IR 05000413/1993003
| ML20034G010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1993 |
| From: | Herdt A, Hopkins P, Miller W, William Orders, John Zeiler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034G002 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-93-03, 50-413-93-3, 50-414-93-03, 50-414-93-3, NUDOCS 9303080061 | |
| Download: ML20034G010 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f,, ^
g REGION 11 g
3 g 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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-f ATLANTA GEORGI A 30323 N% p$
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Report Nos.:
50-413/93-03 and 50-414/93-03 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street i
Charlotte, N.C.
28242 i
Doc.ket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
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Facility Name:
Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: Januar 1993 - February 6, 1993
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f /22 /f_3 Inspector:
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/bA W.T. Orders,Sen%rResi(eptInspector Datd Signed
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e 2 /st/93 Inspector:
fb'P.C.Hopk~ ins,ResideytIns
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Date Signed LL/93 Inspector:
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D6te S'igned
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ff,^ J. Zeiler, Resident I ector Inspector:
cR4 r-L y
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W. H. Miller, Jr., Ppect Eng'ihadr Date Signed Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief Date Signed
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Reactor Projects Branch 3-i Division of Reactor Projects
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i SUMMARY j
Scope:
This routine, resident inspection included but was not limited to, evaluations of plant operations; temporary waiver of compliance;
i control room annunciator improvements; Residual Heat Removal System
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j Train A transient event; Control rod wear measurement inaccuracies;
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surveillance testing; maintenance activities; licensee event
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reports; and follow-up of previously identified items.
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Results:
No violations on deviations were identified.
One Unresolved Item was identified involving a water hammer induced reactor coolant leak event that occurred while placing the Unit 2 l
Residual Heat Removal System in service (paragraph 6).
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9303080061 930223 i
PDR ADOCK 05000413
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In the area of maintenance, a strength was identified involving the
, repair of Train B Control Room Ventilation and Chill Water System
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(VC/YC) chiller compressor motor (paragraph 9.b).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted l
I Licensee Employees j
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- J. Cox, Acting Regulatory Compliance Manager
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S. Bradshaw, Shift Operations Manager j
- T. Crawford, Systems Engineering Manager
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v J. Forbes, Engineering Manager
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- R. Futrell, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- T. Harrall, Safety Assurance Manager
- J. Lowery, Compliance W. McCollum, Station Manager i
W. Miller, Operations Superintendent M. Tuckman, Catawba Site Vice-President
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspectors f
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- P. Hopkins l
- J. Zeiler
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- Attended exit interview.
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Plant Status
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Unit 1 Summary
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Unit 1 operated at essentially 100% power for the entire report period l
with no major problems.
i Unit 2 Summary f
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f Unit 2 began the report period at 100 percent power. On January 29, the
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licensee began reducing power on the unit for a scheduled refueling
outage.
The unit was taken off line later that evening.
Hot standby i
(Mode 3) was achieved on the morning of January 30, hot shutdown (Mode 4)
j that evening and cold shutdown (Mode 5) the following evening. The report
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period ended with the unit in Mode 5.
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f 3.
Plant Operations Review (71707)
i The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the report period to-i verify conformance with regulatory requirements, and administrative
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control s.
Control Room logs, the Technical Specification (TS) Action Item
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Log, and the Removal and Restoration (R&R) log were routinely reviewed.
l Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in i
accordance with approved procedures. The complement of licensed personnel
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on each shift inspected, met or exceeded the requirements of Technical Specifications.
Further, daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
Plant tours were performed on a routine basis. The areas toured included but were not limited to the following:
Turbine Buildings Aux 4iary Building Units 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Rooms Units 1 and 2 Vital Switchgear Rooms Units 1 and 2 Vital Battery Rooms gp Standby Shutdown Facility g13 During the plant tours, the inspectors verified by observation and interviews that measures taken to assure physical protection of tu
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facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the securitj organization, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper conditions, and that access control badging
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were proper and procedures followed.
In addition, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activities and radiological control practices. The inspectors also reviewed Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs) to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Temporary Waiver of Compliance (71707)
At 1:30 a.m., on January 11, Train B of the Control Room Area Ventilation and Chilled Water System (VC/YC) was declared inoperable after the chiller failed to start.
TS 3.7.6 requires that an inoperable VC/YC Train be returned to service within 7 days or both units must be shutdown.
Troubleshooting efforts identified a ground fault in the Train B chiller compressor motor.
The compressor motor housing functions as the chiller pressure boundary and the motor is located internal to the housing. Major disassembly was required to accomplish the repair effort.
Due to the magnitude of the repair process and the post-maintenance testing required to return the chiller to service, the licensee was uncertain if VC/YC Train B could be returned to service within the 7 day action statement which was due to expire at 1:30 a.m., on January 18.
On January 14, a conference call was held between the licensee, NRC Region II, and NRR to discuss the problem and the potential need for a Temporary Waiver of Compliance to extend the action statement to allow sufficient time to complete the necessary repairs. The waiver was submitted to the NRC on the morning of January 15 and was approved that afternoon.
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waiver allowed an extension of the 7 day action statement to 10 days. The licensee also established compensatory actions to mitigate the effects of a failure of VC/YC Train A during this period.
VC/YC Train B was returned to service at 12:01 a.m. on January 18, prior to the expiration of the original time specified in the TS Action Statement. Since full compliance was attained within the time limitations imposed by the original TS, the provisions of the waiver were not i.
implemented. VC/YC Train A remained operable during the entire period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Control Room Annunciator Status Improvements (71707)
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In December 1992, licensee management renewed their efforts toward a goal l
of achieving a " dark board" Control Room Annunciator status. Significant j
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resources were expended to repair equipment and modify annunciator logic i
to reduce the number of illuminated and intermittently illuminated
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annunciators. In order to track their progress, the status of outstanding
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annunciators was presented to management on a weekly basis. By the end of i
i the report period, a significant reduction in the number of nuisance
annunciators was obtained on both units.
Although less progress was
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attained on Unit 2, the licensee plans to make the necessary equipment
repairs and/or annunciator modifications on the remaining items during the
current refueling outage in order to startup with as few outstanding items i
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as possible.
The status of these items are being tracked on the outage
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schedule to ensure that they receive greater attention.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Residual Heat Removal System Train 2A Transient Event (71707)
On January 31, Unit 2 was in Mode 4 with the Reactor Coolant (NC) System at 375 psig and 340*F in day 2 of a planned 65 day refueling outage.
l Operations personnel were preparing to establish Residual Heat Removal (ND) cooling using ND Train A.
Prior to placing the train in service, Boron concentration in the ND piping had to be increased to match NC concentration.
Therefore, between 4:19 a.m.
and 5:00 a.m., ND Boron concentration was increased by operating the ND pump in miniflow recirculation while letting down to the Chemical and Volume Control System through the ND train piping.
Subsequent to the boron mixing evolution, between 5:40 a.m. and 6:07 a.m.,
valves 2ND-1B and 2ND-2A, the ND suction valves from NC, were stroked as part of testing to verify that the valves would close automatically upon receipt of a high NC pressure signal.
At 6:44 a.m., ND Pump 2A was restarted in miniflow recirculation. Shortly after starting the pump, operations personnel noticed an unexpected increase in the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) level and a decrease in pressurizer level. Believing that the ND suction relief valve, 2ND-3, had lifted, ND Pump 2A was shutdown and valves 2ND-1B and 2ND-?^ were closed,
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l isolating ND from the NC System. Pressurizer and PRT levels stabilized at i
this time, indicating that the leakage had stopped.
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I At 7:12 a.m., operations personnel re-opened the NC Loop suction isolation i
valves in an attempt to determine if 2ND-3 had reseated. Coincident with i
opening the valves, a momentary alarm was received which indicated that
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one or more of the ice condenser doors had opened.
The operators also I
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noted that pressurizer level had decreased slightly, and containment pressure and Containment Floor and Equipment Sump level had increased. At 7:18 a.m.,
the NC Loop suction isolation valves were closed and pressurizer level stabilized indicating that leakage had stopped.
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Operations personnel stated that the system parameters observed when the
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valves were re-opened were unexpected, in that PRT level had remained l
steady but pressurizer level had decreased. Based on this unexpected
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response, operations personnel decided to re-open the isolation valves once more to assess the situation. At 7:39 a.m., valves 2ND-1B and 2ND-2A
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were again re-opened and the same system responses were noted as during
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the prior opening of the valves.
At this time, it was concluded that
system integrity had been breached downstream of the isolation valves. At j
7:44 a.m., the valves were closed and plant conditions stabilized once
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again.
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The licensee subsequently discovered that a pipe break had occurred in a
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3/4 inch line located directly upstream of valve 2ND-5. -This is a 3/4 l
inch vent valve off the ND suction line.
ND Train 2A was declared
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inoperable and an investigation of the event was initiated.
Preliminary licensee analysis of the event determined that a water hammer
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in the ND Train A suction piping had caused the ND suction relief valve to l
lift and had also resulted in the failure of the ND vent valve piping.
The water hammer was reported to have been induced by isolating hot NC i
water in the ND suction piping after the ND pump was operated with letdown established at 4:19 a.m.
ND System pressure then decayed to saturation
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pressure due to a small leak in the system.
This resulted in the I
i formation of voids in the ND suction piping.
The subsequent re-i pressurization of the suction piping just prior to starting the ND pump at
j 6:44 a.m. resulted in the first water hammer. Transient data indicates I
that water hammers also occurred when the valves were opened the second
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and third times.
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Preliminary metallurgical analysis of the piping failure indicated that
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fatigue failure may have occurred.
There was also evidence of pre-i j
existing cracks in the vent piping. A detailed metallurgical evaluation l
was being performed at the end of this inspection period. The results of
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the evaluation will be summarized in a subsequent report.
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Much of the data required to evaluate this event was not available by the
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end of this report period.
However, based on a preliminary review, the
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inspectors have concerns regarding the operator's compliance with
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actions taken in response to the incident.
Until this review can be l
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completed, this issue will be carried as an Unresolved Item (URI). This item is documented as URI 414/93-03-01:
Review ND Train'2A Water Hammer Event.
One URI was identified. No violations or deviatior.s were identified.
7.
Control Rod Wear Measurement Inaccuracies (71707)
On October 21, 1992, the licensee discovered that the ultrasonic test (UT)
method used by Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) to quantify wear of control rod fingers at Catawba was not as accurate as previously assumed. As a result of this finding, the structural integrity of the control rods had to be reassessed. The inspectors were concerned about the possibility that the contractor had performed this service for other utilities, and were interested in the generic implication and the safety significance of the finding.
In discussions with the licensee's engineering staff, the inspectors determined that the licensee and the contractor had performed a detailed evaluation to determine the true accuracy of the test method.
The evaluation is documented in B&W calculations 32-1212251-00 and 32-1212865 and is based on tests performed in the contractor's shop and a demonstration performed at the McGuire Nuclear Station.
After re-evaluating the methodology, the licensee considers its use acceptable. All previous control rod wear data was reassessed using more conservative criteria which indicated that the data remained valid. The inspectors also determined that B&W had performed similar control rod evaluations at Seabrook Nuclear Station, and that a similar re-analysis was performed which confirmed that their test data also remained valid.
The inspectors were informed that no other United States facility was affected.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Surveillance Observation (61726)
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General During the inspection period, the inspectors verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactivity control systems, reactor coolant systems, safety injection systems, emergency safeguards systems, emergency power systems, containment, and other important plant support systems.
The inspectors verified that: surveillance testing was performed in accordance with approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed
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b.
Surveillance Activities Reviewed The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following surveillances:
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PT/1/A/4250/02C Turbine Control Valve Movement Test
PT/1/A/4250/03C Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No.
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1 Performance Test r
PT/1/A/4250/06 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
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Head and Valve Verification
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IP/1/A/3145/01B Containment Pressure Control System Train B i
Operability Test
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PT/2/A/4200/08F Auxiliary feedwater Pump Suction Valve
Partial Stroke Valve Test l
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
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General
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Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components -
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were observed / reviewed to ensure that they were conducted in l
accordance with the applicable requirements.
The inspectors l
verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following-areas of inspection:
activities were accomplished using approved
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procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were
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performed prior to returning components or systems to service;-
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quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were T
properly certified.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the
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status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned
to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system i
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performance.
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Maintenance Activities Reviewed
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The inspectors witnessed or reviewed maintenance activities associated with the following maintenance Work Requests (W0s):
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92085575-01 Pre-Outage Electrical Instrumentation Work
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to Diesel Generator 2A 92087367-01 Destrap and Clean Corrosion on Standby Shutdown Facility Battery SDB2 93002812-01 Replace Motor on Control Room Ventilation Chiller B 93006236-01 Inspect / Replace Bearings on Control Room Ventilation Chill Water Pump 1
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On January 11, Train B of the VC/YC System was declared inoperable after its associated chiller failed to start.
Troubleshooting
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efforts identified a ground fault in the chiller compressor motor requiring replacement of the motor.
Since the compressor motor i
housing functions as the chiller pressure boundary and the motor is i
located internal to the housing, major disassembly was necessary to accomplish the motor replacement.
Between January 12 and 16, the inspectors reviewed the work package (WO 9300812-01) associated with the compressor motor replacement, frequently visited the job site to observe work in progress, and held discussions with the maintenance engineers and craft personnel concerning the work. The inspectors consider that this maintenance was completed in an efficient manner, and there appeared to be good
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cooperation between maintenance engineering, operations, and craft personnel. This activity was identified as a strength in the area of maintemance.
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Generic Diesel Generator Staring Air Question
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On January 27, 1993, the NRC issued an event follow-up report pertaining to a failure of one of the emergency diesel generators at Vogtle Nuclear Station.
l The diesel is a Transamerica Delaval engine similar to those r
I installed at Catawba. The problem was identified as a missing vent path in the starting air distributor housing.
This problem could
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ultimately result in an engine's failure to start. On January 15, 1993, Cooper-Bessemer Inc., the current manufacturer of the engines, issued a 10 CFR, Part 21 report describing the problem and proposed
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corrective actions. The licensee has initiated inspections of the f
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air start distributors but expects to find no problems based on successful surveillance data.
The inspectors will continue to follow this issue until corrective actions are complete.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine report adequacy.
The determination included: adequacy of description, i
verification of compliance with applicable regulatory requirements, corrective actions taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
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a.
(Closed) LER 413/91-01:
Both Trains of Residual Heat Removal and
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Auxiliary Containment Spray Inoperable Due to Defective Procedures
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and Inappropriate Action.
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This LER reported the licensee's identification that the Auxiliary
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Containment Spray Systems had been inoperable during performance testing activities.
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The inspectors verified that the following corrective action for i
this item had been implemented by the licensee.
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Procedures PT/l&2/A/4200/26, NS Valve Inservice Test, Enclosures 13.9, 13.9.1, 13.10 and 13.10.1 have been revised i
to reschedule the stroke testing of valves 1(2) NS38B and 1(2)
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NS43A to be accomplished during cold shutdown.
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The Duke Power Company General Office was to provide the
Catawba Station with the results of a design study of the i
problem identified at McGuire in which RHR valves were
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inoperable during stroke valve testing.
This problem was resolved through the Problem Investigation Report program and
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a design study was not made.
Therefore, this planned action j
is not applicable for Catawba.
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FSAR Section 6.2.2 was revised to address the periodic testing to be performed on the Containment Spray Systems.
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TS Interpretation 3.5.2 has been written to provide guidance in the containment spray operability concerns.
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Duke transmitted Nuclear Network Entry QE 4385 to advise other i
utilities of the concerns identified with the testing of RHR i
and containment spray system valves during plant operations.
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(Closed) LER 413/91-21:
Turbine / Reactor Trip Due to Installation l
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Deficiency.
j This turbine / reactor trip occurred during turbine building cleaning l
operations when a vendor inadvertently sprayed water into an
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electrical termination box. The water caused erroneous high water level signals for Moisture Separator Reheater D.
This initiated a turbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. The licensee's corrective
actions included the identification of all non-safety related NEMA l
4 electrical termination boxes installed in the Turbine Building,
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and the issuance of work requests to inspect and seal each of these
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boxes were required. The inspection and sealing of these boxes has
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been assigned a " Priority 4" category and will be worked as a
" filler job" until completion. Work is presently in process but a
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completion date has not been established.
To prevent recurrence, j
the site cleaning contractor has written a procedure pertaining to
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the proper use of the pressure washer which is used for cleaning
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activities in the Turbine Building and other site areas.
This procedure contains operational and safety measures which includes
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instructions pertaining to spraying electrical cabinets, panels, motors, etc. Adherence to this procedure should prevent recurrence of this problem until the electrical boxes are properly sealed.
Therefore, this LER is closed.
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(Closed) LER 413/91-22:
Technical Specification Violation As A
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Result of a Missed Grab Sample on Radiation Monitor EMF-36 Due to
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Inappropriate Action and Management Deficiency.
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This LER involved the licensee's failure to collect a grab sample while Radiation Monitor EMF-36 was inoperable.
The corrective actions included:
communicating this incident to all appropriate Radiation Protection personnel; revisions to procedure HP/0/B/1009/ll, EMF loss, to clarify the requirements for collection and analysis of EMF samples; and the training of Radiation Protection shift personnel on the proper use of this procedure. The inspector verified that the corrective actions were completed, d.
(Closed) LER 413/91-29:
Technical Specification Violation from Failure to Perform Reactor Trip System Surveillance Due to Inappropriate Action.
This LER reported the licensee discovery that the surveillance requirements for the Turbine Startup Pressure Switch Alarm had not been performed on Unit I during the 1991 refueling cutage and subsequent Turbine startups.
The corrective actions on this item included a revision to procedure PT/1/A/4250/028, Weekly Main Turbine Valve Movement Test, to properly document the Turbine Emergency Trip System Response. Also, this event was discussed with the Operations Support Group.
The inspector verified that the corrective action had been completed.
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(Closed) LER 414/91-15:
Technical Specification Violation Due to Lack of Boration Flow Path During Refueling Activities Due to Deficient Communication.
This LER reported the addition of water to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) from the Boric Acid Tank (BAT) which resulted in the FWST boron concentration being decreased to 1975 ppm.
This concentration was less than the TS requirements of 2000 ppm.
The licensee's corrective action included additional make up to the FWST until a boron concentration of 2031 ppm was achieved and discussion with Chemistry and Operations Supervisors involved in the boron addition activities to improve the communication between Chemistry and Operations concerning boron concentration requirements for the FWST.
The inspector verified that the corrective action had been completed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413, 414/90-32-02: Review Licensee l
Resolution of EMF-34 Problems.
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EMF-34, a liquid effluent monitor, was provided for the detection of i
activity in the water sample taken from the shell side of the steam j
generators. As originally designed, EMF-34 monitored the flow from j
all four steam generators through piping connected to the Steam
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Generator Blowdown System and the Nuclear Sampling System.
Upon
reaching the high activity setpoint, EMF-34 would activate an alarm
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in the Control Room and initiate a signal to close several valves to j
isolate the unit's steam generators from the Steam Generator Blowdown and Nuclear Sampling Systems.
However, due to several operational problems, the EMF-34 System was found useless for
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continuous duty and was unable to meet its operability requirements.
I Another radiation monitor, airborne monitor EMF-33, is provided to I
o continuously monitor the gaseous exhaust from the condensate air j
ejector exhaust to the unit vent but had no control functions. The l
Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) originally required EMF-34 to be l
t operable at all times and EMF-33 to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 or
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Due to the operational problems associated with EMF-34, modification
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projects CN-11245 and CN-20635 were initiated which removed the cantrol functions from EMF-34 and transferred them to EMF-33. EMF-
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34 has been removed from continuous on-line status and placed in a
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" wet lay up" configuration.
If steam generator tube leak is
j detected and the faulted generator identified, EMF-34 can be placed l
on line for that generator to " trend" the tube leak.
2 The SLC document has been revised to remove EMF-34 from the listed required effluent monitors and transfer the EMF-34 Control
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requirements to EMF-33.
lhe licensee has completed evaluation CNC-1503.13-00-0464.
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evaluation determined that there was no unreviewed safety questions
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associated with the modifications.
The inspector reviewed the
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evaluation and had no further questions.
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(Closed) Violation 413/91-11-01:
Failure to follow Procedures
Resulting in Diesel Fuel Oil Spill.
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The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated June 19,
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1991.
The corrective action taken to avoid further violations
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included discussions with the involved personnel concerning the need l
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to pay attention to detail and follow procedures. This message was
also communicated to all Operations shift personnel through special t
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meetings conducted by supervision.
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(Closed) Violation 413,414/91-21-02: Failure to follow Procedures i
or Inadequate Procedures.
i The licensee responded to this violation by letters dated December i
2, 1991 and January 31, 1992.
The wording of Procedure
OP/1/A/6400/05 has been enhanced to ensure clarity of intent. Work l
requests are to be completed before proceeding with work activities.
Post maintenance testing required following maintenance or modification activities is to be completed prior to returning a system to service.
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The plant operators have been given additional training on how to recognize and prioritize alarm response on diesel generator local alarm panels.
Also, the annunciator response procedures, OP/1,2/A/6100/90A, have been enhanced to give reducing load or
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tripping diesel generator a higher priority in response to diesel i
generator overheating.
d.
(Closed) Violation 413,414/92-09-01: Failure to Follow Procedures Which Had the Potential to Result in an Overexposure of a Plant Employee.
The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated June 1, 1992.
The corrective actions taken to avoid further violation included providing the Safety Group with additional training on radiation protection practices utilizing a mock-up which reflected actual plant conditions.
The Catawba General Employee Training J
program has also been revised to cover the overexposure event and to
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provide additional instruction in the Catawba Frisking Policy.
Ho violations or deviations were identified.
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i 12.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 9,1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number Description and Reference URI 414/93-03-01 Review ND Train 2A Water Hammer Event (paragraph 6).
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