IR 05000390/2025002
| ML25220A293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/2025 |
| From: | Renee Taylor NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB5 |
| To: | Erb D Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2025002 | |
| Download: ML25220A293 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2025002 AND 05000391/2025002
Dear Delson Erb:
On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. On July 30, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Chris Reneau, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. These two findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
August 13, 2025
Sincerely, Ryan C. Taylor, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000390 and 05000391 License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96
Enclosure:
As stated,
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000390 and 05000391
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000390/2025002 and 05000391/2025002
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-002-0021
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority
Facility:
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Location:
Spring City, Tennessee
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2025 to June 30, 2025
Inspectors:
J. Copeland, Reactor Inspector
W. Deschaine, Senior Project Engineer
S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist
D. Restrepo, Resident Inspector
R. Wehrmann, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Ryan C. Taylor, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71152
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Maintain Quality of Lubricants Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000390,05000391/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.12 Inspectors identified two examples of a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, when the licensee failed to control the handling and storage of material in accordance with work instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. Specifically, the licensee failed to store lubricants in accordance with quality-related procedure NPG-SPP-04.003, Material Storage and Handling, to assure the lubricants were not deteriorated or beyond their shelf-life prior to use in safety-related equipment.
Failure to Control a Locked High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000390,05000391/2025002-02 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71124.01 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.11, "High Radiation Area," was identified when the licensee failed to lock the entrances to Unit 1 containment during flux mapping activities.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period shut down in Mode 5 to perform repairs on the main generator. On May 5, 2025, reactor start-up was performed. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on May 15, 2025, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On April 1, 2025, the unit entered end of life coastdown. On April 11, 2025, the unit was shut down for refueling outage 2R6. On May 13, 2025, reactor start-up was performed. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on May 16, 2025, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather, thunderstorms with expected high winds, on May 20, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)unit 2 residual heat removal in mode 5 with both trains in service for cooldown on April 12, 2025 (2)unit 1 residual heat removal in mode 3 after realignment for emergency core cooling standby on May 4, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)unit 2 pressurizer heater transformer rooms on April 22, 2025 (2)unit 2 upper containment on May 7, 2025 (3)unit 2 annulus on May 8, 2025 (4)unit 2 lower containment on May 8, 2025
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated external flooding mitigation protections in the auxiliary building elevation 737' on June 12, 2025.
===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities in Unit 2 during refueling outage U2R6 from April 21 to April 30, 2025.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:
1. Liquid Penetrant Examination
a.
2-062B-T336-9A, pipe to tee weld, ASME Class 1. This included a review of associated welding activities b.
2-062B-T336-13C, flange to pipe weld, ASME Class 1. This included a review of associated welding activities
2. Ultrasonic Examination
a.
FWS-021, pipe to elbow weld, ASME Class 2 b.
FWS-023, tee to elbow weld, ASME Class 2 c.
W01-02, reactor pressure vessel lower head circumferential weld, ASME Class 1 d.
W04-05, reactor pressure vessel lower middle shell to upper middle shell weld, ASME Class 1 e.
W09-10, reactor pressure vessel circumferential head to head weld, ASME Class 1 f.
WP-10-SE, pressurizer surge nozzle to safe end weld, ASME Class 1
3. Visual Examination
a.
RVNUT-09 through 14, reactor pressure vessel closure head nuts, ASME Class 1 b.
RVWASHER-09 through 14, reactor pressure vessel closure washers, ASME Class 1 PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection
Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:
1. Bare metal visual examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Closure
Head, ASME Class 1 PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees boric acid control program performance, which included the following activities:
1. Boric Acid Walkdown - Tuesday, April 22, 2025
2. Review of the following boric acid evaluations (by condition report number):
a.
===1896946 b.
1940518 c.
1940610 d.
1941407 e.
1982184
3. Review of the following corrective actions performed for evidence of boric acid
leaks that were identified (by condition report number):
a.
2008074 b.
2008094 c.
2008095 PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Section 03.04)===
The inspectors verified that the licensee is monitoring the steam generator tube integrity appropriately through a review of the following examinations:
1. Steam Generator 2 - Eddy Current Testing (ECT) for tubes R96C83,
R101C76
2. Steam Generator 4 - ECT for tube R101C64, R102C67
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during unit 2 shutdown on April 11, 2025
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training for crew 3, cycle 25-02 on June 10, 2025
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) A-A shutdown board room chiller failure to start as documented in condition report (CR) 2008309 on April 23, 2025
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
(1)a review of implementation of NPG-SPP-04.003, Material Storage and Handling, in the lube oil dispensing room and Level B storage area
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)unit 2 elevated risk due to 125V vital battery charger and battery board 1 outage, April 2-3, 2025 (2)unit 2 yellow shutdown risk for RCS partial draindown, April 14-15, 2025 (3)unit 1 and Unit 2 during 2B shutdown board outage, April 23-24, 2025 (4)unit 1 and Unit 2 transition from mode 5 to mode 1 during the week of May 4-10, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)valve not installed in accordance with WBN-24-036 under CR 2004822 on April 8, 2025
- (2) CR 2016157, B main control room chiller has erratic operation of hot gas bypass and large expansion valve on May 27, 2025
- (3) A-A ERCW pump troubleshooting due to inability to develop required discharge head as documented in CR 2017043 on May 31, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)480V electrical board room HVAC procedurally controlled temporary modification
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated unit 1 main generator forced outage activities from April 1 to May 11, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated unit 2 refueling outage 2R6 activities from April 11 to May 14, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) WO 124137225, Replace WBN-2-RFV-0662-S, CVCS letdown relief header relief valve on May 4, 2025
- (2) WO 125310247, Replace 2-FCV-67-105; it failed post local leak rate test at 85.83 standard cubic feet per hour on May 8, 2025
- (3) WO 124947738, Replace lower compartment cooler motor on May 11, 2025
- (4) WO 123733399, Install rebuilt seal on #3 RCP on May 11, 2025
- (5) WO 123733691, Replace 2-RFV-068-0564 pressurizer safety valve on May 12, 2025
- (6) WO 125327134, Unit 2 N41 AFD step change following restoration for trip setpoint adjustment on May 14, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)2-SI-0-53.2-B, Remote Shutdown Transfer Switch Verification Outage Performance - Train B on April 13, 2025 (2)0-SI-82-6, Loss of Offsite Power with Safety Injection Test - DG 2B-B on April 14, 2025 (3)2-SI-61-5, 18 Month Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors Inspection on May 9, 2025 (4)2-SI-68-301, Cross Calibration of RCS Temperature Sensors Using RTD Cross Calculation - DAQ on May 12, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)2-SNUB-063-0504 failed on high drag, on April 22, 2025, under CR 2008000 and WO
===125273967
- (2) A-A ERCW Pump failed to develop required total dynamic head per 0-SI-67-901-A as documented in CR 2017043 on May 31, 2025 Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01)===
(1)local leak rate test on unit 2 penetration X-91, on April 22, 2025
Ice Condenser Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)unit 2 Ice Basket Weighing per 2-SI-61-2, under WO 124183014
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)elevated RCS leakage on Unit 1, under CR 2014434 on May 19, 2025
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) B 480V FLEX Diesel Generator testing on May 21, 2025
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) On May 28, 2025, inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill which included the following: elevated turbine generator vibrations result in a manual reactor trip, during response a loss of offsite power occurs coincident with a loss of the 1B-B shutdown boards, subsequently a LOCA occurs and the inability to transfer to cold leg recirc, elevated radiation levels along with loss of reactor vessel level requires the declaration of a General Emergency.
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
(1)licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA)
(2)control of non-fuel material stored in the spent fuel pool
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
(1)unit 2 reactor vessel head lift, from cavity to stand (2)work in the Unit 2 transfer canal (3)trash consolidation on the refuel floor (4)steam generator nozzle dam removal High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas (HRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs):
(1)tritiated drain collector tank room locked HRA (LHRA)
(2)unit 2 keyway entrance VHRA (3)waste packaging area LHRA Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
(1)control room emergency ventilation system, train A, May 22, 2024
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) high-efficiency particulate air temporary filtration system # 700-13, decontamination room
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry.
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:
(1)internal dose assessment exposure, November 5, 2024 (2)internal dose assessment exposure, April 15, 2025 (3)tritium in-vitro bioassay for four workers between January to March 2025
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) reviewed exposure record for one declared pregnant worker (June 2024)
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
(1)personnel contamination monitors at the RCA exit (2)portal monitors at the RCA exit (3)small article monitors at the RCA exit
- (4) Ludlum Model 3030P alpha-beta sample counter in the instrumentation room.
(5)portable ion chamber survey meter 'ready for use' in the instrumentation room.
(6)portable Telepole radiation survey meter 'ready for use' in the instrumentation room (7)area radiation monitors (ARMs) in auxiliary building and main control room (8)continuous air monitors (CAMs) in the auxiliary building and spent fuel pool floor (9)gamma spectroscopy equipment and liquid scintillation counters in the chemistry count room
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (13 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
(1)unit 1 upper containment high range ARM, 1-RE-90-271, March 28, 2023, and January 7, 2025 (2)unit 1 lower containment high range ARM, 1-RE-90-273, May 1, 2023, and November 18, 2024
- (3) Ludlum Model 12 general purpose survey meter (TVA no. 848523) with 43-92 alpha scintillation detector (TVA no. 848523), November 21, 2024
- (4) Mirion TelePole II survey meter, TVA no.952195, September 26, 2024
- (5) Ludlum Model 3 frisker, TVA no. 952067, July 26, 2024
- (6) ORTEC Standfast II whole body counter, TVA no. 03, March 7, 2024
- (7) Canberra GEM-5 personnel monitor, TVA no. 848513, July 14, 2024
- (8) Thermo Fisher Scientific SAM-12 small article monitor, TVA no. 848507, July 1, 2024
- (9) Canberra ARGOS-5AB personnel contamination monitor, TVA no. 848220, March 12, 2025 (10)main control room area radiation monitor, 0-RE-90-135, March 4, 2024
- (12) Ludlum Model 3030P alpha-beta sample counter, TVA no. 848558, March 20, 2025
- (13) Sartex Model 309B(LD) portable tritium air monitor, TVA no. 842486, August 27, 2024 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
(1)unit 1 shield building vent radiation monitor, 1-RE-90-400, 01/16/2024 and 03/02/2022 (2)liquid radwaste discharge effluent monitor, 0-RE-90-122, 07/30/2024 and 03/27/2023
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following abnormal discharges:
- (1) loss of pressure in waste gas decay tanks, F, G, and H, 02/11/2025 - 02/15/2025
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15)===
- (1) November 9, 2024 through April 30, 2025 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) November 9, 2024 through April 30, 2025
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) CR 2011839, Advanced Rad Worker Requirement
- (2) CR 2005880, Unit 2 Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors Found not Fully Opening
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in procedure use and adherence that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain Quality of Lubricants Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000390,05000391/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.12 Inspectors identified two examples of a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, when the licensee failed to control the handling and storage of material in accordance with work instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. Specifically, the licensee failed to store lubricants in accordance with quality-related procedure NPG-SPP-04.003, Material Storage and Handling, to assure the lubricants were not deteriorated or beyond their shelf-life prior to use in safety-related equipment.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed the storage of lubricants for which either the manufacturer or the licensee specified a shelf life. Quality-related procedure NPG-SPP-04.003, Material Storage and Handling, Attachment 1, Storage Levels, Section 2.0, Storing Material Issued to Plant Organizations, states, in part:
Staging area owners are responsible for maintaining proper storage levels and monitoring for shelf-life expiration until the material is installed. Verification of storage level conditions shall be provided by calibrated temperature recorders and shall be documented and maintained by staging area owners.
Example 1: Control of shelf life and condition of lubricating oils:
Inspectors identified 10 Items designated as Q2 (commercial graded dedicated for safety related use) in the lube oil dispensing room that were issued over one year prior and were either opened or transferred to storage containers with open vents. The affected items are listed below:
1. Item ID CAT406M, stored in Tank 1-batch 70196261, Received 05/05/2017; Tank 10-
batch 70295836 issue date 02/25/2020
2. Item ID CAT418D, stored in Tank 3 with the following issue ticket UTC 0000058169,
printed 04/07/03; Tank 11 Lot 761433 with issue date of 9/18/2019
3. Item ID CBV241F, stored in two 55-gallon drums, from the manufacturer: shelf life
greater than 3 years if stored between 15°C and 30°C (59°F and 86°F) for closed drum with original seal
4. Item ID CAT081D, stored in Tank 5 has issue ticket with lot number 613856 and
manufacture date 06/16/2014.
5. Item ID CAP373Q, stored in Tank 20 has issue ticket with lot number 544849,
manufacture date of 04/03/2013; Tank 22 has issue ticket with lot number 278709, and manufacture date of 6/24/2011.
6. Item ID CAT404R stored in multiple opened 5-gallon pails with receipt dates of
03/14/2017, and 10/10/2019.
7. Item ID CND014M, 5-gallon pails with trace 6252871 with expiration date of
06/30/2024, and trace 5838014 with expiration date 09/30/2023.
8. Item ID SF1145, in 2 five-gallon pails with a listed shelf-life of 4 years per label, cure
date of August 2012.
9. Item ID CAT402X, stored in a 5-gallon pail, has a specified shelf-life of 10 years, trace
221687, and a manufacture date of 03/02/2011.
Inspectors also observed seven transfer containers partially filled with either no date on the label or dates greater than one year.
The TVA Procurement Engineering Group (PEG) shelf-life evaluations in the Inventory Module in MAXIMO for each of the items listed above, state, in part: Recommend TVA Level B storage. Recommended Shelf Life (SL) of 10 years for unopened containers.
Recommended Shelf Life for 1 year for open containers. For instance, where a shelf-life extension is needed the lubricant can be tested utilizing the complete CGD testing for the item. This testing will meet the intent of P.S.4.M.1.5 and EPRI 1022959 by providing confidence that the lubricant is still acceptable for use. PEG approves an SL extension of 1 year with performance of this testing in accordance with the PDS requirements. Except for emergent situations coupled with PEG approval the SL of lubricants may only be extended one time utilizing this process. The evaluation lists TVA supply chain review (SCR) 125555 as the basis for the shelf-life determination. Contrary to the aforementioned requirement, documented shelf-life extensions for the above oils could not be located.
For Level B storage, NPG-SPP-04.003 requires, in part: The area shall be provided with uniform heating and temperature control or its equivalent to prevent condensation and corrosion. Minimum temperature shall be 40 degrees Fahrenheit and maximum temperature shall be 140 degrees Fahrenheit or less if so stipulated by a manufacturer.
Contrary to the above, inspectors identified temperature monitoring as required by NPG-SPP-04.003 was absent.
Example 2: Control of shelf life and condition of greases:
The inspectors noted that, once greases were issued from the warehouse to in plant organizations, the quality of the storage conditions was not maintained to ensure the life of the greases were not degraded. The lube oil dispensing room was not a designated Level B storage location that was controlled in accordance with NPG-SPP-04.003.
NPG-SPP-04.003, Attachment 3, Shelf-Life/In-Storage Maintenance, Section 3.2.B, states in part: Shelf life for QA-1 Safety Related items should be set to the manufacturer/supplier recommendation. Inspectors found the following examples contrary to the aforementioned requirements:
- The manufacturers of MOV long life and Mobil Grease specified that the established life was approximately five years dependent on if the containers were unopened and stored around 68°F to 74°F. The inspectors noted that, in the lube oil dispensing room, temperatures exceeded this requirement such that the greases could degrade.
- CJJ799X, MOV long life, Q1 (safety related use), was observed in 2 five-gallon pails with a manufacture date 10/26/2017, and an expiration date of 08/31/2022.
- CAN761L, Mobil grease, Q2, has a specified 5-year shelf life from date of manufacture.
Multiple containers were found with manufacture dates greater than five years ago.
- A box of Conoco Phillips Multiplex Red #2, labeled for EOP use, was untagged.
Additionally, the greases were separating from the lithium base and had soaked through the cardboard packaging.
- The Inspectors found the grease used for safety related components were checked out from the warehouse and stored in the lube oil dispensing room unsealed without proper environmental controls before placement in their final locations i.e. in the components that required their application. Specifically, no evidence of the maintenance of the shelf-life of the greases, records of inspections of the storage area, or segregation of the materials that were expired were found.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program to restore compliance. On February 26, 2025, the licensee posted the lube oil dispensing room as a level B storage area. Additionally, the licensee removed the expired lubricants from the lube oil dispensing room on June 26, 2025.
Corrective Action References: CR 1974324, CR 1984774, CR 2011805
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to store lubricants in accordance with quality-related procedure NPG-SPP-04.003 to assure they were not degraded or beyond their shelf life prior to use in safety-related equipment was a performance deficiency within ability of the licensee to foresee and prevent.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee failed to demonstrate that the properties of lubricants (oils and greases) are not adversely affected by the storage conditions in the lube oil dispensing room and that if used in the plant on systems that respond to initiating events, there would not be an adverse impact to reliability. The licensee had no further barriers to prevent the use of lubricants that did not meet their quality assurance requirements from being installed into the plant. This is similar to example 5.c in IMC 0612 Appendix E.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Exhibit 2, A.1.The finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of mitigating SSCs, however the SSCs maintained their operability and PRA functionality therefore the finding screens to Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, when transferring control of lubricants from the warehouse to in plant organizations there were not positive controls established to ensure that storage conditions and shelf-life requirements were met.
Enforcement:
Violation: Appendix B, to 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, requires, in part that, Measures shall be established to control the handling and storage of material in accordance with work instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. When necessary for particular products, special protective environments such as specific moisture control and temperature levels shall be specified and provided.
Quality-related procedure NPG-SPP-04.003, Material Storage and Handling, section 2.0 Storing Material Issued to Plant Organizations states, in part, that:
Staging area owners are responsible for maintaining proper storage levels and monitoring for shelf-life expiration until the material is installed. Verification of storage level conditions shall be provided by calibrated temperature recorders and shall be documented and maintained by staging area owners.
Contrary to the above, from initial license until February 26, 2025, the licensee failed to store lubricants in a manner to provide assurance that they were not degraded or beyond their shelf life prior to use in safety-related equipment.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Control a Locked High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000390,05000391/2025002-02 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71124.01 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.11, "High Radiation Area", was identified when the licensee failed to lock the entrances to Unit 1 containment during flux mapping activities.
Description:
On May 19, 2025, the licensee performed routine flux mapping activities as part of Unit 1 start-up. This involved manipulating the incore detectors, so they traversed vertically through the core, and resulted in elevated dose rates in Unit 1 lower containment near the seal table area. Maximum dose rates seen on area radiation monitor 1-RM-90-61 during this evolution were 9.36 Rem/hour at approximately 8 feet from the source. As described in licensee procedure RCI-162, "Control of Radiological Work", an administrative hold had been placed on this work activity that required the main control room to contact the Radiation Protection (RP) Shift Supervisor (RPSS) prior to commencement of flux mapping, so that the entrances to containment could be locked and the postings upgraded from High Radiation Area to Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA). Instead, main control room staff contacted an RP technician to inquire if everyone had been evacuated from lower containment, then removed the administrative hold and proceeded with flux mapping. Afterward, main control room staff notified the RPSS that movement of incore detectors was complete, at which point the RPSS identified that the required locks and LHRA postings had not been utilized. The licensee performed surveys of the area after the fact and confirmed that dose rates had returned to normal levels. A review of card reader access records showed that no individuals entered the affected areas in lower containment during the time period when dose rates were elevated.
Corrective Actions: The licensee took immediate corrective actions including suspension of clearance rights for certain control room staff and changes to clearance procedures for flux mapping, to clarify communication expectations between groups. Planned corrective actions include placement of a physical locking system on the control room incore movement control panel.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report (CR) 2014729
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to lock the entrances to containment during flux mapping activities, as required by TS 5.11 and licensee procedures, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Program & Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, if procedural guidance for flux mapping activities is not clear to all groups involved then adequate controls for LHRAs might not be implemented and unintended doses could occur.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. Specifically, the event did not involve ALARA planning, did not result in an overexposure, there was no substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. The two work groups involved, Operations and RP, did not communicate and coordinate their activities in an effective manner.
Enforcement:
Violation: Licensee TS 5.11.2 states that high radiation areas with dose rates exceeding 1 rem/hour at 30 cm from the radiation source shall be provided with a locked or continuously guarded door or gate. Contrary to this, on May 19, 2025, during flux mapping activities that created dose rates in lower containment exceeding 1 rem/hour at 30 cm, the entrances to containment were not locked or continuously guarded.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation (EAF-RII-2025-0148)71152A This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2)(i) states, in part, that, a holder of a nuclear power reactor license under this part shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the planning standards of § 50.47(b). Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15)requires, in part that the emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following standard: Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency. Similarly, planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)requires, in part, that, the emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following standard: On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available, and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
Contrary to the above, intermittently from 2015 to May 8, 2025, the licensee failed to follow and maintain an effective emergency plan that met the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) and (b)(2) in that they failed to provide radiological emergency response training to those required to assist in an emergency and they failed to maintain adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the required training qualifications and minimum staffing levels for the advanced radiation worker position, as specified in the facilitys emergency plan implementing procedures.
Significance/Severity: Green. Using IMC 0609 Attachment 4, this issue affects the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone since it is a failure to comply with a planning standard.
Per Table 3, the inspector is directed to IMC 609 Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process. Using Table 5.2-1 - Significance Examples
§50.47(b)(15), Emergency Responder Training, this issue screened as Green because it aligned with an example of a Degraded PS FUNCTION since it involved lapsed training of staff maintained on the emergency response organization duty roster who were relied upon to respond during an emergency.
Corrective Action References: CR 2011839 Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution Process: VLSSIR 480V Electrical Board Room HVAC Temporary Modification not meeting Design Bases 71111.18 This issue is a current licensing basis question and inspection effort is being discontinued in accordance with the Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution (VLSSIR) process. No further evaluation is required.
Description:
Inspectors reviewed the compensatory actions and procedurally controlled temporary modification for loss of B train 480V electrical board room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (480V EBR HVAC), as documented in 0-SOI-30.07, Shutdown Board Rooms HVAC Elevation 757 & 772. No relevant Engineering Change Package (ECP) was found.
0-SOI-30.
notes state, in part, that:
1) The following actions will permit the plant to continue to operate at full power for the duration of the event (maximum of 30 days) without exceeding the design temperature for this area per Technical Requirement 3.7.5.
2) Only ONE out of four 480V Shutdown Board Room HVAC subsystems is assumed to be out of service at any given time.
3) These compensatory measures are justified by design output from SDD-N3-30AB-4001 Section 4.18 which was added by DCN 30327.
This attachment is a Procedurally Controlled Temporary Modification (PCTM). If the technical content of the attachment changes, then this procedure will need to be reviewed by engineering, require an update to the TE/50.59 associated with the ECP, or a new ECP.
Design Change Notice (DCN) 30327 documented that the compensatory measures were only required for loss of A train cooling as B train would be adequately cooled by partial cooling supplied by A train to the B train room. DCN 50508 amended DCN 30327 and states in part that:
Operator intervention is required to ensure that the compensatory actions are performed in the event of the inoperability of a Train B A/C subsystem due to an equipment failure of preventative maintenance shutdown.
Since the dedicated breakers for temporary fans are located in the Train A 480V Board rooms, it also will be necessary to open doors A 180 and A 193 between Train B and adjacent Train A roomsThese fire doors must be kept open until the inoperable A/C system is restored to its operable status and therefore, for the duration of the event, the fire watch(s) shall be in place, in accordance with the plant Fire Protection Report and SPP-10.9, "Control of Fire Protection Impairments".
Station logs documented the installation of the procedurally controlled temporary modification on March 2023. The temporary modification was intermittently in service through March 30, 2025. Station logs and condition reports documented several times temperatures in the 480V EBR exceeded Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Section 3.7.5 normal limits with the temporary modification installed.
- June 15, 2024, the station entered TRM 3.7.5 Condition A due to exceeding limits in the 2B2 480V EBR for greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- June 26, 2024, the station entered TRM 3.7.5 Condition A due to exceeding limits in the 2A2 480V EBR for greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- June 27, 2024, the station entered TRM 3.7.5 Condition A due to exceeding limits in the 1A2 480V EBR and the 125V vital battery charger for greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- June 27, 2024, CR 1940462 documented that the 1B-B 480V EBR air-conditioning unit was not cooling properly and was declared non-functional.
- June 29, 2024, station logs and CR 1941022 documented that the already installed compensatory measures for the A-train were transferred to the B train.
- July 9, 2024, CR 1942691 documented that the 480V EBR HVAC compensatory measures were ineffective to maintain temperatures in the 1B board room.
- August 9, 2024, CR 1951189 documented that with the compensatory measures installed the 2A board room was not being adequately cooled.
- September 16, 2024, the licensee documented that the scheduled work for the 2B 480V EBR chiller was not performed due to the 2A 480V EBR chiller being tagged out since May 28, 2024.
TRM 3.7.5 states, in part, that normal temperature limits of each area shown in Table 3.7.5-1 shall not be exceeded for greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; Table 3.7.5-1 defines the normal limit for the 480 Volt EBRs as less than or equal to 83°F.
TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, Section 7.0, Design Control, states, in part, that: The QA program requires that measures shall be established and documented to ensure that applicable specified design requirements, such as design bases, regulatory requirements, and codes and standards, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, or instructions.
The requirements specified in DCN 30327 and as amended by DCN 50508, were partially translated into SDD-N3-30AB-4001 and 0-SOI-30.07. Specifically, while the DCNs specify that the temporary configuration is allowed for up to 30 days and that only one train of 480V is permitted to be out of service at a time. Those requirements were not translated into the design outputs SDD-N3-30AB-4001 and 0-SOI-30.07.
Licensing Basis: Watts Bar Nuclear Stations Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
Section 9.4.3.2.5, "Auxiliary Board Rooms Air-Conditioning Systems," states, in part, that the auxiliary building electrical boards, located on floor elevation 772.0, are separated into two sub-areas per unit corresponding to train A and train B emergency power. Four separate air-conditioning systems are provided, one to serve each of the four board room sub-areas.
Additionally, following an accident, the electrical boards in either sub-area have the capability to support a safe shutdown of the unit. Because each sub-area is served by an attendant air-conditioning system sized to remove 100% of the heat produced by electrical equipment in that sub-area, full redundancy is provided.
UFSAR Section 8.3.2.2, "Analysis of Vital 125V DC Control Power Supply System," states, in part, that the batteries are located in separate rooms, and the chargers are located in groups of three in separate room at Elevation 772 of this same building. Therefore, this equipment will not be exposed to hostile environments and, since it is outside the primary containment area, it will not be exposed to significant radiation due to a LOCA.
Based on the above there is ambiguity in the design bases based on the differing descriptions of the Vital DC system and the air conditioning system.
Significance: For the purpose of the VLSSIR process, the inspectors screened the issue of concern through IMC 0609, Appendix A Exhibit 2 Section A Questions 1 through 6 would all be answered NO; therefore, the issue would screen to Green having a performance deficiency been identified.
Technical Assistance Request: As the current licensing basis for this facility cannot be determined without substantial further research and the significance for the associated issue of concern is not greater than a very low level the inspection effort is being discontinued in accordance with the VLSSIR process, and a technical assistance request (TAR) has not been initiated.
Observation: Unit 2 Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors found not fully Opening 71152A On April 12, 2025, at 04:16 Watts Bar unit 2 entered Mode 5. Initial inspections by the system engineer were performed in the lower ice condenser the following dayshift. These inspections noted that 18 of the 48 ice condenser inlet doors were not cable of fully opening under a light pull force. 15 of these doors were identified as being obstructed by ice buildup in front of the doors. One of the remaining doors was constrained by loose sheet metal and the final two doors were constrained by sheet metal screws which had backed out. Operations declared the doors inoperable on April 12. The licensee concluded the there was no firm evidence of the lower inlet being inoperable prior to the time of discovery on April 12, and since, on April 12, the unit was in Mode 5 and TS 3.6.12 only applies in Modes 1 through 4, noncompliance was not identified for inoperability of the inlet doors. After comparing the as found engineering inspections with the TS required surveillance requirements (SRs), the inspectors cannot conclude that the doors would not pass SR 3.6.12.4 or 3.6.12.5 which verify the required torque to cause each inlet door to operate. The engineer stated the initial inspections opened each door with two fingers then stopped as soon as resistance was met. Based on this description it is not clear if the doors would have opened if the allowed torque in the acceptance criteria of these surveillances had been applied. Per IMC 0309, Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Power Reactors, the NRC considered whether this inspection sample should be the subject of a reactive inspection and determined that a reactive inspection was not necessary, as documented in ML25132A008.
Observation: Procedure Use and Adherence Issues 71152S During a review of corrective action program documentation for the period of January 2025 through June 2025 inspectors identified a potential adverse trend with procedure use and adherence.
CR 1989952 written February 5, 2025, documented that the Unit 2 South Valve Vault Room had exceeded its maximum temperature limit for the three previous shifts. 2-PI-OPS-1-AB "Auxiliary Building / Radwaste AUO Workstation Responsibilities Section 7.0 Performance states, in part, that: "Noted and out of limit data shall be reviewed by the Unit Supervisor and corrective action taken when required." Additionally, Attachment 1 "AB/RW Rounds Basis Document states for the South Valve Vault Room the Basis is: "Inspect for water/steam leaks, unusual noise, temperature <140 for MSIV operability." OPDP-1 "Conduct of Operations" Section 3.7.1 "Log Keeping Operations" F. states: "Capture in the narrative log including critical thinking in sufficient detail to accurately categorize system and component operability and availability in accordance with OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and Limiting Conditions for Operations."
CR 2004285 written April 6, 2025, documented inspectors questioning procedure adherence to 0-TI-31.02, Specifically, CR 2003372 documented that vibrations were in the "ALERT" range for A Train Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment system. The last statement of the CR says, This equipment should be able to perform its intended function at this time and normal scheduled vibration checks should continue to be trended." The inspectors questioned whether this aligned with the guidance from 0-TI-31.02 section 7.2 [2] C. which states: "If the vibration amplitude is in the ALERT range, THEN increase the monitoring frequency for each machine in this range."
CR 2016889 written May 30, 2025, documented inspectors identifying a scaffold built that was contrary to the requirements of MMTP-102 without a fire impairment as required by NPG-SPP-18.4.6. Specifically, the scaffold was within three feet of a fire suppression nozzle.
This configuration required that a fire impairment be entered, or engineering evaluation be generated to address the location of the scaffold. Subsequently the licensee reconfigured the scaffold and developed an engineering evaluation for the scaffold configuration.
Based on the above examples there appears to be an adverse trend in procedure use and adherence; however, none of the identified examples were screened to be more than minor per IMC 0612, Issue Screening.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 30, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Chris Reneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 30, 2025, the inspectors presented the ISI inspection results to Chris Reneau, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 1, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Kevin Michael, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
1-SOI-74.01
Residual Heat Removal System
Revision 28
Procedures
2-SOI-74.01
Residual Heat Removal System
Revision 25
Fire Plans
RXN-2-702-01
Reactor Building Elevation 702 prefire plan
Revision 03
Fire Plans
RXN-2-713-01
Reactor Building Elevation 713 prefire plan
Revision 01
Fire Plans
RXN-2-757-01
Reactor Building Elevation 757 prefire plan
Revision 02
Procedures
0-AOI-7.01
Maximum Probable Flood
0010
Procedures
0-AOI-7.12
Extended Loss of All AC Power (ELAP) During Flood
Conditions
004
Procedures
0-MI-17.003
Flood Mode Preparation Storage Locations and Periodic
Inventory
0016
Procedures
0-MI-17.004
Movement of Equipment, Flood Mode Preparation
28
Work Orders
23467257
Perform Inspection of U1 and U2 Thermal Barrier Booster
Pump and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Flood Wall
Work Orders
24389246
Flood Mode Tool Boxes Inventory Inspection
Work Orders
24529717
Flood Mode Tool Boxes Inventory Inspection
Miscellaneous
Watts Bar U2R6 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment
Revision 0
NDE Reports
R-060
Ultrasonic Examination of Weld WP-10-SE
04/21/2025
NDE Reports
R-061
Visual Examination of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Closure
Head
04/20/2025
NDE Reports
R-080
Ultrasonic Examination of Weld W09-10
04/20/2025
NDE Reports
R-111
Ultrasonic Examination of Weld FWS-021
04/23/2025
NDE Reports
R-122
Ultrasonic Examination of Weld FWS-023
04/24/2025
NDE Reports
R-129
Visual Examination of Carbon Steel Reactor Vessel Washers
04/27/2025
NDE Reports
R-130
Visual Examination of Carbon Steel Reactor Vessel Nuts
04/27/2025
Work Orders
Work Orders (by
number)
23421125
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2005687
Unit 2 TDAFW pump started after receiving a start signal once
MFPT vacuum was broken
04/12/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2007680
Ice mass identified in unit 1 ice condenser bay 15/16
04/21/2025
Corrective Action
CR 2012243
Unit 1 manual turbine trip
05/10/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2012630
Unit 2 loss of seal injection flow/charging and AOI-20 entry
05/12/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2005724
Unit 2 'C' CRDM cooler has a coil leak. The leak is leaking
into containment.
04/12/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2009869
NRC identified loose/missing insulation in Unit 1 Containment
04/30/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2011994
What is acceptable leakage past a closed feedwater isolation
valve
05/09/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2006053
H-B ERCW Pump failed to start in Section 6.3 of 0-SI-82-6
04/14/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2011920
Flange leak on 2-FCV-67-105
05/09/2025
Engineering
Evaluations
WBR2501R1
AMS Onsite Report: Cross Calibration of Primary Coolant
RTDs at Watts Bar Unit 2
05/12/2025
Procedures
0-TI-68.018
RCS Leakage Monitoring and Action Plans
0000
Procedures
2-SI-32-701
Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Control Air
System
Revision 5
Procedures
2-SI-62-701
Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Chemical
and Volume Control System
Revision 6
Procedures
2-SI-67-701-C
Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Lower
Compartment ERCW
Revision 4
Procedures
2-SI-92-8
Power Range Overpower Trip High Range Bistable
Adjustment for Limiting Conditions for Operation
Revision 8
Procedures
NETP-125
0005
Work Orders
2-SI-0-53.2-B Remote Shutdown Transfer Switch Verification
Outage Performance - Train B
04/13/2025
Corrective Action
CR 2006743
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2007170
Procedures
NISP-RP-002
Radiation and Contamination Surveys
Revision 2
Procedures
O-TI-7.005
Storage of Material in the Spent Fuel Pool, Cask Pit, Transfer
Canal & New Fuel Vault
Revision 33
Radiation Surveys wbn-M-20250419-
U2R6 S/G 1 bowl survey
Radiation Surveys wbn-M-20250419-
U2R6 S/G 2 bowl survey
Radiation Surveys wbn-M-20250419-
U2R6 S/G 3 bowl survey
Radiation Surveys wbn-M-20250419-
U2R6 S/G 4 bowl survey
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2010268
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2007394
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2007265
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2010224
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2010234
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2006831
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2009920
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2010269
Radiation Surveys 20250217
Tritium air sample
Radiation Surveys G-20250215-082-
B
Gaseous release permit
Radiation Surveys G-20250215-083-
B
Gaseous release permit
Radiation Surveys G-20250215-084-
B
Gaseous release permit
Radiation Surveys G-20250215-085-
B
Gaseous release permit
Radiation Surveys G-20250217-030-
B
Gaseous release permit
Miscellaneous
REP-Appendix C
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan
Revision 117
Procedures
EPIP-14
Radiological Control Response
Revision 31