IR 05000424/1993002
| ML20034E881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1993 |
| From: | Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Skinner P, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034E872 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-93-02, 50-424-93-2, 50-425-93-02, 50-425-93-2, NUDOCS 9303020047 | |
| Download: ML20034E881 (15) | |
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Q UNITED STATES k
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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Report Nos.:
50-424/93-02 and 50-425/93-02
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Licensee: Georgia Power Company l
P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201
Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: January 3, 1993 - January 30,'1993
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Inspect
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' Senior Resident Inspector Datd Sighed m-s1-es a
R. D. Star ~a,
sident Inspector Date Signed Y
2//? lH-c[aP.'A.Bal ident Inspector D(te Signed Accompanied by:
J.. Starefos e
Approved by:
P. SkinneT, Chief Date Signed
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Reacto'r Projects Section 3B Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, inspection entailed inspection in the following areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, refueling preparations and follow-up.
- Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
A weakness was identified in the control of measuring and test equipment (M&TE) used for pump vibration In-Service Test (IST)
surveillances and in the control of software used for initialization of the frequency response range.
The licensee was slow in the repair of diesel generator (DG) room dampers which are a part of the safety related DG Heating
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Ventilation and Conditioning (HVAC) System. Although the dampers had been-failed open in the safe position, the licensee was slow in identifying and correcting the damper problems.
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A Part 21 notification on a manufacturing defect in the four-way hydraulic valves used in the main feedwater isolation valves (MFIV) was reviewed. All four-way valves in service at Vogtle were identified as part of the defective lot. Since the Vogtle MFIVs have no present indication of failure and have redundant hydraulic closure trains, it was concluded that this was'not an immediate safety concern.
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REPORT DETAILS I.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Beasley, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations S. Bradley, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support
- S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support
- C. Christiansen, SAER Scpervisor C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
- G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance
- M. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications M. Hobbs, I&C Superintendent
- K. Holmes, Manager Operations
- D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support R. LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor
- W. Shipman, General Manager Nuclear Plant
- C. Stinespring, Manager Administration
- J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning C. Tynan, Nuclear Procedures Supervisor
- T. Webb, Engineer J. Williams, Supervisor Work Planning and Controls Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors,-
and office personnel.
Oglethorpe Power Company Representatives
- T. Mozingo
- C. Mitchell NRC Resident Inspectors
- B. Bonser
- D. Starkey
- P. Balmain
- J. Starefos
- Attended Exit Interview An alphabetical list of abbreviations is located in the last paragraph of the inspection report.
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2.
Plant @erations - (71707)
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a.
General The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications, and administrative
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controls.
Control logs, shift supervisors'. logs, shift relief
records, LC0 status logs, night orders, standing orders, and
clearance logs were routinely reviewed. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry and health
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physics, engineering support and technical support personnel.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
Activities within the control room were monitored durLg shifts and shift changes.
Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS. Direct
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observations were conducted of control room panels, recorder traces and instrumentation important to safety. Operating parameters were observed to verify they were within TS limits.
The inspectors also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee-
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was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine
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basis. They included, but were not limited to the turbine building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings, and the' low voltage switchyard.
During plant tours housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed. The inspectors observed a visitor exiting the protected area without following
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administrative procedures. The incident was brought to the attention of the security manager who investigated the situation and took corrective actions.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics
policies / procedures were followed. This included observation of
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HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits, postings, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior
to entry into the PA; vehicles were properly authorized, searched,
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and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; and personnel in vital areas were authorized.
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Unit 1 Summary
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The unit began the period operating at 100% power and operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
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Unit 2 Summary The unit began the period operating at l'00% power and operated at
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full power throughout the inspection period.
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Fire Drill t
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On January 15 the inspectors observed an announced fire drill.
The simulated fire occurred in the Administration Building
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auditorium. This was the first time that a fire drill scenario i
required the fire team to exit the protected area to respond to a i
fire.
The fire team dressed out at the TSC fire team equipment.
room then proceeded to the PA vehicle entry gate to exit the PA en route to the Administration Building. Coordination with Security
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appeared to go smoothly and no delay was encountered in exiting a
the PA.
Once at the simulated fire location the fire team
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performed a search and rescue.to remove an injured individual from the auditorium and extinguished the simulated fire. The.
inspectors were satisfied that the drill met its objectives and l
that the fire team responded appropriately.
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The licensee's post drill critique identified one potential l
problem. The nearest fire hose cabinet outside the Administration i
Building is located behind the building inside the fenced PA and, therefore, not easily accessible. There are numerous hose
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cabinets inside the Administration Building but they could be potentially inaccessible during a fire. The licensee is
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considering several solutions to this problem. The inspectors
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considered it commendable that those participating in the drill
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identified this potential problem and that prompt action was
initiated to find a solution.
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e.
Soft Drink Spill in Control Room On January 25, while touring the Unit 2 Control Room, the inspector observed a' fresh stain on the carpeting immediately adjacent to the main control board. The inspector learned.that the stain resulted from a soft drink spill that occurred when the cap on a pressurized soft drink bottle came off and the liquid was
expelled on the CR ceiling and floor. The liquid in the three liter bottle was under higher than normal pressure.
This incident itself was of minor significance since the liquid
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did not spray on any control board. The inspector, however, was concerned about the cause and the potential consequences, and brought these concerns to the attention of plant management.
The
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licensee's investigation found that no " horseplay" had been
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involved and that the incident was solely due to human error.
The licensee, in order to increase awareness of the control of food
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and drink in the control room and to highlight the potential
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consequences of this incident, plans to prepare a shift briefing covering this specific incident and other similar ndustry events.
The inspector will observe the licensee's actions associated with this effort.
t No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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General Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions,
acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies
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noted, and review of completed work.
The tests witnessed, in
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whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites
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were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test
results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
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SVRVEILLANCE NO.
TITLE
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14629-2 SSPS Slave Relay K623 Train B Test Containment Isolation i
14803-2 CCW Pumps and Discharge Check Valves Inservice Test 14806-1 Containment Spray Pump and Check Valves Inservice Test
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14807-1,2 Motor Driven Auxiliary feedwater Pump Inservice Test 14808-2 CCP Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Test-CCPA 14804-2 Safety Injection Pump Inservice Test b.
Control of Measuring and Test Equipment for Inservice Tests
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During this inspection period the licensee began using a CSI vibration measurement system to acquire displacement vibration amplitude data during pump inservice tests. This CSI system is normally used for the predictive maintenance program. The transition to this vibration measuring equipment is being made to
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obtain more consistent vibration data for IST trending.
Prior to the transition, IST vibration data was taken using IRD vibration monitors. With IRD vibration monitors, raw data was collected on a strip chart and interpreted to obtain a vibration measurement.
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The CSI monitors collect and uniformly analyze vibration data and
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provide a numerical result without interpretation.
The inspector observed several pump IST surveillances and observed vibration data being recorded using IRD monitors concurrently with CSI monitors.
The vibration data taken with the CSI monitorc was l
for comparison use and was not being used to fulfill IST cr TS
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surveillance requirements.
Following evaluation of this data the
IRD monitors will be phased out and the CSI monitors will be used for TS surveillance data collection. The inspector also verified
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that the IST surveillance procedures specifically required the use
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of an IRD-820 monitor with a 560 velocity pickup, and that the
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instruments were required to be calibrated to i 5 percent accuracy
as a pair (meeting the accuracy required by ASME Table Code
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Section XI IWP 4110-1, Acceptable Instrument Accuracy).
On January 14, the inspector was reviewing calibration records for i
CSI vibration monitor number VP-2-1566 and identified that the sensor pickup on this monitor was not matched with the pickup with which it had been last calibrated. The inspector asked toolroom personnel to retrieve the three other CSI monitors to determine if
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these were also unmatched.
It was determined that three of the
four monitors had sensor pickups exchanged.
Following identification of this, the licensee matched the pickup and monitor pairs and engraved identification numbers on two of the
pickups. Maintenance Engineering personnel contacted the vendor that calibrated the CSI monitors and determined that exchanging
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pickups could give results five percent higher than expected. The
inspector reviewed calibration records for three IRD monitors and verified they were correctly paired.
The inspector also identified, during discussions with Maintenance Engineering personnel and the IST engineer following Unit 2 CCW pump tests, that the CSI monitor was not initialized with the frequency response range required by IWP-4520, Instruments to Measure Amplitude. The inspector determined that the software
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used to initialize the CSI monitor was not controlled in accordance with procedure 00410-C, Control of Computer Software.
The licensee is establishing instructions to comply with these administrative controls.
Due to the discrepancies found with the control of the CSI vibration monitors, the inspector reviewed completed surveillances to determine if the CSI monitors had been used to fulfill IST or TS surveillance requirements. The inspector determined that a CSI vibration monitor had been used on one occasion to obtain IST data.
This occurred on November 25, 1992. The data obtained was used to generate new baseline data for a Unit 2 Boric Acid r
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Transfer pump, following pump disassembly and maintenance, when all of the IRD monitors were offsite for calibration. The
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inspector reviewed the completed data sheets for procedure 14811-2, Boric Acid Transfer Pumps and Discharge Check Valves
Ir.;ervice Test, and noted that the procedure was temporarily
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revised to require an IRD monitor or an equivalent CSI monitor
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with a velocity pickup calibrated to a i 5 percent accuracy as a pair. The CSI monitor used for this surveillance was one of the CSI monitors mentioned above which had an exchanged pickup. The inspector could not determine when the pickups had been exchanged; however, based on a review of subsequent data acquired with a calibrated monitor, the inspector concluded that the November 1992 BATP surveillance was acceptable.
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The TS requirements were met in all the tests which the inspector observed. However, since the licensee intended to use the CSI monitors for future TS surveillances, the inadequate control of the CSI monitors could have resulted in unreliable vibration data.
The inspector considered the lack of control of the CSI monitors and pickup pairs, and the improper initialization of the frequency
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response range of the CSI monitors, a weakness ia the control of j
M&TE used during IST surveillances.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
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General The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved proctdures, TSs, and applicable industry codes and standards.
The inspectors also frequently i
verified that redundant components were operable, administrative controls were followed, clearances were adequate, personnel were
qualified, correct replacement parts were used, radiological controls were proper, fire protection was adequate, adequate post-maintenance testing was performed, and independent verification
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requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently
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verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance activities.
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l MWO NOS.
WORK DESCRIPTION 19102176 Inspect Leakage on Containment Spray Pump A 19202222 Repair SG Blowdown HX#5 Flange Leak
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19203054 Restroke Steam Dump Valve ITV500F from 9 to 56
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19203937 Calibrate Loop IF-1819B 19201839 Repair Leaking Flange on CCP 1A
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19203737 PM on Containment Spray Pump 1A 29300246 A-Train DG Room Dampers Will Not Close 29300372 Check Packing Leak CS Pump 2B b.
Diesel Generator Room Dampers
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During a Control Room review of active and Information LCOs the inspector identified an Information LCO on_ the 2A DG room wall Jampers which had been in effect since February 1992. There was also a similar Information LC0 on Unit I which had been in effect
for a shorter time. The inspector was concerned that the licensee may have not taken timely action to repair the problem.
Information LCOs do not indicate actual entry into an action statement but are a method of tracking a safety related equipment malfunction or changes in plant parameters which could restrict unit operation if another problem occurs. This Information LC0 covered the DG 2A wall dampers which are part of the DG'HVAC
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system covered in TS 3.7.13, Diesel Generator Building and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump House ESF HVAC Systems.
The DG HVAC system functions to remove heat from the building
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during DG operation and to supply sufficient heat, when the
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diesels are not operating, to allow easy starting of the DGs and to allow personnel occupancy. The HVAC system in the DG building is divided into two subsystems, ESF and non-ESF. On a DG start the dampers open to exhaust air to maintain building temperature.
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While the DG is idle, the dampers. function as air intakes with the
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non-ESF fan to maintain building temperature.
In this case the dampers were inoperable; but as a compensatory action they had been failed open and were, therefore, considered operable since
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they would fulfill their design function.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's engineering evaluation and found that the analysis had determined that with the dampers failed open the resulting air flow would remain above the calculated flow necessary to maintain the DG room ambient temperature below the maximum design temperature during a design basis accident. The inspector also reviewed the effects of cold temperatures.
Cold winter temperatures have been documented at some plants as affecting governor oil temperatures which affects DG operability. The licensee's evaluation had found that this was not a concern at Vogtle. The inspector was satisfied with the licensee's compensatory actions and justification for their actions.
The inspector, however, did conclude that the licensee had not expeditiously corrected the damper problems.
These problems had existed for over a year on one DG.
In response to the inspector's concerns the licensee has undertaken a program to test every DG damper, improve their performance and replace defective parts.
c.
Potential Defect In MFIV Four-Way Hydraulic Valves On October 29, 1992, Anchor / Darling Valve Company notified GPC of a potential defect in the hydraulic four-way valves supplied with the Vogtle MFIVs.
These four-way valves direct hydraulic fluid to open or close the MFIV during normal valve stroking and fast closure during a main feedwater isolation.
Each MFIV has redundant hydraulic closure trains with two four-way valves in each closure train.
Either train is capable of closing the MFIV.
Anchor / Darling determined that the valve bodies may have been manufactured with elongated bores. During normal operation, the excess bore dimensions may permit extrusion of the lock ring and eventually the o-ring.
Failures of these components could prevent the safety-related closure function of the MFIVs.
This discrepancy is limited to four-way valves manufactured with pre-1600 serial numbers. Vogtle performed field. CSdowns and discovered that all four-way valves in servi
.re in the potentially defective lot. Thirteen spare va..es were located in the warehouse, nine of which were of the affected lot.
The licensee, from discussions with other utilities with similar MFIVs, learned that a valve with the elongated bore would likely fail rapidly after initial installation. Such a failure could result in slower closure times for the MFIV and could be preceded by a " low hydraulic accumulator pressure alarm. There has been no indication of such failures at Vogtle.
However, since the Vogtle MFlVs have redundant hydraulic closure trains, the licensee considers that a simultaneous failure of both MFIV closure trains does not appear to be a credible possibility.
The licensee plans to replace all of the MFIV four-way valves during upcoming refueling outages.
The inspector reviewed the Part 21 notification and the licensee's response and determined that the
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actions appear to be appropriate based on industry experience-and
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vendor recommendations.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Refueling (60710)
During this inspection period the inspectors observed the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel as several fuel shipments arrived on site for the upcoming 1R4 refueling outage. There was good coordination between Operations, Security, Quality Control, Health Physics, and Maintenance as each shipment arrived and was off loaded into the new fuel storage vault. The inspectors observed the activities'of the QC
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inspector as he monitored the receipt of the new fuel and verified that the the new fuel inspection checklist was properly completed.
Discussions were also held with a Reactor Engineer who was present while the new fuel was unloaded. The inspectors were satisfied that the new fuel receipt had been handled carefully and with good preplanning.
6.
Follow-up (92701) (92702)
The following items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspection record review, and discussions with licensee personnel as appropriate:
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(Closed) 50-424, 425/P21 (Part 21),92-248, Potential Defect in Cylinder Heads of Enterprise Standby Diesel Generators Results In a Minute Cooling Water Leak Into the Lube Oil System.
On November 25, Cooper Energy Service issued a Part 21 notification to members of the TDI Diesel Owners Group which identified the existence of a potential problem with DG cylinder heads cast prior to August 1, 1984. The defect was discovered when traces of engine cooling water were found in samples of lube oil in one of the DGs at a Gulf States Utilities Company.
Subsequent hydro testing and exploratory machining was performed on the suspected defective cylinder head. During the testing some wetness was identified at the bottom of one 3/4"-10 capscrew hole located on the top side of the head.
Further inspection revealed a very thin wall section between the tapped hole and the interior casting surface. Cylinder heads cast after July 1984, were modified such that this potential defect was eliminated. Cooper Energy Services determined that the root cause for the failure of the cylinder head was due to inadequate casting wall thickness at the tapped hole.
Cooper recommended that until long term corrective action was determined, lube oil analysis should be performed monthly to monitor for jacket water contamination. Vogtle was already performing monthly lube oil analysis and had not identified any abnormalities in moisture content of the lube oil. The inspector
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confirmed that the recommended interim actions will continue until the recommended long term actions are completed.
On December 17, 1992, Cooper Energy Service issued a follow-up letter to the Part 21 notification stating their recommended long term corrective action. That action involved the application of Loctite Hydraulic Sealant to the suspect threaded hole and stud.
Tests at Cooper-Bessemer proved that this repair was sufficient to withstand 100 psi of water pressure without leakage. A Service Information Memo (SIM # 384) is being issued by Cooper which explains the procedure in more detail.
It was recommended that this corrective action be performed at the next scheduled refueling outage, or cold shutdown, whichever occurs first. The licensee intends to initiate the recommended actions during upcoming refueling outages.
The inspector had no concerns regarding the licensee's corrective actions to this Part 21 notification.
b.
(Closed) VIO 50- 425/91-15-03; failure To Seal Piping Penetration in AFW Pump Room.
NRC IR 91-15 identified that the licensee failed to seal piping penetration 2-59-012-1 in the Unit 2 AFW Train 'B'
pump room. The penetration is located in a 3-hour fire rated wall between the AFW pump room and a pipe chase and is below the maximum flood level for the two affected rooms.
The penetration had never been sealed because it had been incorrectly classified in the Penetration Seals Designation List.
The licensee took action to correct the immediate problem of the unsealed. penetration by establishing compensatory fire watches until the penetration seal was installed.
A MWO was generated to seal the penetration and a change request was written to correct the error in the PSDL.
Sealing of the penetration was completed on July 23, 1991. To prevent future oversights of this type, the licensee initiated an REA to verify the accuracy of the Fire Protection Boundary List which is the reference document for surveillance procedure 29144-C, Fire Area Boundaries-18-Month Visual Inspection.
When the boundary list verification was completed and procedure 29144-0 was revised, maintenance personnel were retrained on the latest procedural requirements for inspecting fire area boundaries.
The inspector determined that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate. This item is considered closed.
c.
(Closed) VIO 50-424,425/91-15-02; Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated September 4, 1991. This violation involved two examples of inadequate procedures. One example involved a procedure which
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inadvertently caused an entry into TS 3.0.3.
Immediately following entry into TS 3.0.3, the SS realized both trains of ECCS l
were inoperable and immediately took action to correct this
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condition.
Procedures 14808-1 and 2, Centrifugal Charging Pump
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and Check Valve Inservice Test, were revised on July 22, 1991, to
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change the test methodology so that performance of the procedure
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on one ECCS train does not impair the operability of the redundant i
train. A broadness review identified four additional procedures l
that had discrepancies similar to procedure 14808. Those
procedures were, vised to prevent a recurrence of this type
event.
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t The second example involved a manual valve in the baron injection
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flow path from the boric acid storage tank which was not included in the baron injection flow path verification surveillance
procedure as required by TS.
The instruction section for i
procedures 14405-1 and 2, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation, and 14406-1 and 2, Boron Injection Flow Path
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Verification - Shutdown, were revised to ensure that all available flow paths are identified when the surveillance procedure is
performed instead of identifying only the flow paths for which
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r credit is taken. A verification was performed on all other boron injection flow path valves to ensure they were in the correct
position. Valves 1-1208-U4-482 and 2-1208-U4-482 were secured
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with a lock and added to the safety related locked valve program.
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By adding these valves to the locked valve program, the TSs allow
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them to be excluded from the monthly surveillance requirements, reducing the requirements to enter potentially contaminated rooms.
Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions, this
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item is closed.
No s '91ations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Mee.ing
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 29, 1993,
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with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No
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dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
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Abbreviations ACOT
- Analog Channel Operational Test AFW
- Auxiliary feedwater System ANIl
- Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector ASME
- American Society of Mechanical Engineer BATP
- Boric Acid Transfer Pump
- Centrifugal Charging Pump i
- Component Cooling Water System
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.i CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations CR
- Control Room CS
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- Computational Systems Incorporated l
CVE
- Containment Ventilation Isolation DC
- Deficiency Card
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- Diesel Generator DPM
- Data Processing Module
- Emergency Core Cooling Systems E0P
- Emergency Operating Procedures ERF
- Emergency Response Facilities ESF
- Engineered Safety Feature GPC
- Georgia Power Company i
- Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning HX
- Heat Exchanger INPO
- Institute for Nuclear Power Operations IR
- Inspection Report IR4
- Unit 1 Refueling Outage 4 ISEG
- Independent Safety Engineering Group IST
- In-Service Test LC0
- Limiting Condition for Operation LDCR
- Licensing Document Change Request LER
- Licensee Event Report M&TE
- Measuring and Test Equipment MFIV
- Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MOV
- Motor Operated Valve MWO
- Maintenance Work Order t
- Non-Cited Violation NPF
- Nuclear Power Facility NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR
- Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSCW
- Nuclear Service Cooling Water System PA
- Protected Area PE0
- Plant Equipment Operator PERMS
- Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring System PSIG
- Pounds Per Square Inch Gage RCS
- Reactor Coolant System REA
- Request for Engineering Assistance RER
- Request for Engineering Review
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- Reactor Operator RWST
- Refueling Water Storage Tank SAER
- Safety Audit And Engineering Review SER
- Significant Event Report (INPO)
- Safety Injection SPDS
- Safety Parameter Display System SS
- Shift Superintendent SSPS
- Solid State Protection System TS
- Technical Specifications i
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- Unresolved Item USS
- Unit Shift Supervisor l
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- Violation WRT-
- Work Request Tag WWRB
- Waste Water Retention Basin i
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