IR 05000397/1992011
| ML17289A497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1992 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17289A496 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-92-11-MM, NUDOCS 9204290063 | |
| Download: ML17289A497 (76) | |
Text
Report No:
License No.:
Licensee:
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-397/92-11 NPF-21 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2)
Meeting at:
NRC Region V Office Walnut Creek, California Date of Heeting:
Harch 27, 1992 Prepared by:
Approved by:
Date Signed K. E. Johnston, Project Inspector, Projects Section
~
~
~P Jodo P.
H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Projects Section
ana ement Meet'n on March 27 1992 Re ort o. 50-397 9-An open Hanagement Meeting was held to discuss electrical safety, licensing and assurance issues, the 1992 refueling outage scope and 'challenges, and operations training improvements.
A briefing was held on Harch 26, 1992 to discuss containment atmosphere control (CAC) system problems.
9204290063 9204i4 PDR ADOCK 05000397
eetin Partici ants
~TQ LS uclear e ulator mmission J.
B. Hartin, Regional Administrator B. H. Faulkenberry, Deputy Regional Administrator R.
P.
Zimmerman, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects R. A. Scarano, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards K. E. Perkins, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects F. A. Wenslawski, Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
- W. H. Dean, Project Hanager, Nuclear Reactor Regulation G.
P.
Yuhas, Chief, Reactor Radiological Protection Branch L. F. Hiller, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch
- S. A. Richards, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch
- P. H. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
- R. C. Sorensen, Senior Resident Inspector, MNP-2
- D. L. Proulx, Resident Inspector, MNP-2
- K. E. Johnston, Project Inspector, Reactor Projects Section
Washin ton Public Power Su l
S stem D.
M. Hazur, Hanaging Director A. L. Oxsen, Deputy Managing Director J.
V. Parrish, Assistant Hanaging Director for Operations
- J.
W. Baker, Plant Hanager L. L. Grumme, Acting Director, Licensing and Assurance G.
C. Sorensen, Hanager, Regulatory Programs S. L. HcKay, Operations Hanager J.
E. Myrick, Outage Hanager
- S. L. Washington, Hanager, Nuclear Safety Engineering D. R. Kobus, Hanager, Technical Training 0.
F. Pisarcik, Health Physics and Chemistry Hanager
+S. L. Scammon, NSSS Systems Supervisor
~Also attended the Harch 26, 1992 briefing regarding the containment atmosphere control system.
ana ement Heetin of Harch
99 On March 27, 1992, an open meeting was held at the Region V office in Malnut Creek, California, with the individuals identified in paragraph 1.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss current operations issues, including electrical safety, Licensing and Assurance issues, the 1992 refueling outage scope and challenges, and operations training improvements.
The meeting convened at 8:30 a.m.
Hr. Hartin opened the discussion by noting that the meeting was one in a continuing series of periodic management meetings and encouraged an open discussion.
Hr. Hazur stated that the agenda was to discuss the Supply System's progress in several areas and recent items of interes Hr. Baker summarized a March 8, 1992 incident where an electrician was seriously injured while performing a preventive maintenance task on an electrical breaker.
He stated that a review of.the event was ongoing.
Hr. Baker also summarized similar electrical safety incidents which occurred in 1988 and 1990 and associated corrective actions.
Hr. Hartin expressed concern regarding the licensee's performance in this area, noting that they were an outlier in Region V, and that careful management attention appeared warranted.
Hr Parrish concurred and stated that the event will be reviewed with other similar incidents where safe work practices were not used.
He also indicated that the Supply System would call on industry peers to support the assessment.
Hr.
Grumme discussed current efforts of the Licensing and Assurance (L8A) organization including management initiatives to improve performance, a management processes assessment, a shutdown safety assessment, and an upcoming management effectiveness assessment.
Hr.
Martin questioned the status and future benefit of the management processes study which had been performed by a consultant to the licensee.
Hr. Parrish stated that plans to improve the ten management processes (such as maintenance work and design changes)
which were evaluated would be implemented in June, 1992, with 80X of the work to be completed in three years.
Hr. Parrish expected the changes to improve efficiency, enhance safety, and focus the responsibility for work performed at WNP-2.
Nr. Perkins asked what actions had been taken to assure that past management initiatives were being implemented at the working level.
Nr.
Nazur stated that successful follow through on previous corrective action initiatives was a priority.
He noted that his managers have in the past been too involved in the day to day operations of their.
organizations.
He has emphasized that managers make efforts to examine the broader view and assess the effectiveness of improvement programs.
Hr. Hartin observed that the LM issues of concern, listed in the LV Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1991 did not clearly indicate who was responsible for addressing the issues.
Hr. Parrish stated that ownership of these problems had been identified and that improvements to the format of the report were pending.
Mr. Hartin emphasized the benefit for the Director of L8A to have frequent direct communications with the Managing Director to discuss issues and problems of concern.
Nr. Wyrick briefly discussed the scope of the outage and noted that four major efforts would be undertaken; a first time full core off-load, a
reactor recirculation system chemical decontamination, a turbine rotor replacement, and the drain and inspection of the "A" service water spray pond.
Nr. Hartin asked how much of the outage work was planned and ready to be performed.
Nr. Wyrick responded that. approximately 70X of the work was planned.
However, he noted that health physics planning was behind schedule.
Nr. Pisarcik described health physics challenges for the outage.
He noted that they had focused on planning, recognizing that it was
V
essential for success.
Hr. Scarano observed that in the past the Supply System has been an average performer in the area of health physics with a tendency not to be ambitious with program improvement.
He stated that this outage presented an opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate improvement.
Mr. Hazur, agreed and noted that the planned recirculation system chemical decontamination to reduce overall exposure was a
commitment to improvement.
Mr. Hartin expressed concern regarding the chemical decontamination, noting that if not closely monitored it presented the potential for significant exposure.
Mr. Baker stated that it was not a process to take for granted and committed to proceed conservatively.
Hr. Baker discussed shutdown safety initiatives.
He st'ated that an outage policy regarding system availability had been developed and was consistent with recent industry guidelines.
Mr. Baker noted that to plan for the full core off-load, the licensee had employed a defense in depth philosophy.
To supplement the normal spent fuel pool cooling system, which was not designed to remove the decay heat of a full core, the licensee plans to align the "8" train of residual heat removal (RHR).
Mr. Baker also briefly described the efforts to develop contingency plans, including plans to provide back-up power to the RHR and fuel pool cooling pumps.
Hr. Richards asked if a test of the back-up power capability will be performed.
Mr. Baker stated that they would like to perform the test and would study its feasibility.
Hr. Hartin noted that the full core off-load and the chemical decontamination presented considerable vulnerability if not provided with adequate management attention.
When asked by Hr. Hartin, Hr.
Grumme stated that L&A would be involved in these significant efforts.
Hr. Oxsen described the development and findings of an operations/
training task force.
The purpose of the task force was to assess the license requalification'program to create a stable, consistent, and predictable requalification process.
He observed that working level groups of operators and trainers had expressed considerable concern With their recent experiences in this area.
Based on the task force findings, a plan was developed identifying long term and short term actions.
Hr. Kobus outlined actions to be taken in the training department and Nr. HcKay described an operations department five year plan.
Mr. Perkins encouraged the licensee to provide challenging simulator scenarios, critical performance evaluations, and management support for improvements.
Hr. Hartin stressed the importance of a consistent format for operator communications and established command and control expectations, noting that to avoid confusion and conflicting instructions, it was necessary for managers to understand the established operations conventions.
Hr. Mazur stated that although there will be considerable pressure to control outage duration, decisions regarding safety will not be impacted.
He observed that the Supply System had the potential to be a
top performer and he expected performance to improve.
Hr. Hartin acknowledged that the Supply System recognized their weaknesses.
However, based on past performance, he expressed concern regarding the Supply Systems commitment to ensuring identified weaknesses are comprehensively addressed.'r.
Martin provided a list of recent inspection findings to Mr. Parrish and reviewed the significant findings.
He noted that while the licensee had performed a very credible electrical distribution system inspection (EDSI) two years prior to the recent NRC EDSI, he was disappointed to learn that the corrective actions had not been aggressively pursued.
He expressed concern that the Supply System might not be-following up other important programs and taking the opportunity to solve identified problems.
Hr.
Hartin closed with the observation that Supply System management should
'nsure that it is clear at the working level that efforts to correct problems are undertaken to improve performance and not simply in response to NRC and outside pressures.
The meeting adjourned at 12:30 p.m.
larch
99 riefi to 'ss t e Containment Atmos here Control stem m rovements On March 26, 1992, a briefing on the containment atmosphere control (CAC) system was held in the Region V office with the individuals identified in paragraph 1.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the licensee's efforts to understand the design of the CAC system and the subsequent system improvements.
The licensee's efforts were in response to NRC enforcement actions discussed in NRC Special Inspection No. 50-397/91-44.
The meeting convened at 3:45 p.m.
Mr. Washington discussed the findings of the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) performed by LM on the CAC system that was initiated in response to the NRC inspection findings.
Hr.
Scammon discussed CAC system modifications and testing.
Complete system functional testing was performed in response to commitments made to the NRC.
The system modifications were developed to resolve problems identified by the SSFI, the engineering staff, and during system testing.
Hr. Richards asked how comprehensive the CAC system design review had been.
Mr. Washington indicated that the SSFI had covered approximately 50X of the system design.
Mr. Baker stated that based on the system functional testing, a thorough review of the hydrogen recombiner catalyst operability, and the design reviews performed by both L&A and the engineering organizations, they had a good understanding of the CAC system and were confident of its operability.
The meeting adjourned at 5:00 e
MANAGEMENT MEETING WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM March 27, 1992
~GENDA l.
Opening Remarks, Purpose of Conference J.
B. Hartin, Regional Administrator, and D.
W. Hazur, Supply System Managing Director 2.
Issues of NRC Interest
~
Electrical Safety
~
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling with Full Core Offload 3.
Presentations'by the Supply System t
j
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Overview J.
V. Parrish, Assistant Hanaging Director for Operations
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Licensing and Assurance Issues L. L. Grumme, Acting Director, Licensing and Assurance
~
1992 Refueling Outage Scope and Challenges J.
W. Baker, Plant Manager, Outage Planning J.
E. Wyrick, Outage Manager Health Physics D. J. Pisarcik, HP/Chemistry Manager Shutdown Safety J.
W. Baker, Plant Manager
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Operations/Training Task Force A. L. Oxsen, Deputy Managing Director Training Impact -- D. R. Kobus, Technical Training Hanager-Operations Impact S.
L. HcKay, Operations Manager
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Conclusions D.
W. Hazur, Managing Director 4.
NRC Perspective cn WNP-2 Performance 5.
Closing remarks
e t
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PLANT OPERATING HISTORY SINCE RESTART FROM R-6 09/26/91...........
Commenced Reactor Start-Up and Low Power/Post-Outage Testing 10/01/91...........
Plant Manually Shut Down to Correct an Oil Leak on.a Turbine Reheat Stop Valve 10/04/91...........
Plant Returned to Service I
10/25/91...........
Plant Down-Powered to 10% for Drywell Leakage Inspection.
Leakage Corrected 11/01/91...........
Manual Shutdown of the Reactor Due to a Condenser Tube Leak 11/04/91...........
Reactor at 1000 psig/Drywell Inspection.
Declared Unusual Event Due to Pinhole Leak in Weld for the Shutdown Cooling Drain Valve 11/07/91...........
Plant Returned to Service 11/14/91...;..'.....
Established 24 Hour Generation Record of 27,420 lVDVHe Gross 11/19/91...........
Automatic Reactor Scram.
Unusual Event Due to Loss of Feedwater/Level 2 Isolation 11/22/91...........
P)ant Returned to Service
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12/20/91...........
Plant Shut Down Due to Condenser Tube Leak 12/26/91...........
Plant Returned to Service 01/92....;.... '....
Record Generation for 31-Day Month 02/22/92...........
Plant down-powered.
Generator Removed from Grid Due to Unidentified Drywell Leakage.
Isolated Leak from Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flange.
Returned to Power Operation 02/25/92...........
Plant Shut Down Due to Problems with Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC)
Drain Piping 03/19/92...;.......
Plant Returned to Service
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04/17/92...........
Commence Shutdown for R-7 03/30-04/10/92.......
INPO Plant Evaluation 04/27-05/01/92.......
INFO Corporate Evaluation
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION 1)
SALP REPORT ISSUES Assure a Self-Critical Approach to Improving Perforinance Aggressively Seek to Identify Areas of Weakness
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Evaluate Efforts to Resolve Previously Identified Problems
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Ensure Effective Corrective Actions are Taken in a Timely Manner Forcefully Bring Issues to Senior Management's Attention
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Assess Program for Evaluating Potentially Reportable Events Stay Abreast of Industry Issues 2)
ARMAGEMENTINITIATIVESTO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE
~ Structure Tree Developed
~ Improve regulatory performance
~ Improve organizational performance
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Reduce cost of power Tenera Final Report Recommendations Initiated
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Focused on ten process areas
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Seven main teams being established Implementation plans being developed for completion by June 30
Continuing Support to Total Quality Efforts
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Quality Council
~ Management training
~ Individual training
~ Quality action teams
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Customer/supplier agreements Performance monitoring
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Empowerment of staff 3)
CURRENT LICENSING A2'6) ASSURANCE PERFORIVRMCE FOCUS Emphasis of Performance-Based Audits, Surveillances, and Assessments Identifying Areas of Potential Weakness Communication of Significant Technical Issues to Senior Management Increased Awareness of Status of Ongoing and Emerging Industry Issues Benchmarking Programs Against Similar Programs at Other Utilities Continuing Staff Development Self-Improvement Initiatives
4)
-LICENSING MG) ASSUIWXCE PERFORMANCE MPROVEMENT INITIATIVES Integrated Planning of Licensing and Assurance Staff Licensing and Assurance Annual Report Upgrades (Annual and Semi-Annual)
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Database Improvements
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Increased Use of Team Inspections
~ Management Effectiveness Assessments Shutdown Safety Policy/Assessment a
Upgrading Cooperative Problem Solving
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Customer/Supplier Agreements to Improve Interface with Customers Total Quality (Quality Action Team) Involvement Structured Trending Standards of Performance
5)
WNP-2 SMjTDOWN SAFETY ASSESSMENT
~ Draft Assessment Issued:
~ MMARC91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management", used for assessment
~
Assessment Team Leader and Outage Manager Attended NUMARC Workshop February 13-14, 1992 Information from Other Utilities Used; i.e., Susquehanna River Bend, Fermi, Grand. Gulf, TMI-l,North Anna, Davis Besse, Kewaunee, Nine-Mile Point 2 e
Corporate Level Policy Statement Approved by POC and Issued to Wl&'-2Employees
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Contingency Plans and Procedures in Preparation for core Offload to Spent Fuel Pool During R-7 Outage
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Team (Operations, Technical, Engineering, Outage management, and Licensing) meets weekly to address issues
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Other Procedures in Preparation:
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Procedure to minimize the potential of draining the reactor vessel or the cavity
~ Abnormal procedure to place fuel in safe place in event of cavity or core drain-down Plan to Finalize Assessment Report before March 31, 1992
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Improvements Adopted from Asse'ssment by Plant willbe Implemented by December 31, 1992
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IVDLNAGEMENTEFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT Purpose:
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Validates the effectiveness of attaining the corporate mission and vision
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Provides senior management with an evaluation of whether key functional initiatives are achieving their intended objectives
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Represents a Lessons Learned to Our Previous Effectiveness Assessment Program.
New Concept Approved by Quality Council
~ Initial Phase:
~ Evaluation of goals and targets - established for management performance upgrades
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Determine ifgoals are in harmony with overall Supply System plan Second Phase:
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Assess key functional initiatives for results achieved in meeting overall strategic plan
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This phase will be repeated on a rolling 24-month schedule Licensing and Assurance Will be Overall Coordinator, Using a Team Approach {5-6 Staff} Representing:
~ Licensing and Assurance*senior staff
~ Evaluated organization
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Outside industry experts
~ Institute of Nuclear Power Operations gNPO) and/or utility assistance
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Assessment Proposed Scope will be Pre-Approved by Quality Council.
Scope willInclude Industry Benchmarking Assessment Results are Reported to Management of Area Evaluated.
Summary Presentation to Quality Council
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Assessment Areas:
~ Regulatory performance:
Maintenance (pilot)
Operations Engineering Support programs
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Cost of power:
Outage length reduction Plant reliability performance
~ Improved organizational performance:
Work process improvement Quality improvement/performance measurement/accountability/
communications
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R-7 OUTAGE 1)
R-7 OVERVIEW
~
75 Days Breaker-to-Breaker 700-800 Contractor/Temporary Staff
$25-30 MillionBudget Scope:
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1100 maintenance work requests
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4000 preventive maintenance tasks
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200 technical specification surveillances
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"-0 major maintenance/plant modification record Several "First Time" Tasks:
~ Full core off-load
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Reactor recirculation system chemical decontamination
~ Turbine rotor change-out
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Drain/inspect Service Water Spray Pond A
l h
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2)
R-7 SUMMARYSCHEDULE 4/17
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4/20
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5/5
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5/2 1
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5/27
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6/22
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6/29 o
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/23
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,Plant Shutdown Turbine Outage Reactor De-Fueled Division I Operable Reactor Refueled Division II Operable Refuel Activities Complete Turbine Restoration Complete Plant Start-Up Outage Finished 3)
R-7 MAJOR PROJECTS Safety Enhancement
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Service water spray pond drain/repair
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250 VDC battery replacement
~ Motor-operated valve program
~ HFA relay preventive maintenance (reactor protection system)
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Control rod drive replace/rebuild
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Reactor pressure vessel nozzle/safe-end in-service inspection
~ Main steam relief valve replace
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Reactor recirculation system pump discharge valve modification
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Reactor pressure vessel cavity crud trap removal
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Reliability Enhancement
~ Turbine rotor replacement
~ Main condenser eddy current
~ Motor-operated valve program
~ Control and service air compressor replacement
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" Feedwater heater eddy current
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~ Local power range monitor replacement
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Recorder upgrade program
~ Megawatt improvement program
~ Main steam relief valve setpoint tester and valve position indication 4)
PLAN'GNG FOR SUCCESS Past Practice Full utilization of available resources
~ Full utilization of critical window durations
~ No logic planning within window R-7
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Contingency resources controlled by the outage manager
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70/30 concept for critical window durations
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Detailed planning in most outage windows
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Scope Control
~ January 6, 1992 cut-off date
~ March 31, 1992 cut-off date
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Process for control of emergent work.
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HEALTH PHYSICS 1)
HEALTHPHYSICS R-7 CHALLENGES Staffing for Success
- ~ Maintaining Personnel Exposure As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
Controlling Contamination 2)
STAFF'ING FOR SUCCESS
~ Health Physics Technicians
~ ALAI'lanning
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Supervision 3)
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MAENTAIICNGPERSON'&L EXPOSUI&S ALARA
~ Planning Scheduling/Sequencing
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Chemical Decontamination a
Nozzle Flushes Mock-Ups, Shielding, Pre-Fabrication, etc.
4)
SIGNIFICAM'-7WORK PACKAGES:
< In-Service Inspection.................
112 Man-Rem I
a Main Steam Relief Valve Setpoint Tester... 130 Man-Rem r RRC-V-67A/8.....................
40 Man-Rem Control Rod Drive Remove/Replace.......
56 Man-Rem Snubber Optimization................
1S Man-Rem Local Power Range Monitor Replacement...
19 Man-Rem.
5)
CONTROLLING CONTAIVHNATION
~ Potential for Loss of Control Station Buy-In to Improvement-Contamination Control Coordinator
SHUTDOWN SAFETY 1)
SM3TDOWN SAFETY BACKGROUND'G)
~ Industry Experience
~
Events
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Challenges
~ NCMARC 91-06
"Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management"
~
To be fully implemented by December 31, 1992 2)
SHUTDOWN SAFETY POLICY During Outages, Supply System Remains Committed to Safety Provide Defense in Depth for Key Safety Functions
~ Key Safety Functions:
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Coolant inventory control
~ Electric power availability
~ Reactivity control
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Containment
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Defense in Depth:
~ Redundant
~ Alternate
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Diverse Augment Technical Specification Requirements as Necessary to Provide Defense in Depth Implementation
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Outage schedules
~ Control schedule changes
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Understand capabilities of systems, structures, and components
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Procedures
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Contingency plans
~ Training
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Commitment
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'est Estim Heat-Up of Spent Fuel Pool During=R-7 Full Core Offload (FPC Heat Exchanger Cooling Water inlet Temp.: 70 deg F)
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- Loss of Both FPC Heat Exchangers Decay Heat Load: 2.6e7 Btu/hr 17 Days After Reactor Shutdown Reactor Operating Time: 16,000 hr Initial Pool Temp.: 135 deg F Reference: TM-2021, Rev. 0 130
10
20
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40 Heat-Up Time (hrs)
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OPERATIONS/TRAINHMG TASK FORCE 1)
IVbMAGEMENTCONCERNED ABOUT REQUALIFICATION.
PROCESS N Impact on Individuals
~ Impact on Organization Organized Task Force January 6, 1992
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Operations/Training management
~ Administrative Auditor
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Assistant Managing Director for Operations
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Expanded membership to include shift managers and trainers
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Purpose
~ Build upon the 1991 performance improvement gains to create a stable, consistent, predictable operator requalification and p'erformance process Methodology
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Brainstormed list of issues (positive and negative)
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Selected ten most significant issues (+/-)
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Surveyed Operations, Training and oversight staffs
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Sifted input; placed in categories
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Feedback to participants
Results
~ List of problem statements
~. Action assignments
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Commitment to resolve significant issues
~ Short-term/long-term actions
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5-year staffing plan Conclusions
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Process painful; eye-opening
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Honest input - vented anger; frustration
~ Staff anxious to participate in solutions
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Completion of action items willachieve goal
t
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TRAINING 1)
MUST HAVE CONSISTENT A2'6) CRITICALSIMULATOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
General Physics Selected to Provide a Simulator Instructor Course (40 Hours) (First Session - April 13)
~ Preparation for evaluation and training
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Facilitation= techniques
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Observation techniques
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Performance feedback Instructor Evaluation Process Improvements and Completion of Evaluations of AllInstructors An Internal Instructor Facilitation Techniques'ourse was Presented
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The Requalification Schedule was Modified to Include an Instructor Week 2)
INSTRUCTIONALSTAFF CREDIBILITYREQUIM<S EAHRQMCEMENT a
Planned Rotational Instructor Positions (Seven Total). Two Already Exist
~ Instructor Crew Liaison Program Started Instructor Requalification Week
3)
PARTICIPAI'A'S NEED MORE INPUT INTO THEIR PROGRAM Instructor Crew Liaison Program End-of-Week Debriefing with Supervisors and Operations Liaison 4)
PROVINCIALISMMUST BE CFGLNGED BY EXM4PLE Al'G)
CRITICALSELF-EVALUATION Interface and Peer Evaluation Trips to Other Utilities
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Goal of at least one per year per training group Already visited Millstone, Brunswick, Fermi, Trojan, LaSaHe Regional Training Group is Being Established Lessons Learned Analysis Applied to Other Technical Training Programs Training Program Evaluation Process Overhaul
~ Facilitated by QA
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Responsibility at the department level
~
Use of external reviewers
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Focus on performance observation and less on process evaluation
I 5)
IMPROVE 'IHE SCHEDULING Al'6) EFFECTIVENESS OF CONlIll'KEDTI4QMNG
~ Instructor Crew Liaison Program
~
Feedback for effectiveness and proper focus
~ Train while on shift; i.e. job performance measurements on swing shift Department Instruction Written for Proper Scheduling and Scope Added Fiexibility for Specific Training Requested by the Crew or for Prior Weakness Remediation Schedule Flexibility Minimizes Perturbations and Overtime'onduct Non-Operational Training Outside the Training Week-23
~,
OPERATIONS IMPACT 1)
DEVELOPMENT AI'G) EVIWING OF A FIVE-YEARPLAN
~ Predictable Shift Schedule
~
Reduction in Overtime
~
Increased Training Hours
~ Allows for Career Development
.
~
Provides for Attrition
~ Allows for Operations/Training Transfer 2)
DEEZ6<D CONSEQUENTIAL EXAIVHNATIONPROCESS
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Analysis Driven
~ Mutual Training/Operations Review
~
Provides Flexible Remediation 3)
INITIATED.A FOUR SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR UPGRADE PROGRAM
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Candidates are Selected
~ Will be Calendar Year 1992 Graduates 4)
THE DEFINITION OF EXPECTATION CONI1NUES TO IMPROVE
~ PPM 1.3.1 Under Revision
~
Revised Evaluation Form
~
Recent Industry Peer Input
~ EOP Training Manual Under Development
5)
- COMMENCED OUTAGE REQUALIFICATION Real Dollar Impact
~ Three Days/Week R-7
~ Five Days/Week R-S 6)
PHASE 2 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDUIW IMPLEIVKNTATIONTIMING
~
Reduces Training Development Needs
~ Allows For a More Timely Training Schedule
~
Based on a Proven Phase I Product
RECENT INSPECTION FINDINGS The following recent inspection findings represent opportunities for gA to have been more involved in licensee activities:
~
Numerous findings of the EDSFI in general, indicate that the licensee's threshold for attention to detail and correction of problems is too high.
Ineffective followup on problems identified during licensee's EDSFI Numerous examples of not filling out surveillance test documentation as prescribed
~
Plant Operations Committee (POC) approval of a test procedure for CAC which would have violated Tech Specs (could have resulted in potential escalated enforcement if the residents had not challenged the licensee).
~
Standby Gas Treatment System in assessing Ken Johnston's NOV, the licensee determined that the SGTS fans could have tripped on overload under limiting design conditions.
~
Improper licensee handling (PER not initiated, and not reviewed for reportability) of a licensee-identified failure to properly isolate a
CRD (as required by TS).
~
Premature entry into Mode 2 (with only one recirculation loop in operation).
Improper closure of main steam line drain valves (contrary to a newly issued procedure and concern for thermal cycling of the drain lines).
Low oil levels in the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) pumps.
Improperly posted high radiation area (no flashing lights).
Access plugs left out of "A" and "B" RHR rooms (an SRO observed this but it was not considered a restart restraint); after resident inspector inquired, it was reported pursuant to 50.72 as a potential common mode flooding concern.
An out-of-calibration flow indicator on the HPCS diesel.
Valving out an RPS-enable feature (turbine first stage pressure transmitter) without proper documentatio CAC PRESENTATION Walnut Creek, CA March 26, 1992
~
~
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INTRODUCTION - J. BAKER CAC SSFI - S; WASHINGTON CAC SYSTEM MODIHCATIONSAND TESTINGS - S. SCAZrBVION CAC ENGINEERING - K. WISE
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~
CAC SYSTEM REVIEW USING SSFI METHODOLOGY BY NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEERING
~
~
CAC SSFI TEAM W. KOOY F. RIPPEE TEAMLEADER PRINCIPAL ENGINEER SENIOR ENGINEER CHEMICALPROCESSES B. LANDER PRINCIPAL ENGINEER MECHAZGCAL B. EKA3HN PRINCIPAL ENGINEER OPERATIONS - SRO BECHTEL ENGINEES ELECTRICAL D. BIALA J. WORTHY SAFETY ENGINEER SPECIALIST TENERA
INSPECTION METHODOLOGYAJ6) SCOPE ESTABLISH SYSTEM REGULATORY &
CODE REQUI.'REMENTS ESTABLISH CAC DESIGN BASIS REVIEWED LBD DOCUMENTS YSTEM PURCHASED ETS DESIGN BASIS MODIFICATIONSR MAINTENANCE SYSTEM OPERATION, MEETS DESIGN BASIS REVIEWED PURCHASE SPEC VENDOR DESIGN VENDOR TESTING PREOPERATIONAL TESTING REVIEWED MODIFICATIONS REVIEWED MAINTENANCE WORK REVIEWED EQ REVIEWED SPARE PARTS REVIEWED OPERATIONS PROCEDURF cl REVIEWED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES REVIEWED EOPS
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~
CAC REVIEW CONCERNS SYSTEM DESIGN IVDDNTENANCE&
MODIFICATION OPERATIONS CATALYST (Iodine.Fouling)
SYSTEM FLOW CAPABILITY (Abilityto Meet Design Basis Flows)
CONTAINMENT SUPPRESSION (Drywall/Wetwall Intertie)
PRE OP TESTING (System Tests)
(Scrubber Tests)
LOOP SEAL (Drain Properly)
RHR/CAC (System Interaction)
CATALYST (Flooding/Degrada-tion)
(Surveillance Testing)
SYSTEM CONTROL (Recycle Flow)
SUPPLY SYSTEM ENGINEERING CAC ANALYTICALPRINCIPALS
/
Steve Kirkendall, MS, Mech. Engrg.,
PE 75 - 79, BLR 79 - Present,'upply System Dale Bainard, BS Che, PE
- 52 - 72, General Electric 72 =- Present, Supply System Loren Sharp, MS, Nuclear, PE 74 - 77, US Army RED 77 - 81, Nestinghouse Hanford 81 - 84, Burns 5. Roe 84 - Present, Supply System Stan Haynes, MS, Nuclear 87 - 90, ANF 90 - Present, Supply System Tom Mi)es, ISC Engineer
-,
74, Boeing 74 - 76, Diablo Canyon 76 - 78, Westinghouse Hanford 78 - 80 Davis Besse 80 - 86, Burns
& Roe 86 - Present, Supply System
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CAC SYSTEH EVALUATION, BECHTEL TEAN Robert Chu, Engineering Specialist BS ChE, University of California Eighteen year s experience in process design of petroleum refining, chlorinated chemical projects, natural gas processing, etc.
Use of computer simulation and design and startup of equipment and systems for chemical and petroleum products.
Familiar with the, types of equipment utilized in the CAC process such as catalystic reactors, blowers, scrubbers, coolers, etc.
Gordon K. Ashley II, Applied Physicist BS Physics, University of Utah PhD Physics, University of Utah Supervisor of Special Projects Group responsible for analysis of problems requiring advanced solution techniques involving computer modeling and simulation.
Co-developer of two important computer programs in use in the nuclear industr'y, BALANCE and SCOPE.
Familiar with containment accident modeling and phenomena, including detonation of combustibl'e materials.
. Knut 0. Larssen, Project Engineer BS HE, Purdue University HS HE, Purdue University Hr; 'Larssen has ]7 years of engineering experience in the nuclear industry and 4 years in the chemical. industry.
For the past three years he has been in technical interfacing work between Bechtel and WNP-2.
He is familiar with both the technical and the operational aspects of nuclear power plants in general and WNP-2 in particular.
Anthony K. Lee, Senior Process Engineer BS ChE, University of California, Berkeley Seventeen years experience in process design of petroleum and chemical facilites,'ncluding nuclear waste disposal and fuel reprocessing.
Familiar with process, simulation programs and a wide variety of chemical and nuclear processes.
Gilbert E. Kligman, Hanager of Process Engineering BS ChE, University of California Registered Professional Engineer, California Forty years experience in process technology research, development, design, startup, and operation.,
Has both technical and management experience in a wide variety of chemical processing plant CATALYSTHEALTH ISSUE RESOLUTION
~
Obtain consultant assistance, selected consultant with petrochemical industry experience
~
Supplemented with catalyst vendor opinions
~
Performed testing responsive to consultant recommendations RECYCLE CONTROL
~
Developed full understanding of control loop
~
Investigated fiow sensors, estimated inaccuracy impact
~
Used original design calculation tool to study containment response to provide selection of recycle ratio
~
Developed JCO, procedure changes and associated 50.59 analysis FLOW CAPABILITY
~
Consultant analysis, using blower characteristics verified system capacity
~
Incorporated in JCO CLOSURE ACTIONS
~
Business decision on purchase of spare catalyst
~
Orifice testing
~
Complete Technical Memorandum and incorporate various calculations into Engineering documentation
~
Technical Specification change to directly measure catalyst performance by hydrogen concentration
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~'
ADDITIONALENGINEERING ACTIONS CONSULTANTWORKSCOPE WAS BROAD, NOT NAfMOWLY DIRECTED AT ONLY SSFI ISSUES, INCLUDING:
- PERFORM TECHNICALREVIEW OF THE DESIGN OF THE CAC SYSTEM TO ESTABLISH ITS ABILITYTO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. THE REPORT SHALLALSO INCLUDE:
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONSOF Al'PZ MODIFICATIONSOR IMPROVEMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE IVRQ)E TO THE DESIGN TO IMPROVE ITS RELIABILITY, SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONSOF AJPE CkDPIGES TO THE TESTING OR OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR THE CAC SYSTE r a0'
ADDITIONALENGINEER%6 ACTIONS (CONTINUED)
TWO ENGINEERS ~TH CONTROL SYSTEM EXPERTISE PERFOMdED A DETAILEDREVIEW OF CONTROL SYSTEM FUNCTIONS, VERIFYINGPERFORMANCE EITHER THROUGH PERFORMANCE 'IESTING OR WIRINGVERIFICATIONIN THE FKLD.
FLOW MEASUREMENT, USING THE ECCENTRIC ORIFICES ON THE SKID WAS REVIEWED.
THE FEASIBILITYOF RAISING CATALYTICBED EXHAUST-TEMPERATURE LIMITWAS INVESTIGATED,VESSEL AND PIPE CODE DESIGN WAS LIMITING.
F~C STUDIES OF START TIIEE, RECYCLE RATE, PRESSURE AI6) THROUGHPUT WERE PERFOM4ED TO ASSURE SATISFYING BASE REQUIREMENT OF LESS TEDLN 5 VOLUMEOF OXYGEN
- DEVELOPMENT OF THE JCO ON RECYCLE CONTROL REQUIRED UNDERSTAI'G)ING SYSTEM PERFORM'ANCE. IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE REQUXRED ANALYSISANDTO DESCRIBE SYSTEM BEHAVIOR,A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF SYSTEM COMPONENT INTERACTIONAND RESPONSE TO CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS WAS DEVELOPED, ESPECIALLY AS IT RELATED TO RECYCLE FLOW RATIO. THIS RESULTED IN AN APPRECIATION FOR SYSTEM DESIGN FEATURE v
PLEA'ECHNICAL CAC TEAM S. SCAMMON SUPERVISOR - MECHA26CAL J. SRQ)ER MECHANICALENGINEER LEAD J. CAN'HK'LL SR ENGINEER - MECHAZGCAL C. MOORE PRINCIPAL ENGINEER - MECKAZGCAL J. PARKER PRINCIPAL ENGINEER - I & C
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CAC MODIFICATIONSAND TESTING PMR 92M294
= WIRING CHANGE - BISI ALA%MFOR TMPPED OVERLOADS OF CAC FANS (R7 Implementation)
PMR 9240564 RELOCATION OF CAC DRAINLINERE'I URN TO CONTAINMENTgmplemented)
.
PMR 92-00574 CAC SCRUBBER DRAGON VENT PATH implemented)
PMR 9240854 CAC VALVETEST PUSH BUTTON TP 8.3.238 R
- TP 8.3.239 RECYCLE FLOW TESTING WITHOUT RECYCLE TO CONTAINMENT TP 8.3.230 RECYCLE FLOW VERIFICATIONFROM CAC-HR-1B DRYWELLTO WETWELL ~
TP 8.3.248 RECYCLE FLOW VERIFICATIONFROM CAC-HR-1A
-
DRVtVELLTO WETWELL~
TP 8.3.246 CAC-HR-1A 2% HYDROGEN RECOMBINATIONTEST ~
TP 8.3.247 CAC-HR-1B 2% HYDROGEN RECOMBINATIONTEST ~
TP 7.4.6.6.1.4 1% HYDROGEN RECOMBINATIONTEST, ~
CAC-HR-1A TP 7.4.6.6.1.5
-
1% HYDROGEN RECOMBINATIONTEST +
CAC-HR-B
~ TESTING PREFORMED FROM 3-10-92 THRU 3-14-92 TO DETERNIINE SYSTEM-OPERABILITY
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