IR 05000445/1990036
| ML20059K350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1990 |
| From: | Stetka T, Wagner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059K341 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-90-36, 50-446-90-36, NUDOCS 9009210264 | |
| Download: ML20059K350 (14) | |
Text
_
_
-_
_
.
__
_
_
_
_
__
.
.-
,
,
.
,
APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/90-36 Operating License:
NPF-87 l
50-446/90-36 Construction Permit: CPPR-127
,
t Dockets: 50-445-50-446 I
Licensee: TU Electric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive, L;B. 81 Dallas. Texas.75201 Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric station (CPSES)
Inspection At: CPSES, Glen Rose Texas Inspection Conducted: August 20-24, 1990 Inspector:
~
_ 9/#/9e
'
P. C.' Wagner, Reactor Inspector, Plant Systems Date '
Section, Division of Reactor. Safety Approved:
/
9/4/90
'
T. F. Stetka, Chief, Plant Systems Section.
Date
>
l Division of Reactor Safety
!
Inspection Summary
-
,
'
Inspection Conducted August 20-?4. 1990 (Report 50-445/90-36: 50-446/90-36)
Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's program for Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE), and the-licensee's implementation of a system to mitigate an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS).
-
Results: Withi.i the areas inspected, two violations were identified. The first violation involved the inadequate controls to ensure the ability of-the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry ()AMSAC) system to fulfill the intent
>
of 10 CFR Part 50.62 - see paragraph 3.3(14. The second violation involved-the failure to follow the procedural requirements related to the issuance _of H&TE - see paragraph 2.2.
,
5h009210264 900917 PDR ADOCK 05000445
Q PDC
-
-
..
.. _
..
_. _
_.
..-
.-
.
.
-2-The inspector determined that the licensee had established a good H&TE program and that the involved personnel were both diligent and enthusiastic in maintaining a quality program. The inspector found the licensee's MATE calibration facility to be impressive.
The inspector determined that the AMSAC system met the licensee's comitments to the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.62. However, the inspector determined that acceptable administrative controls were not established to ensure that the system was properly operated.
The inspector noted two instances of inadequate controls in addition to the two items discussed above. The inspector noted that the M&TE organization was frequently required to initiate condition identifications-in order to induce craft personnel to return equipment for overdue calibrations. The inspector also noted that AMSAC calibration procedure steps, which were not performed and were marked "N/A." were apparently reviewed and _found to be acceptable without
_
performing an evaluation of the potential consequences of excluding those actions.
Licensee personnel were cooperative during the inspection and appeared to be o
receptive-to the inspector's concerns.
l
.
j
- l
.
.
_
_ _ _ _..._-
_.
_.
_
i
.
..
]
-.
-3~
i DETAILS
'
1.
PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 TU Electric Peronnel
- R. Adams,InstrumentandControls(I&C)EngineeringSupervisor
- J. Amin, IAC' Supervisor i
- 0. Bhatty,-Issue Interface Coordinator
- W. Cahill, Executive Vice President R. Flores, Station Operations Manager R. Green, Maintenance and Test' Equipment Supervisor j
- T. Hopse, Site Licensing Engineer J
- J. LaMarca, Manager, Electrical and 18C
)
- G. Laughlin, I&C Manager
-
- J. Muffett, Manager of Project Engineering
- S. Palmer, Stipulation Manager
.
I
- J. Rodriguez, Licensing Engineer
- A. Scott, Vice President of Nuclear Operations-
- P. Stevens, Manager, Electrical Engineering
- J. Streeter, Executive Assistant
- M. Syed, Senior Engineer.
- R. Towery, Senior Specialist, Quality Assurance
'
- R. Walker, Manager of Nuclear Licensing
- J. Waters, Licensing Engineer J
A. Upback, M&TE Calibration Laboratory Supervisor j
1.2 CASE Personnel
,
.
'
- H.;Phillips, Consultant
- 0. Thero, Consultant
-
1.3 Other NRC Personnel
- D. Chamberlain, Chief,ProjectSectionB,DivisionofReactorProjects(DRP),
Region IV-
.
- A. Howell, III, Resident Inspector, CPSES.
- J. Johnson, Acting Deputy Director, DRP, Region IV l
The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the
inspection, j
- Denotes those persons present at the August 24, 1990, exit interview, 2.
MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT - UNITS 1 AND 2 (35750)'
The inspector evaluated the licensee's program for the control of measuring and test equipment-(M&TE) to ascertain if regulatory requirements and consnitments
,
,
.
r
.
-
-
__
!
L
'
,
,
I
!
o
.
I-4-f
were being fulfilled. The inspector also evaluated the usage, storage and
!
calibration of selected H&TE.
- 2.1 M&TE Program The inspector verified that the Station Administration Manual's Procedure,
!
.STA-608, " Control of Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision 14 dated July 28,
,
1989, incorporated all of the comi%ents that were discussed in Section 17.2.12-i of the CPSES Firal Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The inspector noted that
STA-608 contained both accuracy requirements for utilizing M&TE and accuracy
'
requirements'for standards used to calibrate the M&TE. The procedure also i
j contained other controls for the issuance and usage of M&TE.
l The inspector noted that STA-608 required the M&TE user to be trained
appropriately and to verify the proper range,. type, accuracy, and calibration status of the device prior,to its-use. The procedure-furtner required the user to return the M&TE to the issue facility by.the end of each shift. M&TE could.
(
be retained past the shift if it was in use, provided it was retained beyond its calibration due date. The inspector questioned the implementation of ?. hose requirements in light of the existence of numerous condition identification and
,
evaluation documents ("0NE Forms"), which described overdr4 calibrations for.
t M&TE that had not been returned to the issue facility.
In response.to-this
'
concern.. the inspector was provioed a copy of Analysis of Repetitive.
Concerns (ARC) Sumary, ARC 90-05-01 dated May 31, 1990. This ARC discassed the failure to return M&TE for calibration and indicated that the subject had been discussed at the Quality Assurance Overview Committee meating on June 20, 1990. The ARC remained open for further monitoring by licensee personnel..
2.2 MATE Component Evaluations
.
The inspector selected 11 items of M&TE from the licensee's Master List for
-
I detailed review. The selected M&TE is listed in Table 1.
The inspector evalua^.ed the storage areas, the calibration procedures, and the calibration records for the selected M&TE.
The inspector found the issue facility and the calibration laboratory to be.
clean and organized and to have the temperature and humidity monitored..Tle inspector also noted that appropriate limitations on the usage of the reviswed'
H&TE were displayed on the " limited use" tags that were affixed to the. devices.
,
'
The inspector verified the location of the selected RJE with one exception; i
two items were stored at the issue facility, two items had been issued and
!
I issue documentation was available, three items were stored at the calibration laboratory for use as standards, and three items had been retired to the.
storeroom. The issue facility had no record of the issuance of one digital nultimeter, IC-1881. The instrument was, however, located in the Unit 1 cable spreading room where it was being utilized by the Performance and Test Group.
The instrument was apparently taken directly into the plant following its initial onsite calibration without complying with the STA-608 controls for the issuance of M&TE.
t
.
.
-
. -,
~
- -.
.
p
--~ ~
-
--
-
--
-
,-
- - - -
,
y
,;
,.
,
,
e-5--
l
'
3-c Whenthisproblemwasbroughttothelicensee'sattention-a'ONEForm(FX90-2074 dated August 22,1990) was initiated and the proper M&TE issuance forms were!
,
J
' completed.1 The inspector. verified that the multimeter was in calibration..This-t L,
finding was considered to be an apparent-violation in'which appropriate correctivej l,
action was initiated prior to the end of the inspection._ Since this appeared to.
'
r-
.be an isolated occurrence in an o m rwise controlled process,.theLenforcement _
discretion of Section Y.A. of the NHC's Enforcement Policy has been met.' Therefore
'
+
-
no' Notice of: Violation.is being~ issued for'this violation of Procedure STA-608.
!-
TABLE 1
.SE.LECTED H&TE-w Numbq
. Description l-EM-0472-
-Crimp Height'Comparator
,
!
10-0166
> Resistor
1c4186 Hydraulic Deadweight Tester
,
l 1C-0316 Angle. Gage Block Set
!
IC-1336 Decade Resistance Box
'
10-1401 Digital Thermometer 10-1881 Multimeter
.
.IC-2108 Flowmeter
[
10-4135 Crimping Tool
"
e,
,
10-8115 Dial. Caliper i
g o
MR-1062 AC Anneter q
,
2.3 M&TE Calibration
,
i i
The inspector reviewed the calibration procedures and the completed Master. Data Sheets (MDS) for the selected H&TE to verify that proper calibrations were being performed at acceptable intervals. The procedures are listedsin7the Attachment.
The inspector noted that M&TE records were stored in fire resistant: cabinets-
.
-
and.made the following observations during the review of'the-M&TE(calibration files:-
.
i
'
'
<
ine calibration of the standard 0.1 ohm resistor (IC-0166)S co$tained a.
'
e L
correction factor that had been rovided by. the National Institute of; Standards and Technology (NIST) - (former1 the National Bureau of. Standards). [The correction factor was required to conform the.U.S. legal units offresistanceito
'
theInternationalSystemofUnits(SI). The inspector also noted;that the=
resistor had. earlier been calibration checked by the NIST-andlthel results
<
'
reviewed by the-licensee. Since this resistor was a standard'(i.e'.',f used asna
-
reference to calibrate other components) its calibration 1was verif,1ed on a.
one-to-one ratto (1:1) as allond by STA-608.
m
'
Thecalibrationprocedure(INC-6500)for-thedeadweighttesterJ(IC-0186);
'
contained precautions to allow the temperature and pressure:to stabilize-
-l
following increases in test' pressure which cause compressiond and thus heating, i
'of the fiuid being utilized during the test. The inspector foundathese, types F
=of precautions to be a strength of the N&TE program.
t
.i
,
l'
'
.
m
-.
..
+, _ _.
.
o
/
,
.
.
.
-
-
.
-
---
-
-.
_
'
..
.c.
'
.
y 6--
a
,
The voltage source utilized'to calibrate the digital multimets OL 4 11
'r
- listed.an accuracy.of 450 microvolts on the 0-100 VDC scale. Since th.,
-tolerance of the multimeter on the 0-100 YDC scale was 5.0'mi111 volts, the-t, source was over ten times!more-accurate and, therefore, far exceeded the.
. required 4:1-accuracy requirement.
(In cases where the 4:1 accuracy could not
.
!
.bemet,STA-608allowedanevaluationandapprovalprocess.)
'The inspector:noted that some M&TE was sent-to outside sources for; calibration.
~
.The calibration of the angle gage block set (10-0316) was checked-by the NIST.
.
and found acceptable.. The licensee' reviewed and approved the calibration data provided.by HIST for.the gage blocks prior-to their-uselat CPSES. This process.
fulfilled the requirements of STA-608.-
'
'
2.4' M&TE Audits
[
r
The, inspector reviewed the'QA. Audit Reports for the 1989 and 1990 audits of M&TE.:The1989 audit (TUG-89-15)wasconducted)inJune1989,:andthe, report i
documented;three' deficiencies: M&TE storage enyironmental control'.. control,and,!,
$'
use of M&TE, and use of. teflon. tape in the metrology laboratory..These; three; deficiencies were closed as documented in TU Electric memorandum QIA-9288fdated a
,
.'
October 23, 1989. The 1nspector found the resolution of:the specific inues sto. '
be-accepte.ble.
s The'11atest QA audit (QAAl-90-027) was conducted from June 18 through~ July 20
~
1990., This audit evaluated the adequacy and effectiveness ofs.the Integrated Maintenance Program and contained the M&TE and I&C' activities of seven different functional groups. The audit concluded that the H&TE area was satisfactory but noted some minor discrepancies. The audit found the new M&TE calibration'-
procedures to have improved job performance but observed that the older -
'
. general procedures lacked sufficient performance detail'.
,q Since the 1990 audit' report was not issued until August 17, 1990, responses and'
resolutions for the identified issues had not, as yet, been developed;
,
,
2.5 Conclusions-q Notwithstanding the two problems involving the implementation of Procedure STA-608.
discussed in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 above, the inspector found the M&TE program to be acceptabic. The inspector noted that the procedural ~ violations were the-result of the persons using the M&TE not fulfilling their-responsibilities.
The personnel involved in the issuance, maintenance and calibrationlof the M&TE.
U all appeared to be skilled, diligent and responsive to a quality program.:. The-inspector also found the calibration facility'to be impressive.
3. 'ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM - UNIT 1-(25020)
3.1 ' Background On July 26, 1984, 10 CFR was amended to include Part 50.62, " Requirements for.
Reduction of Risk From Anticipated Transients' Without Scram (ATWS) Events for i
i
..
.
..
w-e
-
.
w.,
,
..
,
-
'
,
'
.-7-L".ght-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." The requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.62 apply to all commercial light-water-cooled nuclear power plants.
Paragraph = (c)(1) of 10 CFR Part 50.62 specified the basic ATWS mitigation system
'
requirements for pressurized water reactor-plants. Equipment, diverse from the'
Reactor Protection System (RPS), was required to initiate' the; auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system and initiate a turbine-trip,for ATWS events.
In response to 10 CFR Part 50.62(c)(1)', the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) developed a set of; conceptual ATWS mitigation. system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) designs generic to the various Westinghouse plants. These were issued on' July 25, 1985, by the WOG.for staff review in Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-10858,
'AMSAC Generic Design Package." The staff, by letter dated July 7, 1986, found
- I the generic' designs of WCAP-10858 adequate to meet 10 CFR Part 50.62.
As stated in 10 CFR PartL50.62, the' required systems and equipment do not have to meet all of the stringent requirements normally applied to safety-related equipment., However, the required equipment should be of sufficient quality and=
reliability to perform its intended function while minimizing the potential for transients that could challenge the safety ' systems. Guidance for system requirements was provided in NRC letter, " Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment That Is Not Safety Related" (Generic Letter 85-06) dated April.'16,
'1985.
'
~
'
Inaccordancewithparagraph(c)(6)of10CFR'Part50.62,thellicenseeprovided d
- F plant-specific.information by letter dated October 9, 1987. Theiletter
,
forwarded the detailed design description of, the ATWS mitigating. system
..
actuation circuitry proposed for installation at'CPSES. The licensee elected
.
to implement the AMSAC design associated with monitoring the steam'
generator =(SG)waterlevelandactivatingt the AMSAC when the SG water level was below the low-low set point, i
~ Since many details and interfaces associated with thel implementation of-the i
c final AMSACidesign were of a plant-specific nature, in its July 7,1986 safety -
j evaluation of WCAP-10858, the staff identified 14 key elements that required.
! resolution for each plant design. A discussion'on the' licensee's compliance
,
j with respect to each of the plant-specific elements was included in
'
,
Supplement 22 of the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 22) dated January:1990.
'S ER'22 concluded that the licensee's commitments were acceptable and that-the
. implementation of those commitments would be the subject of: an onsite inspection.
'
3.2 'AMSAC Description
!
The AMSAC provides a diverse method to trip the main turbine and to initiate.
AFW system flow in the event of an ATWS. The AMSAC produces trip'and iinitiation signals when low levels (less than'28 percent) are present in 3=of the'4 SGs.. The AMSAC functions are inhibited below 40 percent power as sensed
.by both turbine first stage shell pressure transmitters. The AMSAC is a microprocessor based system which contains three actuation logic processors (ALPS),
i
.a test / maintenance processor, and two sets of eight output relays. The ALPS-l
L
-
-..- - -
-
.
._..__m
__.
,.
. _
..
.
.
.
'
' lc -
.
.
>
u
.
.
.
.,
..
.
i
-8-
- \\o
.
.
..
.
each monitor-all four SG 1evel and both turbine first stage pressure signals.-
-;
The ALPS provide the AMSAC actuation signals when two of the three ALPS sense-1 low level in three offthe four.SGs;with reactor power above 40 percent. The-J
.
test / maintenance processor provides internal self-testing capabilities.;
!!
,
i The output relay contactsiare wired in parallel with other actuation signals to-
,
produce the diverse actuation signals. The AMSAC-provides closure signals to the SG blowdown'and sample line valves in addition to a start signal for:both i
motor driven and the.turfine driven AFW pumps and a_ trip signal to'the main A
turbine.
3.3 AMSAC Design Inspectioni
~
The inspector evaluated each of. the 14 plant specific issues discussed'in-SSER 22.
.
(1) Diversity
!
TheinspectorverifiedthatStruthers-Dunn:pluginrelays(Model291XDX181NE)^
l had been installed as the output relays in the AMSAC cabinet. These relays
"
'
fulfilled the licensee's comitment.
.;
(2) Logic Power Supplies
'l l:
The inspector' verified that the AMSAC was powered through static
l uninterruptable power su) ply (SUPS);1V105.. Therefore, the-battery supply-to L
the SUPS should ensure t1at power would be available to:the AMSAC.during acloss
>
of offsite power. This'setisfies the licensee's' comitmer.t.-
(3) Safety-Related Interfaces
)
<
- "
~ The inspector verified that the SG 1evel inputs and the turbine pressure inputs :
to the AMSAC were isolated from> the reactor. protection system (RPS) through the '
a
-
use of isolation cards in the RPS. The, isolation of:the nonsafety-related.
.
AMSAC output signals ns accosiplished by the' output relays discussed above.
'
These designs were it accordance with the:11censee's1 commitments.
]
(4) Quality Assurance (QA)
j t
l
- The licensee committed to comply with the QA guidanc'e contained in. Generic
' '
Letter 85-06.- The' inspector reviewed the facility electrical erection specifications (ES-100) related to the installation of conduit (Section III),.
j electricalcables(SectionIV)and:electricalterminations(SectionV). The-J u
requirements for the AMSAC components were the'same as.those for Class 1E
.
equipment in each of these areas.
In addition,' Attachment 10 of Appendix D to l
L the CPSES QA Manual specified the compliance required for-the AMSAC system with
,
respect to each section of the QA manual. Therefore, the-inspector determined a
"
that the'11censee met the comitments for appropriate QA control for the H
installation of the' AMSAC' system. -
'
i
.
.
Y I
\\N r
l y..
'
n (
y
.
\\l
.
,
-
>
.
.
_...
_
_
.
.
,
.
. _ _-
_. _ _
'
V
,
a
.9
['
,
-.g.
e
,
(5) Nsintenance Bypass The inspector' verified that a bypass: switch was provided to inhibit the AMSAC-
-
system for test or maintenance purposes. The inspector further verified that'
the'"AMSAC Trouble" annunciator would be illuminated when, among)others, the--
-
switch was placed in the bypass position..(See item (14) below.
- (6)- Operating Bypasses
'
.
TheLinspector reviewed design drawings and verified the existence of..the.
-
automatic bypass.of the AMSAC signals below 40 percent reactor power..The
-
- AMSAC actuation signals' were inhibited by the "C- 0". interlock. The C-20
. interlock was activated by signals-f rom the. turbine' first stage chamber'
pressure when the pressure is equivalent to-40 percent' reactor. power.
-The, inspector also'v'erified the existence.of the C-20 permissive anns..icator on:
the reactor plant control panel.-
-
(7) Means of Bypass-Seeitems(5)and(6).-
"
-
(8) Manua1' Initiation.
,
SSER 22 stated that manual-initiation =of-the AMSAC was not necessary.
(9) Electrical Independence From-Existing:RPS See item ~(3). The inspector further? verified'that'the isolation devices were'
~
properly qualified for their expected environmental conditions.. These/
'
conditions fulfill the licensee's connitments; (10) - Physical Separation from Existing RPS.
,
.
L The inspector verified that:the AMSAC. components were physically sounted in.a y
cabinet separate from the RPS cabinets and that the AMSAC: electrical: cables were routed in conduits separate from the RPS' cables. These provisions' satisfy
"
-
.
the licensee conmitments.
- i (11) Environmental OualificationL i
,
L The' licensee committed to environmentally-qualify theLisolation dev' ices-
'
utilized by the AMSAC~ system.'. The-seismic qualification of those' devices were
. verified by the inspector. No other conditions of qualification were required.
because of the~ location of the equipment in the Control Room whichtis a mild j '
environment.-
'(12)'.TestabilityatPower-The AMSAC is fully testable'by placing the mo% switch to the bypass. position ~.
Although'not stated in-the licensee's letters dated October.9, 1987, and t
!
1 <
.
.
.
.
d-
-
.
-l
+
'
,
.
.
,
,
a
.
g, e-10-H
- .
,
-.
,
- February 16, 1988, SSER'22 stated that "these procedures will ensure thatithei d
AMSAC will be returned to service when testing is complete." This, however,
'
provedtobeanerroneous, assumption;_seeitem(14).
-(13)~CompletionofMitigativeAction?
I The inspector reviewed the.AMSAC, AFW pumps,;and turbine trip schematic.. -
Tiagrams. Efhe inspector verified that if an ANSAC signal were generated toa energize the output relays, that'the required actuations would occur even if=
.
the initiating signals were monetary and subsequently cleared. The inspector
" *
'.
'
furtherrverified that manual-actions woul.d.be required to restore the actuated -
components to their ' norma 1' conditions.- Therefore, the licensee's comitments -
}
!
were being. fulfilled.
t j
< (14) Technical Specifications (TS)
'
s
,
In the' October 9. 1987,< plant specific submittal, the-licensee stated, "TU-
]
Electric feels that Technical Specifications for AMSAC do not enhance the-
+
"
'
overall safety of the nuclear plant and constitute'a backfit. TU Electric also.
<
believes that normal nuclear administrative controls are sufficient to control-
AMSAC." The staff stated in SSER~22 that a review of the need for TS was being:
- conducted and that, if necessary, guidance would be provided at a later date.
No guidance has, ar yet, been provided and io TS conditions _ exist..- However,
the inspector questioned the adequacy of-the licensee's " normal nuclear 1 L
administrative controls." During a walkdown in the control room _on August 23,
~j 1990, the inspector noted-that the AMSAC trouble annunciator was illuminated with a--red'"X" through the window.- When asked, the shift supervisor responded that the alarm was disabled because it-had become a " nuisance alarm " Further
inspection determined that the mode switch was in the bypass position. _Having-o the mode switch in bypass disabled the-AMSAC system even though the reactor was;
operating.at full power.
I
-
.
The licensee subsequently informed the inspector, that records: indicated.that-
)
the AMSAC mode switch had been placed in bypass on August 10.1990 -during.the performanceofaSG~leveltransmitterca11brationprocedure.(INC-7326A). At'
-
the completion of the SG 1evel transmitter calibration, Procedure INC-7356A directed the technician to inform the reactor operator that the AMSA; mode switch could be returned to normal; Because the reactor was-shutdown at 'that time,the.AMSAC system was not required to be in service and the mode switch was not repositioned.
.! hen the reactor was later returned to power,-there
were no administrative controls to specifically require the AMSAC. system to be
returned to an operable condition.
!
Licensee personnel informed the inspector that;the mode switch was returned to normal and that changes to operating and testing procedures were being
considered to provide-more adequate control of the AMSAC system.
The failure to control the operation of the AMSAC system is considered to be
!
contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V which requires procedures to control plant activities and is considered to be a violation.
4
-
"
~
_
_
_
,
_,
'
I Y,ly3'
.
r
.
.
,
\\
-
lT
Violathn (445/9036-01): failure to have procedures to cor. trol the operation
~
.of the AM5AC system.
34-(MSACTestingandMaintenancez r
!
- The inspector performed additional evaluations of the AMSAC system testing arid.
j maintenance provisions'to ensure that applicable requirements and recommendations,
,
'were being implemented. The inspector _ reviewed the computer generated' activity:
j L
_ list for the AMSAC system and noted:that monthly self-diagnostic checks,.
-
h
-
l.
quarterly system tests, and an:18-month calibration were required in addition.
to the replacement _of the power supply capacitors every 5 years. The list;-
(
'
however, did not contain a requirement to replace the memory board batteries;as-a
- recomended in.the AMSAC Technical Manual. The inspector subsequently noted
'
that a requirement to: replace:these batteries was included as part of the'
.
AMSAC calibration procedure..
The'AMSACcalibrationprocedure(INC-4909A,'AMSACChannelCalibration, Revision 0,
= dated June 27L 1989) was reviewed and found to be acceptable. 'The inspector noted
'that most of the AMSAC tests were accomplished by the internal self-diagnostic
-
circuitry. The inspector also observed that the licensee did not perform a
.
complete end-to-end test of the AMSAC' system.
!
?SSER-22 had,lhowever, stated that the_ licensee wou'd: perform,"a complett i
"
end-to-end test of.the AMSAC system." LThe-inspector noted that thet AMSAC input
'
signals were calibrated as part~of the SG 1evel and turbine. pressure transmitter calibrations; that the AMSAC relay actuation circuitry was calibrated as part
~
of the AMSAC internal calibration; and that the AMSAC output' relay operations
>
were verified as a separate part;of the AMSACLealibration procedure.~ The
-
inspector. reviewed the licensee's. procedures and determined that'theiindividual'
,
- tests provided adequate assurance of system operability. The inspector further i
E determined that theclicensee's testing was in consonance with the TU Electric
-
AMSAC submittals: dated October 9,1987, and February 16, 1988.
s The inspector did not evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's combination of the<
-
individual tests and component accuracies to' ensure the overall acceptability of the' system setpoints; nor'did the inspector evaluate the scaling. factors utilized during component calibrations. These' areas willsbe evaluated as.part of the routine instrument calibration program inspections.-
~
!'
The inspector' reviewed the records of completed AMSAC system tests and calibrations.
The inspector noted that the provisions for replacing the AMSAC internal-batteries and the cabinet filters had been marked "N/A" on the data sheet for
the initial calibration of the system which had:been completed on December 6,
.
1989. The inspector, questioned 1the operating and shelf-life' times of the
batteries in order to make a determination of their continued operability. The-inspector was informed that the batteries had a shelf-life of 5 years and were installed:in June 1988.
In addition,' the inspector observed that the battery
' condition ~1ights were on in the AMSAC cabinet. -(A low battery condition would-
.
cause the battery light to be out and would also activate the AMSAC Trouble annunicator.) :The licensee initiated a Technical Evaluation form-
-
'
(TE No. IC90-2366) to document their evaluation of the batteries' condition j
.
.
. <
4i i
.
,
-
a
. -
-
-
.
, -
.
,,,
,.
... {in [{
-
,,
,t-
, 11 ct
.
g.
,.,
- '
.
,-
,
,
'
-12 1 r
'
'
.
following the' discussions with the inspector. 'The TE concluded thatLthe
~
battery replacement' as part anf _ the-initial calibraticn was.not required because
'
the calibration was satisfactory. While the inspector agreed with ~the licensee's,
'
conclusion on the acceptability of the installed batteries, he.found the
.
,
,
.~
licensee's documented. evaluation to lack technical de.ith.
'
'
3.5 ~ Conclusions-
.l
'
!-f
-The inspectorffound the1AMSAC sy' stem to be acceptable.in fulfilling 10 CFR-J
4
'
Part 50.62 requirementsiand:the= licensee's commitments. However, the inspectorc o
'
,
found-the licensee's controls'and operation of'the system to.be inadequate'+ A
'
>
.
,
violation was identified ~1n paragraph 3.3(14) related to maintaining the AMSAC.
system in operation when the-reactor:is operating. The inspector also-found.'
'
the licensee's evaluation:ofs battery replacement requirements; to' lack;the-
,
normally. expected depth'of: engineering considerations ~
.i
.
.
4.-
EXIT INTERVIEW:
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of-the inspection'during the'
.
~
d exit interview on August 24,11990,'with the personnel-identified in. paragraph:1.;
Although some proprietary! documents were reviewed.by the inspector, no proprietaryL
-
,
documents were removed from the facility, and no proprietary information ist
.
contained in this report.
As the result of subsequent discussions between the NRC and_ licensee personnel-on September _9,1990~, the licensee was' informed that the control' of-the AMSAC :
system is considered to be a violation.of 10 CFR Part:50, Appendix B,.
'
Criterion V.
,
l
,
!
i
..
s
.
.I c
,
'
>
e
%
. -
..
..
--
..
..
.
-..
'
+,
,
,
,
, _t i~ 9y
'
,
,
J
,
,
>.
,
.
'
-
,
_
-ATTACHMENTi LIST-OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
,
PROCEDURES Number Subject Revision:
D1te
=INC-4909A.
- Calibration of AMSAC-
'0 6/27/89l
}
INC-6210 Calibration of Fluke Thermometer 1-
.6/05/90; i
!
'INC-6435-Calibration of_ Standard Resistors 0-4/08/88 INC-6439 Calibration.of Multimeter
- 01 11/23/88 I
.
INC-65001
' Calibration l of. Dea'dweight. Testers '
.1:
5/03/90'
'
INC-6556 Calibration of Torque Wrenches-
,1 11/15/89)
INC-6559 Calibration of Crimping Tools 0'
12/16/89 d
-
t
,
INCs7296A-Calibration of.SG Level Inst.
'3~
2/13/90
-
,
INC-7920A Calibration of Turbine Impulse Press.;
10/12/89
'
,
i
'
r
.
.
.
STA-608-Control of' MATE.
- 14'
L4/06/90:
DRAWINGS-
,
Number Subject Revision El-001 Plant One Line. Diagram CP-5 i
El-0018-03A-AC Distribution CP-6 El-0031-37-Motor. Driven AFW Pump Schematic CP-51
'
El-0037-19 Auxiliary Relays Schematic-CP-2
.
El-0037-32 Turbine Driven AFW Pump SOV Schematic CP-5
El-0037-35 Turbine Driven AFW' Pump 50V Schematic-CP-5'
El-0037-49 Auxiliary Relays Schematic CP-1-
-
El-0067-93-
-Status Light Schematic CP-5t l
'El-0076-26A-Annunicator Schematic CP-1 El-0079-21 Annunicator. Windows-CP-7 M-0.202,
Main Steam System Flow Diagram CP-19
- , >:
.t
~
l
-
.
,
'
.
,
.-
..-
-
.
i
,: ~
.
.
T h
?
-
,
-
.
.-2-
3020430-1--
AMSAC Interconnection Diagram J3 i
,
. c
.
..
L3D20430-2 AMSAC Interconnection Diagram 2'
'
,
- 3D20430-3
=AMSAC Interconnectior. Diagram-
'
-3D20430.4 AMSAC Interconnection Diagram.
'
'7247005-15
> AFW Pump. Start Functional Diagram,
1 z
7247005-16 Turbine Trip Functional Diagram
-j
'
-
,
,
r
.
AMSAC Signals Functional Diagram-
<3
.
D 7247005-18
-
8810D31-14~
' W. Interconnecting Wiring Cabinet l'
8810D31-17
- W Interconnecting Wiring' Cabinet ~1
- 12
-
,
14'
-l 8810032-14 W Interconnecting Wiring ~ Cabinet 2-
<
t8810032-17.
W Interconnecting Wiring Cabinet 2
'8810b33-16 W Interconnecting Wiring Cabinet 3 E141
.
s-8810D34-17 W Interconnecting Wiring Cabinet 4 114'-
'
,
.0THER DOCUMENTS-
'
Attachment 6 of DBD-EE-021 " Reactor Protection and NSSS Related Control-
-i
'
' Systems," Revision 0 I
~ Appendix D of the CPSES QA Manual.. Revision.0, datt.d July 3, 1989(
CP-0001-127 AMSAC Technical Manual (Westinghouse Corp. Proprietary)J
' Revision 1, dated' July 18 1990
.
'
'
ESE-68A-01 AMSAC Environmental Equipment Qualification l Summary Package,
Revision l', dated December:20, 1988 m
m ES-100 Electrical Erection Specifications, Revision 7, Sections 11II, IV, i
-
and V
'
.DCA 56841 AMSAC Modifications, Revision 5, completed August 3, 1989 '
-*
,..
s
.
4-
.
k f'
,
':, r