Text

Ack Receipt of Responding to Requesting Info Re Insp Repts 50-445/90-47 & 50-446/90-47. Reply Is Responsive to Request for Info
	ML20024H573
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/30/1991
From:	Collins S; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	William Cahill; TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
References
	NUDOCS 9106050054
	Download: ML20024H573 (3)
	v • d • e

-

..

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _

I*o MAY 3 01991

Decket Nos. 50-445/90-47 50-446/90-47 License No. NPF-87 Construction Pernit Ns. CPPR-127 TV Electric ATTN:. W. J. Cahill, Jr., Executive Vice President, Nuclear Skyway Tower

. 400 horth Olive Street, L.B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter of April 26, 1991, in respsnse to our letter dated February 26, 1991. We have reviewed your reply and find it respcosive to the request for information.

The actions describeo relative to scaling activities en Unit 2 are considered 6ppropriate for prevention or prompt identification of documentation problems, such as those encountered on Unit 1.

The actions described for encoureging employee icentification of concerns and prompt handling of concerns are also considered appropriate. We will monitor four actions in these areas during future inspections.

Sincerely,

/s Samuel J. Collins, Director Division of hesctor Projects-cc:

t-TU Electric l~

7 ATTN:

Roger D. Walker, Manager -

Nuclear Licensing Skyway Tewer 400 North Olive-Street, L.C. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Juanita Ellis President - CASE

/-{U 1426 South Polk Street Ds11as, Texas 75224

.

l N

$ l*

5 Nee a

NRR /[,g NRR w uus

' DD:DRP

D f

RIV:C:DRP/B NRR futu DDChamberlain;df NFields GDick MVirgilio TPCwynn SJC 1 ns 5/2o /91 5/20/91 5/z1/91 5/21/91 5/h/91-C 91 9106050054 910530 l

PDR ADOCK 05000445 l'

G PDR

'

,

, - -

.

.. -

-.

.

_

-.

-

.

.-

-

. - _ -. _

_ - - -. _. - - ~ ~..

..

. -.

. _

--

-

%

TV Electric-2-GDS Associates, Inc.

Suite.720 1850 Parkway Place Marietta, Georgia 30067-8237 10 Electric Bethesda Licensing 3 tietro Center, Suite 610 Bethesda, tiaryland 20014 Jorden, Schulte, and Burchette ATTN: William A. Burchette, Esq.

Counsel for Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texes 1025 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20007 Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

ATTN: Jack R. Newman, Esq.

1615 L. Street, N.W.

Suite 1000 Washington, D.C.

20036 Texas Department of Labor & Standards ATTH:

G. R. Bynog, Program Manager /

Chief Inspector Boiler Division

,

l P.O. Box 12157, Capitol Statien Austin, Texas 78711 Honorable Dale McPherson l~

County _ Judge l

P.O. Box 851 L

Glen Rose, Texas 76043 L

Texas Radiation Control Program Director 1100 Kest 49th Street Austin, Texas 78756 Owen L. Thero, President Quality Technology Ccmpany Oak Dale _ Park - Space 101 l

'

Box 1619 Glen E;se, Texas 76043 bec to CMB (IE01)

i

-.. -.

-. - -. - -... -.... - -

. - - -

.. - -.... - -

.....

- -.. -..

-. _.

.

.%

TU Electric-3-bec distrib, by RIV:

R. D. Martin FesidentInspector(2)

DRP DRS SectionChief(DRP/B)

ProjectEngineer(DRP/B)

DRSS-RPEP5 Lisa Shea, P.M/ALF MIS System-RSTS Operator RIV Files

I

'

l I

.

...

..

. -.-

,

.. -.

_... _

_

,

.. _,... _... _._ _.. _._

___ ______._,____

-..

'

!

APf: 2 91991 L

gg Log

TXX-9:

1 0 h[

File

10086

-- -----

,

-,

10130

--

TT T

E5E April 26, 1991 Williarn J. Cahill. Jr.

Imusive s we n,mtent U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desh Washington, D.C.

20555 SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NO. 50-445 AND 50-446 NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-445/90-47; 50-446/90-47 RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS Gentlemen:

NRC letter from Samuel J.

Collins to W.

J.

Cahill, Jr. dated February 26, 1991, enclosed Inspection Report 90-47 for CPSES, requested TU Electric to respond to two issues.

The attachment to this letter provides TU Electric's response to these issues.

The first issue is how scaling activities will be performed on CPSES Unit 2 to assure that documentation problems are prevented or promptly identified and corrected.

The second issue is how employee concerns will be handled to prevent delays in their resolution and to encourage prompt identification and correction of potential safety issues.

Additionally, CASE's March 29, 1991, letter provided, for TU Electric's evaluation in preparing this response, CASE's input resulting from their review of the subject Inspection Report.

The attachment, includes TU Electric's evaluation of that CASE input.

As the attachment demonstrates, TU Electric has taken a number of actions to ensure the adequacy of the scaling activities for CPSES Unit 2, to enhance its programs for detecting and correcting any problems that may occur in these activities, and to strengthen its programs for encouraging CPSES employees to identify and report concerns and for resolving them.

Sincerely,

/

'

.

p William J.

Cahill, Jr.

JDR/ lmb Attachment c-Mr.

R.

D.

Martin, Region IV

,

l Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)

Mr.

J.

W.

Clifford, NRR Mr.

M.

B.

Fields, NRR 400 North ohve Street L B. 81 Dallu, Texe 75201 l wm

.

._

.

-

, -. _.. - -..

-

-. -. -. - - -. ~..

-. -

- - - -. - -

- -

.

.r.

.

Attact:. ment to TXX-91106 Page 1 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO URC REQUESTS FELATXp To CREES S. CAL 11LQ_AgIVITIES NRC Recuest 1

[Y]ou are requested to provide a written explanation of how scaling activities will be performed for CPSES, Unit 2, to assure that documentation problems are prevented or promptly identified and corrected.

TU Electric Response to Raauest 1 The basic approach for performing scaling for CPSES Unit 2 is essentially the same as used for CPSES Unit 1.

As discussed in TU Electric letter logged TXX-88373, from W. to the NRC dated' April 14, 1988, full use will be made of the activities performed for CPSES Unit 1 in completing decign documentation (including scaling calculations) for Unit 2.

Similarly to CPSES Unit 1, the results of the scaling activities for Unit 2 will be used as an aid to the initial setup and calibration of loop instrumentation.

The loop will-be tested to identify _and correct any of the anomalies associated with the loop instrumentation and

-

to establish appropriate numerical values and steps for the calibration procedures.

Because findings and observations were identified in several areas related to scaling activities for CPSES Unit 1, TU Flcrtric identified a number of lessons learned and_made related enhancements for performing scaling for CPSES Unit 2.

In many cases, thvae enhancements were in effect prior to the completion of the scaling activities for Unit 1.

The lessons learned and enhancements for Unit 2 are summarized below:

o Egalina Calculation Preparation Guidelines Although there were procedures and controls in place for the preparation of scaling calculations for CPSES Unit 1, the1TU Electric Technical Audit Program (TAP)

found_that there was no single document that defined the overall relationship of various sources and reference documents used in the preparation of the scaling calculations.

The Scaling Calculation Manual (SC-8800) was revised to provide additional direction c

'

and to incorporate information from other documents.

The Scaling Calculation Manual now defines its intended l

scope, usage, and implementation; defines the method

for preparing scaling calculations; clarifies the i

relationship between the Manual, project procedures, and documents used in the preparation of scaling i

!

I

'

.,,. -, - _, -

. _ - -,, -.

... -. -,.

.

,. -. - - _ -

- -..

-

.- -

- -..-

, - -. -

-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -....

-

-. -

.

l

.

'

i

.

,

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 2 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS RELATED TO CPSES SCALIRG.ACTIVITIEE calculations (e.g.,

Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Design Specifications, Westinghouse Scaling Manual (WCAP-9696), and source documents such as the Precautions, Limitations and Setpoint Document (PL&S), drawings, and instrumentation specification data sheets); and provides guidelines for documentation of Programmable Read Only Memories (PROMS).

The revised Scaling Calculation Manual has been reviewed by Quality Assurance (QA) audit personnel, and they closed their audit' finding regarding the lack of a single program document based upon the review.

Additionally, the revised Scaling Calculation Manual was successfully used for reviewing and revising the scaling calculations for CPSES Unit 1 in 1989-1990.

For Unit 2, the current Unit 1 and Common Scaling Manual will be enhanced to add Unit 2 specific references, and to explain unit specific differences, if any, with respect to Design Basis Documents (DBDs), setpoint methodology, Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD)

-

characteristics, etc.

o Preparation / Review / Issuance of Scaline Calculatiana There were a number of issues involving-the preparation of scaling calculations for Unit 1, including missing, unspecific, or incorrect references; typographical or transcription errors; lack of explanatory notes for mathematical manipulations; and minor mathematical errors.

Although these errors did not. affect the technical adequacy of -the results of these scaling calculations, they did indicate a lach of attention to detail by the preparers of the scaling calculations.

TU Electric took several actions to ensure the proper preparation Of CPSES scaling calculations, including the following:

For Unit 2, the appropriate Unit 1/ Unit 2 and common Scaling Calculation procedures and Scaling Calculation Manual SC-8800 will be revised to provide and clarify the Unit 2 specific requirements for scaling calculation content.

Emphasis will be placed on the design adequacy review and on the administrative aspects (such as proper references) of the scaling calculations.

,. -- -

-.-

_

--- -.-

---

~__ _..~ _.-. - - -. _

-. - _ _

-

.

,

%

.-

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 3 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS REIJ@ED TO CPSES SCALING ACTIVITIES For Unit 2, prior to preparing scaling calculations, personnel will be trained to the requiroments of the revised Scaling Calculation Manual and the project procedures that control preparation and issuance of scaling calculations.

This training will include a description of relevant guidance and input documents (such as the TU Electric Scaling Calculation Manual (SC-8000)

and the Westinghouse Scaling Manual (WCAP-9 6 9 6) ),

a description of the requirements applicable to the contents of the scaling calculations, a discussion of the derivation of numerical values and a description of the responsibilities of preparers, reviewers, and supervisors for ensuring the completeness and accuracy of the scaling calculations.

The training further includes lessons learned on Unit 1 (emphasis on administrative aspects of the calculation (such as

-

avoiding transposition / typographical errors and incorrect references), hardware training to address lessons learned from NCB 1, NCB 11 and NCH cards, PROM issues, explanation of Westinghouse use of G01 and G02 groups, etc.)

o Document Control Several instances existed in which documents related to the preparation of scaling calculations were not updated or were not distributed to holders of controlled copies or to Document Control Center (DCC)

satellites.

Additionally, other documents such as the Westinghouse Scaling Manual (WCAP-9696) were not maintained current or as controlled documents because the information in them was not utilized in preparing CPSES scaling calculations.without first verifying its adequacy.

Based upon these findings and obser' dions, TU Electric has taken several actions to updat<s and enhance the control of documents related to scaling calculations, including the following:

WCAP-9696 was reviewed and updated, and is now being maintained current as a controlled document for CPSES.

.

- _ - _

__-

_ --

.

. - -..

.

..., _ _

__

-

..

-...

-

.

_ ____.-_.__ _ _ __ _._._.. _.._._

_._._ ___ -.

__

.

%

,

.

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 4 of 11 TO ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS RELATEL TO CPSES SCALING ACTIVITIES Various scaling calculation input documents (including the PL&S, Westinghouse NSSS Design Specifications, and instrumentation specification data sheets) were reviewed to assure tha.t.they are acceptable for use and are being controlled through the CPSES DCC.

Other Westinghouse input documents, such as Field Change Notices (FCNs), Instrument and Control Diagrams (ICDS), and Interconnection Wiring Diagrams (IWDs) are being reviewed to identify any needed changes, and Design Change Au'.horisations (DCAs) will be issued as necessary to reflect these changes.

These documents are controlled and maintained current'in accordance with applicable project procedures.

The Westinghouse WPT transmittal letters were reviewed to assure that any attachments to the WPT

-

letters that contained design input for scaling calculations were identified and included in the DCC.

WPT letters continue to-be controlled for CPSES Unit 2, including distribution of the WPTs

&dd the respective Project Information Package (PIP) Master-Index to holders of controlled copies of the PIP Master Index.

For Unit 2, vendor letters will be first processed in accordance with the appropriate vendor document processing procedure prior to being utilized for scaling calculations.

Vendor design information required for scaling or references will be included in the DCC.

o Control of PROMg Several issues existed regarding the-control of PROMS.

These issues included scaling calculations that did not specify the type of timer module to be installed in PROM locations, drawings and scaling calculations that i

did not identify both the instrument tag number and the l

associated PROM library, and a lack of a procedure that describes controls for programming and physically identifying PROMS.

Several actions are being taken to address these findings, including the following:

i

-. ~,

.-

._,

.

_. _ -. _.,

. - _. _.. _ -, _. _

_ _ _ _

_. _. -.. __

-.. _. _

m.

. _._._ _ __

_...

.. - _. - _ _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _.

,

%

,

.

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 5 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS RELATED TO CPSES SCALING ACTIVITIES The Scaling Calculation Manual was revised to require the specific timer group number to be stipulaced in the scaling calculations.

The Scaling Calculation Manual was revised to include directions for identification of PROMS with respect to scaling calculations and drawings.

A procedure was developed to control the programming and physical identification of PROMS.

The enhanced hardware training will provide the necessary training to scaling personnel on PROMS, their configuration and the operations procedure for_ controlling the programming and physical identification of PROMS.

TU Electric has also made-several enhancements in:its ability to detect and correct any problems related to the preparation of

--

scaling calculations for CPSES Unit 2.

These enhancements generally relate to the following areas:

o Review of Scalina Calculations The existence of the deficiencies in the scaling calculations described above also indicates that the reviewers of the scaling calculations were not paying sufficient attention to details.

TU Electric has taken several actions to help ensure-the adequate review of CPSES Unit 2 scaling calculations, including the following:

Engineering personnel reviewing scaling calculations receive the same training provided to the preparers of scaling calculations.

The training emphasicos the need to assure that inputs i

are identified and traceable, that assumptions are identified and appropriate, that the overall methoCology is appropriate and has been properly

[

executed, and that the equations are correct.

t I

l

!

l l

!

___ - _ _. _, -. _.,.. - _., -. - -

_., _.,,

,,,..

_,

.

.. _.

_

_., _ _ _

_.. -.

- - -...

- --

.

.-

- ~. ~.

. - - -.

-

_- -.....

- - _ _ _ - -. -

.

%

.

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 6 of 11 TU ELECTRIC' S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS RELATED TO CPSES SCALING ACTIVITIES Procedures for the review of scaling calculations have been revised to include requirements to verify that the use of data is consistent, the mathematical manipulations are correct, inputs are correct, source documents are referenced, and the results of the calculation are accurate and acceptable for use, o

Mangggment and OA Overview of Scalina Activities Several changos have been made in the method of operation of TU Electric management and the Nuclear Overview organization.

In combination with the changes discussed above, the changes will enhance the detection of any problems involving Unit 2 (including scaling activities for Unit 2).

These changes include the following:

The TU Electric Quality Assurance organization for

-

Unit 2 is aligned by functional area (e.g.,

c;nstruction, engineering, startup) rather than by activities (e.g.,

audit, surveillances and procedure review).

This restructuring provides an enhanced sense of quality accountability and improvements in the performance of audits, surveillances, and procedure reviews.

Audits /surveillances have been-enhanced by having them focus greater attention on performance attributes of an activity while continuing to evaluate compliance.

Additionally, QA continues to use as input to the overview process _such things as experience with completion of CPSES Unit 1,

TU-Evaluation (TUE) forms, and the output of the trending program.

By using this information

'

l as input to plans for audits and surveillances, the results of audits and surveillances are more

likely to identify any emerging or potential problems.

I

'.

-. - - -.

..- -

- - - - -. -

.

..

4~

Attachment.to TXX-91106 Page 7 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS BE_L2TED-TO CPSES SCALING ACTIVITIES Once problem areas or weaknesses are identified, they'are being giv3n greater attention to ensure that proper corrective action is taken.

For example, the performance of engineering contractors from a' quality standpoint is being

'

appraised on a monthly basis to highlight thoso areas warranting improvement.

Additionally, Nuclear Overview has established a quality accountability group to review significant deficiencies, tv help identify their causes, and to obtain the appropriate level of management attention to resolve the deficiencies and prevent their recurrence.

In summary, TU Electric has made a. number of enhancements in its scaling activities for Unit 2 in order to help prevent the type

- of problems =that occurred in the scaling activities for CPSES

' Unit-1.

Additionally, TU Electric has also enhanced:its ability to detect and correct any problems that may occur in these

-

activities.

s-

4

.

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 8 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS RELATED TO Cf_SES SCALIFG ACTIVIflEn 11EC RequqaL2

"[We] request _that you provide a written response describing how employee concerns will be handled to prevent delays and to encourage prompt identification and correction of potential safety issues."

TU Electric Response to Recuest 2 Prior to November 1987, TU Electric had established a number of programs and had taken a number of actions to_ encourage employees to report any concerns they may have and to ensure-that the concerns were properly resolved.

These included the establishment-of the SAFETEAM and HOTLINE programs, issuance of policy statements and procedures encouraging employees to report

'

concerns-and protecting those who do so, issuance of notices to and holding meetings'with employees to ensure that they are aware of TU Electric's policies and procedures and to seek feedback from the employees, and providing orientation training on TU

-

Electric's programs and policies related to. employee concerns.

These actions are described in more detail in various-TU Electric letters to the NRC, including TXX 4838 (June 2, 1986) and

-

TXX-4696 (February 7, 1986).

Since-November'1987, TU Electric has made a number of improvements to thes" programs and actions.

These improvements have been intended ns_ only to encourage and facilitate _the reporting of concerns by employees, but also to help ensure that identified concerns are properly resolved.

These improvements, which apply to both TU Electric and onsite contractor employees, include the following:

o In December 1987, TU Electric issued a notice to all-employees at CPSES reemphasizing TU Electric's commitment to_the protection of the public health-and safety, and encouraging anyone with-a safety concern-to report'it to management, SAFETEAM, or the NRC.

,

r

- - -,,.,.. _..,

,---,---,._,,mo,e,

,_w,.-..e m

..y

,

n.

,i-_me, w%,--

.,r-

,-----,,,,.,m-..

.,_,i,e.rr r

g.,.

,

-

_

- __._ ___ _ _ _ __

-. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

.._ _ _.. - _ _

_ _.. _. _

_. _ _ _

_.

.

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 9 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS EILATED TO CPSES SCALIRG_ASTIVITIE.jl o

In February 1990, the TU Electric Executive Vice President for Nuclear Engineering and Operations issued NEO Policy Statement 55.

This Policy Statement stated that each individual at CPSES is responsible for being alert to potential conditions adverse to quality, for notifying appropriate levels of management of such conditions, and for correcting such conditions that are within his/her responsibility, including taking action to prevent recurrence of similar problems.

This Policy Statement also emphasized that each individual must be receptive to information or suggestions regarding potential problems or concerns. This Policy Statement has been printed on a monthly basis in the " Comanche Peak Monitor."

o In December 1989, TU Electric established a new system for identifying and reporting conditions adverse to quality.

This system allows any individual to use a single form (the ONE form for CPSES Unit 1) to report

-

any potential condition adverse to quality, including conditions applicable to hardware, abnormal events, personnel errors, procedures,-or documentation.

Conditions reported on ONE forms are tracked to closure and are trended to identify any potential generic concern.

In June 1990, a similar system and form (the TUE Form) were established for CPSES Unit 2.

o In December 1989, TU Electric established a

<

multi-disciplined panel to review concern received by SAFETEAM.

The purpose of the panel is to assure that all issues identified by concernees are appropriately considered and investigated.

In January 1991, the membership of this committee was expanded and its scope was modified to include concerns related to plant safety, environmental protection, plant reliability or wrongdoing received by SAFETEAM or HOTLINE, as well as allegations referred to TU Electric by NRC or other Federal or State regulatory' agencies, notifications received-from a contractor of concerns raised by its employees,-and allegations or concerns submitted to the Stipulation Manager by CASE.

An additional important aspect of the committee's function is that it assures that both line managers and other knowledgeable managers consider the potential need for immediate action to mitigate the continuation of concerns that

. - - -

.

..... -.. - -. - - -. -. - -

. -. -.... - - - - - -

-

- - - - - -

_ _ _..

.

_-

_.

_ _ _. _..

.

. _ -

.

__

.

..

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 10 of-ll TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS RELATED TO CPSES SCALING ACTIVITIES may relate to plant safety, environmental protection, plant reliability or wrongdoing, o

Several actions to provide additional training to managerial and supervisory personnel on metho'ds for responding to and resolving employee concerns.

For example, as part of the cooperative efforts between TU Electric and CASE, a series of sessions were held in 1989 at which counsel to CASE provided mid-level managers and supervisors at CPSES information on methods for dealing effectively with employee concerns.

In 1990, a copy of a video cassette taping of one of these sessions was made available to each supervisor at CPSES, and the supervisors were instructed to review the tape and to discuss its contents with the employees under their supervision.

Additionally, senior management meets periodically with lower and mid-level managers to emphasize the importance of identifying and correcting problems (including correction of weaknesses

-

in controls and processes even if the activities are being performed in a technically adequate manner).

Additionally, TU Electric has selected and arranged for lower and mid-level management personnel to receive INPO observer training to improve their ability in assessing their own programs at CPSES.

o In 1989, TU Electric established several new systems for ensuring that identified conditions are properly evaluated and corrected. These systems include a formalized process for performing root cause analyses; provisions for establishing Evaluation Teams to assure the timely, thorough, and systematic evaluations of plant events and off-normal conditions; a Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES); and a formalized process for conducting Failure Analyses of significant failures and degradations of quality-related equipment.

o In early 1989, TU Electric established the Participative Management Development System (PMDS) / Team Building concept to facilitate teamwork in approaching and solving problems.

-. -

-.

-

.

..

..-.

- -.. - - -. -.. -.

-...

-

_ _. _ _ _ _. _ _..

_

_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _. _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. __

,

.

Attachment to TXX-91106 Page 11 of 11 TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO NRC REQUESTS BE14TED TO CP_SES SCALING ACTIYlTJJJ7 In summary, TU Electric has made a number of enhancements for encouraging employees to identify concerns and for resolving ruch Concerns.

TU Electrds Res.ponse tp_ CASE __heit_qI In a letter to TU Electric dated March 29, 1991, CASE provided its assessment of the scaling activities for CPSES Unit 1 and offered some suggestions for enhancing the scaling activities for CESES Unit 2.

In preparing this response to the two NRC questions discussed above, TU Electric has taken into account CASE's input.

TU Electric believes that the foregoing responses to the two NRC questions adequately address the two primary issues raised by CASE; namely that the preparations and review of scaling calculations for Unit 2 be appropriately controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and that enhancements be made in the audit activities for Unit 2.

Additionally, with respect to CASE's suggestion that all Plant Incident Reports (PIRs) and Licensee Event Reports (LER)s be reviewed to identify

-

potential enhancements for scaling, under existing procedures TU Electric reviews each PIR and LER at the time of issuance to determine its root causes and to take appropriate corrective and preventive actions, including any enhancements that may_be warranted _in scaling or other activities.

Similarly, with respect to the suggestion that TU Electric should evaluate CASE's recommended enhancements to the Scaling Calculation Manual (SC-8800), _such an evaluation has already been performed and the results of the evaluation are documented in Attachment 7 to TU Electric letter logged TXX-90280 from W.

J.

Cahill, Jr. to C.

Grimes of NRC dated August 15, 1990.

- -.

. -

.

....

..

-.

. -.

_ _ _,, _ _ _.. _.,. _ -.. _ - _. _ _, _

_, -

__

_. _._ _._ _.._~_- _ _.._ _ _ _._._ _. _ _

-_._. - _

,

.

lllll ':lllllllll -

Log i TXX-91084 1.

.:

File # 916 (3/4.3)

Ref. # 10CFR50.90

---

-

--

10CFR50.92 TUELECTRIC Millism J. Cahill, Jr.

April 26, 1991 i ~~ s,a r,nw

,. Nuclear Regulatory Commission s

Attnr = Document Control Desk

'

Was* agton, DC' 20555 SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAN ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES), UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-445 0UTAGE TINES AND SURVEILLANCE TEST INTERVALS FOR VARIOUS ENGINEERED SAFETY AND REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS LICENSING ANENDNENT REQUEST 91-003 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.90 Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) hereby requests an amendment to its Facility Operating License _No. NPF-87 by incorporating the enclosed change to Technical Specification Tables 3.3-1, 3.3-2, 4.3-2, and BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.

The enclosed License Amendment Request (LAR) proposes to modify the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications by changing the Allowed Outage Times (A0T) and the Surveillance Test Intervals (STI) for Analog Channels shared by both the Reactor Trip System (RTS)_ and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS).

The-proposed change will result in less frequent testing which will result in fewer inadvertent reactor trips and fewer actuations of ESFAS components.

The change proposed in this LAR is not required to address an immediate 'fety concern. TU Electric desires to implement the requested change as soon as possible and therefore. requests timely review and approval of this LAR by the-

-

NRC. TU Electric requests that the revised Technical Specifications be made effective seven days after approval of the license amendment by the NRC.

404 North Olne Street LD BI Dallas, Texas 75201

-

.

--

.

'

.

j

'

i i

TXX-91084 Page 2 of 2 In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b), TV Electric is providing the State of Texas a copy of this proposed amendment.

Sincerely,

/

tt i

/

William J. Cahill, Jr.

JDR/grp Attachment 1.

Affidavit 2.

Proposed change and Significant Hazards Consideration Evaluation (10CFR50.92)

3.

Proposed replacement pages.

c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)

Mr. J. W. Clifford, NRR D. K. Lacker Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street Austin, Texas 78704 l

i

!

_

...- __

_.. _

_.-

. _ _. _ _ _... _ _ _.. _ _..

.

..-_.

._

_ _.. __

%

.

Attachment 1 to TXX-91084 Page 1 of 1-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of

)

Texas Utilities Electric Company

)

Docket No. 50-445

)

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric

)

Station, Unit 1)

)

AFFIDAVIT William J. Cahill, Jr. being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Executive Vice President, Nuclear of TV Electric, that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this License Amendment Request; that he is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

.

///

/

'/

/,

'

~

i l[i am J. Tp"p[l T,~ J r.

//

Executive Vire President, Nuclear STATE of TEXAS

)

)

COUNTY OF SOMERVELL )

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, on this 26th day of April

, 1991.

aA t. e O M2 0,, ' PATRICIA WILSON '

Notary Public WY COW.SSON EXPlRES *y March 16,1993. =

,

-,me--

a

]

l J

-

,,r-

, -, - - -

-,,

-.,,----.--.,-r

-,,, ~,.,, -,.,,,,..

,

,--

- - -,,,,,,. -, -

.

__.

_ _. _ _ _

. _ _. _

_.m.__

~_

_m_.

_.... _ _. _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. ~.. _.

.

.. _ _. _. _ _ _ _. _ _

'

i

'

.

a 1.

Attachment 2 to TXX-91084

- page 1 of-10-

.

t CPSES UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-445 LICENSE AMENDMENT RE0 VEST 91-003

. TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 1.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION-2.

PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCORPORATION

.

w g-

, _

+h

-

- -..-

.-

..

-

.

- - -.

-.

.

-

- -

..

.

...

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

Attathment te TvX 91084 page < of 10 Sign 1+1 cant Hazard'. Lentideration h oposed Unit 1 Technical

'f M t: 1fitatien Change Varions W, sud E5f Action and Surveillance Pequirementr

.

1.

DE SC RI P110!J 1his change proposes to mojity the tomanche peak Steam Liectric Station Unit 1 Technical Specifications tiy relaxing the Allowed Outaae Times

.

(A0T) and the Surveillanto Test intervals (Sili for Analog (hannels shared by both the Reactor h otection System (RPS) and the Engineered Saf ety Features Actu8 tion System ([SI AS).

E 11.

B AC L GROUtJD in response to the high numt et of reatter trips and Engineered Sofet)/

f eatures Actuation System ( ESF AS) actuations experiented by plants as a l

result of instrument testing and surveillance activities. the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) initiated a program to develop generic

-

justification for revising generic and plant specific instrumentation

-

technical specifications to reduce the test and maintenance requirements.

As a result of the WOG submittals, the f1RC. in the f ollowing correspondence, approved almost oli the rulerations suggested by the WOG.

Lotter C. O. Thomas (11PC ) to J. J. Shepperd (WOG) dated February

21, 1985 (t1RC Safety Evaluation for WCAP 10271)

Letter Charles E. Rossi (f1RC) to Roger A, flewton (WOG) dated

f et>rua ry 22. 1989 (flRC Safety Evaluation for WCAP-10271 Supplement and Supplement : Revision 1)

.etter Charles E. Rossi (f4RC) to Gerald 1. Goering (WOG) dated

April 30 1990 (ftRC Supplement al Safety Evaluation for WCAP.0271 Supplement 2 and Supplement 2 Revision 1)

CPS' S incorporated most of the suggested STI and A0T relaxations in the orig nal Technical Specifications issued on February 1990: however. in

_

the months prior to license issuance and during Technical Specification development, all review and acceptance of the Westingaouse Owners Group submittal of WC AP-10271 ( and supplements ) was not completed.

As a result, most, but not all provisions of WCAP 10271 (and supplements)

'

were incorporated.

This change proposes to incorporate the remainder of the changes.

This request is being made under the generic justification

-

provided by Westinghouse Electric Corporation during approval of WCAP-10271 Supplement 2. and Supplement 2 Revision 1.

r-

-

!

.

\\

-

I

.

At t achment 2 t o 1X X 91084

'

page 3 of 10 l

'

111.

JUSTIFICA110N An increase in the allowed out ane t ime f ot maintenance will allow better more deliberate testing and repair. thus reducing the potential for human error and reducing vulnerability of CPSES to the high trip rate experienced by other operating plants.

The chanues A B. C. and D. listed in Part V of this enclosure, result

directly from the completion of a Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG)

i evaluation of Surveillance Test Intervals (S11) and Allowed Outage Times (t0T) and their ef f ect on nuclear safety.

Changes E and F listed in Part V of this enclosure result from a supplemental study of the Reactor Water Storage Tank ( RWST ) level unavailability performed specifically for CPSES (WCAP 10271. Supplement 3). WCAP 10271 Supplement 3 was transmitted to the NRC f rom 10 Clect ric via letter logged TXX-91069 and

'

dated March 9, 1991.

Several administrative changes are proposed, as listed below:

1.

Update tne BASES.5ection at page B 3/4 3-1 to reflect the NRCs-supplemental safety evaluation of WCAP 10271 and its supplements.

2.

Reword action statements requiring the plant to be in HOT STANDBY

in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to allow 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to restore the inoperable channel, then 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to be in HOT STANDBY (same total length of time).

-

This will avoid the incorrect perception of being in a shutdown action statement which has reportability and emergency classification connotations.

3.

Renumber action statements to prevent human error. This change avoids two * Action 12's* and renumbers the Action Statements of Table 3.3 2.

4.

Delete reference to STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION (MODES 2 and/or 1) in Action 17 and 23 and replace with ' Operation *, similar to the wording used in Action 14.

The LC0 to which these Actions apply include Applicable Modes beyond MODES I and 2 (1, 2: 1, 2.

'

3: and 1, 2, 3, 4).

This change avoids confusion when the plant is in MODES 3 or 4 and the Action is entered.

5.

Deletes note "e' of table 3.3-1.

The note is no longer applicable since as a result of the WCAP 10271 and its supplements the A0T instruments common to RPS and ESFAS do not have differing RPS and ESF. requi rer.ient s.

!

t

-.

..-_ _ - _ _ - -.

--

- _ _. -

- - - -.. _..

-

,

.

l

Attachment J to lxX-91084 page 4 of 10 IV.

SAFE 1Y EVALUA110f1 In WCAP 20271 including supp1-ments 1. and J. the WDG evaluated the impact of the proposed Sil and Auf changes on core damage frequency and i

public risk.

The f4RC staff tencludes in its evaluation of the WOG submittal that an overall upper bound increase of the core damage l

frequency due to the proposed ST]/A0T changes is less than 6 percent for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plants.

The f4RC Staff also concluded that attual core damage frequency increases for individual plants are espected to be substantially less than 6 percent.

The f4RC Staff considered this core damage frecluency increase to be small compared to the range of uncertainty in the core damage ffequency analyses and therefore acceptable, in WCAP 10271 Supplement 3. the Reactor Water Storage Tank ( DWST ) level channels were evaluated and found tc be identical in configuration to t he Steam Generator level channel and theref ore the RWST level channels would be bounded by the unavailability analysis for the Steam Generator level channel.

l The proposed changes are consistent with the f1RC Staff's letters dated February 22. 1989, and April 30. 1990, to the WOG regarding evaluation of WCAP 10271. WCAP 10271 Supplement 1. WCAP 10271 Supplement 2 and WCAP-10271 Supplement 2. Revision 1.

The Staff has stated that approval of these changes at a particular plant will be contingent upon

~

confirmation that certain conditions are met.

CPSES compliance with these conditions is provided below:

1.

Common cause evj.luation of plant protection system failures.

'CPSES has previously implemented quarterly surveillance intervals except for RWST level.

Quarterly Surveillance of the RWST level is included in this proposed change to the technical-specifications.

Plant programs and procedures are in place and being used to evaluate failures, trend failures, and perform common mode failure evaluation when necessary.

Evaluation and

,

reporting under the fluclear Plant Reliability Data System (f1PRC>S)

are included in these programs.

2.

Testinq of analoc channels in bynass.

Testing of analog channels,

-

described in FSAR 7.2.2.2.3 and 7.3.2.2.5. is done with the i'

channels in the trip condition except f or containment spray actuation which is an energize to actuate channel and therefore designed to be tested in bypass.

Jumpers and lifted leads are not

used f or this testing.

'

l T

. v.

~,..,, _...

.,,...-,..,_.-m.m,,,.,,,_m,...,,y4_.,,_.._._-..,,,,..,,,,,._,,,_.,._.-,.mm

,m.,,

,,r.,m..,,..r m.,,,,,--..y,_cwm.,,,,

-

.

Attachment 2 to TXX 91084 page 5 of 10 3.

Otpoint drift.

(PSES implemented quarterly analog testing upon receipt of the operating license in February 1990, except for RWST level as noted above.

The setpoint methodology contains adequate allowance to bound anticipated dr if t over a three month period.

Additionally. setpoint drif t data has been trended since prior to licensing to confirm this allowance.

No excessive drift has been noted over t his period-

Abolicability of Generic Analysis to CPSES.

CPSES is a 4-loop Westinghouse PWR With a Solid State Protection System.

As described in WCAP 10271 and its supplements, all chang'es proposed in this amendment are addressed by the generic analysis except for RWST level.

RWST level was separately evaluated on a plant specific basis in WCAP 10271 Supplement 3.

This amplified the analysis presented in the other supplements to encompass RW5T level.

This analysis concluded that RWST level is identical in configuration to the steam generator level channel; theref ore the system unavailabilities resulting from relaxed STis and A0Ts were essentially the same and will have no impact on_ plant safety.

V.

DETAILED DISCUSSION The requested amendment revises several aspects of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safety Features (ESF) of Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

These changes include the

-

f oll owi ng :

A.

Added new Action 13 (Table 3.3-1) applicable to safety injection input from ESFAS and automatic trip and interlock logic allowing for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months maintenance A0T and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months surveillance A01.

B.

Changed Actions 12 (Table 3.31) and Actions 19. 22. and 26 (original Action 12) (Table 3.3-2) to increase the Allowed Outage Time (A0T) for Surveillance Test to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

C.

Replaced original Action 13 with Action 17 for 3 channel systems (Table 3.3-2), to allow the same provisions as 4 channel systems.

D.

Revised note 'e' of Table 3,3-2 to make the time allowed to place the Steam Generator High Level channel into trip and the Surveillance A0T consistent with the provisions for inoperable channels (Action 17).

E.

Revised test f requency f or the RWST Low Low level to Quarterly (Table 4,3-2).

F.

Revised Action for RWST Low Low Level from 26 to 17 (Table 3.3 2).

t

- _.,. _ _. _. - _... _ _ - _ _ -

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

.

Attachment 2 to TXX 91084 pace 6 of 10 I

G.

Administrative thanges as follows:

1.

Updated BASES reference to include the latest SEks.

f 2.

Actions 13 (new) (Table 3.3 1), and Actions 19, 22. and 26

'

(new)- (Table 3.3 2 ) have been revised to br**dt the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months i

shutdown time requirement into the more standard 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to restore or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 l

hours.

'

3.

Deleted Actions 13 and 26 (Table 3.3-2) that were no longer used, and re-numbered original ESF Action 12 to new Action 26.

This avoids the two ' Action 12's' that previously existed.

Renumbered Actions on Table 3.3 2 accordingly.

Revised Actions 17 and 23 to delete specific reference to STARTUP ana/or POWER OPERATION (MODES I and/or 2) and apply broader term of * operation *,

5.

Deleted Hote 'e' on Table 3.3 1 for Pressurizer Pressure Low and $ team Generator Water Level low low.

VI.

PRECEDENTS

-

The changes proposed by this License Amendment Request (with the exception of the RWST changes) have been accepted by the NRC in the correspondence listed in part !! above, The proposed changes to the RWST, although not specifically accepted, have been evaluated and found to be identical and thus bounded by the Steam Generator Level unavailability analysis which has been accepted by the NRC.

Other changes also accepted in that listed correspondence were incorporated into-the CPSES Technical Specifications prior to their issuance in February, 1990.

<

Vll.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALVATION PER 10CFR50.92 The standards used to arrive at a proposed determination that the chances described involve no significant hazards consideration are included'in-10CFR50.92.

The regulations state that if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not; (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety then a no significant hazards consideration determination can be made.

l l

CPSES has reviewed the requirements of 10CFR50.92 as they relate to the proposed RPS and ESFAS Technical Specification changes for CPSES and determined that a significant hazards consideration is not involved, in support of this conclusion,the following analyses are provided, c____._

-..-.a._

_ _.. _. _ _.. _ _ _.. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _. _ _.. _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _.

.

,

. -

Attachment 2 to TXX 91084 page 7 of 10 Criterion 1 -

The do rmination that the results of the proposed changes are within all actc; table criteria was established in the SER($) prepared for WCAP 10271 Supplement 2 and WCAP 10271 Supplement 2. Revision 1 issued by letters dated February 22. 1989 and April 30, 1990.

Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in an acceptable increase in total Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety features Actuation System unavailability.

This increase results in a small increase in core damage frequency (CDF) and public health risk.

The values determined by the WOG and presented in the WCAP for the increase in CDF were verified by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) as part of

'

an audit and sensitivity analyses for the NRC Staff.

Based on the small

-

value for the increase compared to the range of uncertainty in the CDF, the increase is considered acceptable.

The extension of the WOG relaxations to the RWST level has been separately shown to be bounded by the increased-CDF resulting from relaxation of the Steam Generator Level channel and therefore should be acceptable on the same basis.

The proposed changes do not-result i n an increase in the severity or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, implementation of the proposed changes af fects the probability of f ailure of the RPS or ESF but does not alter the manner in which protection is afforded nor the manner in which limiting criteria are established.

-

Operation of CPSES in accordance with the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2 -

The proposed changes do not involve hardware changes and do not res ul t E

I in a change in the manner in which the Protection System provides plant l

' protection.

No change is being made which alters the functioning of the Protection System.

Rather the likelihood or probability of the Protectic-System functioning properly is affected as described above.

Therefore the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

,

-w-"--,-v,aav-mm-,,-e-<m..,-m-...,-a,-,mw,,.+w--m-~r,--<-.e,-s,.ew

- w m-s,-,e-p,-,,ew4,,,w,,

.m-w.,,,,,-,,,,,--,r--,.-e,w..,,,,enr-,,

,.

,g,---,----,.v,c,,.-9

.

+

I

.

I

'

I Attochment J to TXX 91084 page 6 of 10 Crit erion 3 -

The proposed changes do not alt er tha manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints er limiting ccnditions for operation are determined.

The impaCl Of reduced testing other than addressed above is to allow a lonaer time interval over which instrument uncertainties (e.g.,

drifti nay act.

Experience has shown that the initial uncertainty assumptions are valid for reduced testing.

Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in an rcerall improvement in safety due to:

a.

Less frequent testing which will result in fewer inadvertent reactor t rips and actuations of the Engineered Safaty Features Actuation bystem components.

b.

Improvements in the effectiveness of the operating staff in monitoring and controlling plant operation.

This is due to less frequent distraction of the operator and shift supervisor to attend ta instrumentation testing.

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the proposed amendment to CPSES technical specifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident, does not

~

create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

y!!1.110 SIGillFICANT HAZARDS C0flSIDERAT10fl DETERHlflATI0ff The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (51 FR 7751) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards consideration.

Example (i) relates to a purely administrative change to Technical Specifications: for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.

Example (vi) relates to a change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan; for example, a change resulting f rom the application of a small refinement of a previously used calculational model or design method.

.

~

,

-

- -..

-

-.m,.,

., -

_ _ _ _ _.

..,

.

Attachment 2 to TXX-91084 page 9 of 10 In this case, the change request described above is similar to Example (1) in that it is partially an administrative change to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specifications.

Additionally it is similar to Example (vi) in that portions may result in some increase to the probability of a previously analyzed accident, but the increase is not significant compared to the range of uncertainty of the analysis and therefore is considered acceptable. Based upon the preceding analysis. CPSES concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

IX.

EfiVIRONMENTAL EVALVAT10ll Til Electric has evaluated the proposed changes and has determined that the changes do not involve (1) a significant hazards consideration, (ii)

a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any ef fluent that may be released of f site, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed changes meet the eligibility-criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10CTR51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10CTR51.22(b). an environmental assessment of the proposed changes is not required.

-

X.

REFERENCES 1.

CPSES Unit 1 Technical Specifications 2.

WCAP-10271 Supplement 1, Supplement 2, Supplement 2 Revision 1, and Supplement 3.

...

.

..

.

- -

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

.__

_.. _ _ -

--_ _ _ _

__._ _. _

__ -

--___m_.

. _ _ _ _

.

,

.

At tachment 2 to 1XX-91084 page 10 of 10

.

ItlSTRitCT!0fl5 TOR lt1COPPORAT10N

)

PEMOVE INSERT

t page 3/4 3-1 thru 3/4 3-8 page 3/4 3-1 thru 3/4 3-8

,

page 3/4 3-15 thru 3/4 3-24 page 3/4 3-15 thru 3/4 3 24 I

page 3/4 3-35 thru 3/4 3 36 page 3/4 3-35 thru 3/4 3-36 page B 3/4 3-1 thru B 3/4 3 2 page B 3/4 3-1 thru B 3/4 3-2 i

a m

. -

,

i l-

'

l

!

!'

l I

r r

I.:

.

. -

..

.

. _... _. _ _ - _.. _,. _ _. _ _ _.. _ _. -. _,. _ - _..,..... - _. _ _ _ _..,,..,, - -. -....

-

_._

_ _ _ _ _.

. _ _ _.

-

_. _ _ _ _.. - _ _. _.. _ - _ _ _ _ _.. _ __ _

. _._. _ _.

Attachment 3 to TXX-91084

.

,Page 1 of 22 i

.

,

.,:

p. :.v:., :.-..,

i

.

..

.

...

.

. e. s * :. -. s

:,-

se. P.

'. : :,:-:9 s: :

..

.

,. 9...., a.

....

-e q

.;

-..q

..

...

..

1. 3. '. ;3 3

-

e:ent:

~~: :.ne 3t e :3t :n :ie3 3:

4-ter'::<s :

i: 'e ! 3. 5 3'

e ::E:;5.E.

s --..,

.. :

..:n...

.

v

......

.

......t.

...

n i 0'e 3.3 '..

e as sne.n

.n.e,-

...

.w.. ::.. o.. : :. v e. s u.

-

,

..

r 4. 3.1.1 Es:n ceact:

'ri: ij5te

' strumentation rannel ano inte t::< are tre avt:mati: tri: 10gt: snait te :emonstratec OPERABLE :y tre :erf:rmance of tne React:r fri: System :nstrumentation Surveillance ;ecuirements s:ecifiec in ia:1e a. 3 - 1.

~

4. 3.1. 2 Tae REACTCR i;;

3rs'EM RE3 CNSE * ME of eac* 2eact:r tri: ';-:.':-

Sna11 :e :emonstratec t: :e itnt, itr limit at least ce :er 13 m:ntns, Eacn telt $nall i*0IL:e at Iealt Ore train $ yen tn3t : in traies are telte: it least Or*e Oer 36 m0"t's 3*" :Fe Charnel Oer 'anction

.cn that all :Parrei l are teste3 at lea 51 ence every 1 times 13 montn5 anere N

'5 t*e total "U*:er

' recur: ant char e's 4n a 5:ec'fic React:r tri: funct :n as snown in t e

" Total 90. a' Ctanaels" ::1.mn of Ta:le 3.3-1.

-

-:

l I

i f

f CMANC-E :Ek - UNIT 1 3/4 3-1

'

.

...

.

..

-..

...

.

. -

.

-...

.. -

_. -. _. _ _ _., - _ _..

,

I Allli 3.3-1 5' ?

oo

- - - - - - -

,o e C Ce C

41 ^E3 9R_IIll.I.*_fd '*. !I.H _]N' l RUHI N I A l_ lgN k

Y l

_

ra oo r

'"

HI N IHi1H

A

. ', '

101Al NO.

CllANNI i *>

LilANNIi5 Al'I'l I t Aill l Ow

$"

iIINCI10NAl iINIi 01 CilANNIIS 10 IRIP UPI H Alli i Hullt *.

AI. I ION *

--

O 1.

Manual Reactor 1 rip

1

/

1. /

N

z

"

h C

1

?

I". 4 ' ', ', '

.o n

~

2.

Power Range, Neutron l~ lux a

a.

liigh Selpoint

2

1. /

?

is.

tow Setpoint

/

l'. ?

?

'

3.

Power Range. Neution Ilux

/

1/

/

liigh Posit ive Rate w

.

4.

Power Range, Neut :on I lux.

2 I

I, ?

/

';'

liigh Negative Rate to 5.

Intermediate Range, Neutrun ilux

I

/

l'. /

I 6.

Source Range, Neutron Ilux a.

Reactor Irip and Indication 1)

Startup

1

2,,

2)

Stoutilown

/

I

3. 4. S

,

b.

Boron Dilution Ilux Doutiling

1

/

I. 4.

'e

/.

Overtemperatiere H 16

2

1. 2 I#

8.

Overpower N-16

2

1. /

l/

'

.

9.

Pressurite Pressure--low

2 i

l

'-

j 10.

I'ressuriier l'ressin e--liigli

2

1. 2 8'

!

-

"

!

'

\\

I w

..

G

-

...

-

- _ _

.

o>

ae

.n g 1 Altii i t-1 (( ont inneil)

.

-

o ce wh

,,

g.,

c Ill AL 1014 Ilt ll' *.Y'ill M IN'ill{llMI fil_ AI tilti oN

'?

'a

!,.'

MiftlMIIM Ed w 108At 14 0 tllANNIiN i il Afeill i '.

Al'I'l it Alti i

'"

-

01 ( llANNI.I 5 Ill f it I P OPl IIAlli i Milill '.

At i10f1

.jl

.

o E

I IINL I l ON.A_l_l_lN I.i

..

.

II-x

,

..

n I

?

/

x.

c 11.

Pressurizer Water Level--liiyh

$

x

{j I,

-

I/.

Reartor Coolant Ilow--tow

// loop in

// loop

~*

1/lerip a.

Single l oop

"

.iny loop

t/ loop

// loop in

// loop

s.

ti Iwo loops any Iwo loops 6.

4/Sim ep o

//.im yen 1/stm 9.- n I..'

11.

Steam Gene ator Water

'

in any tm m

A l eve l--l ow-l ow yen

'"

4 - 1.'lo -

/

I l

.

14.

linifervoltdele -Reactor Coolant l'naips 4 - I /lius

/

l

iS.

linilerf retpienty--Heac Lor CooIant l'nasps I,

'-

i t..

lin le i ne Irip

/

~'

I ow I luial Dii l'e c, sus e

I, I"

t

a.

le.

loslaine 51op Vaive CIo,uie I

/

3.

'

1/.

?,alet y in ge( t son leput f o i.m f sl As l

(

\\

l l

-

!

,w

.

I Ailll_}._l-l (f unt inueel)

j{

_

o E

EI O! I!IN..I NII.1'$2!I H 1,N'3[@_iH1 NI A,110N

_5 x

?

'"

HI N IHitM m"

""

,',;

101Al F40.

tilANNI i ',

CliANfil I 5 Al'i'l11Altii L"

iUNCi10NAl llNII U1 filAtlNI I 5 I O _ i H Il'

Ol'l HAl}l i H01)l '.

A(. I l_IIN

.

S

1 11.

He.ic tor I rip System Interitet hs

,

d

.i.

Intermeeliate Range

/

I

?

?,'

/

'

Neutr..n Ilux, P-fi

-

-'

,a ti.

Iow Power Reactor I r ips B lot-k. I'- /

,

1)

P-10 luput

/

I 1./

/

2)

P-13 Input

/

I

/

I

/

c.

Power Range Neuteon

'4

i i

/

Ilua, l'- U

.

m

d.

Power Range Neutron

2

l'

/

m

Ilux, P-9 e.

Power Rantje Neutroni

2

.1 1, /

/

Ilux, P-10 19.

Reactor Irip Breakers

1

1. ?

H.

/

I

f '. 4 ' '. ',' '

'l 20.

Atitomatic trip and Interlock

1

?

I,.*

[ 13 togic

1

f ', 4 ' ', ',

's

.

S

=

.

-

.

- -

- - -

Attachment 3 to TKX-91004

-

Page 5 of 72

,

.

, ELE ' :.

-t

.ec)

5LE s0':**:N5

>

react 0F t**D Ort 4*e"1 *10:e' 10 e t*e

!*se: ::5 t*:-

t*: t*e 3*rly t'

'

nte:1 2.J Orive 5.5tet is ;3:3*'t

' r:0 alt *0ra-al Eei:w t*e ~~f s.-;+--*e:'ste O tage Neste:a #1.4 ". - te r ) :: x ) !#;;:

-t U

Eelca tre P*10 (.0a 3et :i"t

aer S irQe Neut" 9 #'.4

!9ter'::(. 3et::'-t I

t*e P*7 (At '0*e")

l e t * 0 ' * *.

i lb i

ad Ihe 3;gi ;ggig J[ ;; inC ALI';N ltate*ents f or t~ese Onant,el 5 r g[e,

.

5able 3.3 2 are more restr'ct've arc t*eref*re. acclicaele, __

f Atove the P*3 (3*l000 f i c w' :er*i f3144) $tt0Cint.

9above tre D*7 anc tel:a t~e P*i Set::t9ts.

Cou0li"g $1gnals may t0 0 0cked during react:" 5tartv0.

The coron Oiluti0h fl61 Above tre P-9 (React:r trip :n Tur0ine trip Interlock) Set oint.

ACT!CN S'ATEMENTS ACTI*N 1 * a'ith tre numeer of CPERABLE nannels cre less than tne u ' - ' u t.

Channels OPERABLE reavirement, restore e inocersole cnaarel to 00E'ABLE status aitn.in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or :- in NOT $TANCBY aitnin the aent 6 nours.

A:~l*N 2 aitn t*e rumter of OPEDABLE channels 0"t less than the T0tal Numcee Of Channels. STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATICN may r::eec prosi:e: tre following c nditions are satisfied:

~~e inoperable channel is :laceo in tre tripped c rcit'on a.

aitnin 6 nours, b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE reautrement is met; neaever, the inoperable enannel may be bypassed for up to a hours for surveillance testing of other enannels per 5:ecifi:ation L.

4.3.1.1, and

,

Either. THERMAL POWER is restricted to less tnan or ecual c.

to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER ano the Power Range Neutron

1un Trio Setpoint is reduced to less tnan or ecual to EE*. of DATES THERMAL POWER within a nours; Or, the Qu 0 RANT PCwER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once :er-a 12 nours per Specification 4.2.4.2.

CCMANCHE DEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 3*5

_ _ -. -

-..

-

-- -. ~..

-.

___

.-. - _ -

_-.,

w cacrac m To, mm:v

-

Paae 6 nf 22

!.!

'.

~:-* - e:;

.

-*:s : :*!u!N'i

rt

.ee)

.

N 3 ait t e

. :e c' : ar els FE:42.E re 'ess tran te u-+-

.

'

Cnannels ;;E;;Evi *e:utrement and

'in t~e *-ERMAL ::aE; 'e.e

3el:- t e ;*6

.-te *e ' ate Oa ge Neuteca si.a

tee'::()

5etectet.

est:re tre

era:1e :rannel to :PE aB.E stit.s r,

e t:

reas g *-E: PAL ::WE: ate.e t e ;-i let::i-t.

ve t e D-f (:-te eciate Range Newt :n

'un :-te 1::()

5et:: -t :.t :ei:. ".;'. Of RATED TWERuAL PCWE4.

est:re t e

,

' : ers:le : an e1 to C ERABLE status crier to i : easi ;

T ERMAL PCaER acove 10% of RATED THERMAL PCWER.

- N4-aith teaumter :f C:EcaBLE :mannels one less inan t e u,nsmum

.

C"annels CDERABLE re:wirement, suscend all Operati:ns *,olvi g nsiti<e react'sity : ranges.

C*::N 5 aitn t*e eu.?:ee f CDERABLE :hannels one less than tre uia' um Cnannels OPE:AELE recuirement, restore tne inoceraele : anrel t: :DERABLE status itnin as nours or.ithin tre rest :ur ::en tre react:r trie :-ea(ers, suscene all operations in.olvi g positise ea:tisit;. :*anges anc verify either valve ':5-e455

.

or valves 1:5-5560, ;CV-111B,1C5-5439,1C5-E441, nac 1:5-3453 are :lesec and securea in position, and verify this :ositi:n at least once :er 14 cays inereafter.

Wi - no enannels CPERABLE com:lete all tne ateve actions witnin nours anc verify tne positions of tre aeove valves at least :nce per 14 cays inereafte.

: N 6 a'itn tne numter of OPERABLE channels'o + less than t*e *:tal Num er of Channels, 55ARTUP anc/or POWE; OPERATICN may :receec provice: tne fellowing concitions are satisfiec:

a.

Tne inocersole enannel is placed in the tri;;e: ::

1:!:n ithin 6 nours, anc b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is tet;

-ever, the inoperable channel may be bypasseo for up t: 4 "ours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 7 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE.

itnin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associatec :ermissise annunciator win 00w(s) that the interlock is in its recu1 rec state for the existing plant concition, or apply Specificat':n 3.C.3.

COMANCHE :EAK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6

'

Attachment 3 t o T U.-910M

!

Page 7 of P2

,

.

TABLE 3 3 1 (::at'- ec)

ACTION SiaTEugNT; (:3-ti ueo)

'

ACTION 3 - Witn :ne numoer of OcER&BLE :aannels ne 'ess tnan t e "i-it m Chanmis CPERABl.! recutrement, te in at least *0T !* *CB'

'

.itn19 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; newever, ore cnannel tay te cypassec *:

a t:

C nours for surveillance testing per Specificatien 4.3.'..'.

or maintenance, provicec the otter c.annel is CPERABLE.

i ACTION 9

itn the numcer of CPERABLE crannels one 'ess than t~e uimimum Channels CPERABLE recuirement, restore the sneceraole :nannel

'

to OPERABLE status aitnin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the react:r trip breakers ithin tee next hour.

ACTION 10 - With the numoer of ODERABLE channels less than the Total Numoer of Channels, coeration may c:ntinue provided the inocersele enannels are placec in the tripped conoition within 6 nours.

,

ACTION 11 - witn one of the civerse trio features (uncervoltage or shunt trip attaenment) inoperacle, restore it to OPERABLE s'.atus witnin AB nours or ceclare the breaker inoperaole anc imply ACTION B.

The breaker snall not be Dypassed while ore cf the diverse trip features is inocerable except for tne t te recuired d

for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to CFERABLE status, curing wnicn time ACTION 8 applies.

ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels ~c less than the Total

'

Number of Channels. STA,RTUP anc/or PCM t CPERATION may proceed provided the following concitions are itisfied; a.

The inoperaDie channel is placec the tripped c:ncitien within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met:

owever, D.

the inoperable channel may oe bypassed fo uptoghours for surveillance testing per Specificatiois 4.3..1 or 4.2.5.4 h;u p -

W[N NumbtA Ub W"

% Q &,L ;; e,

kadt OVG RAWr AyM}~'>

~

'T1 a,a f wJh. ekva r owM

.

W $ l1s.ml ha ln l~ blMl NCEb Y

g w & %dcna;ImeycGA~t<

b

& spa hA v

$Noni t*AMikN9

\\1 P

[

Q t C'~N 0"'N II, peisAd h W

U

'

OWGM -

. COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-7 g

,

' M W.:.;h n a % te.,'i.. e :- ::w.,

,q;94 r.:p yg&Q&

,

_.

t u>

e, n o

9,,

-- -IAllit 4.3-1-y;

<

1,=-

2'9 RI ACIDH 1 RIP sysit M lt4%IHilMINI AIION SilRVi llI ANCE RigulRIMitais 3., y

- o m

.,

m" IRIP Riu,

ANAL 0G ACillAllNG MODIS IUR

-

CllANNE L DEVICE WillCH O

CitANNI i CilANNF I OPERA 110NAL OPE RAI 10t4AL AC illAl 10t4 SIIRVI 11 i Af41 I j

c-f5 IIINCI10NAL IINII Clll CK C Al IllRAI ION 11 SI il53 IOGIC 11si I5 RIQlliRI D

,7

.. _ - - -

l d

~*

"

1.

Manual Reactor Trip H.A.

N A.

H A.

R(14)

f4 A.

I, 2,

4 , ',

!

,

i

?.

Power Rauge, Neutron ilux llegh Setpoisit 5-D(2, 4 ),

y to A to A 1, /

!.

a.

H( 3, 4 ),

4(4. 61, R(4, 5)

'

is.

tow setpoint

R(4)

S/ll( l )

to. A te A l', ?

m

,

3.

Power Range. Neutron ilux, N.A.

R(4)

Q N A.

f4 A 1, ?

.

i liigh Positive Rate

,,,

s 4.

Power Range, Neutron flux, H.A.

R(4)

Q N A.

ti A 1, /

iligh Negative Rate

"

5.

Intermediate Range,

R(4, 5)

5/U(l)

N.A.

to A.

I', ?

Neutron Ilux

'l.

f 6.

Source Range, Neutron Ilux 5 R(4, 13)

5/U(I), Q(9)

R(12)

N A.

I, 4, S

'

.

,

"

7.

Overtemperature N-16

D(2, 4 )

Q NA to A 1. ?

?

M( 3, 4 )

Q(4 b)

R(4, 5)

6.

Overpower N-16

U(2, 4 )

Q ti A.

ti A I.

R(4. 5)

9.

Pressurizer Pressure--low 5 R

Q(8)

f4 A ti ^

l 10.

Pressurizer Pressure--liiyh 5 R

Q.

f4 A to A 1. /

,

t

.

,.,

,

s-

_ _ _.

__

-.

.

. _.

.

, >

, _

I Altli 3 1-2 on O O n__

.,.

If#;INII RI11 *,All IY II Aliiki 5 AClilAIION SV511M Ita' IHtiMI Ni AIluft

,

a 2:

e 5, E-

. _

o tj

,,,

rT1 HINIHilM

.i 101Al NO.

CilANNI I 5 filANNI I 5 APPI IC A!!! I

-

O IliNCI10NAl llNii

[ q ~,jy Of LilANtil i *.

10 IRIP ist'l RAlil i Mt ihl ".

As.IlON y

-

%.

,

$

c

?E 1.

Safety injection ([CCS, Reat_ tor irip,,Ieedwater

-*

"

isniation. Control Room

~

lacryency Hecirculation, Imergency Diesel Generator Operat:on, Contaisimerit Vent isolation, Stationi ser vit.e Wat er, Phase A Isolation. Au=iliary leed-wat er-Motor Driven Pomp,

"'

.

N lu bine Trip, Component Cooling Water, Issenttal y

Ventilation Systems, and

+"

w Containment $ pray Pump.

Manual Initiatioti

?

I

/

l. 2 1. 4 b.

a.

Is.

Automatic Actuation

/

I

3. 2 l4

[

t oqic anil At tualinn Relays i

2 I, 2

Il n-Containment Pressuv e--ifigh-l

2

1. l.

I il al.

P essuriter Pr essin e--I ow

',1com Iine P es use--Iow I/ > t e.am Isne 2/slcam Iine 2/,Ir.se Iine I./. l

I/

e.

in any steam twe l

l

,

.

a>

I Alti l 1. 3_ ?..(.C_ont.in_ tie l_l

= <

-

..

.

._

o.

n, O o.

,

T

$

1 Nr.l NI_ I_.H_i 11*>A__l 1_ i__Y.. l i A l.l_lRI *, Af lilA_I IU_f4 _S__Y',I l H _ I N'.,1 H_ilMI N_ i A_l_ I_ON

--h

_

_.

.

_ _.

_.. _

_..

o, $

n Im

. '. '

HINIMuH

jw

101 Al NO.

FilAfiNi i *,

tilANNI I *.

APPI 10 Alti 1

-

O

.

I llNCI IC'4Al liNI I Of CilANNI l '.

10 1RlP Ol'1 NAlit i Hulli *.

AtiION

'

N k

2.

Containment Spray 7o a.

Mania.il liiitiationi 2 paie I laa t e

? li.i n s-1. ?. f. 4 It.

g

"*

.

opera t eil cg

"

s imie I t.incon. I y le.

Automat ic At t osation

/

?

I

?.

i. 4

/N ingic acid Actinationi Relays

<:

Containment Pressure--

/

l 1. /. I

".'

lii gti-3

.

T 3.

Containment Isolation a.

Pliase "A" Isolatiosi

"*

1)

Manual Initiationi

I

/

l. /.

1. 4 l'*

/

2)

Automatic Actuation

/

I

?

1. ?

1 4 logic and Actuation Relays

cc item 1. aleuve los all 5.elety leijes.t sosi asial aat es.

tiei. l i...r.

.i i i. i 3)

Safety injection

.

,

e eqis i s emen t,

ii.

Pliase "it" Isolat saisi

I)

H.nnal initiatson See item ?.a aleuve Please "11"

.o l.e -

1. 7 I. 4 18-tson is mann.nlly e v e t i.it cil lies:

i 4..ol a s emien t

,p ay f iien i s i.n s-m.sou e i I y s ee n t s al e.l.

G

?)

Aut omat sc As tisat seen

/

t

/

l. l.

1 4

[

I oy s t anel At t::at son I clap 3)

Con t.i i nmesil

/

I

J.

II

.

Ps essun e--!!iqli-3

- >

+

_

-

Attachment 3 to TXX-91004

.

Page 11 of

,c,

-

c

.

t

.

=

-

.

.. -

..

-

..

_.

-

.

.-.

s

..

.

<

%

-

.

.-

-

.

~,..

-

.

- - =

,

.

..

.

,

_f.

.

..

.

.,.

u

. =,

-

.

<

.

q,

.

-

E_i

-

.

-s

-

x z

-

.

.x.

e

- -

-

,

.

-

.

,

..,

--

-

w

-

...

g

< :

E. =. =

N-n

-

=,

s

,a

,

. _ 5,.

.

. s.

, :

<

-.

i.

.

-

.:

-

,

-

w

_

-

..

,

s

>-

t

.-

s-

.

=

: .: :

-

.

.;.

.

..,.

. :.

-

34,

-

-..

.

- -

-

.

=.

.

-

..s..

.

... -

g

.

-

.

. _

-

-.

,

D

<.

.

. :

--

-

s

.

-

s

..

...

.

o., =

-

- -

>

-- -

_..

~

.-

.

.s.

.

,

.

.:

=.

.. 2

-

.,;

w<

-

<

w.

.,.

,

,s

_

.,.

.

-

...

w

-

...

,, -

.

N : -

-

.

-

.

E a.,. ~> : :

E, a.

-.

F.

.

_

.

.-

.

== <.

.-

--

. -

t i>

-

.

4_

,,.

..

.

.".:

-

".'.:s

.

.,.

g w

....... =.

.

-

.

~

'

. -

.a

< '.

.

N

.*

.

c:

,.

. - -

.

-

.*

-

=

'

<

.

~

%

==

-

--

-

=.4

.

..

.

=

.-

i

_

O w w

i 9,

.

.L

-

z

.

.-

w

.

-.

,.

i w,

..

.-

..

.m

- -

s

,

-

.

=l

.'

4<

L

-

-

.,,,

.

m

.. =

m

.

.-.

-

1.s w

-

.

T

$

h

.

g

..

e a.

e.m e

p

,

"O

-

t)

.

S < <

.*

h

e

-

g"" W a=

>

".

X w

==

=

-4 W

.s "

@

lC

=

,o

= -

E

+-

.

""

"-

-

L i'

.=

=-

> - i

-

a

.-

--N d

<

,;

.-

..

p i

3>

i.

- -

'

=

a

=. ;. : -.:

,

-

tN e

7-ll*

-

= ' <

L

""

.-

a e

a

I N

E

<,

. '=

=

.

t,,,; -

-

8 c'

e Z'

L w

.

=

A

'

.

..

..I Z..

v

, +...

1.,

1...

.

1,.

s C..

.

....tt.

'

.

e~Ik

.

e

'b

.'g.

4.w-,...-,-

., w v.or v e y -

-,+-w-e,----e-t-~,--v..*m-.

- - *

-~--<-,-+--=%..==------=>-=-i,v-

,-

I Altt i 1.1-/ ((notinue.1)

y3 o

.a n (A O Ca

$."

i__ ngl:411. Iti il '.Al I i Y I I ail 3NP '. A__C.lilA I IO_N S Y% 11 M_ _I N_i_l. _Rt1MI Ni.A I ION

@

x

.-

- _... _. - _

_

.. _..._.

,, go n

r a=

(T)

%

e"8*

HINIMilM ym S

"3 A"

10lAl f 40.

tilANNIi%

t.ilANNI I S Al'I'l Ii Allii f

10_. I H _I P._

Ol'l.H_Alti l__

-

A._d.i.l ON O

Muhl s

' ' -

-. il. ANN.i l ". - -.

IUNCll0NAL l) Nil.

-

--

-

...

.

y 4.

Steam Line isolation (Continne el)

.

$

d'

el.

Steam Line Pressure--inw 3/ steam line

// steam line 2/ steam line I, i', i 1/

' ' '

@

in any,tcam

"

u line e.

$ lean line Pressure - '

1/ steam line

?/ s t eat + line

?/ team line l' ' ' '

)(

Negat ive Rate --liigli sei asiy. team I Ilet*

S.

Ius-laine irip azul w

D f eedwater isolation

.

'

;*

a.

Aistomatic Actuation

?

J 1. ?

..

'd; lugic anal Actuatios Relays le.

Steam Genierator 3/sta. eiesi. " 2/sta. 9esi.

2/stm 9.'s a 1. /

/

Water Level--

in any sim.

liigh-liiyh gen.

all 5.atety injettinn snel.esinq lun.ts..u.

.n.. i Sately injection

ee item I

.

....

.

c.

eque:ements.

6.

Auxiiiary Ieedwater Automat ic Ac t ual inn I nuit

1

1, /, i l's a.

anal Actisat ion Ref.iys

Si en 1;en. Wates ieveI--

'

low-low 1/. t =

q. p I. /, t II

tant Hutne-4/.tm qen

// tm e gen I)

.r Driven Pamips asi any opt -

t n c.no li at s sig s tsu gen ope.eliny sta y. s e

.

1b m

..

.

l ll ill l

ll'il

' $ " % * y]

.

>*

,,,5,a'~

mlacm w O^

.

-

U

.

n b

h n

.

f.

i

'

t

.

t i

!

t e

i s

..

i l

.

i n

i q

n i

!

.

l

,

'

,

h *

't Ai a

l t

I I

i l

t l

n u

i ih

.

l.

i t J

i

.

J

/

l P

A.

l'

n

.

l._

A i

e

1

fa e

ti.

I i.

,

lm.

p i

n n

p

.

-

q i

m 4'

p f

I

.

n n o

i.

1 b i p t

e p

n

-

.,

l

n i. i e

t

!

l m

.

e W

l A

i l f

i l.

l f

t ei l

e l

/

A

. m a

).

l f

t

/ npi l

A i.

'

l i

1'l 1 i I

i

~

i c

i O

n

.

f t e

l i

i i

e t

e

. u In l.

.

g o..

l.

n n

r o

p f.

A.

-

i f

i (.

l

i t

ti n

p i

>

u l'

.

i. -

c n

p l

I p

/

E.

l l.

f

.

w n

.

A..

f l.

mue a

o.

i.

W i i I

i

!

.

. ap t

e l

l l

I

'..

Al

/ n i

/

m i.

l A

i l

i 0 i

i f1.

/

l e '.

in i

?

t I

t i.

l e

Al A

n.

m l

l re

l

'.

t s

)

l.

n e

m

-

p I i e

ii p

p l t es u

l f t

.

e. e n p

i t

A f

l

a A.l A!.

m a

W

!

e l

/

I l,

A t

D

i

/

I O

I

?

t.

)

-

?

l.

l e

l.

e s

S i

n e

i.. _

n mg C

f C

o r t

i I t l

t P

e n

nn i

l.

n -

w o e n

on-om euo e

f i

C n e P e e n

t t (

ip nv v n n

ni aa s

n oi e i i.

is na uu i

t r

v n

s r

l t

t

ap i t t t e u l'

)

i

r Mm

t n

.t t

t -

s - o o-s ao AA t

l a

n l

I e

ler f

s l p

P ip C

l i

w o

u m

l om l

t t i f

i s

v ut Ot i u A rt u u

n t

i i

e ai o - o n l'

e o l'

ns t a l

,

i Ma c

f M

a s

l.

I

'1,

y o

n oa n

mc y f

f t i

,

s e wt e ce oia l.

l t

-

i fi.

y es s,

plir v s

v t gl s p r l

a,

)

t a

- ami ni uoe eai t

i

?

i.-

t, ot or ret r a

f.

AI l i

Al.

s

'. *

t

'>

)

Sil mi.,

I l'

I I ot

.

fO n

t u

I A

a A %.e.

i.

u l

e a

0 _.

f i

l _

l

/

,,. U., " M 'J

'- 1

..,

,

d

.,.., '

...

.i

,

'

l I

l

,ft jllllll!

lll

,

llll

Attathment 3 to YU Yf0F4

_ _ _. _ _ _. _. ~. _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ -,. _

,

Page 14 of 22

,

.

-

.

..,

_

.d

.

I

_

.-

--

-

C-

-

,

,,

..

.

.-

-

.

_2 ;

. _

-

.

,

s.

..

,

.

-

..

-

_.

.

-

.

a

=

.-

-.

--

-

>

-

_=

,.

-

_

.

_-.

.

%

.

.,

W

-

-.,

._

h_,w

.. mF

..,,

-

.

_

,.

,

-,

_.

, --

_.

-

_

<\\

,

<

-e

.

-

e h4

.

v

._

_

.

.,

.

-,

.

_

.

._

~_

.

_.

ei

.

_

,

s x

s s

=

.s x_

s_

_.

,

-

.

r.,

-a

_.

>

-

.

..

-_.

s,

.

-

.-

-

.

i -.

-

_. = < __

_

-

_.... -.

.

_._ _

.

-. _

..

g I

-

.

s.ep

.

h W W 9 i

8

.

t

~

-e e

'. li G

.

g.

:

(

8'

wI

-

.s W,l

.

/

w*

-w,p

g W-

.*

.

-

/.

W

-

.a

.

-

.GW O

,

M

.

?

98l m

)

.

N.

h

%

\\

'%

N'

= =. *

",

N N

N g

.

edn

.

N O.

.*

!.

<

Z,.".C.

l me

.

i

,,,

-

.*

e p

.h o

e.

.e" y

@.

-

=. aa.n.

.

S Zl i.,,J ** '

b

,

g-

,,,

M

.h ese 6

,

d.D

. <,

a.

W

.

4E

.

W 8t'*

.e t

e.'.'

.

@

..O

.my

@UWd

.A.

.f.

.L

-

.

o

,.

aus.?.

O.

.D e.6 e.tber e6 e.eg.

e

& W

.

M u.mp e

t N'

ei.

e W

ene gp e

e e.gf

.p.

W

\\

_.

g%.-4.

E'"

l N

N N

N

",

'. %

N

%-'

==e-,,s

.

m -

."

w W.S gm.

888 8-

'

.m, i

.a s O..

t Im f

W me

%

e

&

w-o W

l

e.

.-

.

g

.

O,.

-.

.

."'

-

.-

-

at I.

W M

es.

es,

T =

.

e g

my

.*

ed ese

2; O

'E

%

>

.= W

J

~

=

+

-

==

= *s Q A e4 6 O ".

O 0"

O O

r

-

2"

*

3.t

. 1

>

%

.

,

.

W

.

M as

."W M

gir W

=

h, e

.$.=

. g

'.r

L

' ' * *

.&

.

=~

o e ***

.O

U

.'

e ul

e#

" >

= >

e W

up

.e S-w

~

=

-

==i s

E E

L'

m.

O i

L L

- -

-

"'""

1 Q^

t J,,.,.L.,

@

.&. **./

7

J C'

==

= f,.,) *;l'

=.=,

.=

w-

& *:

a

-

L i

E

J

.W

...

-A-s.

-

.s,

.

..

_

gne

.w

'.I.e.

.

=,,

., a e'

a-es.

e.

,

_v m

W =

W

<88 A

em. am

.

ur w

,f,

,m,,,

,,,,3

.,.,

-n

>

i s.

-

um up my g

g,.

~

- es

> b

> k

>

'-

-

--

u

.

y s.. : A a i e v,

a

>

> 6

~

'"

.

wy

.-

.D dW eW 9W g

.OW O

6 -

.

..

~.

W

'

.

a.m g

.8.

i W

M

4.enug e.-

q,gs

-*

,

ggg

, gg

.W

=-

.M.

.%

.E4

.

- 6

~

se t

--

em 4-v W

'M O

W.

W

~.,

.a

.sup enig ap 4iB.

m 7.

w GE f J =' O J A

@A

.3

4

T" O O.

E

ep ea

.

I, n

w we,

et c,,,,..m=

A,.h.

..

.d

- ",, '

W '"

.. =, 5

,

.n.no

.

.9

%9 e.

.

"

.,

.

-

,).~

.

t

+

,e e

==

,.

==

w

.

s.e.e i

9-s W

Wk t

W I

ap4

.k

.. <g i..m

..4, k,

,,g

}j

s,,t

9as,I

.

-s

-

.

+

.

-.e4

,+-,%-

.m.-,-.<

.-en7.-,-.,

,-#-,r.

.,,

w-

,.c,,..

.., -,,,,,.. -., _

mn

.,--.m.+-rme-.w..1

.-rw.e-v.,r+.--

..-.c,.

.

. m>;

-

'

I Altli

.t.1-2 (l.out ino. ii)

$$

,

O o

-'

,

--

INGINI I 11111 ?.Al i lY l i All1RI *. AllllAiION '.)'ill H IN' littiMi N! AlluN

8 5-5 o=

+-

r HI N IHilH m

!

101Al N()

tilANNI I S CilANNI i *.

Al*l*l IC Alli i yw[

,',;

2-1IINClIONAL llNli Of EllANNI i *.

10 litit'

Ol*l RAllt i H001 *>

AtiION

-

oi

-4 -

li.

Salety injection See Item 1. aliove 1or a l i *.elet y in let I ion ini t ial in.1 line. I a nn..inil

i

[

_z requieements

,g ;

.

Ss,

10.

Ingineered Safety features

, '

-

As.tuationi System Interlocks a.

I'ressurizer l'ressure,

.1

?

l. ?.

I li!

J

,

l'-11 is.

Reactor Irili, l'-4

/

1. ?.

!

/88

!

II.

Solid State Saf enisas-ds w

'

,

s Sequencer (5555)

Salety injettion 1/ t r.s i n 1/t r.iin I/ train 1. /.

1. 4

N w

h a.

Sequence b.

tilackout Sequence I/ train 1/ t r.iin 1/ train I, 7 1. 4

.",

!

.

I

L

!

l

!

-

- -

--

-

Attachment 3 to TXX-910M C

Page 16 of 22

.

BLE 3 3 : I::at*m.ec)

,

BLE NC~a*::NS 3'

<unctic may te clectec inis *CCE :elow t*e ; ;; (;ress ri:er ;-essure

nter'c:x) 5etecint.

0*rt: * r:ti:n aut:mati: ally 0 0:Kec scove ;-11 anc tay :e or:10:se: :etc. ; ;;

.

j t'::.'ag t~e safet. I-jection on lo. steam lire Oress.re.

C Not 3:cli:acie

'd enen af'ected tain steam isolation valve anc 'ts 35100 stec v: stream crain ct 'sciation valve Oer steam line is closec The provisions of 5:ecification 4.0.4 are not applicaele for entry into MCCE 3.

'The cnannel.nien provices a steam generator.ater level controi signa) (if one of three specific trip channels is selected to provice ircut into steam

_g3nerat:r.ater level control) must te placec in the trippec conciti:n witnin G I ncur anc t,aintainec in tne tri: ec concition witn tne exception trat the enannel may te taken out of the tri ced concition for up to p eurs to all:*

testing of recuncant :nanne15.

fNot 3::ticaele i' Preferrec Offsite Source Breater is open.

ACTICN STATEMENTS ACTICN 12 - Wit's the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimus Cnannels OPERABLE reouirement, ce in at ' east HOT STANOBv within 12 nours anc in COLD SHUTDOWN within tu following 30 nours;

-

50.ever, one channel may te bypassed.fr.

up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for survet11ance testing per Specification

,3.2.1, proviced the otner enannel is OPERAB1.E.

I b

ACTION 13 - With the numeer of OPERABLE channels one less tnan tre Tctal Num:er of Cnannels, operation may proceed until performance of tne next reouired ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATICNAL TEST proviced the inocerable enannel is placed in the tricoea concition witnin k

1 nour.

ACTION 14 - With tne numeer of OPERABLE channels one less than tne Total Number of Channels, oparation may proceed provided the inoper-able channel is placed in the bypassed conoition anc the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met.

One additional enannel

. may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per I

i Specification 4. 3.2.1.

...

ACTION 15 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE recuirement, opera-tion mey contince'provided the containment pressure relief valves are closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ano maintained closec.

ACT!CN 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channvis one less tnan the Minimum Channels OPERABLE reouirement, restore the inoperaele enannel to OPERABLE status within 48 nours or be in at least HOT STANOBt witnin the next 6 nours and in COLD SHUTDOWN witnin the following 30 nours.

CCMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-22

..

.

_ _

__

__.

_

_ _.

_

._

_

Attachment 3 to 1XX-91084

.

.Page 18 of 22 121.E ' !

>::-t -_ect

.

.;

N :*;TEuENTS (::nt'aued)

1.CT':N 2A witn tre numcer of CPERABLE :nannels one less taan t e ud-um Chanrels CEERaELE #ecuirement, eestore tre 'r:ceracie : aaael te CPERABLE status.itntn 38 hours4.398148e-4 days 0.0106 hours 6.283069e-5 weeks 1.4459e-5 months or 'n'tiate inc at-ta n

erati:n of t~e C ntrol Room E ergency Recir:viat :n 2,-stem

.;;;;9 ;5

.it-t e numcer c' ODERAELE :nannels on One or more-a,as less inan t'e 'd'"imum "'3nrels 2EEEABLE recuirement.

eClare *. e

-

Otesei eneratorts) associatec itn the affectec tr3t is)

inopera0 le anc a:Oly tre appropriate ACTl;N for ice: 1*,

3 1cn 3. 3.1.1.

-

L

--

hCIICN;6-ith tre number of CPERABLE :nannels one less than t e Total lumber of Channels. STARTUP anc/cr DOWER OPERATION taf

- ceec

'

proviced the following ::ncitions are satisfied; a.

The ine:ersele cnannel is placea in a trippec ::nciti:n witnin 6 nours, and c.

The Minimum Channels CPERABLE recuirement is ' et.

wever, one accittonal channel may be cypassed for up t: ; ncurs for surveillance testing of other enannels per j

becification 4.3.2.1. f

,,

Uih h Nae-0 f& SA D{& bay); opq, fr77 (~1C lf" Er4 ~ 1%,- % M(. sin oJ)ckA OPGPaolg,c,

.,;<<m,J

<1(Jbnf N 5 *(belb cbsw O O Y A0bh at b!

t Ir w m he7 o % s wr a nboy w ut s twa sila Colb THu1%) v;A,,,& l,\\\\a, n

3 o k o.I n 1 *

h aw tp sA, C A b e U $ 8 s4 f t bs(fu l t cl n

b v.3.31, pod;L,ruever%mdifiqp up +ey boaa T ec.f;<,,.o a f

aLoAcL dnoMMGM CCMANCHE EAK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-24

.

_

-

.

renacnmenr'no MWus4 -

~ - " ^ ' " - - - -

- -

'~

- ~ -

~ " - - ^ ~ - - -

Page 17 of 22

-

'

BLE : :-2 /::-t weci

CT:CN !*A*gugyT; (;; t.auec:

tai

CT::N 17 - witn tre numcer P C ~::BLE : s-nei e less t ar. e

Numeer P tanne's #14E m '-- A ;?:^ r ::V a:. :-::eeo

rovice: t e folic.ing conoi:1:ns are satisfiec: df e 'aflu N

e 7m :erstle enannel is : lace:

'n :ne tr,::e: :: : ti:n, g m

,

aitnin e nours, anc w

j

.

"e M -i'"um CPar els CE! ABLE "eOuire*ent is *et;

wever.

@** g\\

I One a citional cnannel may te cypasseo for w: t: a cours for surveillance testing of otner cnannels :er 5:ecifica-tien 4.3.u.,..

'=gs 3 a. s ACTION iS - With less than tre Minimum Number of Channels OPEPABLE,.itnin '"O{

1 nour :etermire y ceservation of the associated cermissive g.-s

'

o annuncist:r inen ( s) inat the interlock is in its recu1 rec

! @

s**te for the ee sting plant concition, or a: Ply $0ec1 #4 cationjg kg

""

3.0.3.

evi ACTICN 19 - witn :ne number of OPERABLE ce nnels one less than the Minimum

).5 Channels CPERABLE recuirement be in at least HOT STANDBY within

ggb6 X nours arc !- " ' a $ e *- HOT SHUTOOWN within tne f ol1owing 6 h urs; nowever, one channel may be bypassed for up to X nours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 proviced the other enannel is OPERABLE.

L W

ACTICN 00 - with the numeer of OPERABLE channels o ? less than the Total k w=

Number of Channels, rest:re the inopert: 1e channel to CPERABL 4*

status aitnin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or De in at least HOT STANDBY witnin Q* "5 6 no.rs anc in at M ast M0T SHUTOCWN witnin the following 5O 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

P-ACTION 21 Witn tre num er of OPERABLE crannels one less tnan the Total r>g"/

Numoer of Channels, restore the inoperaole cnannel to CPERABL: y

.3 status itnin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or ceclare the associatea valve inoperyT.,dD

.o acle and take tne ACTION recuired ey Specification 3.7.1.5.

'WA ACTION 42 - With the number of OPERABLE ch nnels one less tnan the Minimum p M b gnannels CPERABLE recuirement, ae in at least H

hcars;however,onechannelmaycecypassedforuptoff'heurs for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 proficed the other enannel is OPERABLE.

ACT!DN 23 - with tne nuv er of OPERABLE channels one less than tne Total Num:Er ;f Channels, STARTUP anc/cr POWER OPERATION may proceeo provicea tne following conditions are satisfied:

The inocerable channel is placed in the tripped concition a.

aitnin 6 nours, anc The Minimum Channels OPERABLE reovirement is met.

b.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-23

_

_-

,

>% on 7$

w o * x 7 $ c E-(

,$o *- [

a'

s

.'

u e

I a

I

1

~

e

i l

ni

.

s

1

1 t

t

,

.

l I

t l

l i

el

.

1 e

.

,

.

WI

.

'

V1

/

?

J

/

t

l

.

,

.

l

l IO I.

l'

h l

i

1

1 I

I t 1

.

Y IVAI A1 A

A A

n A

l l I

i N

o N

t

> i t

I i

t f

t t

ti

s e

)

1 nI m

I A

A A

A n

A A

.

_

lV.

l

4 i

o

4 i

H

t s

t t

I'

f t

f l

o l.

.

i t

t

i i I

.

l I N

I

.

O A1

.

l u.

.

I l

A l

A A

A a

.

I.

I

A

l N

N t

l o

i N

N AI N

i t

i N

ew n

l ll A

.

k N

'i.

i

.a U

l.

n t

I I

'4 o

)

)

l I

t I

?

/

7

/

i A( A l

l'

l I

R I.

l l

I I Vl A

,

.

,

H

'

ec

I

l J

j s

Rl l

l

l AiO1 N

(

l i

}

i.

l l.

d N-n

'!

'V I I

"

SM.

.

l

'

A y

!

I

&

t

!

iR t

t d i l.

u e

l

.

t li.

I l

l 2"

.

a j

Nl

>

l l

i A

.

A

.

l t

-

l i

.

A.

A

i f iH-I.

l t i A

n AAl l

t

.

N N

N l.

Nl l'

l I

/

l

.

f t

a H

N ACOI n

I A i-N-

Sh.

r

il

fo

.

ki.

I i t

l.

l e

.

H AV.

l l

I A

v I

i

^[

l -

R I

l n

.

I

.

Nli l

i l.

i.

t

.

..

t

.

y-Al

.

I A.

i-

I R

R R

H

-

I i'

I l

.

l-m A. -

'

e

-

I

-

t I

NK

I 4~

NI

.

A A

A

.

Al

.

A I

i t

.

i-l t i

n

N N

.

i-

I i N

e e

e

.

m t

t I

s G

n i

i

>

.

N-ia l

t I-e e

i li

&

'

l l

'

g Oy e

I(

u s

w V

a t.

-

e l

C o

k

)

t el r

n n

e ael t l s

l e

i l

l

- h u

g r o ao i

t f

e o

-

i e

i

.

a rv nv n

ia d

re wt a

t i i

t st er rr

i a

)

ie

t e

ee r

a Gg t

rl W

t (

l f

s e

l e-

-

e no el t

s g

r a

f i

l

-

n u

i u

e g

wt l t j

rav re l n

-

I i v N

n.o I

I i.n en n

eur l'

Ai l

D e

ol

-

l l

wqe e

i D e o

-

i v e i

l I I l.

s y

l'

I

_

t t el oel Ve V e.

V y V y y

v x.

o

.

l al

-

k t k

n.

k a V

n.

V i

e i

Nl

. I s

l k c s

l r

t t

t e

NA s

e n

<

l 9l 0l l

n 0l s

9i 9u

) l AN w

n e

i. *. C I

f t

i

'

o o

s

. o o

o

. o

l S i.

O l

(

f n

i CI m

W.

a.

.ve b *>

6 a v

6V 4V 4U

i

.

e

-

'

0"

JC t

e.

I e

s0s f

l l

ul. n.

e o8 y

.

s.

.

i

.

i AI '

l S 4S i.

c l

e I

I a

t I

.

/

1

,

61n "n 7. ;,_

.

i-

," Zm

,

-

,

'

s g

' e

'

,

<

4

I i

I!

ikli

{!

,i,'

$

-

_-_

i ni_ll i__.__4___

l- /__ ( Cun.i.. s e_n.se 1_ )

.,02

_

_._

. _.

$de

1

' All lY II AlilR! N ACillAi10t1 SYsilil Ird'.IRilill til A1luf4 gg I le'.lHi i ill 1)

--

-"

- - -

.,gggg g j g g, j-jggggg g g,g gy gj j a,-

- - - - -- -

.

%

z

. t..

I R il'

.

Holli '.

M" AfiAlUG Af lilAl ING

?

tilANf41 i til VItl IIN. l i l'

'.I AVI i Hit WilliII E

3,

~

CilANNI i l'llANNI I UI'l RAI lutlAl Ol'l RAI IONAl At lilA i 1011 til i M RIIAY * Ill!VI il 1 Alp I

-

,

'

O

,

^

.E I IINC i 10NAl llNI I (111 CK 1 Al illRAIlull l l '. !

11 '.I I Os.ll: 11'.I 11 *.I 11 '.1 l'. til yellRI O

{

CilAf4NI l

'

$=

-

o

e

s.

Canil oi Ruum iseralency

~

fleiirrufatinn

.i.

Manual luitiaison N.A.

fl. A.

id. A.

R ti A.

II A f4 A All l eer.si l '.alel y f ee lei l son 'au ve i l lani c Reiioni w ul

aiety injettinn

's ee llem 1.

alisiv e-le.

.

10.

I nigineere

Pressuriter fi. A.

R Q

NA il A.

id A il ^

1.*.

i a.

l'res'.ure, l'- 11 te.

Reatto I r ip, l'-4 H.A.

f4 A.

f4. A.

1:

N A.

f4 A fJ A

. '.

I'

Ii.

'.u l iil 'il al e 'ia l enlis.n al.

cagnent.cr ( M% )
..alely injeniinn il A.
R ti. A H( l. l.4, f4 A.
fd A il A I.
i. 8
'
.
'
a.
' esguesu e
' esinent e NA R
li. A.
N( l. l.4 )
fd A
3 ^
I8 ^
8-
' - I i
'
-
le.
til.u.kinal
.
,
l
.
+
,
- - _
____. =_
-
-
-
Attachment 3 to TXX-910N
-
'
,Page 21 of 22
'
ya3 y :yp, :- ~
,
EASES 3 ' i '. vc 3/4 3.2 EAC7 R
'O'D ~ M :" rc EN3INEE EO 54FE7- ::Ai d E5
<
l'.. - _,..;, 5, ITEM V:Mca The 0;ERAB
.!*
' tne Eeactor
D Ustem ano the Engineerec safety O
eat, es Actuat1:r i. stem !nstrumentation anc interlocks ensures inst: (i) tre
/P associateo ACT :N a n or React 0r tr'c.111 ce init13:ea wnen the carameter
.-
monitorec cy eacn anrel or como19ation thereof reacnes its Setoot-t (2) the g
spec 1fi ec coincicence :gic anc suf#i:1e" "ecuncanc; is maintairec t: permit j h'
a channei to Oe out of-service !0r testing or maintenance consistent.ith main-
-
taining an appropriate level of reliaDility of the reactor protect'on and eng1-Q.h neerec safety features instrumentation, ano (3) suf ficient system f unctional capacility is avallacle from civerse carameters.
%

The OPERASIL:TY of these systems is recuirec to provide the oser311 j} 3-P reliacility, recuncancy, and diversity assumeo availaole in the facility design
,
}
for the protection and mitigation of accicent anc transient conditions.
T"e-3 integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent aith the assumptiers
'3
$
used in the safety analyses.
The Surveillance Reauirements scecifiec for trese D
systems ensure tnat tne overall system functional caca011ity is maintained com-
[ p '. t paracle to the origi9al cesign stancarcs. Th? periccic surveillance tests per-
,,, Q formec at the minimum frecuencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
g 3 "y >
pec'fiec surveillance intervals anc surveillahG
'
and maintenance outuge times ave oeen ceterminea in accorcance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Surveillance s
k ruquencies anc Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation 3i N System" and supplements to M *reportfas approved t the NRC and documentea in
}- +. y the "..
(letter to J-J t m c '-- Uc O. M tQ
"c-ei dated February 21, 10857, n s
N Wdds 4 W d 5::;-
by e(
y The Engineerea Safety 4atures actea(.ye s ion Systent. strumentation, trip g
,
_
Q ],y h are set for eacn functional unit.
A 5etpoint is cons ;ered to be adjust h
Setcoints spec 1fied 'n Table 3.3-3 are tne nominal va es at which the c' tables c-
-

consistent with tre nominal value s en the "as measureo" 5etpoint is witnin f
Ib n
e g g g the cana allowec for calitration acc racy.
.g
T. -
~
To accommocate tne instrument crift assumea to occur cetween Joerational 3t
. tests anc the accuracy to which Setpoints can ce measured and calibrated,
"
d4 Allowaole values for ne Setcoint-have ceen specifiec in Tacle 3.3-3, Opera-F I
"
tion with Setpoints less conservasive tnan the Trip Setpoint but withir. tne
Allowaole value is acceptacle since an allowance has teen made in the safety D.,
analysis to accommocate this error.
An optional provision nas been included a
for cetermining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found
.?
to exceed the Allowable Value.
The methodology of this option utilices the m
"as measured" deviation from tne specified calibration point for rack and
sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other U
uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calicrating tne instrumentation.
In Ecuation 2,2-1, 2+R+5( TA, the,nteractive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, anc the "as measurea" values of the errors are considered.
Z, as specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis exclucing those associated with the sensor anc rack crift anc tre accuracy of their measurement.
TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in cercent scan, R or Rack Error is the as measured" d
deviation, in the percent spar, for tne affectec cnannel from the specified Trip 5etcoint.
3 or Sensor Error is eitner the "as measured" ceviation of COMANCHE ;EAK - UNIT 1 3 3/4 3-1
Attachment 1 tn TU-91 W
.
Page ?" of
"

.
'ysi q ugNTl.T* ?,
EASE 5
_,.,
EACTOR T

UO 5VSTEM anc ENGINEE E0 I?JEn 'EaiiME5 1CTUATICN 515?Eu
'N5H M NTATION (Untinueci
ne sensor f em ts calieration point or the value speci'ied in Ta 1e 3.3-),
n cercent scan. * om the analysis assumot1:ns.
Use of Ecuatiun 2.2-1 31'c s for a sensor crift factor, an increaseo racx crift factor, anc cr vices a inresnold value for REPCRTABLE EVENTS.
Tre metncaciogy to ::erive the Tric setooints i2 based ucon c:moining all of the uncertainties in the cnannels.
Innerent to the cetermination of the Trip 5etooints are the magnituces of these channel uncertainties.
Sensor and rack instrumentation utili:eo in these cnannels are exoected to De cacaole of coerating within the allcwances of these uncertainty magnitudes Rack cr1ft in excess of the Aliowable Value exnibits the behavior that the rack nas not met its alic*ance.
Being that nere is a small statistical chance that this will nappen, an infrequent excessive crift is expected.
Rack or sensor cr1ft.
d in excess of the alic ance that is more than oc:asional, may te indicatr.e of h, 9 more serious croelems anc snoulo warrant f urtner investigation.
The measurement of response time specified in the Technical Requirements Manual at the specified frequencies pr0vides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineerec Safety Features actuation associated witn each channel is completed within the time limit assumeo in the safety analyses.
No crecit was taken in the analyses for those cnannels witn response times indicatet as not applicaole.
Response time may be cemonstrated by any 5eries of sequential, overlaccing, or tctal channel test measurements provi:ed that sucn tests
~
demonstrate the total channel response time as define:.
Sensor respcnse time verification may te cemonstrated d, eitner:
(1) in c sce, onsite, or offsite
-
test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors.ith t rtified response time.
The Engineerec Safety Features Actuation System senses selectec plant carameters and ::etermines wnether or not predetermined limits are ceing exceecea.
If they are, the signals are comoined into logic matrices sensitive

to combinations incicative of various accicents events, and transients.
Once the requirec logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineerec Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition.
As an example, the follcwing actions may te initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident:
(1) ECCS pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumos start and automatic valves position (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feect.ater pumos start and autcmatic valves position, (10) station arvice water pumps start and automatic valves position, (11) Control Room Emergency Recirculation starts, and (12) essential ventilation systems (safety chilled water, electrical area f ans, primary plant ventilation ESF exhaust f ans, battery room exhaust f ans, and UD5 ventilatien) start.
CMANCHE ;EAA - UNIT 1 S 3/4 3-2
_
__
__ _____
_____ _ _ _ _. _ _
__ _
-
'd M iao 16/PO<PO X1 291 53Sd3 DdN WOdd

.
4 C A S E==-
l CITIZENS ASSN. FOR SOUND ENERGY)
March 29, 1991 Nr. W. Vice Chairman TU Electric 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 1900 Dallas, Texas 75201
Dear Mr. Counsil:
Subject:
Scaling Calculation Dispute Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),
Units i and 2. Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 Re:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Final Report
.
Addressing Scaling for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Unit 1, Enclosure 1, dated: February 1991 CASE is in receipt of the referenced U. S. Nuclear Re9ulatory Commission (NRC) final report encompassing:
1.
the U. S. NRC letter to CASE President Mrs. Juanita Ellis, dated February 27, 1991, responding to the dispute regarding the scaling calculation issue at CPSES; 2.
the U. S. NRC scaling calculation final report; and the U. S. NRC Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-3.
445/90-47; 50-446/90-47), dated February 26, 1991, reporting NRC inspection results conducted December 14, 1990, througn February 21, 1991, encomoucsing the scaling calculation pro 9 ram at CFSES.

The NRC inspection report identified "the failure to promptly identify and i
correct deficiencies with scalir.g documentation for initial setup and calibration of instrumentation lbops.
Additionally, the NRC was concerned
"
that "significant involvement from a fonner employee and from CASE over an extended period of time" was required "before the deficiencias with scaling documentation were adequately identified and corrected."
The Notice of Violation reported that TU Electric was in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," for the problems identified by the fonner employee during the 1986/1987 time frame which were not corrected to the satisfaction of the NRC until 1990.
The NRC recuested TU Electric to provide, within 60 days (of February 26, 1991), "a written explanation of how scaling activities will be performed for CPSES, Unit 2, to assure that documentation problems are prevented or
'

.
e
.m
.,, -,,
c
-
-
_
p
-
.
.
---
- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
C
'd CE: 40 16/roero G ist 33sep Dw wogy
'
.
.
promptly identified and corrected.
Also, because of our (the NRC's) concern with your [TU Electric's) delay in responding to an employee's concern in this instance, we [the NRC) recuest that you (TV Electric) provide a written response describing how employee concerns will be handled to prevent delays and to encourage prompt identification and correction of potential safety issues."
We are therefore providing, for your evaluation in responding to the NRC, what is intended to be constructive input resulting from our review of the referenced report.
Additionally, even though the NRC considers TU Electric's actions (in this instance) regarding the " corrective action" issues to be acceptable, and has not reovired a written response, CASE feels obligated to address the matter of corrective action as well as the other violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. reported in our final report of July 9, 1990.
.
The r.any-f aceted concarns raised in the CASE draf t report of December 6, 1989, followed by the detailed CASE final report of July 9,1990, reported
.. both the safety-related and balance-of-plant progrunnstic and technical
t. 'ng issues for CPSES, Unit 1, as well as violations of 13 of the 18 criteria of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
In CASE's view, the balance-of-plant programmatic and technical scaling issues also had safety-related implications.
As reported by the NRC in its inspection report, scaling concerns were
-
initially raised (by Mr. Gary Bodiford) in the 1986/1987 time frame.
Additionally, these concerns were included in one of a few lawsuits which were outstanding at the time of the July 1988 CASE /TU Electric Settlement TU Electric Agreement and CASE /TV Electric /NRC Staff Joint Stipulation.
committed to work with CASE to try to resolve Hr. Bodiford's concerns; these concerns, however, were still not resolved as late as 1990.
CASE nowever, also recognizes and appreciates the efforts of TU Electric subsecuent to the initial meeting of May 1989 between Mr. Bodiford, TU Electric, and CASE to investigate and resolve the scaling concerns identified by Mr. Bodiford. CASE does not agree with the recently stated position of TU Electric that the scaling project was intended to be merely an "sid" to the I&C and Operations field effort. This was never CASE's understanding of the purpose of the scaling calculation program at CPSES. Had that been the case, we would certainly not have devoted the massive amount of time, money, and effort to the identification, articulation, documentation, and resolution of Mr. Bodiford's concerns which we invested. Had that been the case, there were many other safety-related issues to which CASE could have, and would have, devoted its resources.
Further, even had that been the case, once a commitment was made by TU Electric (beginning as early as 1979 with the inception of the scaling program conducted by Westinghouse) that the scaling calculation program was to be included and covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, from that point on the TV Electric inspection and audit program should
)
- - - - -_ - ___ - _ - - - __ - _
_
_ _
_
_
___
_ _.
_ _
.-
_
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _. _
~ _ _ ___
_ _- _
___
r
d PG:40 16er0/r0 x1 ES: $35d3 3dN WOdd

.
,

.
.
have come fully into play and cruentiv identified and corrected the problems identified by Mr. Bodiford and CASE.
Additionally, CASE remains extremely concerned that TU Electric appears to have chet'n to select Criterion XI, Test Control, of 10 CFR Part 60, Appendix B, as the sole management standard (irrespective of all others) to control and assure that the safety-related activities were effective in At a minimum TU Electric has implementing the scaling calculation program.
apparent 1y' disregarded equally important oravantico aspects of 10 CFR Part assuring quality over cost and sdtedule and that 50, Appendix 8, such as:
an appropriate quality assurance program is effectively developed, maintained, and executed, including that of the contractor (s) (Criterion I, Organization); assuring that the quality assurance program is regularly reviewed for both status and adequacy (Criterion II, Quality Assurance Program); assuring that design bases are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions, and that deviat1ons
-
from such standards are controlled including verifying or diecking the adequacy of design (Criterion III, Design); assuring that purchased services conform to precurement requirements (Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Naterial Equipment, and Services); and, that audits am carried out to verify compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance program (Criterion XVIII, Audits),
As previously stated, however, throughout LASE's involvement with Mr.
Bodiford and TU Electric, the scaling effort was always visibly administered as a safety-related pro, lect, attempting to implement (by pnscess of the organizational and prograematic controls by'both the contractor and TV Electric), the teneta of 10 CFR Part 60 Appendix 8.
Nothing else was expected, and nothing less should have been achieved during the conduct of Two previous vendors (Westinghouse and 01bba a Hill) to the the program.
present organization (Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, SWEC) were contracted by TU Electric in an attempt to achieve a satisfactory and product (scaling calculations) which required all the discipline and checks and balances included in 10 CFR Part 60, Appendix B.
This won not achieved by the implementation of either the contractors' or-the utility's Quality Assurance programs.
CASE does not agree that the only violation to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, involved Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action" (although we certainly agree that criterion XVI was violated). At a minimum, CASE suggests that TU Electric closely evaluate the Audit and Surveillance progress administered by both the contractors and TU Electric to evaluate why the many inspections conducted by these organizations f ailed to adequately follow-up on the concerns identified by Mr. Bodiford to: the contractor (SutC) in the 1966/1987 time frame; the SAFETEAM in November of 1987; and by TU Electric in May 1988 (ME-190g7).
It is the assessment of CASE that each of these organizations totally failed to conduct critical examinations in accordance with critarion XVIII, " Audits." which should have detected and corrected the various violations identified in the CASE reports. A dynamic, properly
~ ~.
.
..
-
- -_.
-
- - -. -.-
- - - - - -
..
.
. - -. - _ -
-
S
'd 55840 16/ro/ro X.L Di S3Sd3 DdN WQdd

.
.*
.
i implemented Qt. audit program has the capability of, and is relied upon for, detecting and correcting programatic and implementation deficiencies and weaknesses associated with the other seventeen Criteria of Appendix 8.
In fact, it is CASE's further evaluation that had the special audit (ATP-89-1468) not been performed with the significant planning input and in-process monitoring by CASE (i.e., Gary Sodiford and CASE Consultant Owen Thero),
the issues identified by the audit, which resulted in resolution of the many audit deficiencies / observations and the significant action plan developed by TU Electric, would not have occurred. This programatic failure of the audit and surveillance programs, in CASE's assessment, must be evaluated as a potential root cause for the breakdown in the project's corrective action program.
It is also CASE's assessment that TU Electric should not take solace in the fact that the NRC (see Section VII. General Conclusions, NRC Final Report)
-
states, in part;
... [B]ecause the scaling doctmentation was considered by the

licensee to be an aid to the initial setup and calibration process, and not a primary design tool, the (NRC] staff does not consider the poor implementation of the scaling documentation process to be indicative of a pervasive breakdown of the GA program during the time period in question (1986 to 1988)....
The staff further concludes that, while the licensee's initial performance was poor in the development of the scaline-related documentation, the safety of plant operation was not compromised due to the corrective actions taken in the 'atter part of the licensing stage (anaisted by the efforts of the CASE oreanization)
along with in-place testing of the 7300 series systes by knowledgeeble personnel and evaluation results obtained from hot functional and pre-operational testing."
(Emphasis added.)
CASE basically agrees with the NRC and TU Electric that apparently a strong I&C and Operations program would and did uncover the majority (though not necessarily all) of the deficient conditions crea.ted by the deficienctes identified by Mr. Bodiford and as documented in the CASE reports / meetings.
That was not the primary issue in CASE's pursuing the resolution of Mr.
Bodiford's concerns.
Obviously, TU Electric did not purposely elect to poorly implement the scaling program just because they planned to manage and depend,on a much stronger preoperational test program, any more than they would have purposely isolemented a poor weld inspection and NOE program just because they planned to have and rely on a strong hydrostatic testing program for Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
their piping system.
requires / mandates a strong total approach to quality (10 CFR Part 60, Appendix B) when safety-related programs and controls are encountered by a
.
.
.-
.
_
.-
-
.
.
-
.
.- -
'd 95:40 16ercero X1 DI S35d3 Mn ucy3
.'
,*
.
This was not done by either the responsible contractors or TU licensee.
Electric during the implementation of the scaling project for Unit 1.
Although it is gratifying to CASE to receive recognition for its work, the fact is that CASE is not part of the QA program for CPSES. Moreover, although CASE will continue to do what it can with its limited resources to assure public health and safety, it must be remembered that TU Electric is the licensee; as such, TU Electric has the greatest responsibility and must also shoulder its own burden in this regard to meet the goal of assuring the public health and safety. Of particular concern to CASE is the fact that CASE's role is scheduled to soon be over in some portions of the monitoring of Cceanche Peak (notably the monitoring of audits under paragraph A.It of the CASE /TU Electric /NRC Staff Joint Stipulation).
CASE is still very concerned that the QA audit program mandated by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 0, Criterion XVIII, is not achieving the purpose which was intended and which is necessary.
A strong and critical QA audit program must be relied on to
-
fulfill an essential and effective auditing responsibility. CASE 1mplores TU Electric to assure that this critical evaluation ancompassing audits /surveillances is developed and implemented to incorporate issues arising from lessons learned from Unit 1 activities, employee concerns, and other areas reported as being deficient (ONE/TUE forms, test programa, PIR's/tER's, trending, etc.) and that the results of the evaluation are incorporated into these assessment programs, and theret,y utilized in a positive and constructive manner.
Also, since the audits /surveillances are a very brief snap-shot in time, incorporating a small evaluation sample, it is imperative that the functions be performed with a critical eye.
" Adequate" cannot be accept-able when audit evaluations are concerned.
Extreme caution must be exercised to determine when an audit-found deficiency is determined to be * isolated" and when an auditor allows a ONE/TUE form to be initiated by the audited organization rather than by the auditor, thereby mitigating the neod to perform additional inspections and to perform a root cause analysis - and thereby negating, in advance, much of the effectiveness of the audit program.
The experience of the CASE Honitors has been that too often QA auditors who otherwise may be experienced, qualified, capable individuals appear to find it difficult or impossible to bring themselves to take a hard line with the audited organization and to accept the role of what amounts to the internal CASE understands that no one wants to be policemen of the nuclear industry.
disliked by the people one works with and that this is indeed a difficult position for the auditors to be in; however, it is also a necessary function of a QA auditor, and one which will ultimately be most beneficial to the CASE audited organization, TU Electric, and the public health and safety.
urges that TU Electric do everything possible to turn around wnat we believe to be a continuing inadequacy in the QA audit function.
CASE believes that this is an area where TU Electric upper management can be extremely helpful
.
.r
--<
-
-
-
--
L
'd LG:40 16/rcero X1 Ett 539d") 3dN WOdd

e j
..
I
.
in making certain that both the auditors and the audited organizations fully understand what is expected of them and why.
Additionally, it is recuests/
'5** TU Electric review all PIR's/LER's to determine if a deficient e ici scaling calculation could have
tion from occurring, and that any such prevented and/or mitigate.
,-
enhan; aments be incorporat
. scaling effort for Unit 2.
It is also requested that the ext..".es provided in the CASE final report for enhancements of the 1-60-8800 Scaling Nanual be evaluated for incorporation into the Scaling Manual for Unit 2.
CASE offers this assessment and these suggestions in the hope that TV Electric will consider them as constructiva criticism and utilize them to improve the project's fulfillment of its auuit responsibilities in complying with regulatory requirements, thereby protecting the public health and
-
safety.
Sincerely, CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy)
w 163 hA * 1
-
bra.)JuanitaEllis President cc: Mr. W. J. Cahill, Jr.
Executive Vice President TU Electric 400 North Olive Street, LB 81 Dellas, Texas 75201 George L. Edgar, Esq.
Newman & Holtzinger, P. C.
1615 L Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Me. Susan S. Palmer Stipulation Manager TU Electric -- CPSES P. O. Box 1002 -- Highway $6 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Mr. Christopher I. Orimes, Director Project Directorate IV-2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20556
2
~ ~ ~ ' ~
g
.g y191 g
.d LG: 0 16/roero x1 251 53Sd3 DSN Wuss
'
'
..
-
Mr. T. P. Owynn, Deouty Director Division of Reactor Projects U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccanission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Nr. Dennis Crutchfield Assistant Director of Special Projects U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
-
Washington, D. C.
20555 Mr. Joe Callan, Director Reactor Safety Division U. 8. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
~
Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Mr. Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conenission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Dr. Ausaf Husain, Chairman Operations Review Committee (ORC)
T1J Electric 400 Parth Olive, LB 81 Dallas, Texas 75201
f
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
__-
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
_
_____________ _ _ __ _ -

IR 05000445/1990047

Text

.

Dear Mr. Counsil:

Navigation menu

v t e Inspection Report - Comanche Peak - 1990047
80 \| 81 \| 82 \| 83 \| 84 \| 85 \| 86 \| 87 \| 88 \| 89 \| 90 \| 91 \| 92 \| 93 \| 94 \| 95 \| 96 \| 97 \| 98 \| 99 00 \| 01 \| 02 \| 03 \| 04 \| 05 \| 06 \| 07 \| 08 \| 09 \| 10 \| 11 \| 12 \| 13 \| 14 \| 15 \| 16 \| 17 \| 18 \| 19 \| 20 \| 21 \| 22 \| 23 \| 24 \| 25 \|
1990 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 7(0) 9(0) 10(0) 11(0) 12(0) 13(0) 14(0) 15(0) 16(0) 18(0) 20(0) 21(0) 22(0) 23(0) 24(0) 25(0) 26(0) 28(0) 29(0) 30(0) 31(0) 32(0) 33(0) 34(0) 36(0) 37(0) 40(0) 41(0) 43(0) 47(0) Security Operator Exams Emergency Planning Other

IR 05000445/1990047

Text

.

Dear Mr. Counsil:

Navigation menu

Search