to be very strong.
The efforts being made by the engineering department's personnel
error reduction program to reduce personnel errors were effective.
The initiation of the design modification / minor modification task
force was considered a proactive action on the part of licensee management.
The vendor technical information program had undergone improvements.
- in the processing and tracking of vendor correspondence since the-reorganization of the program in December 1992.
The licensee's process improvement team program efforts were in
varying stages of completion.
The overall actions taken by the licensee for the control of fuses
was considered to be very good.
The licensen's design basis document program was considered to be
excellent. This program was considered a strength in the engineering area.
The support of the engineering and technical support groups l for the
Unit I refueling outage was considered to be excellent.
The team noted that a relief valve on the steam generator blowdown
line had been gagged by issuing a work request to stop.the valve from lifting early.
It was the team's observation that an evaluation of the consequences of installing the gag.had not been performed.
The overview of engineering activities at' Comanche Peak Steam
Electric Station by the nuclear overview organization and engineering assurance was considered to be a strength.
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DETAILS 1 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 1.1 Desian Chanaes and Modifications (37700)
1.1.1 Design Modifications The team reviewed the licensee's process associated with plant modifications.
The governing procedure for all permanent modifications to structures, systems, and components located at CPSES was Procedure No. -STA-716, " Site Modification Process," Revision 10. This procedure described in detail the methodology and responsibilities for performing design modifications, minor modifications, and facility changes. The procedure was found to be comprehensive and well written.
The team selected several design modifications for review.
Particular emphasis was placed on the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, the technical'
content of the engineering work, and the impact of the modification on design basis documents. Where possible, a walkdown of the modification to compare the installed configuration with the design drawings was performed.
The team determined that the licensee's design modification process was well controlled and satisfactorily documented.
Safety evaluations were well written and broad-based in scope. The design work generally reflected conservative engineering practices. Below are comments specific to each modification that was reviewed.
DM 89-303:
Install a Relief Valve on the Bonnet of Four Containment Isolation Valves to Eliminate the Concern of Pressure Lockina the Gate Valves This Unit I modification added a relief valve to the bonnets'of Valves 1-8811A and -B, " Residual Heat Removal Sump Isolation Valves," and 1-CT-0101 and -
0106, " Core Spray Sump Isolation Valves." The' purpose of the modification was
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to prevent pressure locking of these gate valves by precluding the buildup of excessive pressures in the valve bonnet.
In each case the relief valve-discharge piping was directed to the downstream piping.
The team was concerned that the licensee had not considered'the pressure of the downstream piping in the determination of the relief valve setpoint. This pressure would act as a backpressure on the relief valve, which was of a non-bellows type.
In the testing of the relief valves that was performed by the valve vendor, the relief pressure of the valves.was set at the design pressure determined by engineering based on the capability of the motor-operated valw.
This issue affected Containment Spray Valves 1-8811A and -B.
Based on discussions with the licensee and a consideration of all operating modes, the team determined that the pressure downstream of Val'Jes 1-8811A and -B would not exceed approximately 68.9 kPa (10 psig) and, thus, would not have a significant affect on the tested set pressure of 3275 MPa (475 psig). A motor-operated valve specialist for the licensee demonstrated that the motor-operated valve had sufficient capacity to open at a bonnet pressure of I
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3344 MPa (485 psig), set pressure plus backpressure. Though the technical t
concerns were resolved, the team considered the licensee's failure to consider
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the relief valve backpressure to have been an oversight.
DM 91-059:
Replacement of Existina Solenoid Operated Valves 1-HV-8220. -8221 with a Different Solenoid Operated Valves Desion This Unit 1 modification involved the replacement of the existing solenoid operated valves (1-HV-8220, -8221) installed in the high point vent line from the suction piping of the centrifugal charging pumps and the positive displacement pump to the gas space of the volume control tank. The existing globe valve design, as installed, was not effective in isolating flow in the direction of the volume control tank to pump suction.
It was replaced with a gate valve design, which was effective in isolating flow in both directions.
The team found that the safety concern was a common mode failure of the high head injection pumps due to gas binding, which this modification corrected.
The team did not identify any concerns related to this inodification.
DM 91-158:
Emeraency Diesel Generator Overspeed Trio System Modify Tubina to Eliminate Spurious Annunciation This Unit 1 modification involved the removal of an emergency diesel generator overspeed device orifice line that had been installed under a previous design change authorization (DCA 72086) and the reinstallation of the original supply line. The licensee had determined that recurring spurious overspeed alarms were related to the configuration of the revised supply tubing. The team was informed that-spurious alarms were corrected by the modification.
The team did not identify any concerns related to this modification.
DM 90-198:
Replace Relief Valves 100-123. -129. -223. and -229 on the Diesel Startino Air Receiver Tanks This Unit I modification replaced Relief Valves 1D0-123, -129, -223, and -229 and their discharge piping on the emergency diesel generator starting air receiver tanks. The purpose of the modification was to replace the original relief valves, which had problems with premature lifting and excessive blowdown. The original valves were oversized for the application with a capacity greater than 22.65 SCMM (800 SCFM). The replacement valves had a blowdown of less than 15 percent of opening pressure and a capacity of approximately 5.66 SCMM (200 SCFM). The shortened blowdown would allow '.ne system to respond to inadvertent lifting of the relief valves by closing aftar dropping 15 percent instead of a complete discharge of the air receiver tanks.
This would retain the systems ability to provide starting air to the emergency diesel generators.
As part of the review of the design modification, the team walked down the new relief valve installations in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator rooms.
The team noted a sign attached to each valve installation which stated not to bump the relief valves since it could prematurely open and cause the air receivers to discharge. The licensee stated that the signs had been installed
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for the original relief valves which had been replaced and did not apply to the new valves.
However, the signs had been left in place as a precautionary
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measure. The team concluded that this design modification was well prepared i
and had received appropriate reviews to identify and address all potential issues of safety significance created by the modification.
DM 92-021: Replace Existina Valve Stems on Valves IFV-4772-1. -4772-2.
-4773-1. and -4773-2 with a Hiaher Strenath Material to increase Strenath
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This Unit 1 modification involved the replacement of valve stems in i
Containment Spray Pump Recirculation Valves IFV-4772-1, -4772-2, -4773-1, and -
-4773-2.
The purpose of the modification was to replace the original valve stems made out of 316 stainless steel with a higher strength stem material, SA-479 Grade XM-19. The maximum stem load allowable for the original material
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was 3234.1 kg (7130 lbs) and for the new material the maximum stem load allowable was approximately 8164.7 kg (18,000 lbs.). During RF01, motor-operated valve testing indicated that the total load, including inertia, after torque switch trip could exceed the allowable for the 316 stainless steel stems.
In addition, the SA-479 Grade XM-19 material was considered to have better corrosion resistance than the 316 stainless steel stem. The team concluded that by replacing the stems with a higher strength material there would be a substantial increase in load carrying capability and an increase in margin.
The team did not find any concerns related to this modification.
DM 92-087:
Modify Diesel Turbocharaer Drio System Supply Tubina to Meet Desian Intent
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This Unit 1 modification involved deleting the original prelube and keep-warm tubing to the emergency diesel generator turbochargers and replacing it with a new design.
It was determined that the prelube and keep-warm tubing to the emergency diesel generator turbochargers did not provide sufficient pressure and flow, which could have caused damage to the engines in the event of an emergency start.
This modification moved the prelube supply to the inlet side of the strainer and increased the tubing size from 1.27 cm (0.5 inch) to 1.9 cm (0.75 inch). The team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screening, which
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determined that a safety evaluation was not required. The team determined that the screening was thorough and well written.
The team did not find any concerns related to this modification.
1.1.2 Minor Modifications The team reviewed a sample of minor modifications. A modification is categorized as minor if it meets the following criteria: the work requires one design change notice with limited interdisciplinary involvement,
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implementation requirements are sufficiently simple, no change is required to the Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis, no change is required to Chapters 6 and 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, new seismic qualification documentation is not required, no change is required to an environmental qualification package,
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the safety classification of a component is not changed and minor
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modifications are limited by budgetary restrictions.
The minor modification criteria and processing _is described in Procedure No. STA-716, " Site
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Modification Process," Revision 10.
The team reviewed the technical content, safety evaluations, and installed configurations (where possible) of the following minor' modifications:.
,91-287 Change Torque Springpack in Motor-Operated Valve 1-8701A, Unit 1 92-135 Remove Check Valve Internals from Valve 2CH-0466, Unit 2 92-168 Modify Tubing From Starting Air Headers, Unit 1 92-228 Relocation of Valve ISF-0047, Unit 1
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'92-265 Move Listed Conduits to Alleviate the-Interference Concern, Unit 1 92-290 Remove Existing Structure of Pipe Support with a Modified Structure, a
Unit 1
- 92-331 Safety Valve ISB-4401 is Leaking and Parts Are Not Available, Unit 1 92-332 Replace DG Air Start Valve Piston and Cap Assemblies, Units 1 and.2 92-465 Change Motor Gear Set on Motor-0perated Valves, Unit.1 I
92-472 Evaluate Break Postulation of High Energy Line, Unit 2 93-044 The Present Jacket Water and Lube Oil Keep-Warm Temperature Control Systems Cannot Be Adjusted-to Maintain Temperature Without Recurring
Alarms, Units 1 and 2 93-285 Temperatures in the Rod Control Cabinet are Above the Design Setpoint, Additional Cooling is Needed, Unit 1 93-294 Delete CCW Supply to RC PASS Sampler Cooler flow
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Transmitter 2-FT-4231A, Unit 2
,93-357 Replacement of Motor-0perated Valve Springpack with Heavier Model, Unit 2 93-438 Deletion of Check Valve 1-C0-317 Internals, Unit 1 The team noted that the design package for minor Modification 92-135, which involved the removal of the internals from Check Valve 2CH-0466, did not contain a reference to the controlling pipe stress analysis, which had not been revised or annotated to reflect the change in system weight.
In response to the team's finding, the licensee determined that pipe stress analysis Problem No. CH-1-S107 had not been updated to reflect the removal of the internals from Valve 2CH-0466 or from the corresponding Unit 1 Valve ICH-0466.
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The licensee issued Operations Notification and Evaluation (ONE) Form 93-1876 to investigate this problem. The immediate safety concerns were minimal since-these modifications involved the removal of a very small amount of weight (131 kPa (19 pounds)). The ONE Form stated that the modifications to the two check valves would have no significant impact on the pipe stress analysis results. The ONE Form will investigate the potential for other similar oversights.
Pending the licensee's review, the team considered this to be an isolated finding.
During a field walkdown of minor Modification 92-472,. the team noted that one of two sway struts that had been installed as part of Pipe Support 58-2-030-401-E25R was excessively bent near the middle of its shaft.
The bend angle appeared to be approximately 10 degrees.
This pipe support supports a 20.32 cm (8 inch) high energy line in the steam generator blowdown system.
In response to the team's finding, the licensee examined the support and issued ONE Form 93-1898. The licensee stated that their preliminary position was that the pipe support was acceptable as installed and verified by quality control, and that the strut shaft was bent at some time later, which will be reviewed as part of the ONE Form evaluation.
The team reviewed minor Modification 92-168, dated March 18, 1992, which was initiated to modify tubing from the starting air headers of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators. The purpose of the modification was an enhancement to allow warm combustion intake air to flow through the starting air header to vent any exhaust-gases and prevent condensation. The Unit 2 emergency diesel generators had been supplied with this enhancement. The team noted that the modification was still open'and had been assigned an A4 priority. The A4 priority was defined as an issue that, if not corrected, would lead to a Technical Specification violation, limiting condition for operation, and/or plant shutdown. The licensee stated that the A4 priority was incorrect since the modification was an enhancement which did not affect the operability of the emergency diesel generators. The licensee stated that they would review a sample of open minor modifications to determine if any high priority modifications had been neglected.
The team reviewed minor Modification 92-332, dated August 21, 1992, which was initiated to replace the emergency diesel generator starting air valve piston and cap assemblies. The emergency diesel generator vendor had recommended refurbishing the starting air valves by replacing the valve's piston and cap set with a vendor modified set. The modified set included a change in materials and internal dimensions but the part numbers remained the same. The team noted that the modification was voided July 16, 1993, with the explanation that the vendor's change of materials and dimensions did not require a change to site design documents, therefore, a modification was not necessary. The team asked the licensee how configuration control was to be maintained since both the old and new parts had the same part number. The licensee stated that when new parts are purchased, they are stored in the CPSES warehouse under a Texas Utilities stock number and not by the part number. Since the stock number changes with purchase order number, the new parts would be controlled.
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1.1.3 Temporary Modifications l
The team reviewed the following.seven plant temporary modifications:
TM 92-1-007 Installaticn of Blind Flange for Leak Rate
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TM 93-1-018 Install a Temporary Amine Addition _to-j Condensate System - Unit 1 l
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TM 93-1-026 Install Temporary Submersible Pump at
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Meteorological Tower
TM 92-1-105 Lift Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation
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. i TM 93-2-015 Install a Temporary Amine Addition to
Condensate System - Unit 2
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TM 93-2-016 Place a Multiplexer in Auxiliary Building j
TM 93-2-017 Addition of Nitrogen' to' Reactor Water Make-Up
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The team reviewed Station Administrative Procedure STA-602, " Temporary
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Modification," Revision 11, which was the controlling procedure for temporary i
modifications.
The team concluded that the procedure properly provided for the control of temporary modifications-to. safety-related and nonsafety-related
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systems. The procedure was detailed and provided a clear definition of responsibilities. The quality of Procedure STA-602 was excellent. However,
the requirement for having a separate temporary modification drawing stick j
file could provide _for confusion. Specifically, a vital plant drawing
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affected by a temporary modification existed on two different stick files in l
the control room and the work control center. The vital drawing did not indicate in any manner that a temporary modification was outstanding. Thus, the possibility existed that an individual could use a vital drawing without knowing that a temporary modification affected it.
In addition, the marked-up drawing used in the temporary modification stick file was the revision at the time the modification was installed. The inspector noted that the. temporary modification drawings were not revised and'that the drawings were as many as three revisions behind. This presented the potential for an individual using an outdated drawing.
The team reviewed the seven temporary modifications and found the'10 CFR 50.59 evaluations to be good. The team noted that all required approvals, including
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the Station Operations Review Committee, were performed prior to installation of the temporary modifications. A review of selected vital drawings affected
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by the modifications were verified to be in the control room and the work control center in their own drawing stick file.
The team performed a physical walkdown of three temporary modifications to verify that the installed modification reflected the approved design and that
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temporary modification tags were properly hung. The temporary modifications were: TM 93-2-017, TM 93-02-015, and TM 93-1-018. The team found that the temporary modifications were installed as designed and that tags were properly hung with the following exceptions. Temporary Modification TM 93-1-017
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resulted in the installation of four nitrogen bottles to add nitrogen to the reactor water make-up tank and the placement of 16 tags. The team found that tags were missing from two of the nitrogen bottles.
In addition, 0.952 cm (0.375 inch) Valve 200-C408 appeared closed when the temporary modification indicated that it should be in a normally open position. The team concluded
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that the discrepancies had minimal safety significance. The four nitrogen bottles were secured together and the other two bottles were properly tagged.
There would be little chance of not recognizing that a temporary modification
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l was installed. The team informed the licensee of these discrepancies. The l
licensee stated that the missing tags would be reinstalled, and it was verified that Valve 2DD-C408 was in the closed position. The team was
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subsequently provided with Temporary Procedure SOP-TP-93B-3, " Temporary Nitrogen Injection, Revision 0, dated July 30, 1993, which described the nitrogen injection activity. This procedure had changed the requirement to require this valve to be closed. The licensee's actions satisfied the team's concerns in this area.
The team observed during the temporary modification walkdown that grey metal duct tape was being used on stainless steel components in various areas of the plant. The team questioned the licensee on this use since chlorides in duct tape can contribute to stress corrosion cracking. The licensee provided the i
team with the procurement information on the duct tape used at CPSES. The duct tape in question was nuclear grade with limits on leachable chlorides.
The team noted that the brand of duct tape observed in the plant was the same as on the procurement data. This issue was considered resolved.
The temporary modification program has undergone significant changes in 1993.
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Many of these changes were the result of findings published in the licensee's
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Temporary Modification Task Team Report, completed in February 1993. The licensee formed an evaluation task team to evaluate the collective significance of temporary modification issues identified in several ONE Forms.
The team reviewed the licensee's report and found a thorough evaluation of the temporary modification program. The corrective actions resulting from this l
report contributed to an excellent temporary modification program. The team found that the program was being properly implemented.
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The licensee has implemented a program to perform periodic reviews and audits of the temporary modification process. Operations personnel performed weekly l
reviews to verify that all affected vital station drawings were maintained in
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both the control room and the work control center. Also, a review was l
performed by operations to determine if any temporary modifications can be
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restored. The Manager, System Engineering, was responsible for reviewing the modifications that are nearing the end of their projected duration.
In addition, the applicable system engineer performed a monthly walkdown of the affected system to inspect the physical status of the temporary modification.
The team reviewed the most recent Quality assurance audit report (QAA-93-116),
dated June 24, 1993, of the design control program. This audit specifically exempted the temporary modification program since the task team report's
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corrective action had not been fully implemented. However, the team reviewed four surveillances performed by the Independent Safety Evaluation Group and found them to be very good.
The team also determined that the temporary modification program receives high visibility from licensee management.
The licensee's Weekly Management Summary
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published the following information:
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A graph of the number of installed temporary modifications presently
installed on each unit for the preceding 3 months.
i A graph of the age of the installed modifications.
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I A listing of the modifications that are I month from their targeted
restoration date. The applicable system engineer is also listed.
In conclusion, the licensee had an excellent temporary modification program.
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The quality of the program can be greatly attributed to the improvements recommended by the temporary modification task team. The use of a separate
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drawing stick file in the control room and the work control center for i
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temporary modification was considered a weakness.
l.1.4 Conclusions j
The design modification process was well controlled and
satisfactorily documented. The overall process for controlling design modifications appeared effective.
The safety evaluations and the modification packages were well
written and generally reflected conservative engineering practices.
The priorities assigned to minor modifications was somewhat
arbitrary.
The licensee stated that they were to review a sample of minor modifications to check the appropriateness of the assigned priorities.
The temporary modification program appeared to be excellent. The
quality of the program was attributed to the improvements recommended by the temporary modification task team.
The use of a separate drawing stick file in the control room and the
work control center for temporary modifications was considered a weakness.
1.2 Offsite Support Staff / Nuclear Enaineerina and Support Oraanization The Nuclear Engineering and Support organization (see Attachment 3) is composed of Reactor Engineering, Administrative Services, Project Cost and Control, Technical Support Design Engineering, and an engineering outage coordinator.
The engineering organization is located on site with the exception of part of Reactor Engineering, which is located in Dallas. The
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managers of each of these groups reports to a Vice President of Nuclear Engineering and Support.
The team found that in December 1992 engineering was reorganized to integrate all Unit I and Unit 2 engineering functions into one organization. The focus of engineering is now to support operation of both units following the licensing of Unit 2 for operations.
Long-term strategic planning is also now
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receiving attention.
l.2.1 Technical Support and Design Engineering The Technical Support and Design Engineering organization is composed of
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Mechanical Engineering, Electrical / Instrumentation and Control Engineering, Maintenance Engineering, Projects Engineering, System Engineering, Procurement Engineering, and Civil / Environmental / Site Facilities Engineering. The managers of each of these groups report to the Manager of Technical Support and Design Engineering.
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The majority of engineering has been integrated into this organization with
exception of Reactor Engineering. The team was informed that present plans
are for this organization to be centrally located in the Comanche Peak t
engineering building after the first of the year with exception of Project
Engineering, Procurement Engineering, System Engineering and Maintenance
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Engineering. The team noted that each of the design groups use contractor support to perform design work and this support varied from around 10 percent to 70 percent of the design modification activities. A lead engineer is assigned to oversee each design modification performed by a contractor. The contractors are located in onsite offices and conform to the licensee's
procedures. The use of contractors has provided for increased encineering
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support of plant operations.
i 1.2.1.1 Electrical / Instrumentation and Control Engineering Electrical / Instrumentation and Controls Engineering consisted of four design i
engineering groups. There were 39 utility personnel and 3 contractors.
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Electrical / Instrumentation and Controls Engineering was responsible for instrumentation and control setpoints, electrical systems (including environmental qualifications), electrical drawings, and computers.
Additionally, the electrical and instrumentation design basis documents were within the purview of electrical / instrumentation and controls.
The team noted that the engineers were knowledgeable in their area of responsibility. The team observed, however, that the engineers lacked knowledge of other areas, resulting in a reduced ability to provide comparable coverage in the absence of the assigned engineer. The team was informed that plans were being developed to provide for cross-training to address this j
weakness.
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1.2.1.2 Civil / Environmental / Site Facilities Engineering
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Civil Engineering consisted of two design groups that performed safety-related activities.
There were 20 utility personnel and 7 contractors assigned to
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these two groups. Civil Engineering was responsible for civil and structural engineering, computer aided drafting, pipe supports, and seismic equipment qualification.
The team interviewed two supervisors and six engineers from the two design groups described above.
Based on information provided by the licensee, and as
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I confirmed in the interviews, the experience level in the civil engineering
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area was very high. The typical engineer in this group had about 15 years nuclear experience with 10 years at Comanche Peak. As a whole, the interviews indicated that management, material, and procedural support was strong in this area and that morale was high. The group expressed no concerns related to
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interfaces with other plant groups. Some of the engineers stated that informational flow from management was sometimes slow.
1.2.1.3 Mechanical Engineering l
Mechanical Engineering consisted of four design groups that performed safety-related activities. There were 41 utility personnel and 4 contractors
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assigned to these four groups. Mechanical engineering was responsible for system design, mechanical equipment design and codes and standards.
The team interviewed two supervisors and eight engineers. The experience level for the mechanical engineering group was found to be high. As a whole, the interviews indicated that morale was high, and the engineers felt that they had good management support.
1.2.1.4 Project Engineering
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l Project engineering consisted of two groups. There were 10 utility personnel and 7 contractors.
Project Engineering coordinated the implementation of
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design modification programmatic requirements. The activities included
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coordination of design modification projects through approval, engineering implementation, testing, and closure. These activities also included overview of scope changes, schedule adherence and associated costs.
The team noted that the function of Project Engineering is an area that can be l
critical to the timely completion of outages on schedule.
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l.2.1.5 Procurement Engineering Procurement Engineering consisted of a Procurement Engineering group and a Material Engineering group. There were 18 utility personnel and 3 contractors. These groups established the technical and quality assurance requirements for procurement documents, controlled the master parts list, l
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implemented the commercial grade steam dedication program, and maintained the j
vendor equipment technical information program. -They also established receipt
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verification plans, developed pre-engineered item data sheets, and maintained
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the defective item list.
i This group is located in the procurement buildings. The team was informed
that the licensee has also established a test lab onsite to facilitate.
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1.2.1.6 System Engineering
The system engineers were divided into four departments. The. four departments'
i were Nuclear Steam Supply System, Balance-of-Plant, Plant Support,'and l
Instrumentation and Control and Electrical, with each department supervisor
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reporting to the System Engineering Manager. The System Engineering Manager j
reported to the Technical Support & Design Engineering Manager.
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i The systems in the plant were divided into 171 separate assignments for system
engineering responsibility. System engineers were individually assigned as
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either primary or backup to each of these systems.
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The main functions of the system engineers were:
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Providing general technical and engineering support to Nuclear j
Operations and assigned systems, y
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Developing and implementing a systems engineering program to:
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l monitor system performance, correct performance problems, and
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recommend cost effective improvements;
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Provide system experts in support of operational activities;
i Prepare, review, and approve minor and temporary modifications; j
Manage the implementation of minor and temporary modifications;
Coordinate major overhaul tasks during outages; j
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l Support event investigation task teams; and
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Assemble and present the weekly management summary report..
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As part of the licensee's recent engineering reorganization and staffing, a
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number of engineers were assigned new system responsibilities. The team i
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observed that the reassignments allowed limited time for system familiarization. This has created a situation in which about half of the system engineers were in the process of completing their qualification cards i
for system engineering. The experience levels of system engineers was seen as an attribute in reducing the impact, as well as the overall low work-backlog and minimal use of overtime.
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While a large number of system engineers had not completed their certifications, their progress appeared to be good.
The good progress appeared to be supported through management oversight which ensured ample time for system engineers to devote to their system training. Turnover appeared
minimal and vacancies have been quickly filled.
In response to an Independent Safety Engineering Group Assessment Report, the j
System Engineering Manager had recently conducted some preliminary inquiries
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into the area of system engineering training and familiarity with assigned systems. The System Engineering Manager determined that there was a need to reduce the impact of system turnover through a more controlled process and to develop an improved training program. The development of this plan was being
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established for both short-and long-range objectives.
j 1.2.1.7 Maintenance Engineering The maintenance engineers were divided into three departments. The three
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departments were Technical Programs, Component Test, and Performance Test, with each department supervisor reporting to the Maintenance Engineering Manager. The Maintenance Engineering Manager reported to the Technical Support & Design Engineering Manager.
The main functions of the maintenance engineers were:
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Implementing a preventive maintenance program including maintaining
the preventive maintenance database; Implementing equipment history, equipment performance monitoring and
failure analysis programs; Implementing a Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System Program in
l accordance with INP0;
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Coordinating with Reactor Engineering on reliability centered
maintenance issues;
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l Maintenance and performance of assigned surveillance and preventive
maintenance test procedures; Developing a programmatic response to the recent NRC maintenance
rule; Preparation and performance of assigned Design Modification
Acceptance Test Procedures; Maintenance and performance of predictive maintenance techniques f
including: vibration analysis, lubrication analysis, motor current analysis, and thermographic analysis; Coordinating the test review group;
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Maintenance of the Post Work Test Guide; and
Analysis of component-related issues (e.g., valve packing).
- Maintenance engineering was in the process of reviewing and establishing new qualification standards to support their reorganization earlier in the year.
The new qualification standards were being revised to adjust to the new organization structure and reassigned responsibilities. New qualification standards had been recently issued to supervisors for review and were expected to be completed within a month.
Progress of this program was being implemented and tracked through the training coordinator. This program was being developed to enhance maintenance engineer individual qualifications and promote cross training within maintenance engineering.
l Maintenance engineering backlog and overtime were low. Turnover was low and manning appeared appropriate.
Enhanced cross training plans should provide additional abilities to increase plant support for long-range goals.
l 1.2.2 Reactor Engineering Reactor Engineering consisted of a group located in Dallas, Texas, and an onsite group. The functions of these groups included fuel management, reload design, thermal hydraulics analysis, integrated risk, modeling, severe accident management, radiation analysis, safety analysis, and probabilistic risk assessment. They support all areas of reactor engineering technology and represent the licensee in industry groups dealing with nuclear fuel or reactor safety.
The team found this group to be very strong technically. The licensee performed their own reload analysis with exception of the mechanical analysis
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performed by the fuel vendor. They have NRC approved topicals for performing reload analysis with the exception of their main steam line break which is
pending final NRC approval, but is not required for restart of Unit 1.
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Applications of probabilistic risk assessment to plant operation: was still under review. A risk assessment was performed to determine outage risks.
1.2.3 ONE Forms and Technical Evaluations Engineering's major functions to support plant operation included the review and disposition of ONE Forms, which document potential adverse conditions in the plant. This also included the review and evaluation of technical evaluations, which provide the means for requesting and documenting technical information, evaluation or assistance within an organization, from one organization to another, or from unit to unit.
The team reviewed 22 ONE forms and 19 technical evaluations. The team found the engineering evaluations and responses in general, to have been well written. One example of a poorly written evaluation was Technical Evaluation 93-1725 related to repeated maintenance on a leaking flange.
The o-ring that sealed the flange was subsequently found to have been damaged during replacement. The technical evaluation concluded that repetitive
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maintenance was not considered abnormal and that no further investigation was required. The licensee expressed to the team that they did not consider l
repeat maintenance to be normal.
Instead, the licensee provided revised
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wording to the team that stated this repetitive maintenance activity was not i
indicative of a generic procedure, equipment, or parts problem.
i The team noted that in some instances system engineers may be required to
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answer technical evaluations outside of their discipline. The system i
engineers may have the assistance of an engineer in the subject discipline, but it is at the system engineer's discretion. The team recognized that
technical evaluations were not considered quality documents by the licensee
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l and, therefore, did not require the detail and auditability of quality
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documents. During the inspection, the Manager of Technical Support and Design (
Engineering showed the team a draft memorandum to all engineering personnel
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reemphasizing the need to ensure that quality information is not transmitted t
by technical evaluations and that ONE Forms are required for quality-related
issues.
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i 1.2.4 Engineering Initiatives
i 1.2.4.1 Personnel Error Reduction Beginning in 1992, the licensee established a personnel error reduction
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program. The program involved setting goals for personnel error reduction, a j
monitoring program to track and trend errors, and various programmatic l
initiatives to help in achieving the goals.
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In April 1993, the Vice Presidents of Nuclear Engineering and Nuclear
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Operations and the Director, Nuclear Overview, jointly issued a document i
entitled, " Performance Enhancement Program for CPSES-White Paper," in which a detailed description was provided of the efforts aimed at personnel error i
reduction.
In June 1993, the Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, issued a i
paper providing an explanation of how to apply the "seven steps of self-i verification" process to engineering work.
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All engineering personnel have received. training on the objectives of the j
program and have viewed a 45-minute videotape entitled " Performance Enhancement: All in a Days Work." The video was produced by the licensee and reenacts three actual mistakes that were made in the plant.
Interviews of the people involved in the incidents are included along with a talk with a psychologist.
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According to the licensee's trending program, the 1993 goals established for personnel errors in Engineering were being met as of September 1993. The significant error rate per 10,000 man-hours was 0.018 versus a goal of 0.109 and the total error rate was 1.68 versus a goal of 2.48.
The team interviewed the designated engineering contact for this program, reviewed the written material referenced above, and viewed the videotape.
The team concluded that the efforts being made by the engineering department to reduce personnel errors were earnest and effective.
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l.2.4.2 Design Modification / Minor Modification Task Force The team noted that the licensee had formed a task team to evaluate the findings of Temporary Modification Program Task Team as they related to the design modification and minor modification programs. The team reviewed the findings of the Design Modification / Minor Modification Task Team and found that the licensee had identified some areas where improvement could be made.
The team considered that management initiation of the task team to have been a
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proactive action.
1.2.4.3 Vendor and Industry Technical Information
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The team reviewed the program for processing vendor technical information at CPSES.
The program was described in Procedure No. STA-206, " Review of Vendor
Documents and Vendor Technical Manuals," Revision 18, dated October 8,1993.
The purpose of the procedure was to establish guidelines for the review, control, and disposition of vendor technical documents related to equipment, correspondence and vendon technical manuals. An additional part of the vendor i
and industry technical information program is an 18-month vendor contact program. The vendors are contacted to ensure that the vendor technical manuals are maintained current at CPSES.
In December 1992, the vendor equipment technical information program was reorganized to report to the procurement engineering department. At that time there were approximately 2000 vendor documents in the backlog. A task team was assembled to review the vendor and industry technical information program.
Some of the items affected by the task team were as follows:
backlog was reduced to less than 500 items; a vendor document review priority system was established; tracking of vendor document reviews by computer was initiated; screening of all new vendor documents to determine review requirements, responsible organization, and priorities was established; a revision to Program Procedure STA-206, which was effective October 8, 1993, was made to simplify the steps required to process a document; and a revised vendor document review traveller form was generated which included a requested completion date and reason that the vendor document had to be reviewed.
The team concluded that the vendor document program had undergone some major improvements in the processing and tracking of vendor correspondence.
Since many of these changes were effective on October 8, 1993, which is the effective date of the revision to Procedure STA-206, the team could not make a conclusion concerning the effectiveness of the procedure.
The team reviewed a number of the licensee's permanent record files for vendor documentation in order to assess the licensee's evaluations and applicable actions.
The team reviewed the following vendor documents:
VL-10017 Cleaning, Examination and Testing Procedures, ASME Section III Cooling Coils; VL-10421 Letter Dated June 25, 1992 on CVCS Boration Requirement; VL-10901 RCP Internals Replacement;
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VL-12478 Service Information Memo Exhaust Manifold to Cylinder-
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Head Bolts; VL-12994 Reactor Coolant Pump Standpipe Level Switch; VL-14183 Elgar 10kV ECN Manual; I
VL-15815 Quality Assurance Notice.Sorrento Electronics; and VL-16706 Installation Parts and Service Product Upgrade-l Recommendation.
l The inspectors concluded that the licensee had appropriately documented their review of each of the documents in the vendor and industry technical-information program.
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The team reviewed the nuclear licensing department's Procedure TNL-4.01-1,
" Incoming Correspondence," Revision 3,-dated October. 27, 1989. The purpose of l
the procedure was to assign responsibility ~ for ~ control and dispositioning of i
regulatory or industry correspondence and to' provide the method for _ tracking i
actions resulting from the correspondence. The-team considered-the procedure i
to have sufficient detail to properly handle regulatory and industry
correspondence.
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The team reviewed a number of the licensee's permanent record files for NRC
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information notices in order to assess the licensee's evaluations and i
applicable actions. The team reviewed Information Notices 91-62, 91-82,
~j 91-85, and 92-60.
In'all cases it appeared that the licensee had performed a i
thorough review and had taken appropriate corrective action.
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The team concluded that the licensee had appropriately ~ documented their review of each of the documents and had sufficiently detailed procedures.to properly handle regulatory and industry correspondence.
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L 1.2.4.4 Process Improvement Teams
The team reviewed the results of the licensee's. Engineering' Process Improvement Project, which was initiated.in the spring of 1993. The purpose
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of this project was to identify and evaluate processes for inefficiencies and
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improvement possibilities. The licensee distributed. to all-engineering personnel a questionnaire asking what business processes / procedures needed (
improvement.
Engineering management selected from the responses 113 areas designated as " quick hitters." The selection criteria for " quick hitters" were those generally low in complexity, changes having relatively high impact, and those having a high probability of success.
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l Process Improvement Teams were established to investigate each of:the 13 l
" quick hitters." Each improvement team consisted of a team leader and team members which included representatives from the work groups that could be affected by the change process. The improvement team analyzed-the ' current
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process, redesigned the process, and performed a cost / benefit analysis. After I
concurrence was received from those members that would be affected by the i
change the team developed a plan. The plan was then implemented after
management concurrence.
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The team reviewed three of the final reports. Those were on the vendor
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technical information program, reduction of waste disposal costs, and business i
process interactions with the master equipment list. Most of the other-
improvement processes were in varying stages of completion. Thus, it was not possible to assess the impact these improvements had. However, a review of l
the three completed reports indicated'a considerable amount of effort expended
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to improve those processes.
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1.2.4.5 Fuse Control
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t The team reviewed engineering's role in the fuse control program and found-
that the licensee had prepared Design Basis Documents DBD-EE-051, " Protection
Philosophy," DBD-EE-053, " Starter Control Circuit Parameter Requirements," and l
DBD-EE-054, " Control Circuit Parameters / Loading Requirements," to provide the j
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requirements for sizing and selecting protection devices for starter and
control circuits. The team also noted that the licensee had initiated a
program to review: device level one line drawings for the 125VDC,118VAC, and
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120VAC power distribution and control circuits; motor control center drawings j
for starter control circuits; switchgear drawings for potential transformer i
circuits; fuse / breaker bill of material drawings for the size, type, and
manufacturer details for fuses; and vendor design documents. The team was
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informed that all reviews had been completed except for the Unit 1480VAC motor control-centers, which were scheduled to be completed by the end of 1993. The program did not include vendor skids; however, the team was informed that fuses on vendor skids would be evaluated and documented when replacement was required.
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The team did note a weakness in the program that could_ permit multiple i
replacements of a fuse without the issuance of a work order. The team found that fuse replacement by operators was permitted for.the first time a fuse bl ew.
The replacement was to be annotated on the operator logs, however, elapsed time between the operation of the component could permit the replacement of the fuse the next time the component was operated without the
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operator knowing of the previous replacement.
l The team considered the overall actions taken by the licensee for the control i
of fuses to have been very good. The identification of fuses on drawings with reference to the fuse type and manufacturer as well as the size was considered to be a very excellent practice.
j 1.2.5 Audits and Assessments Audits and assessments of engineering activities are performed by the CPSES
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Nuclear Overview Department (N0D). The N0D organization consisted of quality assurance (QA), the independent safety engineering group (ISEG), quality control (QC), and plant analysis.
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The team observed that there were approximately seven audits performed by QA which related to engineering so far in 1993. The inspectors reviewed Audit
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Report QAA-93-ll6, "CPSES Design Control Program."
The overall conclusion was that the audit demonstrated the adequacy of the CPSES Design Control i
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Program and its implementation for dual unit operation. Six of the eight deficiencies were corrected prior to the completion of the audit and, for the
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remaining two, ONE Forms were issued. The two ONE Forms related to completion
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of site procedures to reflect the reorganization of engineering in December
1992 for dual plant operations. One observation was made related to the time
for completion of related work packages long after completed field work is d
declared operable. ' A reply to this observation was requested. The team observed that the findings of this audit appeared to be objective and that use'
of the ONE Forms in response to audit deficiencies was an effective means for Closure, j
l There were two functional assessments performed by ISEG with regard to instrument air and service water _in 1993. The team reviewed the service water
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operational assessment which was documented in Report No. lAR 93-14.
There
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were four team members, one from each group in the Nuclear Overview
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Department. The assessment approach was patterned after the NRC Temporary
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Instruction TI 2515/118 for performance of a service water operational l
performance inspection. The overall conclusion of the assessment was that the l
service water system was satisfactory and that the' system _was being operated, maintained, and tested in a condition to fulfill its system safety function.
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The assessment resulted in three recommendations which required responses from
system engineering and maintenance.
There were 12 improvement items
identified for management consideration which required no response. The
findings of the assessment appeared to be objective and professional.
Although this assessment only utilized personnel from all four groups within
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the N00, the team observed that outside personnel can be utilized to broaden
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the expertise of an assessment group at managements discretion. The ISEG also issued field notes on their periodic observations of different areas related to engineering.
l The inspectors found that NOD issued a monthly overall assessment of plant I
performance. The assessment covered each of the four NRC systematic
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assessment of licensee performance areas. The assessments were based on such activities as audits, assessments, surveillances, inspections, reviews, trending, and other information through N0D's involvement in meetings and task efforts.
In addition to the N0D activities, Technical Support and Design Engineering has established an Engineering Assurance Coordinator position. The coordinator, as one of his duties, conducts continuing reviews'of design changes and change notices to determine error rates. The team found that weekly engineering quality accountability memorandum were issued. The team observed from the review of memorandum that meetings were conducted every Thursday to review such issues as design changes and hardware / paper change error rates, performance enhancement data, adequacy of 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, programmatic ONE Forms and procedure reviews.
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The team concluded that the overview of engineering activities at CPSES, including the engineering assurance function, was a strength.
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1.2.6 Configuration Management I
The team reviewed the licensee's process for reflecting design changes' into plant drawings. The controlling procedure for design drawings was Engineering i
Procedure ECE 5.05, " Design drawings," Revision 3.
This procedure established
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the responsibilities and requirements for the preparation, review, approval, and revision of design drawings.
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The design change notice was the fundamental document for the control of
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design changes. The design change process was defined under Engineering
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Procedure ECE 5.01-03, " Design Change Notices and Related Process
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j Documentation," Revision 4.
The design change notice documented all the
drawings affected by the design change.
The procedure required that if the affected drawing had a temporary modification outstanding against it, the
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applicable system engineer should be contacted to determine impact. After revision, the responsible engineer reviewed the drawing to ensure that it was prepared in accordance with the procedure and instructions and that it was technically accurate. The drawing proceeded to-an engineering verifier and a review by the supervising engineer. After all reviews and approvals were completed, the design drawing was transmitted to the Document Control Center for processing and distribution. The team reviewed selected control room vital drawings and found that the latest revision was in place.
1.2.7 Design Basis Document Program The licensee initiated a design basis document (DBD) program in 1984. The DBDs created in that effort were multipurpose design documents that included
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design criteria and bases, design inputs, system descriptions, and a roadmap
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to other design and licensing information. Though this initial effort was performed by contractors, the licensee's design engineering organization now maintains the DBDs.
l At the time of this inspection,137 DBDs had been issued, including 82 system DBDs (e.g., Safety Injection System) and 55 programmatic DBDs (e.g., Seismic Qualification of Equipment).
Five additional DBDs were planned for development.
A DBD upgrade program was scheduled to be completed in August 1994. This i
program included transferring the DBDs into a word processor format, a review for technical content and commitments, and a closeout of the resulting open items.
The licensee stated that revisions to DBDs could be more efficiently handled once the system was computerized.
Based on interviews with the individual in charge of the DBD program and design engineers who regularly use these documents, the team concluded that the licensee had established an excellent DBD program. This program was considered a strength in the engineering area.
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1.2.8 Support and Interface Activitie;
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Several enginearing interface and support activities were noted. Attendance of the plan of the day meetings provided short-term support needs and established priority support needs. Duty system engineers provided a direct point-of-contrct to engineering for operations and maintenance. Attendance at
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the mornino
.tus meetings provided daily plant status, priorities, a 1
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emergent.
Work week look-ahead meetings provided a review of planned
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tification of restraints. Tha ONE Form committee provided for review of new ONE Forms, assessment of operability, reportability, and the assignment of the disposition responsibility.
Task team participation provided multi-discipline team evaluation of plant events and issues. The plant and design modification review groups, and the station operations review committees provide multi-discipline evaluations and reviews, establishment of priorities and coordination. At the weekly manager meeting, ONE Form status, task team efforts / status, and technical evaluation badhgs were reviewed.
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The team reviewed the plans for engineering support of the Unit I refueling outage that started during the inspection period. The team found that system engineering went into a shift rotation corresponding to the plant operators to provide 24-hour coverage 7-days a week. Maintenance Engineering provided 24-hour coverage Monday through Friday, and Design Engineering was on 10-hour shifts to provide at least 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of coverage 7 days a week.
In addition to the outage coverage, the team noted that System Engineering provided a Duty Engineer to assist the operators during back shift hours.
i The team considered the support of the Engineering and Technical Support groups to have been excellent. The coverage was directed by licensee management to ensure engineering support when it was needed without adversely affecting the outage.
j 1.2.9 Walkdowns
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While walking down some of the plant design modifications, the team noted l
horizontally mounted pressure relief valves in the diesel generator rooms.
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The horizontal lube oil relief valves were mounieu un ile sudion side of the emergency diesel generator lube oil pumps. The relief valves discharged into i
the lube oil sump. The licensee stated that even if the valves failed and stuck open, the lube oil pumps would still receive sufficient oil for the
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engine since the relief valve line was small compared to the lube oil pump suction line and discharged below the suction line elevation.
In addition to
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finding the horizontal relief valves, while in Emergency Diesel Generator 2-01 room, the team noted that between the generator and the turbine there was some i
oil pooling and dirty rags on the floor.
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During walkdowns, the team found a pressure relief valve with a gag installed.
The valve, Tag No. 2SB-01, was the downstream relief valve on the steam generator blowdown heat exchanger. There was no tag on the valve to indicate that the valve was gagged and would not open. However, there was a work request tag, WR 163066, which stated that the valve lifts early. The licensee indicated that the valve was not safety-related, however, there was a human safety concern if the pipe failed due to overpressure that the relief valve i
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It was not apparent that the affect of steam on the surrounding equipment or need for other compensatory measures had been considered. The licensee stated that the work request had been written to gag the valve since the valve was lifting early, but no evaluation had been performed. During the exit, the licensee stated that a ONE Form was being prepared to evaluate the gagged relief valve. The licensee's controls over gagged relief valves will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(Inspection Followup Item 50-445;446/9335-01).
1.2.10 Conclusions Design, system, and maintenance engineers all appeared to possess
high morale and good team spirit.
The experience level of the engineering staff was considered a
significant strength.
The establishment of a shift duty system engineer, who provided a
continuous onsite system engineering presence, was considered a strength.
The interfaces among design engineering, system engineering, and
operations appeared to be very strong.
The efforts being made by the engineering department's personnel
error reduction program to reduce personnel errors were earnest and effective.
The initiation of the design modification / minor modification task
l force was considered a proactive action for licensea management to
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have taken.
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The vendor technical information program had undergone some major
improvements in the processing and tracking of vendor correspondence
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since December 1992.
The results of the licensee's process improvement team program were
in varying stages of completion.
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The overall actions taker, by the licensee for the control of fuses
was considered to be ve-"
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The licensee's design 1str eocument program was considered to be
l excellent. This prog.
,tes considered a strength in the engineering area.
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The support of the engineering and technical support groups for the
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Unit I refueling outage was considered to be excellent.
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The support of the engineering and technical support groups for the
Unit I refueling outage was considered to be excellent.
The team noted that a relief valve on the steam generator blowdown
line had been gagged using a work request.
It was the team's observation that a work request does not provide for evaluation of the consequences of installing the gag.
The overview of engineering activities s'
CPSES including the
engineering assurance function was a str.s eth.
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ATTACHMENT-1
1 PERSONS CONTACTED l
1.1 Licensee Personnel t
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K. Abbamonte, Senior Engineer, Environmental / Site Facilities Engineering
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I. Ahmad, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering t
- J Baker, Manager ISEG j
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C. Beckett, Principal Engineer, NSSS and HVAC Systems-
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P. Bell, Senior Engineer, Electrical Engineering
T. Bennett, Senior Engineer, Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Engineering j
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- M. Blevins, Director of Nuclear Overview l
R. Burns, Principle Engineer, Civil / Structural / CAD Engineering
- W. Cahill, Group Vice President-
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D. Carlsen, Senior Engineer, Electrical Engineering i
J. Chance, Associate' Engineer, Environmental / Site Facilities Engineering
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S. Chowdhury, Associate Engineer, I&C Engineering-
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H. Crockett, Senior Engineer, Codes and Standards
M. Cunningham, Senior Engineer, Balance of Plant Systems -
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M. Dempsey, Senior Designer, Electri. cal Design E. Evans, Supervisor, I&C Engineering-J. Finneran, Manager, Civil / Environmental / Site Facilities Engineering t
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- W. Guldemond, Manager, System Engineering H. Haby, Supervisor, Balance of Plant, Systems Engineering
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T. Hammons, Senior Engineer,. Codes and Standards i
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B. Henley, Senior Engineer, Civil / Structural / CAD Engineering l
- T. Hope, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
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D. Hopkins, Senior Engineer, Mechanical Equipment
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P. Howrey, Supervisor, Electrical Design.
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R. Jackson, Senior Engineer, I&C Engineering i
J. Kelley, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support i
S. Lakdawala, Supervisor, Civil / Piping Engineering j
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- J. LaMarca, Engineering Outage Coordinator
. i F. Madden, Manager, Mechanical Engineer F. Maddy, Systems Engineer R. Mays, Supervisor, Codes and Standards
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- D. McAfee, Nuclear Overview Manager G. McGee, In-Service Testing Coordinator
- G. Merka, Licensing Engineer J. Meyer, Supervisor, NSSS and HVAC Systems H. Meyers, Welding Program Coordinator, Codes and Standards E. Morales, Senior Engineer, Civil / Piping Engineering
- J. Muffett, Manager, Technical Support and Design Engineering
- D. Palmer, Event Analysis Manager T. Parker, Senior Engineer, Systems Engineering P. Passalugo, Supervisor, Civil / Structural / CAD Engineering D. Patankar, Senior Engineer, Civil / Piping Engineering F. Powers, Manager, Procurement Engineering M. Quick, Engineer, Systems Engineering J. Reyes, Associate Engineer, Balance of Plant Systems
- M. Riggs, Project Manager R. Smith, Supervisor, Electrical /I&C Systems Engineering j
M. Sunseri, Manager, Maintenance Engineering q
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l R. Smith, Supervisor, Electrical /I&C Systems Engineering
M. Sunseri, Manager, Maintenance Engineering l
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- C. Terry, Vice President Operations
T. Terryah, Senior Engineering Analyst, Civil / Piping Engineering i
S. Ward, Nuclear Electrical Design Engineer, Electrical Engineering
W. Williams, Senior Engineer, NSSS and HVAC Systems-
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- L. Yeager, Engineering Assurance Coordinator
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D. Walling, Manager, Electrical /I&C Engineering i
i 1.2 NRC Personnel i
- D. Graves, Senior Resident Inspector
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K. Kennedy, Resident Inspector
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G. Werner, Resident Inspector
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In addition to the personnel listed above, the majority of whom were-
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interviewed, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection
[
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l
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
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2 EXIT MEETING i
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An exit meeting was conducted on October 22, 1993.
During this meeting,'the l
l team reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did 'not
l express a position on the inspection findings documented in this report.
!
Although proprietary information was reviewed, no proprietary information is
!
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contained in the report.
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INSPECTION FINDINGS INDEX i
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