IR 05000412/1979005
| ML19257C075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1979 |
| From: | Jernigan E, Mcgaughy R, Narrow L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257C064 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-79-05, 50-412-79-5, NUDOCS 8001240073 | |
| Download: ML19257C075 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-412/79-05 Docket No. 50-412
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License No. CPPR-105 Priority
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Category A
Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
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Facility Name:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection cond ted:
23-26, 1979 Inspectors:
54b M
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L. N r Reactor Inspector (fate signed
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, Re or Inspector date signed
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[}' LCs n 9-5-7 f AY A. Vhrela, Reactor nspector date signed Approved by: /, /4/ [l[e b,o w h-//-/9 R.W.McGaughy,Ch/if ojects Section, date signed RC&ES Branch Inspection Summary:
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Inspection on July 23-26, 1979 (Report No. 50-412/79-05)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by three regional based inspectors.
The inspectors examined the QC programs for concrete placement, storage and maintenance of equipment, placement of structural backfill, document control, and the status of outstanding items.
The inspection involved 78 inspector-hours on site by three NRC regional based inspectors.
Resul ts : Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in three areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one area.
Failure to provide an adequate procedure for maintenance and protection of equipment following its installation and consequent failure to prevent possible damage or deterioration of the equipment. (Paragraph 4)
I797 127 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8001240 D
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Duquesne Light Company (DLC)
L. E. Arch, Senior QA Engineer
- R. Coupland, Director of Quality Control
- H. N. Crooks, Jr., Assistant Director, SQC C. R. Davis, Senior QA Engineer
,C. Earnest, Document Control Supervisor, SQC D. W. Denning, Assistant Director, SQC
- R. J. Swiderski, Superintendent of Construction
- S. T. Adams, Superintendent Construction Services G. Bingham, Construction Supervisor P. H. Bodine, Supervisor of Document Systems D. DeSanzo, Supervisor of Document Control
- S. M. Dew, Head, Site Engineering Office
- J. Giler, Assistant Resident Engineer
- G. E. Gregory, Construction Control Engineer C. Hansen, Engineer, Site Extension:0ffice A. R. Mikus, Construction Area Superintendent
- R. H. Tarr, Engineer R. Trudeau, Construction Engineer
- J. E. Williams, Resident Manager K, Kolhman, Storage Engineer Schneider, Inc. (Schneider)
J. Peyer, Site Project Engineer G. F. Sessler, Site QA Manager G. Timko, QC Sepervisor Sargent Electric Company (SEC)
J. Juffalo, Document Control Supervisor W. Pearson, Assistant Project Manager R. Wise, Electrical QC Supervisor 1797 128
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Dick Corporation (Dick)
A. Cafardi, QC, Inspector Concrete H. Jones, QC, Inspector Backfill J. Long, QC Consultant J. Stanich, Construction Superintendent Beaver Valley Builders Supply (BVBS)
T. M. Ordich, QC Manager S. Walker, Batch Plant Operator 2.
Plant Tour The inspector made a tour of the site to observe work activities in progress, completed work and construction status. -Work items were examined for obvious defects and for evidence of noncompliance with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
Evidence of QC activities and quality control of the work was observed. Specific activities observed by the inspector include storage of rebar,
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i E P.ing and_ han equipment and~gers in_the laydown area; installation of electrical cable trays; progress in civil / structural work,
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repair. of lower pump _ cubicles, operation of batch plant and storage of aggregate.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Receiving, Storage and Maintenance of Equipment - Prior to Installation The inspector reviewed the procedures provided for the control of receiving, storage and maintenance of safety related components prior to their installation.
He observed implementation of portions of these procedures, and audited related records.
These reviews and observations were made to determine whether the storage / maintenance program and its implementation were consistent with the requirements of the PSAR and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.38.
a.
Procedure Review Specificatiens/ procedures reviewed by the inspector included:
WNSD "NSSS Component Receiving and Storage Criteria"
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2BVS-981 " Storage and Maintenance During Storage of Pennanent
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Plant Equipment During the Construction Phase" The inspector found that adequate procedures had been provided for receiving, storage and maintenance as shown below:
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(1) receiving inspections are performed which verify that components are in conformance with specifications and undamar 2d or, if not, that the nonconformance or damages are ider~ ified, documented and means provided to assure appropriate disposition thereof; (2) components are adequately identified; (3)
components are stored and protected to prevent deterioration; (4)
crane testing; rigging and component lifting requirements established as necessary prior to lifting of safety related components; and, (5) adequate records are generated to demonstrate that the required inspection / maintenance activities were performed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Implementation of Procedure The inspector observed the storage and protection provided for safety related components.
These items were stored in onsite warehouses and temporary storage buildings.
The storage environment and protection provided the equipment met the applicable storage specification requirement.
The specific equipment inspected included:
2-MSS-SV-102-A, Reactor Coolant Stop Valve
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2-MSS-SV-104-B Reactor Coolant Stop Valve 2-S IS-T K-21 C, Safety Injection Accumulator Tank
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2-SIS-TK-22, Boron Injection Tank
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The inspector found this equipment was stored in a manner specified by the S&W procedures in that:
the equipment was identified; the surrounding areas were free of combustibles other than equipment crates and plastic covers; and a maintenance program was established and implemented by S&W.
In addition, the inspector interviewed QC inspectors responsible for performing receiving and storage inspections and the material control personnel responsible for receiving, storing and handling the equipment.
The inspector found these personnel to be knowledgable of procedural requirements related to the storage, handling and maintenance of safety related equipment.
No items of noncompliance were identified relative to pre-installation equipment storage.
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c.
Storage Inspection Records The inspectors audit of storage inspection records included a review of records associated with the above mentioned equipment.
These records indicated that storage inspections had been conducted at the required frequencies and that storage requirements were met as specified in applicable procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Storage and Maintenance of Equipment Following Installation The inspector reviewed procedures for and observed in-place storage and maintenance of equipment following installation.
Field Construction Procedure FCP-201 " Cleaning and maintaining the cleanness for Piping, Tubing and Associated components" is identified by Specification 2-BVS-981 as the applicable procedure following installation of the equipment. Specification 2-BVS-981 requires that an internal inert gas blanket be maintained in certain components.
However FCP-201 has no requirement for maintaining a protective internal atmosphere nor for taking other measures to protect the component internals, or for inspection to detennine if there was any deterioration of the internals.
The inspector observed in-place storage of specific components including; heater drain coolers, extractor heaters; feedwater heaters, and primary component cooling water heat exchangers.
Discussions with cognizant site personnel revealed that the protective atmosphere had been removed to permit installation of connecting piping.
The nitrogen atmosphere had not been replaced, nor had other protective measures been taken to prevent deterioration of the internals.
As an example, Heat exchangers 2-CCP-E-21A, B and C had been without a protective internal environment since their installation, a period of approximately two years.
In addition, no inspections of the internal condition of these heat exchangers had been conducted since their installations.
Lack of an adequate procedure for maintenance and protection of equipment following its installation and consequent failure to prevent possible damage or deterioration of this equipment is considered to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII (79-05-01)
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Document Control The inspector examined records and discussed distribution methods and control of drawings, specifications, changes and Engineering & Design Coordination Reports (E&D's) with responsible S&W and certain subcontractor personnel to determine conformance with the requirements of the PSAR and the following procedures:
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FCP (Field Construction Procedure) -30, Change No. 3, "Jobsite Document Control" FCP-31, dated June 21, 1968, " Indexing and Retrieva) of Nuclear
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P1 ant Documentation".
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The inspector examined records for distribution and control of a random selection of drawings and specifications.
The inspector observed that a relatively small number of E&D's had been issued and was informed by the licensee that S&W had been directed to incorporate changes into drawings and specifications were feasable without delay to the work.
The inspector observed that documents distributed by the S&W Document Control Section were issued to selected groups representing subcontractors, and other on-site organizations.
These are considered to be the
" Accountable Holders" of the documents and are responsible for distribution to working levels within their organization.
The records and evidence of document control by the S&W Document Control section are, considered to be acceptable.
However, the ir.spector was informed that this section had no responsiblility for control of documents distributed by the " Accountable Holders".
The inspector discussed distribution and use of E&D's with representatives of Schneider.
These discussions confirmed that relatively few E&D's were issued except to designers and draftsmen for incorporation into drawings, isometrics, etc.
Even if issued to the field, they were for reference only.
The inspector examined a random selection of SEC's document control records. Documents received by SEC document control center are distributed to various locations including a subsidiary electrical construction document control center which made a further distribution of documents to the working level and maintained its own records.
The inspector observed a number of minor discrepancies between the various records.
During later discussions with the licensees representatives the inspector was informed that such records were included in audits of the various s ubcontractors.
In view of the large number of " Accountable Holders" of records and the number of discrepancies identified by the inspector, these audits do not appear to provide an adequate means of insuring control of documents by the " Accountable Holders".
This item is unresolved pending review of the adequacy of document control by the licensee and further review of document control by an NRC inspector.
(412/79-05-02)
6.
NDE of Penetration Welds The inspector questioned the type of NDE which had been performed on the sleeve to forging welds of the flued head penetrations and was informed that engineering had recently raised the same question.
The drawing requirements and inspections performed had been found not to meet the requirements of ASME III.
These nonconformances had been reported on N&D No. 9169.
This item is unresolved pending review by an NRC inspector of the disposition of this N&D and the corrective actions taken. (412/79-05-03)
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7.
Structural Concrete Placement Containment The inspector observed preparations for and work perfonned in structural concrete placement, including quality verfication of these activities, for the reactor crane wall and reactor core wall.
These vertical wall placements within the containment building, pours PC #2148 and 2152 involved approx'mately 130 and 140 c.y. of a 5,000 p.s.i. concrete mix and were placed by pumping through steel pipe from a truck discharge station and boom crane with mixer-pump located outside the containment building.
The inspector determined that work was accomplished acenrding to applicable specifications, codes standards, NRC requirements and SAR commitments.
He verified that work and inspection activities were accomplished according to appropriate criteria identified in the
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following:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 PSAR Appendix B and Sections
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15 and 17.
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Specifications No. 904, Placing Concrete and Reinforcing Steel No. 940 Mixing and Delivery of Concrete; and No. 903 Concrete Testing Services.
Beaver Valley Site QC Inspection Procedure IP-6.2.3, Preplacement,
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Placement and Post placement of Concrete.
Work activities and QC inspection were observed, and discussions with
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construction engineering, supervision and QC personnel were conducted to evaluate conformance to above criteria in the following areas:
Preplacement Preparation and QC Inspection
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Delivery, Placement and Concrete Testing Batch Plant and Mixer Truck Qualification, Operation and QC
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Inspection.
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Storage, Qualification of Concrete Ingredients and In-Process Controls Generation and Control of Batch Plant Records
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Placement, Compaction and Testing of Backfill The inspector observed work in progress in placement, spreading, compaction and testing of structural backfill in the safeguard building area at approximately elevation 715 in areas less than 1,000 ft. sq.
By discussions held with QC inspection personnel and construction engineering the inspector ascertained that work was accomplished and testing and inspection activities fu11 filled the requirements established in the following:
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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 PSAR Quality Assurance Sections
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15 and 17, and Appendix B.
Specification #928, Excavation and Placement of Fill Under Structures
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and Final Backfilling.
Beaver Valley Site QC Inspection Procedure, IP 6.1, Excavation,
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Placement of Fill Under Structures and Testing of Final Backfill.
Work in progress was observed periodically durina two days of this inspection The inspector observed controls during placement of structural. fill obtained from a prequalified offsite source; controls such as 6" loose fill depth, removal of over 8" stone and minimum of four passes using certified equipment (Vibro-compactor-Dynapac/48" wheel, model #CC-42A), and testing of every 2.5 ft. of compacted fill using a Troxler nuclear dosemeter.
As required by job specification 928 testing for in-place density of compacted fill could be either by the rubber balloon method, ASTM D 2167 cc, the nuclear method, ASTM D 2922.
The choice of the nuclear method necessitated calibration of the nuclear instrument and testing for calibration curve adjustment.
This was performed by comparison with the rubber balloon method.
The inspector reviewed Moisture Density Comparison documentation dated March 9, 1979 for a new Troxler nuclear instrument model #3411 B, Serial #5867, and observed that no adjustment of the calibration curve was necessary.
Field testing was observed to provide compaction to 95% of the density determined by ASTM D 1557.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Containment Liner. Plate - Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector observed work performance by PDM relative to receipt inspection of liner plate and calibration and use of proper test equipment during subassembly of the dome liner at the site.
He reviewed S&W specification #6S, Reactor Containment Liner, PDM QA Manual and DLC Site OC surveillance procedure IP-6.5 prior to observation of the above.
(a) PDM fabricates plates at their Neville Island, plant where they remain stored until required on site.
Therefore receipt and storage at the site is not a requirement of the specifications.
However a vendor surveillance shippina release prepared by the purchaser's inspector. accompanies each shipment and identified plate numbers.
The inspector observed no storage of plates but noted that subassemblies for the dome being welded were adequately identified and stored.
(b) Calibration and use of proper test equipment was demonstrated to the inspector during subassembly work for the dome.
The only site calibrated instrument is the magnaflux DC current electromagnetic yoke which is calibrated monthly to an instrument adequately certified by the National Bureau of Standards m 1777 134 No items of noncompliance were identifie.
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Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee Breakdown in Hahn & Clay Machine and Boiler Works (H&C) QA Program.
This item had been reported by the licensee on March 3,1977 as a significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
Interim report of the deficiencies identified and corrective actions taken
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were reported by the licensee on April 1, 1977, May 22, 1977 and July 28, 1977; and a final report was submitted on September 29, 1977.
The Vendor Inspection Branch of I&E Region IV conducted an inspection of H&C on September 7-9, 1977 and had determined that the problems identified were not generic and that H&C had implemented appropriate corrective action.
Inspection Report 50-412/77-09 had reported on review of audits by S&W and DLC.
The inspector reviewed the following reports of additional
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audits by S&W and DLC:
Combined S&W and DLC audit of H&C during the week of July 24,
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S&W audit of H&C on January 9-12, 1979 Combined S&W and DLC audit of H&C on April 9-12, 1979
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The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
Stop Work Directive to the Portland Company (PC0).
This action was taken by S&W due to deficiencies in implementing its QA program by PC0 and was reported by the licensee on November 25, 1977 as a significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The inspector discussed the inspection of PC0 by I&E Region IV on March 7-9, 1978, with the Region IV inspector; reviewed the report of the S&W audit of PC0 on January 12-13, 1978; and discussed the actions taken by PCO with the licensee's QA representative.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
Deficiencies in implementing its QA program by Walworth Valve Company (WVC). This item was reported by the licensee on February 14, 1978 as a Significant dificiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The inspector reviewed the reports of the S&W corrective action audits of WVC which were conducted on March 7,1978 and April 11-12, 1978 and DLC audit No. DC-2-78-5.
These audits showed that WVC had taken satisfactory corrective action on all items identified except one concerning approval of a vendor for manual gears which are not used on this project.
The inspector had no further questions.
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11. Licensee action on Previous Insoection Findings (Closed) Infraction (79-03-01):
Failure to provide proper weld slopes
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for piping diameter transitions.
The inspector examined the documents listed below:
a.
N&D No. 6142 which identified Welds No. 2CHS-010-F-02 and 2CHS-010-F-03 as not conforming to ASME III 3:1 requirement for taper of transition welds and dispositioned rework to meet above requirements.
This N&D was closed and properly signed off.
b.
Repair weld data sheets; weld technique sheet SPBV-300-B, Rev. 2; Special Field Welder Qualification-Restricted Area which qualified Welder No.138; and Radiographic Interpretation Sheets which showed 26 repairs for the above welds to be acceptable.
c.
Memo's DLC to Schneider dated March 13, 1979 requesting an additional inspection requirement for inspection of slope of transition
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welds; and reinspection of all Category I transition Welds to the above ASME III requirements, d.
Memo Schneider to DLC stating that Inspection Plan IP-7.2.2 had been revised per requirement of "c" above; on the job training had been conducted concerning taper requirements; 3:1 taper Go/No-Go gauges had been prepared for use by inspectors; and that all transition welds (Cat.1) had been inspected with only the two identified on N&D No. 6142 found not to meet the AMES 3 requirements.
The inspector was informed that a training tape had been prepared concerning this requirement and examined records of training conducted on April 16,1979, May 9,1979 and May 14, 1979.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this items.
12. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, or items of noncompliance. Unresolved items identified during the inspections are discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 6.
13. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 26, 1979.
The inspector sumarized the scope and findings of the Inspection as in this report.
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