IR 05000413/1993015
| ML20045G062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045G061 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-93-15, 50-414-93-15, NUDOCS 9307120043 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20045G062 (21) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATL ANT A, GEORGt A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-413/93-15 and 50-414/93-15 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.:
NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: May 24-28, 1993 Inspector:
SON b 4/2//PJ F. N. Wright, Team Leader j
Date S'igned
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Team Members:
G. Salyers P. Hopkins R. Pugh/)
Approved by:
N K. P. Barr, ' Chief'
Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observatica and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response Facilities, including the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations facility. The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's critique. This unannounced exercise was conducted on May 26, 1993, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., with offsite participation limited to receiving notification messages.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. One exercise weakness was identified concerning failure'to properly classify an-emergency event. A noted exercise strength was the scenario' concept, goals, and realism. The licensee's performance during the exercise was good, with the licensee successfully meeting most of its exercise objectives. Overall, the exercise demonstrated an effective capability to implement the Emergency Plan in the event of a radiological emergency.
9307120043 930624 PDR ADOCK 05000413 O
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REPORT DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- G. Addis, Human Resources Manager
- D. Baysinger, Radiation Protection Staff D. Brewer, Corporate Probabilistic Risk Assessment Staff
- M. Greene, General Office, Corporate Communications
- J. Huggins, Human Resources R. Katalinich, Simulator Operator Evaluator
- T. Kuhr, Nuclear Emergency Planning Consultant
- B. McCollum, Station Manager
- P. McNamara, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- G. Mitchell, Emergency Planning Exercise Director D. Parsons, Radiation Protection Staff
- K. Seasley, Compliance Engineer
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Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- P. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector (McGuire)
- J. Zeiler, Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Meeting Abbraviations used throughout this report are defined in the last paragraph.
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine
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whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's j
Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
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10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed with licensee representatives. The licensee approached the scenario development with deliberation and the objective to improve knowledge of plant systems and emergency response capabilities. The scenario was developed to test the licensee's response to a condition providing significant potential for core failure and a success path for mitigating accident conditions. During the development of the scenario, licensee personnel conducted studies of the limits and capabilities of various
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safety components in the absence of component cooling. Alternative methods for cooling and protecting various plant equipment were identified which could be used in emergency conditions to extend
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operability of safety related equipment.
Information formulated during l
the scenario development also proved useful for probabilistic risk assessment activities. The licensee also identified simulator limitations during the scenario development process.
For example, the
simulator did not have the entire loss of ECCS modeled prior to scenario development. The licensee modified the simulator to model the complete loss of ECCS.
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The licensee added realism to the exercise with a real fire and plane
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crash mockup, medical exercise, and use of critical equipment mockups.
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The mockups provided sufficient testing for a significant portion of the emergency response staff. Mockups were strategically staged to prevent disclosure of the exercise start time. The scenario kept the Emergency i
Response Organization busy and thinking of courses to protect the
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reactor until the exercise was terminated. The scenario allowed the
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staff the opportunity to prevent core damage and tie players were
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successful in accomplishing the task.
-l The final exercise scenario was well organized, detailed, and adequate
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to exercise the participants.
However, the Scenario Development Staff experienced simulator problems with the scenario that delayed the submittal of the exercise for NRC review. The NRC received the scenario approximately two weeks prior to the exercise. The Exercise Director reported that the simulator problems had not been anticipated or
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factored into the schedule and that development of the scenario should have started earlier. The Exercise Director reported that future scenario development schedules would include sufficient time to permit resolution of any unplanned scenario development problems.
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The inspector reviewed the scenario with licensee personnel onsite.
In discussion with the Exercise Director, the inspector identified that the
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EALs and emergency classifications in the Scenario Narrative did not appear appropriate for the conditions described. The scenario developers anticipated that at least two emergency classifications, an
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Alert and a Site Area Emergency, would be made during the exercise. The inspector indicated that the appropriate emergency classifications appeared to be a Site Area Emergency and a General Emergency, based upon
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a review of the Emergency Classification procedure. The details of the scenario conditions, EALs and emergency classifications are discussed below:
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The scenario began with a plane crash and fire at the Service
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Water Intake Structure.
Scenario message number 5 called for a person to report the following information to the SCR concerning the crash:
"This is a Drill Message... Some kind of military
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plane just crashed into the RN (Service Water) Pump House Structure!
It ripped a hole in the southwest corner and the plane
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is on fire!
Smoke is coming out of the RN Pump House!" The
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licensee's anticipated response for classifying the event was. an
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Alert based upon EAL for " Fires potentially affecting safety systems needed for current operating mode." The inspector determined that another EAL appeared to be more appropriate for
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the conditions reported to the SCR.
EAL 3, of " Natural Disasters
and Other Hazards," included the following initiation condition j
for declaring a Site Area Emergency: " Aircraft crash causing
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damage or fire to Containment Building, Contrcl Room, Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, or RN (Service Water) intake structures in modes 1-4."
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The scenario called for the loss of Service Water to Component
Cooling System and threat to Safety Injection, Chemical and Volume Control, and Residual Heat Removal Systems. A loss of Reactor
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Coolant Pump Seal injection would also result in a Reactor Coolant Pump seal failure and LOCA. The scenario developers anticipated the Emergency Coordinator would, as a minimum, declare a Site Area Emergency based on Reactor Coolant Sy:'.em leakage greater than-1
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available ECCS capacity. During the scenario review the inspector
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noted that complete loss of ECCS was very probable and the plant conditions warranted the declaration of a General Emergency based upon EAL 1 of " Primary Coolant Leak," "LOCA with failure of both trains of ECCS recirculation capability and NC (Reactor Coolant
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System) System subcooling cannot be maintained greater than 0*F."
The Exercise Director discussed the exercise conditions and the basis for the selected EALs and Emergency Classifications with the inspector.
The inspector noted that scenario conditions did exist for the classifications indicated in the scenario narrative. However, more conservative emergency classifications could be made by the players utilizing the scenario conditions and the licensee's Emergency Classification procedure. Scenario developers reported that the anticipated EALs and Emergency Classifications were selected with knowledge of technical basis for the EALs and the operator training programs. The inspector reported that EALs were to be clear-cut,
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observable, measurable criteria which could be used by the Emergency Coordinator to make prompt emergency classifications with limited information and time. The inspector stated that, in accordance with the licensee's Emergency Classification procedure, conditions existed for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency due to the fire and plane crash at the Service Water Intake Structure and a General Emergency due to a LOCA and Loss of ECCS. The inspector stated that it was important the appropriate EAls and Emergency Classifications be determined by the licensee's Scenario Development Staff prior to the start of the exercise so that a basis for evaluating licensee performance was clearly established. The Exercise Director later reported that,- based on additional licensee review, the scenario would be revised prior to the exercise to show a Site Area Emergency for the plane crash at the Service Water Intake Structure and a General Emergency declaration due to a LOCA and loss of ECCS.
The inspector discussed the licensee's scenario review and validation process and determined that the scenario was reviewed by staff having s
knowledge of engineering, health physics, emergency preparedness, training, and plant operations.
The licensee reported that the e
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verification process would be reviewed to examine cdequacy of existing procedures.
Licensee representatives also reported scenario development for the next NRC-evaluated exercise would be initiated earlier to permit timely scenario submittal to the NRC.
i One exercise control problem was identified by the inspector and the licensee. The Shift Supervisor (Emergency Coordinator) declared an Alert Emergency Classification, based upon EAL 1. of Event 4.1.7, " Fires
and Security Actions," " Fires potentially affecting safety systems needed for current operating mode." The Alert classification was made 'a
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few minutes after the report of a fire and airplane crash at the Service Water Intake Structure. The licensee had anticipated a Site Area
Emergency would be declared based upon EAL 3 of Event 4.1.9, " Natural
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Disasters and other Hazards,"." Aircraft crash causing damage or fire to Containment Building, Control Room, Auxiliary Building, or RN intake
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Structure." The licensee had prepared a contingency message to be given to the Shift Supervisor if he had not declared a Site Area Emergency 20 minutes after the fire at Service Water Intake Structure was reported.
When the Emergency Coordinator failed to declare a Site Area Emergency, the SCR Lead Controller issued the contingency message approximately 10 minutes too early. The premature contingency message did not permit sufficient play time for the Emergency Coordinator to reassess the plant
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i conditions and choice of Emergency Classification. When the contingency message was delivered, the Emergency Coordinator de:lared a Site Area
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Emergency based on EAL 1, " Fire compromising the functions of safety
systems." The premature contingency message was discussed with licensee
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representatives.
Licensee representatives reported that corrective
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actions to prevent similar occurrences would be made.
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In summary, the licensee developed a very good scenario that was challenging to players and intended to improve emergency response capabilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
The area of assignment of responsibility was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency respcase by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available
to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50,
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Appendix E,. Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,
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Section II.A.
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The inspector concluded that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described and the responsibilities for key organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and implementing procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
Implementation of the licensee's onsite emergency organization was i
observed to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as' required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspector concluded that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear, that staff were available to fill key functional positions within the organization,
and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were clearly defined.
The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize licensee response personnel. Augmentation of the initial onsite emergency response organizations was accomplished through activations of the ERFs. The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organizations in the SCR, TSC, OSC, and the E0F. The inspector determined that the licensee was able to staff and activate the facilities in a timely manner.
The required staffing and assignment of responsibility was effective and consistent with the licensee's approved procedures.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency
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response organization was not required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
The area of Emergency Response Support and Resources was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate
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State and local staff at the licensee's onsite Emergency Operations
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Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A and
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specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
Licensee Exercise Objective B.23 was " Demonstrate proper plant personnel
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response to a simulated fire emergency and timely backup assistance from the offsite fire support agency."
State and Local Agency participation in the exercise was limited to
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receiving Emergency Notification messages from the licensee. The
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licensee simulated other communications to those agencies. The licensee
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also simulated the offsite transport of an injured worker. The licensee j
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l had planned for the Bethel Fire Department to participate in the fire drill. The licensee utilized a discarded bus filled with burning straw and wood to simulate aircraft wreckage. A request for offsite fire l
fighting support was made by the Emergency Coordinator, however, the Bethel Fire Department did not respond. According to licensee personnel, Bethel Fire Department representatives had not notified the staff of their non-participation in the exercise. When the request was made, the fire department reported that they were not participating in the exercise. Therefore, a portion of exercise objective B.23 was not
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met, in that timely backup assistance from the offsite fire support agency was not exercised. The problem appeared to be an exercise planning and communication problem and led to a scenario artificiality.
The licensee also reported that the Bethel Fire Department had responded to an actual automobile accident during the period of this exercise.
The licensee's Fire Brigade response was timely and effective. The tactics used by the site Fire Brigade in extinguishing the fires were good.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Classification System (82301)
The emergency classification system was observed to determine that a j
standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by I
the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-
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0654,Section II.D.
Licensee Exercise Objective B.1 was " Demonstrate the ability to declare l
emergency classification in accordance with procedures."
The inspector reviewed licensee procedure RP/0/A/5000/01,
" Classification of Emergency," revision dated December 29, 1992, which provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification categories.
Enclosure 4.1, " Emergency. Event List for Emergency Classes," of the procedure listed various events ar:d the corresponding emergency classifications per existing conditions.
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The selection of appropriate Emergency Classifications for existing scenario conditions was discussed prior to the start of the exercise-(see Paragraph 2). The anticipated Emergency Classifications were a Site Area Emergency due to a fire and plane crash at the Service Water Intake Structure and a General Emergency due to LOCA and loss of ECCS.
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The players correctly classified the General Emergency but failed to l
properly classify the Site Area Emergency.
The subject EALs included the following:
Event number 4.1.7, " Fires and Security Actions," of
RP/0/A/5000/01, described the following conditions for declaration of an Alert or Site Area Emergency.
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Alert
" Fires potentially affecting safety systems needed for current operations mode."
" Observation of a fire that could adversely affect safety systems needed for current operating mode."
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Site Area Emergency
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" Fire compromising the functions of safety systems."
" Observation of a fire that defeats both trains (or the single operable train) of safety systems needed for current
operating mode."
Event number 4.1.9, " Natural Disasters and Other Hazards,"
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described the following condition for declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
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Site Area Emergency
" Damage from tornado, severe weather, missile explosion, I
aircraft crash, train derailment or explosion."
" Aircraft crash causing damage or fire to Containment
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Building, Control Room, Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, or RN intake structures in modes 1-4."
Following the notification of a fire and plane crash at the intake structure, the Shift Supervisor entered the classification procedure
RP/0/A/5000/01. The Shift Supervisor declared an Alart Emergency
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Classification based on " Fires potentially affecting safety systems needed for current operating mode." Observation of a fire that could
adversely affect safety systems needed for current operating mode. A
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few minutes later the Lead Controller in the SCR issued a contingency message requiring the Shift Supervisor to declare a Site Area Emergency.
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The Shift Supervisor expressed disagreement with the request and changed the Alert Emergency Classification to a Site Area Emergency based on
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" Fire compromising the functions of safety systems. Observation of a fire that defeats both trains (or the single systems needed for current i
operating mode." The inspector did not observe any discussion of
classification based on Event Number 4.1.9.
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The Emergency Coordinator failed to properly classify an event in i
accordance with licensee procedures in that the Shift Supervisor
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received notification of a plane crash and fire at the Service Water
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Intake Structure and declared an Alert based on Event number 4.1.7 (Fires potentially affecting safety systems needed for_ current
operations mode) and did not classify the event as a Site Area Emergency i
in accordance with EAL number 4.1.9, (Aircraft Crash Causing Damage or Fire to RN Intake Structures in Modes 1-4.) The licensee failed to
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demonstrate objective B.I.
The inspector stated that failure to declare i
the plane crash as a Site Area Emergency would be an Exercise Weakness.
Exercise Weakness 50-413, 414/93-15-01:
Failure to properly classify
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emergency events in accordance with the licensee's emergency response procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
The Notification Methods and Procedures area was observed to assure that i
procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations was established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were. established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
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Exercise Objective B.2. was " Demonstrate the ability to notify States and Counties within fifteen minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classification."
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i Exercise Objective B.3. was " Demonstrate proper use of the message format and authentication methodology for messages trr.nsmitted to state and counties."
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's implementing procedures for notifying offsite authorities and the NRC. The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented
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emergency response organization. Notifications to the States.of North
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Carolina and South Carolina and to local offsite agencies were promptly
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completed following the classification and declaration of the emergency
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events.
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Emergency Notifications during the exercise were adequate, with minor
problems experienced. A follow-up Emergency Notification exceeded its
required transmission interval time (30 minutes) due to a deviation between a-personal watch and the control room clock. Additionally, the
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Emergency Notifications transmitted from the control room contained
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minimal information concerning the nature of the emergency. For
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example, the notification messages did not discuss an airplane crash or
the time the fire was extinguished. The licensee's performance in
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issuing Emergency Notifications was adequate and showed improvement from the previous NRC observed exercise. The licensee adequately demonstrated Exercise Objective B.3.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Communications (82301)
l The Emergency Communications area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations.
Emergency communications with offsite agencies were adequate with minor problems experienced with communication equipment. Selective signal notifications to Gaston County failed to function; however, the licensee was able to contact the County with a backup telephone.
Exercise participants did a good job of
transmitting drill messages and properly identifying them as drill-related.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
l The Emergency Facilities and Equipment area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
Licensee procedure RP/0/A/5000/04, Site Area Emergency, Revision 20, dated January 29, 1993, required the EC to activate the emergency facilities upon declaration of a site Area Emergency classification.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the SCR, TSC, OSC, and E0F.
l Support for and commitment to the Emergency Preparedness program were seen in the ERFs and equipment. The licensee had good emergency facilities with sufficient space and equipment to support emergency activities and continued to make facility improvements.
For example, the licensee had recently installed a system of video cameras in the TSC and OSC to improve communications between the two facilities. A wide angle view of activities in each facility permitted an overview of-activities in a facility by the manager of another. There was also a close-up camera at the facility manager's table to permit " face to face" conversations. The inspector observed the use and value of the system during the exercise.
The inspector noted that communications between
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the facility managers were very good, in that they could interact as though they were across the table from one another. The cameras appeared to be a valuable facility tool.
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a.
Simulator Control Room
With the exception of the initial emergency classification, the operations personnel properly analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies to combat the equipment failures.
Operations personnel kept management well informed of changing l
plant conditions, and management responses were timely and
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appropriate to the circumstances. The Shift Supervisor demonstrated good command and control throughout the exercise.
Both reactor operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of emergency operating procedures and the EPIPs throughout the exercise with appropriate delegations to subordinates, utilization of resources, establishing priorities, and monitoring of assignments. The operations staff worked well as a team and exhibited good communication skills. The inspector noted that the
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turnover briefing from the Shift Supervisor to the EC was accurate t
and complete.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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i The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon request of the EC in the SCR. A PA announcement was made to activate the TSC and OSC at 07:08 p.m.
By Plan and procedure, the TSC was required to activate at an Alert Emergency Classification or higher. The
Emergency Organization's response to staff the TSC was excellent i
with most of the TSC staff in the facility by 07:30 p.m.
The TSC
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was staffed and operational at 08:08 p.m.
u The inspector observed good command and control of the emergency-l organization. Technical assessment and mitigation activities were
aggressively and properly pursued by the_ TSC staff and periodic briefings regarding the incident status and ongoing mitigating actions were frequently given.
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The licensee's TSC facilities and equipment were very good. No problems.with the facility or equipment were-identified by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Support Center l
The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel i
response in the staffing of the OSC.
Upon the direction by the
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Emergency Coordinator in the SCR, the OSC was activated, fully i
staffed, and functional in a timely manner.
The request for-i
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j activation of the OSC was announced at 07:08 p.m. and the OSC was
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activated with the TSC at 08:08 p.m.
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The inspector observed and verified that personnel responded
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promptly to the plant's needs.
Repair teams coordinated with the
TSC and Radiation Protection before dispatch and the teams were
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i briefed on potential radiological conditions and protective
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measures.
Radiation protection technicians accompanied the teams.
The OSC was effective in monitoring and controlling the teams and in responding to the simulated events.
Health Physics personnel
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I also provided radiological controls for the OSC. The OSC Director r
j informed OSC staff of plant and emergency status through frequent
briefings.
The licensee's OSC facilities were adequate and no facility or equipment problems were identified by the inspector.
No vio!ations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Operations facility j
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The Site Area Emergency declaration was made at 07:08 p.m. and E0F i
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activation was requested at that time. The EOF was activated at l
07:52 p.m.
The licensee's goal was to activate the E0F within
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75 minutes of declaration of any Emergency Classification greater than a Notification of an Unusual Event.
The EOF was promptly
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staffed and activated with qualified personnel. The minimum staff l
was available at 07:44 p.m.
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The Emergency Director provided timely and accurate status updates
to the E0F staff.
Emergency classifications were timely. The
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accident assessment staff was aggressive in its support to the i
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plant staff in determining system capabilities and advising i
methods to mitigate the consequences of the Icss of service water,
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The EOF and supporting equipment were excellent and utilized
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accordingly.
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l No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Accident Assessment (82301)
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The Accident Assessment area was observed to determine whether adeqtate
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methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or i
potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, i
Paragraph IV.B. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
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i Exercise Objective B.22 was " Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigating strategies."
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The accident assessment personnel in the TSC and E0F did an excellent job of mitigating plant conditions during the simulated accident.
Teamwork was excellent. The staff in all facilities did a good job of
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analyzing plant conditions and developing appropriate strategies for
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combating equipment failures. The licensee's staff successfully met the exercise objective.
The offsite monitoring teams were dispatched as required by procedures, j
and verified that radiological releases were not significant.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Protective Responses (82301)
The Protective Responses area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal
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guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for i
emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific
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criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
i Exercise Objective B.21 was " Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective Actions recommendations la offsite officials
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in accordance with station procedures."
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Licensee procedure RP/0/A/5000/05, " General Emergency," described the immediate actions which must be taken by the staff in the declaration of a General Emergency. Step 2.4 stated, " Recommend to Offsite Agencies that all residents of the 5 mile radius (zones A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, and F-1) of the plant seek immediate shelter and await further I
instructions. Additional protective actions recommendations may apply Enclosure 4.4 (Guidance for Protective Actions)."
During the exercise the RAC in the EOF was using HP/0/B/1009/18,
"Offsite Dose Projections." Enclosure 5.3 ef the procedure listed
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affected sectors depending upon the wind conditions. The affected sectors for 0-5 miles and wind from the East (about 100 degrees) were
A-0, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, G-1.
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The licensee met the exercise objective during the exercise and identified a discrepancy in the EPIPs. When the General Emergency was declared the "Offsite Dose Projections" procedure was utilized to
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determine the affected sectors for sheltering. However, Enclosure 5.3 i
for the existing conditions did not include Sectors A-1 and B-1 as
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required by procedure RP/0/A/5000/05, " General Emergency." Notification
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Message Number 5 issued at 09:22 p.m. did not include those sectors for
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recommended sheltering. Licensee representatives in the TSC promptly i
recognized the PAR sector omissions and reported the problem to the
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Emergency Directcr who confirmed the error.
Simulated telephone
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notifications to the State and local agencies were made to report io
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i sectors A-1 and B-1 were to be included in the sheltering. The Emergency Director requested a follow-up notification message to show the correct sectors for sheltering.
l Licensee representatives committed to correct the discrepancies between the two procedures. The inspector stated that a review of the licensca's correctiv_ actions to resolve the conflicting procedure PARS-l would be reviewed in a future inspection as an IFI.
j IFI 50-413, 414/93-15-02: Review licensee procedures for determining l
protective action recommendations to ensure procedures do not contain
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conflicting guidance.
Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the
Site Area Emergency declaration by conducting an accountability of.those i
personnel inside the protected area. The site accountability process
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was achieved and reported within 30 minutes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exercise Critique (82301)
l The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
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determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were
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brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective
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action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
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Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The licensee conducted facility critiques with. exercise players i
immediately following the exercise termination.
Licensee controllers
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and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal
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critique to management on May 28, 1993.
Issues identified during the
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exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the critique.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during l
subsequent NRC inspections. The licensee's critique addressed both substantive deficiencies and improvement areas. The conduct of the-
critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines I
cited above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
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i (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-413,414/92-05-01:. Failure to follow
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and/or provide completion verification of procedural requirements. A
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review of records.and procedures completed during the exercise showed
considerable improvement over the previous inspection. The inspector
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stated that this item would be closed.
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I (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-413,414/92-05-02:
Emergency Notification Messages were not sufficiently timely and complete to meet exercise objective. A review of emergency notifications was.nade during the
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exercise. The content of the notification messages was adequate. The
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inspector stated that this item would be closed.
(Closed) Non-Cited Violation 50-413, 414/92-14-01:
Failure to adequately maintain EPIPs at the Control Room and Operations Support Center. A review of EPIPs in the ERFs and those utilized during the exercise was made, and all procedures appeared to be adequately maintained.
14.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 28, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Propriety information was not reviewed during the inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. Licensee management was informed that three previous open items (listed in Paragraph 13) were reviewed and considered closed.
Item Number Description and Reference 50-413, 414/93-15-01 Exercise Weakness - Failure to properly classify emergency ccnditions in accordance with licensee procedures (Paragraph 6).
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50-413, 414/93-15-02 IFI - Review corrective actions for discrepancies in the protective action procedures (Paragraph 11).
15.
Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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EAL Emergency Action Level EC Emergency Coordinator
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ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
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EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
ERF Emergency Response Facility
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KC Component Cooling LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident NC Reactor Coolant System i
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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i OSC Operations Support Center
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RAC Radiological Assessment Coordinator j
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SCR Simulator Control Room
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Attachments.
Exercise Objectives, Narrative
Summary, and Time Line
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 1.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
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A.
Scope The 1993 Catawba Nuclear Station annual exercise is designed to meet the
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exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E.,Section IV.F. The exercise will i
be conducted during the week of May 24,1993.
This exercise will involve panicipation of Catawba Nuclear Stanon emergency-response personnel. The States and Counties will receive communications only.
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The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will participate.
i his exercise will be an off-hours unannounced drill to include staff augmentation.
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The Annual Fire Drill will be part'of the annual exercise. The Annual Medical
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Drill will also be conducted during annual exercise week.
A formal critique including Duke Power ard NRC will be held on May 28,1993, at 10:00 a.m. at Catawbs Naclear Station. This critique will be closed to the public.
B.
Exercise Obiectives (Duke Power Company Emercency Organization)
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Emercency Management 1.
Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classification in accordance with procedures.
2.
De-nonstrate the ability to notify the States and Counties within fifteen n..utes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classification.
3.
Demonstrate proper use of the message format and authemication methodology for messages transmitted to States and Counties.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC, OSC and EOF facilities after declaring an Alen or higher emergency class.
5.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC.
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6.
Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than one hour after i
declaring one of the emergency classes.
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Catawba Nuclear Station Page Two
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7.
Demonstrate assembly of statica personnel within 30 minutes in a l
simulated emergency and provide accountability for any not present at the
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assembly locations.
8.
Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions and intercoms.
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9.
Test off-site communications equipment to the County and State warnmg points, County and State emergency operations centers and to NRC including the Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification System.
10.
Test the adequacy and ope-=bility of emergency equipment / supplies.
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Evaluate the adequacy of the following assesement tools, as applicable:
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Drawings 2.
Data Display 3.
Maps 12.
Demonstrate precise a:xi clear transfer of responsibility from the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC to the Emergency Operations Facility
Director.
& s'ent Assessment
it.nnnstrate the ability to transmit data using the Emergency Operations facility Data Transmittal System in accordance with procedures and to distribute this data throughout the EOF.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to provide data to the TSC and OSC in accordance with station procedures.
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15.
Demonstrate the ability to locate a simulated, radioactive plume and to
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measure the off-site radiation levels.
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16.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the off-site i
monitoring teams and the TSC/ EOF.
17.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance
with procedures.
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18.
Demonstrate the abi1% < collect soil, water vad vegetation samples in accordance with procecus.
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I Catawba Nuclear Station
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Page Three
19.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency
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worker exposure.
20.
Demonstrate the ability to determme on-site radiation levels atxi airborne radioiodine concentrations.
i Protective Action Recommendations i
21.
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations to off-site officials in accordance with station procedures.
Plant Onerations 22.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategies.
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Fire Drill I
23.
Demonstrate proper plant personnel response to a simulated fire emergency and timely backup assistance from the off-site fire support agency.
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Medical Drill 24.
Demonstrate proper response to a simulated medical emergency involving a contammated patient in accordance with station procedures.
Other
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25.
Demonstrate resolution of previous exercise firxiings (weaknesses, deficiencies) identified by evaluators, QA, or NRC, as applicable.
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION ANNUAL EXERCISE SCENARIO MAY 26,1993 NARRATIVE This exercise will be a station only off-hours unannounced drill to include staff augmentation (an additional staff augmentation drill will also be held at CNS this year).
The Simulator Control Room Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be manned with players and evaluators. The News Center and Joint Information Center will not be manned because the States (North Carolina and South Carolina) and Counties (York, Gaston, Mecklenburg) are not playing in this exercise. However, the States and Counties will take messages.
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The exercise will begin with a plane crashing into the corner of the RN (Nuclear Service Water) intake strucmre that houses the RN pumps. The plane will be a military training plane with no ordnance (weapons or explosives) on board. Witnesses will state that the pilot has safely ejected over the lake.
The fire will be a real fire set nearby that Bethel Fire Department (our backup fire support) can assist CNS fire brigade in putting out. The fire scenario should cause the Shift Supervisor to declare a Site Area Emergency and activate the CNS Emergency Response Organization.
The plant casualty will consist of a loss of RN to KC (component cooling) which begins to render most or all of our ECCS pumps inoperable. It will also cause the operators to trip the Reactor and Reactor Cool.mt Pumps. Due to an additional failure to the SSF (Standby Shutdown Facility), the plant also experiences a medium sized LOCA when the NCP's seals fail. This will result in a General Emergency.
l If RN to KC is not restored along with at least one ECCS pump within six hours, core damage would occur.
A contaminated medical injury drill will also be conducted at some time during the exercise, but our primary hospital (PMC) will not play during this exercise.
The objeebvE of this drill is to have a realistic exercise in which the ERO can solve plant problems, fix
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equipment, and save the Reactor core from damage. There will not be a radiological release to the environment unless caused by inappropriate player actions. Tue Field Monitoring Team (FMT) will Jill be dispatched as normal.
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[0 CNS ANNUAL EXERCISE MAY 26, 1993
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1900 Fire at RN Intake Structure Catt Bethet Fire Department for Assistance 1915 Declare Site Area Emergency
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Activate TSC, OSC, EOF Conduct Site Assensty 1915 RN 287A Falls Shut (Loss RN)
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1918 KC High Temperature Alarms Received 1933 NCP Motor Lower Bearing Tepps Hign 1942 1A WV Pump trips (burned up)
May start 1B NV Ptmp and/or go to SSF 1944. - Manually trip Reactor 1944 Trip NCP's due to High Temperature 1949 Start iB NV Ptnp (if not running)
May try to Restart an NCP 1957 Monitor for Natural Circulation if no NCP's on 2024 18 WV Pung trips (af ter 30 min. run time)
Dispatch to SSF (provide NCP seal flow)
i 2029 Valve NV872A faits to open (no NCP seat flow)
2034 All four NCP's seats fall 1 1200 gpm LOCA j
2035 Manually SI
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2037 Containment pressure 3.8 psig 2049 Declare General Emergency 2053 When obtaining boron sanple, contaminated
medical injury occurs Cooldown, depressurization in progress.
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2105 1A NI Ptep trips (if it was running)
r Total loss of ECCS injection (core damage
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can occur within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />)
2128 FWST swap to stmp
2140 NC LOCA 300 gpm at this time
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Repaired and opened RN 2S7A - RN to KC flow established i
ECCS injection wy still be unavailable until 18 NI Pung repaired 2147 NC lest rate 100 gpm at this time
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2200 Restored 18 NI Puto to service.injteting 600 gpm -
continue cooling down, depressurizing.
2230-2300 Terminate Exercise l
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