IR 05000387/2020001
| ML20126G434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/2020 |
| From: | Jon Greives Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4 |
| To: | Berryman B Susquehanna |
| Greives J | |
| References | |
| IR 2020001 | |
| Download: ML20126G434 (16) | |
Text
May 5, 2020
SUBJECT:
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 -
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2020001 AND 05000388/2020001
Dear Mr. Berryman:
On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. On April 17, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Kevin Cimorelli, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, X /RA/
Signed by: Jonathan E. Greives
Jonathan E. Greives, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000387 and 05000388 License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000387 and 05000388
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000387/2020001 and 05000388/2020001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0058
Licensee:
Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
Facility:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Berwick, PA
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020
Inspectors:
P. Boguszewski, Resident Inspector
L. Casey, Senior Project Engineer
N. Floyd, Senior Reactor Inspector
L. Micewski, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Rolph, Health Physicist
M. Rossi, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Jonathan E. Greives, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,
Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 98 percent power. The station had been requested by grid operator on November 21, 2019, to reduce power to approximately 1260 MWe, which corresponds to approximately 98 percent power, during a planned distribution line outage. This request is in place until further notice. On January 10, 2020, operators commenced end-of-cycle coast down for the remainder of the cycle. On March 27, 2020, operators commenced reducing power from 72 percent for a planned refueling outage. Unit 1 reached Mode 4 on March 28, 2020, and remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 98 percent power. The station had been requested by grid operator on November 21, 2019, to reduce power to approximately 1260 MWe, which corresponds to approximately 98 percent power, during a planned distribution line outage. This request is in place until further notice. On February 14, 2020, operators inserted a manual reactor scram due to degrading vacuum in the main condenser. Operators commenced a reactor startup on February 15, 2020, and returned the unit to 98 percent power on February 21, 2020. The unit remained at or near 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) during Unit 1 'B' core spray system outage window (SOW) on January 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) during reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) 24-month functional test on January 27, 2020
- (3) Unit Common, 'A', 'C', 'D' emergency diesel generator (EDG) during 'B' post maintenance testing on February 19, 2020
- (4) Unit 2, ECCS and Unit Common 'A' loop essential service water (ESW) during 'B' loop ESW weld repair on March 9, 2020
- (5) Unit 1, RCIC, core spray, and residual heat removal (RHR) systems during online HPCI logic functional testing on March 24, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit Common, standby gas treatment filter area (fire zone 0-30A) on January 22, 2020
- (2) Unit Common, engineered safeguards service water (ESSW) pumphouse (firezones 0-51 and 0-52) on February 6, 2020
- (3) Unit Common, diesel generator bay 'E' (fire zone 0-41E) on February 10, 2020
- (4) Unit 1, HPCI pump room (fire zone 1-1C) on February 26, 2020
- (5) Unit 1, division 2 lower relay room (fire zone 0-24D) on March 17, 2020
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill in the Unit 1 'B' core spray room on March 9, 2020.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room following Unit 2 reactor scram on February 14, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during start up following Unit 2 reactor scram on February 15, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulation of a steam leak in the drywell, coincident with the loss of several ECCSs, requiring emergency depressurization on February 3, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1, hydraulic control unit 50-27 high water alarms on February 18, 2020
- (2) Unit 2, drift trend in 'B' narrow range reactor vessel water level switch on March 20, 2020
- (3) Cooling water flexible tubing used for EDGs on March 25, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (1) Unit 2, yellow risk during automatic depressurization system (ADS) drywell permissive surveillance testing on January 10, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, ECCS protected during Unit 1 'B' core spray SOW on January 13, 2020
- (3) Unit 2, yellow risk during reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level functional testing and calibration on January 23, 2020
- (5) Unit Common, 'A', 'B' and 'D' EDGs protected during emergent repair on 'C' EDG on February 4, 2020
- (8) Unit 1, yellow risk during 0A10303 breaker maintenance on March 12, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1, HPCI static inverter failure on January 10, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, HPCI breaker difficult to close following preventive maintenance on January 21, 2020
- (3) Unit Common, past operabillity for linear indication on ESW pipe to 'B' EDG on February 27, 2020
- (4) Unit 2, 'B' narrow range reactor vessel water level switch found out of tolerance on March 3, 2020
- (5) Unit 1, instrument air with significant piping leak on the 1B air compressor on March 11, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Unit 1, 'B' core spray system outage window on January 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 2, RCIC system outage window on January 28, 2020
- (3) Unit Common, 'B' EDG mid-cycle overhaul on February 13, 2020
- (4) Unit 2, scram discharge volume valve stroke timing following repair of decoupled actuator on drain isolation valve on February 15, 2020 (5)
'B' loop ESW weld repair on March 9, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated cooldown and heatup and startup activities following a Unit 2 scram due to loss of condenser vacuum from February 14, 2020 to February 15, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 2, reactor pressure vessel level functional test and calibration on January 23, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, RCIC 24-month functional test from remote shutdown panel on January 27, 2020
- (3) Unit 2, division 2 RHR flow verification on February 13, 2020
- (4) Unit 2, rod block monitor and rod coupling testing on February 15, 2020
- (5) Unit Common, 'B' EDG analyzer and monthly operability run on February 19, 2020
- (6) Unit 1, online functional test of remote shutdown panel on March 24, 2020
- (7) Unit 1, loss of coolant accident with loss of offsite power surveillance test on March 31, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2, division 1 core spray quarterly flow surveillance test on January 2, 2020
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Tabletop exercise, radiological emergency due to reactor water cleanup leak concurrent with inability to close containment isolation valves on February 27, 2020 and March 11,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the controls for the following Locked High Radiation Areas in the Unit 1 reactor building:
- Reactor water clean up pump room
- Reactor water clean up heat exchanger room
The inspectors also evaluated the controls for the Very High Radiation Areas in the Unit 1 reactor building:
- Traversing incore probe room
- Drywell personnel entrance
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments for actual internal exposures:
- (1) Internal dose assessment performed on April 5, 2019, for an individual who received facial contamination on March 28, 2019. The individual was working in the control rod drive rebuild room.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019-December 31, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019-December 31, 2019)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019-December 31, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019-December 31, 2019)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019-December 31, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019-December 31, 2019)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Degraded bolts on the 'C' emergency service water pump
===71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) Unit 2, manual reactor scram in response to degrading main condenser vacuum on February 14,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: Degraded bolts on the C emergency service water pump 71152 The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Susquehannas causal evaluation and corrective actions associated with condition report CR-2019-13078 for degraded bolts discovered on the C emergency service water pump. Specifically, the pump failed its in-service test acceptance criteria for differential pressure during a flow verification test on August 28, 2019, and upon further investigation, Susquehanna staff discovered severely degraded bolts on the pump flange connections as well as separation of the pump casing.
Susquehanna staff replaced the C emergency service water pump and bolting hardware as an immediate corrective action and sent the bolting to a laboratory for failure analysis. The NRC previously reviewed the in-service testing data and documented a Green NCV because Susquehanna did not identify and evaluate the past surveillance test data. Further details on the violation can be found in IR 05000387, 05000388/2019004 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML20044E226). This inspection focused on Susquehanna staffs performance to evaluate the problem, identify the causes, and develop effective corrective actions for the degraded condition associated with the bolting hardware.
The inspectors interviewed Susquehanna staff, reviewed the chemistry treatment program and monitoring trends for the spray pond environment, and reviewed work orders for past pump overhauls, including pictures and associated condition reports. The inspectors conducted a walk down of the accessible portions of the ESW and RHR service water components in the pumphouse. The inspectors also independently examined portions of the bolting hardware, pump casing, and pump columns removed from the C ESW pump and the 2B RHR service water pump that were stored in the maintenance shop.
Susquehanna staff identified the decrease in differential pressure measured during pump testing was due to degraded bolting which led to the separation of the pumps flanged connection between the bottom column to top casing and protrusion of the supporting O-ring. Susquehanna staff determined the cause was the corrosion susceptibility of the carbon steel bolting in a raw water environment. Additionally, Susquehanna staff determined the corrosion was accelerated by galvanic interactions with silt, copper never-seize lubrication applied to the bolts, and alloy steel. As part of the extent of condition, Susquehanna staff considered all the pumps submerged in raw water at the plant and narrowed their review to the ESW pumps and RHR service water pumps because they were exposed to the same water environment (i.e. spray pond) with carbon steel hardware. Susquehanna staff removed the 2B RHR service water pump from service in December 2019, which was the next pump in service for the longest period to that point and performed an inspection to determine if a similar issue existed. Susquehanna planned additional corrective actions to review and update work orders with the appropriate use of never-seize compounds; review various corrosion prevention options with the pump vendor; develop a technical decision-making document to establish an appropriate frequency for pump overhauls; and if necessary, revise their cause evaluation based on further activities.
Based on direct observations of the removed hardware and a review of pictures from other pump overhauls, the inspectors did not conclude the copper never-seize lubrication accelerated the corrosion because the threads of the bolts and nuts where the lubrication was applied were largely unaffected while significant corrosion was present on the exposed surfaces of the hardware where there was no lubrication. The inspectors discussed this with Susquehanna engineering staff and acknowledged that further analysis by a laboratory and discussions with the pump vendor were in progress. The inspectors noted that there is an open corrective action to revisit the cause evaluation based on the inspection results of the 2B RHR service water pump, which is scheduled to be completed by June 2020. The inspectors determined Susquehannas overall and ongoing response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and included appropriate corrective actions.
However, during a review of the preventative maintenance strategy for the ESW pump, the inspectors identified that Susquehanna staff changed the frequency of pump overhauls from 10 years to 12 years as documented in AR-2018-12840, dated December 5, 2018. Procedure NDAP-QA-0415, Susquehanna Preventative Maintenance Program, Revision 10, requires the staff to evaluate applicable operating experience from past failures, vendor manual recommendations, and maintenance feedback. The inspectors reviewed previous work orders and pictures from overhauls on the other ESW pumps and identified that the A, B and D pumps displayed significant degradation after being in-service beyond 10 years.
Susquehanna staff documented severe corrosion of the pump hardware in a condition report for each of the occurrences, but they did not utilize this information in their decision to extend the overhaul frequency to 12 years.
The failure to properly consider plant operating experience when changing the preventative maintenance frequency was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Additional Issue Screening Guidance, because none of the screening questions were met. Specifically, the preventative maintenance change was a procedural error that did not result in the failure of the pump.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 17, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Kevin Cimorelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Fire Plans
"E" Diesel Generator Building Fire Zone 0-41E Elevation
656'-6", 675'-6", 708'-0"
Revision 7
HPCI Pump Room fire zone 1-1C Elevation 645'-0"
Revision 5
Corrective Action
Documents
AR-2020-00430
Provide Engineering Input to Support Reportability
Evaluation for CR-2019-15165
01/06/2020
CR-2020-01315
LISB212N024B SW1A Drift Trend
01/27/2020
Miscellaneous
NSEP-AD-0413D-
1, Attachment G
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Cause Determination
2/18/2019
Work Orders
Quarterly Calibration - Reactor Vessel Water Level
Channels
2/27/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-2020-00750
NRC comment relating to protected equipment postings
01/13/2020
CR-2020-00820
NRC comment relating to protected equipment postings
01/14/2020
Calculations
EC-PIPE-0799
RHR Service Water and ESW Inspection Thickness
Evaluations
Revision 2
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2019-15165
LIS-B21-2N024B SW#1A As Found reading was out of
acceptance criteria during SI-280-305
2/03/2019
CR-2020-02144
WO 2128103 after prepping the HRC-3 piping for welding a
crack like indication was found
2/11/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2020-02366
SDV drain valve XV247F011A remained closing during U2
2/14/2020
Procedures
SO-255-002
Quarterly SDV Vent and Drain Valves Operability Check
Revision 21
Procedures
SO-200-011
Reactor Vessel Temperature and Pressure Recording
Revision 28
Corrective Action
Documents
AR-2020-04494
Document Alternate Methodology for Satisfying Acceptance
Criteria under SO-124-117
03/31/2020
CR-2020-04496
Continuity was not lost as expected at the 1C222 Panel while
performing SO-124-117
03/31/2020
CR-2020-04497
During Loca loop testing DG recorders failed to record data
needed for acceptance criteria
03/31/2020
Procedures
ON-4KV-101
Loss of 4KV Bus
Revision 6
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ON-4KV-101
Loss of 4KV Bus
Revision 6
SO-124-117
Unit 1 Division 1 Diesel Generator LOCA LOOP Test
Revision 5
SO-124-117
Unit 1 Division 1 Diesel Generator LOCA LOOP Test
(Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution)
Revision 5
SO-149-019
On-Line Functional Test of RHR Loop A, Common, CIG, and
SRVs at 1C210B
Revision 2
SO-249-B02
Quarterly RHR System Flow Verification Div II
Revision 28
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2019 10684
Area Contamination Report (ACR)
CR 2019 12560
ACR U2 'B" RHR
CR 2019 13489
ACR Radwaste 660'
CR 2019 13731
ACR Unit 2 Reactor Building 645' RCIC
CR 2019 15229
Stop Work
CR 2019 15230
ACR Reactor Building 670' Floor Drain
CR 2019 15234
ACR Unit 1 Reactor Building 670'
CR 2019 15695
Stop Work
CR 2020 00414
Liquid Radioactive Waste Collection Tanks OP 302
CR 2020 00509
Valve Miss-position Liquid Radioactive Waste Effluent
Monitor
Radiation
Surveys
Unit 1
Reactor Building 799'
2/6/2019
29
Unit 1
Reactor Building 779'
11/7/2019
0840
Unit 1
Reactor Building 749/762'
11/26/2019
1000
Unit 1
Reactor Building 719'
10/28/2019
1405
Unit 1
Reactor Building 683'
10/29/2019
251
Unit 2
Reactor Building 799'
2/6/2019
0815
Unit 2
Reactor Building 779'
11/7/2019
1118
Unit 2
Reactor Building 749/763'
2/6/2019
0845
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Unit 2
Reactor Building 719'
11/26/2019
240
Unit 2
Reactor Building 683'
11/15/2019
200
Unit 2
Reactor Building 670'
11/7/2019
1015
Unit 2
Reactor Building 645'
11/19/2019
1530
Unit 2
Reactor Building 645' RCIC
2/6/2019
0300
Unit 2
Reactor Building 645' 'B' RHR
2/6/2019
0819
Unit 2
Reactor Building 645' HPIC
2/6/2019
0300
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2019 15625
Electronic Dosimeter Dose Rate Alarm
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-1518508
CR-1738058
CR-2014-26980
CR-2019-12789
CR-2020-00965
CR-2020-01129
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-2020-01495
NRC inspector identified a potential gap between the
adjustment plate and the coupling on 0P504D
01/30/2020
CR-2020-02289
NRC notified WCC of a Rad trash bin in U1 683' equipment
space with trash above the arresting lid
2/12/2020
CR-2020-02591
NRC walk down of B DG area
2/19/2020
CR-2020-03888
NRC concern regarding DR 174 being unlocked
03/17/2020
Work Orders
1948157
2139300
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2020-02350
U2 RPS Div 1 logic failed to reset post scram
2/14/2020
CR-2020-02354
During U2 loss of RCB transient ~75% of radio comms were
2/14/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
not received in the main control room
CR-2020-02366
SDV drain valve XV247F011A remained closed during U2
2/14/2020
CR-2020-02374
U2 Control rod 54-23 declared slow following performance of
SR-255-004 for plant scram
2/14/2020
CR-2020-02411
Continued U2 CRD Accumulator trouble alarms from U2 42-
2/15/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-2020-02404
NRC Question related to CR-2020-02305 U2 RPS Div 1 logic
failed to reset post scram
2/14/2020
Miscellaneous
OP-AD-327
A
Post Event Review Report for event # SC-02-20-01
2/14/2020
OP-AD-327
C
RPS Performance Review
2/14/2020