IR 05000334/2007003

IR 05000334-07-003, 05000412-07-003, on 04/01/2007 - 06/30/2007, Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2

ML072130017
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	07/31/2007
From:	Ronald Bellamy NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Sena P FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
BELLAMY RR
References
IR-07-003
Download: ML072130017 (41)

Text

July 31, 2007

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2007003 AND 05000412/2007003

Dear Mr. Sena:

On June 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 17, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.

Sincerely,

/RA/ AAR for Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.:

50-334, 50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73 Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000334/2007003; 05000412/2007003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl:

J. Hagan, President and Chief Nuclear Officer J. Lash, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating Officer D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering J. Rinckel, Vice President, Fleet Oversight R. Anderson, Vice President, Nuclear Support, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy Corporation Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Manager, Fleet Licensing, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000334/2007003, IR 05000412/2007003; 04/01/2007 - 06/30/2007; Beaver Valley Power

Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, regional reactor inspectors, and a regional health physics inspector. No findings of significance were identified.

The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3 dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified

Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status:

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On May 11, the unit was down-powered to 81 percent for planned condenser waterbox cleaning and returned to full power on May 13. The unit remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 13, the unit was down-powered to 97 percent for planned main turbine governor valve adjustments and returned to full power on the same day. Additionally, due to cooling tower performance associated with warm, humid, environmental conditions, the unit manually down-powered approximately 3-5 percent several times throughout May to maintain secondary plant parameters within specification. For the remainder of the inspection period, the unit remained at 100 percent power.

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

(1 Site Sample-Seasonal Readiness)

In preparation for summer weather conditions, the inspectors reviewed the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) design features and FENOCs implementation of procedures to protect risk significant mitigating systems from adverse weather effects due to hurricanes and high winds and system availability during hot weather. The inspectors conducted interviews with various station personnel to gain insights into the station's hurricane readiness program and reviewed the status of various work orders categorized as warm weather preparation activities. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program database, operating experience, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications, and plant documents for the Off-Site Power System and alternate AC power to determine the types of adverse weather conditions to which the site is susceptible, and to verify that the licensee was appropriately identifying and resolving weather-related equipment problems.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator (TSO) and the station to verify that the appropriate information is exchanged when issues arise that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors also reviewed and walked down the Emergency Diesel Generators and Vital 4160 VAC systems to verify seasonal readiness.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

Biennial Team Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

(7 Safety Evaluations and 17 Screenings & Applicability Determination samples )

The inspectors reviewed seven safety evaluations (SEs) completed within the past two years. The inspectors evaluated the SEs to determine whether First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) had appropriately evaluated the activities or changes and properly determined that the activities or changes could be accomplished without prior NRC approval, or had obtained such approval prior to implementing the activities or changes. The SEs were reviewed to determine whether the changes to the facility or procedures as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR) were reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Additionally, the inspectors assessed whether safety issues pertinent to the activities or changes were properly resolved.

The inspectors reviewed seventeen screenings and applicability determinations for which FENOC had determined that no SE was required. These reviews were performed to assess whether FENOC's threshold for performing SEs was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59.

The SEs, screenings, and applicability determinations were selected based on the risk significance of the associated structures, systems, and components (SSCs). In addition, the inspectors reviewed FENOC's administrative procedures used to control the screening, preparation, review, and approval of SEs to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The reviewed SEs, screenings, and applicability determinations are listed in Attachment 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed four partial equipment alignment inspections, during conditions of increased safety significance, including when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions. The partial alignment inspections were also completed after equipment was recently returned to service after significant maintenance. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems, including associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:

• On April 5, 2007, Unit 1, Vital Battery #1 and #2 during battery charger swaps;

• On May 28, 2007, Unit 1, River Water pump seal injection and motor cooler lineup during filtered water isolation;

• On June 6, 2007, Unit 2, B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) while it was the protected train during A EDG testing; and

• On June 14, 2007, Unit 1, A Recirculation Spray during B recirculation spray pump [RS-P-1B] testing [1OST-13.7D].

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

(71111.05Q - 9 samples)

The inspectors reviewed the conditions of the fire areas listed below, to verify compliance with criteria delineated in Administrative Procedure 1/2-ADM-1900, Fire Protection, Rev. 13. This review included FENOCs control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; material condition of fire protection equipment including fire detection systems, water-based fire suppression systems, gaseous fire suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and the adequacy of compensatory measures for any fire protection impairments.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment:

• Unit 1, Motor Generator Room (Fire Area MG-1);

• Unit 1, Communication Equipment and Relay Panel Room (Fire Area CR-3);

• Unit 2, Normal Switchgear Room (Fire Area SB-4);

• Unit 2, Battery Room 2-1 (Fire Area SB-6);

• Unit 2, Battery Room 2-2 (Fire Area SB-7);

• Unit 2, Battery Room 2-5 (Fire Area SB-10);

• Unit 2, Intake Structure (Fire Area IS-2);

• Unit 2, Service Building 745' elev. (Fire Area SB-3); and

• Unit 2, Cable Tunnel/Fan Room (Fire Area CT-1).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

(2 internal samples)

The inspectors reviewed flood protection measures for equipment in the A cubicle of the intake structure during the A turbine plant river water pump replacement. This review was conducted to evaluate FENOCs protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal flooding conditions. The inspector performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the UFSAR, related internal flooding evaluations, and other related documents. The inspectors examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk analysis assumptions.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and 2 flood seal program to evaluate FENOCs protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal flooding conditions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of various flood seals in both units.

Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

(1 annual sample)

The inspectors reviewed a thermal performance test associated with the Unit 1 B charging pump lube oil cooler conducted on May 16, 2006, in accordance with 1BVT-2.30.7, Charging Pump Lube Oil Cooler [1CH-7A,B, or C] Heat Exchanger Thermal Performance Testing, Rev. 0. The review included an assessment of the testing methodology and verified consistency with Electric Power Research Institute document NP-7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines, December 1991, and Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. The inspectors reviewed inspection results against applicable acceptance criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

(71111.11Q - 1 sample)

The inspectors observed Unit 1 licensed operator simulator training on June 14, 2007.

The inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance regarding command and control, implementation of normal, annunciator response, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures, communications, and technical specification review and compliance for various simulator scenarios. The inspectors evaluated the licensee training to verify that

(1) deficiencies in operator performance were identified, (2)conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution, and

(3) applicable training objectives had been achieved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

(71111.12Q - 2 samples)

The inspectors evaluated Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation for the issues listed below. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes, such as MR scoping, characterization of failed structures, systems, and components (SSCs), MR risk characterization of SSCs, SSC performance criteria and goals, and appropriateness of corrective actions. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required by 10 CFR 50.65 and the licensees program for MR implementation. For the selected SSCs, the inspectors evaluated whether performance was properly dispositioned for MR category (a)(1) and (a)(2) performance monitoring. MR System Basis Documents were also reviewed, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Condition Report 07-19708, 1OST-13.7C for RS-P-1A UNSAT Due to Time Delay Outside Acceptance Range; and

• Condition Report 07-18971, Annunciator Bay #3. Annunciators A3-65 through A3-128 Inoperable

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control

a.

Inspection Scope (7 samples)

The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of seven activities, and evaluated the effect on overall plant risk. This review was conducted to ensure compliance with applicable criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the planned or emergent work for the following activities:

• On April 5, 2007, the inspectors reviewed FENOCs risk evaluation and preparations associated with planned, battery charger load testing on Unit 1.

This evaluation included a deviation assessment for performance of the testing under Yellow risk management status, versus the originally-planned Orange risk status;

• On April 16, 2007, Unit 2 entered a planned yellow risk during relay calibration for transformer TR-2B;

• On April 27, 2007, inspectors reviewed condition report CR 07-19405 concerning switchyard maintenance risk assessments;

• On May 23, 2007, the inspectors reviewed FENOCs switchyard activities and risk management actions during resolution of a thermal anomaly on the Unit 1 main generator output breaker disconnect switch. This thermal anomaly was documented in condition report CR-07-20721, and affected the bus-side disconnect switch on the A Phase of the Unit 1 main generator output breaker PCB-331;

• On May 29, 2007, the inspectors reviewed CR 07-21098 concerning risk deviation during replacement of 1FO-55, fuel oil day-tank sightglass isolation valve, for the #1-1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG);

• On June 18, 2007, the inspectors reviewed the weekly probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for the station; and

• On June 28 and 29, 2007, the inspectors reviewed risk and work management during the replacement of the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) at Unit 2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a.

Inspection Scope (7 samples)

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of selected operability determinations (OD), Basis for Continued Operations (BCO), or operability assessments, to verify that determinations of operability were justified, as appropriate. In addition, the inspectors verified that TS limiting conditions for operation (LCO) requirements and UFSAR design basis requirements were properly addressed. Documents reviewed are listed in the

. This inspection activity represents seven samples of the following issues:

• On April 15, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's assessment of operability for a fire protection pipe leak in a Unit 1 safety-related area, as detailed in CR-07-

===18489;

• On April 17, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's assessment of operability for a Unit 2 vital battery [2-2] charger unable to change charging mode, as detailed in CR 07-15002;

• On April 25, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's operability determination and operational decision making issue (ODMI) for the Unit 2 C safety injection (SI)accumulator pressure transmitter failure [2SIS-PT929], as detailed in CR-07-19725;

• On May 10, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's assessment of operability for a high oil level in the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump [FW-P-2]

outboard bearing, as detailed in CR-07-20307;

• On May16, the inspectors evaluated the licensees OD, as detailed in CR 07-20653, concerning the Unit 1 #2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) lower air intake damper not opening;

• On June 5, the inspectors evaluated the licensees assessment of operability for the Unit 2 emergency service water outfall and its impact by a nearby sink hole, as detailed in CR 07-21637; and

• On June 20, the inspectors evaluated the licensees assessment of operability of seismic instrumentation when both units seismic instrumentation were unavailable, as detailed in CR 07-22332.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

Biennial Team Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

(71111.17B - 10 samples)

The inspectors reviewed ten permanent plant modifications (i.e., facility changes)completed within the past two years. The changes were selected based on the risk significance of the associated structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and included design changes, calculation revisions, setpoint changes, procedure changes, and engineering evaluations. The inspectors assessed whether the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant SSCs had been degraded as a result of the facility change process.

The inspectors reviewed the design inputs, assumptions, and design calculations to evaluate the adequacy of FENOC's facility changes. The inspectors compared selected design and operating parameters, such as safety classification, energy requirements, instrument setpoints, intra-system interfaces, and results from supporting electrical and mechanical calculations and analyses, to the design and licensing bases to evaluate the design adequacy. Design assumptions were assessed to determine whether they were technically appropriate and consistent with the UFSAR. The inspectors reviewed selected portions of the post-modification testing, functional testing, and instrument calibration records to determine whether the SSCs were ready for operation.

The inspectors reviewed affected procedures, drawings, design basis documents, and the UFSAR to evaluate whether the affected documents were appropriately revised and updated. For the selected permanent plant changes, the 10 CFR 50.59 screens or evaluations were reviewed as described in section 1R02 of this report. In addition, the inspectors performed walkdowns of selected accessible portions of the modified systems and interviewed plant staff to identify whether any abnormal or unexpected installation issues existed. The permanent plant changes reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

=

The inspectors reviewed the following activities to determine whether the post-maintenance tests (PMT) adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as TS requirements. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following seven maintenance activities and associated PMTs were evaluated:

• On April 20, 2OST-34.8, Standby Diesel-Driven Air Compressor Test Rev. 2, performed following maintenance activities on Unit 2 air compressor [2IAS-C21];

• On April 30, WO 20027913, Repair 1RW-159, Charging Pump Cooler A Supply Header;

• On May 1, 1OST-13.7E, 2A Recirculation Spray Pump Auto Start Test, Rev. 4, performed for failed restart of 1A Recirculation Spray;

• On May 12, 2OST-6.4/2LCP-7-F124, Measurement of Seal Injection Flow, Rev.

5, performed following repair of flow transmitter 2CHS-F124;

• On June 12, 1OST-13.7F 2B Recirculation Spray Pump Auto Start Test, Rev. 4, performed after timing relay calibration;

• On June 13, WO 200214680, 2MSP-36.28-E, 21C Reactor Coolant Pump 4KV Bus Underfrequency Relay, 81-VC200 Functional Test, Rev. 14, performed after relay calibration; and

• On June 29, WO 200259141, Pre-operational checks for RMS-11-1 and RMS-11-2, performed after replacement of the Unit 2 Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

- (4 routine surveillance, 1 leak rate, and 1 isolation valve sample)

The inspectors observed Pre-Job test briefings, observed selected test evolutions, and reviewed the following completed Operation Surveillance Test (OST) and Maintenance Surveillance (MSP) packages. The reviews verified that the equipment or systems were being tested as required by TS, the UFSAR, and procedural requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment:

• On April 6, 1BVT1.39.14, Station Battery Charger [BAT-CHG1-1A and BAT-CHG1-1B] Load Test, Issue 2, Revision 4;

• On April 16, 2OST-39.1B, Weekly Station Battery Check [BAT* 2-2], Rev. 18;

• On May 15, 1OST-47.3J, Containment Isolation and ASME Section XI Test-Work Week 6, Rev.8;

• On June 7, 2OST-36.1, Emergency Diesel Generator [2EGS*EG2-1] Monthly Test, Rev. 50;

• On June 12, 2MSP-36.28-E, 21C Reactor Coolant Pump 4KV Bus Underfrequency Relay, 81-VC200 Functional Test, Rev. 14, WO 200266978; and

• On June 18, 1OST-6.2A, Computer Generated Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, Rev. 15.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a.

Inspection Scope (1 sample)

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification (TMOD) based on risk significance. The TMOD was reviewed against the system design basis documentation, including the UFSAR and the TS. The inspectors reviewed the TMOD implementation procedure, Administrative (ADM) Procedure, 1/2-ADM-2028, Temporary Modifications, Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• WO 200264638, Install temporary pressure gauge as contingency for failure of redundant Unit 2 C safety injection pressure transmitter [PT931].

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01) a.

Inspection Scope (11 samples)

Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, Technical Specifications, the site Off-site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and the licensees procedures. This inspection activity represents completion of eleven

(11) samples relative to this inspection area.

• The inspector reviewed the 2006 Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report to verify that the effluent programs were implemented as required by the ODCM.

As part of this review, changes made to the ODCM were evaluated to determine if the changes affected the licensees ability to maintain effluent doses as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).

• The inspector walked down the major components of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring systems, with the cognizant engineer, to verify that the system configuration complied with the FSAR description, and to evaluate equipment material condition.

• The inspector reviewed the Effluent Monitoring Subsystems procedure (2-HPP-4.02.021, Rev. 6) and observed technicians collecting weekly particulate and iodine samples and taking noble gas grab samples from the following effluent radiation monitors:

• 2RMQ-RQ303, Waste Gas Storage Vault Vent

• 2RMQ-RQ301, Decontamination Building Vent

• 2HVS-RQ109A, Wide Range Gas Monitor (SLCRS-filtered)

• 2HVL-RQ112, Condensate Polishing Building Vent

• The inspector reviewed the most current Unit 1 and Unit 2 liquid and gaseous effluent monitor functional test results to verify that the associated pumps/isolation valves and fans/isolation dampers, respectively, were operable.

Operations Surveillance Test (OST) reviewed were 1OST-43.9 for Unit 1 and 2OST-43.3 for Unit 2 liquid effluent pathways. 1BVT1.16.10 and 2BVT-1.16.10 were reviewed for gaseous pathways.

• The inspector reviewed the air cleaning system test surveillance results for HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Absolute) and charcoal filtration systems installed in Units 1 and 2, to ensure the components met their acceptance criteria, and discussed the test results with the cognizant engineer. The inspector confirmed that the air flow rates were consistent with the ODCM values.

• The inspector observed the preparation of two liquid discharge permits. On 05/21/07, discharge permit RWDA-L-5244 was prepared for discharging a Unit 2 steam generator blowdown test tank (2SGC-TK23A). On 05/24/07 permit RWDA-L-5245 was prepared for discharging tank 2SGC-TK23B. In preparation for discharging the 23B tank, the inspector observed the technician acquire and count the sample, calculate discharge concentrations, and adjust the radiation monitor (2SGC-RQ100) alarm set points.

• The inspector reviewed monthly dose projections for liquid and gaseous effluents performed during the past 12 months to verify that the effluent was processed and released in accordance with ODCM requirements. The inspector confirmed that no ODCM performance indicator criteria was exceeded for this time period.

• The inspector reviewed the calibration records and quality control records for the counting room gamma spectroscopy instrumentation (Detectors Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, &

6) to determine if the required lower limits of detection (LLD) were achievable and that effluent samples were adequately quantified and evaluated.

• The inspector reviewed the results of the licensees inter-laboratory quarterly cross check program for 2006, to verify the quality and accuracy of effluent sample analysis performed by the licensee.

• The inspector reviewed the Validation and Verification (V&V) results for the radiological effluent dose calculation software (i.e., LIQDIS and GASDIS), used for the generation of discharge permits, to ensure that the software currently in use provides accurate dose projections.

• The inspector reviewed the licensees actions to evaluate and monitor potential groundwater pathways that may contain radioactive materials from past spills and leaks. Included in this review were the results of a hydro-geological study entitled, Ground Water Flow Characteristics Report for the Beaver Valley Power Station, dated 12/18/06. The inspector reviewed the plans for establishing monitoring wells in strategic locations to identify potential pathways. The inspector also reviewed the results of the licensees study entitled, BVPS Applicablity to IE Bulletin 80-10 and IE Notices 88-22 and 2006-13," dated 03/20/07. This study resulted in more accurate evaluations of possible cross contamination of clean (non-radioactive) systems, including increased sampling/analysis frequencies.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

[OA]

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a.

Inspection Scope (6 samples)

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for six performance indicators (PI) listed below for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed portions of the operational logs and PI data developed from monthly operating reports, and discussed methods for compiling and reporting the PIs with cognizant engineering and licensing personnel. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period, PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 4, were used for each data element.

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (2 samples)

The inspectors reviewed the PIs for unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours, to verify that power changes greater than 20 percent had been properly reported. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the reported data through reviews of Licensee Event Reports, monthly operating reports, plant operating logs, and additional records. The inspectors reviewed data from April 2006 to March 2007.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Activity (2 samples)

The inspectors reviewed the PI for RCS activity to verify that the proper dose equivalent Iodine-131 was reported and that it was below the TS limit. Inspectors reviewed data for each unit from April 2006 to March 2007.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate (2 samples)

The inspectors reviewed the PIs for RCS leak rate to verify that the maximum identified leakage did not exceed the TS value and that it was properly reported.

Inspectors reviewed data for each unit from April 2006 to March 2007.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into FENOC's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing detailed packets of each CR, attending screening meetings, and accessing FENOC's computerized CR database.

.2 Annual Sample Review (1 sample)

Focused Review of Scaffolding Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a focused review of the scaffolding program and actions taken in response to an issue where scaffolding was built in such a manner that it interfered with the operation of two main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and caused an entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 on October 1, 2006. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause analysis report, corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence, the implementation of those corrective actions, interviewed personnel, and toured selected scaffolding to verify it was erected in accordance with plant procedures.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's actions to prevent improperly built scaffolding are appropriate. These actions included enhancing the scaffolding erection and tagging procedure by classifying scaffolding by risk significance and providing increased oversight according to the risk of the scaffolding work being performed. The risk of a scaffolding activity is assessed by a senior reactor operator prior to building or disassembling a scaffolding.

The inspectors found that FENOC appropriately identified issues associated with scaffolding and entered them into the corrective action program. The inspector identified several examples where protective padding installed on scaffolding was in contact with plant components contrary to the procedural requirement. The licensee entered the issues into the corrective action program.

.3 Inspection Module Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Review

Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed fifteen

(15) Condition Reports, six

(6) Nuclear Oversight Field Observation Reports, and a Nuclear Oversight Assessment Report to evaluate the licensees threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems in implementing the ODCM. This review was conducted against the criteria contained in 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, the ODCM, and the licensees procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Biennial Inspections of Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed condition reports (CRs) associated with 10 CFR 50.59 issues and permanent plant modification issues to ensure that the licensee was identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems associated with these areas and that the planned or completed corrective actions for the issues were appropriate. The CRs reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 Review Personnel Performance during Non-Routine Operations (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one event that demonstrated personnel performance in coping with a non-routine transient. The inspectors observed operations in the control room and reviewed applicable operating and alarm response procedures, technical specifications, plant process computer indications, and control room shift logs to evaluate the adequacy of FENOC's response to these events. The inspectors also verified the events were entered into the corrective action program to resolve identified adverse conditions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the

.

• Unit 1 and Unit 2: On June 1, at 7:13 p.m., the station experienced an off-site power grid disturbance as indicated by multiple annunciators related to off-site power and various computer status alarms. The operators appropriately entered abnormal operating procedure (AOP) 1/2-35.1, Grid Disturbance and took action to verify proper off-site power line-up and verify the status of operating equipment. Both units observed a negative generator load spike of approximately 15 MWe, at the time of the disturbance. Operators contacted the grid system operator, in accordance with the stations grid protocol, and were notified that a grid voltage perturbation occurred due to an insulator failure on a transformer in the nearby town of Midland. Unit 1 and Unit 2 offsite electrical status remained normal. The operators performed a plant walkdown of each unit. The inspectors also reviewed plant data and logs to ensure appropriate actions were taken and applicable emergency plan entry conditions were considered. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the station to ensure equipment was operating as designed and had not been impacted by the grid disturbance. The event and subsequent information was documented be the licensee in CR-07-21465.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 Unit 1 Extended Power Uprate (IP 71004)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed data from selected plant testing during and after final power ascension to rated thermal power (RTP). Unit 1 reached RTP (2900 MWt) on March 9, 2007. Additionally, the inspectors observed post-100% power activities and reviewed selected plant data to determine if significant plant anomalies occurred, and to ensure plant behavior was consistent with the data by simulator and analytical data.

The inspectors reviewed operator actions, applicable procedure changes, and reviewed selected plant design changes and other inspection activities conducted under the normal baseline inspection program, to ensure an adequate sample of risk-significant attributes required by NRC inspection procedure 71004 were evaluated.

Specific inspections completed in the current report can be found in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unit 1 Steam Generator (SG) Replacement Inspection (IP 50001)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed SG post-installation results from the following tests to ensure that the plant modifications have been successfully completed. Documents reviewed are listed in Attachment 1:

• RCS flow verification

• RCS leakage testing

• SG secondary side leakage testing

• Calibration and testing of instrumentation affected by SG replacement

• SG performance testing - moisture carryover tests This followup review is a continuation of inspection activities for SG post-installation testing previously documented in inspection report 05000334/2006003, Section 4OA5.8.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Conversion from current Technical Specifications (CTS) to Improved

Technical Specifications (ITS)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator training, licensing documents, and evaluated station implementation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 individual CTSs into a single station ITS, as approved on February 21 (ML070390063). ITS was implemented on June 23 based on a station developed plan. Inspectors monitored the transition of Beaver Valleyfrom CTS to ITS and reviewed station conditions to verify FENOC was in compliance with ITS.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems

On May 24, the inspector presented the inspection to Mr. E. Hubley, acting Director of Maintenance, and other members of the FENOC staff. The licensee acknowledged the conclusions and observations presented. No proprietary information is presented in this report.

.2 Biennial Inspections of Permanent Plant Modifications

On June 8, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Manoleras, Director of Engineering, and other members of the FENOC staff. The inspectors verified that this inspection feeder does not contain proprietary information.

.3 Quarterly Inspection Report Exit

On July 17, the inspector presented the normal baseline inspection results to Mr. J.

Lash, Site Vice President, Beaver Valley Power Station, and other members of the FENOC staff. The licensee acknowledged the conclusions and observations presented.

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of the inspection period.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Baker

Radiation Protection Manager

M. Banko

Environmental & Chemistry Supervisor

C. Battistone

Supervisor, Rapid Response

R. Beal

Unit 1 Ventilation Systems Engineer

R. Bologna

Operations Manager

G. Cacciani

Engineering Analyst

A. Durbin

Senior Radiation Protection Technician

R. Fedin

Regulatory Compliance Engineer

K. Frederick

Senior Design Engineer

D. Hoover

Mechanical Design Engineer

E. Hubley

Manager, Maintenance

H. Kahl

Fire Protection design Engineer

C. Keller

Regulatory Compliance

B. Klinko

Diesel System Engineer

J. Lash

Site Vice President

K. Lynch

Design Engineering

A. Lonnett

Advanced Nuclear Specialist

R. Lubert

Plant Engineer

J. Mauck

Regulatory Compliance

T. McGoutry

Component Engineer

L. Mickinac

Nuclear Oversight

J. Miller

Fire Protection Marshall

L. Miller

Fire Protection System Engineer

K. Mitchell

System Engineer

R. Moore

Radiation Protection Supervisor

B. Murtagh

Supervisor, I&C and Electrical Design Engineering

F. Oberlitner

Design Engineering

M. Patel

Electrical Design Engineer

B. Paul

Design Engineering

D. Price

Supervisor, Nuclear Mechanical/Structural Engineering

J. Redmond

System Engineer

M. Ressler

Supervisor, Design Engineering

D. Salera

Chemistry Supervisor

B. Sepelak

Compliance Supervisor

M. Testa

Senior Design Engineer

P. Vakharia

Plant Engineer, Effluent Monitoring Systems

T. Westbrook

Structural Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None Open/Closed None