IR 05000397/1992017
| ML17289A642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1992 |
| From: | Mcqueen A, Reese J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17289A641 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-92-17, NUDOCS 9206240141 | |
| Download: ML17289A642 (19) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.:
50-397/92-17 License No.
NPF-21 Licensee:
Mashington Public Power Supply System P.O.
Box 968 3000 George Mashington May
- Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Mashin'gton Nuclear Project, Unit 2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted; May 11 - 15, 1992
, Inspector:
fMc
~ I I irr el~~ vz
~ i c ueen, me e
c repare ness na ys a
e
>gne Approved by:
~Sammar:
arne
.
eese, ie
,
a eguar s, mergency a
e
>gne a
dness, and Non-P wer Reactor Branch Areas Ins ected; This unannounced, routine inspection by a region-based 1nspec or examined the following portions of the licensee's emergency preparedness program:
Open Items identified during previous emergency preparedness inspections; Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program and Inspector Identified Items.
During this inspection, portions of Inspection Procedures 82701, 92701. and 92703 were used, Results:
In the areas inspected, the licensee's emergency preparedness program appeared adeguate to accomplish its objectives.
The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC-requirements within the areas examined during this inspection.
9206240141 920608 PDR ADOCK 05000397
. PDR
Il p>t
!
INSPECTION DETAILS Ke
"H.
"A.
AJ
kF
- R
+N.
- R.
- J
"R.
- A.
- J D.
)kL
+R.
AD M.
"R.
- A.
- M
'AD G.
)kM AD AG
~R.
- D AD
"A.
"R.
S Persons Contacted L. Aeschliman, Emergency Planner J.
Connor, Security Bell, Manager, Plant Services R.
Coody, Supervisor Fitness for Duty L. Dehart, Security f'rograms E. Fuller, Compliance L. Garza, Emergency Planning Training J.
Given, Security A. Gloyn, Manager Security Training E. Jorgensen; Senior Trainer, Emergency Planning F. Klauss, Supervisor, Emergency Planning (EP)
A. Landon, Drills and Exercises Supervisor'.
Larson, Manager, Emergency Preparedness A. Leingang Safeguards Systems Specialist, Safeguards Compliance D.
Madden, Principal gA Engineer, Corporate Programs and Audits W. Martin, Manager, Security Programs il. Monopoli, Manage'.,
Support Services S.= Morris, Emergenc Cperatior.s: acB ity Communications Center Coordinator P. O'Reilly, Senior Engineer, Plant Technical L. Oxsen, Deputy Managing Director C. Peterson, Safeguards Specialist J. Pisarcik, Manager, Health Physics/Chemistry 0.
Ray, Emergency Planner P.
Reis, Compliance Supervisor J,
Schumann, Principal Engineer, Operating Events Analysis and Resolution C. Sorensen, Manager, Regulatory Programs L. Utter, Supervisor, EP Training M. Vorhels, Security Programs H. Walker, Manager, Health Physics and Fire Protection C. Ware, Security L. Wardlow, Supervisor, Radiological Services L. Washington; Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering The above individuals denoted with an asterisk were present during the exit meeting on'ay 15, 1992.
The inspector also contacted other members of the licensee's emergency preparedness, administrative, and technical staff during the course of the inspection.
NRC Personnel at Exit Interview E
H.
D. Chancy, Health Physics Inspector, RV N.
L. Mamish, Health Physics Inspector, RV A.
D. Mcgueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, RV L.
R. Norderhaug, Physical Security Specialist, RV D.
L. Proulx, Resident Inspector, RV
2.
Functional or Pro ram Areas Ins ected
~
~
The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous level of performance in the following areas,and their program appeared adequate to accomplish their objectives.
a.
0 erational Status of the Emer enc Pre aredness Pro ram (HC-82701)
(1)
Emer enc Plan and Im lementin Procedures Several Licensee Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP),
which had been revised since the last routine inspection, were reviewed as indicated by margin change bars during this inspection.
o EPIP 13.4. 1 Notifications, Revision 12, dated April 2, 1952.
o EPIP 13.5.3, Evacuation of Exclusion Area and/or Nearby Areas, Revision 8, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13.5.4, Columb',a River Evacuation, Revision 8, d:".,ed March 26, 1992...
o EPIP 13.5.5, Personnel Accountability, Revision 8, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13.5.6, Personnel Search and Rescue, Revision 6, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13.8.2, Backup Emergency Dose Projection System Operations, Revision 10, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13.9.1, Environmental Field Team Operations, Revision 6, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 9. 2, Field Exposure Rate Surveys, Revision 8, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13.9.7, Aerial Monitoring, Revision 7, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13.9', River Evacuation Monitoring, Revision 4, dated March 26, 1992 '
EPIP 13. 10. 1, Control Room Operations and Shift Manager Duties, Revision 8, dated March 26, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 10.3, Technical Support Center Operations and Technical Support Center Director Duties, Revision 9, dated Hay 4, 1992, This EPIP contained an added "Action 10" on page 3 of 8, which indicated that
"When advised the TSC is
uninhabitable, the Plant Emergency Director will select staff members to go to the Control Room or. the Emergency Operations Facility.based on functional need."
The licensee confirmed that there was no alternate TSC "per se,"
and that the support expertise required in such cases would be redistributed to the most appropriate location to continue support.
"Open C.A.R. Report" (Corrective Action Request)
90-0062 indicated a finding that "Control Room (CR) may not be adequate for handling TSC staff.
Last
drills have had scenarios that rendered the TSC uninhabitable and made it necessary to relocate TSC staff members to the CR, Observations of this work arrangement note that the Simulator (thus the CR) may lack adequate space and equipment to support this influx of personnel."
The C.A.R.
remarks section indicated that "Installation of
~
~
hones in the control room is waiting for action on MMR AR 693 (est.
completion August 92)."
This item will be reviewed in future emergency preparedness exercises and inspections to insure that adequate technical support can be accomplished in event of an actual emergency event.
(92-17-03.)
EPIP 13. 10. 4, Radiation Prot;.cion Manager Duties, Revision 8, dated April 2, 1992.
EPIP 13. 10.5, Operations Manager Duties, Revision 5, dated May 4, 1992.
EPIP 13. 10. 6, Plant/NRC Liaison Duties, Revision 7, dated April 2, 1992.
EPIP 13.10.7, Plant Administrative Manager Duties, Revision 8, dated April 2, 1992.
EPIP 13. 10.8, Security Supervisor Duties, Revision 7, dated April 2, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 10.9, Operations Support Center Director and Staff Duties, Revision 13, dated April 2, 1992.
0'PIP 13. 11. 10, Security Decision Center Operations and Security Manager Duties, Revision 7, dated April 2, 1992.
o EPIP 13.10.11, Plant Emergency Team Duties, Revision 7,
. dated May 4, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 10. 12 Reentry/Recovery Team Duties, Revision 7, dated May 4, 4992.
EPIP 13. 11.4, Safety Manager Duties, Revision 6, dated May 4, 1992.
EPIP 13. 11. 8, Licensing Manager Duties, Revision 5, dated May 4, 199 e
o EPIP 13.11.11, Offsite Agency Coordination Center Operations and Offsite Agency Coordinator Duties, Revision 8, dated May 4, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 12. 1, Crisis Management Center Operations, Revision 6, dated May 4, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 12.2 Headquarters Communications Center Operations, kevision 6, dated April 2, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 12.3, Joint Information Center News Coordination Team Duties, Revision 7, dated March 3, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 12. 11, Joint Information Center Information Manager Duties, Revision 8, dated March 3, 1992.
o EPIP 13.12.15, Joint Information Center Support Manager Duties, Revision 8, March 3, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 12. 18 Headquarters Administrative Support Supervisor Duties, Revision 4, dated May 4, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 13. 1, Reentry,,Revision 5, dated May 4, 1992 o
EPIP 13. 13.2, Recovery Operations, Revision 5, dated.May 4, 1992.
o EPIP 13. 14.4, Emergency Equipment, Revision ll, dated May 4, 1992, o
EPIP 13. 14.9, Emergency Program Maintenance, Revision 7, dated April 2, 1992.
No apparent degradations in site emergency preparedness or inconsistencies with regulatory requirements were noted.
(2)
Emer enc Facilities E ui ment Instrumentation and Su lies The Technical Support Center (TSC) was inspected, to include annual radiation monitoring calibration records.
(See also item 4.c below.)
Maintenance records and corrective action requests (CAR) were reviewed regarding emergency preparedness equipment and supplies.
Equipment was verified as being in calibration.
A report from the "Emergency Preparedness Tracking System,"
dated May 12, 1992, was reviewed to determine status of routine emergency planning maintenance tasks.
A discussion of a perceived problem with response to requests on status of items tracked by this system is contained in the inspection report for the previous routine emergency inspection at WNP-2 (Inspection report 50-397/92-05, dated March 20, 1992, Section 2. c.(2)).
Although tasks on the report were indicated as being
"overdue," the licensee indicated that they were in fact not
I'
(I
~
j tl
5.
known to be overdue.
The EP staff had simply not yet received some of the task sheets to verify that they were, done.
In some cases, the report indicates items as overdue, which are in fact not yet due.
For example, a monthly task -is indicated by the computer printout as overdue by mid-month even though the true overdue date is the last day of the month.
In some cases, documentation that the tasks were appropriately performed on time are not received by the EP staff until sometime in the month following the due date.
The licensee indicated that the tracking system was "inherited" and they are not completely satisfied with it.
The system appears to present a problem that EP testing and maintenance tasks could be missed without the EP staff being aware until long after due dates or suspense dates.
The licensee indicated they would again review the system and seek a better way to track routine tasks.
(3)
Or anization and Mana ement Control (a)
At the time of this inspection, the licensee was in the early stages of a major outage, to last about ten weeks until mid-July 1992.
The outage was indicated as having some impact on virtually all organizations at the ;lant.
In emergency planning (EP), of twelve individuals c:
".he organization chart furnished by the licensee; seven were available full-time for their normal routine EP functions.
Of the remainder; one was full-time.with the outage '. "
organization, one was two days a week with the outage organization, two were engaged for the week in revalidation of the plant s)mulator, and one was on leave.
The licensee indicated that this was having some impact; however, the necessary functions were being performed.'
(b)
Licensee Open C. A. R. Report" 92-0001 indicated a finding that-PER NUREG 0654 and Supply System Emergency Plan 4.3.2.3 - six Environmental Field Team responders are required to be available to respond within one hour to an alert or higher classification.
On January 14, 1992, Supply System emergency responders were contacted by th~ Melita Automatic Dialer as part of a routine notification test.
Only five Field Team members were contacted.
During a notification test conducted on February 13, 1992, only three Field Team members were contacte ~ To address this potential regulatory problem, the licehsee
'ecruited and trained three new team members for call-out.
~
Two are trained he'alth physicists.
As a result the two most recent drills (Harch 26 and April 27, 1992)
have met the six team member requirement with no difficulty.
The licensee is. continuing to address the potential problem and is considering recruiting even more team members if deemed appropriate.
The licensee indicated that the CAR is being kept open for track'ing.
This will be tracked as an inspection followup item for the next few routine inspections to insure that the team continues to meet regulatory requirements.
(92-17-02)
(4)
~Trainin (a)
A review of training records indicated that required training for the emergency orqanization was being erformed, albeit with some msnor difficulties.
The mergency Training Supervisor tracks training requirements for the emergency organization at the site.
He makes notificatio'ns of required training to the individuals affected and then conducts the training.
In the event an individual misses the scheduled training, he is sent a
notice of the fact and an attempt is made to reschedule the training.'
copy of the notice is sent to the individual's supervisor, who is responsible under plant procedures to see that his subordinates receive the necessary training.
The review of records indicated several individuals listed as "overdue" for some training modules.
The worst case noted was an individual who had been sent five notices over a five month period.
In most cases, when individuals miss the first training session
"and possibly followup sessions, the training function defaults to a one-on-one training session between the Emergency Training Supervisor and the individual concerned.
In these cases, the individual misses the class discussion and question and answer sessions, which are also important elements of the education process.
(b)
Another area reviewed was that of training documentation.
The MNP-2 Technical Training Manual indicates at Section 5.6.1.b.2 that Fire Brigade Refresher Traininq in actual fire-fighting practice is requ>red on an annual basis.
It was noted in a review of the "Supply System Personnel qualification System Retraining Report 'ated May 12, 1992, numerous fire brigade members were indicated as overdue for annual fire brigade continuing traininq.
This report was listed as the "FILE: MASTER."
In a review of the "Radwaste Control Room Log," which lists members of
t QI
the Plant Emergency Team on each shift for the date of May 12, 1992, it was noted that of nine names selected from the three team lists for that date, only one of the nine were indicated as current in annual fire brigade training on the master retr'aining report.
The remaining eight had training past due dates from August 1991 through October 1991.
In an interview with the site Fire Marshal, he produced documentation to confirm that the dates on the master training report were incorrect.
Training Attendance Records for August, September, and November 1991 indicated that all of the fire brigade members had received.the proper training.
He also provided a printout from a personal data base he maintained on fire brigade training, which indicated that all fire brigade members had been properly trained and requalified on time and before due dates.
He could not account for the past due dates in the master training report; but indicated that he does not rely on it in any respect for current regualification status.
He prefers his own data base wh)ch he insures is current and complete as training and retraining occur.
He uses this personal data base for assigning members to,/he site emergency team, not the master trainii g 'record.
These traininq observations were reviewed with the licensee during the exit meeting on May 15, 1992.
(5)
Inde endent and Internal Reviews and Audits (a)
Annual Audit The 1992 Annual Audit of the Emergency
~PP
2 PINPdhdh hdldht t
yet conducted.
(b)
Licensee Drill and Exercise Criti ues Licensee emergency preparedness drill/exercise evaluation report titled "DRILL 92-1, REPORT OF PLAYER ACTIVITIES, dated April 15, 1992, was reviewed.
Player and controller comments critiquing the exercise appeared appropriate and offered several suggestions for improving emergency planning and response.
d.
Licensee Initiatives (1)
ualit Action Team ( AT) for the 0 erations Su ort Center In NRC Inspection Report Number 50-397/91-02 based on interviews with two OSC director-designees, st was observed that
ll
... based on the results of the OSC Director interviews, the licensee should consider whether corrective actions are necessary to ensure that the OSC can be effectively managed during an emergency.
Licensee CAR Number 91-0002 was initiated to address the OSC performance issues.
A equality Action Team ((AT) was selected to review the issues and make appropriate recommendations to
~
~
~
~
lant management.
The first meeting was held on November 25, 991, and the team is expected to, make its recommendations
. prior to June 1992.
The (AT has focused it's information gathering in three areas:
Facilities, Organization and Training.
The licensee indicated that the Team report is in draft and is expected to be completed and finalized on schedule.
(2)
Scenario Generator The licensee provided a project schedule for development of a
-"plant specific exercise scenario radiological data generation computer program."
The project was initiated in January 1992.
The scenario generator should enhance emergency preparedness training since it ;.llows.for production of more realistic radiological conditions "1n the plant and will model the plant source term and plant systems.
As with the (AT, the licensee indicated that this project is on schedule for completion as planned.
f.
Onsite Followu of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events at Power eac or ac>
s ies The licensee had no emergency events classified or declared since the previous routine emergency preparedness inspection.
The licensee had documented the review of an incident of March 8, 1992,
'herein a WNP-2 plant worker had been injured (NRC Event 22968).
The event was reviewed and the licensee's determination that the incident did not constitute an emergency event under NRC regulatory requirements and guidance appeared appropriate based on event circumstances.
3.
Follow-u on NRC Information Notice NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-32, dated April 29, 1992, Subject:
Problems Identified With Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Center, was addressed to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactor.
The licensee had not received a copy of the IN and was provided one by the inspe'ctor.
The licensee indicated that the notice will be thoroughly reviewed in that both the'OF and TSC for WNP-2 are located within 10 miles of the sit "9 4.
Follow-u on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a.
0 en)
Follow-u Item (91-33-01).
Emer enc Notification S stem annwfn al ure sn nnua xercsse b.
C.
During the 1991 Annual Emergency Exercise; it was noted at the TSC that the on-line Emergency Notification System (ENS) communicator with the NRC was unable to view status boards from his location and the line was left unmanned at times up to fifteen minutes while gathering requested data.
This was contrary to 10 CFR 50.72(c)(3),
which indicates that "Each licensee shall, during the course of the event:
Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC."
This request had been made by the NRC.
A review of this item during the previous inspection determined that the licensee has installed portable telephones for manning of the ENS and HPN during events.
Several of the EPIPs reviewed during this inspection contained procedural changes to address this stem.
This item will be reviewed during the 1992 annual emergency preparedness exercise.
(Exercise Observation)
Dose Pro 'ections for Future Offsite Releases It was observed during the 1991.Pgnual Emergency Exercise that approximately 45 minutes prior'to the termination of the exercise, following discussions with the NRC Site Team and Operations Center Staff, the Meteorology and Unified Dose Assessment Center (MUDAC)
staff performed a dose consequence assessment of a complete core damage scenario.
To perform this assessment, the MUDAC staff utilized the core inventory of radionuclides tabulated in Chapter
of the FSAR and attempted to estimate the response of the elevated release point monitor.
Rather than use the iterative process that was actually used, the MUDAC staff should have had a more efficient method for estimating the offsite consequence of a release of 100K of the core inventory.
Such a method would have facilitated smoother interaction with the NRC site team and operations center staff.
The licensee indicated that they are looking at several options to accomplish this type task and the'most promising one will be considered for implementation.
This item will be reviewed in the 1992 annual exercise.
(0 en)
Follow-u Item (92-05-01).
The tour of the Technical Support Center (TSC) indicated that previously identified conditions were rec'urring.
NRC Inspection Report Number 50-397/91-02, dated February 19, 1991, had indicated that the TSC did not appear in a state to be quickly and efficiently converted to an emergency facility.
The inspectors had also observed that there was a pool of standing water in the TSC instrument room.
The licensee determined that the water resulted'rom a leaking relief valve on a hot water heater located in the room.
The licensee's review concluded that the condition was a
safety concern and raised the priority of the repair work,
It was noted on=-this tour of the TSC that some desk clutter was.
still evident in the actively used office areas, but the TSC decision center area appeared cleared and ready for use as an emergency center.
The water heater relief valve was still leaking.
These observations appeared to indicate that TSC emergency readiness
-
may not have been receiving appropriate attention as an emergency facility.
Preparation and activation of the TSC will be observed during the 1992 annual emergency exercise.
d.
(0 en}
Follow-u Item (92-05-02).
One item identified by the licensee's 1991 annual audit is being tracked by NRC as an inspection followup item (IFI).
The audit report found that the Agreement Letter between the Washington Public Power Supply System and the State of Washington Department of Emergency Preparedness and Response had exp>red and a replacement letter had not yet been approved.
During this inspection the licensee indicated that the parties to the agreement have set a 90 day target date as of the'eek of this inspection for execution of the letter.
In that this is an emergency plan requirement, the item will be tracked until an appropriate letter is promulgated.
5.
Ex'.t Interview.
wgP I'I Ic On May 15, 1992, at the conclusion of the site visit the inspector met with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 above to summarize the scope and the preliminary results of this inspection.
The inspector reviewed the issues and followup items discussed in paragraph 2 above and the licensee indicated that they would review improvements to their procedures and performanc ~ l
j